Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: North Korea

  • North Korea’s Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official

    On January 10th 2003 North Korea announced its intent to become the first country ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Though North Korean officials argued that its withdrawal was official immediately, according to Article X of the treaty the withdrawal was not official until today, three months after the notification was issued. This unfortunate event highlights the severe implications of the Bush administration’s refusal to engage North Korea diplomatically. It also draws attention to concerns about the uncertain future of the NPT regime.

    Under the NPT North Korea and other countries not possessing nuclear weapons at the time agreed not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons and the nuclear powers agreed to disarm and not to spread nuclear weapons to other states. Now that North Korea is officially not a party to the NPT, there are few legal obstacles preventing it from developing nuclear weapons and selling such weapons, technology and materials to other countries.

    North Korea had announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT regime once before in 1993. At that time the United States engaged in bilateral negotiations leading the DPRK to retract its withdrawal days before it officially went into effect.

    When North Korea again announced its withdrawal in January its statement of intent clearly called for further negotiation initiatives with the United States. These requests did not, however, result in the skillful diplomatic maneuvering that was employed during the 1993 crisis. Instead, the Bush administration has refused all requests for bilateral talks, urging a multilateral approach that has, thus far, proved entirely unfruitful.

    North Korea now joins India, Pakistan, Israel, as the only countries not currently within the NPT regime. Few of these countries have faced serious consequences for such remaining outside of the regime.

    Although some sanctions were originally imposed on India and Pakistan after they conducted nuclear tests in 1998, these sanctions have been largely abandoned. The nuclear status of India and Pakistan is increasingly accepted by the world’s major powers. They have been allowed to enter into certain international nuclear research institutions, from which they were previously excluded, and the U.S. is investigating ways to aid these countries in securing their nuclear arsenals.

    It currently appears unlikely that the U.N. Security Council will take any punitive action in response to North Korea’s NPT withdrawal. This seeming complacency of the international community in regards to nuclear proliferation begs the question: what is preventing other nuclear aspiring nations, such as Iran, from following North Korea’s lead and withdrawing from the NTP regime?

    As the United States continues to wage a pre-emptive attack on Iraq, in part due to Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programs, increasing alarm is voiced by other nations accused of such proliferation. It is likely that nations such as Iran will accelerate their nuclear weapons programs due to fears of such U.S. aggression. This is particularly so as the Bush administration continues to increase its emphasis on its own nuclear weapons technology, ignoring its disarmament obligations under Article XI of the NPT. Though these issues will likely be discussed at the upcoming preparatory meeting for the NPT Review Conference this May, the Bush administration is increasingly distancing itself from arenas pushing to find diplomatic solutions to the threat of weapons of mass of destruction.
    * Devon Chaffee is the research and advocacy coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • North Korea Incites More US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    David KriegerOn January 10th, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by stating, “North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. This kind of disrespect for such an agreement cannot go undealt with.” Dick Cheney opined that North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT “could undermine decades of non-proliferation efforts.”

    Yet, those who have read and understand the NPT appreciate that the treaty intertwines the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The one is dependent on the other. Since the US and the other declared nuclear weapons states have failed in their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, they should expect, sooner or later, that one result will be a breakdown of the NPT regime.

    The NPT was created in 1968 by the US, UK and Russia as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and, in return, the nuclear weapons states agreed to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    In the years since 1970 when the treaty entered into force, 187 countries have signed and ratified the treaty. All of these countries are non-nuclear except for the five declared nuclear weapons states (US, UK, France, Russia and China). The only four states that are not parties to the treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba, and Cuba has indicated its intention to join the treaty.

    India, Pakistan and Israel have all developed nuclear arsenals outside the framework of the treaty. India made clear for many years that it was willing to forego its nuclear option if the five declared nuclear weapons states would take seriously their obligations for nuclear disarmament. After years of waiting in vain for the implementation of serious nuclear disarmament efforts by the nuclear weapons states, India went nuclear in 1998 and Pakistan followed suit.

    In 1995 when the NPT was extended indefinitely, the declared nuclear weapons states promised “[t]he determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    In 2000, when the parties to the NPT held their sixth review conference, the nuclear weapons states again promised “[a]n unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament….” In addition to violating this obligation, the US has also withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after promising in 2000 that it would preserve and strengthen this treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability.”

    The US also agreed to apply the “principle of irreversibility” to nuclear disarmament, meaning that deactivated warheads would be destroyed. Instead of following this principle, however, the US pushed the Russians to agree to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that is based upon the opposite principle, that of reversibility. The US announced that at its discretion the strategic nuclear weapons taken off active deployment pursuant to the agreement would be kept in storage for potential future redeployment.

    After the US promised “the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” in 2000, the Bush administration has refused to re-send this treaty to the Senate for ratification (the Senate failed to ratify in 1999). The Bush administration has also sought to reduce the time needed to resume nuclear testing.

    Bush spokesperson Ari Fleischer commented on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “There is a light at the end of the tunnel, and that begins with North Korea’s immediately dismantling its nuclear weapons programs and coming into compliance with its obligations around the world.” The light at the end of the tunnel could also begin with the United States coming into compliance with its obligations around the world, starting with its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

    To defuse the current crisis with North Korea, the US should pursue a policy of engagement. It should accept North Korea’s offer to enter into negotiations for a non-aggression pact. The US should also offer to provide North Korea with additional development assistance to help them in building their economy and eliminating starvation.

    Assurances of peace and non-aggression on the Korean Peninsula would make all of North Korea’s neighbors more comfortable. Such assurances would also be an acceptable trade-off for North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency back into the country to verify the termination and dismantlement of any nuclear weapons program. These assurances would allow North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age.

  • Back to the Framework

    There is an eerie case of deja vu in Korea. Nearly nine years ago, President Kim Il Sung expelled international inspectors and threatened to process plutonium from spent fuel at an old graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The Clinton administration had rejected negotiations with North Korea, was contemplating a military strike to destroy the nuclear facility and was seeking U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. The North Koreans announced that such sanctions would be considered an act of war. It was clear the United States and South Korean militaries could prevail, but there would be massive casualties from the formidable ground forces of North Korea.

    As now, the isolated and economically troubled nation was focused on resolving basic differences with the United States. Deeply suspicious and perhaps paranoid, the North Koreans were demanding assurances against a nuclear attack and opportunities for normal bilateral relations.

    At the invitation of Kim Il Sung, and with the approval of the White House, I went to Pyongyang and negotiated directly with the man known as the “Great Leader.” He agreed to freeze the nuclear situation at Yongbyon and permit international inspectors to monitor the agreement. In return, the United States was to pledge that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea and that two modern light-water reactors would be built to replace the Yongbyon facility. In the meantime, a monthly supply of fuel oil would help provide electrical power. The subsequent death of Kim Il Sung, who was replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il, interfered with the more rapid timetable that we envisioned, but these nuclear proposals were accepted officially in the Agreed Framework, also involving South Korea and Japan.

    Kim Il Sung wanted to discuss long-term issues, with the goal of achieving normal relations between the Koreas and with America. He agreed to an immediate summit meeting with South Korea’s president to discuss cross-border visitation among Korean families and the implementation of general principles adopted in 1992 regarding reunification. His suggestions for future talks with the United States included cooperation in recovering the remains of U.S. soldiers, a step-by-step reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, with U.S. troops to be reduced in the same proportion, withdrawal of long-range artillery and other aggressive military forces from near the demilitarized zone, and mutual inspections to ensure the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

    Although the promised light-water reactors were not built, substantial progress was made between North Korea and the United States, illustrated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s successful discussions in Pyongyang.

    The Bush administration brought a change in relationship with both Koreas.

    Rejection of the “sunshine policy,” which had earned the Nobel Peace Prize for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung; announcements that North Korea, like Iraq and Iran, was part of an “axis of evil”; public statements that the new “Great Leader” was loathed as a “pygmy” who deliberately starved his own people, that America was prepared to fight two wars at the same time, and that our missile defense system was a shield against North Korea — all this helped cause many in that country to assume that they were next on America’s hit list after Iraq.

    With evidence that Pyongyang was acquiring enriched uranium, in direct violation of the Agreed Framework, President Bush announced that there would be no discussions with North Korea until after its complete rejection of a nuclear explosives program, and the monthly shipments of fuel oil were terminated.

    Now, once again, international inspectors have been expelled, and the North Koreans have announced they will no longer be bound by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or an agreement to forgo testing of ballistic missiles. This is a serious threat to regional and world peace. North Korea has offered inspectors from the United States access to its nuclear sites to confirm that they are not developing weapons, but only complete international monitoring can determine whether they have decided to develop a nuclear arsenal or are using threats as a ploy to promote bilateral agreements with the United States.

    It is clear that the world community cannot permit the North Koreans to develop a nuclear arsenal. They must be convinced that they will be more secure without nuclear weapons, and that normal diplomatic and economic relations with the United States are possible.

    The announced nuclear policies of North Korea and the American rejection of direct talks are both contrary to regional and global interests. Unfortunately, both sides must save face, even as the situation deteriorates dangerously.

    To resolve this impasse, some forum — perhaps convened by Russia or China — must be found within which these troubling differences can be resolved. The principles of the Agreed Framework of 1994 can be reconfirmed, combined with North Korea’s full and verifiable compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a firm U.S. declaration of nonaggression against North Korea, so long as all agreements are honored.

    Then perhaps the more far-reaching proposals discussed with Kim Il Sung can be implemented and a permanent peace can come to the reconciled Koreas.
    *Former president Carter is chairman of the Carter Center in Atlanta.

  • Iraq & North Korea Meeting the Challenge of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

    President Bush has adopted very different policies toward Iraq and North Korea, despite having provocatively labeled both countries part of the “Axis of Evil,” along with Iran. He has repeatedly threatened war if Iraq does not divulge and eliminate its purported weapons of mass destruction, has been moving US troops into the Gulf region to demonstrate the seriousness of his intent, has engaged in threatening practice bombing runs over Iraqi territory, and has been illegally arming and inciting opposition forces to initiate a civil war in Iraq. But, with regard to North Korea, which has now admitted to having a nuclear weapons program and is known to have advanced delivery systems, Bush has made clear that he prefers to rely on diplomacy over military action.

    Iraq appears to be cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors, while North Korea has asked the inspectors to leave its country and has given notice of its intent to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as is its legal right, in order to pursue, if it chooses, a nuclear weapons program free from treaty restraints. Why, then, is war the prospect for Iraq and diplomacy for North Korea?

    Bush seeks to justify the distinction by insisting that Iraq poses special dangers because it has invaded neighboring countries in the past and has previously used non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. This distinction, however, seems dubious, especially given past US policies. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 at the urging of the US, and the US was fully aware of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in its war against Iran and against the Kurds. At the time the US was supporting Iraq and even supplying it with many of the components needed to produce chemical and biological weaponry. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US ambassador at the time sent mixed signals, telling Saddam Hussein that its dispute with Kuwait was a matter of only regional concern.

    The two aggressive wars initiated by Iraq during Saddam’s rule both involve a measure of US complicity. Iraq has not acted aggressively toward neighbors during the past decade. Iraq fully understands that if it were to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction at this point it would face almost certain annihilation, and nothing in Saddam Hussein’s career, however brutal, suggests such irrationality. Indeed, the Baghdad regime has always given highest priority to its own survival and to that of the Iraqi state.

    The Bush administration has set itself up as the arbiter of who is and who is not allowed to possess weapons of mass destruction. This is not a strategy likely to succeed without giving American foreign policy a militarist character that includes being constantly prepared for warfare in remote parts of the world. In recent years, the US failed to stop India and Pakistan from developing and possessing nuclear weaponry. Nor did it act to prevent Israel from developing its own nuclear arsenal, and even appears to have supported Israel’s program in various ways. At a minimum, the US certainly turned a blind eye toward this dangerous addition to the nuclear weapons club. Bush has chosen to continue these policies, which predate his presidency, despite his seeming preoccupation with nuclear proliferation.

    The Arab world is keenly aware that the US has adopted very different standards for Iraq and North Korea, and also with respect to Iraq and Israel. There is no acceptable explanation of this double standard other than the strategic opportunism of Washington.

    Is the real rationale for the policy that the US doesn’t want unpredictable leaders to develop nuclear arsenals? Doubtful, because North Korea, Pakistan and Israel each currently have unpredictable leaders.

    Is the policy that the US will only allow its allies to develop nuclear arsenals? Also doubtful, because North Korea, India and Pakistan are not properly regarded as allies, although Pakistan has temporarily shifted its alignment due to pressure from Washington in the aftermath of September 11th.

    Is the policy that the US will use the suspected development of weapons of mass destruction as an excuse to intervene in a country that sits on large oil reserves? One cannot help feeling that oil is a major economic and strategic interest that helps explain why the Bush administration seems so intent on waging war against Iraq as a prelude to regime change. There may be other political and strategic motivations as well, including the desire to assert regional dominance in the Middle East and eliminate a troublesome leader.

    We believe that the US government needs to develop a consistent policy on weaponry of mass destruction that applies to all nations. President Bush’s pursuit of a diplomatic solution with North Korea seems like the right course of action, especially if compared to its approach to Iraq.

    The US Government needs to enter into negotiations with North Korea, rather than seeking to isolate it. The United States must also be willing to offer security assurances as well as much needed development assistance to the people in North Korea in exchange for the North Koreans forgoing their nuclear option. It would be diplomatically constructive for the US to encourage the establishment of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone that covers the two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and that portion of Chinese and US nuclear forces deployed in Northeast Asia. It would also be helpful to support reunification discussions between Seoul and Pyongyang.

    With regard to Iraq, the Bush administration should also be willing to enter into negotiations. The UN inspectors, after all, have already reportedly visited well over 200 Iraqi sites, selected on the basis of intelligence leads, and have so far found no evidence of prohibited weaponry. If the Bush administration has information, as it repeatedly has claimed, that Iraq has violated the UN mandate on eliminating its weapons of mass destruction, it has an obligation to provide this information to the UN inspectors so that they can carry out their work. In the event that Iraq is cleared by the UN inspectors with respect to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs, the US should end its sanctions against Iraq and certainly end the bombing of the No-Fly Zones that it established in Iraq more than a decade ago without any authorization by the Security Council.

    To be consistent in its efforts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Bush administration should put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Resolution 687, calling for Iraq’s nuclear disarmament, makes note of the calls to create a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. The US should seek to realize these goals, and this will not be possible unless Israel’s nuclear arsenal is dismantled. As a major donor of military aid to Israel, the US is in a position to exert a benign influence on Israel’s policy on these issues that will be helpful in the pursuit of regional stability and a just peace throughout the Middle East.

    The US has wrongly treated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a one-way street for more than 30 years. From the outset the treaty was negotiated as a two-way street. The non-nuclear weapons states gave up their right to acquire or develop nuclear weapons in return for a solemn promise by the nuclear weapons states to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The US, as well as other nuclear weapons states, has not upheld its part of the bargain, which is a “material breach” of the treaty. It has also been unacceptable to other countries, particularly those that feel threatened by US foreign policy.

    Consistency, however, is not enough. Non-proliferation is increasingly being revealed as a dead-end that is not capable of protecting the peoples of the world against the dire possibility of a nuclear war. If the US really wants to put an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation, it must demonstrate that it has the political will to propose and engage in serious negotiations for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world, including its own, as called for almost 35 years ago in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    War is not a solution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The only approach with some chance of success depends on a demonstrable political will to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. When the US demonstrates this political will, the inspection procedures and institutional structures to guard against cheating can be established, tested and gradually implemented. Only at that point can the world begin to breathe more easily.

    Moving in this direction will require a sea change in the strategy of the US Government, but it is the only policy that will have the consistency and international support needed to succeed, and is by far the best way to reduce the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Until the United States is prepared to forego its own nuclear weapons option, preventing others from doing what we have been doing for more than half a century will seem like an extreme version of moral hypocrisy. It is time for Americans to realize that reliance on nuclear weapons is incompatible with our most fundamental moral and legal obligations as well as with preventing and reversing nuclear proliferation.
    *Richard Falk, visiting professor, Global Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, is chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. David Krieger is a founder and president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • North Korea and the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Folly: Nuclear Admission Demonstrates Militarism is not a Solution

    The Bush administration’s recent announcement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) admission to developing a nuclear weapons program has thrust the fact that Iraq is not an isolated nuclear weapons proliferator into the center of the war debate. The announcement highlights startling questions as to the administration’s lack of a consistent and comprehensive nonproliferation strategy and has evoked serious accusations as to why Congress was not told about the DPRK’s admission prior to voting on the resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

    The parallels between the DPRK and Iraq’s nuclear weapons program are undeniable. Both countries are known to have had programs to develop nuclear weapons and have been designated as members of the “axis of evil” by the Bush administration. The United States even came close to war with North Korea over their nuclear weapons program in 1994.

    In fact the DPRK’s weapons program may be far more advanced than Iraq’s. North Korea has enough plutonium to construct an estimated six nuclear weapons within six months, is pursuing technology to enrich uranium, and has consistently resisted the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) push for full inspections. Iraq, on the other hand, is not thought to have the materials necessary to build a nuclear weapon, and has stated that it will allow United Nations lead weapons inspections.

    Yet the administration has made clear its commitment to find a diplomatic solution to crisis with North Korea and to pursue the option to use force against Iraq, without providing convincing answers as to why its response to the two nations should differ so greatly.

    This glaring inconsistency puts a spot light on the fact that the Bush administration’s Iraq policy does not provide a comprehensive, long-term solution to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we must wage war on Iraq because of the threat of nuclear weapons, why not Israel, which is thought to possess approximately 200 nuclear weapons? Why not Pakistan, which is nuclear capable and is thought to have provided North Korea with enrichment technology? Why not China which provided Pakistan with that technology in the first place? It is clear the United States cannot and should not take pre-emptive military action against each of these proliferators.

    On the other hand, if the Bush Administration is confident that diplomacy is the correct option for North Korea, Israel, India, Pakistan and other potential proliferators, why not Iraq? The very fact that the United States is treating Iraq differently from other proliferators is infuriating many countries, particularly Arab ones, and threatening US interests in the region. This was made very clear in the recent Security Council emergency session on Iraq where country after country condemned Iraq’s violation of disarmament obligations, but also opposed the US push for authorization for the use of force against Iraq.

    Though the administration claims that its militant Iraqi policy proves that it is hard on proliferation, the White House has, in fact, impeded effective arms control not only by thwarting multilateral treaties such as the CTBT and the protocol to the Biological weapons convention and but also by providing insufficient funds for efforts to control nuclear materials. The administration’s expectation that other nations will embrace disarmament and nonproliferation principles while the United States continues to disengage from multilateral solutions and advance its nuclear weapons technology seems clearly unreasonable.

    Congress Kept in the Dark

    Democrats in Congress have, through their aids, voiced criticism that they were not told of North Korea’s admission to its nuclear weapons program while they were considering the resolution authorizing the administration to use force against Iraq. The Washington Post quoted one aid as stating, “Senators are concerned and troubled by it…This cloud of secrecy raises questions about whether there are other pieces to this puzzle they don’t know about” (October 19, 2002).

    Informing Congress about the DPRK’s admission could have delayed the vote on the war resolution to allow further consideration of the precedent that would be set in Iraq and how that could affect US policy towards proliferators such as the DPRK. Congress would have been forced to address the Iraq situation in the broader context of global proliferation through the concrete example of North Korea.

    The White House’s explanation for the delay is that analysts were still considering a response to the DPRK. Yet when the announcement was eventually made no planned response was released, and the administration is clearly still in the process of consulting other nations.

    Though Congress had been briefed on evidence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons effort, the outright admission by the DPRK significantly increases pressure on the United States to deal with the program in a timely manner. Keeping such clearly relevant information from Congress during a debate on whether the United States should go to war is likely to damage even further the credibility of the administration’s intelligence claims.

    Solution Remains Unclear

    Exactly what the DPRK hoped to get out of the admission that it has an active nuclear weapons program is still far from clear. It may be that the Kim John Il felt he had little left to lose in relations with the United States besides nuclear power reactors its deteriorated electrical grid cannot accommodate and heating fuel shipments which make up less than five percent of the country’s yearly energy needs.

    North Korea has responded to criticism by pointing out that, by neglecting for years its commitment through the 1994 Agreed Framework to make significant efforts to end hostile relations and normalize diplomatic and economic ties, it was the United States that first violated the bilateral pact.

    Some analysts suggest that North Korea made the announcement in preparation to make significant concessions in dismantling its nuclear weapons program. Such negotiations will depend on the commitment of both the Kim regime and the Bush administration to finding a peaceful resolution to this looming conflict, and the ability of Bush administration to navigate diplomatic avenues without relying on military action.
    *Devon Chaffee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.