Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: non-proliferation

  • Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security

    A Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Panel Discussion

    During the 2004 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee at the United Nations, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a panel discussion entitled “Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security,” enabling the opportunity to discuss current proliferation trends and recommendations to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

    The panel was moderated by David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and speakers at the event included Canadian Senator and Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, Douglas Roche OC, Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, and Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The resulting discussions were constructive as panelists debated the challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the responsibility to offer alternative visions of security for a more peaceful world.

    Senator Roche set the tone by addressing the current state of the world today. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to abide by their promise of good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Without a serious effort by nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament, the NPT will continue to promote double standards that allow some states to continue to expand and improve their nuclear arsenal while denying others of the same rights. In order to meet the challenges of today, the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is in urgent need of reconstruction. In reflecting on the role he played both as a parliamentarian and as a representative of civil society, Senator Roche underlined the importance of the role of civilian grassroots and non-governmental organizations in educating the public and influencing top level policy decisions among different countries.

    Kate Hudson spoke on the subject of the “Special Relationship between the US and UK .” Having summarized the background to the relationship based on the UK ‘s historical economic dependence, Hudson spoke of the problems arising from the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) between the two countries. This provides the basis for extensive nuclear collaboration, without which it is unlikely that the UK would be able to sustain its possession of nuclear weapons on Trident submarines. According to Hudson , “It is unlikely that the UK could remain a nuclear weapon states without the support of the US .” The MDA is in line for renewal during 2004, which has a strong bearing on the issue of a possible Trident replacement and the potential development of new nuclear weapons.

    Hudson also discussed the UK ‘s strong support for the new framework of the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review. It was noted that many observers feel that political support for US initiatives is part of the “Special Relationship.” The problem in the UK is that the current British government strongly supports the relationship and backs the full range of US policies, including pre-emptive war and nuclear first strike. CND is currently campaigning against the development of new nuclear weapons; for an immediate parliamentary discussion on MDA; for a rejection of pre-emptive war and nuclear first use policies; in opposition to a Trident replacement; for withdrawal of permission for US use of British bases for Missile Defense; and for withdrawal of US weapons from Lakenheath.

    Jacqueline Cabasso focused on US nuclear weapons policy and underlined the importance of nuclear disarmament as a core issue on the global peace movement’s agenda. According to Cabasso, while the Bush administration is demanding nuclear disarmament from other nations, it continues to upgrade and expand its nuclear arsenal. Cabasso supports this by referring to several US documents, including:

    • The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for:
      • a variety of nuclear attack options to compliment other US military capabilities;
      • contingency plans for use of nuclear weapons against seven named countries (including non-nuclear weapons states) in “immediate, potential, and unexpected contingencies;” and,
      • a revitalized nuclear weapons research, development and production infrastructure to maintain the existing US nuclear arsenal, develop new nuclear warheads in response to new requirements, and maintain readiness to resume full scale underground nuclear testing.
    • The 2002 US National Security Strategy which highlights the administration’s willingness to engage in pre-emptive war, including the possibility of nuclear first strike by “acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
    • The US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which reserves to the US the right to respond with overwhelming force – including using nuclear weapons – to the use of weapons of nuclear, chemical or biological against the US or its allies.

    According to Cabasso, the legitimization of nuclear weapons by the world’s first nuclear weapons state and super power, the US , poses the gravest threat to international security. The US policy of preventive war and its push to modernize its nuclear arsenal provide arguments for other countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

    Cabasso challenged that while the security policy of the Bush administration are more extreme than other administrations, they are really a continuation of them. Cabasso continued by pointing out that even if Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry (D-MA) succeeds in winning the election in November 2004, the global community must not assume that current US nuclear weapons policy will take a dramatic turn for the better. Reading excerpts from An American Security Strategy, released in July 2003 by the National Security Advisory Group to the Democratic Party, Cabasso revealed that Democratic national security policies are not necessarily opposed to current US nuclear weapons policy. The policy paper only demonstrates a marginal change from the current US stance and endorses the current level of spending on US nuclear weapons and other military programs.

    Current US nuclear policies have made visible the present and very real dangers of nuclear weapon use. Nuclear weapons threaten everyone’s security and Cabasso concluded for the need to redefine security, “throwing out the outdated model completely to replace it with a human security model” based on food, shelter, clean air and water, jobs, healthcare and education for everyone everywhere, without regard to national borders.

    Justine Wang ended the panel discussion by addressing recent calls for countering proliferation and suggesting recommendations for improving the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Wang addressed the recent initiatives proposed by US President George Bush on February 11 2004, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and the recently passed US-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While these proposals are constructive and necessary to the extent that they don’t enshrine double standards, they fall seriously short of being able to meet the current global proliferation challenge.

    Wang called for the stemming of nuclear proliferation under a more strict, equitable and effective multilateral framework and shared recommendations of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to improve the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Recommendations include commencing negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, universal application of the NPT to all states under a strict timetable, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , universal and equal application of the Additional Protocol , and the phased elimination of nuclear power.

    Wang reiterated that the continuation of the current NPT regime that ignores existing double standards is destined to result in both further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons. Only by embracing significant changes that end existing double standards and elevate nuclear disarmament obligations can the non-proliferation regime succeed.

    Krieger concluded the panel discussion and mentioned that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is launching an online campaign entitled “Turn the Tide: Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy” as an example of a grassroots initiative needed to mobilize the public to alert policy makers on the threat of nuclear weapons on the world’s security.

    Discussions ended with a question and answer session, where many participants engaged in constructive dialogue on facing the challenge of the increasing threat of nuclear weapons and the future of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.

  • We Need You

    We Need You

    The Foundation’s overarching goal is to help create a world free of nuclear weapons. In a rational world, this should not be a difficult task. A persuasive case can be made that a nuclear war could destroy civilization and possibly put an end to the human species and most forms of life. At a minimum, the use of these weapons could obliterate cities, including our own. We know what happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a result of two small nuclear weapons. Today’s weapons have on average eight times the explosive power of those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    But, of course, this is not a rational world. It is a world in which fear, denial and irrationality hold high office. It is a world in which international law is trampled on and strategies of “might makes right” are employed far too frequently by national leaders. In our world, many leaders cling to old views of power, failing to realize that in the Nuclear Age, as Einstein pointed out, “everything has changed save our modes of thinking.”

    At a recent Foundation event, a woman asked, “Can an organization like the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation make a difference on the issue of eliminating nuclear weapons?” This is an important question. The honest answer is that it is a tough struggle, one in which there are no guarantees of success. In many respects, fighting for a world free of nuclear weapons is an act of faith rooted in a strong belief in a resilient human spirit.

    It is clear that the dangers of the Nuclear Age have not diminished, despite the end of the Cold War. It remains a dangerous world in which the ultimate expression of anger and frustration, a nuclear 9/11 or 3/11, must be prevented. The best way to prevent such an occurrence is to assure that nuclear weapons and materials do not proliferate any further than they already have. The best way assure this is to dramatically reduce the number of these weapons with the goal of their elimination, and to apply international safeguards to both nuclear weapons and materials.

    Achieving a nuclear weapons-free world is a colossal task,one that too many people consider unattainable and therefore not worth the effort. In fact, it is the consequences of not undertaking this effort that makes it so essential. The risks posed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave to chance or to politicians or generals. They demand a response from the people; they demand our involvement.

    The work of the Foundation is perhaps even more necessary today than it was at
    the height of the Cold War. It is to bring critical issues related to nuclear dangers
    to people everywhere, and to provide quality information, analysis and ideas
    for advocacy. This is the work we engage in daily and the work we have engaged in
    for more than 20 years. Our only chance of success is to work with others to build a movement big enough to impact governments. To do this, we need your active support
    and involvement.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation seeks to be a voice of reason at a critical juncture in human history. This election year we are launching a campaign to Chart a New
    Course in US Nuclear Policy. We need your help. Please add your voice, and help us to extend the Foundation’s reach and its ability to achieve a more rational and caring world, one that we can be proud to pass on to the next generation.

  • Get Rid of All Nuclear Arms

    President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) provides the right solution, but to the wrong problem. Nuclear proliferation is merely a symptom; the real issue is the nuclear weapons themselves. And, in this sense, the PSI is no more than a Band-Aid, and a quite small one at that.

    The recent scandal in Pakistan, where a corrupt scientist sold nuclear secrets for profit, only demonstrates that such traffic is much too lucrative to be stopped by increased policing. For 60 years, ever since Hiroshima, the U.S. and the world have tried to control the spread of nuclear weapons. We’ve tried treaties, economic sanctions and moral persuasion. And we’ve failed.

    We could not stop the Soviets from getting nukes. We chose not to resist, and actually ignored, Israel’s nuclear program. We looked the other way when India went nuclear and, thus, could do little when Pakistan followed suit. And we merely fumed when North Korea flexed its nuclear muscles. In the meantime, we have built and maintained the world’s largest nuclear stockpile.

    Can we contain Pakistan’s nuclear program? Yes, we can. But first we will need to contain India’s. To do that, however, India will need to see China’s program rolled back. How does that happen? For that, we will need to start looking at our own. As my grandmother used to say, “If you point one finger at someone, at least three will point back at you.” No one said this was easy!

    Are we really surprised that the rest of the world rolls its eyes when we pontificate about the dangers of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in general — as when Bush referred to them as “the greatest threat to humanity today”? What other countries doubt is our sincerity. It is hypocritical to tell the rest of the world that nuclear weapons are good enough for us, but not for them. We can’t have a world part nuclear and part not.

    Perhaps the fathers of our own atom bomb — Robert Oppenheimer and his colleagues from the Manhattan Project — were correct in believing that the only real way of dealing with nuclear proliferation is to ban nuclear weapons altogether. Everywhere.

    International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei understands this reality. He recently wrote: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”

    We must insist on a nuclear-free world. We must make a sincere commitment to it at home and demand it abroad. Rather than better mousetraps for proliferating nations, we need an approach to eliminate nuclear weapons. Some may argue this is unrealistic. But no more so than the misguided, even naive, hope that a feel-good Band-Aid called PSI will make the world a safer place.

    *Adil Najam is an associate professor of international negotiation and diplomacy at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. This article was originally published by USA Today on February
    18, 2004.

  • Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction

    Nuclear proliferation is on the rise. Equipment, material and training were oncelargely inaccessible. Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

    If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability — and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programs. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons.

    If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction.

    Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the nonproliferation regime.

    The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear nonproliferation. The current system relies on a gentlemen’s agreement that is not only nonbinding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise.

    We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

    In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so — in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of nonproliferation treaty obligations requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 percent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. Again, as President Bush suggested yesterday, it should be in force for all countries.

    In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months’ notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

    This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council.

    The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users.

    Toward this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

    Of course, a fundamental part of the nonproliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the nonproliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

    If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the nonproliferation treaty review conference next year.

    We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

    Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.

    *Mohamed ElBaradei is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This article was originally published in the New York Times on February 12, 2004.

  • JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation

    Originally Published in Carnegie Analysis

    In honor of the memory of President John F. Kennedy, we present below some of his most important comments on the dangers inherent in the possession of nuclear arms and his proposals for stopping the spread of the the most deadly weapons ever invented.

    “There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious. . . I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.” Third Nixon-Kennedy Presidential Debate, October 13, 1960

    “The deadly arms race, and the huge resources it absorbs, have too long overshadowed all else we must do. We must prevent the arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear powers and to the reaches of outer space.” State of the Union Address, January 30, 1961

    “In the thermonuclear age, any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of humanity.” Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961

    “Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

    Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons–ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth–is a source of horror, and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes–for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness–for in a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

    For fifteen years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream–it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race.

    In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan, and a test–a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act.

    Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict and greed– but it would bring a world free from the terrors of mass destruction. It would not usher in the era of the super state–but it would usher in an era in which no state could annihilate or be annihilated by another.

    But to halt the spread of these terrible weapons, to halt the contamination of the air, to halt the spiraling nuclear arms race, we remain ready to seek new avenues of agreement, our new Disarmament Program thus includes the following proposals:

    • First, signing the test-ban treaty by all nations. This can be done now. Test ban negotiations need not and should not await general disarmament.
    • Second, stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and preventing their transfer to any nation now lacking in nuclear weapons.
    • Third, prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not own them.
    • Fourth, keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space.
    • Fifth, gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and converting their materials to peaceful uses; and
    • Finally, halting the unlimited testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and gradually destroying them as well.”
      Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York City, September 25, 1961

    “World order will be secured only when the whole world has laid down these weapons which seem to offer us present security but threaten the future survival of the human race. That armistice day seems very far away. The vast resources on this planet are being devoted more and more to the means of destroying, instead of enriching human life but the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.”State of the Union Address, January 11, 1962

    “Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.” Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962

    “I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

    The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security–it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.” Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963

    “Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

    Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control-a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.

    A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, “the survivors would envy the dead.” For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world’s slide toward final annihilation.

    I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

    If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War.” Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963

  • United Nations Launches Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education

    If disarmament and non-proliferation goals are to be furthered the public must be educated about these issues on a wide scale, particularly in areas of conflict. To help bolster such education efforts the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs launched the U.N. Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education Wednesday October 9 after two years of work and deliberations.

    In March 2000 a group of experts from around the world were appointed to examine existing disarmament and nonproliferation education and training programs, and to give recommendations for furthering such work, particularly through the U.N. system. The resulting analysis stems largely from consultations with non-governmental, academic, research and media communities from throughout the world.

    Though the study’s 34 recommendations are varied, they include specific actions that can be taken to increase the availability and distribution of disarmament education resources; to improve collaboration between organizations currently working on disarmament education; and to take advantage of appropriate education technology.

    The study emphasizes that there must be education efforts at all levels, from young school children to military personnel, and that different methods must be used to reach the public on all levels, with particular sensitivity to cultural and language differences

    The First Committee of the United Nations will now begin discussing the document, and it is hoped that the study will lead to an increase in the available resources for effective disarmament education initiatives.

    The study calls for increased action by a number of actors, including municipal leaders; religious leaders and institutions; grassroots organizations; and a number of U.N. actors. While impact of some of its suggestions may be difficult to measure, any steps taken by the U.N. General Assembly, the Department of Disarmament and Public Information, U.N. affiliated organizations, U.N. member states, and international non-governmental organizations will be clearly visible.

    Disarmament education is a key step in moving towards a more peaceful and non-violent global environment. It is hoped that the study’s suggestions will be enthusiastically implemented.

    U.N. Undersecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala and Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, William C. Potter, stated, in a recent International Herald Tribune article:

    “Young people live in a world ravaged by conflict and awash in arms. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, they also must contend with the fear of total annihilation. As diplomats and educators we have a responsibility to provide them with hope founded on reality. Disarmament and nonproliferation education is an important but underused tool to accomplish that end.”
    *Devon Chaffee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • A Terrorist Threat – The Movement of Black Market Nuclear Materials into the United States

    “What is the problem? The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear materials scattered throughout the newly independent states and increased the potential for the theft of the those materials, and for organized criminals to enter the nuclear smuggling business. As horrible as the tragedies in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were, imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been a small-scale nuclear device exploded there.”

    — President William Jefferson Clinton

    Overview

    The problem is recognizing that the nuclear threat from terrorists acquiring weapons grade fissile material is greater than all the other threats combined and that it has to be treated independently for the specific set of threats it poses.

    Biological and chemical threats are scalable in their level of threat because they create damage in proportion to the amount of material distributed over a given geographical area. The effects, while deadly, are relatively short term and perishable with proper treatment. Also, they are dependant on effective distribution systems and environmental conditions. They can be used in small amounts in small areas quite easily but use in large areas requires techniques that lend themselves to detection and prevention. If an event occurs, rapid response can mitigate their effects substantially in a relatively short time.

    In comparison, the nuclear threat is that it will cause the greatest damage over a large area from a single point with a small amount of material. A nuclear blast is its own distribution system and its effects are persistent over larger areas for longer periods. Rapid response to an event will offer little in the mitigation of the effects other than defining the areas of destruction and contamination. It will create its own environment for distribution as it expands into the prevailing environment.

    Level of Threat

    Dealing with nuclear terrorism requires an understanding of what the potential threats are, at what level they exist and what their consequences will be. The most formidable characteristics of terrorism are variability and unpredictability. Target selection, time of use, degree of destruction and psychological impact are all open questions.

    Where any nuclear threat is perceived, maximum effort has to be expended to verify its potential and prevent the occurrence of an event. There are no options to this action. However, reaction at this level will require a mobilization of resources in a given area in a very short period of time. Therefore, the overall consequences of a nuclear threat by terrorists have to be evaluated within its probability of occurrence. Multiple threats of nuclear events would quickly paralyze the response systems and produce wide scale vulnerabilities, increasing the probability of a successful terrorist event at some location .

    Specific scenarios of prevention and reaction need to be developed by posing postulates for as many methods of acquisition, assembly and deployment as can be imagined. Unfortunately, it appears that no focused effort in this regard has coalesced. The most discernible appreciation for the nuclear threat seems to be to prepare for an after-the-fact reaction to it.

    Background

    Proliferation in the production of fissile materials in many countries has increased the probability that such materials will fall into the hands of terrorist groups who have the capability for assembling crude nuclear weapons.

    During the Cold War, nuclear materials were highly controlled by the nations that developed them. With the end of the Cold War, the controls have slipped to an unacceptable level; security for nuclear inventories has been dangerously degraded. In fact, there are unknown amounts of fissile material for which there has been no accountability. Locations for these materials are scattered and, for the most part, unknown. Additionally, inventory control at many of the existing storage warehouses for nuclear materials is lacking and security measures are generally unsophisticated and inadequate.

    The major threat these unaccounted for materials present is that they will fall into the hands of terrorist groups whose purpose is to bring about, for their own cause, destruction, distraction from national purpose and general social upheaval. Secondary threats will be the creation of unbridled fear, distrust, economic instability and the sense of a loss of personal security should the possession become known.

    Preventive Measures

    The imperative for detecting and controlling these materials is recognizing that for them to be useful for terrorist purposes the materials must be moved from their points of origin or storage to points of utilization. If a concentrated effort is directed toward identifying potential transfer methodologies and routes of distribution then it might be possible to interdict the materials before they can be transformed into weapons status.

    In the area of import/export accountability there is much work to be done. There are no international standards that can be effectively applied for maintaining control during the transportation of nuclear materials and, even if there were, It would take a prodigious effort to oversee the extremely complex interconnected network of international transportation and commerce. The proliferation of the drug traffic throughout the world presents strong evidence of this fact. Gaps in import/export controls almost insure that distribution of fissile materials will occur undetected.

    Once the material is in the distribution system the unknown factors increase – Where did it go? To whom? And for what purpose? Even when lost it bequeaths a set of hazardous conditions that are unacceptable in normal commerce.

    Yet, movement is a key to interdiction. To be useful, the materials must be sent to a central location for additional processing and assembly. At some point sufficient material must be present to construct a nuclear device. Movement of large quantities of fissile material to a construction site is unlikely because it presents a greater possibility for interdiction than do small quantities. Also, large scale movements present additional hazards to the handling facilities because of the possibilities of radioactive leakage and accidental detection.

    Movement of small quantities of the material, on the other hand, afford a greater probability that the movement will be undetected by conventional means and will be delivered successfully to a destination of choice. Smaller shipments are more likely to remain undetected during transport.

    Established commercial conveyance systems probably will be used where small quantities of fissile material can be shipped using various packaging techniques and routes to a single destination. Because of the increased detection probabilities, quantities of fissile material will not be shipped in a given container to a single destination.

    Some possibilities for moving this type of material are:

    (1) – Superimpose the shipment of small, well-shielded packages on established drug and contraband routes.

    (2) – Ship materials conventionally in well-shielded, small containers through a surreptitious network of widely dispersed handlers.

    (3) – Man carry many small quantities across the mostly porous borders of the United States.

    (4) – Use diversified distribution techniques (routes and conveyances) by requiring multiple way-points and altering the characteristics of external shipping containers at each point.

    (5) – Mix materials and legitimate products for routine deliveries.

    The formidable nature of the tasks required to detect and identify well packaged fissile materials in small quantities renders the likelihood of detection highly questionable.

    The most complex of the above projections is No. 4. Presuming an originating point in Asia, a small package could be shipped with little notice through Cambodia to the island of Palau into Micronesia or the Phillipines, then through the small Kiribati Islands to the Cook Islands, then to Hawaii and then to the mainland USA through Mexico, Canada or directly through an open area of the US borders. There are literally hundreds of such routes that could be set up and utilized. The detection and surveillance of these multiple transfer shipping points would require the participation of hundreds of specialists examining all arriving and departing packages – a near impossible task, thereby essentially insuring a successful delivery for most attempts.

    The virtual impossibility of providing surveillance at the many points of exit in the Far East and the many potential points for entry into the United States makes this an imposing task but nevertheless it has to be undertaken. It is almost a given that, once in the United States, the free and open access to our highway network and relatively unsecured transportation system, make it a simple task to transport dangerous materials throughout the United States without any great fear of interdiction.

    Where nuclear materials are concerned, individuals involved with national security need to become focused on more effective prevention strategies than ever before. This new era of terrorism demands a dramatic shift in thinking with regard to the possibility of a small-scale, but dramatic and destructive, nuclear catastrophe. No longer are they faced with decisions about extensive arrays of military weapons with comprehensive destructive capabilities, but rather, they are faced with the likelihood of attacks by small covert bands of individuals with crude nuclear weapons which can still deliver substantial destructive power.

    New methodologies incorporating sophisticated sensing devices are needed for the tasks of detecting, containing, and eliminating small-scale movements of nuclear material in order to prevent such terrorist events. The face of war is changing from that of a well-equipped soldier in uniform to that of the nondescript member of a dedicated cult whose very nature is to deceive and remaine hidden from view until their targets are most vulnerable and the political climate is confused.

    Conclusion:

    There are no easy solutions or quick fixes.

    “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, as we drift toward unparalleled catastrophes.”

    – Albert Einstein

    A number of experts predicted that some catastrophic event similar to the Oklahoma City bombing disaster would be needed to energize the international community to work in concert to eliminate this problem. It has happened in New York and Washington. The unfortunate fact is that the US government, as well as other governments, and the American people found themselves in situations for which they were not prepared. This has to change.

    The danger is so great, and the threat so immediate, that US policymakers and the public need to recognize that the diversion of fissile materials is as critical and urgent a national security priority as controlling the theft of a complete nuclear weapon. This will require top-level commitment to public education and sufficient resource allocation if, eventually, we are to prevail in this new security challenge.

    One can only hope that a nuclear tragedy will not be necessary for galvanizing world action, and that we will achieve progress toward an international consensus that it is in no one’s interest to allow these materials to be expropriated for terrorist purposes. The need is to concentrate an effort within existing political structures to build a collective regional security, capped by the United Nations, that would promote collaboration among nuclear weapons states to establish methods and records of control over the inventories of fissile materials.

    In examining current efforts on how to stop the illegal distribution of these materials, it is hard to see how any current strategy, no matter how clever the concept or broad the implementation, could do more than raise the level of awareness of the problem. The responsibility is so fragmented among sovereign states and among competing agencies within these sovereignties that viable methods of control are either paralyzed or, for practical purposes, nonexistent. Because of this, problems in managing the inventories of these materials are too diverse and complex to solve in the short term. Consequently, without international cooperation, the United States cannot expect to control the misappropriation of fissile material that is inherent in nuclear proliferation and inappropriate nuclear disarmament methodologies.

    The reality is that a number of states are actively seeking the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. Their main requirement is getting the materials to do so. Unfortunately, because of some very lax attitudes toward the security of weapons grade nuclear materials during the current disarmament process, the materials already exist in the Black Market. Indifference to this fact seems to be continuing and will contribute to the likelihood that, within the next two-to-three years, there will be a political crisis involving a terrorist group and nuclear materials.

    Slow progress has been made in establishing global and regional non proliferation measures. Commensurately, little effort has been expended for controlling the illegal movement of fissile materials. There appears to be a blindness to the fact that, in this imperfect world, while no system can be developed that will stop all the determined terrorists; a high level of effort must be expended for understanding the dimensions of the problem and correcting deficiencies. In some measure, all civilized nations should be prepared to respond as effectively as possible when terrorist threats of any kind occur but, especially, where nuclear materials are concerned.

    During the Cold War, high technology warheads sat atop powerful delivery systems. Targeting was a known factor. The world was at risk of a hair-trigger response but the realization of a mutually assured destruction kept these systems under “reasonable” control. Today, the potential weapon size is speculative and the delivery system in all probability will have feet. The targets are completely unpredictable – they can be anything, anywhere, at any time. No negotiating. No advanced warning. No clues of impending danger. Nothing is rational in the equation.

    Ultimately, there can be no foolproof system short of eliminating all inventories of the materials. However, it is an immediate and critical imperative that all nations work in collaboration to eliminate the spread of fissile materials. Control will require the continuous and simultaneous exercise of multiple measures including international intelligence gathering, international cooperation for conflict resolution, import/export accountability, and selective, proportional coercive measures including the use of force. Eventually, a comprehensive set of measures will have to be developed for the international community that will allow it to exercise the political will to stop and ultimately eliminate the threat of a catastrophe involving terrorist and nuclear materials.

    George Washington said, “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” Again, it is time to listen to one of our founding fathers.

    *Gene R. Kelly is a human factors engineer who has consulted for government and industry on issues of nuclear security for the past 22 years.

  • Welcoming the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

    Statement by Under-Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala, October 8, 2001

    I begin by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, upon your election to guide the work of this Committee. Your distinguished career equips you well for the tasks ahead — a career that, in the disarmament area, features your prominent role in the historic 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as your chairmanship of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. I also congratulate the other members of the bureau and pledge the fullest support of the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) in all your efforts to make this a productive session.

    On 10 September 2001, the Secretary-General issued his annual Message on the eve of what was to be the International Day of Peace. He urged people everywhere to “try to imagine a world quite different from the one we know.” He called on everybody to “picture those who wage war laying down their arms and talking out their differences.” He stated that this “should be a day of global ceasefire and non-violence.” And he closed with these words of hope: “let us seize the opportunity for peace to take hold, day by day, year by year, until every day is a day of peace.”

    The next morning, only an hour before the Secretary-General was planning to ring the Peace Bell, thousands of citizens from dozens of countries perished in acts of unmitigated brutality that defy description. The challenge now facing this Committee, as it convenes in the shadow of this dark and ominous cloud, is to confront these new and old threats to international peace and security. At this critical juncture — when the peoples of the world stand together in repudiating mass terrorism — we must all work together to build upon this remarkable display of unity. This is a time for cooperation, for reaffirming the rule of law, for recognizing common threats, and for acknowledging the extent to which our common security depends upon justice, fundamental human rights, and equitable development for all societies. For this Committee, it is particularly a time for reinforcing the roads and bridges leading to the fulfilment of multilateral disarmament commitments, while exploring new paths to reach the same destinations. It is, in short, a time to resume the work of realizing the vision described in the Secretary-General’s Message on the International Day of Peace.

    Only history will decide how much of a defining moment 11 September will be. But history will certainly not absolve us for failing to learn the lessons of this unspeakable tragedy. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his address on 1 October to the General Assembly, stated “While the world was unable to prevent the 11 September attacks, there is much we can do to help prevent future terrorist acts carried out with weapons of mass destruction.” For us in the disarmament community he set out several guidelines for future actions that I hope delegations will consider carefully.

    Some specific initiatives that merit serious consideration include:

    · First, the need to expand the membership of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, while strengthening controls over nuclear facilities and the storage and transportation of nuclear materials.

    · Second, the need for new efforts to negotiate a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism — the recent terrorist attacks should add new urgency to these efforts.

    · Third, the need for a global database — based on publicly available material — on acts, threatened acts, or suspected acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The Department for Disarmament Affairs is in contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on many of these issues and is prepared, if so mandated, to establish such a database.

    Mr. Chairman, the starting point for the work of this Committee must be the sobering realization that last month’s tragedy could have been so much worse had nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons been used. The objective facts require that we be neither alarmist sowers of panic, nor complacent do-nothings. We do, however, have a duty to protect innocent citizens throughout the world by reinforcing the multilateral disarmament regime. Many of the deadliest super-weapons remain difficult to manufacture due to the unique characteristics of their weapons materials, improvements in methods of detecting the production or testing of such weapons, and technical problems in converting dangerous materials into effective, deliverable weapons. The world community must do all it can to raise these hurdles, while strengthening the fundamental norms against the possession or use of such weapons. The best way to accomplish this is through the active pursuit of a robust disarmament agenda. Of one thing we must be clear — in the disarmament area there is no going back to business as usual.

    The agenda of this Committee has always been challenging, yet the tasks ahead are more critical than ever. Many of these challenges, however, existed well before the tragic events of 11 September. At the conclusion of its 37th session in Geneva last July, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters concluded that “there currently exists a crisis of multilateral disarmament diplomacy.”

    The symptoms of that crisis — while numerous earlier in the year — are now self-apparent even to casual observers. We are witnessing a weakening of the basic infrastructure of disarmament — one of the eight priority areas in the United Nations work programme. This state of affairs — if allowed to continue — will threaten the very sustainability of disarmament as a means of enhancing international peace and security.

    Disarmament is facing difficult times. There is no doubt that its future rests heavily upon a strong level of understanding and support in civil society. Yet today we see signs of private foundations and other funding agencies moving out of the field of disarmament or reducing their commitments to this goal. As funding grows scarce — a problem aggravated by the turbulent global financial markets — key groups in civil society are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their work on disarmament issues. In academia, we find all too few articles in serious scholarly journals on disarmament per se and very few new doctoral dissertations that deal directly with disarmament. We find the news media focusing on the glare of current conflicts rather than the typically slow and incremental process of eliminating the weapons used in such conflicts — or eliminating the weapons that could even destroy the world. These trends must be reversed, and at a minimum, more funding made available to non-governmental groups working in the field of disarmament.

    On an inter-state level, we find few governments with offices specifically devoted to disarmament issues, and New Zealand still has the distinction of having the only minister of disarmament. We see a flourishing global arms market — the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimates the total value of arms transfers from 1993 through 2000 at around $303 billion — and almost 70 percent of these arms were imported by developing countries. Meanwhile, global military expenditures are again on the rise — amounting last year to an estimated $800 billion. This growth in the arms trade and military spending contrasts with the terms of Article 26 of the Charter, which refer to the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments.

    At times it appears — certainly in terms of the United Nations budgetary procedures — that we are seeing instead the least diversion of resources for disarmament. It goes without saying that the smallest department in the United Nations is the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which is now seeking a modest increase in the 2002-2003 biennium budget that is before this session of the General Assembly. It is also not uncommon to read of financial problems and resource shortages in key treaty-based organizations like the IAEA and OPCW.

    Two of the classic diplomatic measures for advancing disarmament, non-proliferation, and anti-terrorism goals — export controls and sanctions — are now in dispute, based on claims that they are ineffective, discriminatory, or harmful to other global values. The utility and legitimacy of these mechanisms requires that these criticisms be addressed, with a view to reaching universally-agreed guidelines. The danger remains that without them, the world community would find itself confronted with a stark choice between ignoring gross violations of global disarmament and non-proliferation norms and having to defend such norms by force of arms.

    The treaties that constitute the global legal regime for disarmament are also seriously incomplete. None of the key treaties prescribing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction has universal membership, and un-documented allegations of non-compliance continue to be heard among the States parties, eroding confidence in the various treaty regimes. Many important treaties have still not entered into force, including START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose members will soon meet in New York to consider ways of accelerating the ratification process. With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many years of efforts to conclude a protocol to strengthen this key treaty have ended abruptly. The treaty’s next five-year Review Conference, scheduled to convene next month in Geneva, provides an opportunity to revisit this issue. It must not be missed.

    With regard to the NPT, while it is still too early to predict the fate of the “thirteen steps” to nuclear disarmament agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference, it is fair to say that delegates attending next year’s first Preparatory Committee meeting for the treaty’s 2005 Review Conference will certainly expect hard evidence of a good faith effort to implement each of these important goals.

    The elimination of landmines is another very important international disarmament activity, given that they continue to impede the development and security of populations in almost one third of the world’s countries. Last month, I attended the third annual meeting of the States parties to the Mine Ban Convention in Managua, Nicaragua, convened by the United Nations pursuant to Resolution 55/33 V. Despite the uncertainties of air travel at the time, the event was marked both by an impressive attendance of more than 90 states and by positive results that augur well for the future implementation of this convention. The second annual conference of States parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will take place later this year. It will consider several proposals addressing the scope of the convention, compliance issues, small calibre weapons and ammunition, anti-vehicle mines, and the problem of explosive remnants of war. The Secretary-General is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as Depositary to both of these important legal instruments.

    The global legal regime is particularly underdeveloped in the fields of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, preventing an arms race in outer space, and missiles and other delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. Some of these problems, however, have been getting increased attention in recent years. General Assembly Resolution 55/33 A has asked the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, and to submit this report to the General Assembly at its 57th session. China has introduced in the Conference on Disarmament a proposal for a treaty banning the deployment of weapons in space. The Programme of Action successfully adopted at the July 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects provides a blueprint for international cooperation that may eventually lead to binding international norms. A question remains: will the events of 11 September encourage States to consider once again the need to prohibit the transfer of military-grade small arms and light weapons to non-state actors?

    The chronic deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament — the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — is another serious problem that demands an urgent solution, one that will be found only in the political will of Member States to begin negotiations. Perhaps the new spirit of cooperation that has been re-kindled by the events of 11 September will help to breathe new life into this vitally important international institution.

    Taken alone, any one of these obstacles would be a cause for concern, but taken together, they suggest that disarmament is facing a very difficult road ahead. The crisis that disarmament is facing in multilateral diplomacy may reflect a deeper crisis of the nation-state system as it copes with the new forces of globalization. Large-scale terrorist events, and the possession or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are only two of a growing list of twenty-first century problems that are straining the capacities of political institutions that were developed in other historical contexts, while casting new doubts on the utility of attempting to solve such problems through the exercise of military might. As highlighted in the Millennium Declaration, the Road Map to implement that declaration, and the Secretary-General’s recent report on the work of the organization, the United Nations offers indispensable tools to address precisely such twenty-first century problems.

    Despite the difficult challenges ahead for international peace and security, disarmament remains an attractive alternative to both deterrence and military defensive measures as responses to these challenges. One of the most important contributions of the United Nations in this field comes in the gathering and dissemination of information about worldwide progress in achieving important arms limitation and disarmament goals. On behalf of Member States, the DDA maintains the Register of Conventional Arms, which keeps track of the production and trade of seven categories of major weapons systems. This year more than a hundred governments made submissions to the Register, the highest level of participation since the Register was created nine years ago.

    More Member States are also using the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures — this year, nearly 60 have reported data using this instrument, almost double the average number from previous years. Last July, the States attending the United Nations Small Arms Conference assigned the DDA the responsibility of collating and circulating data on the implementation of the Programme of Action agreed at that conference. DDA’s role as the coordination centre in the Secretariat of all United Nations activities in the field of small arms was specifically welcomed in UNGA Resolution 55/33 F.

    As requested by the General Assembly, DDA is also working with a group of outside experts to prepare a study on disarmament and non-proliferation education that the Secretary-General will submit to the General Assembly at its 57th session. These experts have met twice this year and are making progress in identifying constructive initiatives at the primary, secondary, university and postgraduate levels of education, in all regions of the world. Through its many symposia, newsletters, databases, monographs, films, posters, brochures, lectures to student groups, intern and fellowship programmes, a regularly-updated web site, and its new 454-page annual United Nations Disarmament Yearbook — DDA is giving its educational responsibilities every bit of attention they deserve, despite the heavy strain on its limited resources.

    I would like to take this occasion to invite all members of this Committee to attend a special symposium on “Terrorism and Disarmament” that the DDA will host on the afternoon of 25 October, involving experts from the IAEA, the OPCW, and other institutions. This timely event will examine the specific contributions that disarmament can make in addressing global terrorist threats.

    Mr. Chairman, this Committee faces the difficult task of moving beyond the tears, the grief, and the anger from 11 September — and from all acts of terrorism in all countries — to the re-establishment of a just and stable foundation for international peace and security. The Committee must adhere to its long-standing priorities — it must keep its focus on discovering the ways and means of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General stated in his message last month to the General Conference of the IAEA, “Making progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is more important than ever in the aftermath of last week’s appalling terrorist attack on the United States.” Though all terrorism is tragic and unacceptable, the United Nations must place its highest priority on eliminating threats that potentially affect the greatest number of people — threats to international peace and security — threats, in short, that arise from weapons of mass destruction.

    The Committee has before it many resolutions that point the way ahead in achieving this basic aim. As it considers these resolutions, Member States may also wish to consider in their deliberations some broader questions that concern the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. Recent events, combined with the current crisis in multilateral disarmament diplomacy, may also suggest that the time has come to re-visit the proposal to convene a Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament.

    There is one question, however, that surely does not belong on this agenda, and that is the question of whether the primary focus of this Committee should change from “disarmament” to merely the regulation or limitation of arms. There is of course an important need for efforts on both fronts. When it comes to weapons of mass destruction, there is no question that the world would be far better off pursuing the total and verifiable elimination of such weapons than in perpetuating the fantasy that their possession can be permanently limited to an assortment of exclusive, but by no means leak-proof clubs. By contrast, controls over conventional weapons are in general better pursued by transparent regulatory approaches that limit the numbers or characteristics of agreed weapons systems — approaches that are consistent with the inherent right of self defence in Article 51 of the Charter. Together, both approaches complement each other well in serving the common interest of international peace and security

    Much ground has already been tilled. In their Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the States parties reaffirmed their common conviction that “the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” — and that includes a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon. Given the consequences of even a single use of a nuclear weapon, is international peace and security best preserved by partial or conditional guarantees, or by an absolute guarantee? The same question also applies to other weapons of mass destruction.

    It is not at all unrealistic or inappropriate for this Committee to keep its focus on the search for absolute guarantees, and the more it searches, the more it will return to disarmament — not regulation — as the solution for weapons of mass destruction. In addressing such weapons, the Committee should explore ways of bringing disarmament to the world, or of bringing the world to disarmament, but disarmament must be done. As members of this committee, ask not for whom the Peace Bell tolls. It tolls for you.

  • Analysis of NPT PrepComm III

    Summary

    The third and final preparatory meeting for the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concluded at 10:30 p.m. May 21st with an agreement to disagree. In the arcane world of nuclear diplomacy, this was considered a step forward, since the 1998 Second PrepComm had concluded in disarray without an agreement that the parties disagreed. The 1999 action was but a thin cover over the deadlock persisting between the Western Nuclear Weapons States and the leading non-Nuclear Weapons States and, given the worsening international climate, signals a struggle of immense proportions to maintain the viability of the NPT after 2000.

    China excoriated the United States for “wantonly bombing Yugoslavia for more than 40 days,” bullying other countries, and pursuing an inflammatory missile defence system. The U.S. stated that its commitment to the NPT’s Article VI “is broad and deep,” but refused to allow a subsidiary body, which would examine the details of nuclear disarmament, to be established at the 2000 Review. The New Agenda Coalition tabled a working paper with 44 co-sponsors, criticizing the NWS for re-rationalizing their continued possession of nuclear weapons, and calling for “a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination” of nuclear weapons, which “will require a multilateral agreement.” The Non-Aligned Movement went further, with its repeated call for the commencement of negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament within “a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear-Weapons Convention… .” Canada, building on its new nuclear weapons policy statement, presented a draft of new Principles and Objectives for the 2000 Review, which called for acceleration of the START process, the engagement of the three other NWS “in the near future,” and additional new measures such as de-alerting. A lengthy list of States’ proposals was blended into a 61-paragraph Chairman’s Paper which, while not going as far as the NAM desires, went well beyond what the Western NWS would accept. The Chairman, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, included: a call for negotiations on the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons; de-alerting, de-targeting and de-activating all nuclear weapons and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; an expression of “deep concern that Israel continues to be the only State in the [Middle East] which has not yet acceded to the [NPT] and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA; a legally-binding negative security assurances regime; an ad-hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament “with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.” Several hours of debate on the Chairman’s Paper revealed once more the continuing wide split between the Western NWS and the gathering forces of the NNWS who are increasing their demands that the “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,” promised in 1995, be lived up to. Almost to the end of the PrepComm, it appeared that absolute deadlock would prevail, as occurred in 1998. But deft steering by the Chairman and a general feeling on all sides that a second total collapse of the PrepComm process could prove fatal for the 2000 Review led to an agreement to send to the 2000 Review the Chairman’s Paper along with all the papers submitted by States with the notation: “The Preparatory Committee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.”

    This strategem allows the PrepComm material, containing many ideas for strengthening the NPT, to go forward. But Western NWS opposition to the ideas themselves persists.

    1. During the three years of annual PrepComms leading up to the 2000 Review, the nuclear weapons situation has worsened. START II is blocked. The Conference on Disarmament is virtually paralyzed. Overt nuclear proliferation has spread to India and Pakistan. The Nuclear Weapons States continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals. NATO has reaffirmed that nuclear weapons are “essential.” The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is nowhere near entering into force. A fourth U.N. Special Session on Disarmament has been blocked by India, which says that as long as the U.S. opposes nuclear disarmament as a chief item on the agenda, India doesn’t want the Session at all.

    2. The 1999 PrepComm opened under the cloud of the Kosovo war, which, among its other serious consequences for the international community, has severely strained relations between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China. NATO’s decisions to take in nine more nations (on top of the three new members), operate aggressively out-of-area, and bypass the U.N. Security Council in prosecuting the Kosovo war have angered Russia and China in the extreme. An additional $300 billion will be pumped into the U.S. defence budget by 2003 which already is 18 times larger than the combined spending of the seven so-called “rogue” States identified by the Pentagon. The U.S. Congress has enshrined in ional security policy the intention to field a national ballistic missile defence system; the Pentagon has budgeted $10.5 billion over the next six years to create a workable system. Not only is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty now under threat, the whole non-proliferation regime is under siege. A new nuclear arms race is certain, unless Washington, Moscow and Beijing can quickly put collaborative efforts back on track.

    3. China went up front at the PrepComm in castigating the U.S. Stung by the three NATO missiles that struck China’s embassy in Belgrade, Ambassador Sha Zukang led off his opening speech with a condemnation of NATO’s bombing campaign. “The Chinese Government and people express their utmost indignation and severe condemnation of the barbarian act and lodge the strongest protest. U.S-led NATO should bear all responsibilities arising therefrom.” Sha then accused the U.S., through trying to build absolute security on the insecurity of others, of undermining international peace and security and impairing efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He singled out the proposed U.S. missile defence system as an unacceptable U.S. effort to achieve strategic superiority in the 21st century. “It will disrupt global and regional strategic balances and stability, and possibly trigger off a new round of arms races.” He foresaw the collapse of existing international regimes on disarmament if the U.S. continues its present bullying methods, forcing other countries to resort to every possible means to protect themselves. “If that happens, the bombardment by the U.S. led NATO is the only thing to blame and it is U.S. and NATO which will provoke the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Calling for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, he promoted proposals already put forward, including the time-bound nuclear disarmament program advanced by the NAM, the work of the New Agenda Coalition, and the Canberra Commission Report.

    4. The U.S. speech, given by Norman A. Wulf, reiterated U.S. strong commitment to the NPT and “continuing to meet its obligations under all aspects of the Treaty.” He criticized the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan as “a grave disservice to our collective efforts because it occurred in the context of an historic achievement of a CTBT and a continuing deep reduction in the number of nuclear weapons worldwide.” He called for a “balanced” review process. “We must approach our work with a healthy dose of realism and avoid the assumption that the NPT process can achieve what has not been achievable elsewhere.”

    5. The U.S. tabled two lengthy Fact Sheets detailing steps the U.S. has taken in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The information package showed that the U.S. has brought its deployed strategic nuclear weapons down from 12,000 in 1989 to about 8,000 today, and that 80 percent of the tactical warhead stockpile has been eliminated. “The U.S., through the vigorous pursuit and conclusion of strategic and theater nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with the former Soviet Union, and by canceling new procurement and development programs, has helped to end the Superpower nuclear arms race. This Article VI obligation has been achieved.” Mr. Wulf attempted to marginalize the New Agenda Coalition by stating: “There has been a lot of focus this past year on trying to identify a new agenda for the disarmament process. I would suggest that we have an existing agenda that remains to be completed.”

    6. The NGO community immediately issued a rebuttal to U.S. claims that it is advancing nuclear disarmament. The U.S. Fact Sheets had not mentioned Presidential Decision Directive 60, in which the U.S. will continue to rely on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the “indefinite future.” In addition, recent planning documents of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate nuclear retaliation against the use of chemical and biological arms, an action that would violate negative security assurances.

    The NGO statement said the 8,000 figure was misleading because it counted only operational weapons. By counting those in reserve, the total exceeds 10,000 warheads. The Stockpile Stewardship Program, encompassing sub-critical testing at weapons laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore, violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the CTBT; and the U.S. plans to invest $45 billion over the next decade for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, and production. Stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium are maintained at excessive levels. “While the U.S. may have completely eliminated more than a dozen different types of nuclear warheads, during the same period it has initiated programs to develop several new warheads, or modifications of existing warheads.” These include: the B-61/11, a new earth-penetrating warhead, a new warhead to be deployed on the Trident I and II missile, a refurbishment for the W87, currently used on MX missiles, and improvements for the B83.

    7. Thirteen NGO papers were verbally presented to the PrepComm, covering many aspects of the NPT. Forums and literature were in abundance. At one forum, the new book, “Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention,” whose principal authors are Merav Datan and Alyn Ware, was presented. This thorough examination of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, already a U.N. document, was distributed to delegates. At the forum, Rebecca Johnson, who provided excellent daily reporting (with Nicola Butler) of the PrepComm on behalf of the Acronym Institute, made an interesting observation. A paradigm shift of thinking from the impossibility to the practicality of nuclear weapons abolition is needed. When the paradigm shift occurs, we will be surprised how fast nuclear abolition will take hold. She likened the work of NGOs today to loosening the earth around a big rock at the top of a mountain; after enough digging, the rock will start to roll down the mountain – unstoppable.

    8. The NAM paper called once again for commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on “a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention… .” The NAM also called for negotiations for a legal instrument assuring non-nuclear States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances) to be annexed as a protocol to the NPT. In fulfillment of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the NAM stressed the urgency of Israel acceding to the NPT without delay and recommended a subsidiary body at the 2000 Review to examine this question.

    9. Following adoption of its Resolution 53/77Y at the 1998 UNGA, the New Agenda Coalition submitted a paper, which showed growth of support for the NAC. Though Slovenia, a NATO aspirant, had dropped off the original membership of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, the group was augmented by 37 more countries that co-sponsored the paper: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

    The NAC paper expressed “profound concern” at the lack of evidence that the NWS are living up to their commitments to Article VI. “On the contrary, the continued possession of nuclear weapons has been re-rationalized. Nuclear doctrines have been reaffirmed. …The indefinite extension of the NPT does not sanction the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. That must be absolutely clear. …It is imperative to secure a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination of these weapons.”

    The NAC called for the pursuit of the START process, the “seamless integration” into the process by the other NWS, de-alerting, reduction of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, and a legally-binding Negative Security Assurances.

    10. Canada, building on its new policy statement on nuclear weapons, said that all members of the international community have “a binding obligation” to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI, even though for the foreseeable future the primary responsibility for the negotiation of nuclear reductions rests with the U.S. and Russia, with the engagement of the other three NWS “in the near future.” Canada proposed a new set of Principles and Objectives, to be adopted at the 2000 Review, which would press for acceleration of the START process, de-alerting, entry-into-force of the CTBT, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and discussion of nuclear disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament.

    11. It was left to the Chairman to distill the 27 working papers and other documents submitted by delegations into a coherent presentation of ideas to strengthen the NPT. His final version, amounting to 61 paragraphs, was considered a progressive document, since it embodied an ad hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament, and a call to Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards “without further delay and without conditions.” These two subjects – comprehensive negotiations for nuclear disarmament and Israeli compliance with the NPT – are the thorniest issues the 2000 Review will face. Therefore, the NAM, led by South Africa, pressed for subsidiary bodies to be attached to the regular main committees in 2000 for the purpose of giving detailed attention to nuclear disarmament and the Israeli situation. The United States vigorously objected – as it had in 1998 to the same proposal. For a few moments the PrepComm teetered on the point of subsidiary bodies, a surrogate issue representing the basic split between the NWS and the leading NNWS. Then,because neither side wanted the PrepComm to fail outright, compromise language was crafted in which it was noted that some delegations proposed subsidiary bodies be established, and some delegations wanted to defer the decision, and thus the question would be resolved at the 2000 Review. A sigh of relief went around the room. And when the formal decision was taken to send the Chairman’s Paper forward, with the specific notation that it was not an agreed text, delegates applauded.

    12. Egypt immediately struck a realistic note, stating the PrepComm had not been a success and that no substantive recommendations had been sent to the 2000 Review. It hoped for better results on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East problem in 2000.

    Conclusion

    The NPT stalemate, crucial as it is to the hopes for a viable non-proliferation regime in the 21st century, is itself part of a larger world struggle today. Nuclear weapons, like the Kosovo war, are about the rule of law. How will international law be imposed in the years ahead: by the militarily powerful determining what the law will be, or by a collective world effort reposing the seat of law in the United Nations system? Already, only a decade after the end of the Cold War, the hopes for a cooperative global security system have been dashed on the rocks of power. The trust, engendered during the early post-Cold War years, is now shattered. New arms races are underway.

    It would be the height of folly to sweep under the rug this unpleasant turn of events. It would be equally folly to think that the rest of the world is powerless against the NWS. Gains are being made, however small compared to the immensity of the nuclear weapons problem. Reductions have occurred. Good documentation, even if not agreed, has been prepared for the 2000 Review. The New Agenda Coalition is developing strength. NATO has committed itself to review its nuclear weapons policy. There is an interplay in these NPT-NAC-NATO developments. Singly,they may not amount to much; taken together and built upon by a new fusion of strength by like-minded governments and the advanced wave of civil society, they can create enormous world pressure that the NWS will not be able to ignore.

    The world is staring into an abyss of nuclear weapons proliferation. The danger of the use of nuclear weapons is growing. The recognition of this should galvanize intelligent and committed people – in both governments and civil society – to action.

  • General Lee Butler on NATO’s Nuclear Policy

    Jean-Pol Poncelet
    Minister of Defense
    Belgian Ministry of Defense
    Belgium
    Via Fax: 32-2-550-29-19

    Dear Defense Minister Poncelet,

    German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s suggestion that NATO revise its nuclear doctrine is most welcome. As you discuss these matters with your colleagues it may be that my own experience in thinking through this question as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the U. S. armed forces during the Gulf war might be helpful. I was equally engaged in the matter of prospective nuclear response to attack by WMD during my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Strategic Command during the period 1991 to 1994.

    As you are keenly aware, the Gulf War presented us with the very real possibility of confronting such an attack by the forces of Iraq. We went through the exercise of imagining how it might unfold and examining a variety of response options. My personal conclusion was that under any likely attack scenario, a nuclear reply by the United States and its allies was simply out of the question.

    First, from a purely military perspective, the coalition forces had the conventional capability to impose any desired war termination objectives on Iraq, to include unconditional surrender and occupation. For a variety of reasons, we elected not to go to that extreme but it was clearly an option in the face of a WMD attack.

    Second, given our conventional superiority, and the nature of the war zone, the use of nuclear weapons simply made no tactical nor strategic sense. General Powell noted in his memoirs that several weapons would have been required to mount any sort of effective campaign against military targets, an option that Secretary Cheney immediately rejected – and understandably so. Further, whatever the immediate battlefield effects, the problems of radioactive fall-out carrying over into friendly forces or surrounding countries were unfathomable.

    Third, the larger political issues were insurmountable. What could possibly justify our resort to the very means we properly abhor and condemn? How could we hold an entire society accountable for the decision of a single demented leader who holds his own country hostage? Moreover, the consequences for the nonproliferation regime would have been severe. By joining our enemy in shattering the tradition of non-use that had held for 45 years, we would have destroyed U.S. credibility as leader of the campaign against nuclear proliferation; indeed, we would likely have emboldened a whole now array of nuclear aspirants.

    In short, in a singular act we would have martyred our principal foe, alienated our friends, destroyed the coalition so painstakingly constructed, given comfort to the non-declared nuclear states and impetus to states who seek such weapons covertly.

    In the end, we tried to have it both ways, privately ruling out a nuclear reply while maintaining an ambiguous declaratory policy. The infamous and widely misre-presented letter from Secretary Baker to Baghdad was ill-advised; in fact, Iraq violated with impunity one of its cardinal prohibitions by torching Kuwait’s oil fields.

    When I left my J-5 post in Washington and took up this issue as CINCSTRAT, I found all of the foregoing cautions to be relevant across a wide spectrum of prospective targets in a variety of so-called rogue nations. I ultimately concluded that whatever the utility of a First Use policy during the Cold War, it is entirely inappropriate to the new global security environment; worse, it is counterproductive to the goal of nonproliferation and antithetical to the values of democratic societies.

    Please forgive this rather abrupt intrusion into your deliberations. Obviously, I would not take such a liberty if I did not believe it was warranted by the import and the urgency of the issue.

    Warm regards,

    Lee Butler
    General, USAF (Retired)
    11122 Williams Plaza
    Omaha, NE 68144

    The letter was sent to the following official:.

    Jean-Pol Poncelet
    Minister of Defense
    Belgian Ministry of Defense
    Belgium
    Via Fax: 32-2-550-29-19

    Art Eggleton
    Minister of Defense
    Canadian Department of National Defense
    Canada
    Via Fax: 613-995-8189

    Hans Haekkerup
    Minister of Defense
    Royal Danish Ministry of Defense
    Denmark
    Via Fax: 45-33-32-0655

    Akis Tsohatzpoulos
    Minister of Defense
    Greek Ministry of Defense
    Greece
    Via Fax: 301-644-3832

    Eduardo Serra Rexach
    Minister of Defense
    Spanish Ministry of Defense
    Spain
    Via Fax: 34-91-55-63958

    Joris Voorhoeve
    Minister of Defense
    Dutch Ministry of Defense
    The Netherlands
    Via Fax: 31-70-345-9189

    Ismet Sezgin
    Minister of Defense
    Turkish Ministry of Defense
    Turkey
    Via Fax: 90-312-418-3384

    Jose Veiga Simao
    Minister of Defense
    Portugese Ministry of Defense
    Portugal
    Via Fax: 351-1-301-95-55

    Beniamino Andreatta
    Minister of Defense
    Italian Ministry of Defense
    Italy
    Via Fax: 39-06-488-5756

    Rudolf Scharping
    Minister of Defense
    German Ministry of Defense
    Germany
    Via Fax: 49-228-12-5255

    Dag Jostein Fjaevoll
    Minister of Defense
    Norwegian Ministry of Defense
    Norway
    Via Fax: 47-23-09-2323

    George Roberston
    Minster of Defence
    UK Ministry of Defence
    United Kingdom
    Via Fax: 44-171-218-7140

    Alain Richard
    Minister of Defense
    French Ministry of Defense
    France
    Via Fax: 33-1-47-05-40-91
    Hallder Asgrimsson
    Minister of Foreign Affairs
    Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    Iceland
    Via Fax: 354-562-2373

    Alex Bodry
    Foreign Minister
    Ministere de la Force Publique
    Luxembourg
    Via Fax: 352-46-26-82