Tag: new START

  • It’s Time for the Senate to Vote on New START

    This article was originally published by the Washington Post.

    The Senate should promptly vote to approve the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) with Russia for one reason: It increases U.S. national security. This is precisely why Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared at the outset of Senate consideration of the treaty that it has “the unanimous support of America’s military leadership.”

    The treaty reduces and caps the Russian nuclear arsenal. It reestablishes and makes stronger the verification procedures that allow U.S. inspectors to conduct on-site inspections and surveillance of Russian nuclear weapons and facilities. It strengthens international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and it opens the door to progress on further critical nonproliferation efforts, such as reducing Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

    Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has urged the Senate to ratify the treaty, and seven former Strategic Command (STRATCOM) chiefs have called on Senate leaders to move quickly.

    In addition to our military leadership, there is overwhelming bipartisan support for the treaty among national security experts. Also, officials from the past seven administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, testified before Senate committees in support of the treaty. In fact, the number of Republican former officials testifying outnumbered the number of Democrats.

    We were part of a group of 30 former national security leaders from both political parties — including former secretary of state Colin Powell, former defense secretary Frank Carlucci and former national security adviser Sandy Berger — who published an open letter in support of the treaty.

    The Senate has done its due diligence: Over the course of 21 hearings and briefings during the last five months, senators have had the opportunity to ask questions and put to rest concerns. From the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, senators learned that the treaty in no way limits the ability of our military to deploy the missile defenses it needs or wants. From STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton, they learned that with the treaty in place, the United States will retain a strong and reliable deterrent. Sen. John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even delayed the committee vote on the treaty to give senators an extra month to review background materials and seek answers to their questions.

    Now it is time to act.

    While substantive questions about the treaty have been put to rest, some senators are trying to delay consideration of it based on an unrelated funding issue, namely, claims that future funding for the U.S. nuclear arsenal might be insufficient.

    This is wrong for two reasons.

    First, these claims fly in the face of the considered opinions of Chilton and National Nuclear Security Administration head Thomas D’Agostino, the men charged with overseeing our nuclear weapons and weapons laboratories. They, along with Gates and Mullen, have made clear that the administration’s 10-year, $80 billion plan to modernize our nuclear infrastructure, which would result in a 15 percent increase over current spending levels, represents the funding level that is needed and can be executed in a timely manner.

    More important, delaying this treaty over an unrelated matter undermines our national security.

    By the time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes Sept. 16 on whether to send the treaty to the Senate floor for ratification, it will have been more than 280 days and counting since the United States lost the ability to conduct on-site inspections, monitoring and verification of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This ability will not begin again until the treaty is ratified.

    As Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) told the committee, “The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed Dec. 5, is very serious and impacts our national security.”

    Given the national security stakes and the overwhelming support from the military and national security community, we hope that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will send the treaty to the floor with robust bipartisan backing and that senators will promptly ratify it with the kind of resounding margin such measures have historically enjoyed.

    Senate approval of New START would send a strong message to the world that the United States can overcome partisan differences and take concrete, practical action to reduce the nuclear threat and enhance our nation’s security.

  • Can We Live With the Bomb?

    This article was originally published on the History News Network.

    For some time now, it has been clear that nuclear weapons threaten the existence not only of humanity, but of all life on Earth.

    Thus, Barack Obama’s pledge to work for a nuclear weapons-free world—made during his 2008 presidential campaign and subsequently in public statements—has resonated nicely with supporters of nuclear disarmament and with the general public.

    But recent developments have called that commitment into question.  The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review does not indicate any dramatic departures in the use of nuclear weapons, while its nuclear weapons budget request for the next fiscal year represents a 14 percent increase over this year’s counterpart.  The most alarming sign that the administration might be preparing for a nuclear weapons-filled future is its proposal to spend $180 billion over the next ten years to upgrade the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex.

    From the standpoint of nuclear critics, the best interpretation of such measures—and one that might be accurate—is that they are designed to win support among hawkish Republican senators for the New START Treaty, which will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.  After all, the political argument goes, if Obama is to secure the sixty-seven Senate votes necessary to ratify the treaty, he needs to pick up some Republican support.  Of course, these pro-nuclear measures might reflect a quite different scenario, one in which Obama is abandoning yet another political promise.

    In this context, we might ask:  would abandoning the promise of nuclear abolition be a bad idea?

    There are at least five good reasons why it would be:

    1. 1. If nuclear weapons are not scrapped, it is inevitable that, sooner or later, they will be used in war.  Nations (and before them, competing territories) have engaged in war for thousands of years, and for these wars they have been tempted to draw upon the most powerful weapons in their arsenals.  Today, such weapons are nuclear weapons—some 23,000 of them.  Although supporters of these weapons maintain that they deter nuclear war, there is no reason to assume that nuclear deterrence works, or at least works in all cases.  This is indicated by the U.S. government’s pursuit of national missile defense and its attempts to head off other nations (e.g. Iran) from developing nuclear weapons.
    2. If nuclear weapons are not scrapped, it is inevitable that additional nations will develop them.  When some nations maintain large, devastating nuclear arsenals, it is naïve to expect other nations to tamely sit back and accept their non-nuclear status.  Over the decades, this situation of military inequality has spurred on nuclear proliferation and, unless nuclear nations divest themselves of their nuclear weapons, it will continue to do so.
    3. If nuclear weapons are not scrapped, it is likely that they will be used by terrorists.  Terrorists do not have the production facilities for building or testing nuclear weapons, but they have the possibility of obtaining them, though theft or bribery, from national arsenals.  While nuclear weapons exist in national arsenals, obtaining and using them against civilian populations will provide a constant temptation to terrorists.
    4. If nuclear weapons are not scrapped, it is likely that they will be exploded accidentally.  Numerous nuclear accidents—from nuclear weapons dropped to mistaken nuclear war alerts—have already occurred, although so far without detonation.  In an age of BP oil explosions and other technological disasters, there are limits to how long we can press our luck with nuclear weapons technology.
    5. If nuclear weapons are not scrapped, they—and the uranium mining, warhead production, and testing they necessitate—will continue to pollute the earth with radioactive waste for thousands of years.  Nuclear waste disposal is already a very significant problem in the United States, and, not surprisingly, no state has yet volunteered to serve as the permanent dumping ground for it.

    In short, while nuclear weapons exist, we are living on the brink of an unprecedented catastrophe.

    Thus, if we are wise, we should draw back from the brink and address the problem posed by nuclear weapons.  If the U.S. government and others are serious about building a nuclear weapons-free world, they should begin negotiations on a nuclear abolition treaty.  And, if they are not serious about nuclear abolition, the public should raise enough of a ruckus so that they have no alternative to becoming serious.

    If we can’t live with the Bomb, we should begin planning to get rid it.

  • The New US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

    Falk:    The New START treaty successfully negotiated between the United States and Russia imposed several limits on strategic armaments.  It calls for the reduction of the number of deployed strategic warheads by approximately 30 percent and reduces the number of deployed launchers that each side has to 700.  This seems like an intrinsically desirable step and a stabilizing step.  But the question it raises in my mind is whether this represents a first step in the realization of President Obama’s Prague vision of a year ago that spoke so eloquently about a world without nuclear weapons; or whether it should be conceived as a return to the managerial approach associated with arms control during the Cold War, where these kind of stabilizing arrangements between the Soviet Union and the United States represented not a path toward nuclear disarmament, but a managerial substitute for nuclear disarmament.  Such a path clearly was beneficial, diminishing risks of certain kinds of instability in the arms race between the two superpowers and kept costs of maintaining nuclear weapons arsenals within agreed boundaries.

    Krieger:    There are elements of both perspectives in this agreement.  Those who are making the agreement would argue that it is a step in the right direction, but it is also a necessary step to deal with the discontent that exists among the non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  While the US and Russia were willing to miss the December 2009 deadline of the expiration of the START 1 treaty, which this replaces, it appears that they were not willing to miss the deadline of having this treaty in place prior to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which will be held in May.  My reading of the timing of this treaty is that it’s designed to show the non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT that the US and Russia are at least demonstrating signs of life when it comes to issues of nuclear disarmament and not disregarding their promises and obligations, as I would say was largely the case during the previous eight years leading up to the assumption of power by the Obama administration.

    Falk:    Yes, I think that’s a very important double point.  In other words, that this agreement, however one describes it, does establish for Obama a sense that he is pursuing security issues in the nuclear weapons context in a different and more responsible way than was done during the Bush presidency.  And, secondly, I think you’re absolutely right that a primary incentive to reach this kind of agreement at this time was to provide reassurance to the non-nuclear states just prior to the NPT Review Conference that the two leading nuclear weapons states were themselves trying to do something by way of denuclearization to make the world a safer place.  I still believe it leaves open the question as to whether we who believe in the importance of the Prague vision of zero nuclear weapons being taken seriously as a political project (and not just as high flown rhetoric or easily dismissed as “utopian”) should view this New START treaty with enthusiasm or with a certain prudent skepticism.  I feel, as someone who has been disappointed often in the past by the pretention that arms control is positively linked to a disarmament agenda, that we as citizens should at least express a certain skepticism about what is going on, particularly if, as seems likely, there will be a big domestic fight to get this treaty ratified in the course of which the administration is probably likely to give additional reassurances up front and behind the scenes that it will be cautious about any further steps to reduce the quality and size of the US nuclear weapons arsenal.  It would be acceptable, and probably desirable, to support the ratification of this treaty, but with eyes wide open as to its probable irrelevance to achieving a disarming world.

    Krieger:    There are a few things we can say with certainty.  One is that the lowering of the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles is something to be looked at positively.  At least it is movement in the right direction.  The second point, though, is that the numbers that are agreed upon are still far more than enough to destroy civilization and most life on the planet.  So while this may be a positive step, it hasn’t removed the most serious danger of nuclear war as a possibility.  That’s an issue that citizens in both countries need to be aware of, and certainly we shouldn’t be looking at this treaty as an end in itself.  I’m sure that President Obama and President Medvedev agree that this was meant to be a next step and not the final goal.

    Falk:    Don’t you think that has always been said about arms control agreements?  If you look back at the Cold War, at the various agreements, they were always said to be steps in the right direction, but look where we ended up.

    Krieger:    Right, but even in his Prague speech, President Obama tempered his vision of a world without nuclear weapons by saying that it was doubtful that it could happen within his lifetime.  So he has already expressed the possibility of parameters that go far beyond his control.  To show real seriousness, the kind of seriousness for achieving a world without nuclear weapons that you’re looking for and that I’m looking for, would require President Obama – I think United States leadership is essential here – to initiate negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons.  That would promise to be a complicated process, which would involve not only the US and Russia and the other nuclear weapon states, but all countries in the world in serious negotiations.  Initiating those negotiations would constitute a benchmark for real seriousness about nuclear disarmament as opposed to arms control measures and as opposed to a primary concern with stopping proliferation or the spread of nuclear weapons.

    Falk:    I agree with you and would extend that argument a little bit by saying that this kind of arms control reduction, as you correctly take note of, doesn’t really change the fundamental vulnerability of the world to a catastrophic or apocalyptic use of the weaponry and, indeed, keeps intact a very large nuclear weapons capability for both leading nuclear weapon states.  It even increases appropriations over the next five years so as to upgrade the weaponry being retained.  In this sense, since the arsenal will remain very large, and under no circumstances would more than a small percentage of such weaponry be considered relevant for use, it could be that the total impact of these adjustments will make the United States and Russia more attached to these weapons than previously.  But I would go one step further and say that if the intention of this treaty was to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in world politics, a more direct and less difficult path would have been to agree upon and solicit the participation of the other nuclear weapon states in a declaration of No First Use with regard to nuclear weapons.  An unequivocal declaration, reinforced by adjustments in doctrines and deployment, exhibits a much clearer repudiation of the relevance of nuclear weaponry to the pursuit of national interests.  Such a declaration would reveal with some clarity the intention of a government with regard to the role of these weapons.  The refusal of governments to renounce first use options is a significant signal that disarmament, as distinct from arms control, is unlikely to become a serious policy option in the future, and I have felt this way ever since the original use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities in 1945.  And likewise, this unwillingness to make such a No First Use declaration compromises claims to abhor the weaponry and expressions of intention to avoid any future use.

        If a government claims the necessity of possessing this weaponry of mass destruction, then at least it should limit the claim to circumstances of actual necessity, which would imply confining the role of nuclear weapons to a purely deterrent role and, even then, available only in a defensive mode as a possible retaliatory weapon whose existence is mainly intended to discourage others from ever using them first.  This failure after so many decades to make such a declaration raises serious doubts in my mind as to whether there is really the intentionality needed in this country, and likely elsewhere, to move seriously toward the elimination of the weaponry.  

        I’d say just one further thought on this: That it also would have been possible for the Obama administration to propose the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, where the danger of some kind of war connected with these weapons, either to prevent others from obtaining them or to initiate a preemptive attack of some kind, seems to pose a particularly serious danger.  The unwillingness to endorse this kind of initiative, even though it has been around for quite a while, is again an indication to me that despite the Prague speech and the rhetoric contained therein, that the Obama presidency is not going to challenge the long and well established nuclear weapons status quo.  In the Middle East the Obama presidency is undoubtedly inhibited by not wanting to exert pressure on Israel to take part in an arrangement to ensure the elimination of the weaponry in the region, but if true, it confirms the relatively low strategic priority attached to denuclearization goals.

    Krieger:    I took the Prague speech as a sign of hope, particularly in relation to the previous eight years of the Bush presidency, but at the same time, more an argument for measures for nonproliferation than for disarmament.  The issues that were emphasized in the Prague speech were arms reductions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and stopping terrorists from getting nuclear weapons.  I don’t disagree with any of those points, but I do think that they belong on to the side of nonproliferation rather than nuclear disarmament.  The one thing that President Obama really has never spoken publicly about in the Prague speech or elsewhere is No First Use of nuclear weapons.  As you know, the US government has just released a new Nuclear Posture Review.  This Nuclear Posture Review will set the parameters for US nuclear policy for at least the years of the Obama administration and possibly beyond.  I understand that the idea of No First Use was discussed and rejected.  As positive as it would be to have pledges of No First Use and leadership from the United States on that issue, it was rejected.  This suggests that arms control and nonproliferation are higher priorities than nuclear disarmament.  I would also mention that as a candidate, President Obama talked about de-alerting the US nuclear arsenal, taking the weapons off of high alert.  That would be another positive step in demonstrating a devaluation of the US nuclear arsenal.  But that also seems to have dropped from the agenda and the US and Russia still maintain a total of some 2,000 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert.  There are far more nuclear weapons than that, but there are still a thousand on each side, approximately, that are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired within moments of an order to do so.  

            On nuclear weapon-free zones, that is an area that deserves support.  We now have nuclear weapon-free zones in most of the southern hemisphere of the world.  But even though the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty promised in 1995 – in some states’ eyes as a condition of extending the treaty – to work toward a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, that not only has not come to pass, but there hasn’t been much effort in that direction.  That creates a far more dangerous situation than need be in the most volatile part of the world.

    Falk:    Yes, I agree, and I think that the discussion we’ve had up to this point does raise the question of whether those who really believe that it is morally, legally, and politically desirable to work seriously toward nuclear disarmament – that it is in fact overdue, but that goal be affirmed and steps taken to realize it – should be complicit in this continuing dynamic of shifting the emphasis to arms control and nonproliferation.  I see no evidence that there is any kind of political project underway that seeks to achieve nuclear disarmament and, until I see that, I am very skeptical that if one wants to get to zero, this is the path that will get the country and the world moving in that direction.  My related point here is that we need to make clear as an educational priority that strengthening the nonproliferation regime and managing existing nuclear weapons arsenals may be helpful steps, but that there is every indication that such steps are leading to a dead end if our goal is zero nuclear weapons.  I would even argue that the historical evidence supports the view that progress in arms control tends to divert attention from disarmament and removes the goal of zero altogether from the policy agenda.  We as citizens should do our best to prevent this from happening.

    Krieger:    It puts people like ourselves and organizations such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in a difficult bind.  On the one hand, to not accept the agreement that has been made as progress seems ungrateful and perhaps overly negative to the people who have been waiting for some sign of hope in this area.  On the other hand, if we become too enthusiastic about the progress that has been made then we run the risk of not staying true to our goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.  So I feel there is a necessity to walk a very careful line here, one which acknowledges that some progress has been made and, yet, still points out that there is quite a long ways to go, that we still stand in considerable risk, the future stands in risk, and that there are some far more tangible ways in which a commitment to a nuclear weapon-free world could be manifested.

    Falk:    Don’t you think that there are some serious costs in labeling these kinds of steps as progress toward nuclear disarmament if one doesn’t believe that that’s where the path is leading.  From my perspective, it is what the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre called “false consciousness” when you subscribe to a set of propositions that are in a sense trying to provide a certain form of reassurance, but the underlying reality more carefully considered actually contradicts that reassurance.  And, after all, this path of arms control and nonproliferation is not something new.  It has been walked upon ever since the end of World War II in one way or another with periodic brief indications of an interest in nuclear disarmament, which are then later contested as to whether they were ever sincere and meant to be taken seriously.  By situating the zero goal over the horizon of Obama’s mortality, isn’t that signaling to the nuclear weapons establishment to stop worrying, and shouldn’t we by the same token start worrying!  But my point is: Have we not reached a point where it is important to expose this real choice between stabilizing and minimizing some of the risks of a nuclear weapons world and making a clear commitment to the moral, legal and political imperative of getting rid of the weapons?  What I’m trying to say is you can’t embrace both goals at once, although you could affirm arms control measures as holding operations.  You can’t have 60 years of no real progress toward nuclear disarmament and yet continue to fool yourself into thinking that by continuing to accept arms control/nonproliferation priorities you are somehow going to achieve nuclear disarmament later on.  I am really contesting your use of the word “progress.”  I think the START approach and the Nuclear Posture Review represent helpful moves toward nuclear stability, but that it is an inexcusable mistake to confuse this with progress toward disarmament.

    Krieger:    Let me respond in this way.  I think you make an important point, but I also think that both stability and nonproliferation are necessary prerequisites to actually achieving nuclear disarmament.  In other words, as long as there is a great deal of instability in the international system and as long as the prospects for nuclear proliferation are high, it seems to me that countries like the United States and Russia will err on the side of caution rather than moving energetically toward a world free of nuclear weapons.  Although the primary goals at this point, certainly for the United States, are stabilization, preventing proliferation and keeping the weapons out of the hands of terrorists, those efforts still provide a platform for more serious and actual progress toward a world without nuclear weapons.

    Falk:    I would disagree with your argument that the nonproliferation regime is a precondition for moving toward nuclear disarmament.  I think the more persuasive understanding reaches just the opposite conclusion.  I think if the nonproliferation regime were to breakdown altogether, there would surface here and elsewhere a much more energetic political will to seek nuclear disarmament because only then would the dangers to the nuclear weapon states become sufficiently evident to mobilize a popular anti-nuclear movement that is strong enough to shake the complacency of the nuclear weapons establishment.  Ali Mazrui, the eminent Kenyan political scientist, argued in his Reith Lectures on the BBC several decades ago in favor of proliferation to Third World countries, insisting that only then when the weaponry was so dispersed would the Western nuclear weapon states seriously consider getting rid of them.  His position provoked much controversy at the time, but it is not such an easy position to dismiss.  

            I think we can point to something more recent that moves in a similar direction as did Mazrui.  This is the unexpected advocacy by the Kissinger, Shultz, Nunn, Perry group of an abolitionist goal based, in my view, on their sense that the proliferation regime was being eroded in such a serious way as to undermine the advantages previously gained for the United States through possessing, developing, deploying, and threatening the use of nuclear weapons.  These mainstream realist heavyweights never showed any kind of moral or legal anxiety about relying on nuclear weapons so long as their retention conferred strategic benefits.  Their recent change of heart represents a simple realist recalculation that the world was getting more dangerous for the nuclear weapon states, and it was getting more dangerous because the nonproliferation regime was not working as effectively as it had in earlier decade, and new threats of acquisition and use by non-state, non-deterrable actors or hostile states had surfaced in the post 9/11 world.

    Krieger:    My own view of the Kissinger, Shultz, Perry, Nunn commentaries is that their primary concern is with terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons and there being no possibility of deterring those extremists with nuclear weapons.  Therefore, they’ve begun to talk about abolition as the goal, but they’re still talking in a way that is consistent with how Barack Obama is implementing his policies.  They’re talking about the goal of abolition being the top of a mountain, which they can’t even see at this time and needing to get up to the base camp in order to realize where they’re going.  I agree with you that the goal clearly has to be abolition, and we can see far enough to know what we need to do.  The Kissinger group could see that as well if they were open to it, but they’ve promoted more of a nonproliferation and stabilization agenda.  Their greatest concern seems to be that of cheaters; in other words, how do you properly verify reductions and what kind of actions do you have to take to assure that there won’t be a breakout from the agreed upon reductions.

    Falk:    Yes, I think you’re right to mention their preoccupation with terrorism, but I think, at least in my reading of their advocacy, that it is in the setting of not being able to be very trusting of the countries that now are nuclear weapon states or might become nuclear weapon states.  Their anxiety about terrorism is linked to the failures of the nonproliferation regime to restrict the weaponry to the five permanent members of the Security Council, which I think they were relative comfortable about, although they undoubtedly would have preferred an Anglo-American or Euro-American nuclear oligopoly, assuming that an American monopoly was not in the cards.  Experience with Pakistan also prompted some realist rethinking about security in the nuclear age.  It was deeply disturbing to settled attitudes of complacency that Pakistan’s leading nuclear physicist and weapons designer, A. Q. Khan, had heavily engaged in black-market activity to sell illicitly nuclear knowledge and technology.  Revelations along these lines challenged the conventional wisdom in Washington.  This meant that the control system that had been relied upon in previous decades now seemed risky and potentially very dangerous.

            Against such a background it is not surprising that a realist reappraisal made it seem preferable to work toward the elimination of the weaponry even if it turned out to be difficult to go all the way to the top of that mountain.  I think that what we’re really talking about, and it is an important issue, is whether strengthening the nonproliferation regime is a contribution toward the goal of nuclear disarmament or it operates as a diversion.  I think you are taking more the view that strengthening the nonproliferation is still possible, and hence desirable, and that it may even be a precondition for disarmament.  I’m taking the view that the stress on nonproliferation operates mainly as a diversion; that the only likely way to fashion the political will needed to move toward nuclear disarmament, is through a dramatic breakdown of the nonproliferation regime or through some kind of catastrophic use of nuclear weapons.  Neither of these “preconditions” is desirable.  Quite the opposite, but nothing short of such developments seems capable of shaking the anti-disarmament consensus that pervades the nuclear weapons establishment.

    Krieger:    It is the fear of the catastrophic use that motivates the Kissinger group.  It is the fear that it is something that could happen, that the probabilities of it happening are increasing, and that no matter how large the US nuclear arsenal remains, it won’t be helpful in preventing the use of nuclear weapons by those who can’t be located or don’t care if they are.  They see the kind of rationality that they believed was inherent in nuclear deterrence disintegrating under those conditions.  And also, as you mentioned, the instability with regard to Pakistan and the instability in the Middle East create other sets of problems, which would be less dangerous if nuclear weapons weren’t in play.  I think they see the threat, but they also see abolition, as President Obama has expressed, as a very long-term project.  It seems to me that one of the most important and compelling things we could do as members of civil society concerned with this issue is to find a way to instill in it a greater sense of urgency.  And so, the question that you are raising about whether this agreement should be applauded and move on from there or whether it should be exposed as not having gone far enough in the right direction seems to me to be less the question than that of how can the efforts that Obama is making – the vision that he has expressed, the same vision of the Kissinger group and others around the world – be given an appropriate sense of urgency rather than left in the visionary stage while we move only incrementally toward the vision.

    Falk:    The only thing that I have trouble with is those last words of yours.  I don’t think we are moving incrementally toward the vision.  I think we’re moving toward another vision; the vision of a restabilized nuclear weapons security system.  I don’t believe at all that arms control is incrementally moving toward a world without nuclear weapons.  I think there are two competing visions, not one, and that we each have to make a choice between these visions when it comes to shaping a political project for change.  President  Obama, I admit, has been ambiguous as to which vision he is really championing.  Conceivably, he believes he is championing them both, but I don’t see strong evidence of this, and I see mainly evidence that he is mainly pushing the arms control vision, as you earlier suggested by saying that the main purpose of his Prague speech was to endorse the arms control/nonproliferation vision, not the disarmament vision.

    Krieger:    I would actually say it slightly differently.  I take the president at his word when he says his vision is a commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.  His implementation thus far has been expressed as an arms control/nonproliferation agenda.  The advisors he is surrounded by must favor such an agenda, and although the Kissinger group has expressed a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, their agenda is also consistent with an arms control/nonproliferation agenda.  The question for me is, without rejecting outright what they’ve done, and I don’t think it is to be rejected, how to instill a sense of urgency toward achieving the actual vision that President Obama has expressed.  It may be that he doesn’t clearly understand the difference between the incremental steps that he has talked about and that are being implemented in this treaty and the goal that he expresses of a world without nuclear weapons.  Clearly, there are things that he could do that aren’t currently on his agenda and maybe aren’t even on his radar that would make a far stronger commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

    Falk:    I think that what you say about his own consciousness in relation to his nuclear weapons agenda is quite plausible, but at the same time I do think that it is of considerable importance to try to draw this distinction sharply between an arms control/nonproliferation security system and a security system dedicated to the elimination of weaponry of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.  I don’t feel that distinction is clearly understood, even by many people, like ourselves, who favor nuclear disarmament, but still feel that these arms control steps are somehow not only consistent with a nuclear disarmament agenda but are incremental steps toward its realization.  My view is that the whole record of arms control throughout the Cold War and since, confirmed over the years by my interaction with the people in the Washington defense policy community, especially while I was teaching at Princeton, has convinced me that this still prevailing consensus doesn’t believe that nuclear disarmament is in the national interest and doesn’t think there is a tolerably safe way to manage a nuclear disarmed world so as to be secure against cheating.  

            This Washington consensus was expressed probably most clearly years ago by the Harvard policy analyst, Joe Nye, who wrote at length about the irreversibility of a nuclear weapons world – a world in which you can never be sure that others won’t cheat or given that the knowledge needed to make a bomb is out there, then there will always remain the possibility of putting weapons back into existence even if they are or seem to have been all destroyed.  I think that this skepticism reflects the continuing majority view of the policy community in this country and probably also in other nuclear weapon states.  At the same time, they are prepared to ignore a politician who says that a world without nuclear weapons is desirable as long as the goal is situated well outside the realm of current politics, and Obama has done this by situating clearly his visionary goal beyond the horizon of his own mortality, thereby making the wish seem to be a harmless piety, remote and irrelevant.  I don’t want to let the politicians get away with such an ideological maneuver, seeking to mystify the people who are morally, legally and politically deeply troubled by the implications of living in a world with nuclear weapons.  I am one such person, committed to making zero a political project and not just a vision!

    Krieger:    It is becoming increasingly apparent that nuclear weapons are not necessarily serving the interests of the United States and its citizens, if they ever really did, but are serving rather the interests of a small group of security experts who have developed a whole imaginary world around concepts such as nuclear deterrence; that is, security based on threats of retaliation.  It is true that, even at lower numbers of weapons, those individuals still seem to have a lot of influence and power in Washington.  That is reflected in the new Nuclear Posture Review.  The American people run significant risks by their complacency on this issue.  I can appreciate your concern that the US-Russia agreement, which appears to be progress, could result only in a greater level of complacency in thinking that important steps are being taken to improve the security of the country at lower levels of armaments.  

            I still find it perplexing as to how to move closer to implementing a nuclear disarmament agenda.  I don’t think we’ve had a president who has expressed as clear a vision of a world without nuclear weapons as President Obama has done.  I think he is a person who is clearly intelligent enough to understand the continuing risks of living in a world with nuclear weapons, no matter how many of them there are or how many we possess.  I don’t think he should be attacked for taking steps that he feels are fulfilling his vision.  I wonder how we could be more effective in expressing the kinds of concerns that you’ve articulated about the differences between arms control and disarmament so that they would actually have some possibility of being received in a way that would lead to implementation rather than outright rejection.

    Falk:    I think you raised a difficult, appropriate question and it relates back to this issue of how do you achieve some kind of hopeful posture in relation to what is happening?  And is it false consciousness to view this START agreement to reduce the number of strategic missiles and launchers – is it false consciousness to express hope rather than skepticism in response, or should one try to blend the two and say that if it is to be viewed as hopeful from the perspective of nuclear disarmament, then one needs to follow this step with a clearer sense of future direction in terms of policy?  But if this is coupled with similar kinds of negotiations and no real indication that either the strategy of the country or its capabilities are turning away from relying on these weapons, then I think it becomes important to express a truthful sense of skepticism, not to discredit the motivation of Obama as an individual, but to clarify what the policy of the country seems to be and how this pattern relates to these values and policy objectives.

    Krieger:    I think we should give our best assessment of the situation and our best policy advice, but it still begs the question of how we can be more effective in following that path.

    Falk:    I think, above all, we need at this time to be truthful about the ambiguity of this step.  I think that civil society voices don’t have real resources or governmental power, but they do have the capacity to tell the truth or to express their sincere understanding of an unfolding reality, and if they compromise this true witnessing for a rather vain effort to get a seat at the end of the big table they give away their authenticity as voices of conscience.  I feel strongly that the legitimacy of this civil society voice depends upon its moral and legal clarity and its political insight even if it disappoints liberal sentiments.  That means that sometimes one has to say things that are not in keeping with a widespread belief that it is important to lend support to a president who is better than his predecessor or possible successor.  What should be the guiding motivation here?  I agree that it is a little different for someone like myself who is in some ways an independent intellectual academic person and someone like yourself who represents an organization that is involved with efforts to persuade policymakers to take constructive short-term steps.  You’re more constrained by those practicalities that shape what seems to be a different conception of responsible behavior.  I have license to be irresponsible toward the immediate political process and to ignore the domestic constraints on policy (what the Senate will swallow).  Perhaps, as this dialogue may illustrate, it may be that the combination of these two somewhat discordant voices is the best we can do at this stage.

    Krieger:    It seems to me that you are right in theory, but I’m not sure how it would play out in practice.  I certainly agree with you that we should always speak the truth as we see it and try to find our way through a thicket of obstacles to achieve the goal as best we can – and the goal is a world without nuclear weapons, which I believe is essential for a human future.  

            I want to raise a related issue that I think is important.  Although we’ve been talking about moving to the strongest position possible for a world free of nuclear weapons, there remain quite a few people in the political sphere of this country that would argue that President Obama has gone too far and would see what he has done as a problem rather than a step in the right direction.  You’re approaching it from the other side.  But given the general ambiance in the Senate these days, the possibility of ratification of this treaty doesn’t seem high to me.  Getting 67 votes in the Senate seems like it would be a stretch.  We already know that certain leading Republican senators have said that if there is any mention of curtailing the anti-ballistic missile system that the US is deploying in various places, including Europe, that the treaty won’t get their support in the Senate.  This issue, however, is very important to the Russians.  They didn’t want to have an agreement that would allow unfettered deployment of US missile defenses.  The Obama administration tried to deal with this situation by agreeing to a preambular statement in the treaty that simply said that offensive and defensive missiles have a relationship to each other.  A preambular statement carries no legal effect.  There will still be some potentially serious difficulties in having this treaty ratified by the Senate.  Twenty years ago or so when the START 1 agreement was ratified in the Senate, there was bipartisan support for it.  Now it seems doubtful that there is going to be bipartisan support no matter what compromises President Obama is willing to make.  You can see in looking at that issue of missile defenses, the kind of narrow path that President Obama needed to walk in order, on the one hand, to reach agreement with the Russians and, on the other hand, to be able to get enough support to have the treaty ratified in the Senate.

    Falk:    I don’t disagree with this analysis.  I’m only suggesting that if one wants to support the treaty, one should do it without indulging illusions that it is more than it is and not pretend that it should be viewed as a step toward nuclear disarmament.  I would take a somewhat agnostic position, myself, thinking that it may or may not be, depending on what happens subsequently; accordingly, we should withhold any expression of either positive or negative judgment about whether this particular treaty, aside from endorsing it from a stabilization perspective, is desirable from the perspective of getting to zero.  I believe it is important to clarify that these two paths are in all probability parallel, and not convergent.  Further, that at this point the New START treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review seem clearly to have chosen the arms control/nonproliferation path, and shunned the disarmament path.  I think we have to clarify those two directions that are available to American security policy.  It is my fear that by choosing the arms control/nonproliferation path, whether to overcome domestic political opposition or to mollify the nuclear weapons establishment, the visionary rhetoric, while inspiring, is also somewhat misleading to the extent it suggests that the disarmament path is also being seriously embarked upon.

    Krieger:    Of course, many people would disagree with the proposition that you’ve just put forward that arms control and disarmament are divergent paths and would say that the path of arms control leads ultimately to disarmament.  You are making a clear statement that you don’t agree with that perspective.

    Falk:    Not exactly.  I go further by saying that to the extent that arms control succeeds, it weakens the pressure supportive of disarmament, making zero less attainable than ever.  It is only when there is instability that people feel that there is a need for disarmament, and as long as the regime seems stable, and especially if it seems to keep the weaponry away from those that we don’t like, our adversaries in the world, our leadership will not alter the status quo.  It is only by subverting the ideological and bureaucratic status quo that it may become possible to raise the level of societal receptivity to the disarmament alternative sufficiently to make it a political option.  It should be recalled that the moments in the past when public support for nuclear disarmament was greatest coincided with those times when Cold War confrontations brought public fears of nuclear war to the surface, provoking widespread anxieties.

    Krieger:    That proposition may not be correct because often it is instability that leads to a retrenchment and more armaments, to a restarting of an arms race.  If we can’t develop a program to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament under conditions of relative stability, it seems like we may be not moving up the mountain to a base camp, but trying to instead to roll the Sisyphean boulder up the mountain to achieve nuclear disarmament under unstable conditions.

    Falk:    That it is one of these confusing situations where the evidence is not conclusive for these alternative points of view, and my own skepticism about arms control initiatives really is something that evolved in my thinking over a long period of time, enduring many disappointments, watching from the sidelines what seemed to be the real goals of the arms control community and witnessing their antipathy toward nuclear disarmament, which extended far beyond a belief that one needs to go slowly and carefully toward nuclear disarmament.  I think there are two possible ways of thinking.  Those that are very optimistic about arms control have always said what I think you are saying, that these are incremental steps that eventually make the world secure enough to consider nuclear disarmament.  The contrasting view that I’m espousing suggests that the arms control and security policy community is fundamentally hostile to nuclear disarmament, and its influential advocates view the arms control/nonproliferation goals as ends in themselves that should not be undermined by sentimental and essentially wrong-headed commitments to a disarmament program.

    Krieger:    You are referring to an approach to arms control that confers relative advantage.

    Falk:    It is also prudent with respect to their assessment of comparative risks.  They want to cut risks and costs, and arms control is a sustainable way of managing the nuclear weapons arsenal.  It does not necessarily mean that you get the better of the deal in relation to adversaries, though you may, and this is certainly an aim of arms control negotiations.  The main thing is that it is helpful to have an appropriate regulatory framework, but from an arms control perspective it is also important to discredit what is deemed to be dangerous—namely, the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons in real time, rather than as an “ultimate” but politically irrelevant goal.  My own effort for many years is to challenge this view, and insist that the elimination of nuclear weapons is a practical and desirable political undertaking, and anything less than this represents complicity with the most immoral and unlawful weaponry ever introduced into the domain of world politics.

    Krieger:    I think that the arms control perspective that you are referring to comes out of an identification with national security experts who have largely defined US nuclear policy over the past 65 years.  It often comes out of a military framework, so a security/military orientation guides that perspective.  I agree that there is a managerial element to arms control and nonproliferation, but also one that confers upon these so-called national security experts a sense of dominance in our social structure.

    Falk:    It is part of what Eisenhower was thinking about when he warned about the military-industrial complex.  It is sustained also by a policy community —think tanks, academic specialists, and journalists — that appear to have been socialized into this managerial and strategic mindset that is essentially antithetical to a normative or ethical/legal vision of security systems, and basically doesn’t regard a concern about indiscriminate warfare or the massive killing of civilians as relevant to the framing of security policy for the United States.  The discourse that has realist credibility considers comparative levels of weaponry, of missions that may or may not be successfully performed by different types of nuclear weapons.  But over the years these are the concerns that have defined the outer limits of responsible policy discourse.  If you try to address the issues outside those limits, the gatekeepers in Washington will do their best to exclude you from the discourse, and they usually do their job very well.  As far as I know, none of the people in Washington prominent in the arms control agency or in the national security council hold views that are compatible with the outlook of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

    Krieger:    I noticed in some comments on this New START agreement that Secretary of Defense Gates made a point of saying the reductions are numbers that the defense community, the national security experts, believe can be achieved without any impact on US national security, and that these numbers are reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review.  He also said in his comments on this treaty that it will be necessary to strengthen the nuclear weapons infrastructure at the nuclear weapons laboratories and that would, of course, require a budget allocation.  They are already talking about a $5 billion increase for the weapons labs over the next five years.  I also noticed that the third opinion piece by the Kissinger group, which came out this year, called for similar budget increases in the nuclear weapons infrastructure.  This group of insiders that have dominated national security policy are looking for some commensurate gain to be obtained with the reduction of nuclear weapons.  They may be seeking to take the numbers down, but to also make the nuclear weapons arsenal, in their words, “safe, secure and reliable.”  That will cost more money and will require strengthening the infrastructure at the nuclear weapons laboratories.  This will reinforce the US commitment, in the eyes of the world, to greater reliance on nuclear weapons.  It will be viewed as a step away from nuclear disarmament.

    Falk:     What are your thoughts on the Nuclear Security Summit that President Obama convened in April 2010?  Do you believe it can be effective in keeping nuclear weapons and the materials to make them out of the hands of terrorists?

    Krieger:    The Nuclear Security Summit is a good idea, an important and necessary one, but I fear it will not be sufficient.  Nuclear terrorism is only one strand of the problem.  There are also regional nuclear issues that drive arms races, such as the failure to create Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the Middle East and Northeast Asia.  Israel’s nuclear weapons, which are not publicly discussed, are highly provocative in the Middle East.  And, as yet, the international community has been unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement with the North Koreans to give up their nuclear arms and return to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  

            There is also the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, which remains unstable.  In addition, there is the US insistence on moving forward with deployment of missile defenses, space weaponization and projects such as replacing nuclear warheads with conventional warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, creating a Global Strike Force.  Such steps will slow down, if not halt altogether, further progress on nuclear disarmament between the US and Russia.  We need to lock down all nuclear materials for weapons, but the global trend in spreading nuclear power plants will make this extremely difficult.  If we make plutonium a valued element of international commerce, it will increase the possibilities of terrorists gaining access to it for bombs.  I doubt if, in the long run, the world can both support a resurgence of nuclear power and prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons.  I support President Obama’s efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, but I believe it will require a far more urgent effort to achieve nuclear weapons abolition as well as severe constraints on the spread of nuclear power plants, leading to phasing them out.

    Falk:     I would only add that I would have found the Nuclear Security Summit more in keeping with even slim hopes for a world without nuclear weapons if the approach to threats associated with terrorists acquiring such weaponry was assessed from  the dual perspectives of nonproliferation and various forms of denuclearization, including Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, No First Use commitments and the formation of an international working group tasked with exploring whether plans for phased and verified nuclear disarmament can be drawn up within 12 months.  Until denuclearization is discussed alongside nonproliferation, I will remain mainly critical of what is being done about the various dangers associated with the retention of nuclear weapons.  I classify myself as among those who regard it as totally unacceptable to base security on threats of mass annihilation, a condition that creates a moral urgency and legal imperative to make nuclear disarmament a goal of present policy; and until this is done by our leaders, I will not be content with the steps taken.

    Krieger:    It must be kept in mind that the steps are only steps.  It is too soon to know where they will lead.  We may look back to see that these steps were far too little, too late; or we may look back to see that these steps stemmed the tide and were a meaningful turning point on the path to a nuclear weapon-free world.  It seems certain that where these steps will lead will depend not only on the steps themselves and President Obama’s vision, but on the support and engagement of broad masses of people who are committed to ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity.  Awakening our fellow citizens of the planet, raising their awareness and encouraging their engagement on this project is the key to achieving the world we both seek – a world at peace free of nuclear weapons, one that spends its resources not on war and its preparation, but on meeting human needs for all and protecting the Earth and its resources for future generations.

  • Reaching Zero

    This article was originally published by The Nation

    What is the purpose, if any, of the nuclear bomb, that brooding presence that has shadowed all human life for sixty-five years? The question has haunted the nuclear age. It may be that no satisfactory answer has ever been given. Nuclear strategic thinking, in particular, has disappointed. Many of its pioneers have wound up in a state of something like despair regarding their art. For example, Bernard Brodie, one of the originators of nuclear strategy in the 1940s, was forced near the end of his life to realize that “nuclear strategy itself–the body of thoughts that he himself had helped formulate–was something of an illusion,” according to historian Fred Kaplan. In the introduction to The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman airs the suspicion that the phrase “nuclear strategy” may be a “contradiction in terms.” Henry Kissinger, a leading figure in nuclear strategizing for a half-century, has expressed a similar feeling of futility. In a remarkable reconsideration, amounting to an oblique recantation of his past thinking, he has written recently in Newsweek:

    The basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued. Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign-policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never succeeded, from the doctrine of a geographically limited nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s to the “mutual assured destruction” theory of general nuclear war in the 1970s.

    Now a new moment, full of fresh promise but also with novel perils, has arrived in the nuclear story, and all the old questions have to be asked again. As if responding to some secret signal sent out by a restless zeitgeist, the globe is seething with events large and small in the nuclear arena. Here in the United States, certainly, all the policy pots on the nuclear stove are at a boil. Soon, the Obama administration will complete its overdue Nuclear Posture Review, a statement that Congress requires of the president every four years on the disposition of the country’s nuclear forces.

    It will give the administration’s answer to the key questions: What nuclear forces should the United States deploy? Why? What, if anything, does the United States propose to do with them? On April 8 the United States and Russia will sign a new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement, which will reduce warheads to 1,550 on each side and restrict delivery vehicles to 800 apiece. Also in early April, President Obama will hold a Nuclear Security Summit with the heads of state of forty-four other nations to consider measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapon materials into unauthorized hands. In early May will come the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which is a kind of nuclear posture review for the entire world. Decisions on passage of the long-rejected Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as a resurrected Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are also likely very soon.

    The key question, of course, is whether the policies and actions will meet the mounting perils of the new situation. What’s needed for success, I will suggest, is a revival precisely of the discredited art of nuclear strategic thinking, which may, with suitable adjustments, yet have something to offer us. Strategy, military thinkers have long told us, is the art of marrying up tactical means with broad political ends. That is exactly what is most sorely missing in nuclear policy today. Certainly, no mere piecemeal examination will suffice. A comprehensive approach is needed.

    The Nuclear Surge

    For taken together, the dangers mark the world’s arrival at a new stage in the evolution of nuclear danger, forcing fundamental decisions on nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike. In a word, the nuclear predicament is coming of age, which is to say that it is fulfilling a potential that every competent scientist has known it possessed since the advent of the bomb in 1945: nuclear technology, no longer the preserve of a few privileged powers, is becoming available on a global basis. This is because of the simple but decisive fact that the bomb is based on scientific knowledge, which is in its nature unconfinable. This spread is at the heart of the growing nuclear peril–a kind of nuclear surge–in today’s world.

    To say that the technology is becoming available to all, however, is not to say that it is possessed by all or even that it will be. It means only that if nations or others want it, they will be able to have it. Japan, for example, does not have a nuclear bomb. But one is available to Japan in short order if it so chooses. According to the State Department, the bomb is thus available to some fifty other countries. This number of potential nuclear powers is destined to grow. If those countries do not build the bomb, the reason can only be a domestic and international political decision that they should not. The more this availability spreads (as it must), the higher and stronger the political barriers against proliferation must become.

    Of course, at a certain point, which may not be far off, availability, if not possession, will spill beyond national confines and reach smaller groups. At that point the political walls will have to be high and strong indeed. Otherwise, a nuclear 9/11 may be upon us.

    Obviously, any deliberate spread of nuclear technology, such as the “renaissance” of nuclear power that has apparently begun, will only accelerate the surge.

    This underlying and irreversible pressure of availability is the backdrop for today’s widespread and well-founded dread that proliferation by just a few countries–above all, North Korea and Iran–will push the world over what the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, a group set up by the Japanese and Australian governments, calls a “tipping point,” precipitating a “cascade” of proliferation that will wash away the current nuclear order. South Asia has of course already gone nuclear, with India and Pakistan engaged in an arms race. India, aping the United States, has planned a triad of air, land and sea nuclear forces while impoverished, crisis-ridden Pakistan struggles to keep up.

    The Middle East and East Asia, led by Iran and North Korea, could become the next regions to travel down this path. According to the Washington Post, A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s bomb and the arch-proliferator of its nuclear technology, has said that Iranian officials asked him in the 1980s to sell them ready-made bombs. Since then Iran has appeared to many to be using its right to develop nuclear power technology as a pathway to building the bomb from scratch. If it does, other countries in the Middle East may well follow suit. More immediately, Iran and nuclear-armed Israel would find themselves in a perilous balance–or rather, extreme imbalance, since Israel already has an undeclared arsenal of perhaps 200 warheads. If North Korea, which already has the bomb, refuses, as seems likely, to give it up under pressure from the world community, then something similar could happen in East Asia, and Japan might indeed produce its own bomb.

    And yet if it’s tempting to some in the United States and elsewhere to define the new nuclear moment solely as a crisis of proliferation, they should be brought up short by a single brute fact: more than 95 percent of the world’s 23,000 or so nuclear warheads remain in the possession of two countries: the United States, with some 9,000, and Russia, with some 13,000.

    If one ineluctable truth of Year 65 of the bomb is that the sources of nuclear danger are destined to be global, another is that the world’s existing arsenals are likewise indivisibly global. They are joined in a kind of unity of hostility. Each nuclear nation (Israel, which has no nuclear adversary, may be the odd man out) cites the arsenal of another or others as the rationale for possessing its own, in multiple chains that link them together into a network of threats and counterthreats. For example, in one such chain, Pakistan fears India, which fears China, which fears Russia, which fears the United States. This network of terror and counterterror underscores another truth of the nuclear age: every possessor of the bomb, by its very existence, teaches possible proliferators a pair of lessons that are the prime (if not the only) motives for proliferation. First, you will be living in a nuclear-armed world; second, if you want to be protected in that world you must have nuclear arms yourself. (In addition, it has of course occurred to many countries, especially North Korea and Iran, that nuclear weapons could deter overwhelming conventional power such as that possessed by the United States.) From national points of view, each arsenal is distinct, but from a global proliferation point of view they are a joint inducement for the further spread of nuclear arms.

    The necessary conclusion is clear: proliferation can’t be stopped unless possession is dealt with concurrently. In the seventh decade of the nuclear age, the time for half-solutions is over. The head of state with his finger on the button of some aging cold war arsenal, the head of state itching to put his finger on such a button, the nuclear power operator, the nuclear smuggler and the terrorist in his hideout dreaming of unparalleled mass murder are actors on a single playing field. In this respect, too, the nuclear dilemma has become indivisibly global.

    This is a truth, however, that the world’s nine nuclear powers do not like to acknowledge, because it has an implication they are reluctant to accept, which is that if they want to be safe from nuclear danger they must commit themselves to surrendering their own nuclear arms.

    Strategic Incoherence

    And yet that is exactly what Barack Obama did in his speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, saying, “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Encouragingly, his commitment has been accompanied by the widest support for nuclear abolition since President Harry Truman sent Bernard Baruch to ask the world in 1946 to choose between “the quick and the dead.” For one thing, a remarkable phalanx of former and current officials, Republican as well as Democratic, have embraced the goal. Their calls originated with the by-now-famous article by the “Gang of Four”–former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Senator Sam Nunn–who in a January 2007 Wall Street Journal article announced their support for “a world free of nuclear weapons” and called for “working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.” This unlikely foursome harked back to the previously underappreciated fact that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, at their summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986, had come within an ace of agreeing to nuclear abolition. (The deal foundered because Gorbachev would agree to it only if Reagan dropped his Strategic Defense Initiative, and Reagan would not.) Today, a majority of former secretaries of state and defense support a world free of nuclear weapons.

    A remarkable number of new government and civil panels, commissions and other initiatives have also sprung up to support the goal. Among them is a new group, Global Zero, which proposes abolition by 2030 and is supported by a Who’s Who of international as well as American signatories, including, for example, Gorbachev, Jimmy Carter and former GOP Senator Chuck Hagel. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Henry L. Stimson Center and the Nuclear Threat Initiative all have serious, well-funded programs to scout the path to zero and determine what would be required to stay there. Meanwhile, the traditional antinuclear movement, led by such groups as Peace Action, the American Friends Service Committee and the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, are marshaling support for a nuclear weapons convention.

    If Obama’s commitment to abolition and the movement in support of it were setting the tone and agenda of current nuclear negotiations, the world might now be in the first stage of a final solution (to give that dread phrase a new and positive meaning) of the nuclear dilemma. Each proposal in the negotiations would be weighed in the light of the distance it traveled toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. Instead, what have been offered are at best a series of timid makeshifts or, at worst, de facto subversion of the Prague objective. If this trend continues, it is entirely possible that the ultimate mockery will occur: nuclear arsenals will march forward into the future under a banner that reads Ban the Bomb.

    Let us consider two policy arenas: the START agreement and the Nuclear Posture Review.

    Nothing on the nuclear stage today is stranger or less adequately explained than the spectacle, still on view twenty years after the end of the cold war, of the United States and Russia holding each other hostage to nuclear annihilation with arsenals in the thousands poised on alert. The current agreement, which will remain in force until 2020, sets a ceiling of 1,550 warheads on each side that must be reached by 2017. The reduction from the old ceiling of 2,200 is of course welcome. The continuation of a system of inspections is even more welcome. But what are we to make of the 1,550 warheads that remain? After all, the limit on the 1,550 is also a permission for the 1,550. The arrangement indefinitely leaves intact the essential fact that the United States and Russia are poised to blow each other up many times over, as if the cold war had never ended. What is that about?

    If strategy is the art of using tactics to achieve political ends, then the persistence of these arsenals represents its nemesis. What political purpose is served? There is no quarrel between the two nations that would justify deployment of even a single nuclear weapon. An answer is often made that the United States must have such an arsenal because Russia still does–as a “deterrent.” But this begs the question. For today, as in the past forty years, since the beginning of arms control agreements in 1972, the size of the US arsenal has of course been a negotiated figure. The question is not, as is sometimes pretended, whether in the face of a Russian threat the United States needs to protect itself and size its forces accordingly; it is what figure the two sides should jointly set in talks like the ones just concluded. What stopped Hillary Clinton when she went to Moscow from proposing a force on each side of, say, 300 weapons, as has been suggested by a prominent Air Force officer and two Air University professors recently in Strategic Studies Quarterly? For that matter, why not zero? That step admittedly would require bringing the other nuclear powers into the talks. But why not do that–or at least set a time frame for doing so, thereby explicitly linking the current agreement to the president’s announced goal?

    It is here that the strategic deficit becomes most glaring. It’s not just that tactics have lost contact with political goals, it is that nuclear tactics (in this case, deployments) are weighed without any reference to politics whatsoever. Admittedly, the possibility of Russia backsliding into hostilities with the United States is sometimes cited as a reason for strategic “hedging,” but the obvious next question is whether the United States would prefer to be in a nuclear confrontation with a backslid Russia or in a merely conventional confrontation. Has Washington decided that in case of any hostilities nuclear confrontations are preferable to nonnuclear ones?

    Behind this issue looms a larger unasked strategic question. Are nations in general safer when they aim nuclear weapons at one another (“deter” one another)? Are some pairs safer and others not? Which ones? For example, do Americans think India and Pakistan were wise in 1998 to jointly go nuclear and threaten each other with annihilation? Are they safer today for having taken that step? The refusal of the United States and Russia to show the way by denuclearizing their own relationship is an answer that speaks louder than the Prague commitment and undercuts it. That refusal says that nuclear weapons are useful and do make you safer. But this lesson cuts the legs out from under any serious nonproliferation effort. Wasn’t the need for nonproliferation where we began? Isn’t that now the main professed goal of the United States in the nuclear field? Here is strategic incoherence in its acutest form. Deployments to meet a vanished threat spoil any effort to deal with a current real one.

    What we have heard so far of the Nuclear Posture Review exemplifies the same intellectual debacle. Reportedly, the document will reject the proposal for “no first use.” No first use is the policy of using nuclear weapons only in retaliation for nuclear attacks. All other attacks, including ones with biological or chemical weapons, would be met by conventional forces.

    The rejection of no first use would crystallize, as perhaps nothing else can, the strategic disarray of American nuclear policy. Like the persistence of the forces of mutual assured destruction, it would represent the banishment of politics from strategy (meaning in fact that strategy no longer is strategy). The first-use policy was born in the 1950s, when US leaders believed they could deter perceived Soviet conventional superiority in Europe only by threatening a nuclear response. Is it really necessary to state once again that the cold war is over? Apparently it is, because in this arena, too, news of the geopolitical revolution of 1989-91 has yet to reach the American strategic brain. There, “extended deterrence” seems to be permanently planted on the basis of a kind of incurable nostalgia for the cold war. Fantastically, surreally, the United States is still using nuclear arms to repel a Russian conventional attack on Europe, as if it were 1958. (We might as well say “Soviet attack,” since the threat is imaginary.) This obsolete readiness is symbolically embodied in the deployment even today of some 200 American tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, ready at a moment’s notice to repel Soviet hordes coming through the Fulda Gap. In February, five of the European countries thus “defended” (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway) recommended that the weapons be withdrawn. Washington is still thinking about it.

    More important for today’s concerns is that a no-first-use policy is the sine qua non of any effective nonproliferation strategy. If nuclear weapons are needed not only to counter other nuclear weapons but to repel conventional, chemical and biological attacks as well, then what responsible national leader can afford to do without them? The problem is not merely symbolic. If the nine nuclear powers are ready to use their arms to perform a grab bag of tasks, then the dangers to nonnuclear countries really do multiply, perhaps inspiring them to acquire these devices, evidently so versatile and useful, for themselves.

    Toward a New Nuclear Strategy

    To escape from this scene of halfhearted and ineffectual measures serving unclear or contradictory goals, the United States needs new strategic thinking. In exploring what it should be, perhaps it will be useful to look back at past strategic thought.

    The great intellectual artifact of cold war strategy was the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It adopted a new aim for military deployments. In the renowned words of Bernard Brodie in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” This insight, which was recognized as a basis of policy in the early 1960s by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, marked a true revolution in military affairs. Broadly speaking, war-fighting strategies were replaced by war-not-fighting strategies. Not to fight, according to this policy, was to win. And yet under this policy the way not to fight was nevertheless to plan to fight. The trick was to restrict the plan for fighting to nuclear retaliation, in the hope that that day would never come. Thus was born the paradoxical, or contradictory, policy on which survival in the nuclear age was believed to rest. Safety from nuclear destruction depended not on getting rid of the arms that threatened it but on threats to inflict that same nuclear destruction.

    In retrospect, it seems the doctrine of deterrence has been a true Janus: it has been based on one thoroughgoing absurdity and one profound truth. The absurdity was the idea that you could lastingly and reliably avoid an action–mutual suicide in a nuclear war–by threatening the action. The problem, as many critics noted, was that at any given moment–but especially in a crisis–you did not know whether you would get the nuclear non-use that was the new strategic goal or the use whose threat was the tactical means to achieve the non-use. Strategists and moralists twisted and turned in the coils of this dilemma, even as the world lived (as it still technically lives) on the knife-edge of catastrophe. Moralists pondered the virtue of threatening a crime in order not to commit it; strategists wondered how a threat of “suicide” (McNamara) could be “credible” to the one so threatened. None of them found answers, yet the policy became so deeply ingrained in policy circles that today people refer to the American nuclear arsenal as “our deterrent,” as if the hardware and its alleged purpose were one.

    And yet the doctrine did also rest on one profound truth–its acknowledgment that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” as Reagan and Gorbachev put it in 1985.Implicit in this revolution in military affairs was a strategic revolution. The political gains that governments had pursued through wars were given up, now replaced by a need to preserve the peace, which itself became the only sane strategic objective. You might say that deterrence has pursued a sane goal by insane means–a cleavage manifested in the fact that even as deterrence fought off nuclear use, and in a certain sense fortified what has been called the “nuclear taboo” and the “tradition of non-use,” it at the same time pinioned the world permanently on the brink of such use.

    Is it then possible that abolition can be seen as a rectification and completion of the strategic revolution begun but left unfinished by deterrence? How great, after all, would be the shift from the strategic goal of “non-use,” or the “tradition of non-use,” to the strategic goal of “nonpossession,” to a “tradition of nonpossession”? Doesn’t non-use in a way already cast nuclear weapons on history’s scrap heap?

    It is a peculiarity of deterrence that the weapons themselves, rather than political developments, dictate the strategic aim (non-use). In its pathological form, this peculiarity leads to the divorce of deployments and posture from politics that we see now. But in the benign form of abolition, the strategy dictated by arms and the strategy dictated by policy would coincide. Both would say, with the new Henry Kissinger: there is no quarrel in the world worth a nuclear war, so don’t fight one or arm yourself to do so.

    The conclusion is strengthened when you recall that even at zero, deterrence does not melt away completely. The reason is that the roots of the nuclear dilemma lie in inextinguishable advances in scientific knowledge. For even as this knowledge could permit cheaters to violate an abolition agreement, so it would permit the international community to respond in kind. The point is not to propose overelaborate schemes of nuclear rearmament if a crisis were to occur at zero (the conventional forces of the threatened international community would surely suffice) but to point out that there is no sharp discontinuity, as is often suggested, between the “minimum deterrence” represented by, say, a few hundred weapons and zero. Rather there is a smooth continuity all the way to zero, and even beyond, as political and legal as well as technical arrangements needed to keep the world at zero gradually strengthened. Unfortunately, technical bans are all in principle reversible. It has been otherwise with a few moral and legal revolutions, including the abolition of slavery, and there is reason to hope that the abolition of nuclear arms would be one of these. When that happened, deterrence would have been left finally and completely behind.

    The Architecture of Zero

    The needed change is to turn abolition from a far-off goal into an active organizing principle that gives direction to everything that is done in the nuclear arena–in other words, a strategic goal. The indivisible nuclear surge under way in today’s world can be mastered only with an indivisible program to defeat it. Let us, then, borrowing from Obama in Prague, take “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” as the new strategic objective–the political goal in the pursuit of which all tactics become the means. That goal has two requisites. The first is getting rid of existing nuclear weapons. The tactical means to that goal are of course negotiations among the nuclear powers. The second requisite is building a system that safeguards the world from the recrudescence of nuclear weapons once they are gone. This system will be the true architecture of zero. The tactical means to that goal are negotiating an ever-tightening web of restrictions imposed on all technology usable for nuclear weapons.

    Of the two, the second is more difficult. For while the process of nuclear disarmament will continue for only a limited time, until zero is reached, the architecture of zero must be built to last forever, since the knowledge that underlies nuclear weapons will never disappear. The tactics for reaching this goal only begin with the construction of systems of inspection and enforcement. More important over the long run is building a political and legal order in which the attempt to build a nuclear weapon would be designated a crime against humanity. More important still would be the moral deepening of the taboo.

    The art of strategy–so notably absent in today’s contradictory mélange of policies–is to combine the measures needed to achieve the two goals into a single, coherent, self-reinforcing plan. Above all, the nonproliferation efforts that are the precursors to an architecture of zero are in mortal need of the united planetary political will that can be created only by a clear, credible commitment to a time-bound plan for abolition to which all nuclear powers are formally agreed. It should take the form of a commitment to create the sort of nuclear weapons convention that the antinuclear movement has long advocated–one that, as noted earlier, seeks to ban all weapons of mass destruction.

    To postpone abolition is to postpone nonproliferation. Today arms control and nonproliferation proceed in two parallel negotiating universes–the NPT review on the one side and START talks on the other. The two need to be brought together in a simple bargain that is already implicit in the provisions of the NPT: the nuclear powers will surrender their arsenals on condition that other powers agree not to obtain any.

    Such a strategy would build on the truth underlying deterrence doctrine while gradually retiring its absurd features. It would enable nuclear strategy, at last, to catch up with history. It would deliver Russia and the United States from the weapons-forged hostility that politically no longer exists. It would unify the world around a common goal–one already embraced under the NPT by 184 countries and enshrined in their laws. Nuclear states (as long as they persist as such) would be at one with nonnuclear states in preventing proliferation, even as they all worked together to put in place the architecture of zero that would make the ban permanent and safe. Finally, the strategy would provide a measuring rod for judging the merit of interim steps, such as START and no first use. They would be judged by the specific contribution they made to reaching the common strategic goal. To give some examples: adoption of no first use by all nuclear powers would be highly valued as a way station toward abolition. In principle at least, nuclear weapons would have been completely retired from use, for if no one strikes first, no one can strike in retaliation–thus no one will strike with a nuclear weapon at all, and no one will threaten to do so.

    Arms reductions would, of course, have value as steps toward zero; but the inspection regimes accompanying them would be especially prized, not just for their own sake but because an ever-stronger regime of inspection is a sine qua non of life in a world without nuclear weapons.

    Influence would flow from nonproliferation measures to arms control as well. The more nonnuclear-weapons states accepted stringent inspections, the more they permitted transparency of their nuclear facilities and the more they accepted restrictions on withdrawal from the NPT, the more ready would the nuclear powers be, less afraid now of cheating, to surrender their arsenals.

    What would nuclear weapons then be for? They almost tell us themselves. “We are here,” they say, “to abolish ourselves, and–a big bonus–to put up a barrier to major power war forever after into the bargain. For even after you are rid of us, we will hover in the wings, as a potential that cannot ever be removed.” The bomb is waiting for us to hear the message. It has been waiting a long time. If we do not, it can always return to what has always been its plan B, and abolish us. 

  • The New US Nuclear Posture

    In April 2009, President Obama went to Prague and told the world that the United States seeks “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” A year later, his administration is moving forward toward this goal. The Obama administration released its Nuclear Posture Review on April 6, 2010. On April 8, 2010, the president flew back to Prague to sign a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russians.

    In both tone and substance the new Nuclear Posture Review is far more positive and hopeful than that of the George W. Bush administration. The Obama nuclear posture puts its primary focus on preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. “The threat of global nuclear war has become remote,” it says, “but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.” It views nuclear terrorism as “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.”  

    To prevent terrorists, such as al Qaeda, from obtaining nuclear weapons, the Obama administration seeks to bolster the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and secure all loose nuclear materials globally. It convened a Nuclear Security Summit on April 12-13, 2010 in Washington, with leaders of 46 other countries participating in making plans to prevent nuclear terrorism. The Obama administration is also pursuing arms control efforts, including the New START agreement, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.  

    The administration has been straight forward in stating that it is taking these steps “as a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”  In other words, the Obama administration understands that the US needs to show that it is taking steps to meet its own nuclear disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (something the Bush administration never grasped) if it hopes to have the support of other parties to that treaty for keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.

    Many advocates of a nuclear weapon-free world, including the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, encouraged the Obama administration to go further and adopt a policy of No First Use; that is, committing to use nuclear weapons only in response to a preceding nuclear attack.  While the administration did not demonstrate this level of leadership, it did consider a policy of making the deterrence of a nuclear attack the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons. However, it dismissed even this step, while offering some hope that it will work toward this end in the future.  

    The administration did take a smaller step by committing in the new Nuclear Posture Review not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It referred specifically to North Korea and Iran as countries out of compliance with the treaty. The new nuclear posture will please some advocates of nuclear weapons by leaving open “a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical or biological weapons] attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”  

    The new Nuclear Posture Review states that the “fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.” This suggests confusion in the policy. If terrorists are, in fact, the greatest threat to the country, and as non-state actors they cannot be deterred, then who exactly are the weapons deterring? The review may be contemplating Russia or China, but it also recognizes that the US is interconnected with these countries and the chances of war with them are very low. Or, it may be contemplating some unknown contingency in the future, but if this is the case then wouldn’t the country be better off moving more rapidly toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons?  The review makes clear that the US “would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” This approach, and the vagueness of “vital interests,” will likely be viewed internationally as an unfortunate double standard that other countries may also choose to rely upon.

    In the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the US and Russia will reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 each and reduce deployed delivery vehicles to 700 each with 100 reserve delivery vehicles each by the year 2017.  It is not a large step forward, but it is a step in the right direction, and the Obama administration is committed to seeking further reductions with Russia.  Together the two countries have some 95 percent of the world’s 23,000 nuclear arms.  The new US nuclear posture indicates that the US “will place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.”  In the document, however, there are no constraints on the ability of the US to deploy missile defenses.  Since this is a major concern to Russia, it could limit the possibilities for additional progress toward nuclear disarmament.  

    One of the phrases that recurs throughout the new Nuclear Posture Review is “ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness” of nuclear warheads.  Safety and security both make sense.  If we are to retain nuclear weapons, we want them to be both safe from accident and secure from theft.  But what does “effective” mean?  That the weapons will serve the purpose of deterring?  If so, who?  Effectiveness would be impossible to measure unless we can answer the question, “Effective for what?”  In the end, “safe, secure and effective,” appear to be arguments for modernizing the US nuclear arsenal and spending an additional $5 billion on its nuclear weapons laboratories over the next five years.

    The Nuclear Posture Review concludes by looking toward a world without nuclear weapons. It recognizes that certain conditions are necessary for such a world. These include halting nuclear proliferation, achieving greater transparency into nuclear weapons programs, improving verification methods, developing effective enforcement measures, and resolving regional disputes. The review states that such conditions do not exist today. However, with the requisite political will, these conditions could be developed in the process of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention – a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. While pausing to celebrate the incremental steps in arms reductions and the limitations on nuclear weapons use that are being made now, we should also recognize that a policy of No First Use and a commitment to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention would move us far more rapidly toward the peace and security of the nuclear weapon-free world envisioned by President Obama.  

  • Two First Steps on Nuclear Weapons

    This article was originally published by The New York Times

    Yesterday, President Obama presided over the United Nations Security Council meeting that passed a resolution seeking to strengthen the international commitment to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. A week ago, he announced that the United States will not deploy — at least, not in the foreseeable future — a missile defense site in Central Europe, including powerful radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland.

    Is there a link between the two events? I believe there is. Yet initial comments by many political figures and journalists have for the most part ignored this key relationship.

    Instead, many are asserting that canceling the Eastern European missile defense was simply a concession to Russia, which must now reciprocate with a concession of its own. But President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia had already said last November that if the United States made changes to its missile defense plans, his nation would refrain from countermeasures like deploying its own missiles. Soon after President Obama’s decision was announced, this position was reaffirmed.

    Many of President Obama’s critics in the United States insist that he “caved in” to Russian pressure, virtually leaving America’s NATO allies to fend for themselves. There is nothing behind this argument other than the old stereotype of “bad Russia,” a Russia that is always wrong.

    Consider the merits of the case. Russia’s leaders have been saying for some time that the fear of Iran developing effective long-range missiles in the near future was not grounded in fact. Now, after a thorough review by intelligence and defense officials, the United States government has come to the same conclusion, holding that Tehran is perhaps at least five years or even a decade away from such capacity.

    The initial reaction by some politicians and commentators in Poland and the Czech Republic is no less odd. They seem to enjoy the role of a spoiler in relations between other countries and Russia. Voices of realism and caution are routinely rejected, and the opinion of their own citizens, who by and large have no use for radars and missiles, is brushed aside.

    In Russia, President Obama’s decision has been well received. It also met with support in Europe, with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France lauding it. The Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, called it “a chance to strengthen European security.” Indeed, if the president’s decision is followed by further serious steps, it will provide an opportunity for us to strengthen global security as well as reach a new level of cooperation in ridding the world of nuclear danger.

    At their meeting in Moscow in early July, Presidents Obama and Medvedev reaffirmed the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense. The two nations continue arms reduction talks and, judging by cautious diplomatic statements, they seem to be on course to complete them by Dec. 5, when the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — which I signed with President George H. W. Bush in 1991 — is due to expire.

    This week’s United Nations meeting marks the next stage of progress. It is vital that other nations come away from the meeting believing that America and Russia are moving toward verifiable nuclear arms reductions, and that by the time the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference is held at the United Nations next May, they will have made progress toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Unless they show the world they are serious, the two major nuclear powers will be accused, again and again, of not keeping their word and told that if it is acceptable for 5 or 10 countries to have nuclear weapons as their “ultimate security guarantee,” why should it not be the case for 20 or 30 others?

    It is vital that the two presidents themselves monitor the negotiations closely, sometimes plunging into minute details. I know from experience how difficult it is to deal with such technical details on top of constant political pressures, but it is necessary to avoid misunderstandings that could undermine trust.

    Some questions that will need to be clarified are evident now. The American secretary of defense, Robert Gates, has said that the SM-3 missiles that are to be used under the new missile-defense plan could later be perfected to intercept long-range intercontinental missiles. Yet he has also raised the possibility of cooperating with Russia on missile defense. To me, these two ideas seem incompatible. The sooner such issues are cleared up the better.

    As I see it, there is only one way to move forward: Washington should agree to the Russian proposal for a joint assessment of missile threats. Let the experts from both countries have a frank discussion that would reveal which threats are real and must be dealt with, and which are imaginary. This would help to avoid misguided projects like the Polish-Czech missile shield, and could help move us from a state of mutual deterrence to a goal of minimum nuclear sufficiency for self-defense.

    This is a big agenda. Realistically, it would take two or three years of intense negotiation. But Russia and the United States must set big tasks for themselves. What is needed is nothing less than a change in the strategic relationship between the two major nuclear powers — in their own interests and in the cause of world peace.

     

    Mikhail Gorbachev is the former president of the Soviet Union.