Tag: new START

  • U.S. Launches Minuteman III Missile Test Just Four Weeks After the Last Test

    U.S. Launches Minuteman III Missile Test Just Four Weeks After the Last Test

    For Immediate Release

    Contact: Sandy Jones  (805) 965-3443; sjones@napf.org

    Rick Wayman  (805) 696-5159; rwayman@napf.org

    SANTA BARBARA, CA– Early this morning, for the second time in less than a month, a Minuteman III missile was tested during a launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base.

    Less than a month ago on August 4th, just two days prior to the 75th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the U.S. Air Force launched a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base, which was loaded with three mock nuclear warheads.

    Rick Wayman, CEO of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a non-profit based in Santa Barbara committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons and solving the most dangerous technological, social, and psychological issues of our time, commented on the close succession of missile tests by saying, “Less than one month ago, while the U.S. was launching a missile test, the majority of the world was solemnly remembering the 75th anniversaries of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and vowing that such a catastrophe will never happen again. Wednesday’s test, combined with the three-warhead missile test last month, appear to be in preparation for the expiration of New START in February when limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons will be lifted and the U.S. will be able to put multiple nuclear warheads back on each Minuteman missile.”

    Wayman went on to say, “The unnecessarily provocative tests by the U.S. is an important reminder that the nuclear threat remains very real. We have decision makers who are willing and able to escalate nuclear threats even further by putting multiple warheads back on ICBMs – something that has not been done for decades.”

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    If you would like to interview Rick Wayman, please call (805) 965-3443 or (805) 696-5159.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s mission is to educate and train people of all ages and backgrounds to solve the most dangerous technological, social, and psychological issues of our time, and to survive and thrive in the 21st century. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations. For more information, visit wagingpeace.org and peaceliteracy.org.

  • Nuclear Weapons and the Jobs Myth

    Ray Acheson delivered these comments at an event at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) at a launch event for Ward Wilson’s book Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons.

    Thank you to UNODA for inviting me to be a discussant on this panel. And thank you to Ward for this new book.

    The basic myths that Ward addresses in this book are those that still capture the popular imagination. When talking to anyone not actively involved in the debate about nuclear weapons, if they are skeptical about getting rid of them it is because of at least one of these myths. Thus the style of the book, its accessibility and straightforward language and structure, will be extremely beneficial for any public discussion on nuclear weapons.

    By interrogating five myths, Ward provides a compelling case that nuclear weapons are useless. This begs a larger question: if nuclear weapons are useless why do they still exist? Why are these myths maintained—who benefits from them? Nuclear weapons must be useful for someone or something or else they wouldn’t still exist, they would have gone the way of the penny farthing.

    When considering the continued existence of nuclear weapons, we have to consider who is materially invested in these weapons—they are the ones who benefit from the perpetuation of the myths about nuclear weapons. Thus we need to look to the military-industrial complex, in particular the corporations that run the nuclear weapons laboratories and the politicians with these labs and corporations in their districts.

    This brings me to a myth that wasn’t included in Ward’s book but that is very important, especially in the US context, and that’s the myth of jobs.

    Corporations and politicians in the United States fight to keep the nuclear weapons budget very high, arguing that it is good for economic growth and in particular for jobs in their states. We saw this with the fight over ratifying New START in the US Senate, when the Obama administration had to commit to spend $180 billion over the next twenty years on modernizing nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and related facilities in order to get consent for ratification; and we’re seeing it again now in the fiscal cliff discussions where politicians with nuclear labs in their states are working to ensure that funding for the nuclear enterprise doesn’t diminish.

    But economic benefit is another myth about nuclear weapons. There are several problems with the “jobs” argument. First of all, as the Los Alamos Study Group has shown, nuclear spending is an extremely inefficient method of job creation. Government documents show that multi-billion dollar modernization programmes result in very few temporary working class jobs. Money spent on the high-cost skilled labour needed to maintained global stockpiles is akin to perpetual workfare for top-tier professionals and specialists; individuals from jobs categories that have lower unemployment rates and higher paychecks anyway. Thus military spending creates very few jobs for those most in need of work.

    Second of all, nuclear spending does not benefit communities or populations. Let’s take the case of New Mexico, which is home to two nuclear weapon labs (Los Alamos and Sandia) as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s National Service Center in Albuquerque, a nuclear waste disposal site, and four military bases.

    New Mexico’s economic status is distorted by military spending. The median income for the state is significantly skewed by the incorporation of figures from Los Alamos, the town where the key nuclear weapons lab resides. In a recent report, Los Alamos was found to have the highest concentration of millionaires in the United States. There are 885 millionaire households among the population of Los Alamos of around 18,000, giving the town an 11.7 per cent concentration of millionaire households. Yet outside of Los Alamos the state suffers from poverty. New Mexico has among the worst poverty rates in the United States (18.6 percent in 2010).

    In fact, as spending at the Los Alamos lab has increased, New Mexico’s per capita income rate has declined relative to other states and its income disparity has grown. As lab spending has increased, health and education rankings have decreased and violent crime rate and drug overdose rates have increased. Maintaining jobs at the Los Alamos lab requires a high military budget, which takes money from other federal programmes and incurs massive government debt, thus constraining the investments New Mexico can make in education, health, and infrastructure.

    So why does the myth of jobs and economic growth persist? Because money controls the message.

    In terms of New Mexico, campaign contributions flow from the nuclear weapons labs to the state’s congressional delegation, in quantities as great, or greater, as from any other source. In addition, among colleges and universities, the University of New Mexico is one the largest recipients of Pentagon money in the country. Thus former President Eisenhower’s farewell warning about “the acquisition of unwarranted influence … by the military industrial complex” reigns true today.

    Nuclear weapons are an addiction that needs to be overcome. Ward’s book is helpful for initiating discussion about a process of overcoming the addiction. He makes a compelling case for undermining many of the myths around nuclear weapons—compelling enough that he could have stronger prescriptions for action at the end.

    In particular, the book suggests that pursuing disarmament in the near-term could be destabilizing, which is puzzling in a book that convincingly argues that the nuclear weapons enterprise has been largely sustained on the basis of myth. In this connection, Ward’s arguments actually support a far stronger conclusion, which should hopefully be apparent to any careful reader. If we accept the claim that nuclear deterrence is a myth, we must accept that the same is true for the roles of nuclear weapons in maintaining so-called strategic stability. In light of this, a reasonable person could only conclude that nuclear abolition is both viable and realistic.

    Ray Acheson is Director of Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
  • After New START: Where Does Nuclear Disarmament Go from Here?


    This article was originally published on the History News Network.


    Lawrence WittnerWith U.S. Senate ratification of the New START treaty on December 22, supporters of nuclear disarmament won an important victory.  Signed by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last April, the treaty commits the two nations to cut the number of their deployed strategic (i.e. long-range) nuclear warheads to 1,550 each—a reduction of 30 percent in the number of these weapons of mass destruction.  By providing for both a cutback in nuclear weapons and an elaborate inspection system to enforce it, New START is the most important nuclear disarmament treaty for a generation.


    Nevertheless, the difficult battle to secure Senate ratification indicates that making further progress on nuclear disarmament will not be easy.  Treaty ratification requires a positive vote by two-thirds of the Senate and, to secure the necessary Republican support, Obama promised nearly $185 billion over the next decade for “modernizing” the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.  Even with this enormous concession to nuclear enthusiasts—a hefty “bribe,” in the view of unhappy arms control and disarmament organizations—Senator Jon Kyl, the Republican point man on the issue, continued to oppose New START and ultimately voted against it.  So did most other Republican senators, including Mitch McConnell (Senate Republican leader) and John McCain (the latest Republican presidential candidate).  Leading candidates for the GOP presidential nomination in 2012, including Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin, also opposed the treaty.  As a result, New START squeaked through the Senate by a narrow margin.  With six additional Republicans entering the Senate in January, treaty ratification will become much harder.


    So where do the possibilities for progress on nuclear disarmament lie in the future?


    One obvious focus for action is ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Signed by the United States and most other nations in 1996, the treaty provides for a total ban on the nuclear explosions that serve as the basis for the development of new nuclear weapons.  This ban would be enforced by an extensive international verification system.  Republican opposition blocked Senate ratification of the CTBT in 1999, and President George W. Bush—hostile to this arms control measure and others—refused to resubmit the treaty.  Nevertheless, President Obama has consistently supported ratification of the CTBT, and has promised to bring it before the Senate once again.  After the bruising battle over the START Treaty and in the context of heightened Republican strength in the new Senate, however, he might now change his mind.


    A more promising area for progress is a follow-up nuclear disarmament agreement between the United States and Russia.  As these two nations possess the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, other countries have long argued that, before progress can be made in reducing the arsenals of the other nuclear powers or blocking nuclear proliferation, the two nuclear giants must cut their nuclear stockpiles substantially.  In fact, officials from both the United States and Russia have spoken of another round of START negotiations that would reduce their deployment of strategic warheads to 1,000 each.  There is also pressure to cut the number of tactical nuclear weapons they possess—especially the very large numbers still maintained by Russia.  Indeed, Republican opponents of the New START treaty seized on the tactical nuclear weapons issue to argue that the real need for a treaty lay in the tactical weapons area.  Given their rhetorical stance, it might be useful to confront them with such a treaty.


    Nevertheless, stumbling blocks remain to a new arms treaty with Russia.  Not only are the Republicans likely to use their enhanced Senate strength to block its ratification, but the Russians might refuse to accept a new agreement.  The apparent reason for Russian reluctance is U.S. government insistence upon deploying a missile defense system in Europe, on Russian borders.  Although the Obama administration does not appear enthusiastic about missile defense, it has given way before Republican demands to install it.  Conversely, if the administration bargains away missile defense in treaty negotiations with the Russians, it seems quite likely that Republicans will strongly oppose the treaty.


    Perhaps the most promising area for disarmament progress doesn’t involve treaty negotiations or ratification, but simply blocking nuclear “modernization.”  After all, Senator Kyl and most Republicans didn’t accept the “bribe” offered them, but continued to oppose the New START treaty.  Why, then, should the Obama administration follow through on providing $185 billion for refurbishing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, especially when such a program so clearly flies in the face of his pledge to work for a nuclear weapons-free world? 


    Even if the administration sticks to its “modernization” line, however, there is no reason for other forces, inside and outside Congress, to do so.  Over the coming years, in the midst of a huge debate on budgetary priorities, there will be a fierce battle over scarce government resources.  Are angry seniors (concerned about cutbacks in Social Security and Medicare), parents, students, and teachers (concerned about cutbacks in education), the hungry, homeless, and unemployed (concerned about the collapse of the social safety net), and other groups (facing serious attacks on their living standards) going to welcome spending $185 billion for new nuclear weapons facilities?  Certainly groups with domestic spending priorities, plus peace and disarmament groups, are going to press congress to move the money from funding wars and weapons to meeting social needs.  Perhaps they will succeed.


    Thus, in the next two years, the Republicans may end up choking off the opportunities for negotiated disarmament and opening the floodgates to unilateral action. 

  • New START and the Lingering Nuclear Cold War

    Bennett Ramberg


    This article was originally published on The Huffington Post.


    As the Senate attempts to wrap its lame duck session with the New START finale, lost in the back and forth over ratification lies one question that few senators appear willing to ask: Why, now twenty years after the Cold War, do Moscow and Washington find it acceptable to retain thousands of warheads pointed at the other with or without the treaty? Recent official strategy documents by both countries fail to address the matter convincingly leaving each country dedicated to continuing the mutual nuclear hostage relationship that ought to have been put to bed long ago.


    Today’s Russian-American arsenals remain remnants of a bygone era. During the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons became both the currency of power and the acute source of preemption anxiety born out of the surprise attack scars the two countries suffered in World War II. The result propelled the exponential growth of weapons to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor.


    At its height, the United States stocked 31,000 weapons, the Soviet Union over 40,000 by some estimates. Largely reflecting the Cold War’s demise, but also the legacy of earlier arms limitation treaties, Moscow and Washington have come a long way in curbing inventories. Today the United States deploys some 2000 strategic warheads and Russia 2500. Still, under New START, millions of people will remain in the cross hairs of 1550 deployed warheads.


    In February 2010, Moscow unveiled its rationale. Notwithstanding deterrent weight it now gives to a new generation of precision guided conventional weapons, the Kremlin’s continues to see the nuclear arsenal as its ultimate security blanket: “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.”


    In its April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration took a more nuanced approach. It eliminated nuclear targeting of non nuclear weapons states that complied with NPT vows. It added, only in “a narrow range of contingencies” would it use nuclear weapons to deal with chemical, biological and conventional attack. But all other circumstances, including targeting of Russia with the bulk of the arsenal, nuclear war plans remain in tact. The presumption: the Bomb provides “stability.” “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain secure and effective nuclear forces” to deter, reassure allies and promote stability globally and in key regions.


    Despite the president’s pledge to seek nuclear abolition, the Review registered “very demanding” “conditions” that make more dramatic nuclear reductions practically impossible: resolution of regional disputes that motivates nuclear possession, greater nuclear transparency, better verification to detect nonproliferation violators and credible enforcement mechanisms to deter cheating. The Review concluded, “Clearly, such conditions do not exist today. But we can — and must — work actively to create those conditions.”


    New START marks a step to meet the conditions in the Russian-American sphere, but ultimately a modest one. Eighteen on site inspections, data exchanges, a consultative committee to iron out  disputes serve verification goals. But the Obama administration’s  commitment to an $85 billion ten year refurbishment of the nuclear weapons complex signals little reduction in policies that continue the nuclear hostage relationship.


    Indeed the new nuclear doctrines, budgets to boost the weapons  enterprise and congressional skepticism about New START serve as reminders of President Obama’s lament in his 2009 call for a world without nuclear weapons — “This goal will not be reached quickly — perhaps not in my lifetime.” The difficult New START debate punctuates the deeper underlying point: the nuclear Cold War has never gone away. The fact should give comfort to no one.

  • Beyond START

    Alice SlaterThe Obama Administration will pay a heavy price to ratify the modest New START treaty should it receive the required 67 Senate votes this week to enact it into law. The President originally promised the weapons labs $80 billion over ten years for building three new bomb factories in Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Kansas City to modernize our nuclear arsenals as well as an additional $100 billion for new delivery systems—missiles, bombers, and submarines. He then sweetened the pot with an offer of another $4 billion to the nuclear weapons establishment to buy the support of Senator Kyl. Additionally, he is assuring the Senate hawks that missile development in the US will proceed full speed ahead, even though Russia and China have proposed negotiations on a draft treaty they submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban space weaponization. Every country at that conference voted in favor of preventing an arms race in outer space except the United States, still caught in the grip of the military-industrial-academic-congressional complex which President Eisenhower took great pains to warn us against in his farewell address to the nation.


    There are 23,000 nuclear weapons on the planet with 22,000 of them in the US and Russia.  The other 1,000 are in the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. In order to honor our promise in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament in return for a promise by non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons, it is essential that the US and Russia continue to make large reductions in their arsenals to create the conditions for the other nuclear weapons states to come to the table to negotiate a treaty to ban the bomb, just as we have banned chemical and biological weapons. 


    At the NPT conference this spring, for the first time the possibility of negotiating a nuclear weapons convention was adopted by consensus in the final document. Civil society and friendly governments are now exploring opportunities for starting an “Ottawa Process” for a nuclear weapons ban, just as was done for landmines. China, India and Pakistan have already voted on a UN Resolution to open such negotiations. Perhaps Asia will lead the way. But if the US persists in developing its nuclear infrastructure with new bomb factories while threatening Russia with proliferating missiles, it’s unlikely that this modest New START will help us down the path to peace.

  • Indefensible

    This op-ed was originally published by the Los Angeles Times.

    A year ago this week, American officials wrapped up a two-day inspection of a Russian strategic missile base at Teykovo, 130 miles northeast of Moscow, where mobile SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles are deployed.

    Twelve days later, their Russian counterparts wrapped up a two-day inspection at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, home to a strategic bomb wing.

    These inspections are noteworthy because they are the last to be conducted under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which expired in December 2009. No American inspectors have set foot on a Russian nuclear base since, depriving us of key information about Russian strategic forces.

    Worse, if Republicans in the Senate succeed in delaying ratification of the New START agreement — a distinct possibility — it may be months before American inspectors get another look at Russian nuclear weapons.

    This profoundly negative outcome would damage U.S. national security and set the cause of global arms control back years.

    It would deprive the U.S. of the ability to assess, up close, the status and operations of Russian nuclear forces. It would undermine both nations’ ability to tamp down tensions as they arise. And it would signal to the rest of the world that the nations that hold 90% of nuclear weapons are incapable of taking a leadership role in arms control. This in turn would threaten nonproliferation efforts worldwide.

    There are no substantive objections to the treaty. Instead, it is being held hostage to demands that the Obama administration pour billions more into the United States’ nuclear weapons complex, for modernization of weapons and increased spending on facilities and personnel.

    Last week, the administration offered to add $4.1 billion to its previous commitment to spend $80 billion on modernization over the next decade.

    The fact is, New START — signed on April 9 in Prague, the Czech capital, by President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev — has been thoroughly vetted in 18 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Intelligence committees. Concerns that have been raised, such as claims the treaty would hinder U.S. missile defense plans or interfere with conventional missile forces, have been debunked. The Senate has done its due diligence and is ready for an up-or-down vote on ratification.

    To see what’s at stake, consider the Russian missile base at Teykovo. The Russians have upgraded at least one of the four garrisons there this year, replacing the single-warhead SS-25 ICBMs with new SS-27s capable of carrying multiple warheads, according to Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. All without any oversight by American inspectors.

    So it’s clear why the New START treaty is strongly supported by our military and national security establishment, including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael G. Mullen and numerous current and former commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and its predecessor, the Strategic Air Command.

    The New START agreement will not erode our nuclear capabilities, strategic deterrent or national defense. In fact, as arms-control treaties go, it is modest stuff. It would cut deployed nuclear warheads by 30%, to 1,550 each, and launch vehicles — such as missile silos and submarine tubes — by more than 50%, to 800 each.

    These levels are “more than enough … for any threat that we see today or might emerge in the foreseeable future,” said Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former head of U.S. Strategic Command.

    During the 15-year lifespan of the old START agreement, the United States conducted 659 inspections of Russian nuclear facilities, and Russia conducted 481 inspections of our facilities.

    It would be foolish and wrong to let partisan politics bring this era of cooperation to an end. Worse, it would make us blind to the true size and capabilities of the Russian arsenal. There is no question this would weaken our national security. That would be indefensible.

  • Playing Politics with the New START Agreement

    Soon after President Obama came to office he delivered a speech in Prague in which he said, “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  He said America has a responsibility to act and to lead.

    He then initiated negotiations with the Russians that resulted in a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, what has been labeled a “New START.”  This treaty, signed on April 8, 2010 by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, has significant advantages for U.S. national security.  It is an important next step in U.S.-Russian efforts to lessen the nuclear threat to humanity.

    The treaty will accomplish four important objectives.  First, it will lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 1,550 and the number of delivery vehicles to 800 (700 deployed and 100 in reserve).  Second, it will restore the verification procedures that expired with the START I agreement in December 2009.  Third, it will strengthen our relations with the Russians, and put us on a footing to take future downward steps in the size of nuclear arsenals.  Fourth, it will show the world that the U.S. and Russia are serious about their obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament.  

    Many current and former U.S. military leaders and statesmen have spoken out in favor of the treaty.  The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, for example, has said, “Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly.”

    Republican Senator Richard Lugar, a strong proponent of the treaty, has pointed out, “It is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative efforts indefinitely without the New START Treaty coming into force.”

    Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid released a statement on November 17, in which he said, “It is vitally important to America’™s national security for the Senate to ratify the New START treaty before Congress adjourns this year.  We need our inspectors back on the ground and the critical information they can provide about Russia’s nuclear capabilities.  Ratification of this treaty would accomplish both.”  

    So, what is the problem?  We have a treaty negotiated and signed by the parties that both sides think benefits them and it benefits the rest of the world at the same time.  The treaty should be a slam dunk for Senate ratification, but unfortunately that isn’t the case.  

    Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, the Minority Whip, who has been the Republican point person on this treaty in the Senate, is preventing a vote on the treaty.  He is doing so despite the fact that the treaty was approved by a vote of 14 to 4 in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September.  Sadly, America’s national security is being held hostage by one Republican leader in the Senate.  

    Senator Kyl has already negotiated a commitment from the White House of over $80 billion for modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next ten years.  This is a high price that is being paid, making many countries and world leaders doubt the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.   Recently, President Obama went even further to sweeten the deal for Senator Kyl by committing an additional $4.1 billion for modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex over the next five years.  

    The bottom line is that Senator Kyl is playing politics with a treaty that affects the national security interests of the United States.  It appears he is trying to prevent a vote on the treaty in the Senate this year, either in order to embarrass President Obama on the world stage or to push consideration of the treaty off to 2011 when the new Senate is seated and less likely to ratify the treaty.

    Click here to take action by asking your senators to encourage Sen. Kyl and Sen. McConnell to allow the New START agreement to come before the full Senate.

  • Answering Bolton and Yoo: New START Will Strengthen U.S. National Security

    Two staunch ideologues who served in the George W. Bush administration, John Bolton and John Yoo, ask rhetorically in a New York Times opinion piece, “Why Rush to Cut Nukes?”  Bolton, a recess appointment as United Nations Ambassador under Bush II, never met an arms limitation agreement that he supported.  Yoo, the lawyer who wrote memos supporting the legality of water boarding under international law (not a very favorable prospect for captured U.S. soldiers), worked in Bush II’s Justice Department.  Bolton and Yoo can find no good reason to support the New START agreement with the Russians, arguing that without amendments it will weaken “our national defense.”  

    Let me answer the question posed in the title of their article.  The Senate should support and ratify this treaty because it will strengthen U.S. national security by:

    • reducing the size of the bloated nuclear arsenals in both countries, creating a new lower level from which to make further reductions;
    • reinstating verification procedures that ended with the expiration of the first START agreement in December 2009;
    • building confidence in the Russians that we stand behind our agreements; and
    • sending a signal to the rest of the world that we are taking steps to fulfill our legal commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    The downsides of failing to ratify the treaty would be to remove restraints on the size of the Russian arsenal, forego inspection and verification of the Russian arsenal, undermine Russian confidence in U.S. commitments, and encourage further nuclear proliferation by other countries thereby increasing the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. Further, if the treaty is not ratified before the new Congress is seated in January 2011, its future ratification will be far more difficult.

    What do Bolton and Yoo say they want?  First, to remove language in the treaty’s preamble, which is not legally binding, that says there is an “interrelationship” between nuclear weapons and defensive systems.  That language only recognizes a reality.  Of course, there is a relationship between missiles and missile defenses.  Second, they don’t want the U.S. to be limited in putting conventional weapons on formerly nuclear launch systems.  But that is a price, and a fair one, that each side will pay for lowering the other side’s nuclear capabilities.  Third, they want a Congressional act for the financing, testing and development of new U.S. warhead designs before the treaty is ratified.  In other words, they want guarantees that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be modernized.  They seek long-term reliance on the U.S. nuclear threat, but this means that U.S. citizens will also remain under nuclear threat for the long-term.

    Bolton and Yoo are an interesting pair.  The first would lop ten floors off the United Nations, the second do away with the laws of war when they aren’t convenient.  Do they deserve their own opinions?  Of course.  Do their opinions make any sense?  Only in the context of the American exceptionalism and militarism that were the trademarks of the Bush II administration and have done so much to weaken the spirit, values and resources of the country while continuing to haunt us in our aggressive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

    One must wonder what possessed the New York Times to publish their rantings.  Additionally, using the word “Nukes” in the title suggests somehow that nuclear weapons are cute enough to have nicknames and not a serious threat to the very existence of civilization.  That Bolton and Yoo could rise to high positions in our country is a sad commentary on the country, but perhaps understandable in the context of the Bush II administration’s persistent flouting of international law.  That the New York Times would find sufficient merit in their discredited opinions to publish their article is an even sadder commentary on the editorial integrity of one of the country’s most respected newspapers.

  • Ratification of New START is Necessary

    In April 2009, President Obama went to Prague and spoke out for a world free of nuclear weapons.  “I state clearly and with conviction,” he said, “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  He indicated that he was prepared to take necessary steps to advance this cause.  In order “to reduce our warheads and stockpiles,” he promised to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians during the year.  This treaty, known as New START, took longer than anticipated to negotiate and was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on April 8, 2010.  The next month, the treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification.

    While the agreement was being negotiated, the first START agreement expired, ending the provisions for verification between the US and Russia.  Since December 2009, there have been no verification procedures in place for conducting inspections of the other side’s nuclear arsenal.  This is a gap that many analysts have noted badly needs filling.  It is one of the principal arguments in favor of ratification.  Beyond this, though, failure to ratify would be a serious setback in US-Russian relations, and would indicate that further progress on nuclear disarmament is stalled and unlikely to proceed.

    The principal provisions of the new treaty would lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 1,550 (down about a third from current requirements under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700.  There are some nuances to the counting that affect the final numbers, such as counting each bomber as one nuclear warhead despite the fact that each bomber could carry up to 24 warheads.  The Russians also expressed concerns over US plans to continue to deploy missile defenses in Europe, which the Russians believe affect the strategic balance between the two countries in a manner unfavorable to them.  They indicated that, at some point, US deployment of missile defenses could cause them to withdraw from the treaty.  

    A number of conservatives in the US, including Senator Jim DeMint, have expressed the view that the Russian position opposing deployment of US missile defenses should not constrain the US missile defense program.  Others, including Senator Jon Kyl, have taken the position that the US should devote more resources over the next ten years to modernizing the nuclear arsenal and infrastructure and the means for delivery of nuclear weapons.  President Obama has sought to head off these concerns preemptively by committing to $80 billion for modernizing nuclear weapons over the next ten years and $100 billion for improving nuclear weapons delivery systems.  These funds will be added to the more than $50 billion annually already committed to supporting the US nuclear arsenal, a larger amount than during the Cold War.  

    The US nuclear modernization program will increase our capacity to produce new nuclear weapons and will send a message to the world that the US continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal for security. Even with this extra $180 billion commitment, some conservatives are unlikely to ever be satisfied with the treaty.  John Bolton, a former US Ambassador to the United Nations in the George W. Bush administration, has called New START “unilateral disarmament.”  He has worried publicly that the agreement “will severely limit our small-war capabilities.”

    Against this background, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16, 2010 voted 14 to 4 in favor of sending the New START agreement to the full Senate for debate.  The majority included three Republicans, more than was expected.  Does this bode well for Senate ratification of the treaty?  This remains unclear.  It suggests, though, that all Republicans will not vote as a block against ratification, which would sink the treaty.  Senator Richard Lugar showed leadership, along with Senator John Kerry, in pushing the treaty to the Senate floor.  Their joint leadership, along with that of President Obama, will remain important in seeking the 67 votes needed for the treaty’s ratification.  

    Failure to ratify would be a major setback not only for the Obama administration, but also for the prospects of achieving President Obama’s vision, and that of many other committed leaders, of a world without nuclear weapons.  Failure to ratify the New START agreement would diminish the prospects for a future free of nuclear catastrophe and even of a human future.  The promise of continuing to modernize the US nuclear arsenal has already been pledged as a price extracted for Senate ratification.  If this price is paid and there is no Senate ratification, it would signal the worst of all possible outcomes for those who seek an end to the nuclear weapons threat to humanity.