Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NATO

  • Erosion of Nonproliferation Treaty

    As the review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty convenes in New York this month, we can only be appalled at the indifference of the United States and the other nuclear powers. This indifference is remarkable, considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek nuclear weapons programs.

    In the run-up to the conference, a group of “Middle States” had a simple goal: “To exert leverage on the nuclear powers to take some minimum steps to save the nonproliferation treaty in 2005.” Last year this coalition of nuclear-capable states – including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and eight NATO members – voted for a new agenda resolution calling for implementing NPT commitments already made. Tragically, the United States, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

    Preparatory talks failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between nuclear powers that refuse to meet their own disarmament commitments and the non-nuclear movement, whose demands include honoring these pledges and considering the Israeli arsenal.

    Until recently, all American presidents since Dwight Eisenhower had striven to restrict and reduce nuclear arsenals – some more than others. As far as I know, there are no present efforts by any of the nuclear powers to accomplish these crucial goals.

    The United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including antiballistic missiles, the earth-penetrating “bunker buster” and perhaps some new “small” bombs. They also have abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

    Some corrective actions are obvious:

    The United States needs to address remaining nuclear issues with Russia, demanding the same standards of transparency and verification of past arms control agreements and dismantling and disposal of decommissioned weapons. With massive arsenals still on hair-trigger alert status, a global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the cold war. We could address perhaps the world’s greatest proliferation threat by fully securing Russia’s stockpiles.

    While all nuclear weapons states should agree to no first use, the United States, as the sole superpower, should take the lead on this issue.

    NATO needs to de-emphasize the role of its nuclear weapons and consider an end to their deployment in Western Europe. Despite its eastward expansion, NATO is keeping the same stockpiles and policies as when the Iron Curtain divided the continent.

    The comprehensive test ban treaty should be honored, but the United States is moving in the opposite direction. The administration’s 2005 budget refers for the first time to a list of test scenarios, and other nations are waiting to take the same action.

    The United States should support a fissile-materials treaty to prevent the creation and transport of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

    The United States should curtail development of the infeasible missile defense shield, which is wasting huge resources, while breaking our commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without a working substitute.

    Act on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, an increasing source of instability. Iran has repeatedly hidden its intentions to enrich uranium while claiming that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. This explanation has been given before, by India, Pakistan and North Korea, and has led to weapons programs in all three states. Iran must be called to account and held to its promises under the Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge how Israel’s nuclear status entices Iran, Syria, Egypt and other states to join the community of nuclear-weapon states.

    If the United States and other nuclear powers are serious about stopping the erosion of the Nonproliferation Treaty, they must act now on these issues. Any other course will mean a world in which the nuclear threat increases, not diminishes.

    Jimmy Carter is a former president of the United States and founder of the Carter Center in Atlanta. This comment was distributed by Tribune Media Services for Global Viewpoint.

    Originally published by the International Herald Tribune

  • A New Bridge to Nuclear Disarmament

    A bridge on the long road to nuclear disarmament was built when eight NATO States supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution at the United Nations calling for more speed in implementing commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The bridge gained extra strength when Japan and South Korea joined with the NATO 8 – Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Turkey.

    These States, along with the New Agenda countries – Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden – now form an impressive and perhaps formidable center in the nuclear weapons debate and can play a determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

    The bridge they have formed links the nuclear weapons States, which are entrenching nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, and the Non-Aligned Movement, which wants immediate negotiations on a time-bound program for nuclear disarmament.

    It is hard to know what to call this new collection of important States in the center. It is certainly not an entity. To be called a working partnership, it will at least have to pursue a common goal. And it is by no means certain that the tensions within the center can be contained. Nonetheless, the strategy adopted by the New Agenda Coalition to make its annual resolution at the U.N. First Committee more attractive particularly to the NATO and like-minded States – and thus shore up the moderate middle in the nuclear weapons debate – is working.

    Although the bridge needs strengthening, it is firm enough for the centrist States to exert leverage on the nuclear weapons States to take minimum steps to save the NPT in 2005.

    These steps are spelled out in the New Agenda resolution. It starts out by expressing “grave concern” at the danger to humanity posed by the possible use of nuclear weapons, and reminds nuclear weapons States of their 2000 “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It then calls on “all States” to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments and “not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race.”

    The resolution identifies priorities for action: universal adherence to the NPT and the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-development of new types of nuclear weapons; negotiation of an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty; establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament; and compliance with principles of irreversibility and transparency and verification capability.

    The resolution was adopted by a vote of 135 States in favour, 5 against and 25 abstentions. This was a considerable gain over the 121-6-38 vote for the New Agenda’s much more extensive resolution last year.

    China voted for the resolution and Russia abstained. The three Western nuclear weapons States, the U.S., the U.K. and France, all voted no, along with Israel and Latvia. Not able to object to what was in the resolution, the Western NWS said their “no” was based on what was not in it, namely recognition that the Moscow Treaty “commits the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals by several thousand warheads over the next decade.” Nonetheless, the Western NWS looked forward to “ongoing dialogue” at the NPT 2005 Conference.

    The U.S. took an aggressive stance against the resolution, both in meetings at the U.N. and in demarches in capitals. Some NATO States were obviously intimidated, but the presumed NATO solidarity was cracked when seven NATO States joined with Canada, which for two years had stood alone in NATO in supporting the New Agenda resolution. The fact that such important NATO players as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium have also now taken a pro-active stance indicates that they wanted to send a message to the U.S. to take more significant steps to fulfilling commitments already made to the NPT.

    Japan, which annually offers its own resolution, “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” suddenly decided to support the New Agenda resolution, in order, as the government explained, to engender a “favourable atmosphere for nuclear disarmament.” This was a statesmanlike step, especially since the New Agenda countries failed to reciprocate when they abstained on Japan’s resolution. To parse the minute differences between the New Agenda’s and Japan’s resolutions is to engage in the technical games that experts play that result in diplomatic paralysis and public apathy.

    The situation the NPT finds itself in is so serious and the threat of nuclear terrorism so real that governments need to put aside their quarrels and power plays and take meaningful steps to ensure that the NPT will not be lost to the world through erosion.

    The centrist States have shown that they can cooperate in at least a basic manner to vote together on a program of meaningful action. They will now have to find ways of effectively negotiating with the NWS at the 2005 conference. They can do this provided they retain a confidence that the bridge they have built can hold and trust one another in the forthcoming NPT deliberations.

    Here the role of civil society should be noted. Like the States within the NPT, civil society is itself composed of groups with different viewpoints about how to achieve elimination. Some groups, understandably impatient, want fast action. But the resistance of the Western NWS, particularly the U.S., is so strong that demands for immediate comprehensive negotiations run up against a brick wall.

    Intermediate gains, such as the steps outlined in the New Agenda resolution, would go a long way in moving the international community down the path to nuclear disarmament. The New Agenda strategy of building up the center for moderate, realistic achievements deserves the full-fledged support of civil society.

    Senator emeritus Douglas Roche, O.C. of Canada is Chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative and author of “The Human Right to Peace.”

  • NATO: Abandon First Strike Doctrine, De-Alert Nuclear Weapons

    The world has changed dramatically, even NATO itself has changed, not necessarily for the better, but NATO nuclear policy, based upon nuclear deterrence and a first use option, has not changed.

    For its first 40 years NATO was a defensive alliance. Its purpose was to defend against an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union. NATO relied heavily on the threat to use nuclear weapons to thwart such an attack. Regardless of what one thinks of this policy, it must be recognized that the need for such a strategy has passed.

    The Cold War ended. There is no longer a Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved. No threat against Western Europe currently exists, and the Russians have sought friendly relations with the West.

    How has NATO responded to this situation?

    First, it has expanded. George Kennan, an American elder statesman who crafted the containment policy against the former Soviet Union, has called NATO expansion the single greatest mistake in American foreign policy in the post Cold War era. It is a mistake because it threatens the Russians.

    Second, NATO has changed from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance in disregard of its own Charter.

    NATO, is currently engaged in hostilities that are in clear violation of international law.

    Third, NATO has resisted any change in its nuclear doctrine. It continues to have a nuclear first-strike doctrine, meaning that NATO refuses to declare that it will use nuclear weapons only against attack by nuclear weapons.

    Fourth, NATO continues to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and continues to employ a nuclear sharing policy. U.S. nuclear weapons are located in Germany, UK, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, and Belgium.

    It is important to note that all of this takes place under strong pressure from the United States, and is the result of U.S. leadership of NATO.

    When the new German government came to power and wanted to pursue a No First Use (of nuclear weapons) policy for NATO, the U.S. put strong pressure on them to fall into line. Similar pressure has been applied to Canada and to other NATO governments.

    What is wrong with NATO’s nuclear policy?

    It is terribly dangerous. It could have catastrophic results, by accident or design. It forces the Russians to greater reliance on their nuclear arsenal. It encourages nuclear proliferation. It violates international law, both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Articles VI, and I and II) and the opinion of the International Court of Justice. Most tragically, it undermines the best opportunity we may have to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

    What should NATO do?

    1. Immediately declare a policy of No First Use, and a policy of Non-Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    2. Remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, including withdrawal of Trident submarines from European waters.

    3. Express its support for the World Court decision on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

    4. Make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear arms and take practical steps to accomplish this end, as called for by the New Agenda Coalition.

    5. De-alert its nuclear forces, and begin to separate warheads from delivery vehicles.

    6. Begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, setting forth an agreed upon plan for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons.

    7. Declare an immediate cease fire in the Balkans, and return the issue of peace in the former Yugoslavia to the United Nations Security Council or to the UN General Assembly under Article 20 of the Charter and a “Uniting for Peace” Resolution if the Security Council is deadlocked.

    In concluding, I’d like to share with you a message I received by email from a friend in Russia, Alla Yaroshinskaya, who is an advisor to President Yeltsin:

    “We are very close to theatre of war in Yugoslavia and have information from both sides. And I am very afraid we are on the eve of 3rd world’s war. NATO and USA, bombing Yugoslavia, help very much our crazy communists to take into force sooner than they dreamed about that. And I think that USA has good chance to feel destruction on their own territory if power in such country like Russia with nuclear strategical weapons fall down to the hands of bloody Bolsheviks.”

  • NATO’s Expansion: Provocation, Not Leadership

    NATO claims that by bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the 16-member Organization, the new NATO will “meet the challenges of the 21st century.” But 50 American former Senators, diplomats and officials maintain that NATO expansion would be “a policy error of historic proportions.” George Kennan, the father of the U.S. containment policy on the Soviet Union, says: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.”

    Why is NATO so determined to enlarge? Why is the opposition so strong? Why is the U.S. Senate rushing to judgment on such a controversial step?

    I am an opponent of NATO expansion. I see the expansion of a nuclear-armed Alliance up to Russia’s borders as provocative, not an act of leadership for peace. In fact, NATO’s expansion undermines the struggle for peace.

    I want to set out my reasons in three main categories: instilling fear in Russia; setting back nuclear disarmament; and undermining the United Nations.

    Instilling Fear In Russia

    It is claimed that the idea of NATO expansion started with the leaders of Central and Eastern Europe who wanted to look West in confidence rather than East in fear. President Clinton was impressed with this stance and U.S. policy set out reasons for widening the scope of the American-European security connection.

    NATO expansion would respond to three strategic challenges: to enhance the relationship between the U.S. and the enlarging democratic Europe; to engage a still evolving Russia in a cooperative relationship with Europe; and to reinforce the habits of democracy and the practice of peace in Central Europe.

    Secretary of State Madeleine Albright set out the case cogently: “Now the new NATO can do for Europe’s east what the old NATO did for Europe’s west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the regions where two world wars and the Cold War began.”

    Russia’s early objections to NATO expansion were met by NATO’s assurances that it wanted a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia based on the Founding Act on Mutual Relations. Russia would be consulted; a Russian military representative arrived in Brussels; the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council began meeting at the ministerial level. NATO insisted it was moving away from forward defense planning and reducing its military capability.

    But that is not what Russian leaders see. They maintain that, despite Moscow’s disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, deeper reductions in nuclear and conventional forces than in the West, the hasty withdrawal of half a million troops from comfortable barracks in Central Europe to tent camps in Russian fields, the most powerful military Alliance in the world started moving toward Russian borders.

    Offered only membership in a limited “Partnership for Peace” rather than full membership in the new NATO, Russia is now having a much harder time achieving the goals of Russian democrats.

    Russians are little impressed with Western benign assurances. And their apprehension increases at the prospect of more East and Central European countries joining NATO in the next expansion wave. Worst of all, they fear the entry of the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—Russia’s intimate neighbors—into NATO. A Charter of Partnership has already been signed between the U.S. and the three Baltic nations in which Washington has promised to do everything possible to get them ready to join NATO.

    How can the West expect the Russians, a proud people who have suffered the ravages of war throughout the 20th century, to calmly accept such isolation? They see a ganging-up of nations against Russia as a travesty on the end of the Cold War.

    Why, Russians ask, cannot the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) be the guarantor of security for the whole of Europe? The OSCE was started a quarter of a century ago to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE was established as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in Europe. In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the OSCE was called upon to contribute to managing the historic change in Europe and respond to the new challenges of the post-Cold War period. It was believed that the OSCE would replace NATO as the principal security watchdog in Europe. Russia would like to have NATO subservient to the OSCE. But in NATO’s resurgence, the OSCE is fading.

    Why? One reason is because all states in the OSCE have equal status and decisions are made on the basis of consensus. This does not sit well with the lone superpower in the world whose military might exceeds the combined power of most of Europe.

    Why should the U.S.— exercising its military might through dominance of an expanding NATO — create such a permanent source of friction with Russia? NATO expansion is a backward step in drawing Russia into the community of nations.

    The expansion process should be stopped and alternative actions taken:

    • Open the European Union to all the countries of Europe
    • Develop a cooperative NATO-Russian relationship that implements arms reductions and builds trading relationships
    • Setting Back Nuclear Disarmament
    • The setting back of nuclear disarmament is the most serious consequence of NATO expansion. Global security will suffer. In fact, it is NATO’s insistence that “nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in NATO strategy” that poses such a threat to peace in the 21st century

    The nuclear weapons situation in the world is at a critical stage. Nearly a decade after the end of the Cold War, more than 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the world. No new nuclear negotiations are taking place; the Conference on Disarmament is paralyzed. The Russian Duma, fearing NATO’s expansion, has not ratified START II; START III is immobilized. Some Russian politicians and militarists, concerned about Russia’s crumbling conventional force structure, are once again talking of nuclear weapons as a vital line of defense for Russia. Even if START II were ratified, there would still be at least 17,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds remaining in 2007. More than 8,500 will be in Russia.

    Under Gorbachev, Russia started to move down the road to nuclear disarmament, starting with a no-first-use pledge and other unilateral moves. When he came to power, Boris Yeltsin projected a sweeping foreign policy on democracy, a market economy, the slashing of weapons, a pan-European collective defense system and even “a global system for protection of the world community.” “A new world order based on the primacy of international law is coming,” Yeltsin said.

    Such talk has ceased as Russia, ever more desperate for hesitant Western financial assistance, became mired in constant economic and political crises. Instead of offering a 1990s Marshall Plan-scale of help to Russia (which would be in the economic and political interests of the West, not least in cleaning up the “loose nukes” peril), the West offers an expanded NATO. Since Russia so desperately needs the new eighth seat at the G7 Economic Summit, its protests, though not its resentments, are weakened.

    Despite the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a new technology race in the quest for more innovative nuclear weapons, led by the U.S., has broken out. Since the U.S. so clearly intends to keep producing better designed nuclear weapons, there is virtually no hope that other nations will forego seeking the technology to allow them to keep up with this race. The world is poised to enter the 21st century in a “cold peace” atmosphere in which the CTBT will go unratified by some of the required states and the NPT may begin to unravel.

    The continued retention of nuclear weapons by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who insist that they are essential to their security and that of their allies, while denying the same right to others, is inherently unstable. This is an essential point made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) whose unanimous call for the conclusion of nuclear weapons negotiations continues to be rejected by the Western NWS and the bulk of NATO.

    NATO’s continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, even at reduced levels, along with a refusal to respect the ICJ and enter into comprehensive negotiations, is in direct violation of the pledge made by the Nuclear Weapons States at the time of the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995: to pursue with determination “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.”

    To lessen fears of the growth of a nuclear-armed Alliance, NATO insists that it has “no plan, no need and no intention” to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. That is not the point. Not stationing nuclear weapons in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic does nothing to get them out of Western European countries. Nothing less than the removal of all of NATO’s nuclear weapons from all of Europe will suffice to demonstrate NATO’s sincerity.

    Though NATO operates in great secrecy, it is clear that the Alliance has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons, is determined to maintain a nuclear war-fighting capability, and is prepared to use low-yield nuclear warheads first. It is unacceptable that NATO even refuses to release the Terms of Reference used for its current review of the Strategic Concept.

    The expansion of such a nuclear-armed Alliance is not an aid but a challenge to the development of peaceful relations with Russia. A nuclear NATO sets back peace.

    Undermining the United Nations

    The evolution of a world system is imperative if civilized life is to continue in the coming millennium. The United Nations is the essential centre-piece of that system. Its over-arching purpose is to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the Security Council is given strong powers to enforce its decisions.

    But the UN is undermined by military alliances that threaten force as a standing policy. The long years of East-West animosity during the Cold War virtually immobilized the UN’s efforts to maintain peace. In despair during one of the worst moments of the Cold War, former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar castigated the nuclear superpowers for their militarism, contrasting it to world poverty of vast proportions—”a deprivation inexplicable in terms either of available resources or the money and ingenuity spent on armaments and war.” He criticized governments for ignoring their own signatures on the UN Charter: “We are perilously near to a new international anarchy.”

    Despite the end of the Cold War, the world still spends $800 billion a year on the military, most of this amount is spent by the U.S. and its NATO allies. NATO expansion will send arms expenditures even higher. NATO has already said that new members will have to make a “military contribution.”

    Estimates of the cost of NATO expansion vary from $27 billion to several hundred billion dollars over the next decade, though the U.S. Administration, fearful of a taxpayers’ backlash, has been playing down the U.S. share of the bill. Whatever the final cost, the many billions of dollars to be devoted to new military hardware, thus enriching the leading arms merchants of the world, is a direct theft from the fifth of humanity that is poor and marginalized and that needs but modest investment in their economic and social development to stabilize regional conditions. This is the old anarchy writ new.

    The UN has shown time and again that promoting disarmament and development at the same time enhances security. In the post-Cold War era, human security does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the quality of life that economic and social development underpins.

    Sustainable development needs huge amounts of investment in scientific research, technological development, education and training, infrastructure development and the transfer of technology. Investment in these structural advances is urgently needed to stop carbon dioxide poisoning of the atmosphere and the depletion of the earth’s biological resources such as the forest, wetlands and animal species now under attack. But the goals for sustainable development set out in the 1992 Earth Summit’s major document, Agenda 21, are blocked by political inertia, which countenances continued high military spending.

    It is clear, as the Director-General of UNESCO put it, that “we cannot simultaneously pay the price of war and the price of peace.” Budgetary priorities need to be realigned in order to direct financial resources of enhancing life, not producing death. A transformation of political attitudes is needed to build a “culture of peace.” A new political attitude would say No to investment in arms and destruction and Yes to investment in the construction of peace.

    A nuclear-armed NATO stronger than the United Nations is an intolerable prospect. Yet the residual militarist mentality in the world continues to sideline the UN and even force it into penury. The lavishness of NATO contrasted to the poverty of the UN mocks the most ardent aspirations of the peoples of the world.

    The Role of Civil Society

    Put in strategic terms, the risks of NATO expansion far outweigh any possible contribution to security. The issues are complex and need careful examination and extended public debate. A headlong rush into this abyss could indeed be a “fateful error.” The U.S. Senate needs to hear from informed citizens before giving its advice and consent to such an ill-considered policy.

    Is it too late to stop NATO expansion? Has the U.S. Administration gone too far to pull back? Could a five-year waiting period be invoked for time for sober reflection? What is so sacred about getting expansion done in time for NATO’s 50th anniversary in 1999?

    If NATO expansion is to be stopped by the U.S. Senate, civil society will have to mobilize as never before. The enlightened elements of the public will have to lead the way. Much of government seems mesmerized by the superficial appeal of the politics of an enlarged NATO.

    It was once said of King Philip of Spain: “No experience of the failure of his policy could shake his belief in its essential excellence.” The stakes are too high today for trial-and-error. We must shake the Government and Congress of the United States of the belief that NATO expansion serves the people’s interest. It does not. It serves only the interests of the producers of arms. NATO expansion is folly. We must proclaim this from the roof-tops and help both government and public recover the vision of a de-militarized world.

  • Needed: An Updated Strategy for Nuclear Security During the Disarmament Process

    The continuing success of the global efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament is impressive. Awareness of the true dimensions of the continuing nuclear threat has been raised, yet success in these efforts has revealed an inherent danger in the disarmament process. Security programs developed for the armament process are not, in many cases, adequate for the disarmament process.

    Nuclear weapons security is designed to provide a continuity of protection from manufacture to installation in a potential delivery system or in a ready-for-use storage site. Security comprises a series of special function jurisdictions, each with a unique set of handling or processing requirements.

    It is a compartmentalized security system, meaning that each facility maintains its own security. The least dangerous element (in terms of loss to an adversary or accidental detonation) is the initial step of mining, refining, and converting raw materials for use in the weapons making efforts. Security in this activity is routine industrial plant security as these facilities are not likely to be targets. The most danger begins when the materials are combined to become the components for nuclear weapons. Security requirements at these manufacturing facilities increases and is adjusted to meet the specific needs of the facility depending on its function within the system.

    Therefore, as each function is accomplished and material is passed to the next facility, security responsibilities change commensurately. The ultimate recipients, the military, in turn, provide their own security.

    Superimposed on this system of security arrangements is a number of specialized support groups which provide unique functions that supplement facility security. They provide unique functions not provided by facility security. The most utilized of these services is provided by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD). TSD trains, equips, and controls a group of security specialists known as “Couriers” who provide safe, secure transport of fabricated nuclear materials. Other security support services are provided by Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams (EOD), the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) and a multiplicity of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. These groups work together through a series of interagency agreements and protocols that establish lines of authority and jurisdictional responsibilities. The security system now in place has evolved as the nuclear industry grew to meet the demands of the military for weapons. The system was designed and implemented for serialized, unidirectional (manufacture to use) purposes. Whether or not the same system will be adequate for the disarmament process is an open question. The mounting body of evidence suggests it will not.

    The bureaucracy that created the nuclear security system is multifaceted, and, in some cases, duplicative and unnecessary. Responsibility for its programmatic development is vested in many bureaus within DOE and DOD. These bureaus and subordinated groups are now competing for dominance and the limited funds that are available to maintain their status quo as they struggle to realign their missions to counter the known and perceived terrorist threats. New divisions and ad hoc specialized groups are being created within the existing agencies and, consequently, more competition is engendered for the limited human and monetary resources. The net effect of these developments is that nuclear security, already questionable in many areas , will continue to deteriorate due to the perception that the need for this specific security system diminishes as disarmament efforts become more successful. Already, under the guise of Civil Defense, the Pentagon is flexing its muscle in the competition as it assumes a role in the training of civilian agencies for chemical, biological, and nuclear emergencies. Fifty-two million dollars have been authorized by Congress for this program, yet the diffuse nature of the efforts across so many agencies offers little promise for improving protection against threats of misappropriation where the residual materials of nuclear disarmament are concerned. The focus on specific security regimens is being lost in favor of more generic types of security presumably more capable of countering a broader range of threats to our national safety.

    This type of political and bureaucratic reaction is not responsive to the operational requirements for well-founded security and is not conducive to developing means that will neutralize the dangers from the growing terrorist threat.

    For the conditions existing in the political environment today, there is a primary and essential need to increase awareness of the operational realities related to security in the nuclear disarmament effort so that deficiencies can be identified and corrected. This has to be done as a prerequisite to the dismantling process. The vital issues must be raised in ways that will motivate the government and people throughout our society to take appropriate and effective action.

    More concerted efforts must be made to identify and isolate each perceived or real threat in context with the unique security problems it creates. This level of attention will, in turn, assure that effective deterrents for specific threats can be developed and put into place.

    A prerequisite for the disarmament process to achieve its purpose with minimum risk is an understanding of the complexities arising from the shift in attitudes that avoids considering the significance of independently treating, in depth, the threats specific to nuclear security . The security of nuclear materials cannot be relegated to a dependency upon the generalizations of a generic security program.

    Everyone Gets into the Terrorist Game, – David E. Kaplan, U.S. News and World Report – Nov. 17, 1997, Based on DOE’s Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), begun in the 1970’s, copy-cat units are being established by the FBI (DEST -Domestic Emergency Support Teams), The State Department (FEST – Foreign Emergency Support Team), Public Health (MMST – Metropolitan Medical Support Teams), DOE (two spin-offs to NEST (Best – Biological Emergency Search Team and CEST – Chemical Emergency Search Team) and also the Marines with CBIRF -Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.

    Eye on America, CBS Evening News, Nov.25, 1997, Report by Rita Braver on security problems at Rocky Flats Nuclear Facility

    Taking Civil Liberties – Washington Whispers, U.S. News and World Report – Jan. 12., 1998 pg 15

  • General Lee Butler on NATO’s Nuclear Policy

    Jean-Pol Poncelet
    Minister of Defense
    Belgian Ministry of Defense
    Belgium
    Via Fax: 32-2-550-29-19

    Dear Defense Minister Poncelet,

    German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s suggestion that NATO revise its nuclear doctrine is most welcome. As you discuss these matters with your colleagues it may be that my own experience in thinking through this question as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the U. S. armed forces during the Gulf war might be helpful. I was equally engaged in the matter of prospective nuclear response to attack by WMD during my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Strategic Command during the period 1991 to 1994.

    As you are keenly aware, the Gulf War presented us with the very real possibility of confronting such an attack by the forces of Iraq. We went through the exercise of imagining how it might unfold and examining a variety of response options. My personal conclusion was that under any likely attack scenario, a nuclear reply by the United States and its allies was simply out of the question.

    First, from a purely military perspective, the coalition forces had the conventional capability to impose any desired war termination objectives on Iraq, to include unconditional surrender and occupation. For a variety of reasons, we elected not to go to that extreme but it was clearly an option in the face of a WMD attack.

    Second, given our conventional superiority, and the nature of the war zone, the use of nuclear weapons simply made no tactical nor strategic sense. General Powell noted in his memoirs that several weapons would have been required to mount any sort of effective campaign against military targets, an option that Secretary Cheney immediately rejected – and understandably so. Further, whatever the immediate battlefield effects, the problems of radioactive fall-out carrying over into friendly forces or surrounding countries were unfathomable.

    Third, the larger political issues were insurmountable. What could possibly justify our resort to the very means we properly abhor and condemn? How could we hold an entire society accountable for the decision of a single demented leader who holds his own country hostage? Moreover, the consequences for the nonproliferation regime would have been severe. By joining our enemy in shattering the tradition of non-use that had held for 45 years, we would have destroyed U.S. credibility as leader of the campaign against nuclear proliferation; indeed, we would likely have emboldened a whole now array of nuclear aspirants.

    In short, in a singular act we would have martyred our principal foe, alienated our friends, destroyed the coalition so painstakingly constructed, given comfort to the non-declared nuclear states and impetus to states who seek such weapons covertly.

    In the end, we tried to have it both ways, privately ruling out a nuclear reply while maintaining an ambiguous declaratory policy. The infamous and widely misre-presented letter from Secretary Baker to Baghdad was ill-advised; in fact, Iraq violated with impunity one of its cardinal prohibitions by torching Kuwait’s oil fields.

    When I left my J-5 post in Washington and took up this issue as CINCSTRAT, I found all of the foregoing cautions to be relevant across a wide spectrum of prospective targets in a variety of so-called rogue nations. I ultimately concluded that whatever the utility of a First Use policy during the Cold War, it is entirely inappropriate to the new global security environment; worse, it is counterproductive to the goal of nonproliferation and antithetical to the values of democratic societies.

    Please forgive this rather abrupt intrusion into your deliberations. Obviously, I would not take such a liberty if I did not believe it was warranted by the import and the urgency of the issue.

    Warm regards,

    Lee Butler
    General, USAF (Retired)
    11122 Williams Plaza
    Omaha, NE 68144

    The letter was sent to the following official:.

    Jean-Pol Poncelet
    Minister of Defense
    Belgian Ministry of Defense
    Belgium
    Via Fax: 32-2-550-29-19

    Art Eggleton
    Minister of Defense
    Canadian Department of National Defense
    Canada
    Via Fax: 613-995-8189

    Hans Haekkerup
    Minister of Defense
    Royal Danish Ministry of Defense
    Denmark
    Via Fax: 45-33-32-0655

    Akis Tsohatzpoulos
    Minister of Defense
    Greek Ministry of Defense
    Greece
    Via Fax: 301-644-3832

    Eduardo Serra Rexach
    Minister of Defense
    Spanish Ministry of Defense
    Spain
    Via Fax: 34-91-55-63958

    Joris Voorhoeve
    Minister of Defense
    Dutch Ministry of Defense
    The Netherlands
    Via Fax: 31-70-345-9189

    Ismet Sezgin
    Minister of Defense
    Turkish Ministry of Defense
    Turkey
    Via Fax: 90-312-418-3384

    Jose Veiga Simao
    Minister of Defense
    Portugese Ministry of Defense
    Portugal
    Via Fax: 351-1-301-95-55

    Beniamino Andreatta
    Minister of Defense
    Italian Ministry of Defense
    Italy
    Via Fax: 39-06-488-5756

    Rudolf Scharping
    Minister of Defense
    German Ministry of Defense
    Germany
    Via Fax: 49-228-12-5255

    Dag Jostein Fjaevoll
    Minister of Defense
    Norwegian Ministry of Defense
    Norway
    Via Fax: 47-23-09-2323

    George Roberston
    Minster of Defence
    UK Ministry of Defence
    United Kingdom
    Via Fax: 44-171-218-7140

    Alain Richard
    Minister of Defense
    French Ministry of Defense
    France
    Via Fax: 33-1-47-05-40-91
    Hallder Asgrimsson
    Minister of Foreign Affairs
    Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    Iceland
    Via Fax: 354-562-2373

    Alex Bodry
    Foreign Minister
    Ministere de la Force Publique
    Luxembourg
    Via Fax: 352-46-26-82

  • Scientists Demand NATO: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons as an Essential First Step Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

    The German initiators of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) demand a No-First-Use pledge for nuclear weapons as an essential step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We support the initiative by the German Foreign Minister for a No-First Use in NATO and demand further steps leading to complete nuclear disarmament. The decision of Germany and 11 further NATO member states, not to vote against resolution A/C.1/53/L.48 “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda” in the UN First Committee on 13. November 1998 is a courageous step and a signal that even within NATO there is opposition against the indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons.

    NATO’s nuclear first-use doctrine, stemming from the darkest ages of the Cold War, is completely anachronistic. It is based on the premise of a massive conventional attack of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. None of the underlying assumptions, which were already questionable in earlier times, have any justifiable basis, neither in Europe nor elsewhere. Striking first is not defensive, neither against supposed aggressor states nor against terrorists. The threat of striking first is also in complete contradiction to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which declared the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons to be generally illegal. First use would be illegal in any case. The insistence of the US government on the first-use doctrine is an indicator that the last remaining superpower wants to keep the right to use nuclear weapons any time against any point on this planet. No other country should find this acceptable. As long as this threat persists, more developing countries could follow India and Pakistan to seek reliance on nuclear weapons, undermining the whole non-proliferation regime. A No-First-Use would be the bare minimal step, signalling the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to diminish the nuclear threat.

    No-First-Use could be a first but should not be the last step. Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as the International Court of Justice demand complete nuclear disarmament. No nuclear weapons state can change this fact. What is required is an on-going international negotiation process on the step-wise transformation of the insufficient non-proliferation regime into a new regime of a nuclear-weapon-free world. How this could be done was examined in an expert study of INESAP “Beyond the NPT – A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World” that was presented in April 1995 in New York, as well as in a number of studies by other organizations and individuals that followed. This study sketches a path towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, combined with a process of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) as a legal framework to ban and eliminate all nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the call for the NWC has been expressed by more than 1000 international non-governmental organizations and citizen groups (Abolition 2000) as well as by more than two thirds of all States in UN resolutions of the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. A model NWC that was drafted by an international Committee of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts is now an official UN document (UN doc. A/C.1/52/7).

    Even though the path towards a nuclear-weapon-free world cannot be planned in all details in advance, the required steps can only be negotiated and realized if the goal is clear. The necessary political initiatives have to be taken now. As a non-nuclear-weapon state and NATO member, Germany has a considerable political weight and a special responsibility.

    Therefore, we urge the new German government to insist on its independent path and to take an active role to initiate negotiations on the elimination of all nuclear weapons, aiming at the Nuclear Weapons Convention as a binding framework of international law. It would be consequent and in accordance with the government coalition agreement if the German delegation at the UN would not only abstain on disarmament resolutions in the UN General Assembly but would vote “Yes”. What is most pressing is that Germany makes an end to the first-use doctrine and pushes for the removal of all nuclear weapons from its own territory, a dangerous remainder of past ages.

  • NATO Expansion

    To the U.S. Senate

    We believe that NATO expansion is a serious mistake. In this post-Cold War period, we should concentrate on reducing Russia’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, ensuring that her warheads and nuclear materials are secure from diversion, and bringing Russia into the Western family of democratic nations. As you know, Russia has delayed ratification of the START II Treaty because of NATO expansion. Further, the tensions raised by expanding NATO towards Russia’s borders can only make more difficult our critical effort to ensure her stockpile of nuclear warheads do not fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue regimes.

    We lament that, after the expensive and dangerous Cold War, we seem to take rather cavalierly the opportunity at long last to build a friendship with Russia. Surely, moving NATO right up to Poland’s border with the Russian province of Kaliningrad cannot be taken as an act of friendship, however we might dress it up with rhetoric. Admitting the Baltics, who share long borders with Russia, will make matters even worse.

    The Administration has stated repeatedly the first round “will not be the last.” Thus, this first vote is not simply about Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is as much about Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia and the several others whose expectations have been raised. How can we admit some and exclude others without creating instability and tensions? Indeed, how can there be stability if Russia is destabilized by expansion?

    We share the goal of a stable Europe, but suggest that it would be far better to address the needs of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics by opening the markets of Western Europe to them and by pressing our allies to admit them to the European Union, an organization much better suited to nation-building than a military alliance.

    Signed by former Republican Senators

    Jim Abdnor of South Dakota
    Edward Brooke of Massachusetts
    Dick Clark of Iowa
    John Culver of Iowa
    Mark Hatfield of Oregon
    Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire
    Roger W. Jepsen of Iowa
    Mack Mattingly of Georgia.

    Signed by former Democratic Senators

    Thomas Eagleton of Missouri
    Gary Hart of Colorado
    John Melcher of Montana
    George McGovern of South Dakota
    Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin
    Sam Nann of Georgia
    Adlai Stevenson of Illinois
    Harrison Williams of New Jersey.

  • Schlaining Manifesto

    Introduction

    Since the end of the Cold War, public debate on security issues, and in particular on nuclear weapons, has receded and become overshadowed by other more apparently pressing problems. Despite this fact, opinion polls in many countries show an overwhelming majority in favour of the abolition of nuclear weapons. For this reason, NGOs working in the peace and security fields see a necessity to propose a political programme of action to move from military defence alliances dependent on nuclear deterrence to a cooperative and non-nuclear security structure that aims to prevent and resolve conflicts rather than solve them by use of force.

    On March 13, 1997 the European Parliament adopted a resolution, calling “on the Member States to support the commencement of negotiations in 1997 leading to the conclusion of a convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons”. With this resolution the European Parliament joined for the first time the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission and more than 60 active and retired high-ranking military officers in seriously questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. While today there is a realistic chance to finally develop a European Security Architecture no longer based on nuclear weapons, NATO governments still neglect this option. Instead, they continue to insist that European security will require nuclear weapons. They intend to base the future European Security Architecture on a reformed and enlarged NATO and to develop a (Western and Central) European Defence and Security Identity. Thus, the opportunity to develop a truly Pan-European Security Architecture no longer centred around a military alliance has been missed.

    NATO’s Nuclear Future

    NATO still clings to its nuclear warfighting doctrine and insists on retaining nuclear weapons. Up to 200 US nuclear bombs are still deployed throughout seven European NATO-members; France and Britain retain their national nuclear postures. NATO refuses to give up its doctrine to use nuclear weapons first. Thus NATO explicitly contradicts the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, which declares the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons to be generally contrary to international law.

    It should be emphasised that the ICJ declared the threat or use of nuclear weapons to be generally illegal. The ICJ did not approve any “right” to threaten or use nuclear weapons, but it asserted that it “cannot conclude definitely” whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. NATO nuclear strategy is not covered by this doubtful area of uncertainty. Indeed, NATO threatens to use nuclear weapons even when no member state is threatened in its very survival.

    NATO nuclear forces serve much broader political purposes: “The nuclear forces of the Alliance continue to play a unique and essential role in Alliance strategy. (…) A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning, in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements.” (NATO: The Alliance New Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991) NATO’s nuclear strategy has not been changed since the ICJ advisory opinion.

    Due to NATO enlargement the number of countries committed to such policies will be increased. At the next NATO summit from 8 to 9 July in Madrid, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and possibly other states are expected to be invited to become member states of NATO in 1999. Independently of whether NATO deploys nuclear weapons in the new member states, it will increase the number of countries relying on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. It will expand NATO’s system of nuclear sharing arrangements.

    NATO stated in the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation: “The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.” NATO also stated that it does not intend to build or use nuclear weapons infrastructure on the territory of its new members. (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation of 27 May 1997)

    Nevertheless, the Founding Act fails to provide an internationally binding guarantee that NATO will not deploy nuclear weapons in these countries. In fact, NATO unilaterally reserves the right to change this declared policy on nuclear deployments in the new member states. It is intended that they will become full and equal members and thus eligible to fully participate in NATO nuclear sharing and decision-making arrangements. Full membership status includes the right to ask for the deployment of US-nuclear weapons as well as an obligation to accept that US nuclear weapons can be deployed at least during wartime (Denmark, Norway).

    Participation of non-nuclear weapons states in NATO nuclear sharing includes the possibility that the control over nuclear weapons in wartime will be transferred to the Armed Forces of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Peacetime storage of nuclear weapons on the territory of a new NNWS and peacetime training of the use of nuclear weapons are possible, which is already the case for existing member NNWS.

    NATO nuclear sharing and decision making arrangements are perceived as a violation of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by many non-NATO NNWS. Agreement among the parties to the NPT as to whether this is in compliance or in violation of the NATO countries’ obligations under the NPT has never been reached. NATO unilaterally declares its nuclear sharing arrangements to be in compliance with the NPT, but even so the NATO states did not use the opportunity to deposit clear and formal reservations to that effect. Nevertheless, during both the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 and the 1997 PrepCom for the Review Conference in 2000, the issue was again subject to controversy. When reevaluating this question it should be taken into account that Russia has withdrawn all of its nuclear weapons from the territory of foreign countries.

    NATO – The Right Institution of European Security?

    NATO argues that the Alliance’s expansion will provide more stability for Europe. Despite the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation, the opposite may in fact become true. Neither the Founding Act nor NATO’s enlargement effectively ensure the prohibition of new division lines through Europe. They might even contribute to their creation.

    The goal of being admitted to NATO has already become a driving force for many countries to overexaggerate the perceived threat from Russia. In an enlarged NATO they might feel a need to continue to do so in order to show that their decision to join was justified. Those not admitted during the first round of enlargement, will continue to compete for accession. Those countries, which do not join might start to overexaggerate the perceived threat from NATO, and may seek closer cooperation with Russia. If that option is not available to them, they could eventually feel isolated and insecure. One answer to this problem may be to develop a neutral position.

    If the Founding Act between NATO and Russia succeeds in keeping fear of NATO low in Russia and in developing a common international security policy, it may result in a joint northern block confronting southern countries. It may thus become an instrument for increasing north-south tensions in the world.

    More likely, however, the NATO Russia Founding Act will not eliminate Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia is raising serious security concerns. NATO expansion will leave Russia greatly outnumbered by NATO’s conventional forces. NATO has promised to seek a solution at the Vienna negotiations about the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe, but has not yet tabled a proposal for future conventional force limitations that could really meet Russian concerns. Russia might therefore finally decide to compensate its conventional inferiority by copying NATO’s “flexible response” strategy of the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence, Russia would have to rely heavily on tactical nuclear weapons and would also have to resort to a first use policy. Because of this possibility, NATO expansion may put the ratification of START II at risk and thus jeopardise the future of nuclear disarmament.

    The cost of NATO expansion must also be taken into account especially given current severe economic and social problems. Cost estimates range from US$ 20 to US$ 125 billion over 7-12 years. They will have to be shared between the current and the new NATO members. Severe burdens will be placed on the new member states already struggling to transform their weak economies. They will be forced to spend scarce resources, urgently needed for stabilising the countries’ economies and saving their social security and education systems, on new defence equipment. They might be forced to repeat a core mistake from Cold War times – spending much more on armaments than their economies can afford. This might destabilise newly established democracies and encourage radical positions.

    The USA and several European countries are at present negotiating sales of fighter aircraft to candidate states for NATO membership, which indicates underlying motives for NATO expansion quite separate from the NATO claim of desiring stability in the region.

    A Nuclear Future for Europe?

    “The debate on the European nuclear deterrent will be the moment of truth in the construction of a European political union”. (Assembly of the WEU, Document 1420, 19.5.94, p.35) European Union members are in the process of developing their own security and defence identity. The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty, Art. J4) commits them to eventually frame “a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”. Forming the latter will inevitably put the future of the British and French nuclear arsenals onto Europe’s agenda. While this is not likely to happen soon, the European Union members will eventually have to take a decision: whether the European Union should become a nuclear or a non-nuclear state. The European governments are slowly starting to explore this ground.

    France and Germany have already declared themselves “ready to engage in a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of a European defense policy.” (Franco-German defence and security concept, Nuremberg, Dec. 9, 1996). The former French Prime minister Alain Jupp, proposed a “concerted” deterrence for Europe under which France would be prepared to discuss putting its nuclear weapons at European disposal.

    Britain and France have formed the “Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy” in 1992, which is used for intensifying technical cooperation as well as political consultations between both countries.

    While the three big European countries have thus started to intensify consultations on defence related nuclear matters on a bilateral level, they might wish to explore the ground behind closed doors for a consensus about the future role of British and French nuclear weapons in European security.

    Nevertheless attempts to speed up the development of a European defence including a nuclear component has met with serious resistance. Firstly, countries with a longstanding history of neutrality, such as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland do not at present want to enter collective defence commitments. In a new development, the recently elected UK government has stated its opposition to a common EU defence policy. Secondly, the public in many countries is largely opposed to a common European nuclear deterrent. Finally, the creation of an Independent European Nuclear posture is bound to violate Articles I and II of the NPT. It is likely to require a step by step approach of integration which includes interim steps of nuclear sharing arrangements somewhat modelled on those of NATO, before Europe is one state, thus transferring nuclear weapons to NNWS.

    Alternative Security Structure for Europe

    More attention needs to be given to the development of a common security for the whole of Europe including the East and Russia, based on conflict prevention rather than on a military alliance. Examination of the likely causes of conflicts and methods of increasing stability within Europe should lead to a joint conceptualisation of a common security architecture by European countries on an equal basis.

    To achieve these goals a democratic organisation, in which NGOs play a significant role, should progressively take over the role as the overall decision-making security body for Europe. The likely candidate for this would be the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). All existing military alliances in Europe should eventually dissolve when the political and civilian security model of the OSCE, as defined in Lisbon in December 1996, is ready to be fully implemented, as they would become obsolete. The European Union, the strongest substructure in financial and political terms in the OSCE, should adapt its emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) to strengthen the stabilising capability of the OSCE, as the most important component of pan-European security.

    A very important problem is the present parallel existence of military alliances alongside the OSCE which compete for dwindling resources, political mandates and status. As long as most financial resources are drained by the military aspects of security, which protect the interests of only some member states, the OSCE can never achieve its very important objectives for stability and peace in Europe. Moreover, the costs of the expansion of NATO will make it almost impossible for many member states to set apart adequate and urgently needed resources for the OSCE.

    Intervention in a conflict, once it has become violent, inevitably turns out to be more expensive than mediation and conciliation in the early stages, which also seeks to prevent the human and social tragedy of war. The necessary shift from the intervention option and military solutions to the conflict prevention option requires drastic readjustments of the current disparity between the budgets of NATO and the OSCE.

    OSCE action has demonstrated that OSCE member states are able, without the help of NATO, to prevent conflicts from openly breaking out, and to allow democratic elections to take place, as has been attempted in Chechnya and Albania, although with only a moderate degree of success. Early detection, early warning, negotiations, mediation, consultations, arbitrations, sanctions, follow-up procedures are important existing components of the OSCE mandate. The help of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in peace and conflict research as well as in the field (in humanitarian or medical assistance and particularly women’s groups) would be invaluable for all of these components to be adequately fulfilled.

    In its Annex, the Lisbon Document, emphasised the importance of establishing ,Nuclear Free Weapon Zones” (NFWZ) in the OSCE region as a step towards total nuclear disarmament, also contained in the Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 1996. A strategy for achieving this goal needs to be more clearly defined.

    Political Programme of Action

    The USA should immediately withdraw all nuclear weapons from the territory of non-nuclear weapon states. Such withdrawals should be made legally binding. First of all, all nuclear weapons should immediately be taken off alert, as a next step, warheads should be separated from delivery systems and removed from their deployment sites to an existing, remote and safe storage site, under international inspection (e.g. by the OSCE). As an important step towards a nuclear-weapons free Europe, all states in Central and Eastern Europe which are currently free of nuclear weapons should be declared a nuclear weapon free zone. No country should undertake any preparations or construction of infrastructure to be able to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. Decisive steps should immediately be undertaken by all European states to comply with Article VI of the NPT and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, by starting negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide. This should be coordinated with efforts to promote the effective implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions as well as to improve international control of delivery systems.

    The Member States of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva should be creative in finding ways of ending the impasse currently overshadowing the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. In no case should nuclear weapon states continue or start to offer a nuclear umbrella to non-nuclear weapons states. To exclude all doubts on the intended legal implications of deposited reservations made by various states during the NPT ratification process in the late 60s and early 70s (,European Option”), the Treaty on the European Union should be amended by a specific clause (e.g. Title V, Article J.4, Paragraph) which could read: ,Under international obligations established by the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Union renounces the production and possession of nuclear weapons or any form of control over them, as part of its common defence.” If the European Union accedes to the NPT, it should do so with a non-nuclear status. Military as well as commercial production, reprocessing, and reuse of all nuclear-weapons-usable materials, including tritium, should be unilaterally phased out or prohibited by an internationally agreed cut- off treaty. The first step should be to establish transparency by creating a complete and detailed inventory, updated annually, of all such materials, past and present. The next step should be the reduction and elimination of existing stocks, taking into account materials in warheads. The current impasse regarding a fissile materials cut-off agreement can only be overcome if disarmament measures are linked to non-proliferation measures. Levels of conventional armament under the new CFE should be reduced to the absolute minimum level required for purely defensive operations. Levels should not only be measured in numbers but also in technical quality. Commercial arms transfers should be controlled and reduced and a conversion programme for the arms industry needs to be initiated.

    OSCE member states should continue, in a constructive and innovative way, the ongoing process of the drafting of “A Common Security Model for Europe in the 21st Century”. The security needs of each and every group of OSCE member states should be integrated into the framework of a “common and cooperative security without dividing lines” as defined in the Lisbon Document. Steps should be taken by member states, especially the members of the European Union within the proposed CSFP, to strengthen the OSCE both politically and financially. The OSCE should improve its decision-making process by refining the Moscow mechanism for the “unanimity minus one” procedure. Recognition by all member states of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva, as the OSCE’s mandatory dispute-resolution authority (for instance by deleting the proviso clause) is essential. The OSCE should improve the performance of its tasks, by expanding the existing Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and the Economic Forum, and in particular by establishing a sanctions authority, which would measure case by case the effectiveness and consequences to the population of imposing sanctions, and draw up a code disallowing sanctions on humanitarian and medical assistance. A concept for the establishment of fully integrated OSCE mobile peace-keeping police contingents, trained in conflict moderation and capable of self-defence should be developed. An initiative to develop the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) into a forum for cross-frontier NGO cooperation should be launched. Setting up an early-warning system for conflict prevention which is supported by civilians and local organisations can help to identify flash-points before conflicts break out. Recognised mediation training in conflict resolution should be more widespread and could be encouraged as a voluntary service. East and west European citizens should establish a Citizen Verification Network which observes their own military as closely as possible and especially any actions taken with regard to nuclear weapons.

    There needs to be more widespread discussion on the lessons that are learned from each war or conflict that is experienced. Mediators should be encouraged to regularly communicate with each other to share their experiences with each other and also with NGOs. A network of people working in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and research should be established. A self administered NGO liaison within the OSCE should be established, which would draw on the experience and capacities of NGOs in the field of peace work, and would support NGOs in introducing, on a decentralised basis, a voluntary Civil Peace Service (CPS), and a European civilian youth association. Yearly allocations to the OSCE, from 1998 on, irrespective of increases in their financial contributions to the actual implementation of individual missions, should be at least doubled. The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) should be entrusted with the task of elaborating a comprehensive disarmament treaty (new Military Forces in Europe – MFE – treaty), in order to achieve nuclear- weapon-free zones in the area of the OSCE (beginning with Central and Nordic Europe and Central Asia) as a step towards the global abolition of all nuclear weapons. Furthermore, negotiations with Mongolia (not an OSCE member state and a declared nuclear weapons free state) should be initiated, to allow their participation in the proposed OSCE nuclear-free zone in Central Asia (Almaty Declaration).

    The Schlaining Declaration of NGOs is signed by representatives of the following NGOs in preparation for formal approval by these organisations:

    International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) Dieter Deiseroth, Fax: +49-211-683883

    International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES, INESAP) Martin Kalinowski, Fax: +49-6151-166039, E-mail kalinowski@hrzpub.th-darmstadt.de

    International Peace Bureau (IPB) Chris Bross, Fax: +41-22-7389419, E-mail ipb@gn.apc.org Solange Fernex, Fax: +33-3-89407804

    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Xanthe Hall, Fax: +49-30-6938166, E-mail ippnw@vlberlin.comlink.de Mouvement de la Paix / France Lysiane Alezard, Fax: +33-140115787, E-mail: mvtpaix@globenet.org

    Peace Centre Burg Schlaining / Austria Georg Schöfbänker, Fax: +0043-732770149, E-mail georg.schoefbaenker@jk.uni-linz.ac.at

    Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) Otfried Nassauer, Fax: +49-30-4410221, E-mail its@gn.apc.org

    Woman’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Kirsti Kolthoff, Fax: +46-8-611-3898, E-mail kirsti@kloker.finansforbundet.se

  • The Illegality of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons

    The following notes summarise what we in the World Court Project (UK) believe are the strongest arguments flowing from the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which can be used in exposing the illegality of NATO’s nuclear policy.

    It is important to recognise that none of our arguments will guarantee success in court. However, we are convinced that what we have to say is plausible and carries conviction.

    As a general point, it is important to emphasise that the ICJ found threat and use to be indivisible. Whatever is illegal about use is also illegal about threat. This relates directly to nuclear deterrence.

    NATO’s First Use Option

    NATO retains the option of using nuclear weapons first. In paragraph 94 of the Opinion, the ICJ challenged the nuclear States that they had neither specified any legal circumstance for use, nor convinced it that “limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons.” It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which using nuclear weapons first would not have such a tendency.

    This is especially applicable to the most likely scenario for the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the NATO nuclear States. The US, UK and France have plans to threaten to use nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear “rogue” States to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to protect US/UK/French so-called “vital interests” anywhere in the world. For such so-called sub-strategic use, some of the missiles in the currently patrolling UK Trident submarine are fitted with a single, variable lower-yield warhead – because six 100 kiloton warheads on a missile are not a credible deterrent threat to a “rogue” regime or terrorists.

    These scenarios fall far short of those postulated in the ICJ’s only concession, that it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” We can therefore argue that NATO first use would be illegal, whatever the yield of nuclear weapon used.

    Complying with Humanitarian Law

    The ICJ concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal. Indeed, it found no circumstance in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not violate humanitarian law.

    Even in extreme circumstances, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with international humanitarian law (paragraph 105D). Thus any use must, for example, discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, must not cause unnecessary or superfluous suffering, and must respect neutral States.

    The NATO nuclear States deploy some, at least, of their nuclear warheads on behalf of the Alliance, and are willing to use them in collective self-defence. Although some of these warheads might be relatively small, the majority are far larger in their yield than the Hiroshima bomb.

    For example, most UK Trident warheads are 100 kilotons – about 8 times larger than Hiroshima; moreover, most UK Trident missiles have six warheads. Such enormous destructive power, combined with the ability to cause untold human suffering and damage to generations to come from radiation effects, makes them incapable of complying with humanitarian law.

    Francis Boyle, a US Professor of International Law who has specialized in nuclear weapon issues, advises that the best way to deal with this question is to apply the language of the Opinion to the specific nuclear weapons system under legal challenge.

    The Nuremberg Connection

    The ICJ’s confirmation that the Nuremberg Charter, as part of humanitarian law, applies to nuclear weapons has serious implications for all involved in implementing NATO’s nuclear policy. For example, military professionals need to be seen to be acting within the law if they are to be distinguished from hired killers or terrorists.

    Military professionals shunned chemical and biological weapons before they were prohibited, because they were too indiscriminate and repulsive. NATO’s plans to use even low-yield nuclear weapons are vulnerable to the ICJ’s finding that the effects of nuclear weapons are unique, and more severe, widespread and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons. In so doing, the ICJ confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons – only in many respects far worse.

    Unanimous Call for Nuclear Disarmament

    The judges’ unanimous call in paragraph 105F for nuclear disarmament went further than Article VI of the NPT, by stating that negotiations should be concluded irrespective of any treaty on general and complete disarmament, behind which hitherto the nuclear States have hidden.

    This challenges the current perception among NATO decision-makers that “nuclear might is right” and lawful, and that NATO nuclear policy is sustainable.

    Although NATO’s nuclear plans are secret, its post-Cold War posture shows that it has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons; it is determined to maintain a nuclear warfighting capability; and it is prepared to threaten to use low-yield warheads first, backed by massive nuclear strikes when its public stance is one of last-resort, so-called “minimal deterrence” in self-defence.

    NATO as a Nuclear Alliance

    NATO is an alliance which relies on nuclear deterrence doctrine. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group takes collective decisions. Therefore NATO, as an institution as well as its individual members, carries responsibility for its nuclear policy.

    To date, there is no evidence that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has responded to the implications of the ICJ’s Opinion. The onus is now on NATO to demonstrate that its nuclear plans would:

    1) fit the criteria of extreme circumstance; 2) not violate the humanitarian laws of warfare.

    Our foregoing assessment suggests that NATO should urgently review its nuclear policy in order to comply with the ICJ’s opinion.

    The Authority of the International Court of Justice

    The UK government has consistently argued that the Opinion is not binding and changes nothing. However, on 24 September 1996 in the UN, the UK Foreign Secretary pledged “both moral and material support” to the ICJ, adding that “the more we accept that international law must be the foundation of international relations, the safer we shall all be.”

    The ICJ is the UN’s Court. It can give Advisory Opinions on any question at the request of a UN agency, such as the General Assembly, in order to assist that agency in its duties. These Opinions clarify international law with the highest possible authority. An Advisory Opinion is only given after careful and lengthy deliberation by 15 judges after full hearings involving all interested States and UN agencies. In this case, 43 states – a record number, including the USA, UK and France – filed written submissions and 22 (again including the NATO nuclear States) made oral statements.

    The USA, UK and France have signed the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and have affirmed the Nuremberg Principles. They are therefore bound to abide by these. Thus, the ICJ’s decision that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally violate the Law of War as codified in these conventions and principles means that the NATO nuclear States are under an obligation to respect this.

    It is also worth pointing out that in December 1994, by a comfortable majority, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested the Court to deliver its Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On 10 December 1996, an even larger majority of the UNGA adopted Resolution 51/45M which “takes note of” the Opinion and “expresses its appreciation to the ICJ”. The Resolution went on to call for “negotiations in 1997 leading to the early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention”.

    Conclusion

    By ignoring the ICJ’s decision, NATO is defying the most authoritative view of how international law applies to nuclear weapons; it is opposing the overwhelming majority of world opinion; and it is failing to heed what the UK Foreign Secretary said in the UN on 24 September 1996. This sets an irresponsible example, and augurs ill for the safety of the world.

     

    ******************************************************************* The World Court Project is an international citizens’ network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

    The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    World Court Project UK George Farebrother, UK Secretary 67, Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR Phone & Fax 01323 844 269, Email geowcpuk@gn.apc.org