Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: missile defense

  • U.S. Plans Missile Defense Test From Vandenberg, Aiming at Intercept, Tuesday, May 30

    For Immediate Release

    Contact:
    Sandy Jones: (805) 965-3443; sjones@napf.org
    Rick Wayman: (805) 696-5159; rwayman@napf.org

    Santa Barbara–The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is planning a test of its Ground-based Mid-Course Interceptor Missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base on May 30, 2016.

    The targeted intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) will lift off from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The ground-based interceptor will launch out of an underground silo from Vandenberg between noon and 4:14 P.M. in an attempt to intercept the targeted ICBM.

    According to the Missile Defense Agency, “This will be the first time a ground-based missile interceptor launched from California attempts to smash into a ‘threat-representative’ intercontinental ballistic missile in its mid-course over the Pacific.”

    The U.S. has already spent at least $41 billion on the Ground Missile Defense System. According to Rick Wayman, Programs Director at the Santa Barbara-based Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “The Ground Missile Defense System is a boondoggle of the highest order. The U.S. continues to shovel billions of dollars into a system that simply will never work reliably. It’s long past time to stop throwing good money after bad and end this misguided missile system.”

    The U.S. Department of Energy recently submitted their 2018 budget request in which they proposed “$10.2 billion for Weapons Activities to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons enterprise.” This particular test alone will have a price tag upwards of $244 million.

    It should be noted that the test comes on the heels of negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons in international law. These negotiations took place under the auspices of the United Nations and more than 130 nations participated. A draft treaty has been released and is expected to be finalized by early July.

    David Krieger, President of the Foundation, stated, “The U.S. ground-based missile defense system has only a 53 percent success rate in 17 tests. It will not be able to protect Americans or anyone else. It is simply an efficient and cynical way to funnel funds to defense corporations.” He continued, “There is simply no good prospect for this kind of weapons testing, especially with rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. What is needed is an all-out diplomatic push for true security to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.”

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    If you would like to interview David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation or Rick Wayman, Director of Programs, please call the Foundation at (805) 965-3443.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s mission is to educate and advocate for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons and to empower peace leaders. Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations. For more information, visit wagingpeace.org.

  • March: This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    March 1, 1954 – In the Pacific Ocean’s Marshall Islands, the U.S. military conducted the BRAVO nuclear weapons test, one of thousands conducted by Nuclear Club Members, in the atmosphere, on the ground, and underground, during the Cold War and Post-Cold War period.  The yield, of approximately 15 megatons from the solid fuel lithium deuteride fusion warhead, was 2-3 times what was expected and unusual prevailing winds carried the radioactive fallout to unexpected places including a Japanese fishing trawler, Lucky Dragon sailing outside the exclusion zone.  All 23 Japanese crewmen were later hospitalized and one of the unfortunate men died as a result of radioactive exposure from an immense blast that produced a fireball four miles wide and a mushroom cloud 60 miles wide.  (Source:  Chuck Hansen.  “The Swords of Armageddon.”  Chuklea Publications:  Sunnyvale, CA, 2007.)

    March 4, 1969 – MIT and 30 other universities called for a national research stoppage to alert the public to how the “misuse of science and technology knowledge presents a major threat to the existence of mankind.”  Concerns not only about nuclear weapons, radioactive and chemical toxic leaks from U.S. military and civilian nuclear production and bombmaking sites but also about Agent Orange, and biological/chemical WMDs led scientists and academics to sign on to this pledge.  (Source:  Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick.  “The Untold History of the United States.”  New York:  Gallery Books, 2012.)

    March 11, 2011 – After a historically large earthquake and tsunami struck northeast Japan, three of the six nuclear reactors at Tokyo Electrical Power Company’s Fukushima Dai-chi facility suffered partial meltdowns resulting in the evacuation of tens of thousands of nearby residents.  The accident was the worst nuclear meltdown since the April 1986 Chernobyl Incident.  Nearly three years later, large volumes of radioactive-contaminated water continue to spill into the Pacific Ocean from the plant site as a long-term solution to the crisis has yet to be reached. (Source:  Various news media reports including Democracy Now, 2011-2014).

    March 22, 1963 – At a broadcast press conference, President John F. Kennedy speaks about the possibility that by the 1970s “…of the U.S. having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons…I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”  While those fears were not quite realized, it is nevertheless true that nuclear proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere remains a deadly serious problem in the 21st century.  Some experts believe that only by phasing out nuclear power in the next few decades, can the world head off the actualization of our 35th President’s worst fears.
    (Source:  Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick.  “The Untold History of the United States.”  New York:  Gallery Books, 2012.)

    March 23, 1983 – In a nationally televised speech, President Ronald Reagan expressed the desire to “make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete” by committing the U.S. to develop a national missile defense system based on the ground and in outer space.   Media critics derisively referred to the plan as “Star Wars” and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent on attempts to deploy modest theater and national missile defenses in the coming decades.  In 2001, President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty with Moscow signaling a new destabilizing, uncertain strategic defensive arms race that continues today.  (Source:  Bradley Graham.  “Hit to Kill:  The New Battle Over Shielding America From Missile Attack.”  New York:  Public Affairs, 2001.)

  • Speech in House of Representatives

    Earl BlumenauerMr. Speaker, before turning to the subject at hand, I really hope that people look at the CBO report that was referenced by my good friend from Pennsylvania, and you will find that the 2 million people who would no longer be working, are not going to increase unemployment. The unemployment rate will be lower. There are people who are trapped in the workforce now because they can’t afford health care. The Affordable Care Act will actually enable some people to retire who want to retire or stop working a second job. Read the report and find out that this is actually a very positive signal.

    But, Mr. Speaker, I am here today to reference something else that was in the newspapers. The papers are filled with scandal about the nuclear weapons program. The real scandal is not the cheating or drug use by people with their finger on the nuclear button. The scandal is that these people are there on the job at all, with these nuclear weapons; jobs and nuclear weapons that should no longer exist.

    Don’t get me wrong. The alleged drug use by the people who stand watch daily with a finger on the nuclear trigger, or that were cheating on their proficiency exams, is outrageous, but it is scandalous that we are frozen in time linked to a nuclear Cold War past and committed to wildly wasteful spending.

    These are weapons that have never been used in 69 years, that did not deter the 9/11 attackers, and cannot help us in our major strategic challenges today. They have never been used in battle since World War II, but they have almost been used by miscalculation and mistake.

    In Eric Schlosser’s recent book called “Command and Control,” there are terrifying examples of what were termed “broken arrows,” nuclear mishaps.

    A nuclear bomb was accidentally released over South Carolina, landing in Walter Greg’s backyard, leaving a 75-foot wide, 30-foot crater, leveling his home. Luckily, it failed to trigger the nuclear explosion.

    In North Carolina, a B-52 fell into a tailspin carrying two hydrogen bombs, each 250 times more powerful than Hiroshima.

    There were numerous instances when our bomber fleet, which used to be on the runway idling, on alert 24/7, was prone to catching on fire while packed with nuclear bombs.

    A few years ago, there was a B-52 which flew across the country unknowingly carrying six nuclear-armed air-launched missiles.

    By no stretch of the imagination, do we need these 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles on alert, plus nuclear armed bombers, all on top of our nuclear submarine-based missiles? We don’t need a fraction of this weaponry. At most, we need perhaps one scaled-down system. There is nobody left to deter. We are competing in Russia in the Winter Olympics right now.

    A small portion of one of these delivery systems is all the nuclear deterrence we could ever possibly need. The larger and more complex the infrastructure is not just more expensive, but more prone to mistake.

    We are talking about upwards of $700 billion over the next 10 years in operations, modernization, new systems, new nuclear submarines. It is outrageous. It is dangerous. Let me put that in context. $750 billion is more than the Federal Government will spend on education in its entirety in the next 5 years.

    It is time for Congress and the American people to put an end to this.
    Earl Blumenauer is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Portland, Oregon.

  • Vandenberg to Launch Yet Another Nuclear-Capable Missile

    Santa Barbara, CA — On July 27, 2013, the United States plans to launch a Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to a target in the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This test closely follows a similar test from Vandenberg on June 22.

    The test comes just two weeks before the 66th anniversary of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is a reminder of the United States’ continued reliance on nuclear weapons in spite of proclamations by the Obama administration of the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world.

    Each test costs tens of millions of dollars. In addition to the budgetary implications, such tests result in serious international relations problems.

    David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, stated that the ongoing US testing program is provocative and stimulates other countries to improve or develop nuclear weapons and conduct their own tests. He said, “The continued testing of Minuteman III nuclear missiles is a clear example of US double standards. The government believes that it is fine to test-fire these missiles time and again, while expressing criticism when other countries conduct missile tests. Such double standards encourage nuclear proliferation and make the world a more dangerous place.”

    Krieger also commended the nonviolent protestors who have been holding vigils against such tests outside of the Vandenberg AFB gates. There is a protest planned for 11:45 pm on Tuesday, July 26, just hours before the scheduled launch in the early hours of Wednesday morning.

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    For further comment, contact Rick Wayman, Director of Programs of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, at rwayman@napf.org or (805) 965-3443.  Outside of regular office hours, please contact Rick Wayman at (805) 696-5159.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation — The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s mission is to educate and advocate for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons and to empower peace leaders.  Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations.  For more information, visit www.wagingpeace.org.

  • NATO and U.S. Missile Defense in Europe are a Serious Political Concern

    Steven StarrThe Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently published an article by Pavel Podvig, “Point of Distraction”, which categorizes the ongoing US/NATO deployment of an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe as an “overblown distraction” to U.S.-Russian relations. Given that Podvig’s first reference is to recent public threats made by Russia’s most senior military commander to launch military attacks against US/NATO missile defense bases, and that these threats have also been publicly made by Russian President Medvedev, Podvig’s assertions seem very abstracted from current political realities.


    What is striking about Podvig’s analysis is that he omits any reference to the fact that US missile defense is being deployed in Europe via NATO.  In fact, the word NATO does not appear anywhere in the article, and thus the entire issue of NATO is avoided.  This is unfortunate and misleading, because Russia has always viewed the NATO military alliance, which was set up to “keep the Russians out”, as a real threat to Russian security. BMD and its deployment by NATO are inseparable issues from any realistic political point of view.


    Podvig subsequently fails to address a concern that has been voiced by Russian Generals and recognized by their counterparts in America, that is, the Russian fear that the US/NATO European missile defense system night be used as a “mop-up” system against Russian strategic nuclear forces that survived a US disarming first-strike. I note that General Cartwright addressed this fear directly, as reported by Arms Control Today:


    “Gen. Cartwright and his coauthors go after the root cause of the problem: Moscow, they say, is not just concerned that the European missile system might be capable of intercepting a few Russian missiles. Rather, Russian leaders are worried about the U.S. capability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack and then use strategic missile interceptors planned for deployment in 2020 (the SM-3 IIB) and thereafter to deny a Russian retaliatory strike.”


    While Russian political leaders are thus far reluctant to openly discuss the threat of a US nuclear first strike, it clearly is not taboo for Russian generals to do so. They have some cause to worry, since both nations continue to maintain 1700 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status. But their fears are exacerbated because Russia has also watched NATO and US bases surround their borders, while NATO has become actively involved in many international military conflicts, and presses to add Georgia and Ukraine as member states.


    In this context, missile defense is much more than a “distraction”, it is rather the focal point of Russian discontent. It is the straw that is breaking the Russian camel’s back. US scientists, like Theodore Postol and Yousaf Butt have explained the technological basis of Russian concerns, which unfortunately US political leaders continue to foolishly deny, as if the Russians were not capable of understanding such things.


    The deployment of a highly integrated and layered missile defense system also adds real strength to NATO’s conventional capabilities. Russian war planners certainly fear NATO’s overwhelming conventional military strength – following the NATO intervention in Kosovo, it was such fears that led Russia to develop its military doctrine of “nuclear de-escalation”.


    This is where the danger of military conflict between the US and Russia lies. The expansion of NATO to Russian borders will surely provide opportunities for the clash of NATO and Russian troops. That such a conflict could quickly go nuclear is made even more probable by the forward-based nuclear weapons of NATO and standard Russian operating procedures that plan for the preemptive use of their tactical nuclear weapons against overwhelming NATO conventional force.


    This concern was recently voiced in a letter to David Krieger from Russian Minister Lavrov, in which Lavrov agreed with the suggestions made in the “Open Letter on NATO Missile Defense Plans and the Increased Risk of Nuclear War.” Lavrov states, “One cannot help agreeing to a conclusion that deployment of missile defense system at the very borders of Russia as well as upbuilding system’s capabilities increase the chance of any conventional military confrontation might promptly turn into a nuclear war.”


    The deployment of US/NATO European missile defense is hardly a “distraction” to U.S.-Russian relations and it is a mistake to categorize it as such. Analysts who focus solely on the technical capabilities of missile defense, while ignoring the larger picture of missile defense as an integral part of NATO, are missing the forest for the trees. To continue to dismiss Russian concerns on these issues as trivial is a serious political mistake on the part of both the US and its NATO allies.

  • Response to NAPF from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

    To see the original PDF in Russian and the unofficial English translation, click here.

    Unofficial translation

    RUSSIAN FEDERATION
    MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

    Moscow, March 2012

    President David Krieger
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
    PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Rd, Suite 1
    Santa Barbara, CA, 93108-2794
    USA

    Dear Mr. Krieger,

    I have very attentively read the Open Letter to Presidents of Russia and the US concerning the issue of NATO missile defense plans and their influence on the nuclear disarmament.

    I notice the harmony between the ideas expressed in the letter and the fundamental Russian approaches.  We fully share the view that the fact the North Atlanta Alliance refused to include Russia into a joint missile defense is the evidence of its unpreparedness to treat our country as an equitable partner.  This appears to be specifically alarming against the background of enlarging NATO and pursuit of vesting global military functions into the coalition.  One cannot help agreeing to a conclusion that deployment of missile defense system at the very borders of Russia as well as upbuilding system’s capabilities increase the chance of any conventional military confrontation might promptly turn into a nuclear war.  We have numerously been outspoken that such steps taken by the US and NATO undermine strategic stability and make further progress in reducing and limiting nuclear arms problematic.  Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was obliged to remind of this once again in his November 23, 2011 statement.

    Russia has always been and will remain a committed opponent to a military confrontation.  Despite the growing hardship we do not close the door either for continuing the dialogue with the US and NATO on missile defense issues or for a practical cooperation in this field.  In this respect we find undoubtedly interesting the idea of the freeze on US/NATO deployment of missile defense facilities until the joint Russian-US assessment of the threats is conducted.  We believe that its acceptance by the US side would radically relieve the tension around the implementation of the US missile defense program.

    Let me thank you for the considerations and express my hope for continuing this positive and unbiased dialogue.

    Sincerely,

    /s/

    Sergey Lavrov

  • Open Letter on NATO Missile Defense Plans and Increased Risk of Nuclear War

    To President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev:


    Recent U.S. decisions to deploy an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, coupled with the continued expansion of NATO and its military activities, have created increasingly sharp divisions and distrust between the Russian Federation and the United States.[i] This process now threatens to destroy the New START agreement and reverse previous progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations could result in a return to the perilous nuclear postures of the Cold War.


    Although the “Phased Adaptive Approach” missile defense system is being installed under the auspices of NATO, it is perceived by Russia to be “a U.S. system on European soil.”[ii] This system is regarded with apprehension by Russia, particularly since later phases include plans to deploy very advanced-stage Standard Missile-3 land-based interceptors, which have the potential to effectively target Russian strategic nuclear missiles. Russia consequently regards the proposed and ongoing deployments as no more than “an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defense system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any missile attack.”[iii]
     
    The official U.S. political rationale for these deployments is that they are necessary to defend against yet-to-be-developed Iranian long-range ballistic missiles. Yet American scientists have stated that forward-based European radar systems give the U.S. the ability to track Russian ICBMs very early after a launch and to guide interceptors against them.[iv] Russian leaders have expressed specific concerns that the U.S./NATO missile defense system could be used for such a purpose and continue to question at whom the system is directed.
     
    Fundamental mutual distrust stems from the fact that both the U.S. and Russia still maintain strategic war plans that include large nuclear strike options, with hundreds of preplanned targets that clearly include cities in each other’s nation.[v] Both nations keep a total of at least 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons mounted on launch-ready ballistic missiles, which can carry out these strike options with only a few minutes’ warning.
     
    Thus, many in Russia believe the final stages of deployment of the U.S./NATO missile defense system are designed to have the capability of greatly reducing or eliminating Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Continued technological advances in hypersonic missiles,[vi] which would greatly enhance interceptor missile capabilities, combined with the possibility that nuclear warheads could be installed in missile interceptors, will only serve to exacerbate Russian fears about U.S./NATO European missile defense.[vii]


    Mutual suspicion has prevented true cooperation in joint missile defense, just as it has with the still defunct U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center, which was supposed to share information about U.S. and Russian missile launches.[viii] The failure to include Russia in a joint missile defense also reflects the fact that NATO has not made Russia a full partner in the alliance, despite the end of the Cold War.
     
    It is only natural that Russia should consider NATO a potential threat, particularly since NATO has greatly expanded eastward, has actively recruited and included former members of the Warsaw Pact and has engaged in extensive military campaigns in Europe, Africa and South Asia.  The combination of NATO expansion with the deployment of a massive missile defense system that surrounds Russia has triggered a strong political reaction in Russia.  From a Russian perspective, a U.S./NATO missile defense system in Europe undermines their perceived nuclear deterrent, decreases U.S. vulnerability and increases Russian vulnerability to a U.S. nuclear first-strike attack.
     
    In November, President Medvedev made his most forceful political statement against the U.S. and NATO to date.[ix]  Included in the speech was a specific warning that Russia would withdraw from the New START agreement should the U.S./NATO missile defense system continue to move forward.  This is not new information—the Russian Federation issued an unambiguous statement in April 2010 when New START was signed, making clear that both quantitative and qualitative limitations on the U.S. missile defense program were so essential that Russia would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty if these limitations were not honored.[x]
     
    A Russian withdrawal from New START would likely precipitate a fully-renewed nuclear arms race and thus completely reverse movement toward a world without nuclear weapons. Many of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would also regard the collapse of the New START process as an explicit violation of the NPT; this could lead to the collapse of the NPT and extensive nuclear proliferation.
     
    In his November speech, President Medvedev also issued a number of explicit instructions to his military forces that essentially amounted to military threats against the U.S. and NATO.  He stated, “I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data and guidance systems, if need be ….  [I]f the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe.”[xi]
     
    Although many political analysts in the West have discounted this warning as merely a way to put pressure on the U.S. and NATO to change course, this statement by President Medvedev must be taken seriously. Russia will certainly carry out the directives of its President.
     
    The leaders of the U.S., NATO and Russia must seriously consider the possibility that the current course of political events is pushing them towards an eventual military confrontation and conflict.  Further expansion of NATO, its “nuclear umbrella” and missile defense system to the very borders of Russia increase the odds that any conventional military confrontation would quickly escalate into nuclear war.


    If Russia decided “to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe,” as threatened by President Medvedev, would not such an action be likely to lead to nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia?  According to recent peer-reviewed studies, the detonation of the launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth virtually uninhabitable for more than a decade.[xii]  Such a war would lead to global famine and starvation of most of the human race.[xiii]


    We suggest the following steps, both as a way out of the immediate crisis and to advance the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free-world. These are not the only steps that could be helpful, but we are hopeful that leaders on both sides might be willing to act upon them:



    1. There should be a freeze on U.S./NATO deployment of missile defenses in Europe pending an open, joint U.S.-Russian quantitative assessment of the threats that missile defense is supposed to counter, and of the threats posed by U.S. and Russian tactical and strategic nuclear forces.[xiv] The threats posed by missile defense and its effectiveness should be studied and integrated into the previously-mentioned assessment. It is essential that this analysis include a thorough scientific evaluation of the long-term effects of nuclear conflict upon the global environment, climate and human agriculture.[xv]
    2. It is essential, not only for the creation of a peaceful and secure Europe but for the continuation of civilization and the human species itself, that launch-ready nuclear arsenals be immediately stood-down, that nuclear war be avoided, and that nuclear arsenals be eliminated. This is a priority that must trump all other priorities, including what are seen as the most pressing security priorities of major world powers.

    We reiterate strongly that differences of opinion over missile defense must not be allowed to de-rail progress to zero nuclear weapons, or worse, to put that progress into reverse and instead reinstate Cold War security postures, as would be precipitated by the collapse of New START.


    In pursuing a solution, it is vital that both sides feel their concerns are being respected and that their security interests have been properly taken into account. An outcome that advantages one side only, or that is perceived as doing so, is no solution at all.


    The elimination of nuclear weapons must take place not in some far-off utopian future, but at an early date, as demanded by the vast majority of the world’s governments in resolution after resolution at the United Nations.  It is quite clear that the ordinary citizens of every nation no longer wish to live under the shadow of imminent nuclear destruction and see no reason why massive nuclear arsenals should continue to exist when they clearly represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race.


    Signed:


    Organizations


    Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (France)
    Artistes pour la Paix (Canada)
    Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (Australia)
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Canadian Pugwash Group (Canada)
    Daisy Alliance (USA)
    Footprints for Peace (Australia)
    Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space (USA)
    International Association of Peace Messenger Cities
    International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – Kenya (Kenya)
    Just Peace Queensland (Australia)
    Los Alamos Study Group (USA)
    Medact (UK)
    Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)
    No2nuclearweapons (Canada)
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
    Pax Christi Metro New York (USA)
    Pax Christi Montreal (Canada)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW (Australia)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament WA (Australia)
    Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)
    Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)
    Project Ploughshares (Canada)
    Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire (France)
    Science for Peace (Canada)
    Scientists for Global Responsibility (UK)
    Swedish Peace Council (Sweden)
    Transnational Foundation (Sweden)
    Tri-Valley CAREs (USA)
    US Peace Council (USA)
    Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada)
    West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – U.S. Section (USA)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – Vancouver (Canada)


    Individuals (Organizational affiliation for identification purposes only)


    Lynn Adamson (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Janis Alton (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Marcus Atkinson (International Coordinator, Footprints for Peace, Australia)
    Rosalie Bertell (Regent, International Physicians for Humanitarian Medicine, Switzerland)
    Amanda Bresnan (Member, Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, Australia)
    Adele Buckley (Executive Committee, Canadian Pugwash Group, Canada)
    Yousaf Butt (Federation of American Scientists, USA)
    Helen Caldicott (Co-Founder, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Australia)
    Lisa Clark (Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Italy)
    Gill Cox (West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Phyllis Creighton (Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Canada)
    Wilfred Dcosta (Indian Social Action Forum, India)
    Roberto Della Seta (Member, Senate of the Republic, Italy)
    Dale Dewar (Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada)
    Kate Dewes (Disarmament & Security Centre, New Zealand)
    Jayantha Dhanapala (Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, 1998-2003, Sri Lanka)
    Gabriele Dietrich (National Alliance of People’s Movements, India)
    Dennis Doherty (Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, Australia)
    Gordon Edwards (President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Canada)
    George Farebrother (Secretary, World Court Project, UK)
    Gregor Gable (Shundahai Network, USA)
    Bruce K. Gagnon (Coordinator, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, USA)
    Joseph Gerson (American Friends Service Committee, USA)
    Bob Gould (President, Physicians for Social Responsibility – San Francisco, USA)
    Jonathan Granoff (President, Global Security Institute, USA)
    Ulla Grant (Hall Green Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Commander Robert Green (Royal Navy, ret., New Zealand)
    Jenny Grounds (President, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia)
    Mark Gubrud (University of North Carolina, USA)
    Luis Gutierrez-Esparza (Latin American Circle of International Studies, Mexico)
    Regina Hagen (Darmstädter Friedensforum, Germany)
    John Hallam (People for Nuclear Disarmament, Australia)
    David Hartsough (PEACEWORKERS, USA)
    John Hinchcliff (President, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Herbert J. Hoffman (Vice President, Maine Veterans for Peace Chapter 001, USA)
    Inge Höger (Member of Parliament, Germany)
    Kate Hudson (General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Cesar Jaramillo (Program Officer, Project Ploughshares, Canada)
    Pierre Jasmin (President, Artistes pour la Paix, Canada)
    Birgitta Jónsdóttir (Member of Icelandic Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Iceland)
    Martin Kalinowski (Chairman, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, Germany)
    Sergei Kolesnikov (Member of Russian Parliament and President of the Russian affiliate of IPPNW, Russia)
    David Krieger (President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Harry Kroto (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Steve Leeper (Chairman, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Japan)
    Mairead Maguire (Nobel Peace Laureate, Peace People, N. Ireland)
    Ak Malten (Pro Peaceful Energy Use, Netherlands)
    Willem Malten (Director, Los Alamos Study Group, USA)
    Alfred Marder (International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, USA)
    Bronwyn Marks (Hiroshima Day Committee, Australia)
    Jean-Marie Matagne (President, Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire, France)
    Ibrahim Matola (Member of Parliament, Malawi)
    Lisle Merriman (Palestine-Israel Network, USA)
    Natalia Mironova (President, Movement for Nuclear Safety, Russia)
    Sophie Morel (Board member, Réseau Sortir du Nucleaire, France)
    Peter Murphy (Coordinator, SEARCH Foundation, Australia)
    Abdul Nayyar (President, Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
    David Norris (Senator, Ireland)
    Rosemarie Pace (Director, Pax Christi Metro New York, USA)
    Sergei Plekhanov (Professor, York University, Canada)
    Pavel Podvig (Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Russia)
    John Polanyi (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Ernie Regehr (Research Fellow, University of Waterloo, Canada)
    Barney Richards (New Zealand Peace Council, New Zealand)
    Bob Rigg (Former Chair, New Zealand National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament, New Zealand)
    Bruce A. Roth (Daisy Alliance, USA)
    Joan Russow (Global Compliance Research Project, Canada)
    Kathy Wanpovi Sanchez (Tewa Women United, USA)
    Mamadou Falilou Sarr (African Center for Global Peace and Development, Senegal)
    Wolfgang Schlupp-Hauck (Chairman, Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen, Germany)
    Jürgen Schneider (Professor, Universität Göttingen, Germany)
    Sukla Sen (Committee for Communal Amity, India)
    Steven Starr (Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility and Associate, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Kathleen Sullivan (Program Director, Hibakusha Stories, USA)
    P K Sundaram (DiaNuke.org, India)
    Terumi Tanaka (Secretary General, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, Japan)
    Desmond Tutu (Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, South Africa)
    Hiro Umebayashi (Special Advisor, Peace Depot, Japan)
    Jo Vallentine (Chairperson, Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia, Australia)
    Dirk Van der Maelen (Member of Parliament, Belgium)
    Achin Vanaik (University of Delhi, India)
    Alyn Ware (International Representative, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Elizabeth Waterston (International Councilor, Medact, UK)
    Rick Wayman (Director of Programs, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Dave Webb (Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Tim Wright (Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia)
    Col. Valery Yarynich (Soviet Missile Forces – ret., Russia)
    Uta Zapf (Member of the Bundestag, Germany)


    Endnotes:


    [i] To date, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic have agreed to participate in this deployment. Patriot missiles have been deployed in Poland on the border of the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad and X-band radar is also likely to be deployed in Turkey. Medium- and intermediate-range interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed on U.S. warships in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.
    [ii] Tom Collina, “NATO Set to Back Expanded Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/NATOMissileDefense.
    [iii] Rusian Pukhov, “Medvedev’s Missile Threats are only his Plan B,” The Moscow Times, December 1, 2011, retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/medvedevs-missile-threats-are-his-plan-b/448992.html.
    [iv] Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense” (2011), FAS Special Report No. 1, Federation of American Scientists, September 2011, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf.
    [v] U.S. strategic targets include Russian military forces, war supporting and WMD infrastructure, and both military and national leadership. Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists Brief, February 2010, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf.
    [vi] The U.S. has successfully tested non-ballistic missiles which have traveled at speeds up to mach-20 (16,700 mph or 27,000 km per hour). See http://www.examiner.com/military-technology-in-washington-dc/the-usaf-x51-a-and-the-u-s-army-ahw-both-test-november-2011.
    [vii] “Hypersonic missile: who is the target?” Voice of Russia, November 28, 2011, retrieved from http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/28/61168605.html.
    [viii] JDEC was agreed on and ratified by both the U.S. and Russia, with the purpose of preventing accidental nuclear war between them as a result of a false warning of attack. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/000604-warn-wh3.htm. However, neither side appeared willing to share the “raw” or unfiltered data from their early warning systems because of concerns it would reveal too much to the other side about its warning system capabilities. Thus, the facility was never opened; an empty building in Moscow where the center was supposed to be stands as a testament to the continued failure to cooperate.
    [ix] Text of Medvedev’s November 23, 2011 speech translated from the Russian version, retrieved from http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115:
       First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.
       Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.
       Third, the new strategic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advance missile penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.
       Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems, if need be.
       These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.
       Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defence system in Europe.
       One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region.
       Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
       Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.
    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for the withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty.
       But let me stress this point, we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence, and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.  However, this can only be achieved by establishing a clear, legal basis for cooperation that would guarantee our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account.  We are open to dialogue and hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.
    [x] Missile defense is explicitly discussed in the preamble and in Article 5 of New START. The preamble recognizes the “relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” and stipulates that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” Thus, the ongoing deployment of U.S./NATO missile defense systems is, in the eyes of Russia, at least a violation of the spirit of New START.
    [xi] Ibid.
    [xii] Steven Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009, retrieved from http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf.
    [xiii] Steven Starr, “U.S .and Russian Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Peoples and Nations,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2011, retrieved from /wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf.
    [xiv] Specific proposals for such assessments have already been published. See B. Blair, V. Esin, M. McKinzie, V. Yarynich, P. Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science & Global Security, 2011, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 167-194, and H. Kristensen, R. Norris, and I. Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, April 2009, p. 15, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf.
    [xv] O. B. Toon and A. Robock, “Local nuclear war, global suffering,” Scientific American, 302, 74-81 (2010), retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf.

  • Statement on the Situation with NATO Countries’ Missile Defense System in Europe

    This speech transcript was originally published on the website of the Kremlin.


    Citizens of Russia,


    I address you today in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries’ missile defence system in Europe.


    Russia’s relations with the USA and NATO in the missile defence area have a long and complicated history. I remember that when US President Barack Obama revised his predecessor’s plans to build a missile defence system in Europe in September 2009, we welcomed this as a positive step.


    This decision paved the way to our being able to conclude the important New START Treaty which was signed not too long ago and which clearly states the intrinsic link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defence. Let me state that again, this was a major achievement.


    Subsequently, however, the USA began carrying out a new missile defence plan that foresaw the creation of a missile defence system in stages. This specifically raises concerns in Russia. It would eventually see the deployment of US missiles and military capability in close proximity to Russia’s borders and in the neighbouring waters. 


    At the NATO-Russia Council summit in Lisbon a year ago, I proposed developing a joint sector-based missile defence system in Europe where every country would be responsible for a particular sector.


    Furthermore, we were ready to discuss additional modifications to the system, taking into account our NATO partners’ views. Our only goal was to preserve the basic principle that Europe does not need new dividing lines, but rather, a common security perimeter with Russia’s equal and legally enshrined participation. 


    It is my conviction that this approach would create unique opportunities for Russia and NATO to build a genuine strategic partnership. We are to replace the friction and confrontation in our relations with the principles of equality, indivisible security, mutual trust, and predictability.


    Regrettably, the USA and other NATO partners have not showed enough willingness to move in this direction. Rather than showing themselves willing to hear and understand our concerns over the European missile defence system at this stage, they simply repeat that these plans are not directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be concerned. That is the position of the executive authorities, but legislators in some countries openly state, the whole system is against Russia.


    But our requests that they set this out on paper in the form of clear legal obligations are firmly rejected. We do hold a reasonable position. We are willing to discuss the status and content of these obligations, but our colleagues should understand that these obligations must have substance and not be just empty words. They must be worded not as promises and reassurances, but as specific military-technical criteria that will enable Russia to judge to what extent US and NATO action in the missile defence area correspond to their declarations and steps, whether our interests are being impinged on, and to what extent the strategic nuclear balance is still intact. This is the foundation of the present-day security.


    We will not agree to take part in a programme that in a short while, in some 6 to 8 years’ time could weaken our nuclear deterrent capability. The European missile defence programme is already underway and work on it is, regrettably, moving rapidly in Poland, Turkey, Romania, and Spain. We find ourselves facing a fait accompli.


    Of course we will continue the dialogue with the USA and NATO on this issue. I agreed on this with US President Barack Obama when we met recently, and on that occasion again stated our concerns very clearly. There is still time to reach an understanding. Russia has the political will to reach the agreements needed in this area, agreements that would open a new chapter in our relations with the USA and NATO.


    If our partners show an honest and responsible attitude towards taking into account Russia’s legitimate security interests, I am sure we can come to an agreement. But if we are asked to ‘cooperate’ or in fact act against our own interests it will be difficult to establish common ground. In such a case we would be forced to take a different response. We will decide our actions in accordance with the actual developments in events at each stage of the missile defence programme’s implementation.


    In this connection, I have made the following decisions:


    First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.


    Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.  


    Third, the new strategic ballistic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advanced missile defence penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.


    Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.


    Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the US missile defence system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region.


    Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.


    Furthermore,


    If the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favour, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.


    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty. 


    But let me stress the point that we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.


    However, this can be achieved only through establishing a clear legal base for cooperation that would guarantee that our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account. We are open to a dialogue and we hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.

  • A Nuclear Nightmare in the Making: NATO, Missile Defense and Russian Insecurity

    This article was originally published by Truthout.


    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has become increasingly powerful.  It was created in 1949 as an alliance of Western military forces to protect against the perceived military threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries.


    With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has expanded by adding former Soviet bloc countries, moving to the borders of Russia.  It has also engaged in military actions, notably in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya.


    For the past several years, the US and NATO have been pursuing the deployment of an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as in surrounding waters.  The Russians have protested vigorously that the planned system will undermine its nuclear retaliatory potential and thereby its security.  The United States, the driving force behind NATO missile defense plans, has repeatedly told the Russian leaders that there is no need to be worried about these deployments since they are designed to counter Iranian missiles rather than Russian ICBMs.


    The US has refused, however, to provide Russia with written assurances that the missile defense system is not directed at Russia. Accordingly, Russia has rejected US verbal assurances and has threatened to deploy its own missiles aimed at the NATO missile defense installations. Russia has also threatened to withdraw from New START, an agreement with the US to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the arsenals of both countries. 


    The American Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, with cold indifference to Russian concerns, recently stated, “Whether Russia likes it or not, we are about defending NATO-European territory against a growing ballistic missile threat.  We will adapt the timing and the details to that threat, which is why the focus of our joint effort ought to be about how to figure out how to reduce that threat rather than trying to threaten and retaliate for a deployment that has nothing to do with Russia.”


    Suppose for a moment that the situation were reversed, and that it was Russia who had formed another NATO, a North American Treaty Organization.  Russia leads this military alliance with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Mexico and various other Central American and Caribbean states.  The Russian/NATO states all shared the same military communication and weapons systems, and had previously fought several wars in South America.


    Imagine that, through this alliance, Russia begins deployment of an integrated missile defense system right up to the borders to the US, as well as on naval vessels positioned off the East and West coasts of the United States.  Russia states the purpose of this system, which surrounds most of the continental US, is to protect against a possible missile launch from Canada.  The US protests that the deployment of such a missile defense system would undermine its retaliatory potential and thereby its security.  Concerned about the vulnerability of its nuclear forces, the US then threatens to target the Russian missile defenses and to withdraw from New START.  Instead of taking US security concerns seriously, a Russian ambassador says, “Whether the US likes it or not, we are about defending NATO-American concerns.”


    This is a dangerous scenario, no matter which NATO we are talking about, the real one or the hypothetical one.  Continued US indifference to Russian security concerns could have dire consequences: a breakdown in US-Russian relations; regression to a new nuclear-armed standoff in Europe; Russian withdrawal from New START; a new nuclear arms race between the two countries; a breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty leading to new nuclear weapon states; and a higher probability of nuclear weapons use by accident or design.  This is a scenario for nuclear disaster, and it is being provoked by US hubris in pursuing missile defenses, a technology that is unlikely ever to be effective, but which Russian leaders must view in terms of a worst-case scenario.


    In the event of increased US-Russian tensions, the worst-case scenario from the Russian perspective would be a US first-strike nuclear attack on Russia, taking out most of the Russian nuclear retaliatory capability.  The Russians believe the US would be emboldened to make a first-strike attack by having the US-NATO missile defense installations located near the Russian border, which the US could believe capable of shooting down any Russian missiles that survived its first-strike attack.


    The path to a US-Russian nuclear war could also begin with a conventional military confrontation via NATO. The expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia has created the potential for a local military conflict with Russia to quickly escalate into a nuclear war.  It is now Russian policy to respond with tactical nuclear weapons if faced with overwhelmingly superior conventional forces, such as those of NATO.   In the event of war, the “nuclear umbrella” of NATO guarantees that NATO members will be protected by US nuclear weapons that are already forward-based in Europe.


    Shortly after President Obama came into office, he said in Prague, “The US seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  If he has any intention of making that dream a reality, he had better instruct the US government to work with the Russians in a way that does not undermine their security, or perceived security, which, from the Russian perspective, is essentially the same. 


    The only security that can exist in the Nuclear Age is common security.  An imbalance in security, or perceptions of security, threatens not only the weaker party, but all parties.  NATO missile defense plans have created greater insecurity for Russia, which has set in motion Russian counteractions that are reducing security for the US, NATO and the world.  Two solutions exist: either eliminate US-NATO European missile defense; or allow Russia to become a full-partner in the planning and operation of the missile defense deployments.

  • Ronald Reagan’s Great Dream

    David KriegerOn February 6, 2011, Ronald Reagan would have been 100 years old.  It is worthwhile to recall that this conservative president’s great dream was the abolition of nuclear weapons.  According to his wife, Nancy, “Ronnie had many hopes for the future, and none were more important to America and to mankind than the effort to create a world free of nuclear weapons.”


    President Reagan was a nuclear abolitionist.  He believed that the only reason to have nuclear weapons was to prevent the then Soviet Union from using theirs.  Understanding this, he asserted in his 1984 State of the Union Address, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”  He continued, “The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used.  But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?”


    Ronald Reagan regarded nuclear weapons, according to Nancy, as “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.”


    In 1986, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev met for a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland.  In a remarkable quirk of history, the two men shared a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.  Despite the concerns of their aides, they came close to achieving agreement on this most important of issues.  The sticking point was that President Reagan saw his Strategic Defense Initiative (missile defense) as being essential to the plan, and Gorbachev couldn’t accept this (even though Reagan promised to share the US missile defense system with the then Soviet Union).  Gorbachev wanted missile defense development to be restricted to the laboratory for ten years.  Reagan couldn’t accept this.


    The two leaders came heartbreakingly close to ending the era of nuclear weapons, but in the end they couldn’t achieve their mutual goal.  As a result, nuclear weapons have proliferated and remain a danger to all humanity.  Today, we face the threat of terrorists gaining possession of nuclear weapons, and wreaking massive destruction on the cities of powerful nations.  There can be no doubt that had Reagan and Gorbachev succeeded, the US and the world would be far more secure, and these men would be remembered above all else for this achievement.


    In his book, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Paul Lettow quotes Reagan as saying, “I know that there are a great many people who are pointing to the unimaginable horror of nuclear war….  [T]o those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, ‘I’m with you.’”  Lettow also quotes Reagan as stating, “[M]y dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.”


    In the 18th and 19th centuries, individuals struggled for the abolition of slavery because they understood that every man, woman and child has the right to live in freedom.  Through the efforts and persistence of committed individuals like William Wilberforce in Great Britain and Frederick Douglass in the United States, institutionalized slavery was brought to an end, and humanity is better for it.  In today’s world, we confront an issue of even more transcending importance, because nuclear weapons place civilization and the human species itself in danger of annihilation.


    Ronald Reagan was a leader who recognized this, and worked during his presidency for the abolition of these terrible weapons.  He believed, according to Nancy, that “as long as such weapons were around, sooner or later they would be used,” with catastrophic results.  He understood that nuclear weapons themselves are the enemy.


    Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan died before seeing his goal of abolishing nuclear weapons realized.  It is up to those of us still living to complete this job.  It is not a partisan issue, but rather a human issue, one that affects our common future.