Tag: Manhattan Project

  • This Summer in Nuclear Threat History

    July 1, 2019 – Julian Borger’s article in The Guardian, “U.S. Arms Control Office Critically Understaffed Under Trump, Experts Say,” two and a half years into the Trump Administration, reinforced for the umpteenth time what many mainstream and alternative media outlets had been reporting since January 2017, that Trump haphazardly and against all logic is attempting to permanently demolish established governmental administration while also minimizing and privatizing the U.S. federal system, which includes drastically deemphasizing diplomacy while enhancing military power.  Another example is David Atkins Nov. 12, 2017 article, “Trump and Tillerson Are Gutting the State Department – For No Good Reason,” in the Washington Monthly, which noted that cuts to the entire State Department of nearly 2,000 full-time professionals was just the tip of the iceberg.  Atkins’ story hit the nail on the head by remarking that, “And why? Because Donald Trump promised to ‘drain the swamp’ and level massive cuts across all non-defense departments without the foggiest clue what they do or why?”   But more recently, Borger’s article published on this date noted that a U.S. State Department office, The Office of Strategic Stability and Deterrence Affairs, a repository of decades-long expertise and institutional knowledge on the critical matter of bilateral and multilateral arms control which has long been tasked with negotiating and implementing nuclear disarmament treaties (resulting in cuts in global nuclear weapons levels from 70,000 to 14,000 warheads in the last 50 years), has been cut from 14 staffers at the start of the Trump Administration to four. What’s more under neo-con extremist National Security Advisor John Bolton (who, like an incredible number of Trump appointees, resigned or was fired in September of 2019) arms control focus shifted irrationally to appealing to non-nuclear states to “come up with measures to modify the security environment to reduce incentives for states to retain, acquire, or increase their holdings of nuclear weapons.”  Comments: The danger now realized under Trump, according to experts like former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Frank Rose and many others inside and outside government, is that the State Department in no longer equipped to pursue arms negotiations to attempt to salvage the last domino that Trump is trying to knock off the board – the New START or Moscow Treaty which expires in February of 2021. In 2019, Vladimir Putin noted that Russia was in favor of a New START extension, but warned that time was running out, “If we do not begin talks now, it would be over because there would be no time even for formalities.”  Unfortunately this now seems likely as back in 2009-11 under President Obama, a strong supporter of nuclear arms control, it took 21 months from the start of negotiation to ratification for New START to take effect.  This represents just another of a plethora of highly paramount reasons why Donald Trump must not have a second term as President.  (Sources:  A variety of both mainstream and alternative news media sources.)

    July 16, 1945 – In the first-ever test of what Manhattan Project scientists referred to as the “Gadget”, a fission bomb designed as a plutonium implosion device, was detonated before dawn at the Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range, 230 miles south of the town of Los Alamos, New Mexico in a remote area of the Jornada Desert.  The code name of the test, Trinity, was created by the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer – it was a reference to a poem by John Donne.  President Truman’s personal journal of July 25 recorded that, “We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world…An experiment in the New Mexico desert…caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater six feet deep and 1,200 feet in diameter, knocked down a steel tower half a mile away and knocked down men 10,000 yards away.  The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.”  Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s report to the president noted that, “I estimate that the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT…there were tremendous blast effects…there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds.  This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over 10,000 feet.”   Physicist Ernest O. Lawrence, an eyewitness to the blast, described his experience of a, “gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth…The grand, indeed almost cataclysmic proportion of the explosion produced a kind of solemnity in everyone’s behavior immediately afterwards.  There was a restrained applause, but more a hushed murmuring bordering on reverence in manner as the event was commented upon…”  The “Gadget,” which exploded with an estimated force of 15-20 kilotons, slightly more than the Hiroshima bomb, was a rehearsal for the August 6-9 atomic bombings of two Japanese cities and it represented the first of 1,030 nuclear tests conducted by the United States and one of over 2,050 such tests conducted by the nine Nuclear Weapons Club members in the last 75 years.   Before the blast, a wager was made by Manhattan Project scientist Enrico Fermi that the explosion would ignite the atmosphere and devastate New Mexico and possibly the whole of the planet’s biosphere.  Thankfully, Fermi lost his wager.  But that vision of deadly apocalypse came true for hundreds of thousands of people in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th who were vaporized, burned to death, blown into objects and buildings at horrific speed, lacerated, mutilated, and irradiated.  They suffered and some continue to suffer today from the unconscionable use of fission weapons on civilian noncombatants.  Comments:  While many U.S. military and scientific observers celebrated the beginning of the Nuclear Age, others realized that this event may have represented the beginning of the end of the human species.  (Sources:  Jeffrey Mason, Scriptwriter.  “Legacy of Hiroshima.” America’s Defense Monitor. Howard University Television and other PBS stations nationwide first broadcast on August 6, 1995; Jack Mendelsohn and David Grahame, editors.  “Arms Control Chronology.”  Washington, DC:  Center for Defense Information, 2002, pp. 5, 24; Gar Alperovitz.  “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: And the Architecture of An American Myth.”  New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, pp. 250-251 and “Trinity Test – 1945.” Atomic Heritage Foundation.  June 18, 2014.  http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/Trinity-Test-1945 accessed March 30, 2020.)

    July 26, 1963 – A day after long-time diplomat and septuagenarian W. Averell Harriman, serving as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (drafted quietly by President Kennedy to single-handedly negotiate a treaty with the Soviets without working through hardliner national security channels of the CIA and Pentagon who in JFK’s first year in office proposed to him a highly confidential plan for a preemptive nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union), put his initials as JFK’s representative on the Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow on July 25, President Kennedy gave a surprise television address announcing the unprecedented first substantial nuclear arms treaty.  The 35th President announced on this date, “I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness.  Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water…But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side – it is a victory for mankind. A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step.”  And equally important was Nikita Khrushchev’s role in recognizing that he and Kennedy almost stumbled into a nuclear World War III nine months earlier during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.  The Soviet premier quickly circumvented hardliner opposition of his own and signed the treaty on August 5.  Despite vociferous right-wing and conservative criticism, the treaty was unexpectedly ratified on September 24, 1963 by the U.S. Senate in large part due to JFK’s embrace of a large-scale publicity and Congressional lobbying campaign for the treaty by Norman Cousins and the Citizens’ Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban.  Comments: It is a criminal travesty that the U.S. and Russia, Trump, Putin and other nuclear powers today have taken serious steps to unravel this and other critically important nuclear arms control treaties despite widespread global opposition to a renewed Cold War and nuclear arms race.  (Sources:  Lawrence S. Wittner. “Looking Back: Norman Cousins and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.” Arms Control Today. December 2012 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-12/looking-back-norman-cousins-limited-test-ban-treaty-1963 and Peter Janney. “Mary’s Mosiac: The CIA Conspiracy to Murder JFK, Mary Pinchot Meyer and Their Vision for World Peace.” New York: Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2012, pp. 262-274.)

    August 6, 1945 – Colonel Paul Warfield Tibbets piloted the 509th Composite Group’s B-29 Superfortress bomber named Enola Gay, in honor of the pilot’s mother, from Tinian in the Marianas chain of Pacific Ocean islands to Hiroshima, Japan where the enriched uranium-fueled fission bomb code named “Little Boy” was dropped over a city of a quarter million inhabitants at 8:15:17 a.m. local time.  43 seconds after release and 1,850 feet over the city, the bomb exploded (with a yield estimated to be 12-15 kilotons) registering an air temperature, for a fleeting millisecond of 100 million degrees.  In the city below, 5,400 degree temperatures vaporized thousands of human beings, melted granite, clay roof tiles, and gravestone mica for three-quarters of a mile in all directions from the explosion’s epicenter.  A blast wave of 1,100 feet-per-second blew down everyone and everything left standing that was not previously destroyed by the tremendous heat of the explosion.  The firestorm from the blast, as a result of a huge displacement of air, began to flow back to the epicenter at up to 200 miles-per-hour raising radioactive dust and debris into a mushroom cloud.  78,150 died, 13,983 were missing, and 37,425 injured as an immediate result of the blast.  But tens of thousands more would die of horrendous burns and associated direct radiation impacts within days and weeks and from longer-term radiation-caused cancers for decades afterward.  Two days later, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and launched a massive invasion of Manchuria and on August 9th hundreds of thousands more Japanese suffered a second atomic bombing (with a yield estimated to be 21 kilotons), from the plutonium-fueled “Fat Man” warhead, at Nagasaki.  Before the bombings, General and later President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, voiced misgivings about the use of these weapons against Japan, “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing…”  More than two and a half months before the nuclear attacks, Leo Szilard and two other Manhattan Project scientists reported that Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, “did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war…Mr. Byrnes’ view was that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb will make Russia more manageable in Europe.”   A few years after the bombings, Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and previously chief of staff to President Roosevelt (1942-45) and President Truman (1945-49) publicly stated, “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.  The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender…in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages…wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”  (Sources:  Craig Nelson.  “The Age of Radiance:  The Epic Rise and Dramatic Fall of the Atomic Era.”  New York:  Scribner, 2014, pp. 211-220 and Gar Alperovitz.   “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb:  And the Architecture of An American Myth.”  New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, pp. 3-6, 15, 672.)

    August 7, 1938 – Dr. Helen Caldicott, the world’s foremost medical expert on the humanitarian impact of nuclear war and nuclear power, was born on this date in Melbourne, Australia. Also popularly identified as the single most articulate and passionate advocate of action by global citizenry to address the twin threats to humanity of nuclear war and climate change, the subtitle of her first of many books, “Nuclear Madness,” (1978, reissued as a 1980 paperback) says it all about her penultimate concerns – “The Choice Is Yours: A Safe Future Or No Future At All.”  Dr. Caldicott received her medical degree from the University of Adelaide Medical School in 1961, moved to Boston in 1966 where she became an instructor of pediatrics at Harvard medical School and served on the staff of the Children’s Medical Center there until she resigned in 1980 to work full-time on the prevention of nuclear war. Since then her more than four decades commitment to antinuclear and climate change causes has been unwavering.  Even with her busy schedule while working full-time in Boston, she became a citizens’ lobbyist convincing Australia to file lawsuits in 1971-72 against the French government for their nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In 1975, Dr. Caldicott worked with Australian trade unions to educate their members about the medical dangers of the nuclear fuel cycle, with a particular focus on uranium mining. While living in the United States from 1977 to 1986, she reignited the flame of antinuclear sentiment in a nonprofit group of more than 23,000 doctors – Physicians for Social Responsibility, which went on to play a prominent role in the Nuclear Freeze Movement.  In 1982, Dr. Caldicott also founded the Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND) in the U.S.  Travelling extensively abroad, she helped start other allied nonprofits or governmental medical organizations which led her international umbrella group (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) to win a Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. Her long-time global perspective led her to remark in 1982 that, “As a doctor as well as a mother and a world citizen, I wish to practice the ultimate form of preventive medicine by ridding the Earth of these technologies that propagate disease, suffering, and death.” Dr. Caldicott was one of the most prominent medical and scientific minds to recognize on a very timely basis the significance of the December 1983 TTAPS study that warned that the discharge of even a small portion of nuclear arsenals could trigger nuclear winter and not only the destruction of global civilization but possibly the end of our species and countless others on this planet.  Returning to her native Australia in 1987, she ran for the Federal Parliament but ultimately lost the election by the slimmest of margins, a mere 600 votes.  After moving back to the United States in 1995, she lectured at the New School for Social Research, hosted a talk show on WBAI in New York and founded Standing for Truth About Radiation (STAR) on Long Island.  The winner of many prizes and awards for her work including the Lannan Foundation’s 2003 Prize for Cultural Freedom, she also has earned over 20 honorary doctoral degrees and was named by The Smithsonian Institution and Ladies Home Journal as one of the most influential women of the 20th century.  In 2001 she established the U.S.-based Nuclear Policy Research Institute (NPRI) which eventually became Beyond Nuclear.  She has been the subject of several films including “Eight Minutes to Midnight,” which was nominated for an Academy Award in 1981, “If You Love This Planet,” which won an Academy Award in 1982 for Best Documentary, and the 2004 award-winning film “Helen’s War: Portrait of a Dissident.”  From 2010 to 2013, Dr. Caldicott hosted If You Love This Planet, a weekly radio that aired on many community and public radio stations internationally.  Currently, she is President of The Helen CaldicottFoundation/NuclearFreePlanet.org which organizes and runs symposiums and other educational programs to inform the public and media on the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear weapons and promote her foundation’s long-term goal of a nuclear-energy-free and weapons-free, renewable energy-powered world.  During a March 30, 2011 debate on the U.S.-based program Democracy Now, the world’s leading spokesperson for the antinuclear movement succinctly laid out the terrifying threat that every single individual on Earth is subject to because of our species’ illogical and irrational acceptance of nuclear deterrence and nuclear power as necessary and unchangeable paradigms, “If you inhale a millionth of a gram of plutonium (half-life: 24,000 years), the surrounding cells receive a very, very high dose.  Most die within that area, because it’s an alpha emitter.  The cells on the periphery remain viable. They mutate, and the regulatory genes are damaged.  Years later, that person develops cancer.  Now, that’s true for radioactive iodine that goes to the thyroid; cesium-137, that goes to the brain and muscles; strontium-90 goes to the bone, causing bone cancer and leukemia.”  Dr. Calicott’s life-long mission to prevent the unthinkable has successfully resonated with millions of global citizenry who have acted on her words and will continue to fight against these insane doomsday weapons and the stark threat they represent, “The massive quantities of radiation that would be released in a war fought with nuclear weapons might, over time, cause such great changes in the human gene pool that following generations might not be recognizable as human beings.”  (Sources: “Helen Caldicott Biography.” http://www.faqs.org/health/bios/59/Helen-Caldicott.html, “Helen Caldicott, M.D.” http://www.helencaldicott.com/about/

    Helen Caldicott. “How Nuclear Apologists Mislead the World Over Radiation” The Guardian. April 11, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/environmental/2011/apr/11/nuclear-apologist-radiation which were all accessed April 10, 2020 and other mainstream and alternative media sources.)

    September 3, 2017 – North Korea conducted its sixth and most recent nuclear test, which they claimed was a hydrogen or fusion bomb but many global experts speculated the bomb was a boosted fission bomb, with a magnitude estimated by various international authorities including U.S. intelligence officials to be in the range of 70 to 280 kilotons, approximately four and a half to 18 times as powerful as the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima in 1945.  The test, North Korea’s most powerful nuclear blast, took place over a kilometer underground at the Punggye-ri Test Site on this date.  Comments:  The testing of over 2,050 nuclear devices over the last seven decades by the nine nuclear weapons states has inflicted extremely harmful short- and long-term health impacts to global populations especially native peoples and hundreds of thousands of military “participants.”  Increased cancer rates, groundwater contamination, destruction of land and ocean ecosystems, and other detrimental health and environmental impacts still plague large numbers of people today due to nuclear testing.  So despite the few tests it has undertaken, North Korea along with the other eight nuclear weapons states faces legitimate international criticism for its role in adding to the global total of nuclear weapons tests.  But of course, the response to North Korea’s actions must be measured and wielded through the medium of diplomacy.  Such is not the case with the U.S. response to these tests and North Korea’s status as a relatively new nuclear power.  President Donald Trump, whose nuclear saber-rattling has included unprecedented rhetorical threats to use the U.S. nuclear arsenal to destroy entire nations and their populations, went on Twitter to condemn the North Koreans, “Their words and actions continue to be very hostile and dangerous to the United States.”  But consistent with the historical precedent that has seen the U.S. only avoid regime change for Third World challengers to its hegemony in cases where those nations possess nuclear weapons, no military intervention was undertaken (although nuclear threats were made both before and during the Trump administration) against Kim Jong Un’s regime in retaliation for its January 10, 2003 withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its subsequent development of these weapons of mass destruction.  And while President Trump did meet personally with the North Korean ruler three times, at the Singapore Summit in June 2018, in Vietnam in February 2019, and at the DMZ separating North and South Korea in late June 2019, there has not been any significant progress in formally ending the seventy year old Korean conflict and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.  While some would say that Trump has made more progress with North Korea than recent presidents, his overall disregard and rejection of a plethora of successful bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control treaties (including the New START or Moscow Treaty which will expire in February of 2021) combined with his numerous destabilizing and irrational public statements that see nuclear weapons, especially lower yield ones, as legitimate and useful parts of U.S. military power make him too dangerous to continue as U.S. commander-in-chief.  It is clear from a wide range of both conservative and progressive governmental and independent global scholars and military experts that the risk of nuclear war has increased significantly since 45 took office.  Hopefully, his actions in mismanaging the U.S. response to the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, his impeachment, the economic downturn, and his general incompetence and political inexperience (as revealed by one of his own top-level administration officials) along with the unprecedented nuclear threat he represents will result in the election of a 46th President on November 3, 2020.  (Sources:  Padraig Collins. “North Korea Nuclear Test: What We Know So Far.” The Guardian. September 3, 2017 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/03/north-korea-nuclear-test-what-we-know-so-far, Josh Lederman and Hans Nichols. “Trump Meets Kim Jung Un, Becomes First Sitting U.S. President to Step Into North Korea.” NBC News. June 30, 2019, Anonymous. “A Warning: A Senior Trump Administration Official.” 2019 book and other mainstream and alternative news media sources.)

    September 15, 1980 – On this date a B-52H bomber (as part of the U.S. Strategic Air Command’s commitment to have nuclear-armed aircraft fueled and ready to go at any hour of the day according to its ‘alert status’ to launch nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc nations including China), manned by a crew of six airmen assigned to the 319th Bomb Wing was sitting on the tarmac at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota.  That evening the aircraft was armed with eight AGM-69A SRAMs (Short Range Attack Missiles) each carrying a W69 warhead with a yield of 170-200 kilotons and four B28 nuclear gravity bombs with a yield of 70 kilotons to 1.45 megatons.  Around 9 p.m. that evening during a routine engine start, the plane’s number five engine burst into flames.  The crew evacuated and firefighters battled the blaze for three hours before getting it under control – 35 mile-per-hour winds extended the time required to put out the fire.  Despite the U.S. Air Force’s initial public position that the fire was very unlikely to trigger a possible nuclear accident, years later in 1988, Dr. Robert Batzel, the director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a key U.S. nuclear weapon research and development facility, indicated during closed door testimony before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that this incident had actually come very close to being “worse than Chernobyl.”  A redacted transcript of Batzel’s testimony eventually became public knowledge.  In that testimony, he indicated that a disaster was narrowly avoided telling the Subcommittee that if the wind had been blowing in any other direction, then the intense fire would have been virtually impossible to extinguish resulting in the incineration of the aircraft and the nuclear weapons inside its bomb bays – causing the rocket motors in the SRAMs as well as the conventional triggering explosives jacketing the W69 warheads to explode.  Batzel specifically said that a nuclear explosion would not have resulted but that the blast would have thrown a plume of highly radioactive plutonium into the atmosphere which easily would have impacted a sixty square mile area which including parts of North Dakota and Minnesota and affecting at least 70,000 people living within 20 miles of Grand Forks as well as contaminating water aquifers in the region. While the military and nuclear weapons laboratories have become aware of some of the dangers of Cold War era nuclear weapons and pushed successfully for their removal from the stockpile, consistent with the political decisionmaking of past U.S. presidents, other weapons with perhaps unknown or acceptable defects remain in the U.S. nuclear arsenal or are being added to it in the near future.  Comments:  However more recently Stephen Schwartz, a long-time nuclear weapons analyst and author of the book “Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940” has noted that in fact a thermonuclear explosion could easily have resulted from this 1980 accident.  Schwartz discovered that a design flaw in the B-28 1.45 megaton bomb meant that if exposed to prolonged heat, two wires located too close to the casing of the warhead could short circuit, arm the bomb, trigger an accidental explosion of the high explosives jacketing the core and set off a nuclear blast that would have spread a deadly radioactive cloud 250 miles northeast into Minnesota and Canada.  In January 1983 this scenario almost occurred, a fire that completely destroyed a B52G bomber at Grand Forks Air Force Base and killed five maintenance personnel.  Most fortunately however, this particular aircraft was not carrying nuclear weapons.  Schwartz recently reiterated that “There have been thousands of accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons.  In most cases, we can thank good engineering or smart personnel decisions for keeping things from becoming catastrophic.”   But his dire warning that our luck might run out someday soon is chilling when we consider that all nine nuclear weapons states are planning or already have started to build more “improved” doomsday machines, “The more nuclear weapons we have and the more we have on alert (a reference to the current “hair-trigger” alert status of U.S. and Russian land-based ICBMs), the greater the risk of accidents.  We were extremely lucky during the Cold War that no nuclear weapons ever accidentally exploded and no crises got completely out of hand.”  But of course, all it takes is one such incident which could trigger nuclear Armageddon and the destruction of our global civilization and possibly the demise of our entire species. (Sources:  Michael Peck.  “How A Burning B-52 Bomber Almost Triggered Nuclear Catastrophe.” National Interest. Sept. 25, 2019 http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-burning-b-52-bomber-almost-triggered-nuclear-catastrophe-83296 and Joseph Treithick. “The Time When A Burning B-52 Nearly Caused A Nuclear Catastrophe Worse Than Chernobyl.” The War Zone.com. September 20, 2019 http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29945/the-time-when-a-burning-b-52-nearly-caused-a-nuclear-catastrophe-worse-than-chernobyl/

    September 28, 1980 – Premiere of the first (The Shores of the Cosmic Ocean) of thirteen episodes of the KCET Los Angeles PBS-produced television series “Cosmos: A Personal Voyage,” hosted by astrophysicist and renowned science popularizer Carl Sagan (a cowriter of the series along with Ann Druyan and Steven Soter).  Over the last 40 years since it first aired, it has become the most popular PBS series in the world with viewership in over 60 nations, winning two Emmys and a Peabody Award after its initial run.  In addition to documenting the history of scientific thought relating to the study of the universe, the series looked at the origins of life on Earth and presented a unique and most valuable speculative perspective about our species’ place in the universe.  Critically, the series also addressed the threats facing humanity, specifically the threat of nuclear war, “The global balance of terror pioneered by the United States and the Soviet Union holds hostage all the citizens of the Earth…But the balance of terror is a delicate balance with very little margin for miscalculation. And the world impoverishes itself by spending a trillion dollars a year on preparations for war and by employing perhaps half the scientists and high technologists on the planet in military endeavors…From an extraterrestrial perspective our global civilization is clearly on the edge of failure in the most important task it faces – preserving the lives and well-being of its citizens and the future habitability of the planet. But if we’re willing to live with the growing likelihood of nuclear war, shouldn’t we also be willing to explore vigorously every possible means to prevent nuclear war? …A new consciousness is developing which sees the Earth as a single organism and recognizes that an organism at war with itself is doomed.”  Sagan, who just a few years later went on with his scientific colleagues, the TTAPS Group, to prove that not only does nuclear war represent an unprecedented catastrophe but in fact, it is the means, through their nuclear winter study, to trigger the mass extinction of most species on Earth including ours.  Nuclear winter, no longer a theory but fact as verified by more recent studies by Rutgers University Professor Alan Robock and colleagues, illustrates that a nuclear war is misnamed, for a large nuclear weapons exchange will instead result in nuclear omnicide or at least the end of our global civilization.  While “Cosmos” provided viewers with a stark warning, it also provided an uplifting alternative of possible human futures, “It is well within our power to destroy our civilization and perhaps our species as well.  If we capitulate to superstition, greed, or stupidity, we can plunge our world into a darkness deeper than the time between the collapse of classical civilization and the Italian Renaissance.  But we’re also capable of using our compassion and our intelligence, our technology, and our wealth to make an abundant and meaningful life for every inhabitant of this planet – to enhance enormously our understanding of the universe and to carry us to the stars.” (Sources: Various mainstream and alternative news media sites and The Carl Sagan Portal at carlsagan.com)

  • Comments on the Manhattan Project National Historical Park

    Comments of the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance on the
    Manhattan Project National Historical Park
    Oak Ridge, Tennessee
    1 February 2016

    The job of a National Historical Park is not only to preserve and commemorate history, but to explain it to future generations. In some cases, the history being preserved and interpreted reflects moments of our nation at its best— as in the Women’s Rights National Historical Park in New York and its story of the long struggle for women’s suffrage.

    Other National Historical Parks reflect darker moments in our history—the Kalaupapa National Historical Park in Hawaii tells the story of the physical and cultural isolation of residents suffering from Hansen’s Disease, then called leprosy, who were removed from their families and forcibly relocated and imprisoned on the peninsula. It is a complicated and nuanced story that must be set in the historical context to be understood. Parts of the story sound cruel and barbaric; other parts sound tragic but, in the context of medical understanding in that time, necessary. Even the patients themselves would tell complicated stories—for some the isolation was a refuge.

    The Manhattan Project National Historical Park project also presents complicated challenges to the interpreter. On the one hand, it commemorates a truly stunning achievement of human endeavor—scientific and technical, yes, but also engineering and building, social and cultural. It is rooted, at least in part, in a war effort that almost the entire culture embraced as noble. It’s a story of sacrifice and determination mostly by people who had no idea what they were engaged in.

    But like most history that warrants preservation, it is also a story that transcends the time and place in which it took place. The Manhattan Project changed the world; the creation of the world’s first atomic weapon which was then used to create incomprehensible human suffering, and which led to the devotion of many trillions of dollars to an arms race which is still with us today, reverberating in headlines daily as other nations consider or embark on their own quest to do what we have done.

    The Oak Ridge part of this story has been told for decades at the American Museum of Science and Energy. For the most part, the exhibit there limited the story of Oak Ridge to the creation of the first atomic bomb and it was told in the context of the great secret that enveloped the city and the workers. In the last ten years, the exhibit has expanded somewhat to acknowledge the effects of the bomb once used, and the impact it has had on the entire world.

    But the story of the Manhattan Project in Oak Ridge is even more complicated than that—there was more than one secret. Like the Kalaupapa story, there is a side wrapped up in that history that is not so easy to tell. If we are to learn what it means for humans to wrest power from nature in ways that inform us not only about the past but also cast a light into the future, we have to tell the whole story.

    I have talked over the years with workers from those first years of Oak Ridge. Decades later, their feelings about their work ran the gamut from pride in their achievement to deep sadness and guilt about the results of their labor. I remember one woman telling me about riding the bus home from work at Y12 to LaFollette the day the news of Hiroshima broke—amid the cheering and celebration of her fellow commuters, she said, she sat with her head pressed against the window of the bus thinking, “I don’t belong here.”

    But the reason she and I were talking was not because of the bomb, not directly. It was because her life had been profoundly affected by a long series of health problems that, some twenty-five years later, a doctor in Wisconsin who knew nothing of her work history identified as due to radiation exposure.

    Most of the workers in Oak Ridge were unaware of the nature of great technical secret they were working on. They were also unaware that they were at risk as they worked. For some, the risk was part of a sacrifice they would have borne willingly if informed; for others, not so much. But in any case, they were not informed; they were not warned; protections were scarce if there were any at all. Even the scientists who knew the technical secret did not understand all the risks in those days before health physics. My friend recalled a day when she was taken from her station, her clothes confiscated, she was showered repeatedly and sent home; her urine was monitored for several days, and she was given no explanation, no information, no additional monitoring, no follow-up care. Asking questions, of course, was forbidden in the secret city.

    The Manhattan Project in Oak Ridge kept other secrets. Environmental protection was not high on anyone’s list, really, in the 1940s, and certainly it took a backseat to the effort to win the war. And we were generally ignorant about the impact of contaminants on the environment. It was only later, as people learned more, that decisions were made to keep secrets—the environmental impacts of the Manhattan Project activities—the full effects of radiation releases due to slug ruptures at the air-cooled Graphite reactor—were secret even from the people who knew about them.

    But it happened. It is part of the Manhattan Project story. Some of the radionuclides still rest in the sediments of the Clinch and Tennessee Rivers. A health physicist once told me that a person with a sensitive enough Geiger country could measure Oak Ridge in the Mississippi delta.

    So—tell the history, all of it. The history of the moment as well as its impact on the world we live in today. Those who come to the Manhattan Project National Historical Park should be informed enough to make their own judgments about the accomplishments and the costs of the project, to decide for themselves what to celebrate and what to mourn.

  • The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima

    This article was originally published by CounterPunch.


    Gar AlperovitzToday is the 66th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Though most Americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against Japan in 1945. Moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top American military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: Army, Navy and Army Air Force. Nor was this the judgment of “liberals,” as is sometimes thought today. In fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than American liberals in the years following World War II.


    By the summer of 1945 Japan was essentially defeated, its navy at the bottom of the ocean; its air force limited by fuel, equipment, and other shortages; its army facing defeat on all fronts; and its cities subjected to bombing that was all but impossible to challenge. With Germany out of the war, the United States and Britain were about to bring their full power to bear on what was left of the Japanese military. Moreover, the Soviet Union—at this point in time still neutral—was getting ready to attack on the Asian mainland: the Red Army, fresh from victory over Hitler, was poised to strike across the Manchurian border.


    Long before the bombings occurred in August 1945—indeed, as early as late April 1945, more than three months before Hiroshima—U.S. intelligence advised that the Japanese were likely to surrender when the Soviet Union entered the war if they were assured that it did not imply national annihilation. An April 29 Joint Intelligence Staff document put it this way: “If at any time the U.S.S.R. should enter the war, all Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable.”


    For this reason—because it would drastically shorten the war—before the atomic bomb was successfully tested (on July 16, 1945) the U.S. had strongly and repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to join the battle as soon after the defeat of Hitler as possible. A target date of three months after Germany’s surrender was agreed upon—which put the planned Red Army attack date at roughly August 8, the war in Europe having ended on May 8. (In late July the date was temporarily extended by a week.)


    Nor was there any doubt that the Soviet Union would join the war for its own reasons. At the Potsdam Conference in July (before the successful atomic test) President Truman entered the following in his diary after meeting with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin on July 17: “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about.”


    The next day, July 18, in a private letter to his wife, the President wrote: “I’ve gotten what I came for—Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it…I’ll say that we’ll end the war a year sooner now…”


    The President had also been urged to offer assurances that the Japanese Emperor would be allowed to remain in some form of powerless figurehead bomb garrole by many top advisers—including, importantly, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, the man who oversaw the development of the atomic bomb. Before the bomb was used he explicitly urged the President that in his judgment the war would end if such assurances were given—without the use of the atomic bomb.


    Nor were there insuperable political obstacles to this approach: Leadings newspapers like the Washington Post, along with leaders of the opposition Republican Party were publically demanding such a course. (Moreover, the U.S. Army wanted to maintain the Emperor in some role so as to use his authority both to order surrender and to help manage Japan during the occupation period after war’s end—which, of course, is what, in fact, was done: Japan still has an Emperor.)


    As the President’s diary entry and letter to his wife indicate, there is little doubt that he understood the advice given by the intelligence experts as to the likely impact of the upcoming Russian attack. Further evidence is also available on this central point: The American and British Joint Chiefs of Staff—the very top military leaders of the two nations—also met at Potsdam to consolidate planning for the final stages of the war in the Pacific. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence, summarized the latest (early July) combined US-UK intelligence evidence for Prime Minister Churchill this way: “[W]hen Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”


    The July joint intelligence finding, of course, for the most part simply restated what had been the essential view of American intelligence and many of the President’s top advisers throughout the spring and summer months leading up to the July meeting at Potsdam.


    Among the many reasons the shock of Soviet entry was expected to be so powerful were: first, that it would directly challenge the Japanese army in what had been one of its most important strongholds, Manchuria; second, it would signal that there was literally no hope once the third of the three Great Powers was no longer neutral; and third, and perhaps even more important, with the Japanese economy in disarray Japanese leaders were extremely fearful that leftist groups might be powerfully encouraged, politically, if the Soviet Union were to play a major role in Japan’s defeat.


    Furthermore, U.S. intelligence had broken Japanese codes and knew Japanese leaders were frantically hoping against hope as they attempted to arrange some form of settlement with Moscow as a mediator. Since their strategy was so heavily focused on what the Russians might or might not do, this further underscored the judgment that when the Red Army attacked, the end would not be far off: the illusory hope of a negotiation through Moscow would be thoroughly dashed as Soviet tanks rolled into Manchuria.


    Instead, the United States rushed to use two atomic bombs at almost exactly the time that an August 8 Soviet attack had originally been scheduled: Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The timing itself has obviously raised questions among many historians. The available evidence, though not conclusive, strongly suggests that the atomic bombs may well have been used in part because American leaders “preferred”—as Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it—to end the war with the bombs rather than the Soviet attack. Impressing the Soviets during the early diplomatic sparring that ultimately became the Cold War also appears likely to have been a significant factor.


    Some modern analysts have urged that Japanese military planning to thwart an invasion was much more advanced than had previously been understood, and hence more threatening to U.S. plans. Others have argued that Japanese military leaders were much more ardently committed to one or more of four proposed ‘conditions’ to attach to a surrender than a number of experts hold, and hence, again, would likely have fought hard to continue the war.


    It is, of course, impossible to know whether the advice given by top U.S. and British intelligence that a Russian attack would likely to produce surrender was correct. We do know that the President ignored such judgments and the advice of people like Secretary of War Stimson that the war could be ended in other ways when he made his decision. This, of course, is an important fact in its own right in considering whether the decision was justified, since so many civilian lives were sacrificed in the two bombings.


    Moreover, many leading historians who have studied both the U.S. and Japanese records carefully (including, among others, Barton Bernstein and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa) have concluded that Japan was indeed in such dire straits that–as U.S. and British intelligence had urged long before the bombings–the war would, in fact, have likely ended before the November invasion target date once the Russians entered.


    It is also important to note that there was very little to lose by using the Russian attack to end the war. The atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9. There were still three months to go before the first landing could take place in November. If the early August Russian attack did not work as expected, the bombs could obviously have been used anyway long before any lives were lost in the landing.


    (Since use of the atomic bombs and Russia’s entry into the war came at almost exactly the same time, scholars have debated at great length which factor influenced the surrender decision more. This, of course, is a very different question from whether using the atomic bomb was justified as the only way to end the war. Still, it is instructive to note that speaking privately to top Army officials on August 14 the Japanese Emperor stated bluntly: “The military situation has changed suddenly. The Soviet Union entered the war against us. Suicide attacks can’t compete with the power of science. Therefore, there is no alternative…” And the Imperial Rescript the Emperor issued to officers and soldiers to make sure they would lay down their arms stated: “Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war, to continue under the present conditions at home and abroad would only result in further useless damage… Therefore…I am going to make peace.”)


    The most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top World War II American military leaders. The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that (quite apart from the inaccuracy of this figure, as noted by Samuel Walker) most Americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: Not only did most top U.S. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of Japanese cities and what were essentially noncombat populations. Moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly.


    Here is how General Dwight D. Eisenhower reports he reacted when he was told by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that the atomic bomb would be used:



    “During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.”


    In another public statement the man who later became President of the United States was blunt: “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”


    General Curtis LeMay, the tough cigar-smoking Army Air Force “hawk,” was also dismayed. Shortly after the bombings he stated publically: “The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”


    Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, went public with this statement: “The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. . . . The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan.”


    I noted above the report General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence, made to Prime Minister Churchill that “when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.” On hearing that the atomic test was successful, Ismay’s private reaction was one of “revulsion.”


    Shortly before his death General George C. Marshall quietly defended the decision, but for the most part he is on record as repeatedly saying that it was not a military decision, but rather a political one. Even more important, well before the atomic bombs were used, contemporary documents record show that Marshall felt “these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave–telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers….”


    As the document concerning Marshall’s views suggests, the question of whether the use of the atomic bomb was justified turns not only on whether other options were available, and whether top leaders were advised of this. It also turns on whether the bombs had to be used against a largely civilian target rather than a strictly military target—which, in fact, was the explicit choice since although there were Japanese troops in the cities, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki was deemed militarily vital by U.S. planners. (This is one of the reasons neither had been heavily bombed up to this point in the war.) Moreover, targeting was aimed explicitly on non-military facilities surrounded by workers’ homes. Here we can gain further insight from two additional, equally conservative military leaders.


    Many years later President Richard Nixon recalled that



    “[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off.”


    Although many others could be cited, here, finally, is the statement of another conservative, a man who was a close friend of President Truman’s, his Chief of Staff (as well as President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff), and the five star Admiral who presided over meetings of the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff during the war—William D. Leahy:



    “[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . . [I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

  • The Atom Bomb, Einstein, and Me

    Albert Einstein was Joseph Rotblat’s hero – and the great man’s last act was to endorse the young physicist’s anti-nuclear campaign .

    He is the greatest scientist that ever existed in the world. However, I became involved with Einstein not as a scientist, but as a pacifist. He inspired me very much, as a young physicist in Liverpool before the war. Einstein had transformed all our ideas about time and space. We knew many laws of nature but here comes a scientist who taught us these were only approximations and under certain conditions they are not valid. Many of the things we took for granted were overturned. It was such a tremendous revolution.

    I had started to work on the atom bomb in November 1939 at Liverpool University. I do not believe that making WMD is in the remit of scientists – however, I was afraid that if we in England had thought of the idea, German scientists would too. My rationale, which maybe turned out to be flawed, was that the only way we could prevent this happening was if we also had the bomb and threatened with retaliation. My intention was that it should not be used.

    Making the bomb was much more complicated than we had thought. It required the separation of isotopes which was something beyond our means in the UK during wartime. After Pearl Harbor, America began the Manhattan project. Between Churchill and Roosevelt, it was decided that British scientists would join the project. So I went to Los Alamos.

    It was a paradise for scientists. In Los Alamos, whatever you wanted, you got. If I needed something, from a bicycle to a cyclotron, I only had to write out a chit. I met many of the big names of science. Niels Bohr was already a hero for me. Dick Feynman was there and very young: 23, and I could see straight away he was a genius.

    In 1944, when I learned the Germans had given up the project, the whole rationale for my being there disappeared. I said I wanted to resign. I was accused of being a Soviet spy.

    I was eventually allowed to go on condition that I must not contact my colleagues. So, I became the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project and returned to Liverpool with no idea about its progress until I heard about Hiroshima on the BBC on August 6 1945.

    In Los Alamos, we were not quite sure if the whole thing would work – the atom bomb, after all, was based purely on calculations. I had some faint hope it would be a fizzle. And then, if it did work, that it would not be used against civilians but then it was used against them immediately. This was a terrible shock to me and I knew that a weapon 1,000 times more powerful was possible.

    I decided I should devote a great deal of my time to prevent another such catastrophe and began to go around and talk to scientists in Britain about the dreadful effects of the atom bomb.

    I came to think of Einstein more. I read about his involvement in the same ideas – he declared himself a pacifist. The emergency committee in the US, of which he was chairman, became very involved in the same activities as we did here, so I made an arrangement to go to America and meet him, but was refused a visa because of what happened in Los Alamos.

    I met Bertrand Russell and became an information source for him. There was the idea that high-level scientists should issue a manifesto to the world to draw attention to the dangers of a nuclear war. Russell wanted to get the best scientists in the field and the greatest scientist at the time was Einstein. So Russell wrote a letter.

    By the time Einstein’s reply reached London, he was dead. He had immediately replied, the last act of his life.

    We called it the Russell-Einstein manifesto. It was signed by 11 scientists. Russell insisted they were Nobel laureates, but asked me to sign even though I was not one. He said: “You will get it, I’m sure.” Einstein’s endorsement made an enormous difference his name was recognised by every person on the planet. Now I’m the only one of the signatories still alive. Because of this I feel it’s my duty to go on carrying the message from Einstein.

    Was our effort successful? When I received the Nobel peace prize, the committee said our efforts had contributed to preventing a nuclear war. Maybe to a tiny extent, we did.

    Einstein made us think about everything – nothing is absolute, everything is relative. He was a scientist but a realist and aware of what was going on in the world. He was quite the opposite of what people think about scientists – being absent-minded and immersed in their work and naive. He was fully aware and trying to do something about it. I admire him not only as a great man of science but also as a great human being. I think if he were still alive, he would still be working on his theories. But he would be working towards peace.

    Joseph Rotblat is emeritus professor of physics at St Bartholomew’s hospital medical college, London and cofounder of the Pugwash Conference (www.pugwash.org ). In 1995, he won the Nobel peace prize. This article was originally published by the Guardian.

    Guardian Unlimited C Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004