Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Iraq

  • Obey’s Afghanistan: At Long Last, It’s Guns vs. Butter

    One of the many destructive legacies of the Reagan Era was the effective Washington consensus that wars and other military spending exist on their own fiscal planet. Reagan got a Dixiecrat Congress to double military spending at a time when the U.S. was not at war (unless you were a poor person in Central America.) Meanwhile, Reagan got the Dixiecrat Congress to cut domestic spending – we just couldn’t afford those costly social programs. Reagan pretended the two things were totally unrelated, and the Dixiecrat Congress went along.

    Ever since, the Democratic leadership and the big Democratic constituency groups have largely collaborated in maintaining the destructive fiction that we can shovel tax dollars to war and to corporate welfare called “defense spending” without having any impact on our ability to provide quality education, health care, effective enforcement of environmental, civil rights, and worker safety laws, and other basic services to our citizens that are taken for granted by the citizens of every other industrialized country.

    But maybe – maybe – that destructive connivance is coming to an end.

    This week, House Appropriations Committee Chair David Obey told the White House that he was going to sit on the Administration’s request for $33 billion more for pointless killing in Afghanistan until the White House acted on House Democratic demands to unlock federal money to aid the states in averting a wave of layoffs of teachers and other public employees.

    Obey didn’t just link the two issues rhetorically; he linked them with the threat of effective action.

    At last, at long last.

    But why is David Obey standing alone?

    Perhaps, behind the scenes, the big Democratic constituency groups are pulling for Obey.

    But you wouldn’t know it from any public manifestation. Why? This should be a “teachable moment,” an opportunity to mobilize the majority of America’s working families to push to redirect resources from futile wars of empire and the corporate welfare of the “base military budget” to human needs at home and abroad. Where is the public mobilization of the Democratic constituency groups?

    If we could shorten the Afghanistan war by a month, that would free up the $10 billion that Obey is asking for domestic spending. Rep. Jim McGovern’s bill requiring a timetable for military redeployment from Afghanistan currently has 94 co-sponsors in the House (act here.) If McGovern’s bill became law, it would surely save the taxpayers at least $10 billion. Why aren’t the big Democratic constituency groups aggressively backing the McGovern bill, demanding that it be attached to the war supplemental?

    This isn’t just a question of missing an opportunity. There is a freight train coming called “deficit reduction.” If the big Democratic constituency groups continue to sit on their hands on the issue of military spending, then we can predict what the cargo of that freight train is likely to be: cut Social Security benefits, cut Medicare benefits, raise the retirement age for Social Security and Medicare, cut domestic spending for enforcing environmental regulations and civil rights and worker safety.

    Ending the war in Afghanistan with a timetable for withdrawal would likely save hundreds of billions of dollars. That’s money that could be used to prevent cuts from jobs and services at home.

    And we can cut the “base military budget” – the money we are purportedly spending to prepare for wars in the future, whether those wars have any measurable probability of occurring or not – without having any impact on our security.

    The Sustainable Defense Task Force – initiated by Rep. Barney Frank, Rep. Walter Jones, Rep. Ron Paul, and Sen. Ron Wyden – has modestly proposed a trillion dollars in cuts to the military budget over ten years, targeting long-derided weapons systems like F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and the V-22 Osprey. As Joshua Green notes in the Boston Globe, even Dick Cheney says the V-22 is “a turkey.” As the current annual military expenditure of the U.S. is roughly $660 billion, this would roughly amount to a 15% cut. Note that the U.S. is currently spending about 4.3% of its GDP on the military, more than twice what China spends as a percentage of its economy (2%.) If we cut our military spending 15%, we’d still be spending far more as a percentage of our economy (3.7%) than China, and far more than Britain (2.5%) and France (2.3%). And in absolute terms, we’d still be spending more than the next ten countries combined – most of whom are our allies. Such a cut would free $100 billion a year for deficit reduction and protecting domestic spending from cuts.

    The president’s Deficit Reduction Commission will recommend a package of cuts to Congress in December for an up-or-down vote. Will the Deficit Reduction Commission recommend real cuts to military spending?

    On June 26, the deficit reduction freight train may be coming to your town. The well-financed America Speaks is hosting a “national town hall” discussion in twenty cities on June 26 about ways to cut the deficit, promising that they will push the result into the Washington deficit-cutting decision. Check to see if the freight train is coming to your town. If it is, why not go and see if you can stow away some military spending cuts – like ending the war and cutting the V22 – on board the train?

  • US Opposes ICC Bid to Make ‘Aggression’ a Crime Under International Law

    This article was originally published by the Christian Science Monitor.

    The United States under the Obama administration has developed an increasingly close working relationship with the International Criminal Court in The Hague. But that growing engagement with a controversial institution of international law was unable to prevent the ICC from expanding the scope of its work to include the murky crime of “aggression,” a move the US had vehemently opposed.

    At the 111-nation ICC’s first review conference that wrapped up last week in Kampala, Uganda, delegates decided to expand the international court’s purview to include the crime of aggression – a crime that only the US has successfully tried, in the post-World War II tribunals in Nuremburg and Tokyo.

    State Department officials say the US, which is not a signatory to the ICC, was able to mitigate the drawbacks of such an expansion of the court’s reach, primarily by putting off any prosecution of the newest international crime until at least 2017.

    But some critics say the US failure to stop the enshrining of “aggression” as an international crime demonstrates the limits of President Obama’s multilateralist vision – and sets the US on a collision course with the ICC when the issue comes up again later in the decade.

    “The fact remains that the Obama administration’s vaunted ‘engagement’ strategy was only able to check the ICC’s move towards defining ‘aggression,’ not stop it entirely,” says Brett Schaefer, an expert in international institutions at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. “And it sets the US up for another battle in 2017 when the ICC’s advocates will make another push to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction over ‘aggression.’”

    The US confirmed its new footing with the world’s first permanent court for trying war crimes and crimes against humanity, US officials say, although they acknowledge that the US did not get everything it wanted in Kampala. The Rome Statute establishing the ICC was finalized in 1998, but the court did not begin to function until 2002, when the minimum 60 countries ratified it.

    US participation in the Kampala conference “reset US relations with the court from hostility to positive engagement,” says State Department legal adviser Harold Koh. He says the US focus at the review conference was on efforts to “strengthen justice on the ground” in countries so that eventually their judicial systems will be strong enough to take on the kinds of human-rights work the ICC addresses.

    Mr. Koh says that focus was particularly well-received in Africa, “where there is a strong desire to have these cases tried at the national level.”

    Some ICC critics have also noted that the court has only taken up two cases so far, both involving African countries – one involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, and the other regarding Sudan – and they dismiss the largely European-Union funded court as a colonial institution pressing Western interests.

    But the US increasingly sees the value of the ICC, especially as it has tried cases that begged for international intervention.

    “If it weren’t for the ICC [in cases like Sudan or Uganda] you would have had to set up a special tribunal,” says Stephen Rapp, the State Department’s coordinator for war crimes issues.

    One of the main US concerns in seeing “aggression” added to the ICC’s jurisdiction was the impact it could potentially have on US military operations abroad. But Koh says the US successfully negotiated the “aggression” statute’s wording so that US forces won’t be susceptible to it.

    “No US national can be prosecuted for ‘aggression’ while the US is not a signatory” to the ICC, he says.

  • Learning From Past Disasters, Preventing New Ones

    *This article is the foreword to the book Flirting with Disaster: Why Accidents are Rarely Accidental by Dr. Marc Gerstein with Michael Ellsberg.

    I have participated in several major organizational catastrophes. The most well known of them is the Vietnam War. I was aware on my first visit to Vietnam in 1961 that the situation there — a failing neocolonial regime we had installed as a successor to French rule — was a sure loser in which we should not become further involved. Yet a few years later, I found myself participating as a high-level staffer in a policy process that lied both the public and Congress into a war that, unbeknownst to me at the time, experts inside the government accurately predicted would lead to catastrophe.

    The very word catastrophe, almost unknown in the dry language of bureaucracy, was uttered directly to the president. Clark Clifford, longtime and highly trusted adviser to U.S. presidents, told President Lyndon Johnson in July 1965: “If we lose fifty thousand men there, it will be catastrophic in this country. Five years, billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of men-this is not for us. . . .”

    But it was for us, casualties included, after Johnson launched an open-ended escalation just three days later. In time, Clifford’s estimates were all exceeded: Before our ground war was ended in eight years (not five), the cost in dollars was in hundreds of billions, over five hundred thousand men served in Vietnam in a single year (1968) out of three million altogether, and — uncannily close to his predicted figure — more than fifty-eight thousand soldiers had died. Clifford’s prophecy in his face-to-face session with the president at Camp David — “I can’t see anything but catastrophe for our nation in this area” — could not have been more urgent in tone or, tragically, more prescient.

    And Clifford’s was not a lone voice. Johnson’s vice president, Hubert H. Humphrey, had used almost the same words with him five months earlier; others, including Johnson’s career-long mentor Senator Richard Russell, had also made the same argument. Yet Johnson went ahead regardless.

    Why? I have pondered and researched that question for forty years. (The documentation in the Pentagon Papers provides no adequate answer.) But one seemingly plausible and still widely believed answer can be ruled out. The escalation in Vietnam was not the result of a universal failure of foresight among the president’s advisers, or to a lack of authoritative, precise, and urgently expressed warnings against his choice of policy.

    The nuclear arms race, in which I was intimately involved between 1958 and 1964 as a RAND Corporation analyst serving the executive branch, is a moral catastrophe on a scale without precedent in human history, even though its full tragic potential has not yet occurred. The arms race involved — under both Democratic and Republican administrations, soon joined by the USSR — the mutual construction of a physical and organizational capability for destruction of most of the world’s population within a matter of hours. That project — building two matched and opposed “doomsday machines” and keeping them on hair-trigger alert — is the most irresponsible policy in human experience, involving as it does a genuine possibility of creating an irreversible catastrophe for humanity and most other living species on a scale that the world has not seen since the dinosaurs perished sixty million years ago. Even if the system were decommissioned totally — and it is not yet remotely close to being dismantled — such a course of action would not cancel out the fact that over the past sixty years, a moral cataclysm has already occurred, with ominous implications for the future of life on earth.

    I have been trying since 1967 — when I realized that the Vietnam War must end — to understand how we got into that war, and why it was so hard to end it. Since 1961, even earlier, I have viewed the nuclear arms race as an ongoing catastrophe that has to be reversed, and a situation that has to be understood. I assumed then, and still believe, that understanding the past and present of these realities is essential to changing them. In my life and work, I have tried to do what Dr. Gerstein’s book is trying to help us do: to understand these processes in a way that will help us avert them in the future.

    A major theme to be gained from this important book is that organizations do not routinely and systematically learn from past errors and disasters — in fact, they rarely ever do. This intentional lack of oversight can partly explain why our predicament in Iraq is so precisely close to the Vietnam experience, both in the way that we got into the war, deceptively and unconstitutionally, and in the way the war is being conducted and prolonged.

    It might not seem surprising that after thirty years, a generation of decision-makers and voters would have come along that knew little about the past experience in Vietnam. What is more dismaying is to realize that much the same processes — the same foolish and disastrous decision-making, the same misleading rationales for aggression — are going on right now with respect to Iran, with little political opposition, just three years after the invasion of Iraq, and while the brutal and tragic consequences of that occupation are still in front of our eyes every day.

    One reason for this folly is that many aspects of disasters in decision-making are known only within the organization, and not even by many insiders at that. The organizations involved tend not to make relevant and detailed studies of past errors, let alone reveal them outside the organization. In fact, the risk that such a study or investigation might leak to the outside is a factor sufficient to keep inquiries from being made in the first place. Making or keeping possibly incriminating documentation earlier, at the time of the decision, or later is similarly sidestepped.

    This deliberate decision within organizations not to try to learn internally what has gone wrong constitutes what I have called, with respect to Vietnam, an anti-learning mechanism. Avoiding improved performance is not the point of the mechanism. But because studying present and past faulty decision-making risks may invite blame and organizational, political, perhaps even legal penalties, those outcomes “outweigh” the benefits of clearly understanding what needs to be changed within the organization.

    The valuable cases studies, analyses, and information in the pages of this book were not provided by the organizations involved. This compendium arose from the accounts of individual whistle-blowers, journalistic investigations, and in some cases congressional action- and from Dr. Gerstein’s own initiative in collecting and analyzing the data. Did any one of the organizations detailed herein conduct a comparable study? Quite possibly not a single one. And even if they did, they certainly didn’t publish the results in a way that would allow other organizations and individuals to learn from their mistakes.

    Societally, then, we don’t have an easy way to learn from organizational mistakes of the past. That’s one reason that disasters are so likely, and why comparable disasters occur again and again, across organizations and even within the same organizations. In the case of Vietnam, Americans did not learn from the French or Japanese occupations before ours. Nor did Republicans under Nixon manage to learn from Democratic missteps before theirs. Specifically, there was no systematic study of the Pentagon Papers, which were available within the Defense Department to the Nixon administration, but no one ever admitted to having read them or even to directing their staff to analyze possible lessons from them. (I personally urged Henry Kissinger, in a discussion at the Western White House in 1970, to do both of these, or at least the latter, but he later claimed he had never read anything of them or about them, though he had a copy available to him.) As far as we know, Secretary of Defense Laird, Henry Kissinger, and others had no interest in the documentary record and analysis of twenty-three years of decision-making in the same geographic area, against precisely the same adversaries. And so they ended up committing many of the mistakes made by those who’d gone before, with the same results.

    This “anti-learning” phenomenon also explains why it is possible to reproduce our experience in Vietnam years later in Iraq, and now, from Iraq to Iran. In sum, there is strong and successful resistance within many organizations to studying or recording past actions leading to catastrophe — because doing so would reveal errors, lies, or even crimes.

    There is no substitute for the kind of comparative study analysis Dr. Gerstein shares on these pages. I hope this book is read widely; if we are to avoid the kinds of disasters and catastrophes described, we first need to understand them. Flirting with Disaster is a pathbreaking, indispensable step toward such a goal.

    Daniel Ellsberg Berkeley, California July 2007

    Daniel Ellsberg is a Fellow of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

  • How the Iraq War’s $2 Trillion Cost to the US Could Have Been Spent

    In war, things are rarely what they seem.

    Back in 2003, in the days leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon adamantly insisted that the war would be a relatively cheap one. Roughly $50 billion is all it would take to rid the world of Saddam Hussein, it said.

    We now know this turned out to be the first of many miscalculations. Approaching its fifth year, the war in Iraq has cost American taxpayers nearly $500 billion, according to the non-partisan U.S.-based research group National Priorities Project. That number is growing every day.

    But it’s still not even close to the true cost of the war. As the invasion’s price tag balloons, economists and analysts are examining the entire financial burden of the Iraq campaign, including indirect expenses that Americans will be paying long after the troops come home. What they’ve come up with is staggering. Calculations by Harvard’s Linda Bilmes and Nobel-prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz remain most prominent. They determined that, once you factor in things like medical costs for injured troops, higher oil prices and replenishing the military, the war will cost America upwards of $2 trillion. That doesn’t include any of the costs incurred by Iraq, or America’s coalition partners.

    “Would the American people have had a different attitude toward going to war had they known the total cost?” Bilmes and Stiglitz ask in their report. “We might have conducted the war in a manner different from the way we did.”

    It’s hard to comprehend just how much money $2 trillion is. Even Bill Gates, one of the richest people in the world, would marvel at this amount. But, once you begin to look at what that money could buy, the worldwide impact of fighting this largely unpopular war becomes clear.

    Consider that, according to sources like Columbia’s Jeffrey Sachs, the Worldwatch Institute, and the United Nations, with that same money the world could:

    Eliminate extreme poverty around the world (cost $135 billion in the first year, rising to $195 billion by 2015.)

    Achieve universal literacy (cost $5 billion a year.)

    Immunize every child in the world against deadly diseases (cost $1.3 billion a year.)

    Ensure developing countries have enough money to fight the AIDS epidemic (cost $15 billion per year.)

    In other words, for a cost of $156.3 billion this year alone – less than a tenth of the total Iraq war budget – we could lift entire countries out of poverty, teach every person in the world to read and write, significantly reduce child mortality, while making huge leaps in the battle against AIDS, saving millions of lives.

    Then the remaining money could be put toward the $40 billion to $60 billion annually that the World Bank says is needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, established by world leaders in 2000, to tackle everything from gender inequality to environmental sustainability.

    The implications of this cannot be underestimated. It means that a better and more just world is far from within reach, if we are willing to shift our priorities.

    If America and other nations were to spend as much on peace as they do on war, that would help root out the poverty, hopelessness and anti-Western sentiment that can fuel terrorism – exactly what the Iraq war was supposed to do.

    So as candidates spend much of this year vying to be the next U.S. president, what better way to repair its image abroad, tarnished by years of war, than by becoming a leader in global development? It may be too late to turn back the clock to the past and rethink going to war, but it’s not too late for the U.S. and other developed countries to invest in the future.

    Craig and Marc Kielburger are children’s rights activists and co-founded Free The Children, which is active in the developing world. Marc Kielburger is a member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Board of Directors.

  • No Exceptions

    Article originally published in Haaretz on 11/5/2007

     

    How can a country, which according to endless foreign reports has kept secret for years several atomic weapons, manage to rally the international community in a struggle against a neighboring country that insists on acquiring nuclear energy? What do Israeli politicians answer to those asking why Iran should not be allowed to acquire the same armaments that are already in the arsenals of neighboring countries, like Pakistan and India? The common response is that “Iran is the sole country whose president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, declares openly that he intends to destroy the state of Israel.” This argument is a double-edged sword, par excellence, used by a country that sports a radiant nuclear glow (according to foreign press reports, of course), and who has a senior minister, one assigned to dealing with strategic threats, who has threatened to bomb the Aswan Dam.
    What will Israel’s policy – or for that matter, America’s – be, if in Iran’s upcoming elections, Ahmadinejad were to give way to a more moderate leader, who were to announce that Iran recognizes Israel’s right to exist within the 1967, borders? Will Iran become one of the “moderate” Muslim states, like, say, Pakistan, which is allowed to develop nuclear weapons? There was a day when our friend the Shah ruled Iran, and then came the Ayatollahs, with whom we were happy to trade arms, until the whole affair became muddled. Regimes come and go, but nuclear weapons are forever.
    According to foreign reports, Israel recently bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor that was under construction. It was reported that the United States approved the attack on the Syrian installation and went so far as to encourage Israel’s violation of Syrian sovereignty. Syria is part of the axis of evil, mostly because of its ties with Iran, its involvement in Lebanon and its intentional failure to prevent the entry of anti-American extremists into Iraq. But it is a well-known phenomenon, in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular, that an evil leader can become a popular friend overnight. What will the Israeli and American policies be toward the Syrian nuclear program if Assad were to announce his intentions to step away from Iran, not interfere in Lebanon and seal the border with Iraq?

    A visit to Jerusalem 30 years ago transformed Anwar Sadat from enemy No. 1 into a hero for peace. President Hosni Mubarak is considered an astute, peace-loving leader, and a friend of the west. He was even democratically elected. Sort of. But what would happen if one day, when the nuclear reactor is operational in the middle of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood does to Mubarak’s heir what their Hamas brethren did to Mahmoud Abbas? Will we fly over to bomb the Egyptian nuclear reactor? And how does the free world need to deal with Pakistan, if its nuclear weapons fall under the control of Islamists? Is anyone proposing to preempt and invade Islamabad?
    Jordan’s King Abdullah said several months ago that most of the countries in the region, including his own, would begin developing nuclear energy. He was quick to stress that the Hashemite Kingdom would obviously place its nuclear installations under international supervision. He did not need to point out that this was “contrary to Israel.”
    The question is not therefore whether the Middle East is going nuclear, but when it will happen. The demand for a sanity certificate as a precondition for joining this club ensures that even the opponents of the Iranian regime will back Ahmadinejad against the entire world. Visitors who recently were in Tehran say that intellectuals, who did not hide their displeasure with their president, have expressed full support for his position on the nuclear question. They said that relinquishing the nuclear program would be interpreted as an admission that Iran belongs to the club of pariah nations and persisted in asking, “Why should it be forbidden to Iran when it is permitted to Pakistan and Israel?”
    The struggle against the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs, and in the future perhaps the Egyptian and Jordanian programs, is meant to divert attention from the real problem in the Middle East – the war for hegemony over the region between the religious-extremist camp and the moderate-pragmatic one. The Annapolis summit is an excellent opportunity to update the formula for peace posed by the Arab League and conclude that when the conflict is resolved, the Middle East will be free of nuclear weapons. No exceptions!

     

    Akiva Eldar is the diplomatic affairs analyst for the Haaretz newspaper.

  • A Coup Has Occurred

    Text of a speech delivered September 20, 2007 at American University

    I think nothing has higher priority than averting an attack on Iran, which I think will be accompanied by a further change in our way of governing here that in effect will convert us into what I would call a police state.
    If there’s another 9/11 under this regime … it means that they switch on full extent all the apparatus of a police state that has been patiently constructed, largely secretly at first but eventually leaked out and known and accepted by the Democratic people in Congress, by the Republicans and so forth.
    Will there be anything left for NSA to increase its surveillance of us? … They may be to the limit of their technical capability now, or they may not. But if they’re not now they will be after another 9/11.
    And I would say after the Iranian retaliation to an American attack on Iran, you will then see an increased attack on Iran — an escalation — which will be also accompanied by a total suppression of dissent in this country, including detention camps.
    It’s a little hard for me to distinguish the two contingencies; they could come together. Another 9/11 or an Iranian attack in which Iran’s reaction against Israel, against our shipping, against our troops in Iraq above all, possibly in this country, will justify the full panoply of measures that have been prepared now, legitimized, and to some extent written into law. …
    This is an unusual gang, even for Republicans. [But] I think that the successors to this regime are not likely to roll back the assault on the Constitution. They will take advantage of it, they will exploit it.
    Will Hillary Clinton as president decide to turn off NSA after the last five years of illegal surveillance? Will she deprive her administration her ability to protect United States citizens from possible terrorism by blinding herself and deafening herself to all that NSA can provide? I don’t think so.
    Unless this somehow, by a change in our political climate, of a radical change, unless this gets rolled back in the next year or two before a new administration comes in — and there’s no move to do this at this point — unless that happens I don’t see it happening under the next administration, whether Republican or Democratic.
    The Next Coup
    Let me simplify this and not just to be rhetorical: A coup has occurred. I woke up the other day realizing, coming out of sleep, that a coup has occurred. It’s not just a question that a coup lies ahead with the next 9/11. That’s the next coup, that completes the first.
    The last five years have seen a steady assault on every fundamental of our Constitution, … what the rest of the world looked at for the last 200 years as a model and experiment to the rest of the world — in checks and balances, limited government, Bill of Rights, individual rights protected from majority infringement by the Congress, an independent judiciary, the possibility of impeachment.
    There have been violations of these principles by many presidents before. Most of the specific things that Bush has done in the way of illegal surveillance and other matters were done under my boss Lyndon Johnson in the Vietnam War: the use of CIA, FBI, NSA against Americans.
    I could go through a list going back before this century to Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in the Civil War, and before that the Alien and Sedition Acts in the 18th century. I think that none of those presidents were in fact what I would call quite precisely the current administration: domestic enemies of the Constitution.
    I think that none of these presidents with all their violations, which were impeachable had they been found out at the time and in nearly every case their violations were not found out until they were out of office so we didn’t have the exact challenge that we have today.
    That was true with the first term of Nixon and certainly of Johnson, Kennedy and others. They were impeachable, they weren’t found out in time, but I think it was not their intention to in the crisis situations that they felt justified their actions, to change our form of government.
    It is increasingly clear with each new book and each new leak that comes out, that Richard Cheney and his now chief of staff David Addington have had precisely that in mind since at least the early 70s. Not just since 1992, not since 2001, but have believed in Executive government, single-branch government under an Executive president — elected or not — with unrestrained powers. They did not believe in restraint.
    When I say this I’m not saying they are traitors. I don’t think they have in mind allegiance to some foreign power or have a desire to help a foreign power. I believe they have in their own minds a love of this country and what they think is best for this country — but what they think is best is directly and consciously at odds with what the Founders of this country and Constitution thought.
    They believe we need a different kind of government now, an Executive government essentially, rule by decree, which is what we’re getting with signing statements. Signing statements are talked about as line-item vetoes which is one [way] of describing them which are unconstitutional in themselves, but in other ways are just saying the president says “I decide what I enforce. I decide what the law is. I legislate.”
    It’s [the same] with the military commissions, courts that are under the entire control of the Executive Branch, essentially of the president. A concentration of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in one branch, which is precisely what the Founders meant to avert, and tried to avert and did avert to the best of their ability in the Constitution.
    Founders Had It Right
    Now I’m appealing to that as a crisis right now not just because it is a break in tradition but because I believe in my heart and from my experience that on this point the Founders had it right.
    It’s not just “our way of doing things” — it was a crucial perception on the corruption of power to anybody including Americans. On procedures and institutions that might possibly keep that power under control because the alternative was what we have just seen, wars like Vietnam, wars like Iraq, wars like the one coming.
    That brings me to the second point. This Executive Branch, under specifically Bush and Cheney, despite opposition from most of the rest of the branch, even of the cabinet, clearly intends a war against Iran which even by imperialist standards, standards in other words which were accepted not only by nearly everyone in the Executive Branch but most of the leaders in Congress. The interests of the empire, the need for hegemony, our right to control and our need to control the oil of the Middle East and many other places. That is consensual in our establishment. …
    But even by those standards, an attack on Iran is insane. And I say that quietly, I don’t mean it to be heard as rhetoric. Of course it’s not only aggression and a violation of international law, a supreme international crime, but it is by imperial standards, insane in terms of the consequences.
    Does that make it impossible? No, it obviously doesn’t, it doesn’t even make it unlikely.
    That is because two things come together that with the acceptance for various reasons of the Congress — Democrats and Republicans — and the public and the media, we have freed the White House — the president and the vice president — from virtually any restraint by Congress, courts, media, public, whatever.
    And on the other hand, the people who have this unrestrained power are crazy. Not entirely, but they have crazy beliefs.
    And the question is what then, what can we do about this? We are heading towards an insane operation. It is not certain. It is likely. … I want to try to be realistic myself here, to encourage us to do what we must do, what is needed to be done with the full recognition of the reality. Nothing is impossible.
    What I’m talking about in the way of a police state, in the way of an attack on Iran is not certain. Nothing is certain, actually. However, I think it is probable, more likely than not, that in the next 15, 16 months of this administration we will see an attack on Iran. Probably. Whatever we do.
    And … we will not succeed in moving Congress probably, and Congress probably will not stop the president from doing this. And that’s where we’re heading. That’s a very ugly, ugly prospect.
    However, I think it’s up to us to work to increase that small perhaps — anyway not large — possibility and probability to avert this within the next 15 months, aside from the effort that we have to make for the rest of our lives.
    Restoring the Republic
    Getting back the constitutional government and improving it will take a long time. And I think if we don’t get started now, it won’t be started under the next administration.
    Getting out of Iraq will take a long time. Averting Iran and averting a further coup in the face of a 9/11, another attack, is for right now, it can’t be put off. It will take a kind of political and moral courage of which we have seen very little…
    We have a really unusual concentration here and in this audience, of people who have in fact changed their lives, changed their position, lost their friends to a large extent, risked and experienced being called terrible names, “traitor,” “weak on terrorism” — names that politicians will do anything to avoid being called.
    How do we get more people in the government and in the public at large to change their lives now in a crisis in a critical way? How do we get Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid for example? What kinds of pressures, what kinds of influences can be brought to bear to get Congress to do their jobs? It isn’t just doing their jobs. Getting them to obey their oaths of office.
    I took an oath many times, an oath of office as a Marine lieutenant, as an official in the Defense Department, as an official in the State Department as a Foreign Service officer. A number of times I took an oath of office which is the same oath office taken by every member of Congress and every official in the United States and every officer in the United States armed services.
    And that oath is not to a Commander in Chief, which is not mentioned. It is not to a fuehrer. It is not even to superior officers. The oath is precisely to protect and uphold the Constitution of the United States.
    Now that is an oath I violated every day for years in the Defense Department without realizing it when I kept my mouth shut when I knew the public was being lied into a war as they were lied into Iraq, as they are being lied into war in Iran.
    I knew that I had the documents that proved it, and I did not put it out then. I was not obeying my oath which I eventually came to do.
    I’ve often said that Lt. Ehren Watada — who still faces trial for refusing to obey orders to deploy to Iraq which he correctly perceives to be an unconstitutional and aggressive war — is the single officer in the United States armed services who is taking seriously in upholding his oath.
    The president is clearly violating that oath, of course. Everybody under him who understands what is going on and there are myriad, are violating their oaths. And that’s the standard that I think we should be asking of people.
    Congressional Courage
    On the Democratic side, on the political side, I think we should be demanding of our Democratic leaders in the House and Senate — and frankly of the Republicans — that it is not their highest single absolute priority to be reelected or to maintain a Democratic majority so that Pelosi can still be Speaker of the House and Reid can be in the Senate, or to increase that majority.
    I’m not going to say that for politicians they should ignore that, or that they should do something else entirely, or that they should not worry about that.
    Of course that will be and should be a major concern of theirs, but they’re acting like it’s their sole concern. Which is business as usual. “We have a majority, let’s not lose it, let’s keep it. Let’s keep those chairmanships.” Exactly what have those chairmanships done for us to save the Constitution in the last couple of years?
    I am shocked by the Republicans today that I read in the Washington Post who yesterday threatened a filibuster if we … get back habeas corpus. The ruling out of habeas corpus with the help of the Democrats did not get us back to George the First it got us back to before King John 700 years ago in terms of counter-revolution. We need some way, and Ann Wright has one way, of sitting in, in Conyers office and getting arrested. Ray McGovern has been getting arrested, pushed out the other day for saying the simple words “swear him in” when it came to testimony.
    I think we’ve got to somehow get home to them [in Congress] that this is the time for them to uphold the oath, to preserve the Constitution, which is worth struggling for in part because it’s only with the power that the Constitution gives Congress responding to the public, only with that can we protect the world from mad men in power in the White House who intend an attack on Iran.
    And the current generation of American generals and others who realize that this will be a catastrophe have not shown themselves — they might be people who in their past lives risked their bodies and their lives in Vietnam or elsewhere, like [Colin] Powell, and would not risk their career or their relation with the president to the slightest degree.
    That has to change. And it’s the example of people like those up here who somehow brought home to our representatives that they as humans and as citizens have the power to do likewise and find in themselves the courage to protect this country and protect the world. Thank you.

     

    Daniel Ellsberg is a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Fellow and author of Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers.

  • Watada Beats the Government

    When the Army judge declared a mistrial over defense objection in 1st Lt. Ehren Watada’s court martial, he probably didn’t realize jeopardy attached. That means that under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, the government cannot retry Lt. Watada on the same charges of missing movement and conduct unbecoming an officer.
    Lt. Watada is the first commissioned officer to publicly refuse orders to deploy to Iraq. He claimed those orders were unlawful because the war is illegal and he would be an accomplice to war crimes if he followed them.

    The judge refused to allow me and others to testify as expert defense witnesses on the illegality of the Iraq war and the war crimes the Bush administration is committing there.
    The Uniform Code of Military Justice sets forth the duty of military personnel to obey only lawful commands. Article 92 says: “A general order or regulation is lawful unless it is contrary to the Constitution, the law of the United States …”
    Lt. Watada said at a June 6, 2006 press conference in Tacoma, Washington, “The war in Iraq is in fact illegal. It is my obligation and my duty to refuse any orders to participate in this war.” He stated, “An order to take part in an illegal war is unlawful in itself. So my obligation is not to follow the order to go to Iraq.”
    Citing “deception and manipulation … and willful misconduct by the highest levels of my chain of command,” Lt. Watada declared there is “no greater betrayal to the American people” than the Iraq war.
    The “turning point” for Lt. Watada came when he “saw the pain and suffering of so many soldiers and their families, and innocent Iraqis.” He said, “I best serve my soldiers by speaking out against unlawful orders of the highest levels of my chain of command, and making sure our leaders are held accountable.” Lt. Watada felt he “had the obligation to step up and do whatever it takes,” even if that means facing court martial and imprisonment.
    Lt. Watada did face court martial, and four years in prison, until the judge declared a mistrial.
    This is what I would have said had I been allowed to testify at Lt. Watada’s court martial:
    The United States is committing a crime against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Iraq.
    A war of aggression, prosecuted in violation of international treaties, is a crime against the peace. The war in Iraq violates the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the use of force. There are only two exceptions to that prohibition: self-defense and approval by the Security Council. A pre-emptive or preventive war is not allowed under the Charter.
    Bush’s war in Iraq was not undertaken in self-defense. Iraq had not attacked the US or any other country for 12 years. And Saddam Hussein’s military capability had been effectively neutered by the Gulf War, 12 years of punishing sanctions, and nearly daily bombing by the US and UK over the “no-fly-zones.”
    Bush tried mightily to get the Security Council to sanction his war on Iraq. But the Council refused. Bush then cobbled together prior Council resolutions, none of which, individually or collectively, authorized the use of force in Iraq. Although Bush claimed to be enforcing Security Council resolutions, the Charter empowers only the Council to enforce its resolutions.
    Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes, for which individuals can be punished under the US War Crimes Act. Willful killing, torture and inhuman treatment are grave breaches.
    The torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners in US custody at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq are grave breaches of Geneva, and therefore, war crimes. The execution of unarmed civilians in Haditha and other Iraqi cities are also war crimes.
    Commanders in the chain of command, all the way up to the commander in chief, can be prosecuted for war crimes if they knew or should have known their subordinates were committing war crimes and failed to stop or prevent them. The torture policies and rules of engagement were set at the top. It is George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell who should be on trial – for the commission of war crimes.
    Inhumane acts against a civilian population are crimes against humanity and violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. The targeting of civilians and failure to protect civilians and civilian objects are crimes against humanity.
    The dropping of 2,000-pound bombs in residential areas of Baghdad during “Shock and Awe” were crimes against humanity. The indiscriminate US attack on Fallujah, which was collective punishment in retaliation for the killing of four Blackwater mercenaries, was a crime against humanity. The destruction of hospitals in Fallujah by the US military, its refusal to let doctors treat patients, and shooting into ambulances were crimes against humanity. Declaring Fallujah a “weapons-free” zone, with orders to shoot anything that moved, was a crime against humanity.
    Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson was the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal. He wrote: “No political or economic situation can justify the crime of aggression. If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.”
    Lt. Ehren Watada was correct when he said the war is illegal and he would be party to war crimes if he deployed to Iraq. The orders to deploy were unlawful and Lt. Watada had a duty to disobey them. Although he faces the possibility of a dishonorable discharge, the judge’s grant of a mistrial precludes retrial on the same criminal charges.

     

    Marjorie Cohn, MWC News Magazine senior editor, is a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, president of the National Lawyers Guild, and the US representative to the executive committee of the American Association of Jurists. Her new book, Cowboy Republic: Six Ways the Bush Gang Has Defied the Law, will be published this spring by PoliPointPress.

  • Reflections on the Connections between the War in Iraq and Hawaii: the Stryker Brigade and the Watada Case

    Two great volcanoes comprise most of the Big Island of Hawai’i. Mauna Loa, measured by volume, is the largest mountain in the world, and Mauna Kea, if measured from the sea floor, would rank as the tallest. Both peaks are considered sacred, the realm of the gods (wao akua), not just for Hawai’ians, but throughout all of Polynesia.

    In October of 2002, the first of a series of protests against the imminent U.S. attack against Iraq took place at the Mo‘oheau Bandstand on the Hilo Bayfront. As I drove down to Hilo, I was struck by the majestic and stunning presence of Mauna Kea rising 13,792 ft. above Hilo—so unusually clear on a rare cloudless morning. It was a day that was startling in its beauty even for Hawai‘i, and as I listened to the various speakers call our attention to the horrors of what seemed about to take place in Iraq, my gaze often drifted to the tranquil bay and the waves softly rolling down on the sands below. The contrast couldn’t have been sharper between the peaceful setting of Hilo Bay and the looming war in Iraq. If it weren’t for the voices of the Hawai’ian rights activists—reminding us of the illegal overthrow of the Hawai’ian nation—I might have thought only of the profound difference between these beautiful islands and the war-torn country of Iraq. In fact, what was taking place a world away in Iraq was really not that far away at all and is, indeed, deeply connected to what happened and was still taking place in Hawai‘i. I was reminded of the “infinite extent of our relations” as Thoreau once put it, and from this perspective, the connections between the war in Iraq, the overthrow of the Hawai’ian nation, and the continuing controversy surrounding the military’s presence in Hawai‘i become more and more clear.

    The Stryker in Hawai’i Hawai’i senior Senator Daniel Inouye apparently doesn’t see these connections as is evident in a recent editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser in support of the Army’s plan to transform the 2nd Brigade in Hawai’i into a Stryker Combat Brigade.[1] The Army’s plan would involve basing about 300 Stryker vehicles at Schofield Barracks on Oahu and also expanding the Army’s Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island which the brigade will use for training. The Army’s project to bring a Stryker brigade to Hawai’i has met strong resistance for the last several years from native Hawai’ian groups as well as environmental and peace activists. In October of 2006 a federal appellate court, in response to a lawsuit filed by the nonprofit environmental group Earthjustice acting on behalf of three native Hawai’ian groups, found that the Army had violated environmental laws in not adequately considering alternatives to locating the brigade in Hawai’i.[2] The decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco reversed an April 2005 decision by U.S. District Judge David Ezra allowing the Army to proceed with its plans to bring the Stryker brigade to Hawai’i. The Army must now complete a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement assessing the feasability of alternative locations for the brigade. The appellate court decision ultimately sent the case back to Honolulu and U.S. District Judge Ezra in order to determine what an injunction must cover. On the eve of Judge Ezra’s decision Senator Inouye’s editorial appeared in which he argued that for the safety of our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan “we must allow the training to resume while the Army completes the supplemental environmental study.” Not surprisingly, Judge Ezra’s decision allows for the Army’s plans to go forward while the SEIS is conducted.[3] Live fire training of the Stryker brigade is expected to commence at Pohakuloa on the Big Island in February.

    The Pohakuloa Training Area is already the largest live-fire military training area in the Pacific. It consists of approximately 109,000 acres of land that have been used for the last 60 years as a live-fire area and bombing range for an assortment of military weapons. The Strykers will come to the Big Island on the new Hawai’ian Superferry, offloading at Kawaiihae Harbor and then traveling up to Pohakuloa via a newly constructed military road. It is partly for the construction of this access road, and also to increase the training area for the Strykers, that the military’s plans include the expansion of the Pohakuloa Training Area by approximately 23,000 acres of land recently purchased from the Parker Ranch.

    Pohakuloa sits between Mauna Loa and Mauna Kea. Even the Army acknowledges, in its Environmental Impact Statement, that “the entirety of Mauna Kea, whose southwestern slopes form part of PTA’s base, is considered holy.” Mauna Kea (The White Mountain) is associated with Poli‘ahu, the snow goddess of the summit, while Mauna Loa (The Long Mountain), last erupting as recently as 1984, is associated with Pele, the goddess of volcanic fires. The area between the two sacred mountains, considered to be a site of conflict between Poli‘ahu and Pele, is called “Pohakuloa” (The Veil that Covers the Spiritual Realm). Within the Pohakuloa Training Area there are seven stone shrines and a reported 291 archeological sites.

    By the Army’s own admission in the EIS, Pohakuloa is “spiritually and historically one of the most important places in Hawai’ian tradition and history…It is difficult to describe the emotional and spiritual link that exists between Native Hawai’ians and the natural setting. Hawai’ians generally believe that all things in nature have mana, or a certain spiritual power and life force. A custodial responsibility to preserve the natural setting is passed from generation to generation, and personal strength and spiritual well being are derived from this relationship. Because of this belief, Mauna Kea may be the most powerful and sacred natural formation in all Hawai‘i.” [4] The EIS acknowledges that there will be “significant unavoidable adverse biological impacts” upon the environment at Pohakuloa. The PTA is said, by former area commander Lt. Col. Dennis Owen, to have “the highest concentration of endangered species of any Army installation in the world.” The negative impacts will come from fires that result from live-fire training, as well as from off-road maneuvers by the Stryker vehicles that will adversely affect sensitive species and habitat. The Army also acknowledges significant negative impacts on air quality (caused by wind erosion by the off-road maneuvers of the Strykers), soil loss and soil contamination from training activities, lead and asbestos contamination caused by the construction and demolition of buildings, and destructive impacts on such cultural, historic, and archeological resources such as the Ke‘amuku Village and sacred sites such as the Pu‘ukohola Heiau.

    The Army also proposes an increase in live-fire training. This poses a significant risk, according to the EIS, to workers and army personnel from unexploded ordnance. Environmentalists have drawn attention to the danger from unexploded ordnance that litters many former military sites in Hawai‘i, as well as the military’s poor record of cleaning up these sites. The EIS states that “only simulated biological agents” will be used and that hazardous materials do not pose a significant impact. There is also some concern about the potential toxic contamination from depleted uranium since the primary armament on Stryker vehicles is the Stryker Mobile Gun System which uses ammunition made from depleted uranium. The Army has claimed that depleted uranium weapons will not be used in training at Pohakuloa, but this has hardly eased the concerns of local residents.

    While the military promises to do what it can to limit the adverse impacts from the training at Pohakuloa, it states that there is a practical limit to mitigation measures. The bottom line is that these adverse impacts and potential dangers are considered acceptable by the military.

    The issue that always looms large in the background of this controversy is the very presence of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i. For Hawai’ian sovereignty activists, the proposed expansion of the Pohakuloa Training Area is only the latest issue in a long history of U.S. military acquisitions of Hawai’ian lands—going back most notably to the 1875 “Treaty of Reciprocity” that ceded control of Pearl Harbor to the U.S. Navy. The military now controls 5 percent of land in Hawai‘i, 22 percent of O‘ahu (85,000 acres), and 4 percent of the Big Island (110,000 acres). Moreover, the proposed 23,000 acre expansion of the Pohakuloa Training Area is only about a quarter of the projected acquisition for the further development of the PTA.[5]

    It’s a sad irony that this latest land acquisition is almost the size of Kaho‘olawe (28,766 acres), the “Target Isle” used for bombing practice for nearly 50 years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Navy finally officially ceded control of Kaho‘olawe on November 11, 2003, after over two decades of protests by peace and Hawai’ian sovereignty activists. That campaign cost the lives of two Hawai’ian leaders, George Helm and Kimo Mitchell, who were lost at sea in 1977 in an effort to reach the island to protest the Navy’s occupation and bombing of the island. Their deaths became an emotional turning point in the struggle for Hawai’ian rights. Now, just as the Navy finally cedes control of Kaho‘olawe, the Army takes control of a similar-sized piece of land on the sacred slopes of Mauna Kea. It would be the largest military acquisition in Hawai‘i since WWII.

    For Hawai’ian sovereignty activists, Hawai‘i is an occupied country, and the lands in question are “stolen lands.” Though most Americans are either blissfully unaware or couldn’t care less, the sovereignty activists appear to have international law on their side. For its part, the United States government has already admitted to the illegal overthrow of the Hawai’ian nation, by issuing a formal apology by joint resolution of Congress in November of 1993 in acknowledgment of the 100th anniversary of the coup that dethroned Queen Lili’uokalani. Although the United States was the first nation to formally recognize the sovereignty of the Hawai’ian nation in 1842, it was the U.S. Navy that provided the force that enabled American business interests to dethrone the Queen in January of 1893. In recent years, experts in international law have called into question the legitimacy of “statehood” and American military occupation of Hawai’ian lands by pointing out that there is no known record of the Hawai’ian Kingdom ever relinquishing its sovereignty.

    Lessons from the war in Iraq Since that cloudless Hilo day in October of 2002, the war in Iraq has unfolded in its all-too-easily predictable catastrophe. As the violence spirals out of control and any remaining vestige of a fraudulent justification of the invasion evaporate—that Iraq is better off from having been ‘liberated’ from a despotic dictator or that the world is safer from the threat of global terrorism—the American people have slowly come to the realization that it was all a terrible mistake. It reminds me of a story I read in the paper a number of years ago when I was living in San Francisco about a jumper who had somehow managed to survive his plunge from the Golden Gate. As I remember it the hapless one said his first thought after his ill-conceived leap was “Oops, that was a mistake.” That’s about where we are today as a nation after failing to heed the warnings of so many experts and hundreds of thousands of protestors around the world and instead following the Fox News and New York Times propaganda that cheered on the Bush Administration’s leap into the abyss that is now the war in Iraq. All the head-scratching about what to do now, including the proposals of the Iraq Study Group, are nothing but the desparate flailings of one grasping at thin air after the ground has fallen away. The Bush Administration, of course, can only ‘stay the course’ and thus, with their sights now firmly set on ‘surging’ in Iraq and even more insanely on expanding the war into Iran, seems hell-bent on plunging the nation only further into the abyss.We’ve come to our “Oops” moment as a nation but we are still far from realizing just how devastating a mistake it was to launch this war.

    Senator Inouye’s editorial in support of the Stryker brigade in Hawai’i illustrates this point. The Senator writes: “Our country is at war. With the pace of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our Army is stretched thin. We simply cannot afford to stand down any of our forces right now.” After reminding us that he voted against the Iraq war, the Senator concludes that the “issue on the Stryker brigade should not be a referendum on the Iraq war.” Perhaps it’s the other way around, however, and that the Iraq war should be a referendum on the Stryker brigade.

    Our country is at war—but it is a war that was completely unnecessary. The United States has the most powerful military force in the world, spending more on the military than all the other nations of the world combined; and yet the United States has demonstrated a propensity to use that great military force irresponsibly and that is one of the underlying causes and certainly not the solution to the problem of terrorism. We cannot defeat the problem of terrorism by participating in terrorism and that is certainly what we are doing when we engage in unnecessary wars of aggression. Perhaps the lesson that should be drawn from the war in Iraq is that it is time to stand down all of our forces right now. The best hope for a peaceful world is for the United States to pull out of Iraq, stand down its military force, and recommit itself to the rule of law among nations.

    The United States needs to overcome its addiction to war and a good place to start would be to pull out of Iraq and to shut down the Army’s plan to base a Stryker brigade in Hawai’i. As Kyle Kajihiro, program director of the American Friends Service Committee, puts it: “The Stryker Brigade in Hawai‘i is an illegal and catastrophic project meant for use in an illegal and catastrophic war. The bitter history of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i has demonstrated that if the military gets an inch, it will take a mile, or in this case, 25,000 acres of land. We refuse to allow our sacred ‘aina to be used to perpetuate wars of aggression against other countries and peoples, or to let politicians send our loved ones to kill or be killed in such immoral and illegal wars.”[6]

    Perhaps a concern for the safety of our troops is not the primary reason behind Inouye’s support for the Stryker brigade. Obviously any training that needs to be done before the troops are withdrawn can be done at existing facilities elsewhere. Kajihiro continues: “The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals said that the Army failed to answer the question ‘Why Hawai‘i?’ and ordered the Army to complete a supplemental environmental impact statement (EIS) that considered alternatives. But it is unlikely that another EIS will be able to honestly answer such a question that is essentially political. Stryker Brigades are in Hawai‘i and Alaska because of the power of Hawai‘i’s and Alaska’s Senators to secure ‘military pork’. Politicians cannot claim to be against the war while promoting the military expansion that drives wars.”[7]

    Perhaps the war in Iraq should be a referendum on the Stryker brigade in Hawai’i for there is a deep connection after all between the war in Iraq and the U.S. military’s presence in Hawai’i—the war in Iraq is really only the latest symptom of the same problem that led to the overthrow of the Nation of Hawai’i in 1893. Time and again U.S. military power has been used not really for the defense of ‘freedom’ but for the expansion of corporate global interests.

    War, if ever justified, should be an absolutely last resort. All peaceful means of resolving a conflict should be exhausted before resorting to war. There is every indication that the Bush Administration, acting to extend those corporate global interests, did everything they could to avoid any peaceful solution and manufacture a reason for war.

    Perhaps the problem is that it is far too easy for the United States with its overpowering military force to go to war. There obviously needs to be some greater force of restraint that would make it much harder for the nation to engage in war. Part of the problem is that too few Americans really feel the cost of war. I imagine that if professional sports were banned while the nation was at war, our leaders would make every effort to find a peaceful solution. It might seem a ridiculous suggestion to make, but obviously if it is important enough to go to war then sacrificing professional sports should be no big deal. Conversely, if it is not worth sacrificing professional sports, then it is obviously not worth going to war. Can one imagine just how long the Vietnam War would have lasted if there could be no World Series while the nation is at war? Would the nation so easily have accepted the fraudulant arguments for war and leapt off the cliff into the hell that is Iraq if there could be no Super Bowls while the nation is at war?

    The Watada Case Unfortunately, as Americans love their bread and circuses so much, the only hope for any restraint on the reckless militarism of the United States might be in the example set by the rare courage of the soldier from Hawai’i, Lt. Ehren Watada, who faces court martial for refusing deployment to Iraq. The military judge presiding over the court martial has, however, denied the attempt by Lt. Watada’s defense to ‘put the war on trial.’ The ruling by military circuit judge Lt. Col. John M. Head on January 16 denied the defense motion for a hearing on the “Nuremburg defense” thus preventing Watada’s defense from presenting evidence on the legality of the war. The highest ranking soldier to refuse deployment to Iraq, Lt. Watada has argued in his defense that according to the Nuremberg Principles and U.S. military regulations he was under oath to follow only “lawful orders” and that the war on Iraq is illegal under international treaties and under Article Six of the U.S. Constitution. Lt. Watada’s trial at Fort Lewis, Washington is set to begin on February 5. [8]

    The ruling by Judge Head conflicts with the statement by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal, that the United States must be bound by the same rule of law used to prosecute the Germans: “If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.”[9] The Nuremberg trials established that soldiers are not immune from prosecution for war crimes just because they were following orders. The judgement at Nuremberg means that the common view held by Judge Head and apparently many Americans that “soldiers like Lt. Watada can’t pick and choose when to fight” is just flat out wrong. In denying the “Nuremberg defense” the military is simply setting aside the judgement at Nuremberg and ignoring Justice Jackson’s explicit statement.

    Lt. Watada’s refusal to deploy to Iraq should call to mind Thoreau’s startling words about the three ways one can serve one’s country:

    “The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, &c. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw of a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others, —as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and officer-holders; —serve the state chiefly with their heads; and as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the Devil, without intending it, as God. A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it.” (Henry David Thoreau, “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience”, 1848.)

    Thoreau is clearly right that it is plainly wrong to think that the highest service one can give to one’s country is to serve blindly with one’s body, even if it means giving one’s life. To serve without conscience, as a mere weapon of war, is really to forsake what is highest and most human within us. To force our soldiers to surrender their conscience is not only to ignore the judgement at Nuremberg, it is also treating our soldiers like horses and dogs. Sending our troops into an unnecessary and immoral war is in fact treating them far worse than horses and dogs.

    The nation would be stronger not weaker if it recognized Lt. Watada’s right to refuse deployment to an illegal war. If Lt. Watada’s action is recognized as right, the nation would be far less prone to engage in unnecessary and immoral wars. In refusing deployment to Iraq Lt. Watada is serving the country with his conscience, and in so doing, is giving the highest service. If Lt. Watada goes to prison, as seems now very likely, he will be a powerful symbol of the injustice of the nation and its shame in ignoring the judgement at Nuremberg and refusing to remember Justice Jackson’s counsel.

    1. U.S. Sen. Daniel Inouye, “Don’t fence them in,” Commentary, The Honolulu Advertiser, Sunday, December 17, 2006. 2. “Stryker base here is found illegal,” The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Friday, October 6, 2006. 3. “Judge Allows Stryker training to resume,” The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Saturday, December 30, 2006. 4. Army Transformation Environmental Impact Statement, Section 8:11 Cultural Resources, p.4. 5. See Haunani-Kay Trask, “Stealing Hawai‘i: The war machine at work,” The Honolulu Weekly, July 17, 2002. 6. Kyle Kajihiro, “Aloha ‘Aina Statement on Proposed Stryker Training,” DMZ-Hawai‘i, December 18, 2006. 7. See also Jeffrey St. Clair, “The General, GM, and the Stryker,” Counterpunch, April 22/23, 2006. 8. David Krieger, “The Iraq War Goes on Trial,” Peace Journalism, January 17, 2007. 9. Robert Jackson, Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945, International Conference on Military Trials : London, 1945.

     

    Timothy J. Freeman teaches philosophy at the University of Hawai’i at Hilo. He can be reached at freeman@hawaii.edu

  • A Very Costly I Told You So

    All was in vain. The rhetoric and deceptions by the officials supporting our self-anointed “War President” prevailed, and America launched an attack on a country that was not an enemy or a real threat to the US.

    I wrote several articles denouncing the tricks and lies supporting the war—from the former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from the then National Security Council Advisor Condolezza Rice and, of course, from Vice President Dick Cheney—who were all hovering like hawks over the war drums being beaten by President Bush.

    We, who were in opposition, risked our reputation, friends and even our means of living. It was easier to follow the big river of chorus praising the “march for democracy.” We were branded weird, unpatriotic, even traitors.

    In one of my articles titled “Lying to Provoke a War, Not a New Issue in Washington,” published on the NAPF website on June 9, 2003 and reproduced on many other websites, I finished my comments with the following lines:

    “The Iraq war is not over yet. American soldiers continue dying nearly every week in the occupied Arab nation. Thousands of innocent Iraqi men, women and children have died. So much for the ‘sparing the innocent’ stated by President Bush. The business of oil and the big contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq conceded to the inner club of companies linked to top officials of this administration cover the air with a smell of suspicion.

    The possibility of an investigation by the Senate to determine if the American people and the world were deceived in what George W. Bush pompously called ‘the first war of the 21st century’ could lead to an impeachment and political disgrace.”

    Three years later the situation has changed. The majority of the US public condemns the actions of Mr. Bush and his failed and devious policies. When I wrote that article, two months earlier President Bush had declared “Major combat has ended.” In those days no more than 70 US fatalities were added to the count since the beginning of the war. Now, more than 3,000 American soldiers have died in Iraq and tens of thousands of Iraqis have been seriously injured by bombings, “friendly fire” mistakes, etc.

    Making things worse, George Bush is now ordering more troops to Iraq without a real plan to solve the big mess he has created in that volatile part of the world.

    If this situation were not so tragic and absurd, we could say this is just a chapter of the Human Comedy written by Honore de Balzac in 1842.

    Let’s hope that a better nation, better informed and with true morals demands justice and holds responsible those that have been lying and deceiving not just the US but the whole world.

     

    Ruben Arvizu is Director for Latin America of Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and International President of Freedom From War.

  • President Bush’s Iraq Policy Renewed

    The hope that President Bush might move toward an American withdrawal from Iraq was decisively rejected in his important speech of January 10. This was the first response by the American president to the November electoral mandate that was, above all, an unmistakable rejection of the Iraq policy by the voting public. It was also the first formal response to the report of the high-profile Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State, James Baker, and Democratic Congressional leader, Lee Hamilton, that had recommended a gradual American withdrawal, a robust regional diplomatic strategy designed to encourage help in stabilizing Iraq, and a renewed sense of urgency about seeking a solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict.

    In all respects, rather than heeding these demands of his Iraq critics, or at least meeting them halfway, Bush proposed a set of initiatives that moved precisely in the opposite direction. Instead of withdrawal, Bush decreed a clear escalation of the American combat role, deploying an additional 21,500 American troops to be used in Baghdad and Anbar province, the two areas of most intense resistance to the American occupation of the country. Instead of initiating a regional diplomatic effort that invited the participation of Iran and Syria, the president clearly signaled his intention to confront these countries in a more hostile manner that is almost certain to further heighten regional tensions. This unfortunate prospect was given immediate tangible expression the day after the speech by a provocative American military raid on an Iranian diplomatic mission in the northern city of Arbil, situated in the Kurdish region. And to complete the discouraging picture, not a word was uttered about an increased effort to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine.

    How should we interpret this defiant posture? Already this reaffirmation of the old Iraq policy by Bush has antagonized the Democratic opposition now in control of Congress, and has even disappointed and puzzled most Republicans. This Bush ‘stay the course’ stubbornness almost requires Congress to confront the president on Iraq. If Congress acts it would likely be seen as a challenge to Bush’s authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces under wartime conditions, and could produce a paralyzing constitutional crisis, which might damage the political prospects of the Republican Party for years.

    Part of the explanation of the approach adopted Bush involves a recognition of the extent to which the White House continues to be steered by neoconservative hard liners when it comes to foreign policy. Well ahead of the speech it was widely publicized that these new tactics of escalated deployment in Baghdad had been mainly crafted by Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, a hawkish signatory of the pre-9/11 neoconservative blueprint for American foreign policy published under the auspices of the Project for a New American Century. By relying on Kagan and AEI the Bush presidency reaffirmed its ideological identity, while at the same time repudiating the more pragmatic and realistic option offered by the Baker-Hamilton recommendations. If Bush had gone along with Baker-Hamilton, his leadership would almost certainly have received a dramatic spike of popular support from an American public clamoring for relief from a costly and failing war policy. To have so adjusted would have been applauded throughout the world as a brave effort to acknowledge failure and move in a more hopeful direction. But to do so would have meant renouncing the neoconservative agenda of exporting democracy to the Middle East and of refusing to engage diplomatically with ‘the bad guys’ in control of Iran and Syria. At this point, the Bush presidency remains locked in what increasingly appears to be a death embrace with the neoconservative ideologues. It was they who had advocated regime change in Iraq by military intervention ever since Bush was elected in 2000, if not earlier. It probably should come as no surprise that Bush has so clearly cast his lot with this band of neoconservative extremists, but it is still a disappointment that will make Iraq something worse than the tragedy it has already become.

    Most of Bush’s argument on behalf of the approach he adopted was an elaboration of a single thought: “Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.” To avert failure Bush proposed new tactics involving a dramatic upgrading of the American combat presence in Baghdad, including a new willingness to clear and hold neighborhoods presently controlled by both Sunni and Shi’ia militias, including those of Muqtadar al-Sadr. Bush insisted that the success of such tactics depended on the willingness of the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki to be fully committed to achieving such goals of pacification. Such dependence is almost a guaranty of the failure Bush is preoccupied with avoiding!

    The available evidence clearly establishes that the goal of the Maliki leadership is to consolidate Shi’ia dominance, not to share power with its Sunni adversaries as is implicit in the Bush political strategy. Actually, Maliki had been actively pushing for an adjustment of the American role in Iraq that is diametrically opposed to both the Bush decisions and the Baker-Hamilton recommendations. Maliki was seeking the removal of the American military presence from Baghdad, with its combat mission being redefined as exclusively devoted to engaging and defeating the Sunni elements of the overall insurgency, which would leave the Shi’ia in uncontested control of Iraq. Of course, this makes political sense. Maliki owes his position of leadership to the support of the thirty members of the Iraqi parliament that belong to Muqtador al-Sadr’s political party. For Maliki to act against his own strongest constituency, except verbally to appease the American occupiers, would almost certainly lead to the immediate collapse of his government. In effect, then, Bush’s announced plan of stepped up joint pacification efforts in the Iraqi capital seems doomed before being attempted. More than this, to override Baghdad’s policy on internal security in this way is to make a mockery of the purported transfer of sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government, and to add credibility to the opponents of the Maliki regime who regard it as a puppet government.

    The incoherence of what Bush proposes for a revised Iraq policy is pervasive. On the one side, as mentioned, Bush indicates that failure in Iraq spells disaster for the United States, but arguably in most respects ‘failure’ already exists. On the other side, Bush pins his vain hopes for success on cooperation with the Iraqi government on an approach that contradicts its own power base, and is almost certainly a non-starter. How can a radical Shi’ite leadership suddenly turn around and cooperate in the violent destruction of the most militant Shi’ia political formation with which it has been so closely allied. Think back only a few weeks to the execution of Saddam Hussein, whose hanging was presided over by Shi’ia extremists who were shrieking ‘Muqtador! Muqtador!’ even while the noose was tightened around the deposed dicatator’s neck. This grisley microcosm of the political realities in Iraq should by itself have shown how futile it is to enlist the Maliki government in an effort to crush the Shi’ia militia presence in Baghdad. Maliki is himself a Shi’ia militant, not a captive to forces that he wishes, but is presently unable, to control.

    In the end, what may be most scary, is the double likelihood of continued frustration of the American effort in Iraq combined with growing tensions in the region. In such a setting one cannot ignore the Israeli resolve to confront Iran by military means, possibly on its own, but preferably, more indirectly, by exerting pressure on the United States to do so. There have even been several media reports that Israel has prepared an attack scenario that features the use of bunker buster nuclear bombs against Iranian targets associated with their nuclear program. Such war plans, even if only hypothetical, involve the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki that a government seems to be seriously contemplating the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of its foreign policy. If anything is likely to hasten the collapse of the nonproliferation regime, already tottering, it is such a reckless wielding of nuclear weapons for purposes other than self-defense and deterrence.

    Although American military resources are spread thin, such an expansion of the war zone has some attractive features from the perspective of the neoconservative planners who continue to hold sway in Washington. In one respect, Rumsfeld’s ghost may be a player in this new phase of Middle Eastern diplomacy. The most notorious of the so-called ‘Rumsfeld rules’ fits the present situation—‘if a problem seems insoluble, make it bigger.’ Extending the war zone to Iran and Syria would make the challenge bigger, and divert attention from a deteriorating situation in Iraq. What is more, with Israel strongly behind such an expansion, the Democrats in America might find themselves badly divided and politically confused. And from the perspective of neoconservative priorities, Iraq was always regarded as a prelude to the main goal, which was to achieve regime change in Tehran and Damascus. This kind of objective seems less outlandish as a result of the apocalyptic language used by Mahmoud Ahmedinejad with respect to Israel. As new setbacks in Iraq capture media headlines, the Bush leadership would have to choose between a final admission of humiliating defeat, which it has repeatedly defined as an unacceptable American disaster, or embarking on a regional war, which will end up being a much worse American disaster, but probably not immediately. It may gain the Bush time he desperately needs to end his term in office, and manage to slink back to civilian life on his Crawford ranch before the sky falls.

    We can only hope that prudence intrudes to stop this gathering momentum that is propelling the region toward a calamitous culmination of the neoconservative crusade. It is not a time for American friends in the region and Europe to be silent. It is a great opportunity for Ankara to show that it is an independent actor in the Middle East that has a strategic stake in the conflict, but that also has a constructive view of peace and security for the region.

     

     

    Richard Falk is professor emeritus of international law and practice at Princeton University, and visiting distinguished professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.