Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Iran

  • Lurching Toward Regional War in the Middle East

    Israeli moves toward all out war in Gaza and Lebanon seem linked to wider dangers of a regional war with severe global consequences. By interpreting these wider dangers it is not meant to minimize the human suffering and regressive political effects of current carnage in these two long tormented war zones. Looking at this bigger picture is crucial for its own sake, but also helps us understand the immediate crises more fully than if as officially presented by Israel, and unfortunately echoed by many governments around the world.

    Whatever else, this outbreak of major two-front violence is not about Israel’s right to defend it against an enemy that is seriously threatening its territorial integrity or political independence, the only grounds for justifiable war. To treat border incidents, involving a few casualties from rockets and the abduction of a single Israeli soldier by a Gazan militia and two by Hezbollah in south Lebanon, as if it were an occasion of war is a gross distortion of well-accepted international law and state practice. To justify legally a claim of self-defense requires a full-scale armed attack across Israeli borders. If every violent border incident or terrorist provocation were to be so regarded as an act of war, the world would be aflame. If India had responded to the recent Mumbai train explosions that killed some 200 Indian civilians as a Pakistani act of war, the result would have been a devastating regional war, quite possibly fought with nuclear weapons. There are many other flashpoints around the world that might justify police methods in reaction to provocations, and in extreme instances, specific military responses across borders. If such occasions were viewed as acts of war the consistent result would be catastrophe. Recent Hamas/Hezbollah provocations, even if interpreted through a self-serving Israeli lens, were not of a scale or threat that warranted large-scale military actions that are directed at a wide array of targets unrelated to the specific incidents and causing severe damage to civilians and the entire civilian infrastructure of society (water, electricity, roads, bridges).

    The exaggerated Israeli response, together with circumstantial evidence, suggests that Israel used the Hamas/Hezbollah incidents as pretexts to pursue a much wider and long-planned security agenda directed at Palestine and Lebanon and, beyond this, as an opportunity for a political restructuring of the entire region in partnership with the United States. In this regard, as George W. Bush’s comments at the St. Petersburg G-8 summit emphasized, the real responsibility for the anti-Israeli incidents should be associated with Syria and Iran given their support of Hamas and Hezbollah. It does require a deep reading of international relations to recall that both right wing Israeli opinion and the neoconservative worldview that has dominated American foreign policy during the Bush presidency advances a vision of world order based upon a comprehensive political restructuring of the Middle East, starting with “regime change” in Iraq.

    What Israel is undertaking is a change of tactics with respect to the pursuit of this regional vision. The initial plan seems to have been based on a decisive military and political victory in Iraq followed by an essentially diplomatic campaign to exert major pressure on other problematic governments in the region, relying on The Greater Middle East Project of “democratization” to do the heavy lifting without further military action. Instead, what has occurred has been failure and frustration in Iraq, which has turned into an American quagmire, but more seriously, a consistent set of electoral outcomes throughout the region that have discredited a political approach to the regional vision embraced by Washington and Tel Aviv with the goal of achieving compliant Arab governments that are passive with respect to Palestinian aspirations and accepting of American hegemony. These geopolitical disappointments began to be revealed in the Iraqi sequence of elections, which even under conditions of the American occupation and a hostile resistance, produced clear victories for Islamic political forces and stinging repudiations of the sort of compliant secularists that Washington backed. Similar outcomes, with less dramatic results, were evident in elections held in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which together with the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as President of Iran, apparently sent a clear message that the more democratic the political process, the more likely it was to produce an anti-American, anti-Israeli leadership. The Hamas victory in the January elections in the Palestinian Territories culminated this disillusionment with the democratic path to security, as envisioned by Israel and the United States, for the region.

    But rather than abandon geopolitical ambitions, it appears from recent developments that Israel is testing the waters for all out regional war, either with covert encouragement from the US Government, or at the very least, a green light from Washington to ignite a bonfire. Of course, there are other factors at work. The Israeli leadership, especially its military commanders, never accepted being pushed out of southern Lebanon by Hezbollah, and the politicians appear to hold the Palestinian people responsible for the election of a “terrorist” leadership and, thus, deserving of punishment. Furthermore, the anti-Syrian Lebanese response to the assassination of Hariri on February 14, 2005 was hoped to result in a more robust Lebanese political leadership that would effectively disarm Hezbollah and, thereby, enhance Israeli security. When this did not happen, but rather Hezbollah acquired more potent weaponry, as well as a place in the Lebanese cabinet, it was obvious that the soft Israeli option had failed. Even such a prominent mainstream supporter of Israel as Shlomo Aveneri observes that the real objective of the Israeli attacks on Lebanon is to install a Quisling government in Beirut, which was after all the main objective of the 1982 Sharon-led invasion of the country.

    In relation to the Palestinian conflict, Israel has set for itself a unilateralist course ever since the collapse of the Camp David process in 2000. The Sharon approach, based on Gaza disengagement, the illegal security wall, and the annexation of substantial Palestinian territories to incorporate the main Israeli settlements was always based on moving toward a “solution” without the agreement of the Palestinian leadership. But to move in such a direction in a politically palatable manner required the absence of a Palestinian negotiating partner. First, Arafat was humiliated by direct military attacks on his headquarters and confined as to virtual house arrest; then Abbas was marginalized as too weak to carry weight; and now Hamas has been repudiated as unfit to govern the Palestinians or represent their interests. Against this background, Sharon/Olmert unilateralism appears to be the only option, a worrisome conclusion as it is sure to keep the conflict at boiling point for the indefinite future.

    A further factor is the confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program. Here again Israel and the United States are at the forefront of an insistence that Iran not pursue its legal right to possess a complete nuclear fuel cycle under its sovereign control, although subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that enriched uranium and plutonium are not diverted for military purposes. Whether this unfolding crisis, abetted by the inflammatory language of Ahmedinejad, is part of a deliberate strategy of regional tension devised by Washington and Tel Aviv cannot be determined at this point. What is clear is the selective enforcement of the nonproliferation regime. Several parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Germany, Japan) have complete nuclear fuel cycles under national control; India is being assisted in developing its nuclear technology despite its nuclear weapons program and refusal to become a party to the treaty; Israel itself disallows a nuclear weapons option to other states in the region while maintaining and developing its own arsenal of these weapons; and, of course, the United States throws its nuclear weight around, including developing new categories of nuclear weapons (“bunker-busters” and “mini-nukes”) that are apparently being integrated into battle plans for possible future use.

    This adds up to a confusing picture, but with clear threats of a regional war spiraling out of the present situation, given the Israeli/American vision of security, and the degree to which the control of this region is vital for the energy future of the world as well as decisive in the struggle to withstand the challenge of political Islam.

    There are some factors that are working against such a dismal future: the political/military failure in Iraq, the devastating economic effects of engaging Iran in a war, the rising oil prices, and the opposition of European and Arab countries. But can we be reassured at this point? I think not. Israel tends to view its security ambitions in unconditional terms that are oblivious to wider detrimental consequences. The United States leadership remains wedded to its grand strategy of regional restructuring, and is not encountering political opposition at home or even media criticism as a result of either its support of the Israeli offensives in Gaza and Lebanon or of its efforts to widen the arc of conflict by pulling Syria and Iran into the fray. I fear that what we are witnessing is an extremely risky set of moves to shift the joint Israeli/American regional game plan in an overtly military direction. It always had a military centerpiece associated with the Iraq War, but the basic strategy was based on an easy show of force against a weakened Iraq followed by falling political dominoes elsewhere in the Middle East. Neither the UN, world public opinion, nor regional opposition seem likely to halt this slide toward regional war. We can only hope that prudence somehow remains a restraining force, at least in Washington.

    In concluding, it is obvious that there are wider implications for other countries in the region, especially those faced with ethnic conflict and transnational armed struggle. As tempting as it might be to follow Israel’s lead, the prudent course, especially in light of these dangers of regional war, is to be extremely cautious about undertaking cross-border military operations. The Israeli policies have already backfired to a significant extent, strengthening the political stature of Hezbollah with Lebanon and causing Lebanese public opinion to unite around criticism of Israel’s behavior.

     

    Richard Falk is the Board Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and professor emeritus of Princeton University.

  • India, Iran, and US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    India, Iran, and US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    The Bush administration has approached nuclear non-proliferation with Iran and India by two very different measures. Iran, a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has been threatened with sanctions, if not actual violence, for its pursuit of uranium enrichment, although there is no clear evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. India, on the other hand, has now been offered US nuclear technology, although India is not a party to the NPT, is known to have tested nuclear weapons and is thought to possess a nuclear weapons arsenal of 60 to 100 weapons.

     

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, is at the heart of worldwide nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The US was one of the original signers of the treaty, and was one of the major supporters of its indefinite extension in 1995. The principal goal of the treaty is to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation by assuring that nuclear weapons and the materials and technology to make them are not transferred by the nuclear weapons states to other states.

     

    The five nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty (US, Russia, UK, France and China) all made this pledge. They also pledged “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The 183 non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty pledged not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and the materials and technology to make them.

     

    A problem arises with the treaty because it also promotes peaceful nuclear technology – which is inherently dual-purpose, capable of being used for peaceful or warlike purposes – as an “inalienable right” for all nations. Iran claims to be exercising this right, arguing that it is pursuing uranium enrichment for nuclear power generation and not for weapons purposes. The Bush administration disputes this claim, and insists Iran must stop enriching uranium altogether, a policy inconsistent with its proposed deal with India, a country that has already developed nuclear weapons.

     

    India never became a party to the NPT, and conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, which it claimed was for peaceful purposes. India did not test again until 1998, when it conducted a series of nuclear tests and announced to the world that it had become a nuclear weapons state. Pakistan followed India with nuclear tests of its own. While India and Pakistan were not restricted by the NPT because they had never joined the treaty, they were initially sanctioned by the US and other states for going nuclear. But now this has changed. Mr. Bush wants to provide nuclear technology to India in exchange for India allowing international safeguards at 14 of its 22 existing nuclear power reactors by the year 2014. This makes little sense, as it would leave eight of India’s reactors without safeguards, including those in its fast breeder program, which would generate nuclear materials that could be used in weapons programs.

     

    The Bush administration seeks to reward India for non-cooperation with the treaty and for developing a nuclear weapons arsenal, while Iran is threatened with punishment for being part of the treaty and seeking to exercise its rights under the treaty. The implications of the hypocritical US approach to proliferation are to leave countries questioning whether their participation in the NPT is worthwhile. This approach is likely to lead to a major breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international regime that supports it.

     

    To prevent such a breakdown, a number of important steps should be taken, which will require US leadership. First, there should be a worldwide moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, subject to international inspections and verification. This means a moratorium by all countries, including the US and other nuclear weapons states.

     

    Second, all current stocks of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium in all countries should be placed under strict international controls.

     

    Third, there should be no “nuclear deal” with India until it agrees to give up its nuclear weapons program and dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Congress should turn Bush down flat on this poorly conceived and opportunistic deal.

     

    Fourth, the US should give up its plans to develop new nuclear weapons such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which signal to the rest of the world that the US intends to keep its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

     

    Fifth, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be replaced by two new treaties: a Treaty to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, which sets forth a workable plan for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons under strict international controls; and an International Sustainable Energy Agency that develops and promotes sustainable energy sources (such as solar, wind, tidal and geothermal) that can replace both fossil fuels and nuclear energy.

    The alternative to this ambitious agenda, or one similar to it, is a world in nuclear chaos, in which extremist terrorist organizations may be the greatest beneficiaries. This is the direction in which current US nuclear policy, with its flagrant disregard for international law, is leading us. The double standards in US dealings with Iran and India are the latest evidence of this misguided policy.

     

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a leader in the global movement to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Iran, International Law, and Nuclear Disarmament

    Iran, International Law, and Nuclear Disarmament

    Iran has been accused of secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Although Iranian leaders claim to be enriching uranium only for peaceful nuclear energy purposes, these claims have been treated with derision by the West. Despite the fact that most experts believe that Iran is still years away from developing a nuclear weapon, there are media reports suggesting that Israel and the US are making plans to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, should Iran not give up its uranium enrichment program. Given this possible military scenario, and the recent vote by the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, what is Iran likely to do?

    First, Iran will continue to assert its right under Article IV the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program. Article IV refers to the “inalienable right” of states to nuclear energy. The parties to the treaty are promised assistance from more technologically advanced countries in pursuing this right. While this may be considered an untenable stipulation in the treaty, it is, nonetheless, the way the law stands. In accord with the treaty, in exchange for pursuing this right, Iran must agree to inspections of its nuclear facilities to assure that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials for making weapons. In fairness, if this aspect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to be altered, it must be done for all states, not singling out Iran for special punitive treatment. Currently, uranium enrichment plants are operating in China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom and United States. Of these, Germany and Japan are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus have a similar relationship to the treaty as does Iran.

    Second, Iran will assert that under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States and the other nuclear weapons states have not fulfilled their obligations for “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament. It will point to the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion that states: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” And it will point out the blatant refusal by the nuclear weapons states to carry out their Article VI commitments, including the plans by the United States to develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead, a new type of nuclear warhead to extend the viability of the US nuclear arsenal.

    Third, Iran will question the unequal treatment that it is receiving as compared to another Middle Eastern country, Israel, which is thought to possess some 200 nuclear weapons. Iran will note that there is not only a double standard between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” but also a double standard between Israel and other countries in the Middle East. It will rightly point out that there have long been calls for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, including at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, which have been largely ignored by Israel and the Western countries.

    Article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows for a party to withdraw after giving three months notice if it decides that “the supreme interests of its country” are being jeopardized by the treaty. With threats of an attack against Iran if it does not cease its uranium enrichment, and the example of Israel developing a nuclear arsenal outside the NPT, it would not be unreasonable for Iran’s leaders to conclude that Iranian interests were better served by withdrawing from the treaty. Should they reach this conclusion, they may also point to the precedent of the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 on grounds that US national interests were being jeopardized by that treaty.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most widely adhered to treaty in the area of arms control and disarmament. Only four countries are not parties to this treaty – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – and all have developed nuclear arsenals.

    To effectively preclude Iran from leaving the treaty and possibly developing a nuclear arsenal, and avoid risking the significant dangers involved in preventive military strikes, larger problems must be solved. First, the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime must be made universal, applicable to all states, bringing in the four states currently outside the treaty. Second, the nuclear weapons states, both within the treaty and those currently outside of it, must begin the good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament required by the treaty. These negotiations must be aimed at a Nuclear Weapons Convention that provides for the phased and internationally verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons from all national arsenals. Third, all enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium, fissile materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons, must be brought under strict and effective international control.

    If this sounds utopian, it is surely no more so than believing that the current set of double standards, those that allow some states to continue to possess nuclear weapons while seeking to prevent others from having them, will be maintainable indefinitely. It is also certainly no more utopian than believing that preventive war, such as that waged illegally against Iraq, is a reasonable answer to every suspicion of nuclear weapons proliferation.

    The only safe number of nuclear weapons in the world is zero. The only way to reach this number is for the nuclear weapons states to become serious about the “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate their nuclear arsenals that they made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Until they do so, the prospects are high of countries like Iran following North Korea’s example of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursuing nuclear weapons programs.

     

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of many studies of peace in the Nuclear Age, including Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.

  • American Debacle

    Some 60 years ago Arnold Toynbee concluded, in his monumental “Study of History,” that the ultimate cause of imperial collapse was “suicidal statecraft.” Sadly for George W. Bush’s place in history and — much more important — ominously for America’s future, that adroit phrase increasingly seems applicable to the policies pursued by the United States since the cataclysm of 9/11.

    Though there have been some hints that the Bush administration may be beginning to reassess the goals, so far defined largely by slogans, of its unsuccessful military intervention in Iraq, President Bush’s speech Thursday was a throwback to the demagogic formulations he employed during the 2004 presidential campaign to justify a war that he himself started.

    That war, advocated by a narrow circle of decision-makers for motives still not fully exposed, propagated publicly by rhetoric reliant on false assertions, has turned out to be much more costly in blood and money than anticipated. It has precipitated worldwide criticism. In the Middle East it has stamped the United States as the imperialistic successor to Britain and as a partner of Israel in the military repression of the Arabs. Fair or not, that perception has become widespread throughout the world of Islam.

    Now, however, more than a reformulation of U.S. goals in Iraq is needed. The persistent reluctance of the administration to confront the political background of the terrorist menace has reinforced sympathy among Muslims for the terrorists. It is a self-delusion for Americans to be told that the terrorists are motivated mainly by an abstract “hatred of freedom” and that their acts are a reflection of a profound cultural hostility. If that were so, Stockholm or Rio de Janeiro would be as much at risk as New York City. Yet, in addition to New Yorkers, the principal victims of serious terrorist attacks have been Australians in Bali, Spaniards in Madrid, Israelis in Tel Aviv, Egyptians in the Sinai and Britons in London.

    There is an obvious political thread connecting these events: The targets are America’s allies and client states in its deepening military intervention in the Middle East. Terrorists are not born but shaped by events, experiences, impressions, hatreds, ethnic myths, historical memories, religious fanaticism and deliberate brainwashing. They are also shaped by images of what they see on television, and especially by feelings of outrage at what they perceive to be the brutal denigration of their religious kin’s dignity by heavily armed foreigners. An intense political hatred for America, Britain and Israel is drawing recruits for terrorism not only from the Middle East but as far away as Ethiopia, Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia and even the Caribbean.

    America’s ability to cope with nuclear nonproliferation has also suffered. The contrast between the attack on the militarily weak Iraq and America’s forbearance of a nuclear-armed North Korea has strengthened the conviction of the Iranians that their security can only be enhanced by nuclear weapons. Moreover, the recent U.S. decision to assist India’s nuclear program, driven largely by the desire for India’s support for the war in Iraq and as a hedge against China, has made the U.S. look like a selective promoter of nuclear weapons proliferation. This double standard will complicate the quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem.

    Compounding such political dilemmas is the degradation of America’s moral standing in the world. The country that has for decades stood tall in opposition to political repression, torture and other violations of human rights has been exposed as sanctioning practices that hardly qualify as respect for human dignity. Even more reprehensible is the fact that the shameful abuse and/or torture in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib was exposed not by an outraged administration but by the U.S. media. In response, the administration confined itself to punishing a few low-level perpetrators; none of the top civilian and military decision-makers in the Department of Defense and on the National Security Council who sanctioned “stress interrogations” (a.k.a. torture) were publicly disgraced, prosecuted or forced to resign. The administration’s opposition to the International Criminal Court now seems quite self-serving.

    Finally, complicating this sorry foreign policy record are war-related economic trends. The budgets for the departments of Defense and Homeland Security are now larger than the total budget of any nation, and they are likely to continue escalating as budget and trade deficits transform America into the world’s No. 1 debtor nation. At the same time, the direct and indirect costs of the war in Iraq are mounting, even beyond the pessimistic prognoses of its early opponents, making a mockery of the administration’s initial predictions. Every dollar so committed is a dollar not spent on investment, on scientific innovation or on education, all fundamentally relevant to America’s long-term economic primacy in a highly competitive world.

    It should be a source of special concern for thoughtful Americans that even nations known for their traditional affection for America have become openly critical of U.S. policy. As a result, large swathes of the world — including nations in East Asia, Europe and Latin America — have been quietly exploring ways of shaping regional associations tied less to the notions of transpacific, or transatlantic, or hemispheric cooperation with the United States. Geopolitical alienation from America could become a lasting and menacing reality.

    That trend would especially benefit America’s historic ill-wishers and future rivals. Sitting on the sidelines and sneering at America’s ineptitude are Russia and China — Russia, because it is delighted to see Muslim hostility diverted from itself toward America, despite its own crimes in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and is eager to entice America into an anti-Islamic alliance; China, because it patiently follows the advice of its ancient strategic guru, Sun Tzu, who taught that the best way to win is to let your rival defeat himself.

    In a very real sense, during the last four years the Bush team has dangerously undercut America’s seemingly secure perch on top of the global totem pole by transforming a manageable, though serious, challenge largely of regional origin into an international debacle. Because America is extraordinarily powerful and rich, it can afford, for a while longer, a policy articulated with rhetorical excess and pursued with historical blindness. But in the process, America is likely to become isolated in a hostile world, increasingly vulnerable to terrorist acts and less and less able to exercise constructive global influence. Flailing away with a stick at a hornets’ nest while loudly proclaiming “I will stay the course” is an exercise in catastrophic leadership.

    But it need not be so. A real course correction is still possible, and it could start soon with a modest and common-sense initiative by the president to engage the Democratic congressional leadership in a serious effort to shape a bipartisan foreign policy for an increasingly divided and troubled nation. In a bipartisan setting, it would be easier not only to scale down the definition of success in Iraq but actually to get out — perhaps even as early as next year. And the sooner the U.S. leaves, the sooner the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis will either reach a political arrangement on their own or some combination of them will forcibly prevail.

    With a foreign policy based on bipartisanship and with Iraq behind us, it would also be easier to shape a wider Middle East policy that constructively focuses on Iran and on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process while restoring the legitimacy of America’s global role.

    Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times

  • EU3-Iranian Negotiations: A New Approach

    Unless a new approach is pursued, chances that current negotiations between France, Germany, Great Britain (EU3) and Iran will soon see a breakthrough are slim. In May, after Iran again threatened to resume enrichment activities, the EU3 pledged to present Iran a detailed offer by the end of July or early August 2005. While recent developments of the past month are likely to complicate the bilateral negotiations, the seemingly entrenched positions of both parties are the main factor obstructing a successful resolution regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

    The EU3 have engaged Iran in talks since December 2004, after Iran broke its earlier agreement of October 2003 to suspend enrichment activities. Negotiations have since proceeded at a slow pace, nonetheless withstanding pressure from the United States who has urged for Iran’s referral to the UN Security Council for its alleged nuclear weapons program. Iran claims its program serves peaceful purposes only. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, neither has it verified the country’s compliance. The EU3 strategy to offer Iran economic incentives in turn for “objective assurances” of the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program has thus far remained unfruitful, even after the United States agreed to support Iran’s entry into the World Trade Organization in March 2005.

    Iran has a history of deceiving the international community about its nuclear activities, which greatly undermines the confidence building process of the ongoing negotiations. Most recently, on June 16, 2005, the IAEA announced Iran’s failure to disclose comprehensive information regarding its plutonium activities. Iran had earlier stated that its plutonium experiments ended in 1993. But the IAEA verified that reprocessing experiments took place in 1995 and 1998. Reprocessing separates plutonium which can be used to make nuclear weapons. The IAEA started its investigations into the Iranian nuclear program in 2002 and has since revealed a number of breaches that make Iranian nuclear intentions questionable.

    The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s new President will most likely complicate the EU3-Iranian negotiations. At his first press conference after the elections, Ahmadinejad stated that “We will continue negotiations with the Europeans with the aim of safeguarding our national interests and emphasizing the right of the Iranian nation to use peaceful nuclear energy.” While this seems to indicate a continuation of Iran’s current policy, Ahmadinejad also said he will take on a tougher negotiation position. A top Irani nuclear official recently asserted: “Taking into account the personality of the new president, I think the negotiations will be more difficult.” On July 13, 2005, Ahmadinejad, who will take office in early August, announced a new direction for Iranian foreign policy. Reorganizing the current nuclear negotiation team might be part of this new policy measure. The instant resumption of enrichment activities would certainly lead to an impasse with the EU3.

    Conflicting information about the resignation of the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Hassan Rowhani, might be connected to Iran’s change in government. Currently, Rowhani, a moderate supporting President Mohammad Khatami’s policy of reform, is the chief negotiator in the talks with the EU3. The Iranian news agency Irna announced on July 6, 2005 that Rowhani sent his letter of resignation to Khatami, but AP reported he denied this move. Rowhani’s resignation would trigger a change in leadership in the Iranian negotiation team that could adversely affect the outcome of the talks. Named as a possible successor to Rowhani, Ali Larijani, the representative of the Supreme Leader on the Supreme National Security Council, stated in March 2005: “ The continuation of talks up until now was meant for confidence building. However, I believe that the issue of confidence building in Iran’s nuclear dossier is a two-edged sword. If the Europeans consider it to be one-sided and as Iran’s debt to the West, then the negotiations will not be negotiations at all but a dictated text meant to humiliate the nation, and naturally the Iranians would be obliged to show that their national pride is not less than Europe’s or the United States.”

    First and foremost, Iran wants to maintain its capability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium for peaceful purposes, a right it claims according to Article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An Iranian proposal in April 2005 – which the EU3 rejected – stated the government’s intention to test 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz. In addition to pursuing its inalienable right under the NPT, Iran recognizes the national prestige that comes with mastering the fuel cycle and proclaims its desire to belong to the “exclusive club of technologically advanced states.” The Iranian government has also repeatedly made the link between the nuclear fuel cycle and national sovereignty to independently meet its energy needs in the long-term.

    The current position-based nature of the talks will continue to impede negotiations between the two parties. Iran’s current position is that it will not give up its capabilities to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, reiterated as recently as July 12, 2005. The EU3 on the other hand have repeatedly stated that this position is an unacceptable one in the long-run. On July 5, 2005, the French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy stated: “Our ultimate objective is to ensure that there is a suspension of the enrichment and reprocessing of hazardous nuclear material. I think it’s absolutely necessary to state that the Europeans will never accept the resumption of the Iranian military nuclear activities.” Iran has demonstrated some flexibility towards limiting its enrichment capabilities, but the EU3 is unlikely to amend its position, given the lack of transparency of Iranian nuclear activities and ongoing IAEA efforts to verify Iran’s status of safeguards compliance.

    To create favorable conditions for a successful outcome both parties must move beyond their entrenched positions, which are in complete opposition to each other. To solve the crisis in the long-term, the EU3 must open up the negotiations forum to discussions about both parties’ long-term interests. Talks about broader security issues, including Iran’s national security concerns, will help both parties move away from their current fixed positions and bring more options for a solution to the table. The Unites States should also become involved in the negotiation process in order to grant significant recognition to the regional security debate, especially given the US role in Iraq and the need for greater regional stability supported actively by the US through negative security assurances. At a security conference in February 2005, Gholami Khoshroo, the Deputy Minister for International and legal Affairs, stated: “We believe that it is imperative to use the opportunity created by the removal of a great menace to our region’s security to replace mistrust and arms race with confidence building and transparency, and to establish an indigenously-based and internationally guaranteed regional security arrangement under the UN auspices to spare our region from further bloodshed.”

    An explicit EU3 and US recognition of legitimate demands for regional stability and security would serve the long term interests of both the EU and the United States. Even if the negotiations cannot satisfy all interests brought to the table, the likelihood of progress with an interest-based approach is higher than if the parties continue to confront each other with fixed positions.

    *Anna Langenbach is the 2005 Wally T. Drew Intern in the Washington DC office of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Langenbach is a graduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where she specializes in nonproliferation studies.

  • Heavily Armed Duo in No Position to Lay down Law on Proliferation

    Thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be easier if the US and Israel kept their side of the bargain, writes Richard Butler.

    In recent months the US President, George Bush, and senior members of his Administration have asserted that Iran is involved in the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.

    Last week Bush turned up the temperature during his visit to Europe, when he declared, on one public occasion punching the air with his fist, Iran “must not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon”.

    A month earlier The New Yorker published a disturbing report by Seymour Hersch that US forces had already entered Iran from Iraq to scope out prospective targets related to Iran’s nuclear activities.

    The Pentagon expressed anger at Hersch’s report and attacked him personally, but did not directly deny its substance. Last week Bush chose to comment publicly on this matter saying that reports the US was planning to attack Iran were wrong, but all options were on the table.

    There is good reason for concern about the directions of Iran’s nuclear program. In a manner similar to Bush’s remarks on his future intentions, Iran has also given contradictory signals, claiming that it was not making a nuclear weapon but had a right to do so if it chose to.

    As a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty Iran is obliged to accept inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that it is pursuing no activities leading to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability. Last week, the agency’s director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, appealed to Iran to improve its work with the inspectors.

    But Bush’s strident insistence on Iran’s treaty obligation glaringly omits the other side of the bargain made in the treaty, that the nuclear weapons states must progressively eliminate their armaments. Bush repeatedly and blatantly misrepresents the treaty, which is a two-way – not one-way – street. It provides that states which do not have nuclear weapons must never acquire them and that those which do have them must progressively get rid of them.

    The treaty is reviewed every five years. At the last review conference, in 2000, the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states responded to the grave concern that they were not fulfilling their part of the bargain. They made a new promise that they would increase the tempo of their action to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

    The Bush Administration has not only refused to adhere to its obligations under the treaty and the additional promise of 2000, but has now embarked on what is anathema under the treaty – the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons. These are the new, more compact, nukes the Administration says it needs for the so-called war on terrorism.

    It beggars belief that the Administration appears to believe it can succeed in restraining Iran while it proceeds to violate its obligations. The New York Times recently editorialised to this effect, saying that in the contemporary world, nuclear weapons had become virtually useless. The main danger they now posed was of them falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

    The US is not alone in seeking to maintain a world of nuclear “haves” and “have nots”. Three weeks ago Israel’s Defence Minister said it would be unconscionable for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. This was more than a modicum of chutzpah from a country which, for more than 25 years, has had a clandestine nuclear weapons program producing about 200 devices.

    The existence of the Israeli nuclear weapons capability has been a major stimulus to attempts first by Saddam Hussein (whose reactor the Israelis bombed in 1983) and then others in the region, including Iran, to acquire the same capacity.

    There is, in fact, an axiom of proliferation. It states that as long as any state holds nuclear weapons, others will seek to acquire them. Those others now include terrorist groups and nation states. In making this latter point I would not want to give any assent to the sleight of hand used so successfully to justify the invasion of Iraq, namely that it was made necessary by September 11, 2001. Nonsense: the Republicans had planned the invasion of Iraq as early as 1998 and it has now been thoroughly demonstrated that Saddam had nothing to do with September 11 and that the largest intelligence “error” was the assertion about his nuclear weapons program.

    The axiom of proliferation contains far more truth than the “axis of evil”. It rests on a gut human instinct – fairness. Simply, states are unprepared to believe that their security is less important than that of others. This was put to me repeatedly in more than 25 years of involvement in the treaty.

    It is not acceptable to others for the US, for example, to claim that its security is so important that it is justified in holding nuclear weapons but this is not the case for other states, such as India and now Iran.

    The axiom also means that the basic compact of the treaty is sound and that the only way ahead, whether in the context of Iran or any other potential proliferator, is for the treaty to be implemented. Those who hold nuclear weapons, including countries outside the treaty – India, Pakistan and Israel – should urgently devise safe means for their elimination and for collective action to prevent any future proliferation of new nuclear weapons states.

    Richard Butler was Australia’s ambassador for disarmament 1983-88, ambassador to the UN 1992-97 and head of the UN Special Commission to Disarm Iraq 1997-99.

    Copyright © 2005. The Sydney Morning Herald

  • Rethink Missile Defense Plan

    Most Americans would agree that the country faces multiple threats.

    Osama bin Laden remains at large. North Korea is pressing ahead with its nuclear program, and Iran is likely to become the newest member of the nuclear club. In Iraq, the stubborn insurgency takes a daily toll on American forces and has stretched the Army thin.

    Refusing to set priorities in this dangerous world would qualify as the “failure of imagination” the 9/11 Commission warned about. And yet that’s what the White House and Congress are showing as they rush to deploy a faulty missile defense system against a threat that, for now, is relatively low.

    That’s not to say that missile defense is without future value or that the threat is nonexistent. Intelligence sources say North Korea may have an untested missile that could reach the United States, and in time, other countries will acquire that capability. But deploying a missile defense program before it’s proven won’t deter enemies, and it drains funds from more urgent priorities.

    Even if last week’s $85 million test of an interceptor missile had worked – which it didn’t – the White House would still fall short in its rationale for spending $11 billion a year on the system. That’s double what the Clinton administration spent on its policy of “robust research and development” of missile defense, and it comes at a time when the federal deficit is out of control.

    The system being developed would rely on interceptor missiles in California and Alaska and aboard ships to attack enemy missiles at liftoff. Airborne lasers would fire at warheads re-entering the atmosphere.

    As Ronald Reagan learned from his “Star Wars” proposal, a missile defense system wouldn’t stop a massive attack from a super power. It’s intended, instead, to stop a very small number of missiles from rogue nations such as North Korea or Iran.

    But weigh the program against other threats that compete with it for funding:

    . Loose warheads . A terrorist group obtaining nuclear warheads or chemical and biological weapons from the former Soviet Union’s tattered arsenal could strike the United States by smuggling a bomb across our porous borders. A rogue state might also prefer that method of attack since, unlike a missile, a suitcase bomb leaves no “return address.”

    . New threats . The military has a term for the new threats it faces: asymmetric warfare. Building a military with the size, speed and flexibility to defeat new enemies means restraining spending on old threats such as Cold War-era ballistic missiles.

    . Short-range missiles . The threat from short-range missiles fired by Iran or North Korea is very real, as the Israelis and Japanese well know. But the missile defense program does little to protect U.S. allies or troops stationed abroad.

    As for the ballistic missile threat from rogue nations, the potential danger is real enough to warrant continued research but not premature deployment.

    Deploying a system that repeatedly fails sends a message that missile defense is more about politics than protection. This is not the time for a lapse in imagination.

  • News Media in the 60th Year of the Nuclear Age

    Top officials in Washington are now promoting jitters about Iran’s nuclear activities, while media outlets amplify the message. A confrontation with Tehran is on the second-term Bush agenda. So, we’re encouraged to obliquely think about the unthinkable.

    But no one can get very far trying to comprehend the enormity of nuclear weapons. They’ve shadowed human consciousness for six decades. From the outset, deception has been key.

    Lies from the White House have been part of the nuclear rationalizing process ever since August 1945. President Harry Truman spoke to the American public three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Calling the civilian-filled Japanese city a “military base,” Truman said: “The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.”

    Actually, U.S. planners had sought a large urban area for the nuclear cross hairs because – as Manhattan Project director Gen. Leslie Groves later acknowledged – it was “desirable that the first target be of such size that the damage would be confined within it, so that we could more definitely determine the power of the bomb.” Thirty-five years later, when I looked at the U.S. Energy Department’s official roster of “Announced United States Nuclear Tests,” the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were on the list.

    We’re now six decades into the Nuclear Age. And we’re farther than ever, it seems, from a momentously difficult truth that Albert Einstein uttered during its first years, when the U.S. government still held a monopoly on the split atom. “This basic power of the universe cannot be fitted into the outmoded concept of narrow nationalisms,” he wrote. “For there is no secret and there is no defense; there is no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world.”

    Today, no phrase could better describe U.S. foreign policies – or American media coverage – than “narrow nationalisms.” The officials keep putting on a proudly jingoistic show, and journalists report it without fundamental challenge.

    So, any whiff of sanity is conspicuous. Just before Thanksgiving, when the House and Senate voted to cut funding of research for a new line of tactical nuclear weapons including “bunker buster” warheads, the decision was reported as the most significant victory for arms-control advocates since the early 1990s. That’s because the nuclear-weapons industry has been running amok for so long.

    While Uncle Sam continues to maintain a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying life on Earth, the American finger-wagging at Iran is something righteous to behold.

    Current alarms, wailing about an alleged Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons, are being set off by the same Bush administration officials who declared that an invasion of Iraq was imperative because Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. As we now know, he didn’t. But that hasn’t stopped the Bush team from launching the same kind of media campaign against Iran – based on unverified claims by Iranian exiles with a track record of inaccuracy and a clear motive to pull Washington into military action. Sound familiar?

    We ought to be able to recognize what’s wrong with U.S. officials who lecture Iran about the evils of nuclear-arms proliferation while winking at Israel’s arsenal, estimated to include 200 nuclear weapons.

    When Einstein called for “the aroused understanding and insistence of the peoples of the world,” he was describing a need that news media ought to help fill. But instead, mostly we get the official stories: dumbed-down, simplistic, and – yes – narrowly nationalistic. The themes are those of Washington’s powerful: our nukes good, our allies’ nukes pretty good, unauthorized nukes very bad.

    That sort of propaganda drumbeat won’t be convincing to people who doubt that a Christian Bomb is good and a Jewish Bomb is good but an Islamic Bomb is bad. You don’t have to be an Einstein to understand that people are rarely persuaded by hypocritical messages along the lines of “Do as we say, not as we do.”

    Norman Solomon is co-author, with Reese Erlich, of ” Target Iraq: What the News Media Didn’t Tell You. ” His columns and other writings can be found at ” Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience With Atomic Radiation ” (Delacorte Press, 1982), a book by Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solomon, is online at: http://www.ratical.org/radiation/KillingOurOwn

  • Contesting Iran’s Nuclear Future

    Iran continues to challenge international efforts to hold it accountable for its suspicious nuclear activities. Later this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors will meet to address the issue against the backdrop of growing fear that time to contain the country’s nuclear ambitions is running out. This leaves little doubt that Iran will be high on the Bush administration’s foreign-policy agenda in the months to come.

    To date, the IAEA has relied on public shame to force Iran’s compliance. In the past two years, agency inspectors laid bare much of Tehran’s nuclear program. But suspicions remain that Iran’s ruling mullahs have not revealed all. Should Iran continue to waffle, the international community must decide if it must take more aggressive steps to force the revolutionary state to accede. The following options suggest that there is no clear path.

    The most benign approach would be to continue current IAEA efforts. Arguably, agency inspections and quarterly public reports will, in time, embarrass Iran to resist the nuclear-weapons temptation. This butts against two facts, however. First, suspicions persist that Iran has not come clean about all its nuclear activities. Second, Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing endeavors make no sense apart from nuclear weapons. For example, the solitary power reactor Tehran hopes to initiate in 2005 or 2006 does not justify the economic investment in facilities to recycle nuclear fuel into weapons-grade material.

    Believing that diplomacy had not run its course, Britain, France and Germany opened a dialogue with Iran outside the IAEA framework. In October 2003, the three European powers sent their foreign ministers to Tehran. The diplomats offered economic carrots and peaceful nuclear-energy assistance as a quid pro quo for Iran to halt its developing enrichment program. The meeting prompted cautious optimism: Tehran announced that it would suspend the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Nine months later, the mullahs reversed themselves.

    Chagrined, the Europeans renewed the dialogue. The Iranians stonewalled. They declared that “no country has the right to deprive us of nuclear technology.” The Europeans remain undaunted. They continue to try. Today, for instance, they are sitting down with the Iranians in Paris, where they will likely continue to dangle economic incentives in exchange for Tehran’s promise of a halt to Iran’s enrichment program. Tehran’s probable, coy response: It might suspend – again – its enrichment activities, but just for a short time, to give diplomacy a chance.

    Unimpressed, the Bush administration remains convinced that Iran is using diplomacy to buy time for its nuclear ambitions. For months, the administration has pushed the IAEA to declare Tehran in violation of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The result would place the matter before the U.N. Security Council, which could impose sanctions.

    But this is another path to nowhere. Iran’s critical vulnerability to sanctions – reliance on the hard currency earned through oil exports – is a double-edged sword. The United States is unlikely to generate Security Council support for measures that will restrict the already tight oil market. Washington also is stuck on its own petard – the Iraq WMD intelligence debacle. In the absence of a nuclear weapons “smoking gun” – certified by the IAEA – the Security Council is unlikely to issue more than a rhetorical slap on the wrist that calls upon the mullahs to reconsider their transgressions.

    Among the dwindling options is confrontation. One option would galvanize members of the Proliferation Security Initiative – which includes a core group of a dozen or so nations that have agreed to intercept WMD contraband – to isolate Iran until it disgorges its nuclear weapons capacity. However, building the PSI into a serious new “alliance of the willing,” in the absence of a clear and present danger, is unlikely.

    Then there is military action. Only military occupation can guarantee Iran’s nuclear disarmament; limited military strikes will not destroy hidden nuclear facilities. But, in the Iraq aftermath, either option would be a hard sell to the American public. On the other hand, Israel, which considers Iran a mortal enemy, does not require a sales job. Jerusalem repeatedly has declared that it will not allow Iran a nuclear weapons capacity. But Israel is in no better position than the United States to destroy the program.

    This leaves two factors that may impact Iran’s nuclear future. One is peaceful regime change. Although there is some hope that a new generation of Iranians – who might be more nonproliferation compliant – will replace the mullahs, there appears to be little prospect in the short term. In time, impetus could come from a thriving democratic Iraq. Unfortunately, Baghdad’s political future will not be resolved anytime soon.

    On the flip side, the United States and its allies could concede that little can be done to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By accepting this prospect, the challenge will be to keep the nuclear peace. The solution must include an explicit warning to Tehran from Washington and Jerusalem: Any Iranian nuclear threat or act – or any complicity in a terrorist nuclear act – would result in the elimination of the revolutionary regime by any and all means. The time to issue this warning is now, before the mullahs realize their nuclear ambitions. The result might have a sobering impact as Iran weighs a nuclear armed future.

    Bennett Ramberg served in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the administration of President George H.W. Bush.

    First published by the San Francisco Chronicle.

  • Nuclear Proliferation: One Cheer for Kerry

    George Bush and John Kerry both agreed during their first debate in Miami on September 30th that nuclear proliferation is the single greatest threat to American national security.  They are undoubtedly correct. The late U.S. Senator Alan Cranston liked to say that if a single nuclear warhead detonates a single time in a single city in the world, all other issues will become instantly trivial by comparison.

    On the small nuclear questions Kerry is far superior to Bush. But on the big nuclear question, Kerry might as well be Bush. Because neither Bush nor Kerry have come close to challenging the single greatest stimulant to nuclear proliferation: The nuclear double standard. Our nation’s nuclear narcissism. America’s nuclear hypocrisy.

    “Nuclear proliferation,” said Kerry immediately when asked by Miami debate moderator Jim Lehrer to describe the greatest security threat facing the United States. Nuclear proliferation.” “I agree with my opponent,” said Bush moments later, “that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.”

    These declarations were accompanied by many comments about the present or potential nuclear capabilities of Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and unspecified “terrorist enemies.” But though both candidates said a great deal about the frightful dangers stemming from nuclear weapons in the hands of others, neither said a single word about the 10,455 operational nuclear warheads currently in the hands of ourselves.

    NORTH KOREA: ROGUE STATE OR THREATENED STATE?

    On the question of North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal, the candidates during the first two debates engaged in a dispute so arcane that it almost seemed like a Saturday Night Live parody. Their argument about the costs and benefits of bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations (Bush favors the latter, Kerry favors both) was undoubtedly above the heads of at least 99% of the viewers, and likely swayed not a single swing state voter. Neither candidate came close to addressing the underlying issue: the motivation behind Kim Jong-Il’s quest for a nuclear arsenal.

    Consider the view from Pyongyang. America maintains a breathtaking military superiority over their country (or any country) in both the nuclear and conventional realms. George Bush announces a doctrine of launching unilateral, illegal, preventive wars against any nation his Administration subjectively determines might become a threat sometime down the road. He singles out three countries as constituting an “axis of evil,” (and gratuitously reiterated that characterization at the second debate in St. Louis.) He actually starts a war against one of the three — decapitating its regime, killing the supreme leader’s sons, and driving the leader himself into a pathetic hole in the ground.

    Given this track record, is it wholly unreasonable for North Korean decisionmakers to worry that the United States intends to invade their country, decapitate their government, and drive their leaders into a spider hole of their own? And is it wholly irrational for them to seek to acquire the one tool that could conceivably deter the awesome power that America can wield over them – a couple of atomic bombs?

    THE PRECARIOUS NUCLEAR DOUBLE STANDARD

    The basic predicament, from the perspective of other countries, cannot be expressed more simply: Why can we have them when they can’t? How come the United States and a handful of countries can have thousands of nuclear warheads, but other countries can’t have even one? What’s the principle? What’s the argument? It is never said. To the rest of the world this is sanctimonious and self-righteous, and appears based on the condescending notion that some are responsible enough to be “trusted” with these weapons, while others are not.

    President Bush himself, perhaps unwittingly, has managed to expose and illuminate this conceit of cultural superiority. “We owe it to our children,” he said in August of 2002, “to free the world from weapons of mass destruction in the hands of those who hate freedom.” Well that pretty much settles it, doesn’t it? Nuclear weapons in the hands of those who “hate freedom” are impermissible; nuclear arsenals in the hands of the Lovers of Freedom are, apparently, just fine with us. And just who will determine who “hates freedom” so much they must be denied the nuclear prize? Why the Freedom Lovers, of course, in whose hands nuclear weapons already presently reside.

    The trouble with that is that it’s not going to be entirely up to us. When we insist that nuclear weapons are vital to our security, other countries are bound to conclude that nuclear weapons will enhance their security as well. “There is an irrefutable truth about nuclear weapons,” says Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, who spent much of the 1990s searching for nuclear weapons in Iraq. “As long as any one state has them, others will seek to acquire them.” Far from preventing nuclear proliferation, our nuclear arsenal is in fact the greatest provocation for it.

    This is especially true when the original Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is understood in its original context. The NPT of 1970 was not just a framework to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It was, instead, a grand bargain — where the great many “nuclear have-nots” agreed to forever forego nuclear weapons, while the few “nuclear haves” agreed eventually to get rid of theirs. The World Court concluded unanimously in 1996 that the NPT and other international legal precedents had created “an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.” Moreover, the United States recommitted itself to the grand bargain at the 30-year NPT Review Conference in the spring of 2000, where the NPT’s nuclear signatories pledged “an unequivocal undertaking … to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    If anything seems certain about the political landscape in the decades to come, it is that the nuclear status quo cannot last. We can seriously commit ourselves to fewer nuclear weapons and fewer nuclear states, or we can resign ourselves to more and more nuclear weapons floating around the world and more and more nuclear states. Stay the course, and we’ll likely witness a presidential debate 20 or 30 years hence where candidate Lindsay Lohan argues with candidate Hilary Duff — about how to deal with a world of 20 or 30 nuclear states. Continue down the same road, and our reward will be a vice presidential debate between candidates Mary-Kate Olsen and Lil’ Romeo — where each of them lectures Brazil or South Korea or Egypt or Indonesia or Japan about going nuclear, but neither says a word – any more than did Bush and Kerry — about the United States remaining nuclear.

    THE FALLACY OF BEAN COUNTING

    One thing the peace and disarmament left must begin to challenge is the notion that bean counting makes any meaningful difference on the fundamentals of nuclear security. Under the Moscow Treaty of 2002, the Bush Administration has committed to reduce our active nuclear inventory to 2200 operational warheads by the year 2012. But the Moscow Treaty is probably the emptiest disarmament agreement ever signed. It’s bad enough that the warheads and missiles we have agreed to decommission will simply be put into storage – likely available for redeployment within a matter of days. (As the Italian commentator Bruno Marolo put it: “A subtle distinction is now emerging between deployed nuclear weapons and set-aside weapons, piled up in a cellar so they can age like a good wine for the next generation.”) It’s bad enough too that the treaty allows for immediate withdrawal without cause – meaning that we could move some 8000 warheads into storage between now and 2012, and then immediately redeploy them the day after the treaty expires, as if it had never existed at all.

    But suppose that we do in fact actually destroy about 80% of our present nuclear arsenal, and do indeed retain only about 2200 warheads by the year 2012. What would this do to reduce the actual dangers posed by nuclear weapons? In what way exactly would 2200 warheads instead of 10,455 diminish the possibility that some simmering international impasse will spin out of control, and result – like the Cuban missile crisis nearly did — in global thermonuclear war?  What does bean counting do to eliminate the unfathomable danger of accidental atomic apocalypse (as opposed to dealerting the thousands of missiles we still incomprehensibly maintain on hair-trigger, poised to be launched with less than five minutes notice)? How does our stated intention to reduce our nuclear inventory to 2200 by 2012 make North Korea or Iran feel safer today (or, for that matter, in 2012)?

    Perhaps most importantly, how does simply cutting numbers reduce the risk that some malevolent creature will someday smuggle a nuclear warhead into the heart of an American city, and commit the greatest act of mass murder in all of human history? What could 10,455, 2200, or a single American nuclear warhead have done to stop Mohammed Atta – a non-state actor with nothing to deter and nothing to lose?

    Our nuclear bombers and missiles and submarines were not only irrelevant to Mohammed Atta, they make a nuclear Mohammed Atta more likely to eventually emerge. Why? Because our nuclear weapons make other nuclear weapons all around the world more likely to eventually emerge, and more likely to eventually fall into the wrong hands. And because – let’s face it – it’s not impossible to suppose that someone might steal or bribe their way into getting their hands on one of ours someday. Even an extraordinarily unlikely event, over a long enough period of time, becomes virtually inevitable.

    If an American city is someday obliterated by a 15-megaton nuclear device, it will matter little to the dead whether the offending warhead came from a stockpile of 10,455 or 2200. John Kerry, however, has said nothing to indicate that he would reopen negotiations on the basic outlines of the Moscow Treaty – even though he undoubtedly envisions 2012 as the final full year of his presidency.

    THE KERRY ADVANTAGE

    There is little doubt that John Kerry would be a far better president on nuclear issues than George Bush. It’s hard to argue for any higher priority than securing nuclear materials and warheads in Russia – the remains of the USSR’s 4 ½ decades of preparations for global thermonuclear war. Kerry seems to understand this, and his pledge during the Miami debate to complete the destruction of 600 tons of fissile material in Russia before his first term is out should be unequivocally applauded. Bush, on the other hand, is spending fully 12 times as much on new nuclear weapon research than on efforts to secure and dispose of loose nuclear materials worldwide.

    Kerry was a staunch supporter of the nuclear freeze movement which blossomed after Ronald Reagan’s saber-rattling and victorious presidential campaign in 1980. The freeze, in fact, was one of the central planks of Kerry’s initial and victorious run for the U.S. Senate in 1984. George Bush opposes ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, while John Kerry has consistently supported it. Kerry has promised to toughen export controls, strengthen law enforcement, and work through the United Nations to make trade in WMD technologies an international crime.

    And while Kerry has not categorically rejected missile defenses, it is clear that he is much less enthusiastic about them than Bush. The Administration apparently intends to declare the first elements of its ballistic missile defense operational before the end of this year. It was Bush, of course, who unilaterally withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, a move that Kerry declared would “welcome an arms race that will make us more vulnerable, not less.”

    Perhaps most significantly, Kerry has directly challenged Bush’s plan to build a brand new nuclear weapon: the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.”  This bomb, a good five times the size of the Hiroshima device, is being designed to burrow deep into the earth to seek out and destroy subterranean command complexes. Unlike traditional nuclear weapons that detonate above ground, this one would likely cast hundreds of tons of radioactive rocks and dirt and dust high into the sky, likely exposing thousands to slow and agonizing deaths from radioactive fallout.

    So much for Republicans calling themselves the party that is “prolife.”

    “Right now the president is spending hundreds of millions of dollars  to research bunker-busting nuclear weapons,” said Kerry in the Miami debate. “You talk about mixed messages. We’re telling other people, ‘You can’t have nuclear weapons,’ but we’re pursuing a new nuclear weapon that we might even contemplate using. Not this president. I’m going to shut that program down.”

    This is certainly a good thing, and something the left should unapologetically applaud. But it is one thing for John Kerry to oppose the development of new types of nuclear weapons, another altogether to put the thousands we already possess on the table. Kerry needs to understand that the “mixed message” on nuclear weapons isn’t just about the new weapons that the Bush Administration has begun to pursue. For decades now, the United States has said to other countries, “We need them, but you don’t. They’re good for us, but no good for you. We can have them, but you can’t. ” What kind of message does that send?

    THE NUCLEAR SWORD OF DAMOCLES

    Earlier this year IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei delivered a blistering speech that squarely placed the blame for his difficulties stemming nuclear proliferation on the nuclear double standard. The time has come, he said, to “abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them.”

    Nuclear weapons pollute the psyche with the arrogance of insuperable power. They create delusions of domination. With their calculations of mass casualties, they dehumanize our adversaries … and consequently ourselves. And in the age of American hyperpower, they provide American decisionmakers with very few additional policy options or political/military benefits.

    This is why Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, one of the great hard-line cold warriors who died this month at 97, concluded toward the end of his life that our atomic arsenal is “a threat mostly to ourselves,” that he “can think of no circumstances under which it would be wise for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons,” and that “the simplest and most direct answer to the problem of nuclear weapons has always been their complete elimination.”

    As we stand poised, perhaps, to elect a second JFK to the presidency on November 2nd, Kerry himself would do well to recall the words of the first, spoken in his first address before the UN General Assembly in 1961: “Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or madness. These weapons of war must be abolished — before they abolish us.”

    As the decades of the 21st Century march forward, it will become apparent that only two nuclear options will present themselves to humanity. One choice is a world of a dozen, two dozen, five dozen nuclear weapon states – and god knows how many nuclear non-state actors (i.e., terrorists). The other choice is to figure out how we can at least begin to move toward a world of zero nuclear states and zero nuclear weapons. But the notion that a handful of states can forever maintain a nuclear oligarchy, and forever frustrate the nuclear yearnings of others, is nothing but a forlorn fantasy.

    It would make an enormous difference if an American president would simply state, unambiguously, that abolition is our ultimate objective. That moving to 2200 warheads by 2012 is part of a longer-term plan, or even simply an aspiration, to eventually move to zero. That when we demand that Iran and North Korea forego their own nuclear aspirations, we assure them that the double standard is not something we expect them forever to endure.

    But when’s the last time you heard any American president, Democrat or Republican, say anything like that?

    ” If you expect to be part of the world of nations,” said President Bush during the Miami debate, “get rid of your nuclear programs.” He directed that sentence explicitly at the mullahs who rule Iran. But if he wants them to actually listen, it wouldn’t hurt for us to begin to direct it at ourselves.

    Tad Daley, who served as chief deputy to the late Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cal, 1969-1993) after he retired from the Senate, was Issues and Policy Director for the presidential campaign of Congressman Dennis Kucinich.  He is now Senior Policy Advisor for Progressive Democrats of America,www.pdamerica.org.