Tag: global security

  • Global Survival 101

    David KriegerA missing element in the standard university curriculum is a course that provides awareness of the global nature and dangers of the world’s most serious problems and the attendant global solutions that are needed to solve these problems.

    The most serious dangers confronting humanity are those that endanger species survival.  Falling into this category are nuclear weapons with their potential for triggering an intentional or inadvertent nuclear war, and climate change resulting in global warming.  These dangers are directly affecting the survival potential of the human species and other forms of complex life on the planet.

    Other global dangers include population growth; pollution of the oceans and atmosphere; scarcity of safe drinking water; food shortages and famines; continued reliance on fossil fuels; creation of nuclear wastes; spread of communicable diseases; disparity in resource distribution; the ill-effects of poverty; international terrorism and war.

    In today’s world, all borders are permeable to people, pollution, ideas and disease.  No country, no matter how powerful militarily, can protect its citizens from the global threats confronting humanity.  Without cooperation among nations, the problems will not be resolved and people everywhere and the planet will suffer.  Destruction of civilization and extinction of the human species are within the range of possibility.

    University students need grounding in the global dangers that confront humans as a species, as well as a sense of the interconnectedness of these dangers and the ways forward to solutions that can alleviate and reverse the dangers.

    I propose the creation of a multi-disciplinary course entitled “Global Survival 101.”  The course would be a foundation for global concerns in the 21st century.  I envision this as a mandatory course for all college students regardless of discipline that would be aimed at creating an awareness of global dangers, an understanding of their interconnected nature, and what courses of action would increase or decrease global well-being and improve the odds of human survival.

    Course content could include:

    1. The uniqueness of planet Earth
    2. Global dangers
    3. Species responsibilities
      a. To pass the planet on intact to new generations
      b. To take into account the rights of future generations
      c. To be good stewards of the planet for ourselves and other forms of life
    4. Nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Age
      a. The  power of our technologies
      b. The flaws in nuclear deterrence theory
    5. Climate change
    6. Protection of the Common Heritage of Humankind
      a. The oceans
      b. The atmosphere
      c. The Arctic and Antarctica
      d. Outer space
    7. Population growth
    8. The right to clean water
    9. Food insecurity and famine
    10. Nuclear wastes
    11. Epidemic diseases
    12. Resource distribution and disparity
    13. Poverty
    14. International terrorism
    15. War
    16. Peace
    17. Human rights and responsibilities
    18. Changing our modes of thinking
    19. A new global ethic: liberty, justice and dignity for all
    20. Changing the world
      a. The role of education
      b. The role of the individual
      c. The role of civil society
      d. The role of technology
      e. The role of the arts
  • Globalizing Security: A Challenge For Your Generation

    Thank you, Dean Einhorn. Distinguished guests, members of the faculty, families and friends, honoured graduates,

    Today, in a remote village in Darfur, a young woman named Aisha is packing up to leave town. While the situation has started to quiet down, there are rumors that the same militia group that killed her father and mother last year might be planning another raid. Aisha is not sure of her destination, but she is desperate to get her younger brother and sister to a safe place.

    There are many such stories, each with a different twist. Lives in the balance, lives needlessly lost. In a rural area of Zambia, a young man named Mitambo has watched many of his friends grow sick or die from HIV/AIDS, and worries about the future of his village. In the Gaza Strip, a young man named Hassan mourns the loss of his younger brother, unable to understand what drove him to become a suicide bomber. In Cincinnati, a young man named Steven is grieving at the news that his older brother was killed in Fallujah.

    Here in Constitution Hall is a young woman named Susan. In the six years since she began her university training, the international landscape has changed radically. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 marked the beginning of her undergraduate sophomore year. The split at the UN Security Council over Iraq´s suspected weapons of mass destruction became a case study for her junior year. Developments in North Korea and Iran have made for lively classroom debates throughout her graduate studies. Susan is looking forward to receiving her diploma today. She plans a career in international relations, and is eager to make her world a safer place.

    Aisha, Mitambo, Hassan, Steven and Susan. All these young people are in their twenties. Their names are fictional, but their circumstances are very real. And now that you have heard their stories, I would like to talk to you about the major challenge of the 21st century: how to re-shape our approach to security in a way that takes into account the hopes – and the fears – of each of these young people, and in fact of all their fellow human beings around the world.

    Let me say at the outset that, to do this, we must think and act differently. We must globalize our concepts of security. We must develop a system of security that fits with these concepts. But most importantly, we must act accordingly.

    The story of the past few generations can be read as a series of efforts to build institutions that could resolve conflicts peacefully and, in parallel, to limit the scope of war and prohibit certain types of weapons.

    After the devastation of the First World War, the League of Nations was formed. But it could not prevent the rise of Adolf Hitler, or the atrocities that claimed millions of lives.

    After World War II, the United Nations was born. Principles for maintaining international peace and security were agreed upon. Economic and social development for all. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Centralization of the authority to use force, in the UN Security Council. And limitations on the conditions under which States could justify using force in self-defence.

    The United Nations and its institutions have had many successes, in regulating various aspects of our increasingly interconnected lives: international trade, civil aviation, postal standards, labour practices, and so forth.

    But the overall success of the United Nations as a body is measured most often in terms of its performance in keeping the peace – particularly its role as a peacemaker in terms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and as a peacekeeper in the aftermath of conflicts. Here the UN record is mixed. The UN can point to some success stories, such as in the case of Namibia, in which sustained and active UN engagement led to the country´s transition from occupation to independence. Or the case of East Timor, which through similar UN involvement has become a free and independent nation.

    The problem is how to make such successes the norm. In too many cases, such as the Middle East or South Asia, we find ourselves incapable of finding solutions to conflicts that have gone on for decades. And too often we fail to act when intervention is clearly needed – such as during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, when nearly 1 million people were slaughtered in just over 3 months.

    What about our scorecard on limiting the scope of war or prohibiting the most destructive types of weapons? Here the record is also mixed. As far back as the Hague Conventions of 1899, efforts were made to limit the effects of armed conflict — through, for example, protecting people who are not part of hostilities, and prohibiting methods and means of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering.

    The Biological Weapons Convention of 1975 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997, which outlawed the production and use of these weapons, were major steps forward.

    But the irony is that we still have not outlawed the “big guns”: nuclear weapons. Under the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – the five countries that had nuclear weapons at the time – China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States – committed themselves to &quote;negotiate in good faith” effective measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons and, in the meantime, to share peaceful nuclear technology with any other countries party to the Treaty. In return, those other countries agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons.

    On the one hand, efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons through the NPT treaty regime can be viewed as a remarkable success. With the exception of India, Israel and Pakistan, every country in the world has joined the NPT. The vast majority of NPT members have stood by their commitments. And the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced by more than 50 percent from its Cold War peak.

    On the other hand, in recent years, we seem to have come to an impasse, and many see the NPT regime as faltering. You might say that, while we started on the right track, we have lost our sense of direction. Today we have eight or nine countries that possess nuclear weapons – and more than 20 other members of alliances that continue to rely on these weapons for their security. Some countries are actually announcing programmes for modernizing their stockpiles, and some have even spoken of the possibility of using such weapons – all the while insisting that they are off-limits to others.

    This is a dilemma worth reflecting on. As an international community, we have no difficulties in cooperating when it comes to regulating shipping, coordinating the use of airwaves, or jointly fighting epidemics. But when it comes to how to resolve our differences, our approach dates back to the Stone Age, still rooted primitively in who carries the biggest club.

    In 1974, I was like you today – waiting to receive my graduate diploma from the New York University School of Law.

    It is now over thirty years later. My generation has had its successes and failures. But I also believe we have learned a number of lessons and insights that you may reflect on as you prepare to take over.

    The first lesson is that international peace and security cannot be achieved through business as usual with our existing norms and institutions. Clearly, these norms and institutions – whether the NPT or the UN Security Council – are far from perfect. They need to be strengthened in a variety of ways.

    But beyond the re-engineering of these norms and institutions, we need a complete change of mindset. Most importantly, our approach to security can no longer be centred on the idea of “Us Versus Them”. It must instead be anchored on the idea of the unity of the human family.

    Our world today is marked by asymmetry. Twenty percent of the world´s population consumes 80 percent of the resources. And 2 out of every 5 people still live on less than $2 per day.

    Given that SAIS just completed its “Year of Energy”, let me explain this asymmetry in another way. The average American has 1,800 watts at his or her disposal – powering everything from air conditioners to iPods. By contrast, your average Nigerian has to make do with only enough power for a single 8-watt light bulb.

    In the past, with little travel or communication between countries and peoples, this sort of imbalance could endure for centuries.

    This brings us to Lesson Number Two: in our era of globalization, this imbalance is no longer sustainable. Television and the Internet have made this imbalance glaringly visible. In some cases, that imbalance in living conditions is leading to a sense of injustice – a fertile breeding ground for conflicts and the emergence of extremist groups. And increasingly, the insecurities of one country or region become the insecurities of all.

    In the final year of World War II, President Roosevelt said, “We have learned that our own well being is dependent on the well being of other nations far away.” This reality is now ever more apparent. Chaos mathematicians sometimes describe what is known as “the butterfly effect” – the notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in Washington DC can affect the initial conditions of a chain of meteorological events that ultimately bring about, say, a sandstorm in the Sahara. Today, one can equally speak about the same butterfly effect of insecurity. The recent terrorist attacks in Europe, which could be traced back to the sense of humiliation in parts of the Middle East, are a case in point. Security is no longer as simple as building another wall. Globalization is forcing us to realize that, whether we like it or not, we are all in the same boat.

    When we look at nuclear weapons through this lens, Lesson Number Three becomes obvious. Nukes breed nukes. As long as some nations continue to insist that nuclear weapons are essential to their security, other nations will want them. There is no way around this simple truth. Here, too, the playing field will need to be leveled, one way or another.

    As recently as a few decades ago, the control of nuclear technology and nuclear material was a sensible strategy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are still working vigorously – and must continue to work – to maintain and improve those controls. The proposal to bring under multinational control those facilities capable of producing weapon-usable nuclear material – a proposal endorsed in various forms by many world leaders – is just one such improvement.

    But ultimately, as more countries gain advanced engineering capabilities, these controls, in and of themselves, are no longer enough. Advances in communication have simply made it too easy to share knowledge and technology. And regardless of how diligently we work to block the illicit trade in nuclear technology to nations – or worse, to extremist groups who seek this technology – there will be limits to how much can be controlled.

    When it comes to nuclear weapons, we are reaching a fork in the road. Either we must begin moving away from a security system based on nuclear weapons, or we should resign ourselves to President Kennedy´s 1960s prediction of a world with 20 to 30 nuclear-weapon States. Efforts to control the spread of such weapons will only be delaying the inevitable – a world in which each country or group has laid claim to its own nuclear weapon. Mutually Assured Destruction will once again be the absurd hallmark of civilization at its technological peak.

    Is that really the world we want to live in?

    To date, no one has seriously taken up the challenge of developing an alternative approach to security that eliminates the need for nuclear deterrence. But only when such an alternative system is created will nuclear-weapon States begin moving towards nuclear disarmament. And only when nuclear-weapon States move away from depending on these weapons for their security will the threat of nuclear proliferation by other countries be meaningfully reduced. And finally, only when both groups of countries shift their focus – from a security system based on the build-up of armaments to a security system that addresses the root causes of insecurity, ranging from poverty and repression to unresolved conflicts – will we be able to improve global security.

    Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to develop this alternative system of collective security. The good news is that, as tough as it may sound, this is not “Mission Impossible”. As graduates of the School of Advanced International Studies, you are equipped with the right skills and the broad outlook to take on such a challenge. The globalization of security will require creative diplomacy, innovative technology and above all leadership.

    Unfortunately, I cannot tell you the exact nature of such an alternative system. But I can tell you some of the features that will be essential to its success.

    At its root, this new system of collective security requires a basic belief that we are all part of one human family.

    This requires a re-arrangement of our global priorities. In 2004, the nations of the world spent over $1 trillion on weapons, and less than 10% of that amount – a mere $80 billion – on official development assistance. Experts tell us that, for an additional $65 billion per year, we could cut world hunger in half, put programmes in place for clean water worldwide, enable reproductive health care for women everywhere, eradicate illiteracy, and provide immunization for every child.

    With those kinds of numbers, it doesn´t take a nuclear scientist to figure out a smarter approach to improving our security situation. To quote President Eisenhower, speaking with far-sighted vision in 1953: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies… a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”

    If we can focus on giving our less fortunate neighbours the opportunity to raise their living standards – the chance to compete, to regain their sense of dignity and self-respect – the likelihood of conflict will immediately begin to drop.

    This new system of collective security should incorporate a deterrence based primarily on the interdependence of nations, through the exchange of people, ideas and goods. Armed conflict must become too costly to be anything but the very last option. We must find ways to make nuclear weapons relics of the past.

    Secondly, this alternative system of collective security must include institutions capable of maintaining international peace and security. The United Nations Security Council now holds this responsibility. The Security Council must be representative of the global community it serves. It must be structured in a way that makes it agile in its responses to crises. It must be consistent in its actions. It must have the resources to carry out its mission. And it must make it a high priority to resolve conflicts that have continued to fester for decades. We should not forget, however, that at the end of the day, international institutions are constellations of states, and states are made up of people who should be the focus and the drivers of any system of security.

    Third, we should initiate a series of dialogues to promote mutual understanding and respect. To correct misconceptions. To understand and address causes of hostility. These dialogues should be tailored especially towards young people – young people like Aisha, Mitambo, Hassan, Steven and Susan – because a mindset of mutual respect and understanding will be essential to the effort of your generation to put in place an equitable global security system.

    In the 1960s, Timothy Leary coined the famous phrase: “Turn On; Tune In; Drop Out” – calling on the younger generation to disengage from society and seek enlightenment through psychedelic drugs.

    I would call on you to do exactly the opposite, to engage and become part of the solution – in other words, “Turn Back; Tune In; Reach Out”. Turn Back from an approach to security that relies on nuclear deterrence. Tune In to the security needs of your fellow human beings around the globe. And Reach Out to make those needs your own, so that the dream of peace and security can finally become a reality. Every one of you can make a difference.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Class of 2006: the future rests in your hands. May God bless you with the wisdom and courage necessary to lead us to a safer and more humane world.

    Thank you.

     

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He also shared the 2005 Noble Prize for Peace with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  • Blast from the Past: National Missile Defense is Back

    Sometime in mid-September, a Minuteman III ballistic missile carrying a dummy nuclear warhead will be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base and travel 4,800 miles towards Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands . 20 minutes later, a multiple-stage booster rocket launched from Kwajalein will deliver a “kill vehicle” some 100 miles above earth. Aided by military satellites and an array of ground-based radars, the “kill vehicle” will hone in on the missile and make a “fly-by” without actually intercepting it. Another test will take place a couple months later, probably timed for the November election. If all goes well, the Missile Defense Agency and the Bush administration will rejoice – the U.S. will be just one step away from having an “operational” Ground-Based Mid-course Defense system (GMD), one component of a national missile defense.

    GMD’s job is to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with missiles, the proverbial “hitting a bullet with a bullet.” If this sounds familiar, that’s because it is. While most Americans remember the Reagan-era “Star Wars” project – a technically unfeasible boondoggle – they may be unaware that a similar project is coming to fruition in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era. In just four short years, the Bush administration has poured $20 billion into developing and deploying a staggering global network of radar, satellites, and sea-, land-, space-, and air-based defense systems, designed to intercept missiles at any point in their flight. This complex, integrated system is collectively called the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). President Bush is prepared to announce that the GMD component is ready to be deployed as the first rudimentary step towards full national missile defense. By the end of the year, six missile silos in Alaska will be equipped with interceptor missiles on alert; four more will be in place at Vandenberg.

    This all may come as a surprise to many Americans whose focus has been on two wars and the global fight against terror in the past three years. In the era of low-tech terror, precious resources are being spent to combat a non-existent threat using Cold War technology. Nonetheless, national missile defense is quickly becoming a reality, thanks to the efforts of defense companies, hawks in the Bush administration, and the complicity of some Democrats. “Reality,” however, is a relative term. When GMD goes on-line later this year it will only be “operational” in 3 out of 23 essential categories, according to the Center for Defense Information. Furthermore, out of the eight intercept tests conducted since 1999, only five have succeeded. Five out of eight may not sound so bad, until you consider that the tests are stage-managed to produce positive results. For example, the target in a July 2001 test had a beacon attached to it that helped the “kill vehicle” score a hit. The General Accounting Office has charged, ” As a result of testing shortfalls and the limited time available to test the BMDS being fielded, system effectiveness will be largely unproven when the initial capability goes on alert…” In other words, there is no evidence to demonstrate that missile defense currently works. There may never be since it is impossible to conduct a “realistic” test outside of an actual attack.

    Even if missile defense’s problems were limited to kinks that technicians could work out, what is the big rush to have a system ready this year? The Bush administration cites the necessity of dealing with ICBMs in the hands of “rogue states,” especially North Korea . However, North Korea poses only a distant threat in this area because it neither currently possesses the capability nor is likely to use an ICBM because the U.S. could easily track the missile and retaliate with devastating force.

    Missile defense is an old idea that just won’t die. It’s been kept alive through changing times and evolving threats through hubris and the will of powerful, well-connected interests. National missile defense drains resources needed to promote peace at home and abroad; threatens global security by trashing long-standing treaties; and provides incentives for other countries to step up their own missile programs.

    *Forrest Wilder is the Ruth Floyd Summer Intern at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a graduate of the University of Texas

  • US Nuclear Weapons Policy Under the Bush Administration

    Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Policy Studies, UCLA
    Senior Fellow, The Milken Institute and The Gorbachev Foundation of North America
    A Presentation to the GRAD Conference on “Regional Cooperation and Global Security”
    International Business School, Budapest 30 June – 4 July, 2004

    1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

    There have been remarkable recent changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy under the current Bush administration that were announced in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in three official documents but are not widely known or adequately discussed and critiqued. They constitute a new doctrine, the Bush doctrine, ending the security system and policies of the Cold War and thus representing a discontinuous sea change in the international security system that calls for discussion, debate, and analysis, which have not occurred. The bipolar world has been replaced by a unipolar world with the U.S. as the dominant power or sole superpower. Alliance systems that had existed in the earlier epoch have been replaced by unilateral U.S. actions. Arms control has been replaced by unilateral U.S. arms initiatives.

    The purpose of this paper is to present these new concepts related to nuclear weapons doctrine, to evaluate them, and to consider an alternative approach, that of global security. The new concepts as well as alternatives, such as global security, call for a wide-ranging debate both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, this has not happened, possibly due to the concern over the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were, ironically, examples of the new policies put into action. Both the new policies and their underlying goals should be subjects of intense scrutiny.

    2. BACKGROUND TO THE NEW BUSH POLICY

    The background to these new nuclear weapons doctrines include the end of the Cold War in 1989; the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Project for a New American Century established in 1997 “to promote American global leadership” by a group of individuals who eventually took major leadership positions in the Bush Administration in 2001; the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and the declaration by this administration of a “War on Terrorism.

    3. CHANGES IN POLICY ANNOUNCED IN THREE MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENTS

    These changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy were announced in three official documents that were released by the administration in 2002. The first of these documents is the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in January 2002. It is a classified document that is mandated by law and produced periodically, the last one having been that of the Clinton administration in 1994. The latest version was leaked in March 2002 by the Los Angeles Times. According to the NPR, “A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.” It is a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the 21st century. It states that it does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning. Rather, it states that the Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the U.S. and its allies in order to deter such attacks in the first place. It does, however, refer to the “Possible use of nuclear weapons in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the South.” It also refers to the use of nuclear weapons against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, in retaliation for attacks by nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or “in the event of surprising military developments.” It also states that the administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

    Overall, according to the NPR, nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. The NPR states that these “nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important strategic and political objectives.”

    The second of these documents is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) that was issued by the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President in September 2002. It is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. According to the NSS, there are plans to ensure that no nation could rival U.S. military strength. The emphasis is on defeating rogue states and terrorists, noting that deterrence will not work against such enemies. It proclaims the doctrine of U.S. preemption, where it “Cannot let our enemies strike first” and gives arguments for preemption. For example, it notes that, “For Centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” It further states that, “The U.S. has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.” It might be noted, however, that the U.S. did not preempt in most of the recent wars it has fought, including the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, while its attempt at preemption in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was a failure. Far from there being historical precedents, this new policy represents a fundamental shift from a U.S. policy of reaction to one of initiation. It is too early to say that this policy of preemption in the Iraq War was a success. The NSS notes that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary act preemptively.” Such a policy of preemption is, of course, a violation of the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent precisely such preemption, as in Hitler’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China. The UN Charter forbids a member state from taking military action against another member state unless it has itself been attacked or it has the authorization of the Security Council. The U.S. acted preemptively in the Iraq War, which was consistent with the NSS policy, but a violation of the UN Charter. In terms of international law, the U.S. was as much an outlaw in its attack on Iraq as Saddam Hussein was in his attack on Kuwait.

    President Bush’s West Point Commencement Speech of June 2002 articulates many of the points in the NPR and the NSS. In fact, this speech set the stage for the NSS, which quotes at length from it.

    The third of these documents is the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that was issued by the White House in December 2002. As in the case of NSS, WMD is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. It notes that WMD, including nuclear biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of states hostile to the U.S. or terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the U.S. It notes that an effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the U.S. It states that, as in the war on terrorism, the strategy for homeland security, and the new concept of deterrence, the new approach to WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. It notes that the highest priority is accorded to protection of the U.S. and its allies from the threat of WMD. The three pillars it announces are counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. Among the policies it discusses are interdiction of WMD, new methods of deterrence with threats of overwhelming force, and defense and mitigation, including the destruction of an adversary’s WMD before their use, as well as traditional nonproliferation approaches.

    4. TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    According to the NPR the U.S. reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, thereby possibly breaking the taboo against their use that has existed since 1945. They are treated like other weapons with no sharp distinction from non-nuclear weapons. Nuclear targeting discussions have been a part of U.S. military strategy for some time, but the leak of the NPR provides the first time that an official “hit list” of targets for nuclear weapons has come to light.

    The NPR lists seven nations as possible targets for U.S. nuclear weapons. First are the two “old” enemies of Russia and China. Second are the three countries listed as members of the “Axis of Evil” in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech, namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Third are two countries that are listed by the U.S. as terrorist states: Syria and Libya.

    Of these seven nations that could be targets of U.S. nuclear weapons, three are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, namely Iran, Syria, and Libya (Iraq has been invaded and defeated while North Korea has pulled out of the NPT). The U.S. along with other nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT gave so-called “negative assurances” to non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT, stating that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear stages unless they were allied with nuclear powers. Thus, targeting these three with nuclear weapons would be a violation of these U.S. negative assurances that were an inducement for these states to join the NPT and that were reiterated at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

    The NPR also calls for lesser reliance on the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack, with greater reliance on precision-guided weapons to deter attacks. It states that because of improvements in precision-guided weaponry, as demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military can now rely more on powerful, highly accurate conventional bombs and missiles that could provide an inducement to start a war.

    5. A NEW TRIAD

    According to the NPR there is a new triad. The old triad consisted of three different basing modes for nuclear weapons: long-range bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

    By contrast, the NPR refers to a new triad with three component parts of the U.S. strategic system. First are offensive strike weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, including all three components of the old triad. Second are defenses, both active and passive, including the new national missile defense system. Third is a revitalized defense infrastructure that could “design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements and maintain readiness to resume underground testing if required.”

    The Bush administration has recently obtained agreement from Congress to lift its ban on designing new nuclear warheads, and there are plans to develop two new weapons. One is a low-yield weapon that could potentially be used as a weapon in regional conflicts thus possibly changing the role of nuclear weapons from that of deterring war to that of instruments of war. The other is a “bunker buster” that can destroy underground facilities, including missile silos in Russia and elsewhere. The administration has already started to construct a missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the Secretary of Defense has asked his Science Board to look into the possibility that the new system will use nuclear-tipped interceptors. Such interceptors would be much more effective in destroying incoming missiles than the more conventional hit-to-kill interceptors that are being testing now, and they could even neutralize the Russian second-strike deterrent.

    Thus, the NPR is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US nuclear forces in the future. It promotes a nuclear strategy of maximum flexibility as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    6. PREEMPTION AND ITS DANGERS

    The NSS places major emphasis on preemption and calls for preemption rather than deterrence as the fundamental basis of national security. The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars are the initial cases of such preemption, with the U.S. retaining the right to preempt in defending its vital interests.

    Such a policy of preemption requires massive defense spending, and the U.S. now spends about $400 billion annually on defense, more than the rest of the world combined. In addition to its costs, there are significant dangers of preemption. First, it creates antagonism toward toe U.S. and possible terrorist attacks. Second, it sends a message to the rest of the world, that they should not attempt to fight the U.S. with conventional weapons, leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Third, this policy sets a precedent for other nations to also engage in preemption, including China in Taiwan and India in Pakistan. Fourth, there are dangers stemming from U.S. hubris after its quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq, with the next step possibly being an invasion of the other nations on President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” list: Iran and North Korea or possibly others on the NPR nuclear hit list, such as Syria or Libya, or yet others, such as Sudan or Cuba. These nations will see such a possibility as looming and try to protect themselves, possibly by building nuclear weapons, as has already happened in North Korea.

    7. A NEW PROLIFERATION AGENDA

    The new proliferation agenda included “old approaches” such as controls on materials and technology and “new approaches” such as reserving the right to destroy facilities used to make WMD. A precedent for the latter was the Israeli destruction of the Baghdad reactor before it could be used to make nuclear weapons. Many nations criticized Israel for this action that was in violation of international law, including the U.N. Charter, given that the Security Council did not authorize it. Similar criticisms could be directed at the U.S. if it engaged in such acts. Furthermore, if the U.S. claims a right to such acts other nations could also make such a claim, creating very dangerous situations. For example, India might claim the right to destroy Pakistani nuclear facilities using the same logic or China could claim a right to destroy the nuclear infrastructure of Taiwan. Such policies and actions would make the world a much more dangerous place.

    One could also argue that the “old” problem of proliferation was that of nations acquiring nuclear weapons, while the “new” problem is one of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons. More should be done on a cooperative international basis to deny such weapons to terrorist organizations or subnational groups in general. This should be done under the auspices of the U.N. as a truly international cooperative effort. As to the old problem, involving such nations as Iran and North Korea, a case could be made that their acquiring such weapons could be stabilizing rather than destabilizing if the effect is to deter the U.S. from using its nuclear weapons against these nations. The world has noted that the U.S. invaded and occupied two non-nuclear nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, but did not invade North Korea and Iran, possibly since the former already has nuclear weapons while the latter could possibly acquire them in the near future.

    8. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: GLOBAL SECURITY

    There is an alternative to the policies that are enunciated in the NPR and the NSS, namely global security. The concept refers to security for the planet as a whole to replace the concept of national security, which is outmoded. National security, which defined up to certain well-defined borders, makes little sense given the globalization that has occurred. The goal of global security would be that of protecting the planet as a whole from threats to its vital interests. This approach recognizes the value of global cooperation, in particular, the value of cooperative efforts among the current great powers of the U.S., the E.U., Japan, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and others. It recognizes the need to create a new global system comparable to the creation of a new world system after World War II, one that would encompass not only security but also economics, politics, and other issue areas. This new global system would treat problems of security, both military and non-military, through strengthening existing international institutions or creating new global institutions. These new institutions could be built, in part, on the UN system and its components. They would involve supranational decision making and authority, with enforcement capabilities, transparency, and accountability and with global perspectives and responses. Participation in the global decision making process would be through cooperation. There would be a prohibition against preemption by any one nation, no matter how powerful, in favor of collective action. Such a system of global security should be preferred to the current system of the U.S. as a hegemonic global power.

    References

    Gaddis, John Lewis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy 133 (2003): 50-57.
    Gould, Robert M. and Patrice Sutton, “Global Security: Beyond Gated Communities and Bunker Vision,” Social Justice 29.3 (2002): 1.
    Guoliang, Gu, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 135.
    Heisbourg, Francois, “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 75.
    Hoffman, Stanley, “The High and the Mighty: Bush’s National Security Strategy and the New American Hubris,” The American Prospect 13.24 (2003): 28.
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