Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: George Shultz

  • Nuclear Deterrence: Impeding Nuclear Disarmament

    David KriegerIn an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, published on March 7, 2011, four former high-level US policy makers – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – focused their attention on nuclear deterrence.  They concurred that deterrence based on nuclear weapons is precarious, could destroy civilized life and raises enormous inhibitions against employing nuclear weapons.  They concluded that the US and Russia were “lucky” that nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War, and asked: “Does the world want to continue to bet its survival on continued good fortune with a growing number of nuclear nations and adversaries globally?” 


    The four former policy makers argued that “nations should move forward together with a series of conceptual and practical steps toward deterrence that do not rely primarily on nuclear weapons or nuclear threats to maintain international peace and security.”  Their first step is to recognize that “there is a daunting new spectrum of global security threats” and that an “effective strategy to deal with these dangers must be developed.”  Their second step is to realize that reliance on nuclear weapons encourages or excuses nuclear proliferation.  Their third step is to cease the deployment of US and Russian nuclear arsenals in ways that “increase the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate exchange based on a false warning.” 


    So far, so good.  Their fourth step, however, seems to be a non sequitur: “[A]s long as nuclear weapons exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter a nuclear attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence.”  The former policy makers had just reviewed the great dangers of relying upon nuclear deterrence, and then followed this by indicating the need for America to rely upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, including nuclear deterrence “extended” to US allies.  They also left unstated what uses the US nuclear stockpile might have other than deterring a nuclear attack.  It appears the former policy makers have chosen a “safe, secure and reliable” nuclear arsenal over a safe and secure citizenry.  Nuclear weapons undermine the possibility of a safe and secure citizenry.  As conceived, the modernization of US nuclear forces would also be expensive and provocative and would limit the possibilities for nuclear disarmament.  I’ve often wondered what is meant by a reliable nuclear arsenal: One with sufficient capacity to annihilate a potential enemy down to the last child?


    The four former policy makers do say that the US and Russia “must continue to lead the “build-down” and “must begin moving away from threatening force postures and deployments.”  But such leadership is needed not only for the “build-down,” but also to envision a world with zero nuclear weapons and to commit to doing what is necessary to achieve that vision. 


    In their fifth step, the group of four recognizes that “nuclear weapons may continue to appear relevant” to some nations.  They thus see the need to “redouble efforts” to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts.  Insightfully, they find, “A world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today’s world minus nuclear weapons.”  They demonstrate a lack of urgency, though, in suggesting that “over time” the US and its allies can work together to make changes to extended deterrence.


    The group of four concludes, “Moving from mutual assured destruction toward a new and more stable form of deterrence with decreasing nuclear risks and an increasing measure of assured security for all nations could prevent our worst nightmare from becoming a reality, and it could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.”


    Just a few weeks before the publication of this Wall Street Journal article on nuclear deterrence by George Shultz and his colleagues, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a conference in Santa Barbara on “The Dangers of Nuclear Deterrence.”  The conference concluded with a Santa Barbara Declaration: “Reject Nuclear Deterrence: An Urgent Call to Action.”  The Declaration states, “Nuclear deterrence is discriminatory, anti-democratic and unsustainable.  This doctrine must be discredited and replaced with an urgent commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament.  We must change the discourse by speaking truth to power and speaking truth to each other.”  In other words, we cannot find nuclear deterrence “precarious” on the one hand, and seek to modernize America’s nuclear forces under the guise of keeping them “safe, secure and reliable” on the other hand. 


    The Santa Barbara Declaration concluded, “Before another nuclear weapon is used, nuclear deterrence must be replaced by humane, legal and moral security strategies.  We call upon people everywhere to join us in demanding that the nuclear weapon states and their allies reject nuclear deterrence and negotiate without delay a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.”  The goal must be a world without nuclear weapons, and reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence remains a major impediment to achieving that goal.

  • It’s Time for the Senate to Vote on New START

    This article was originally published by the Washington Post.

    The Senate should promptly vote to approve the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) with Russia for one reason: It increases U.S. national security. This is precisely why Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared at the outset of Senate consideration of the treaty that it has “the unanimous support of America’s military leadership.”

    The treaty reduces and caps the Russian nuclear arsenal. It reestablishes and makes stronger the verification procedures that allow U.S. inspectors to conduct on-site inspections and surveillance of Russian nuclear weapons and facilities. It strengthens international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and it opens the door to progress on further critical nonproliferation efforts, such as reducing Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

    Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has urged the Senate to ratify the treaty, and seven former Strategic Command (STRATCOM) chiefs have called on Senate leaders to move quickly.

    In addition to our military leadership, there is overwhelming bipartisan support for the treaty among national security experts. Also, officials from the past seven administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, testified before Senate committees in support of the treaty. In fact, the number of Republican former officials testifying outnumbered the number of Democrats.

    We were part of a group of 30 former national security leaders from both political parties — including former secretary of state Colin Powell, former defense secretary Frank Carlucci and former national security adviser Sandy Berger — who published an open letter in support of the treaty.

    The Senate has done its due diligence: Over the course of 21 hearings and briefings during the last five months, senators have had the opportunity to ask questions and put to rest concerns. From the director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, senators learned that the treaty in no way limits the ability of our military to deploy the missile defenses it needs or wants. From STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton, they learned that with the treaty in place, the United States will retain a strong and reliable deterrent. Sen. John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even delayed the committee vote on the treaty to give senators an extra month to review background materials and seek answers to their questions.

    Now it is time to act.

    While substantive questions about the treaty have been put to rest, some senators are trying to delay consideration of it based on an unrelated funding issue, namely, claims that future funding for the U.S. nuclear arsenal might be insufficient.

    This is wrong for two reasons.

    First, these claims fly in the face of the considered opinions of Chilton and National Nuclear Security Administration head Thomas D’Agostino, the men charged with overseeing our nuclear weapons and weapons laboratories. They, along with Gates and Mullen, have made clear that the administration’s 10-year, $80 billion plan to modernize our nuclear infrastructure, which would result in a 15 percent increase over current spending levels, represents the funding level that is needed and can be executed in a timely manner.

    More important, delaying this treaty over an unrelated matter undermines our national security.

    By the time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes Sept. 16 on whether to send the treaty to the Senate floor for ratification, it will have been more than 280 days and counting since the United States lost the ability to conduct on-site inspections, monitoring and verification of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This ability will not begin again until the treaty is ratified.

    As Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) told the committee, “The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed Dec. 5, is very serious and impacts our national security.”

    Given the national security stakes and the overwhelming support from the military and national security community, we hope that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will send the treaty to the floor with robust bipartisan backing and that senators will promptly ratify it with the kind of resounding margin such measures have historically enjoyed.

    Senate approval of New START would send a strong message to the world that the United States can overcome partisan differences and take concrete, practical action to reduce the nuclear threat and enhance our nation’s security.

  • How to Build on the Start Treaty

    This article was originally published by The New York Times

    This has been a remarkable time for the Obama administration. After a year of intense internal debate, it issued a new nuclear strategy. And after a year of intense negotiations with the Russians, President Obama signed the New Start treaty with President Dmitri Medvedev in Prague. On Monday, the president will host the leaders of more than 40 nations in a nuclear security summit meeting whose goal is to find ways of gaining control of the loose fissile material around the globe.

    New Start is the first tangible product of the administration’s promise to “press the reset button” on United States-Russian relations. The new treaty is welcome. But as a disarmament measure, it is a modest step, entailing a reduction of only 30 percent from the former limit — and some of that reduction is accomplished by the way the warheads are counted, not by their destruction. Perhaps the treaty’s greatest accomplishment is that the negotiations leading up to its signing re-engaged Americans and Russians in a serious discussion of how to reduce nuclear dangers.

    So what should come next? We look forward to a follow-on treaty that builds on the success of the previous Start treaties and leads to significantly greater arms reductions — including reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and reductions that require weapons be dismantled and not simply put in reserve.

    But our discussions with Russian colleagues, including senior government officials, suggest that such a next step would be very difficult for them. Part of the reason for their reluctance to accept further reductions is that Russia considers itself to be encircled by hostile forces in Europe and in Asia. Another part results from the significant asymmetry between United States and Russian conventional military forces. For these reasons, we believe that the next round of negotiations with Russia should not focus solely on nuclear disarmament issues. These talks should encompass missile defense, Russia’s relations with NATO, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, North Korea, Iran and Asian security issues.

    Let’s begin with missile defense. Future arms talks should make a serious exploration of a joint United States-Russia program that would provide a bulwark against Iranian missiles. We should also consider situating parts of the joint system in Russia, which in many ways offers an ideal strategic location for these defenses. Such an effort would not only improve our security, it would also further cooperation in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat, including the imposition of consequential sanctions when appropriate.

    NATO is a similarly complicated issue. After the cold war ended, Russia was invited to NATO meetings with the idea that the country would eventually become an integral part of European security discussions. The idea was good, but the execution failed. NATO has acted as if Russia’s role is that of an observer with no say in decisions; Russia has acted as if it should have veto power.

    Neither outlook is viable. But if NATO moves from consensus decisions to super-majority decisions in its governing structure, as has been considered, it would be possible to include Russia’s vote as an effective way of resolving European security issues of common interest.

    The Russians are also eager to revisit the two landmark cold war treaties. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty enabled NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to make significant reductions in conventional armaments and to limit conventional deployments. Today, there is still a need for limiting conventional arms, but the features of that treaty pertaining to the old Warsaw Pact are clearly outdated. Making those provisions relevant to today’s world should be a goal of new talks

    Similarly, the 1987 treaty that eliminated American and Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles was a crucially important pact that helped to defuse cold war tensions. But today Russia has neighbors that have such missiles directed at its borders; for understandable reasons, it wants to renegotiate aspects of this treaty.

    Future arms reductions with Russia are eminently possible. But they are unlikely to be achieved unless the United States is willing to address points of Russian concern. Given all that is at stake, we believe comprehensive discussions are a necessity as we work our way toward ever more significant nuclear disarmament.

  • At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    The latest Wall Street Journal article by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” published on January 15, 2008, has a greater sense of urgency than their first joint article a year earlier. They express grave concerns that we are at a nuclear “tipping point” with “a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.” As if these weapons are not already in dangerous enough hands. The former policy makers and Cold Warriors are warning us that, without change, nuclear dangers will worsen. They leave to our imaginations what will happen in a world in which “deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.”

    As the former Cold Warriors soberly suggest, we can no longer count on the threat of retaliation with overwhelming nuclear force to prevent those unnamed “dangerous hands” from detonating nuclear weapons in our cities or the cities of our friends and allies. In other words, our nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to prevent nuclear attacks against us. It is not like the tense days of the Cold War, when at least we knew who the enemy was and where he was located. Now we have shadowy and slippery enemies and our thermonuclear weapons provide no defense against such enemies.

    Actually, thermonuclear weapons never did provide a defense, even during the Cold War. Deterrence is not defense – it is only a psychological pseudo-barrier, a wish and a prayer. Against nuclear weapons, there is no defense, not even so-called missile defenses, which are easily overcome. Even Henry Kissinger gets it now and is speaking out, or at least lending his name, to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Zero nuclear weapons. None for anyone, including us. The US must lead the way, must convene the other nuclear powers. There are steps that must be taken, which the former policy makers outline. Their suggestions are sensible, although they do not go far enough, nor is there any real hope that Washington under the Bush administration will respond to them rapidly enough. The situation may be even more urgent than the former Cold Warriors grasp.

    Nuclear weapons do not make us safer. They leave us more exposed. They are military equalizers. Minor foes, terrorist groups and small countries, can inflict horrendous damage on even the most powerful states. What is to be done? The former Cold Warriors offer the following: Work with Russia to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons by saving the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty of 1991; pursue further reductions in nuclear arms than agreed upon in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; increase warning and decision times for the launch of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; discard Cold War plans for massive attacks; develop cooperative multilateral ballistic missile defense and early warning systems; secure nuclear weapons, including those designed for forward deployment, and weapons-grade nuclear materials; strengthen monitoring of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.

    The former Cold Warriors also call for broadening the dialogue on an international scale. Here they will find that many countries without nuclear weapons have been trying to send a message to the nuclear weapons states for a long time, urging them to do all that Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn seek and more. Progress has been blocked since the end of the Cold War by the lack of political will of US leaders. That is where it continues to be blocked. The Bush administration’s approach to a world free of nuclear weapons is to place as many obstacles in its way as possible.

    As the former Cold Warriors point out, “Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal.” They have made that statement. It is doubtful, though, if it will have any effect on the current US administration, perhaps the darkest, most criminal administration in US history. Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues must look beyond George W. Bush, and hope for a new president of the United States who will be prepared to climb the mountain with them, rather than trying to blow it up. But they are absolutely right to speak up now, and to continue to strongly promote the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As Albert Camus said immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima, “Before the terrifying prospects now available to humanity, we see even more clearly that peace is the only battle worth waging.” Wage on, Henry Kissinger!

    To read the 2008 Wall Street Journal article by the aforementioned authors, click here.

    To read their 2007 Wall Street Journal article, click here.

    To read David Krieger’s “A Bipartisan Plea for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,” click here.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.