Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: deterrence

  • The Irrationality of Deterrence: A Modern Zen Koan

    “The sound of one finger pressing the button is the sound of a deeper silence, brought about by unrelenting apathy”

    What is the sound of one hand clapping? What is the sound of one finger pressing the button? Surely the concept of deterrence is more enigmatic and perplexing than a Zen Koan!

    The concept of deterrence, which underlies the nuclear weapons policies of the United States and other nuclear weapons states, presupposes human rationality in all cases. It is based upon the proposition that a rational person will not attack you if he understands that his country will be subject to unacceptable damage by retaliation.

    What rational person would want his country to be exposed to unacceptable damage? Perhaps one who miscalculates. A rational person could believe that he could take action X, and that would not be sufficient for you to retaliate. Saddam Hussein, for example, believed that he could invade Kuwait without retaliation from the United States. He miscalculated, in part because he had been misled by the American Ambassador to Iraq who informed him that the US would not retaliate. Misinformation, misunderstanding, or misconstruing information could lead a rational person to miscalculate. We don’t always get our information straight, and we seldom have all of the facts.

    Deterrence is a Fool’s Game

    Even more detrimental to the theory of deterrence is irrationality. Can anyone seriously believe that humans always act rationally? Of course not. We are creatures who are affected by emotions and passions as well as intellect. Rationality is not to be relied upon. People do not always act in their own best interests. Examples abound. Almost everyone knows that smoking causes terrible diseases and horrible deaths, and yet hundreds of millions of people continue to smoke. We know that the stock markets are driven by passions as much as they are by rationality. The odds are against winning at the gambling tables in Las Vegas, and yet millions of people accept the odds, believing that they can win despite the odds.

    Nuclear deterrence is based on rationality — the belief that a rational leader will not attack a country with nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation. And yet, it is clearly irrational to believe that rationality will always prevail. Let me put it another way. Isn’t it irrational for a nation to rely upon deterrence, which is based upon humans always acting rationally (which they don’t), to provide for its national security? Those who champion deterrence appear rational, but in fact prove their irrationality by their unfounded faith in human rationality.

    With nuclear deterrence, the deterring country threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons if it is attacked. What if a country is attacked by nuclear weapons, but is unable to identify the source of the attack? How does it retaliate? Obviously, it either guesses, retaliates against an innocent country, or doesn’t retaliate. So much for deterrence. What if a national leader or terrorist with a nuclear weapon believed he could attack without being identified? It doesn’t matter whether he is right or wrong. It is his belief that he is unidentifiable that matters. So much for deterrence. What if a leader of a country doesn’t care if his country is retaliated against? What if he believes he has nothing more to lose, like a nuclear-armed Hitler in his bunker? So much for deterrence!

    It takes only minimal analysis to realize that nuclear deterrence is a fool’s game. The unfortunate corollary is that those who propound nuclear deterrence are fools in wise men’s garb. The further corollary is that we have entrusted the future of the human species to a small group of fools. These include the political and military leaders, the corporate executives who support them and profit from building the weapons systems, and the academics and other intellectuals like Henry Kissinger, who provide the theoretical underpinnings for the concept of deterrence.

    The Immorality of Nuclear Weapons

    Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, we continue to live in a world in which a small number of nations rely upon the theory of deterrence to provide for their national security. In doing so, they threaten to kill tens of millions or perhaps hundreds of millions of innocent people by retaliation should deterrence fail. To perhaps state what should be obvious, but doesn’t appear to our leaders to be: This is highly immoral. It also sets an extremely bad example for other states, whose leaders just might be thinking: If the strongest nations in the world are continuing to rely upon nuclear weapons for their national security, shouldn’t we be doing so also? Fortunately, most leaders in most countries are concluding that they should not.

    There is only one way out of the dilemma we are in, and that is to begin immediately to abolish nuclear weapons. This happens also to be required by international law as stated in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as decided unanimously in the 1996 opinion of the International Court of Justice: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Morality, the law, and rationality converge in the need to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This is the greatest challenge of our time. The will of the people on this issue is being blocked by only a few leaders in a few countries. As the world’s most powerful nation, leadership should fall most naturally to the United States. Unfortunately, the policies of the United States have been driven by irrationality to the detriment of our own national security and the future of life on our planet. This is unlikely to change until the people of the United States exercise their democratic rights and demand policies that will end the nuclear threat to humanity. These include: negotiating a multilateral treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control; de-alerting nuclear weapons and separating warheads from delivery vehicles; making pledges of No First Use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances; stopping all nuclear testing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; reaffirming the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and applying strict international safeguards to all weapons-grade fissile materials and agreeing to no further production of such materials.

    A Call to Action

    The sound of one hand clapping is silence. That is the sound of most people in most places in response to the nuclear weapons policies of the nuclear weapons states. While they do not applaud these policies with both hands, they also do not raise their voices to oppose them.

    The sound of one finger pressing the button is the sound of a deeper silence, brought about by unrelenting apathy. It is the sound of the silence before a more final silence. It is an unbearable silence `for its consequences are beyond our power to repair. It is a silent death knell for humanity. We must raise our voices now with passion and commitment to prevent this pervasive silence from becoming the sound of our world.

  • A Twelve Step Program to End Nuclear Weapons Addiction

    The following steps should be taken by the nuclear weapons states to assure a full commitment to ending the nuclear weapons threat that now hangs over the heads of all humanity and clouds our future:

    1. Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

    2. Publicly acknowledge the weaknesses and fallibilities of deterrence: that deterrence is only a theory and is clearly ineffective against nations whose leaders may be irrational or suicidal; nor can deterrence assure against accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, or terrorists.

    3. Publicly acknowledge the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law as stated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, and further acknowledge the obligation under international law for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    4. Publicly acknowledge the immorality of threatening to annihilate millions, even hundreds of millions, of people in the name of national security.

    5. De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    6. Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    7. Establish an international accounting system for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    8. Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cease laboratory and subcritical nuclear tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems, cease construction of Megajoule in France and the National Ignition Facility in the US and end research programs that could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons, and close the remaining nuclear test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.

    9. Re-affirm the commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and cease efforts to violate that Treaty by the deployment of national or theater missile defenses, and cease the militarization of space.

    10. Support existing nuclear weapons free zones, and establish new ones in the Middle East, Central Europe, North Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.

    11.Set forth a plan to complete the transition under international control and monitoring to zero nuclear weapons by 2020, with agreed upon levels of nuclear disarmament to be achieved by the NPT Review Conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015.

    12. Begin to reallocate the billions of dollars currently being spent annually for maintaining nuclear arsenals ($35 billion in the U.S. alone) to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

  • The Challenge Posed by India and Pakistan

    In a three-week period, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, thus becoming new members of the nuclear weapons club. Their tests have brought forth broad, even jubilant, support among the Indian and Pakistani people. Following the Pakistani tests, one Pakistani clerk effused, “Pakistan is now a superpower.”

    It is not surprising that India and Pakistan would view nuclear weapons as a path to international security and prestige. The five original members of the nuclear weapons club – the U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China – have treated their possession of nuclear weapons this way for decades.

    The major problem is not that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear tests. It is that they, like the other members of the nuclear weapons club, have indicated by their tests that they now choose to rely upon nuclear weapons to maintain their national security.

    The Indians and Pakistanis are doing no more – in fact, much less – than the United States and the former Soviet Union did throughout the Cold War in relying upon their nuclear arsenals for deterrence. The policy of nuclear deterrence – despite the end of the Cold War and ostensibly friendly relations – continues to be the official policy of the U.S. and Russia, as it is of the other nations in the nuclear weapons club.

    The nuclear weapons states claim that there has been no nuclear war because of their nuclear weapons rather than in spite of them. If deterrence is a viable theory, however, there should be no problem with it being adopted by all states, including India and Pakistan.

    Deterrence Is Only a Theory

    The truth is that deterrence is only a theory, and not one that is believed to work universally. If deterrence were in fact considered reliable, nuclear weapons proliferation should in theory be encouraged rather than opposed.

    I doubt if anyone believes that the Indian subcontinent is safer now that India and Pakistan have demonstrated their nuclear weapons capabilities. It is generally and rightly recognized that the region has become far more dangerous with this new capacity for nuclear annihilation.

    Imagine, for example, that the Indians decided to respond to the Pakistani threat by a pre-emptive first-strike to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. Should the Indians fail, the Pakistanis might respond with a nuclear attack. Even the fear of such pre-emptive action by the Indians might lead the Pakistanis to themselves launch a pre-emptive first-strike against India. There are many other possible scenarios that might lead to nuclear war.

    Just as the problem is not the nuclear weapons tests, but the policies that they represent, the danger is not limited to South Asia. By the Indian and Pakistani tests, we are reminded of the danger that exists from all nuclear weapons in the world – those in the hands of all nuclear weapons states. We are also reminded that nuclear weapons proliferation remains a serious threat to regional and global stability.

    There are not responsible and irresponsible nuclear weapons states. All are irresponsible because they base their national security on weapons which have the capacity to murder millions of innocent people.

    A Worst Case Scenario

    As a worst case scenario, and one that has been long understood, a large-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia could result in ending human civilization, such as it is, and destroying the human species and most life on earth. Being willing to run this risk does not demonstrate a high level of responsibility – quite the opposite.

    The choice before us is whether to deal with India and Pakistan as an isolated regional problem, or whether to view their nuclear tests as a wake-up call to commence international negotiations to achieve a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world.

    The first option is not viable. India and Pakistan will not reverse their course unless the other nuclear weapons states clearly demonstrate their commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Following its tests, India issued a statement appealing for such a commitment in the form of a Nuclear Weapons Convention: “India calls on all nuclear weapons states and indeed the international community to join with it in opening early negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention so that these weapons can be dealt with in a global, nondiscriminatory framework as other weapons of mass destruction have been, through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    Nuclear “Haves” and “Have-Nots”

    I have long maintained that a world with a small number of nuclear “haves” and a much larger number of nuclear “have-nots” is unstable and unrealistic. This instability has begun to manifest itself in a detrimental way through nuclear proliferation. We will continue in this direction unless the course is reversed by serious negotiations among the nuclear weapons states to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world.

    The United States is capable of providing the leadership to attain a world free of nuclear weapons. The U.S., however, has shown no inclination to assert this leadership. In fact, U.S. policies under the current administration have all been directed toward maintaining the existing structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. This must change. It is our best hope for preventing a nuclear holocaust in the 21st century.

    One other possibility exists. It is for other nations of the world, without the U.S. but including other nuclear weapons states, to move forward on a treaty banning nuclear weapons in the way that the treaty to ban landmines was created without U.S. participation. Unless the U.S. steps forward as a leader on this issue, I would hope that other nations will proceed without us.

    At the edge of a new millennium, the nation state system is challenged on many fronts to solve global environmental and security problems. The greatest of these challenges is posed by weapons of man’s own creation, the most dangerous of which are nuclear weapons capable of destroying humankind. Will we meet this challenge? Are there leaders among us capable of picking up where Gorbachev left off that can lead the world to end the nuclear weapons era?

    Such leaders will have to pierce the illusions of security that have been created to manipulate the people, now including the people of India and Pakistan, into believing that nuclear weapons should be a source of national pride. Nuclear weapons are quite simply weapons of mass destruction, meaning mass murder, and should be viewed as a national disgrace. But where are the leaders to say this?

    Leadership from the People

    As in all great issues of social change, the leadership for a nuclear weapons free world will have to arise from the people. This grassroots leadership is already emerging from Abolition 2000, a global network working to eliminate nuclear weapons, which is now composed of nearly 1100 citizen action groups from around the world.

    The challenge posed to the world by the two new members of the nuclear weapons club is nothing less than creating a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a challenge of finding new means of achieving security and settling our differences without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.

  • US Threatens Australia and Aotearoa: “Increase Military Ties Or Else…”

    Women for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
    International Peace Bureau, Oceania Representative

    United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Defence Secretary William Cohen recently visited Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand to do some very heavy threatening about military alliances. They made it clear that Aotearoa would not be allowed to rejoin the ANZUS (Aust/NZ/US) Alliance unless it rejects its nuclear free legislation. In Australia they made it clear what that alliance actually means.

    Meeting with Australia’s Defence Minister Ian McLachlan and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, they threatened that if Australia doesn’t substantially upgrade its military hardware. Unless Australia engages in the same technology, doctrines and training opportunities it will not be able to keep up with US developments, undermining its ability to participate in joint operations. This would result in Australia losing its status as a “valuable” US ally and be unable to participate in wars, training, etc., with the US.

    They insisted that Australia increase its military budget accordingly, and establish a “joint defence acquisition committee” with the US. This committee would enable US and Australian experts to consult, cooperate and collaborate so that technology and information gaps are eliminated and Australia had the ability to function under a US controlled alliance.

    The US is developing a combination of satellite and laser technology that goes far beyond that witnessed during the Operation Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1991. Their plans to militarise and control space, outlined in a document called “Vision for 2020”, require the development of ground-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), space-based ASATs and space-based earth strike weapons. This systems, as with all weapons systems, are controlled and coordinated by ground bases such as those in Australia, Ka Pae’aina, Marshall Islands and other nations. This is requires an incredible military budget which is greater than the economy of all South-East Asia countries combined.

    In exchange Australia will be allowed to upgrade its involvement in the US new space-based missile early-warning and monitoring system. This includes stationing Australian defence personnel at Colorado Springs, HQ of the US early-warning system.

    Increased weaponry and other facilities would strengthen Australia’s readiness for future cooperation in the Middle East, specifically against Iraq. It would also enhance Australia’s ties with the Central and Atlantic commands, and therefore with the US army command, and increase its involvement with the US Pacific Command, based in Ka Pae’aina/Hawai’i, which provides training with naval and air components. Part of the package is that the USAF facility at Nurrungar in South Australia will close after 30 years, but that it will be replaced by two new antennas to be built at Pine Gap, the CIA intelligence stations near Alice Springs. The antenna will link into the new geostationary satellites targeted to pick up on tactical and intermediate range missiles (like those of Iraq, India and Pakistan), as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The data collected by these antenna will be sent directly to Colorado, rather than to Nurrungar as before.

    Sources:
    “US warns of defence risk”, The Australian, Greg Sheridan, 31 July 1998.

    “Star Wars Returns to Dominate Space”, Bombs Away. Newsletter of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Vol 12, No 1, Spring 1998. p3.

  • Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons by Retired Pakistani and Indian Armed Forces Personnel

    Recent developments in South Asia in the field of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery are a serious threat to the wellbeing of this region.

    The fact that India and Pakistan have fought wars in the recent past and do not as yet enjoy the best of relations, makes this development all the more ominous. The signatories of this statement are not theoreticians or arm-chair idealists; we have spent many long years in the profession of arms and have served our countries both in peacetime and in war.

    By virtue of our experience and the positions we have held, we have a fair understanding of the destructive parameters of conventional and nuclear weapons. We are of the considered view that nuclear weapons should be banished from the South Asian region, and indeed from the entire globe.

    We urge India and Pakistan to take the lead by doing away with nuclear weapons in a manifest and verifiable manner, and to confine nuclear research and development strictly to peaceful and beneficient spheres.

    We are convinced that the best way of resolving disputes is through peaceful means and not through war – least of all by the threat or use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan need to address their real problems of poverty and backwardness, not waste our scarce resources on acquiring means of greater and greater destruction.

    Signed

    Air Marshal Zafar A. Choudhry (Pakistan)
    Admiral L. Ramdas (India)
    Lt. Gen Gurbir Mansingh (India)

  • No Time to Think

    Reprinted with permission from Himal Magazine, Kathmandu, Nepal, July Anti-Nuke Issue

    For decades, military planners in the United States, former Soviet Union, and the other nuclear weapons states have convinced themselves that their nuclear weapons are a deterrent. The nuclear annihilation that would follow if these weapons were used was supposed to make any enemy stop, think, and decide that war was not worth the consequences. To make sure that an enemy had no doubt about these consequences, all the nuclear weapons states created nuclear arsenals designed to fight a nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence was built on assuming that one day the simple fear of nuclear weapons would not be enough and the weapons would have to be used.

    The reliance on nuclear weapons that could be used in a real war led each nuclear weapons state to live in perpetual fear of a surprise attack that would make their weapons useless. This fear was greatest during the Cold War, when each side thought the other could not be trusted. The US and Soviet Union addressed their fears by building enormously complex early warning systems that would let them know they were about to be attacked and give them time to launch their nuclear weapons before they were destroyed.

    The early warning systems of the superpowers had another crucial role. Since any war would have meant nuclear war, both sides wanted to make sure that war did not begin by accident. Early warning systems created time during which people could make decisions using real information about what was actually happening rather than responding simply on the basis of fears of what might be about to happen.

    The US built and still operates the biggest and most sophisticated early warning system. It is based around a missile warning system and works by collecting information from satellites that can detect the launch of missiles from another country and radars around the world that can follow the missiles to see where they are going. The information is transmitted from these satellites and radars to where it can be processed by computers and then analysed and interpreted by people. To make sure that this is done seriously and properly, this assessment is done at several places separately. If the information is determined to be reliable, it is sent to more senior people who are supposed to decide how to respond.

    When the satellites and radars say that missiles may have been launched towards the US, there is a Missile Display Conference among the commanders of the places where the analysis of the information is carried out. If they decide that the danger is serious, and not a mistake made by the satellites, or radar, or somewhere along the communication system, or a mistake by one of the people who is supposed to interpret the information, then a Threat Assessment Conference is called. This includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and senior military commanders.

    At the same time as a Threat Assessment Conference is called, a state of alert is declared, fighter aircraft take off, nuclear-armed bombers are told to start their engines, and missiles are readied for launch. This is the last step before a Missile Attack Conference. This is where the President is told what has happened, and asked to decide what is to be done.

    Both the US and the Soviet Union, now Russia, had these multiple levels of decision making because they had the time to check, and double check, to make sure that they knew what was happening. Their satellites and early warning radar systems gave them information within one and a half minutes of the possible launch of a missile. They took about two and a half minutes to work out what was happening from this information. A meeting could be called and a threat determined a few minutes after this. In other words within about six or seven minutes, it was possible to decide if a nuclear attack may have started. Since the missiles would have taken about 25 minutes to travel from the US to the Soviet Union or in the other direction, there was still time for a final confirmation that the missiles were real. There was even time left to find out if there had been an accidental launch of the missiles, and to decide what to do.

    False Alarms

    Given the terrible consequences of nuclear war, enormous financial and technical resources were invested in setting up and running these early warning systems, and trying to make them fool-proof. However, history shows that these systems failed. Not once, or twice, but frequently. There is no real history of all the failures. It is known, however, that between 1977 and 1984 the US early warning system showed over 20,000 false alarms of a missile attack on the US. Over 1000 of these were considered serious enough for bombers and missiles to be placed on alert.

    Some of these incidents give terrifying insights into how easily even the most carefully designed and technologically advanced warning systems can go wrong. Two instances will suffice. In November 1979, the US missile warning system showed that a massive attack had suddenly been launched. Jets were launched, and a nuclear alert declared. There was no attack. There were no missiles. The warning was due to a computer that had been used to test the warning system to see how it would behave if there was an attack. Somebody had forgotten to turn off the computer after the exercise.

    A second example was even more dramatic. In June 1980, the early warning systems showed that two missiles had been launched towards the US. This was followed by signals that there were more missiles following the first two. A Threat Assessment Conference was called. The situation was considered to be sufficiently serious that the President’s special airplane was prepared for take-off. Again there was no attack, nor any missiles. The reason for the mistaken signals, and interpretations, was eventually traced to a computer chip that was not working properly. The repeated failures of the US early warning system led at one time to an official enquiry which reported that the system “had been mismanaged… by the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defence”. In other words, every institution assigned to make sure the system worked had failed in its task.

    It was not just the US system that failed. While there is little information yet on how the Soviet Union managed its nuclear weapons warning systems, there is at least one example from recent years that suggests it cannot have worked any better than the US system. On 25 January1995, a Norwegian rocket was launched to take scientific measurements. The Norwegian government told the Russian government in advance that this would happen. Nevertheless, when the rocket was picked up by Russian radar it was treated as a possible missile attack. It seems a warning was sent to the Russian defence minister’s headquarters, the Russian military leadership, and to the commanders of Russian missiles that an attack may be underway. A message was then sent to Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, and an emergency conference called with nuclear commanders over the telephone. Boris Yeltsin has confirmed that such an emergency conference did take place.

    Fear and Paranoia

    The lessons for India and Pakistan are obvious. Experience shows that in any real crisis involving the two, fear and paranoia soon become overwhelming. One need look no further than the recent panic about a possible pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities by India. The fear was there despite a nearly ten-year-old agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. In the absence of basic trust, generals on each side will always assume those on the other side might want to launch a surprise attack, and will want, in turn, to be prepared to respond with nuclear weapons.

    The need for early warning systems is therefore clear. But, even if Pakistan and India had the technology for early warning, and even if it worked reliably, they could not use it, geography has made sure of that. The time to take decisions will not be available to either Pakistan or India. Instead of the 25 minutes that the US and the Soviet Union had, it would take a Prithvi missile somewhere between three and five minutes to reach almost anywhere in Pakistan. It would take the Ghauri missile about five minutes to reach Delhi. In such a short time, an early warning system could give warning of what might be happening, a meeting could be called, and then time would run out. There would be no time to decide whether the warning was real, or a mistake. The decision would have to be made on either launching the missiles immediately or taking the risk of the missiles being destroyed before they could be used.

    In order to avoid such a situation, some people may suggest that India and Pakistan find a way to create time for the generals to make sure they know what is happening in any future crisis. It may be possible to create such time by an agreement whereby each side would keep its warheads stored separately from missiles and airplanes and let the other side check to make sure this was indeed the case. Any nuclear attack could then only come after the warheads were taken out of storage and then loaded onto missiles or planes, and an attempt to do so would be detected.

    But this is, at best, a desperate measure. The lack of trust is so great that making sure a agreement was being honoured would require an extraordinary system of allowing inspections of each other’s missile and airforce bases and nuclear facilities. There is no prospect of that happening. But, any agreement without such inspections would mean the generals on each side, fearing their counterparts had secretly hidden a few nuclear warheads with some missiles, would do the same. The nuclear dangers would remain despite an agreement, and might actually become greater.

    The alternative is simple. No nuclear weapons mean no nuclear crises. No nuclear crises mean no danger of nuclear war.

  • Nuclear Fears, Nuclear History

    Published in Communalism Combat, Bombay

    Atul Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif have two things in common. Both of them have ordered five nuclear tests, and both of them justified their orders by claiming that their nuclear weapons are defensive. This argument was invented by the Americans to justify their nuclear weapons, after the Soviet Union started to build its own nuclear weapons. It was such a convenient argument that all the nuclear states started to use it once they built nuclear weapons. Now every country with nuclear weapons claims that its weapons are defensive, it is just other countries’ nuclear weapons that are a threat.

    How are nuclear weapons a threat? The first answer given is that an enemy may threaten to use nuclear weapons as way to intimidate or blackmail and so win a war. As the most destructive weapons ever made, nuclear weapons should make states that have them invincible. They should be able to win all their wars. In fact, no one should want to fight such states because they have nuclear weapons.

    The facts of the last fifty years tell another story. Nuclear weapons states have elected to fight wars on many occasions. They have lost many of them. Britain fought and lost at Suez, even though they it had already developed nuclear weapons. The United States suffered significant defeats during the Korean war and the war ended with a stalemate. The French lost Algeria, even though they had their nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons did not help against Vietnam. The most famous examples are of course the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan despite having enormous numbers of nuclear weapons. In all these cases, a non-nuclear state fought and won against a nuclear armed state.

    Another fact from the last fifty years is that having nuclear weapons offers no protection against nuclear threats. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union made nuclear threats numerous times, with the United States making around twenty such threats and the Soviet Union making five or six. Even though both sides had nuclear weapons, this did not change the fact they were threatened by the other side. If a state with nuclear weapons is going to make a threat, it will do so regardless of whether the state being threatened has nuclear weapons of its own.

    The only other use for nuclear weapons that has ever been claimed is that nuclear weapons are supposed to deter attacks by other nuclear weapons and so prevent war between nuclear armed states. This is what is usually meant by nuclear deterrence. The normal example of nuclear deterrence that is used is between the superpowers during the Cold War. The absence of war between them is widely attributed to both sides having nuclear weapons. This cannot however be proven. All that can be said is that the absence of war coincided with both sides having nuclear weapons. It is not logical to deduce that nuclear weapons prevented a war that would otherwise have taken place. The absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union may simply have been due to neither side wanting a war. The experience of total war in World War II was so terrible that this may have been sufficient to prevent a major war. It is worth remembering over 20 million Soviets were killed in that war.

    The history of the Cold War is in fact the history of the elusive search for deterrence. As the years passed and became decades, the amount of destructive power needed to create deterrence kept on increasing. From a few simply atom bombs, it became hundreds of bombs, then thousands and then came the hydrogen bomb, with a destructive power a hundred times greater than an atom bomb. But, even having a few such hydrogen bombs was not enough. McGeorge Bundy, who was an advisor in the White house during both the Cuban Missile Crisis, has argued that deterrence works only if “we assume that each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear weapons [hydrogen bombs] which could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible pre-emptive attack.” It is this kind of nuclear arsenal that is credited by Bundy, and other American supporters of deterrence as being responsible for maintaining the Ñnuclear peaceâ between the United States and Soviet Union. The urge to have weapons that could survive a pre-emptive attack is why both sides developed nuclear submarines and specially hardened silos for missiles. This effort to create deterrence cost the United States at least $4 trillion ($,4000,000,000,000) to develop, produce, deploy, operate, support and control its nuclear forces over the past 50 years.

    The Americans were not alone in thinking that large numbers of hydrogen bombs that could survive a nuclear attack were necessary for deterrence.

    All five of the established nuclear weapons state have tried to achieve this kind of nuclear arsenal. None of them has stopped developing their arsenals once they built simple nuclear weapons. they have not even relied on large numbers of such simple weapons. They have gone on to build weapons tens if not hundreds or thousands of times more destructive. Even the smallest nuclear arsenal, belonging to Britain, has 200 thermonuclear weapons with a collective destructive power two thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

    There are, however, some important dissenting voices who say that deterrence never worked. General George Lee Butler, who until a few years ago actually commanded all of the United States strategic nuclear weapons has said the world survived the Cuban missile crisis no thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God. If General Butler is right, and even the fear created by “very large numbers” of hydrogen bombs was not enough to stop two nuclear states getting ready to go to war then what purpose is served by this fear? What this fear can do is stop peace. Even though the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union gone, the nuclear weapons are still there. The US still has over 10,000 and Russia about as many. The fear now is not the other state, but the others nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons there cannot be real peace.

    History teaches that nuclear fears cannot be calmed with nuclear weapons. The simple truth is that there has never been a weapon that can offer a defense against being afraid. The only defense against fear is courage and courage needs no weapons to make its presence felt.

     

  • What is Next After the Latest Nuclear Tests? A Review of Nuclear Armament by the Trustees’ Committee of the Campaign “Abolish Nukes – Start with Ourselves”

    Dortmund, Germany

    (The Campaign is member of the Abolition 2000 Network and consists of 42 German organisations.)

    On the 11th and 13th May of this year India has conducted nuclear test explosions, followed suit by Pakistan detonating nuclear devices of their own on the 28th and 30th May. The design of the devices and the according statements of the respective governments confirm previous suspicions that India and Pakistan are now both to be counted among the nuclear armed states. Both states have weapons systems at their disposal well capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

    The Trustees’ Committee of the Campaign “Abolish Nukes – Start with Ourselves” states the following position on this issue:

    We categorically disapprove of the possession, storage and use, including testing, of weapons of mass destruction as well as the threat of their use, no matter what the rationale for justifying otherwise. We specifically make reference to the legal assessment by the International Court of Justice who declared in July 1996: The use of and the threat to use nuclear weapons constitute a general violation of international law.

    In contrast to the statements issued by the established nuclear powers USA, France, Russia, Great Britain, and China we do not confine our criticism to India and Pakistan as if these two were the only ones suddenly in possession of nuclear weapons in this world. Rather do the nuclear powers and some of the non-nuclear states allied with them share responsibility that India and Pakistan were able to acquire the appropriate nuclear and weapons technologies with which they now have turned into nuclear armed states on their own. Furthermore are we not satisfied with purely demanding that India and Pakistan immediately now sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty because

    • nuclear weapons would neither be dismantled nor outlawed
    • the treaty does not ban computer simulated and sub-critical testing of nuclear weapons
    • only two of the long standing-nuclear armed states, France and Great Britain, have ratified the treaty, leaving doubts about the seriousness of the intentions of the remaining three states.

    We see absolutely no chance of success in demanding that India and Pakistan sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty now, knowing that both have refused to do so for decades.

    Alarming Situation in South East Asia

    Nevertheless, we see at the same time that the decade old volatile situation on the Indian subcontinent has arrived at an extremely dangerous boiling point, now that all the parties in the immediate geographic vicinity – China, India and Pakistan – are capable to launch nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the respective governments in New Delhi and Islamabad have issued assurances to consider their atomic weapons “only” for a defensive role and not for a nuclear first strike. Yet, we are deeply concerned for several reasons:

    1. History has taught us that “defence” is a term that lends itself for some heavy stretching. The reason is that the trigger event for military defence action is subject to the subjective perception and judgement of one party. This holds particularly true if a conflict has already extremely escalated as in the case of the Kashmir region. It applies even more so with antagonists who like the current governments of India and Pakistan are locked in a deep rooted animosity towards each other’s ideological and here particularly religious beliefs. The capacity to rationally assess the intentions of the respective other is dangerously degraded by one’s own pattern of perception.

    2. A defence concept that encompasses nuclear weapons, even if it is as yet only a declared intention, means nothing less than that the opponents are entering the hazard level of nuclear warfare. We do not – even with a public denial of first-use intentions provided – share those notions of security that consider a system based on nuclear deterrence a stabilising factor.

    3. The precarious economic situations in India as well as Pakistan constitute a major factor of internal destabilisation for both. The adverse effects could still increase drastically if even more resources urgently needed for economic recovery were to be diverted to an already overdimensioned military budget. The Indian government has already gone ahead and decided to increase military spending with the Pakistani government expected to follow suit.

    4. Should the international economic sanctions imposed against both India and Pakistan start to take effect things will go from bad to worse. Both countries may feel driven towards compensatory arrangements which may have, for example, Pakistan transfer nuclear arms technology and the corresponding weapons systems to Iran. This, in turn, could trigger a chain reaction in the Near and Middle East which would on the one hand immediately bring the de facto nuclear power Israel into the nuclear gamble and on the other hand also inspire more states in the region to rise to nuclear power status.

    5. The ramifications of trying to establish a balance of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan would be fatal and destabilising not only for the states directly afflicted but would reach beyond the confines of the region: a chain reaction of newly arising nuclear states and more nuclear arms racing in other regions would be the likely results.

    The Global Connection

    The entire problem is aggravated by the fact that so far no effort is being made to turn to appropriate mechanisms or institutions for conflict solving. A key reason for that is rooted in the attitude of the former nuclear monopolist states:

    • by enforcing an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 those states have made an effort – proved futile now by India and Pakistan – to divide the world into two classes of states: those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not, where the former five preferred to have the privilege of exclusive membership in the first group reserved for themselves. That was one of the reasons for India and Pakistan, who liked to see complete nuclear disarmament negotiated, not to join the treaty. The position of the established nuclear powers was duly reflected at the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the next NPT Review Conference where it was particularly the USA which saw to it that the motion of a great number of member states to make far-reaching disarmament steps an imperative were blocked.
    • To safeguard their previous nuclear arms monopoly the USA have developed a “Counterproliferation Strategy” intended to keep others from obtaining nuclear weapons and including as a last resort even the threat of nuclear punishment. NATO has adopted something similar for itself. At the same time NATO will not definitely rule out that nuclear weapons may under certain circumstances (subject to definition by NATO) be stationed on the territories of its new and future member states. Notwithstanding, all NATO member states have ratified the NPT.
    • Ever since the Warsaw Pact was disbanded the previous nuclear monopolist states have not acted to seize the political opportunities that arose out of the collapse of the confrontation between the two antagonistic systems. Case in point is the START II agreement designed to cut down the nuclear long range arsenals of Russia and the US. Not even this treaty could be implemented because the Russian parliament has not ratified it yet. Even after the International Court of Justice in its already referred to assessment has clearly ruled nuclear weapons a clear violation of international law and at the same time assigned a collective responsibility for nuclear disarmament to all states, there was as little reaction from the nuclear powers as there was to the resolution of last year’s UN-General Meeting demanding to start negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. Arriving at the same conclusion, the currently convening Conference on Disarmament in Geneva states clearly that the former nuclear monopolist powers pursue a policy of refusal on the subject of disarmament, especially evident in their refusal to approve of an ad hoc committee of this sole UN body on disarmament which would deal directly with the issue of nuclear disarmament.
    • This policy goes along with efforts to modernise one’s own nuclear weapons systems. The dismantling of obsolete systems in favour of modernisation is often sold as “disarmament” whereas the sub-critical tests performed for instance by the USA after (!) having ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty clearly indicate modernisation. An important point to remember is that the existing nuclear weapons remain on alert status and that NATO and Russia both uphold a nuclear first strike option under their respective military strategies.
    • The present demands that India and Pakistan enter immediate negotiations on mutual nuclear disarmament remain untrustworthy and thus dishonest as long as those demanding are themselves not willing to put their own nuclear stockpiles up for disposal in multilateral negotiations. Likewise contradictory remains a type of attitude exhibited by India’s leadership who on the one hand keep urging repeatedly for total global disarmament as Indian governments have been doing for decades now, but on the other hand believe in backing their demands by achieving equal footing with the nuclear monopolist powers.

    It is obvious now that the NPT is not an effective means to stop nuclear proliferation and achieve a total disarmament down to zero. This treaty is not capable to provide a cornerstone for global security as it leaves the five formerly established nuclear powers unaffected and does not safeguard against the possibility of conducting nuclear developments for military purposes under the cover of civilian programmes. In a disturbing manner the current events in India and Pakistan demonstrate once more how urgent and imperative it is to take action well beyond what the traditional approach of a supposed non-proliferation policy suggests is necessary.

    A New Nuclear Disarmament Policy

    As we principally stand up for a different understanding of security policy and a comprehensive ban of all nuclear weapons we know ourselves in the company not only of hundreds of non-governmental organisations worldwide like those working together in the “Abolition 2000” network but in the company of a great many of governments as well.

    We are convinced that any kind of security concept has to measure up to the criteria of sustainability. From this follows clearly that in the nuclear age security can no longer be defined in purely military terms. Security in our terms refers to a secure prospect for human beings for a humane and unthreatened existence and not to the well-being of military structures and ‘defence’ contractors. In view of the severe escalation of the international situation it is not productive to come up with ambitious schemes with only long-term prospects of realisation without offering short-term concepts for immediately extinguishing the smouldering nuclear fire.

    1. India and Pakistan have followed the lead of the nuclear five. The five have to consider this anytime they direct demands and suggestions at India and Pakistan. This means in concrete terms: any steps demanded from Pakistan and India must likewise be achieved by the nuclear five themselves, otherwise any such suggestions are bound to fail.

    2. There were will be no meaningful way avoiding bloodshed out of this crisis unless the nuclear five immediately initiate some dramatic changes in their nuclear military policies: as first steps towards restoring their international credibility they should unconditionally lift the alert status off their nuclear armed units and they should jointly issue a statement bound by international law to drop for an unlimited time all options of a nuclear first strike.

    3. As permanent members of the UN Security Council the nuclear five share a special responsibility. Concerning the situation on the Indian subcontinent this responsibility demands that these members of the Security Council develop a system of mutual, non-nuclear political security assurances to offer India and Pakistan a way to reverse their mutual threat mechanisms step-by-step. Picking up on the concept of the Asian Regional Security Forum (ARF) of the ASEAN member states the objective should be to develop a security concept tailored to the specific situation in South Asia along the lines of the OSCE and under premium participation of all parties involved (no “imposing” of concepts). This model should be based on the principles of dialogue, confidence building measures, and mutual non-military security assurances. Economic sanctions constitute a violation of these principles: they have to be lifted immediately.

    4. The very issues of controversy focusing on the Kashmir region urge to bring in the United Nations and the International Court of Justice as mediators. Concrete objective must be to establish a regional security constellation that offers everybody involved more gain from a political settlement than from further military, – and perhaps even nuclear – action.

    5. Along with it, the political dimension of disarmament strongly suggests a fundamental break in the military nuclear policies of the established as well as the recent nuclear armed states. Otherwise, the latest developments, having led to the emergence of two new nuclear powers, may encourage other nuclear ‘threshold’ states to follow the path taken by India and Pakistan. As a short-term prospect to set the stage for truly preventive negotiations we urge to immediately approve of setting up an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The need to start such negotiations is now more pressing than ever.

    6. Both Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and NPT have to be revised accordingly. The first treaty is scheduled for reviewing in 1999, the second one in the year 2000. On that occasion the Test Ban Treaty should have amendments added to it to outlaw computer simulated and subcritical testing. The revised treaty should be ratified by all signatory states until 1999. The disarmament obligation in article VI of the NPT has to be fulfilled in compliance with a definite time-bound frame down to zero.

    7. Following the lead of already existing treaties, the prospects for setting up zones free of weapons of mass destruction need to be put on the agenda for negotiations. Predisposed areas are in the Near and Middle East including the still undeclared nuclear state Israel, in Central Europe, and on the Indian subcontinent.

    8. All negotiating approaches must navigate along definite and binding timetables.

    Demands on German Politics

    We advise the forthcoming (*) German government bound to be elected in the fall of this year to start in advance to re-evaluate the foundations of the previous security policy. We are not content making a general reference that we expect the future German government to evaluate the above proposed alternative concepts in an affirmative and constructive manner. We ask the next German government outright to provide a timetable with specific deadlines for:

    • eliminating the nuclear capacity of the German armed forces with suitable conversion actions and abandoning the principle of “Nuclear Sharing”
    • expelling all nuclear weapons still located on German soil for return to their respective countries of origin
    • principally outlawing both the use and the utilisation of weapons-grade and highly enriched uranium granting no exemptions for research
    • making a strong case against the separation of plutonium off spent fuel rods and its use in reactors
    • pushing for a revision of the NATO treaty using its leverage as a NATO member state to definitely deny NATO any option to station nuclear weapons on the territories of new or future member states
    • making a strong argument using its weight as a leading EU- and WEU member state to have no nuclear elements included in the future European “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP)
    • promoting setting up a “Central Europe Nuclear Weapons Free Zone ” backed by binding treaties.

    We are fully aware that German federal governments have on too many occasions in the past ignored the peace promoting non-military proposals and demands of non-parliamentarian forces. We are calling attention to the fact that at the same rate as the economic and social conditions deteriorate any government grows more dependent on a consensus on security policy with the very people who have voted them into office. The levels of military expenditure disproportionate to any conceivable threat and based on an outdated understanding of security have made it clear to anybody willing and able to see: there is no consensus on security policy. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned this has been impressively confirmed by a FORSA survey commissioned by the German chapter of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). The results published on the 2nd June 1998 indicate that 87% of those questioned like to see the nuclear armed states “getting rid of their own nuclear weapons as soon as possible”, 93% consider nuclear weapons an outright violation of international law and another 87% share the view that nuclear weapons stationed on German soil “ought to be removed right away”.

    The German Federal Government should jointly with other non-nuclear states launch an initiative in the United Nations to push for the immediate start of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

    Since a sustainable concept of security cannot be reduced to the sole issue of nuclear weapons we advise the next German government to establish a national “Round Table on Alternative Security”. This forum should have forces both inside and outside the administration and independent scientists working together to design a new security policy consensus for Germany that will replace military concepts of security with a civilian understanding of security aligned along the real needs of people.

  • 75 U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
    Contact: Dave Robinson
    814-453-4955 Ext. 235

    Erie, PA — Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it’s the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons, say 73 U.S. Catholic bishops in a report issued today by Pax Christi USA, the national Catholic peace and justice organization. The report, “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States,” critiques current U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral statement, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which allowed for the morality of nuclear deterrence on the condition that it only be an interim measure tied to progressive disarmament. Further Catholic Church teaching has since called for a concrete policy of nuclear elimination. “With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we feel our statement is both timely and prophetic,” says Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond, Va. and president of Pax Christi USA. “We hope it will help generate further discussions both within the Catholic community and in the policy-making circles of our government.”

    The report recognizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and offers a warning. “Because of the horrendous results if these weapons were to be used, and what we see as a greater liklihood of their use, we feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence,” the report states. Coming in the wake of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the report calls for the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process that will lead to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons the way that the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have banned those weapons.

    “What the Indian and Pakistani tests make clear is that the discriminatory nature of current nonproliferation efforts will not free the world of the threat posed by these weapons,” says Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Mich., and a leading expert on nuclear deterrence in the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. “The choice today is clear. Either all nations must give up the right to possess these weapons or all nations will claim that right. The events in India and Pakistan must be recognized as a sign of what is inevitable. We must act now to avoid a future where the nuclear threat becomes the currency of international security.”

    Citing the $60 billion Department of Energy program known as Stockpile Stewardship and Management, as well as current administration policies, the bishops conclude that the United States plans to rely on nuclear weapons indefinitely. “Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test, and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States (and the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new design and testing capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with ‘progressive disarmament’ and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely,” state the bishops.

    -30-

    The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
    An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States

    Issued on the 15th Anniversary of Challenge of Peace,
    God’s Promise and Our Response

    June 1998

    Dear Sisters and Brothers,

    We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.

    In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral Letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, grappled with the unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their use would not be morally justified.i We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military objective.

    Deterrence
    Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward progressive disarmament.

    Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It depended on three criteria:

    a) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy only. As we stated then, “We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace;”

    b) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim was only “to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;” and

    c) a reliance on deterrence must be used “not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament.”

    In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, we further specified that “progressive disarmament” must mean a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a concrete policy goal

    A New Moment
    In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were considered two historical forces against each other — capitalism in the West and communism in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each other’s ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no longer exists. The United States is now aiding its democratic successor, the Russian Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications and new missions to fulfill.

    But, with the end of the Cold War came new hope. World opinion has coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of this opinion we note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary, destabilizing and must be outlawed.vi We also note the historic International Court of Justice opinion of July 1996 that, “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The Court went on to say, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, “If biological weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear [weapon]. Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge.

    Unfortunately the monumental political changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely clear to us that the present US policy does not include a decisive commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. “Flexible targeting strategies” are aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons or other threats to US national interests.ix This expanded role of the US nuclear deterrent is unacceptable.

    A New Arms Race
    In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (which will ban full-scale underground nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with “progressive disarmament” and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.

    Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as well as other undefined vital US interests abroad.xii Does not this policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come? The Department of Energy’s own timetable for the Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop, test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983. Rather, it is the manifestation of the very reliance on nuclear nproliferation Treaty.

    In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats: “The United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons.”xv Nuclear deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to these goals.

    Inherent Dangers
    The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included the intention to use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and so-called “rogue nations.” The inherent instability in a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That danger can become manifest if but one so-called “rogue state” calls the deterrent bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of nuclear weapons. This must not be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.

    Moral Conclusions
    Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but rather has become the very “long-term basis for peace” that we rejected in 1983.

    b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of vital national interests abroad.

    c) although the United States and the republics that made up the former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the US intends to retain its nuclear deterrent into the indefinite future.

    Gospel Call of Love
    As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the words of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, “by their cost alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve.”xvi We speak out of love for both victims and the executioners, believing that “the whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5-14).

    It is out of this love that we raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in October 1997:

    “The work that this committee (1st Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention must be increased. Those nuclear weapons states resisting such negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. “This is a moral challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be met by the application of our humanity.”

    We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not. Instead, they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be used by someone.

    Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II’s warning that “violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence.”

    On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.

    May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
    Anthony S. Apuron, OFM, Cap.
    Archbishop of Agana, Guam

    Victor Balke
    Bishop of Crookston, MN

    William D. Borders
    Archbishop of Baltimore, MD (ret.)

    Joseph M. Breitenbeck
    Bishop of Grand Rapids, MI (ret.)

    Charles A. Buswell
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO (ret.)

    Matthew H. Clark
    Bishop of Rochester, NY

    Thomas J. Connolly
    Bishop of Baker, OR

    Patrick R. Cooney
    Bishop of Gaylord, MI

    Thomas V. Daily
    Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    James J. Daly
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY (ret.)

    Nicholas D’Antonio, OFM
    Bishop of New Orleans, LA (ret.)

    Joseph P. Delaney
    Bishop of Fort Worth, TX

    Norbert L. Dorsey, C.P
    Bishop of Orlando, FL

    Joseph A. Ferrario
    Bishop of Honolulu, HI (ret.)

    John J. Fitzpatrick
    Bishop of Brownsville, TX (ret.)

    Patrick F. Flores
    Archbishop of San Antonio, TX

    Joseph A. Fiorenza
    Bishop of Galveston-Houston, TX

    Raphael M. Fliss
    Bishop of Superior, WI

    Marion F. Forst
    Bishop of Dodge City, KS (ret.)

    Benedict C. Franzetta
    Auxiliary Bishop of Youngstown, OH (ret.)

    Raymond E. Goedert
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    John R. Gorman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    F. Joseph Gossman
    Bishop of Raleigh, NC

    Thomas J. Gumbleton
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI

    Richard C. Hanifen
    Bishop of Colorado Springs, CO

    Edward D. Head
    Bishop of Buffalo, NY (ret.)

    Joseph L. Howze
    Bishop of Biloxi, MS

    Howard J. Hubbard
    Bishop of Albany, NY

    William A. Hughes
    Bishop of Covington, KY (ret.)

    Raymond G. Hunthausen
    Archbishop of Seattle, WA (ret.)

    Joseph L. Imesch
    Bishop of Joliet, IL

    Michael J. Kaniecki, S.J.
    Bishop of Fairbanks, AK

    Raymond A. Lucker
    Bishop of New Ulm, MN

    Dominic A. Marconi
    Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NJ

    Joseph F. Maguire
    Bishop of Springfield, MA (ret.)

    Leroy T. Matthiesen
    Bishop of Amarillo, TX (ret.)

    Edward A. McCarthy
    Archbishop of Miami, FL (ret.)

    John E. McCarthy
    Bishop of Austin, TX

    Lawrence J. McNamara
    Bishop of Grand Island, NE

    John J. McRaith
    Bishop of Owensboro, KY

    Dale J. Melczek
    Bishop of Gary, IN

    Donald W. Montrose
    Bishop of Stockton, CA

    Robert M. Moskal
    Bishop of St. Josaphat in Parma, OH

    Michael J. Murphy
    Bishop of Erie, PA (ret.)

    P. Francis Murphy
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    William C. Newman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    James D. Niedergeses
    Bishop of Nashville, TN (ret.)

    Edward. J. O’Donnell
    Bishop of Lafayette, LA

    Albert H. Ottenweller
    Bishop of Steubenville, OH (ret.)

    Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S.
    Bishop of Gallup, NM

    A. Edward Pevec
    Auxiliary Bishop of Cleveland, OH

    Michael D. Pfeifer, O.M.I.
    Bishop of San Angelo, TX

    Kenneth J. Povish
    Bishop of Lansing, MI (ret.)

    Francis A. Quinn
    Bishop of Sacramento, CA (ret.)

    John R. Roach
    Archbishop of St. Paul /Minneapolis, MN (ret.)

    Frank J. Rodimer
    Bishop of Paterson, NJ

    Peter A. Rosazza
    Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford, CT

    Joseph M. Sartoris
    Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, CA

    Walter J. Schoenherr
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI (ret.)

    Roger L. Schwietz, OMI
    Bishop of Duluth, MN

    Daniel E. Sheehan
    Archbishop of Omaha, NE (ret.)

    Richard J. Sklba
    Auxiliary Bishop of Milwaukee, WI

    John J. Snyder
    Bishop of St. Augustine, FL

    George H. Speltz
    Bishop of St. Cloud, MN (ret.)

    Kenneth D. Steiner
    Auxiliary Bishop of Portland, OR

    Joseph M. Sullivan
    Auxiliary Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    Walter F. Sullivan
    Bishop of Richmond, VA

    Arthur N. Tafoya
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO

    Elliot G. Thomas
    Bishop of St. Thomas, VI

    David B. Thompson
    Bishop of Charleston, SC

    Kenneth E. Untener
    Bishop of Saginaw, MI

    Loras J. Watters
    Bishop of Winona, CA (ret.)

    Emil A. Wcela
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY

    __________________________________

    1 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, NCCB, 1983, No. 150. 
    2 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 186 
    3 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 185 & 188 (1) 
    4John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations Special Session On Disarmament, 1982,” #8 
    5 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    6 New York Times, December 6, 1996, Statement on Nuclear Weapons by 61 International Generals and Admirals. 
    7 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the (Il)legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996. 
    8 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    9 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.10 
    10 President William J. Clinton, Letter of Transmittal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate, Sept. 22, 1997. 
    11 Western States Legal Foundation, A Faustian Bargain: Why “Stockpile Stewardship” is Incompatible with the Process of Nuclear Disarmament, March 1998. 
    12 Reported in the Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1. 13 Information shared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Senior NIF Scientist, William J. Hogan with Pax Christi USA Delegation to LLNL, October 7, 1997. 
    14 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.9. 
    15 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    16 Giovanni Cheli, Permanent Representative for the Holy See Observer Mission to the United Nations, United Nations 1st Special Session on Disarmament, 1976. 
    17 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    18 Pope John Paul II, Address to Pax Christi International, May 29, 1995.

  • Statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan

    The news of resumption of nuclear testing by India has not come as a surprise to us. For the past 24 years, Pakistan had consistently drawn the attention of the international community to India’s nuclear aspirations. the duplicity surrounding India’s political pronouncements and its clandestine nuclear weapons programme was also pointed out. The Prime Minister of Pakistan had recently drawn the attention of the international community particularly states permanent members of the United Nations Security Council regarding Indian plans to induct nuclear weapons.

    Pakistan’s repeated reminders to the international community particularly to the leaders of the states permanent members of the Security Council unfortunately did not receive attention that they merited.

    The international community has, in fact, by adopting a dismissive approach encouraged India to achieve its nuclear aspirations.

    The responsibility for dealing a death blow to the global efforts at nuclear non-proliferation rests squarely with India.

    Pakistan reserves the right to take all appropriate measures for its security.

    The Prime Minister has assured the people of Pakistan that Pakistan defence would be made impregnable against any Indian threat be it nuclear or conventional.