Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: deterrence

  • Nuclear Renaissance

    The review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a five-yearly event, opened in New York on May 2 without benefit of an agenda. The conference had no agenda because the world has no agenda with respect to nuclear arms. Broadly speaking, two groups of nations are setting the pace of events. One — the possessors of nuclear arms under the terms of the treaty, comprising the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — wants to hold on to its nuclear arsenals indefinitely. The other group — call them the proliferators — has only recently acquired the weapons or would like to do so. Notable among them are North Korea, which by its own account has built a small arsenal, and Iran, which appears to be using its domestic nuclear-power program to create a nuclear-weapon capacity.

    As the conference began, Iran announced that it would soon end a moratorium on the production of fissile materials and Pyongyang declared that it had become a full-fledged nuclear power — a declaration buttressed by testimony in the Senate from the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, that North Korea now has rockets capable of landing nuclear warheads on the United States. If the two countries establish themselves as nuclear powers, a long list of other countries in the Middle East and North Asia may seek to follow suit. In that case, the NPT will be a dead letter, and the gates of unlimited proliferation will swing open.

    The two groups of nations are in collision. The possessors want to stop the proliferators, and the proliferators want to defy them as well as ask them to get rid of their own mountainous nuclear arsenals. One of the liveliest debates at the conference concerns the nuclear fuel cycle, whereby fuel for both nuclear power and nuclear bomb materials is made. In the possessor countries, proposals abound to restrict this capacity to themselves, thus digging a moat around not only their arsenals but their nuclear productive capacities as well. The proliferators respond that the world’s nuclear double-standard should not be fortified but eliminated: In the long run, either everyone should have the right to the fuel cycle — and for that matter to the bombs — or no one should. (This was the view of Pakistan and India until, in May 1998, they remedied the inequity in their own cases by testing nuclear weapons and declaring themselves nuclear powers.)

    Far more contentious is the new American military doctrine of pre-emptive war, aimed at stopping proliferation by force, as the United States said it sought to do by overthrowing the government of Iraq. Inasmuch as the Bush administration has suggested that even nuclear force might be used, the new policy represents the ultimate extreme of the double standard: The United States will use nuclear weapons to stop other countries from getting those same weapons. The proliferators accordingly fear a world whose commanding heights will be guarded by the nuclear cannons of a few nations, while the rest of the world cowers in the planet’s lowlands and back alleys. Nuclear disarmament, once the domain of the peace-loving, would become a prime engine of war in an imposed, militarized global order.

    The debate between the nuclear haves and have-nots is probably unresolvable anytime soon. Certainly it will not be settled at the review conference. And yet, as is true of so many adversaries, the two groups of nations have more in common with each other than with other nations: They both want nuclear weapons. And if one looks at what is happening on the ground, a remarkable uniformity appears. All the parties in this quarrel are expanding their nuclear capacities and missions. In a sense the two groups, even as they threaten each other with annihilation, are cooperating in nuclearizing the globe.

    The end of the cold war was supposed to be the beginning of a farewell to nuclear danger, but now, fifteen years later, it’s clear that a nuclear renaissance is under way. China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Britain are all increasing their arsenals and/or their delivery systems. (In an amazingly undernoticed development, the shadow of danger from Chinese nuclear weapons is falling over larger and larger areas of the United States.) The United States, even as it reduces the number of its alert nuclear weapons — though not the total number of nuclear weapons, alert or otherwise — is rotating its nuclear guns away from their traditional Cold War targets and toward Third World sites. (The United States and Russia built up such an excess of nuclear bombs during the Cold War that they can string out their dismantlement almost indefinitely without carving into their joint capacity to finish off most of human civilization.) Britain likewise is redirecting its targeting. Its Defense Secretary has stated that even the modest step of declaring no-first-use of nuclear weapons “would be incompatible with our and NATO’s doctrine of deterrence, nor would it further nuclear disarmament objectives.” In other words, Britain may find it necessary to initiate a nuclear war to achieve nuclear disarmament. Finally, individuals and terrorist groups are reaching for the bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. Osama bin Laden, for instance, has declared that obtaining such is the “religious duty” of Muslims, and September 11 gave us an example of how he might use them.

    All but unheard in the snarling din are the true voices of peace — voices calling on the one group of nations to resist the demonic allure of nuclear arms and on the other group to rid themselves of the ones they have, leaving the world with a single standard: no nuclear weapons. Of the countries represented at the conference, fully 183 have found it entirely possible to live without atomic arsenals, and few — barring a breakdown of the treaty — show any sign of changing their minds. In the UN General Assembly the vast majority of them have voted regularly for nuclear abolition. Behind those votes stand the people of the world, who, when asked, agree. Even the people of the United States are in the consensus. Presented by AP pollsters in March with the statement, “No country should be allowed to have nuclear weapons,” 66% agreed. In other countries, the percentage of supporters is higher. On the day their voices are heard and their will made active, the end of the nuclear age will be in sight.

    Jonathan Schell, author of The Unconquerable World, received the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 2003 Distinguished Peace Leadership Award.

    Originally published by The Nation Magazine.

  • Civil Society Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament

    Civil Society Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament

    The fate of the world depends upon whether humankind will be able to eliminate the world’s nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons, designed to cause massive damage to large populations, are essentially city-destroying weapons, as was tragically demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These weapons may be created in the hope that they will never be used, but this cannot be guaranteed. Once created, nuclear weapons are an ongoing threat to humanity and other forms of life. So long as these weapons exist, no leader can provide a guarantee that they will not be used.

    I keep on my desk a small booklet, published by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, with the words of General George Lee Butler, a former Commander of the United States Strategic Command. General Butler, who advocates abolition of all nuclear weapons, believes that humanity has been given a “second chance” by our Creator. Here is the perspective of this retired four-star general who now sees himself simply as “a citizen of this planet”:

    “Sadly, the Cold War lives on in the minds of men who cannot let go the fears, the beliefs, the enmities of the Nuclear Age. They cling to deterrence, clutch its tattered promise to their breast, shake it wistfully at bygone adversaries and balefully at new or imagined ones. They are gripped still by its awful willingness not simply to tempt the apocalypse but to prepare its way.

    “To them I say we cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it. It is time to reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.” 1

    These are powerful words, not the kind we are accustomed to hearing from politicians or military leaders. General Butler, an anomaly, is a retired air force officer, a graduate of the Air Force Academy, who once commanded the entire US strategic nuclear arsenal, and came away from this experience sobered by what he had learned. For a short time, General Butler spoke eloquently for a world free of nuclear weapons, his military background giving authenticity to his concerns.

    But there are few military men such as General Butler, and fewer still who have spoken publicly on this most important of all issues confronting humanity. For the most part, military leaders and politicians appear comfortable moving forward with only slight variations of the nuclear status quo. It appears that if there is to be change toward a world free of nuclear threat, the leadership must come from civil society organizations. These organizations face the challenge of awakening largely dormant populations within somnambulistic societies that seem content to sleepwalk toward Armageddon.

    Civil Society Leadership

    In the area of nuclear disarmament, the role of civil society leadership is critical. We obviously cannot depend upon political leadership, which is capable in our frenetic world of only dealing with problems as they become acute. There is a furious pace to politics that dulls the political imagination and often results in less than visionary leadership.

    There are two possible paths to awakening the political imagination on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The first and tragic possibility would be a sadly belated response to a nuclear detonation destroying a city, whether by accident or design, by a nuclear weapons state or by a non-state extremist group. The second would be by an effective campaign led by civil society that awakened and empowered the people of the planet to put sufficient pressure on their political leaders for them to take action as a political expedient without needing to engage their moral imaginations.

    Clearly the second option is far preferable to the first. The critical question is whether civil society organizations can actually provide the leadership to sufficiently awaken a dormant public to in turn move political leaders to take action.

    Why have civil society organizations and their followers not been successful in past campaigns calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons? Intrinsic psychological, political and social factors impede efforts to build a sustained and effective mass movement seeking this goal. A crude but accurate analogy can be made with the plight of a frog placed in a pot of lukewarm water and placidly treading water while the pot is gradually heated to a boil. Here are some of the reasons one could speculate that the frog (or our own species) fails to take the necessary action to save itself:

    • Ignorance. The frog may fail to recognize the dilemma. It may be unable to predict the consequences of being in water in which the temperature is steadily rising.
    • Complacency. The frog may feel comfortable in the warming water. It may believe that because nothing bad has happened yet (even though it has), nothing bad will happen in the future.
    • Deference to authority. The frog may believe that others are in control of the thermostat and that it has no power to change the conditions in which it finds itself.
    • Sense of powerlessness. The frog may fail to realize its own power to affect change, and believe that there is nothing it can do to improve its situation.
    • Fear. The frog may have concluded that, although there are dangers in the pot, the dangers outside the pot are even greater. Thus, it fails to take action, even though it could do so.
    • Economic advantage. The frog may conclude that there are greater short-term rewards for staying in the pot than jumping out.
    • Conformity. The frog may see other frogs treading water in the pot and not want to appear different by sounding an alarm or acting on its own initiative.
    • Marginalization. The frog may have witnessed other frogs attempt to raise warnings or jump out, and seen them marginalized and ignored by the other frogs.
    • Technological optimism. The frog may understand that there is a problem that could lead to its demise, but believe that it is not necessary to act because someone will find a technological solution.
    • Tyranny of experts. Even though the frog may believe it is in danger, the experts may provide a comforting assessment that makes the frog doubt its own wisdom.

    Identical challenges must be overcome if civil society initiatives are to be successful in moving the human population to action. Other challenges have to do with the mass media, which is not inclined to cede either time or authority to civil society leadership. Thus, the messages of those who often have little to say, but are in powerful positions, tend to dominate the media, while civil society organizations struggle for even modest media exposure.

    Civil Society Initiatives

    Indeed, there have been many courageous and ambitious civil society initiatives for nuclear disarmament over the period of the Nuclear Age. They have included marches, protests, appeals, policy recommendations and civil disobedience. I will discuss a few of these important initiatives that have occurred in the post Cold War period, although there are far too many for me to provide a comprehensive overview. Some of these outstanding initiatives have been Abolition 2000, The Middle Powers Initiative, the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, and the Turn the Tide Campaign of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

    Abolition 2000, a global network of over 2,000 civil society organizations and municipalities, was formed during the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference by representatives of organizations that were disappointed with the manner in which the nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States , had manipulated the outcome of the Conference. Despite the serious lack of progress by the nuclear weapons states in fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations to that point in time, the treaty was extended indefinitely. Abolition 2000 began with a Founding Statement, created by civil society representatives at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which articulated its principles. 2 The strong points of Abolition 2000 were that it was broadly international, included many forms of expertise, was activist in its orientation, and was committed to complete nuclear disarmament. This network was largely responsible for bringing the terms “abolition” and “elimination” into the dialogue on nuclear disarmament. It moved the discussion from arms control to abolition.

    The initial goal of Abolition 2000 when it was formed in 1995 was to achieve an agreement for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. When this agreement by governments proved impossible to achieve, despite Abolition 2000 having drafted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, the network decided to continue its abolition work, maintaining contacts within the global network with the more than 2,000 civil society organizations and municipalities that comprised the network.

    The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is a coalition of eight international civil society organizations. It was formed in 1998 to encourage middle power governments to promote a nuclear disarmament agenda. Only months after MPI’s formation, a group of middle power countries, calling itself the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), went public with a strong nuclear disarmament agenda. These countries were: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. 3 They have been active in promoting their agenda in the First Committee of the United Nations (Disarmament Committee) and at the meetings of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They were instrumental in achieving the consensus adoption of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    MPI has given support to the New Agenda countries by convening high level consultations, sending delegations to many countries, including NATO countries and Japan , and publishing briefing papers in support of NAC positions and the preservation of the NPT. By its support of the NAC, the Middle Powers Initiative has tried to focus the attention and efforts of key civil society organizations to bring pressure to bear on the nuclear weapons states from friendly middle power governments. 4

    The Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, also known as Vision 2020, is a relatively recent campaign, having begun its work in 2003. The goal of the campaign is to press governments to begin negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons in 2005, to complete negotiations on this treaty by the year 2010 and to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2020. In a sense, this Emergency Campaign picks up from Abolition 2000, setting its target date for governments to complete negotiations just a decade further in the future than Abolition 2000. This Emergency Campaign has another important element. It is led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , two cities dedicated to the abolition of nuclear weapons, and is composed of mayors in over 600 cities. 5

    The Mayors for Peace participated in the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, bringing 16 mayors and deputy mayors from 12 countries to New York to attend the meetings. They are planning to bring over 100 mayors and deputy mayors to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. There is no doubt that the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign is bringing important new energy to the global effort for nuclear disarmament. Abolition 2000 has created a special arm, Abolition Now!, to support the mayors campaign and that calls upon all countries to make public their plans for nuclear disarmament in accord with their treaty obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 6

    A new and hopeful campaign focuses on the United States , the world’s most powerful state, because US leadership and support is essential for serious global progress on nuclear disarmament. The campaign, called Turn the Tide, is a project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. It seeks to inform and mobilize US citizens to participate in directing messages via the internet to their elected representatives on key nuclear weapons issues. The campaign utilizes sophisticated software to send action alerts and enables easy communications with key officials. 7

    The Turn the Tide Campaign is based on a 13-point Statement:

    • Stop all efforts to create dangerous new nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
    • Maintain the current moratorium on nuclear testing and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    • Cancel plans to build new nuclear weapons production plants, and close and clean up the toxic contamination at existing plants.
    • Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No Use of nuclear weapons against any nation or group that does not have nuclear weapons.
    • Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nations possessing nuclear weapons.
    • Cancel funding for and plans to deploy offensive missile “defense” systems which could ignite a dangerous arms race and offer no security against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.
    • In order to significantly decrease the threat of accidental launch, together with Russia , take nuclear weapons off high-alert status and do away with the strategy of launch-on-warning.
    • Together with Russia , implement permanent and verifiable dismantlement of nuclear weapons taken off deployed status through the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
    • Demonstrate to other countries US commitment to reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons by removing all US nuclear weapons from foreign soil.
    • To prevent future proliferation or theft, create and maintain a global inventory of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials and place these weapons and materials under strict international safeguards.
    • Initiate international negotiations to fulfill existing treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the phased and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.
    • Initiate a moratorium on new nuclear power reactors and gradually phase out existing ones, as these are a primarily means for the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and weapons; simultaneously establish an International Sustainable Energy Agency to support the development of clean, safe renewable energy.
    • Redirect funding from nuclear weapons programs to dismantling nuclear weapons, safeguarding nuclear materials, cleaning up the toxic legacy of the Nuclear Age and meeting more pressing social needs such as education, health care and social services.

    Conclusions

    For nearly 60 years, since the first nuclear test at Alamogordo , New Mexico , the world has been muddling through the nuclear dilemma. Despite the end of the Cold War, we are far from being secure from the nuclear threat. The threat today takes a different form, but is no less dangerous. In our divided world, there are terrible tensions and there is the possibility that nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of non-state extremists who would have no reservations about using them against the populations of many countries, including the nuclear weapons states. The irony of this is that none of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states can provide an ounce of deterrence or security against such extremists.

    The only way to assure the security of the nuclear weapons states, or any state, from a nuclear attack, is to eliminate these weapons in a phased, orderly and verified manner and place the materials to make these weapons under strict and effective international control. This is the reality of our common nuclear dilemma, and getting this message through to the leaders of nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States, is one of the most critical challenges, if not the most critical challenge, of our time. Only with the success of civil society in meeting this challenge can we have a reasonable expectation, in General Butler’s words, to “reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.”

    David Krieger is a founder and president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World Court and may other studies of peace in the Nuclear Age.

    Butler , George Lee, “Ending the Nuclear Madness,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Waging Peace Series, Booklet 40, September 1999.

    See http://www.abolition2000.org

    Originally Slovenia was also a part of the New Agenda Coalition, but did not stay long in the coalition.

    See http://www.mpi.org

    See http://www.mayorsforpeace.org

    See http://www.abolitionnow.org

    See https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com

  • Israel’s Nukes Serve to Justify Iran’s: Deterring the Deterrents

    The more nuclear arms are lying around, the more the chances of them being used. So to persuade Iran to forgo nuclear weapons is a laudable objective. But for the United States, Britain and France to insist on it is hypocritical.

    These Western powers have argued convincingly for decades that nuclear deterrence keeps the peace – and themselves maintain nuclear armories long after the cold war has ended. So why shouldn’t Iran , which is in one of the world’s most dangerous neighborhoods, have a deterrent too?

    And where is the source of the threat that makes Iran, a country that has never started a war in 200 years, feel so nervous that it must now take the nuclear road? If Saddam Hussein’s Iraq , with its nuclear ambitions, used to be one reason, the other is certainly Israel, the country that hard-liners in the United States are encouraging to mount a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear industry before it produces bombs.

    The United States refuses to acknowledge formally that Israel has nuclear weapons, even though top officials will tell you privately that it has 200 of them. Until this issue is openly acknowledged, America, Britain and France are probably wasting their time trying to persuade Iran to forgo nuclear weapons.

    The supposition is that Israel lives in an even more dangerous neighborhood than Iran. It is said to be a beleaguered nation under constant threat of being eliminated by the combined muscle of its Arab opponents.

    There is no evidence, however, that Arab states have invested the financial and human resources necessary to fight the kind of war that would be catastrophic for Israel. And there is no evidence that Israel’s nuclear weapons have deterred the Arabs from more limited wars or prevented Palestinian intifadas and suicide bombers.

    Nor have Israel ‘s nuclear weapons influenced Arab attitudes toward making peace. In the 1973 Arab war against Israel and in the 1991 Gulf war, they clearly failed in their supposed deterrent effect. The Arabs knew, as the North Vietnamese knew during the Vietnam War, that their opponent would not dare to use its nuclear weapons.

    Israelis say that they need nuclear weapons in case one day an opportunistic Egypt and Syria, sensing that Israel ‘s guard is down, revert to their old stance of total hostility and attack Israel. But, as Zeev Maoz has argued in the journal International Security, these countries keep to their treaty obligations.

    Egypt did not violate its peace treaty with Israel when Israel attacked Syria and Lebanon in 1982. Syria did not violate the May 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel even when its forces were under Israeli attack. Nor did Egypt, Jordan and Syria violate their treaty commitments when the second Palestinian intifada broke out in September 2000.

    Since its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has reduced its defense spending from 22 percent of its gross national product in 1974 to a mere 2.75 percent in 2002. Syria ‘s has fallen from 26 percent to 6.7 percent. The combined defense expenditures of Egypt , Syria , Jordan and Lebanon amount to only 58 percent of Israel ‘s. It is the Arabs who should be worried by Israel ‘s might, rather than the other way round.

    Israel ‘s nuclear weapons are politically unusable and militarily irrelevant, given the real threats it faces. But they have been very effective in allowing India, Pakistan, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, North Korea and now Iran to think that they, too, had good reason to build a nuclear deterrent.

    Four of these nations have dismantled their nuclear arms factories, which shows that nuclear policies are not cast in stone. The way to deal with Iran is to prove to its leadership that nuclear weapons will add nothing to its security, just as they add nothing to Israel ‘s.

    This may require a grand bargain, which would mean the United States offering a mutual nonaggression pact, ending its embargo over access to the International Monetary Fund and allowing American investment in Iran . It would also mean America coming clean about Israel ‘s nuclear armory and pressuring Israel to forgo its nuclear deterrent.

    If Western powers want to grasp the nettle of nuclear proliferation, they need to take hold of the whole plant, not just one leaf.

    Jonathan Power is a commentator on foreign affairs.

    Originally published by the International Herald Tribune.

  • The Wrong Deterrence: The Threat of Loose Nukes Is One of Our Own Making

    Nuclear terrorism, thankfully, is still only a specter, not a reality. But the recent wave of bloodshed in Russia underscores the urgency of the need to prevent terrorists capable of indiscriminate slaughter from acquiring nuclear bombs.

    To its credit, the Bush administration has finally launched an ambitious initiative to better secure nuclear and radiological materials, particularly in violence-racked Russia. But unless the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which was introduced in May, becomes part of a far more comprehensive approach to the challenges of nuclear theft and terrorism, it is destined to fall well short of its goal of safeguarding the American people from the threat of nuclear weapons.

    The initiative builds on the bilateral nonproliferation efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a U.S. government-funded, post-Cold War effort that focused on securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The new, expanded cooperative effort seeks to collect weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium that could be used in nuclear bombs from dozens of additional countries, and to lock them down in secure facilities.

    But with U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces still on hair-trigger alert, we need to recognize that present policies for reducing the risk of nuclear strikes against the United States by terrorists or rogue countries are inconsistent and self-defeating. On the one hand, in the name of deterrence, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces both comply with their presidents’ instructions to be constantly prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war with each other at a moment’s notice. On the other hand, in the name of nonproliferation, the United States and Russia cooperate closely in securing Russia’s nuclear weapons against theft.

    By keeping thousands of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch, even under normal peacetime circumstances, the United States projects a powerful deterrent threat at Russia. But at the same time, it causes Russia to retain thousands of weapons in its operational inventory, scattered across that country’s vast territory, and to keep them ready for rapid use in large-scale nuclear war with America. And to maintain the reliability of these far-flung weapons, Russia must constantly transport large numbers back and forth between a remanufacturing facility and the dispersed military bases. This perpetual motion creates a serious vulnerability, because transportation is the Achilles’ heel of nuclear weapons security.

    On any given day, many hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons are moving around the countryside. Nearly 1,000 of them are in some stage of transit or temporary storage awaiting relocation at any time. This constant movement between the far-flung nuclear bases and the remanufacturing facility at Ozersk in the southern Urals stems from the esoteric technical fact that Russian nuclear bombs are highly perishable. In contrast to American bombs, which have a shelf life of more than 30 years, Russian bombs last only eight to 12 years before corrosion and internal decay render them unreliable — prone to fizzling instead of exploding. At that point, they must be shipped back to the factory for remanufacturing. Every year many hundreds of bombs, perhaps as many as a thousand, roll out of Russia’s Mayak factory. The United States turns out fewer than 10 per year. In Russia, the rail and other transportation lines linking the factory to the far-flung nuclear bases across 10 time zones are buzzing with nuclear activity and provide fertile ground for terrorist interception.

    Keeping a small strategic arsenal consolidated at a limited number of locations close to the Mayak factory would be the ideal security environment for preventing Russian nuclear bombs from falling into terrorist hands. But the ongoing nuclear dynamic between the former Cold War foes creates the opposite environment, which undercuts security. Russian nuclear commanders, confronted with U.S. submarines lurking off their coasts with 10-minute missile-flight times to Moscow and thousands of launch-ready U.S. warheads on land- and sea-based missiles aimed at thousands of targets in Russia, are compelled to match the American posture in numbers, alert status and geographic dispersal. U.S. leaders must decide which goal takes precedence: sustaining the Cold War legacy of massive arsenals to deter a massive surprise nuclear attack, or shoring up the security of Russian nuclear weapons to prevent terrorists from grabbing them (or corrupt guards from stealing and selling them).

    And terrorists grabbing such a weapon as it shuttles between deployment fields and factories is not the worst-case scenario stemming from this nuclear gamesmanship. The theft of a nuclear bomb could spell eventual disaster for an American city, but the seizure of a ready-to-fire strategic long-range nuclear missile or group of missiles capable of delivering bombs to targets thousands of miles away could be apocalyptic for entire nations.

    If scores of armed Chechen rebels were able to slip into the heart of Moscow and hold a packed theater hostage for days, as they did in 2002, might it not be possible for terrorists to infiltrate missile fields in rural Russia and seize control of a nuclear-armed mobile rocket roaming the countryside? It’s an open question that warrants candid bilateral discussion of the prospects of terrorists capturing rockets and circumventing the safeguards designed to foil their illicit firing, especially since the 9/11 commission report revealed that al Queda plotters considered this very idea.

    Another specter concerns terrorists “spoofing” radar or satellite sensors or cyber-terrorists hacking into early warning networks. By either firing short-range missiles that fool warning sensors into reporting an attack by longer-range missiles, or feeding false data into warning computer networks, could sophisticated terrorists generate false indications of an enemy attack that results in a mistaken launch of nuclear rockets in “retaliation?” False alarms have been frequent enough on both sides under the best of conditions. False warning poses an acute danger as long as Russian and U.S. nuclear commanders are given, as they still are today, only several pressure-packed minutes to determine whether an enemy attack is underway and to decide whether to retaliate. Russia’s deteriorating early-warning network, coupled with terrorist plotting against it, only heightens the dangers.

    Russia is not the only crucible of risk. The early-warning and control problems plaguing Pakistan, India and other nuclear proliferators are even more acute. As these nations move toward hair-trigger stances for their nuclear missiles, the terrorist threat to them will grow in parallel.

    Even the U.S. nuclear control apparatus is far from fool-proof. For example, a Pentagon investigation of nuclear safeguards conducted several years ago made a startling discovery — terrorist hackers might be able to gain back-door electronic access to the U.S. naval communications network, seize control electronically of radio towers such as the one in Cutler, Maine, and illicitly transmit a launch order to U.S. Trident ballistic missile submarines armed with 200 nuclear warheads apiece. This exposure was deemed so serious that Trident launch crews had to be given new instructions for confirming the validity of any launch order they receive. They would now reject certain types of firing orders that previously would have been carried out immediately.

    Both countries are running terrorist risks of this sort for the sake of an obsolete deterrent strategy. The notion that either the United States or Russia would deliberately attack the other with nuclear weapons is ludicrous, while the danger that terrorists are plotting to get their hands on these arsenals is real. We need to kick our old habits and stand down our hair-trigger forces. Taking U.S. and Russian missiles off of alert would automatically reduce, if not remove, the biggest terrorist threats that stem from keeping thousands of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles fueled, targeted and waiting for a couple of computer signals to fire. They would fly the instant they received these signals, which can be sent with a few keystrokes on a launch console.

    To keep them from flying, we ought to reverse our priorities for nuclear security. The U.S. government should not be spending 25 times more on its deterrent posture than it spends on all of our nonproliferation assistance to Russia and other countries to help them keep their nuclear bombs and materials from falling into terrorist hands. Both the United States and Russia should be spending more on de-alerting, dismantling and securing our arsenals than on prepping them for a large-scale nuclear war with each other.

    The current deterrent practices of the two nuclear superpowers are not only anachronistic, they are thwarting our ability to protect ourselves against the real threats.

    Bruce Blair is president of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and a former Minuteman launch officer.

    This article first appeared in The Washington Post , September 19, 2004.

  • A Safer Form of Deterrence and Security

    Proliferation Brief, Volume 7, Number 9

    The following are excerpts from remarks by Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004 . To read the full text, and for video and audio of the remarks, visit www.ProliferationNews.org.

    Nuclear weapons nations must visibly and steadily reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, and today they are not. The presidents of the United States and Russia should urgently undertake a new nuclear initiative and end their nations’ Cold War nuclear force postures by removing all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status.

    Today, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon is unacceptably high. We are running the irrational risk of an Armageddon of our own making. It is time to find a safer form of deterrence and security. If both the United States and Russia remove nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status, we can immediately eliminate the threat of rapid assured destruction and dramatically reduce the chance of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch. By taking this step, we will de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and make them less relevant.

    Keeping our nuclear weapons on hair trigger now increases the risk it was designed to reduce. President Bush knows this: In the summer of 2000, Presidential candidate George W. Bush said: “The Clinton-Gore administration has had over seven years to bring the U.S. force posture into the post-Cold War world. Instead, they remain locked in a Cold War mentality.”

    Later in the same speech, Mr. Bush said: “The United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation. Preparation for quick launch – within minutes after warning of an attack – was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry. But today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. So, as president, I will ask for an assessment of what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.”

    I have a proposal. Candidate Bush said we should remove “as many weapons as possible” from hair-trigger status. I propose that today “as many weapons as possible” should mean “all of them.” I urge the president of the United States and the president of Russia to order the military and defense officials of each country to present to the presidents, within six months, a set of options for removing all nuclear weapons of both countries from hair-trigger status. These officials should jointly:

    1. Determine what threats posed by the other side justify keeping any nuclear weapons on hair-trigger status.
    2. Determine what steps the other side must take to remove those threats and thus end the justification for hair-trigger status.
    3. Integrate these findings into proposed nuclear force postures that can assure the survivability of nuclear forces and end the need for quick launch capacity by either the U.S. or Russia.

    The presidents should then jointly adopt an approach and a timetable to get the job done and challenge other nuclear nations to follow this lead. If the defense establishments say they cannot, we need clear and convincing answers why not. The burden of proof must shift to those who insist on maintaining the hair-trigger posture in Russia and in the United States .

    Removing all nuclear weapons from hair trigger alert would move towards a nuclear posture where the decision to launch will be slower, more deliberate and far less likely. This is an essential first step in coming out from under the shadow of Mutual Assured Destruction toward an expanded doctrine of “Mutual Assured Safety” – an idea first advanced by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry – where both the U.S. and Russia would shift their nuclear weapons doctrine from one that “seeks security by threatening destruction” toward one that “seeks security by threat reduction.”

    There are a number of possible options for beginning the removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, including:

    1. Immediately ordering that the warheads from each side scheduled to be taken out under the 2002 Treaty of Moscow be taken off alert;
    2. Limiting the number of hair-trigger status warheads each side can deploy to several hundred;
    3. A reciprocal approach where the U.S. would remove all land-based missiles from hair-trigger alert, and Russia would do the same for its sea-based missiles.

    If the United States and Russia de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in our security, it would: immediately reduce the danger we pose to each other; give us more standing to encourage other nations to dismiss the nuclear option; and help build the international cooperation required to apply pressure on nations still seeking the nuclear option – nations like Iran and North Korea – and rally the world to take essential steps in preventing catastrophic terrorism

  • Putting the Chinese Slipper on the Other Foot

    Imagine this: A Chinese airplane is spying on the United States. In a routine flight, it flies just off the coast of Hawaii, using its sophisticated electronic surveillance capabilities to gather intelligence. Since it is a dangerous world, the Chinese want to know what plans our military is making that might affect them. Naturally, our government is somewhat uncomfortable knowing that we are being spied on like this. Why, we wonder, are the Chinese spying on us? What are their intentions?

    US planes regularly intercept Chinese reconnaissance planes, approaching within a safe distance. However, this time, one fighter pilot gets a little overzealous. There is a slight collision. Our plane goes down in the sea. Our pilot is lost at sea. The Chinese plane is damaged and makes an emergency landing on the island of Maui. There are 24 Chinese soldiers aboard the aircraft. They are taken into custody by our military. We also take possession of the Chinese aircraft.

    Our government isn’t too happy about this situation. Opinions are expressed such as: “The Chinese have a lot of audacity coming so close to our territory and spying on us.” Another opinion is: “It’s a damn shame that we lost one of our pilots in an action that never would have happened if the Chinese hadn’t been over here spying on us.” There is a lot of righteous indignation being expressed by top US officials about the Chinese bringing this on themselves by their own arrogance in seeking to spy on us in this manner. Still another opinion expressed is: “They landed on our territory, so we’ll just take our time and examine their plane to see what we can learn about their spying techniques.”

    As soon as the Chinese government learns that its airplane has landed on US territory, the Chinese president sends a message to the US president demanding to see its soldiers and to have its airplane back without any tampering with it. We interpret this as an even greater expression of arrogance on the part of the Chinese, and we respond with silence. In the meantime, we hold the Chinese soldiers in reasonably comfortable detention. We also take advantage of the presence of their aircraft to give it a thorough going over. Since this takes time, we remain silent to the Chinese demands. We decide to just let them cool their heels for awhile. When we do respond to the Chinese, we tell them that we want an apology for their spying on us and for the loss of our fighter pilot.

    The Chinese president, who is relatively new to his job and not too experienced in dealing with people from other countries, responds that he will not apologize. He doesn’t believe that there is anything for which to apologize. He also believes that he will lose face before his people if he does apologize. He thinks an apology will be taken as a sign of weakness. Instead of apologizing, he repeats his demands for the immediate return of the Chinese soldiers and aircraft – and he adds a new demand, that the Americans should stop their spying activities. We can only wonder why the Chinese president refuses to apologize for something that is so clearly poor judgment on the part of the Chinese. His refusal to apologize appears to be additional poor judgment on his part.

    The Chinese president believes he has every right to have his soldiers returned immediately and he takes great offense that the Americans are dragging their feet on returning the aircraft. He dismisses the concerns that we have raised over their spying on us. “Everyone spies,” he thinks. “You spy. We spy. So what is the big deal?” But he also knows deeper down that China bears some responsibility, and that their soldiers and airplane are in US custody. The Chinese president contemplates what threats he can bring to bear on the Americans to get his soldiers and aircraft returned. He is determined to appear strong and not to compromise.

    We Americans, though, are not too worried about any bluster coming from this novice Chinese leader. We know that he does not have a high level of support among the Chinese people. Perhaps showing the Chinese people that he is not as powerful as he might appear to be is not such a bad strategy for us.

    Of course, our position appears sensible. And the Chinese position is arrogant and unapologetic. The next thing we can expect are stronger threats coming from the Chinese leadership, in an effort to assume the moral high ground, even though it was their action that initiated this string of events.

    When our government has discovered everything it wants to know about the Chinese aircraft, we’ll give them back their plane and soldiers. But a reasonable guess is that we will have made an enemy of the Chinese leader.

    It is a dangerous world. Incidents like this can arise without warning at any time. Without restraint on all sides, such incidents can escalate to war. We should never forget that a Chinese leader or any leader armed with nuclear weapons poses a terrible danger not only to us but to the entire world.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • National Missile Defense: Just Say No!

    Ballistic missile defense sounds on the surface like a good idea. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could just make those nasty nuclear weapons harmless? That is, their nuclear weapons, not ours. We don’t worry much about the threat posed by our own nuclear weapons, but these, of course, are not aimed at us. They are aimed at others or, more accurately, they are presently aimed at the oceans if we are to believe Mr. Clinton. They can, however, be reprogrammed to strike anywhere on only a moment’s notice.

    Our nuclear weapons still pose a security problem to us because relying on nuclear weapons for security means that there will be other countries that will do so as well, and the result will be that we are targeted by their nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense, if we are to believe its proponents, offers a technological solution to this dilemma. It is, however, an unproven and unprovable solution and comes at a high price, both monetarily and in terms of security.

    Ballistic missile defense was pushed by the Reagan administration. In that early incarnation it was derided “Star Wars.” Since then, it has gone through many more incarnations, the latest of which is a land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system that is intended to defend against an attack by relatively small and technologically unsophisticated countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya. None of these countries, however, currently has ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. No matter, we are told by proponents of NMD; it is better to be prepared for any eventuality.

    Despite repeated assurances from our government that an NMD would not be designed to protect the US against a Russian attack, the Russians are not convinced. From their perspective, an NMD would undermine their deterrence capability. Even though the NMD would have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles and the Russians would have more missiles than this aimed at the US, the Russians are concerned on two grounds. First, it would create the possibility that the US could initiate a first-strike nuclear attack against Russia and use the NMD simply to deal with the presumably small remaining number of Russian missiles that survived the attack. This scenario may sound far-fetched to us since we don’t envision ever doing such a thing. The Russians, however, cannot dismiss this scenario since they, like us, base their nuclear strategy on just such worst-case scenarios. The second reason for Russian concern about US deployment of a NMD system is that, although initially the system might have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, more could be added later.

    The Russians have made it clear that if the US goes forward in deploying an NMD system this could spell the end of arms control with the Russians. Implementation of an NMD system would require the US to abrogate or violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was entered into between the US and Russia in 1972. The purpose of the treaty was to prevent a defensive arms race that could lead to a renewed offensive nuclear arms race. The ABM Treaty has been at the heart of arms control efforts between the two countries for most of the past three decades. If the treaty fails due to US plans to deploy NMD, the Russians have said that they will withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), will pull out of the START II agreements, in which the two countries have agreed to lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 3,000 to 3,500, and will refuse to negotiate further nuclear reductions under proposed START III agreements.

    Under proposed START III agreements, the Russians have put forward a proposal for further reducing nuclear arsenals to 1,500 or less on each side. Thus far, the US has responded by saying that it is only willing to go down to 2,500 to 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

    The stakes of NMD deployment in our relationship with Russia are very high. They are no less so in our relations with China. Currently China has some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If the US deploys an NMD with 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, the Chinese have indicated that they will proceed with building and deploying more nuclear-armed missiles capable of overcoming this system and reaching the United States.

    You might ask: why would Russia or China take these steps since it is highly likely that a US NMD system would be ineffective? The answer is that the Russian and Chinese planners must plan for the system to work as the US plans it to work; to do less would be viewed by their security establishments as being irresponsible. Thus, whether or not a US NMD system works, it would be viewed by Russia and China as provocative and would most likely lead to new arms races.

    The arms races would not be limited to the three countries in question. If China increases its strategic nuclear arsenal, India (which views China as a potential threat) would probably follow suit. If India increases its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan would certainly follow suit. There has also been talk of Theater Missile Defense in North Asia, which could have similar effects throughout Asia, and of deploying a Theater Missile Defense in the Middle East, which would underline the nuclear imbalance in the region.

    Will the deployment of an NMD system make the US more secure? It is doubtful. Because of the geopolitical implications described above, it will probably make the US less secure. If this is true, why is there such a strong push within the US government to deploy an NMD system? Why did the Congress vote overwhelmingly to deploy such a system “as soon as technologically feasible”? I think there are two reasons. First, a NMD system plays well in Peoria. It gives the impression of improving security even if it does just the opposite. Second, it provides a welfare program for the military-industrial complex in the aftermath of the Cold War. It provides a way of transferring substantial funding (ranging from $60 to $120 billion or even higher) from the American taxpayer to the defense industry. This is a cynical way for politicians to fulfill their obligations under the Constitution to provide for the common security of the American people.

    But could the system actually work? Anything is possible theoretically, but it is highly unlikely. Up to the present, tests of defensive missiles have failed to consistently and reliably shoot down incoming missiles, even when there is only one missile to destroy and it is known when and from where the missile will be launched. Many experts have argued that it will be far easier for offensive missile attacks to overcome defensive systems by using decoys to trick the defensive missiles.

    Rather than pursuing the delusion of missile defense, US officials would be better off pursuing another course of action. First, they could seek to develop policies that would make friends of potential enemies. There seems to be some progress on this front in relation to US-North Korean relations. Second, and most important, the US should take a leadership role in fulfilling its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal and that all nuclear weapons states are obligated to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects.”

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, promises were made to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses, either nationally or regionally, are at odds with these promises. Also, at this Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states promised an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This is where the US, as the world’s economically and militarily most powerful country, must now provide needed leadership. Plans to deploy a US National Missile Defense will undermine this possibility. The results could be disastrous not only for US security but also for our credibility in the world.

    The articles that follow provide international perspectives on US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. They reinforce each other in the view that this would be a dangerous and foolhardy path for the United States to pursue.

     

  • National Missile Defense – Why Should We Care?

    To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, the continuing angry debate over the need for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system has polarized public opinion. Pros and cons are put forward in increasingly strident confrontations which lead not to understanding or accommodation but to divisive, emotional rejection of opposing views. What is there about NMD that produces heat – not light – when the issue arises?

    The answer to that question lies in the political schism between the true believers in NMD and those who counsel other measures to reduce nuclear dangers. The believers argue emotionally that American citizens deserve a defense against missile attack and reject out of hand attempts to raise rational objections to NMD. The opponents are denigrated and their patriotism impugned if they dare to question the need for or feasibility of NMD.

    This failure to discuss NMD in civil, factual terms is unfortunate because the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system raises fundamental issues of America’s role in the world. It involves our relationships not only with our adversaries but with our closest allies as well. It is not surprising that Russia and China are loud critics of NMD but Germany, France, Great Britain and other western nations are also questioning the wisdom of proceeding with a program which threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race. It may be possible to shrug off understandable criticism from potential enemies, but we must give thoughtful consideration and great weight to the same criticism from our friends. The need for public debate leading to a constructive decision has never been greater.

    For example, a final decision to deploy NMD must await careful evaluation of four criteria: 1) There must be a real threat; 2) We must have the technological means to address that threat effectively; 3) Our response must be affordable; and 4) NMD deployment must not do unacceptable damage to the stability of current and future international security arrangements. There are serious questions concerning each of these criteria .

    Threat

    As to the threat, it does not now exist. Although some say that North Korea could create a missile capable of reaching the United States by 2005, the consensus is that it will be years later, if ever, that they would have both the missile and a weapon which could be fitted to it. And why would they, or any rogue nation, invest in such a costly, challenging venture when there are far more feasible means of delivering a weapon against us? For example, a crude nuclear device (which could never be fitted to a missile) could easily be welded in the hull of a tramp steamer and sail unchallenged into any U.S. port. Furthermore, any missile fired at America carries a very clear return address, insuring massive U.S. retaliation. The fact is that NMD would be a defense against the least likely means of attack on America while providing no protection whatever against clandestine, less costly, more reliable means of attack.

    Technology

    To date, despite spending more than $60 billion on NMD since 1983, the technological challenges have not been met. Repeated tests have failed far more often than they have succeeded and even the successes have been limited or suspect. The decoy problem has not been solved nor has the required complex of space based sensors, “X” brand radars, interceptors and command and control facilities been designed and built. Many independent scientists have concluded that there will never be any way to test such a system realistically even when it is in place in order to have high confidence that it would work the first time it was needed.

    Cost

    As to cost, the only thing that has been demonstrated is that each estimate is higher than the previous one. As noted, after more than $60 billion have been spent, there is no assurance that another $60 or $120 billion will produce a reliable NMD. Nor is there any confidence that a competent adversary could not develop effective countermeasures to NMD at far less cost than we invest.

    Nuclear Stability

    Finally, the most important criterion remains unresolved; i.e., the need to maintain the current stability of the nuclear balance by protecting present and future arms control arrangements. What good does a defense system do if it weakens nuclear stability which rests on a hard-won arms control structure built over the last 30 years? Repeated U.S. threats to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 ignore the truth that there is a comprehensive arms control structure within which the individual treaties are interdependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement of 1972 (SALT I) was negotiated in tandem with the ABM Treaty as complementary measures, neither one possible without the other. Subsequently the SALT II agreement and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) were erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation. The existence of this stabilizing arms control structure was recognized by other nations (most importantly by China) and thereby inhibited the expansion of other nuclear arsenals as well as contributed to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. To pull out a keystone of arms control by abrogation of the ABM Treaty now will weaken nuclear stability worldwide, particularly in the sensitive area of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.

    Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly be a bar to progress on future arms control agreements which are essential to achieve genuine reductions in still bloated nuclear arsenals. President Jacques Chirac of France identified this problem when he declared: “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult when powerful countries are developing new technologies [NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities.” The great danger is that other nations, most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their own nuclear capabilities in response to the deployment of an American NMD system. In the political effort to justify deployment of defenses against a highly unlikely threat, the United States can undo significant arms control measures and end up facing much greater real nuclear dangers.

    This is why all Americans should care deeply about the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system. By such an action we will signal to the world that we are willing to pursue illusory defenses against non-existent threats even though we subject all nations to continued nuclear competition and increased risks of a future nuclear war.

  • Criticism and Protest Surround Anti-Missile System

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) conducted its first full system test of the national missile defense (NMD) system on 7 July 2000. However, this $100 million failed missile test did not escape criticism and protest.

    More than 120 people gathered at the front gate of the Vandenberg Air Force Base to exercise their first amendment rights on Saturday, 1 July 2000. Organizations that supported the event included: American Friends Service Committee (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Atomic Mirror, California Peace Action, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, Green Party (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Green Peace, Grey Panthers, Guadalupe Catholic Worker, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Peace & Environmental Council (San Luis Obispo), San Luis Obispo County Environmental Toxic Coalition, and Santa Cruz Center for Non-Violence.

    In the week leading up to the test, activists also held a vigil, coordinated by Greenpeace, at the front gate. Additionally, members of Greenpeace and the Santa Cruz Resource Center for Non-Violence infiltrated the military base and the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace vessel, entered the “hazardous zone” in waters off the California coastline in attempts to stop the missile from being launched. Almost a dozen activists were arrested during the activities.

    Other protests were also held throughout the US and the world to say no to the weaponization of space and a new arms race. Messages of solidarity were sent from Argentina, Australia, Fiji, the UK and many cities in the US, demonstrating broad consensus to halt plans to deploy the controversial anti-missile system.

    Late in the evening on 7 June 2000 PDT, after a two hour delay, a target missile, carrying a warhead and a decoy, was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Approximately twenty minutes after the target missile lifted off, an interceptor missile carrying a model “exoatomospheric kill vehicle,” designed by Raytheon Corporation, was launch from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and was directed toward the target, using data collected from the system’s radars. However, the “hit to kill” weapon fired from Kwajalein Atoll did not separate from the second stage of its liftoff rocket. Of the three tests that have been conducted, two have failed. The Pentagon has scheduled 16 more tests of the system in the next five years.

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) claims that the NMD system is needed to protect the US from incoming Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles that would be launched by “states of concern” such as North Korea. The estimated cost to deploy the system by the year 2005 is $60 billion. However, a report released in late June by the Welch Panel, an independent team of scientists, outlined the probability of the systems failure due to time and schedule constraints.

    The deployment of a national missile defense system would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between Russia and the US. The treaty is viewed as the cornerstone of arms control efforts and amendment or abrogation of the treaty will pose serious threats to international relations. After the failed missile test, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that President Vladimir Putin will try to persuade President Clinton to stop deployment of an anti-missile defense system during the G-8 summit, being held in Okinawa, Japan from 21-23 July. President Putin has also offered to reduce Russian and US nuclear arsenals to 1,000 to 1,500 on each side under a new START III agreement.

    On 22 June 2000, China attacked the proposed US national missile defense (NMD) system saying it would turn outer space into a “battlefield” and jeopardize global stability. China has also voiced opposition to amending the ABM Treaty. Both Russia and China have called for negotiations to ban the weaponization of outer space, but the US has refused to engage in any such discussions.

    President Clinton recently made a decision to defer a decision on deployment to the next presidential administration.* Plans for future non-violent demonstrations at Vandenberg Air Force Base and around the world are already being planned to continue voicing grassroots opposition to the deployment of any anti-missile system. The relentless pursuit by the US to deploy a national missile defense system that threatens to initiate a new nuclear arms race must be stopped. Rather than developing new technology that undermines global security, the US should uphold the commitments it has made in international law to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

  • China’s Concern over National Missile Defence

    Understanding Ballistic Missile Defence

    Ballistic missile defence has drawn heated debate in the international community in the recent years. On the one hand, the US has made it a national policy to develop a limited ballistic missile defence program, with a key decision to be made this year regarding whether to deploy the system. On the other hand, the US missile defence build-up has been much criticised by other countries. It is often argued that missile defence would, if unchecked, tilt the balance of power and therefore affect the international political and security order.

    To be honest, there is indeed a genuine concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other types of delivery means. Coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation presents a major challenge to international security and stability. This was manifested during the second Gulf War of 1991, when Scuds fired against Saudi Arabia and Israel took on great psychological importance. Ever since then, more and longer-range missile flight tests, in South Asia and Northeast Asia, have been reported.[1] While the countries concerned may have quite reasonable grounds to acquire missiles for their defensive purposes, such a trend of proliferation does not bode well for global as well as regional stability.

    Ballistic missile proliferation has thus raised concern among states. There have been three kinds of responses. First, denying the intention of those who would seek such delivery vehicles. This would require the creation of a more secure environment in order to reduce the incentive to acquire them. Second, denying the missile-related technology available through transfer, if denial of intention fails to work. Third, establishing a certain level of ballistic missile defence as a protection against incidental and/or unauthorised attack, or a limited intentional attack with ballistic missiles.

    In this context, it is not impossible to understand the need for a limited missile defence, especially for a global power as the United States, which has vast overseas presence and interests, often in turn a reason to invite attack.

    In fact, the US has never given up its attempt to build various missile defence systems. The US set out to build sentinel antiballistic-missile program in 1967 against China’s nascent nuclear deterrent when it first came into being.[2] For the last two decades, the US government has persistently pursued missile defence. The Reagan Administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative, a land- and space-based multi-layer missile defence system which was never successfully developed. The Bush Administration converted the Star War dream into Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The Clinton Administration has decided to continue ballistic missile defence, with components of both National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

    This paper will address China’s position on missile non-proliferation regime, and its concern on National Missile Defence. It is suggested that the US and China should address their respective security concerns and seek a win-win solution in missile non-proliferation and missile defence issues.

    China and Missile Non-proliferation Regime

    Over the last decade, China has been increasingly exposed to a missile-proliferation-prone peripheral environment. Key neighbouring states either have a formidable missile arsenal, a significant missile programme, a fast developing missile capability or an alliance with a nuclear superpower. As such, missile proliferation has clearly affected China’s international environment.

    Therefore, the PRC has taken a series of steps addressing this problem through joining international missile non-proliferation efforts. It has been cautious concerning the transfer of missiles, adopting strict and effective controls over the export of missiles and related technology. Beijing has committed to missile non-proliferation and kept its obligation.[3]

    In February 1992, China committed to observing the then guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[4] With the enhanced dialogue which emerged between China and the US in the missile area, the two countries signed a joint statement in October 1996, reaffirming China’s promise and obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 kilometres with a payload of 500 kilograms.[5]

    Although China has not joined the MTCR’s formulation and revision, it has signalled that it would study the feasibility of joining the regime. This came as a result of the Jiang-Clinton Beijing summit of 1998, reflecting their effort to cultivate a constructive partnership. It is understood that China has conditioned its joining the MTCR on the question of the US arms sales to Taiwan, especially US TMD development and deployment in this part of the world.

    The two countries were engaging on this matter until their talks on non-proliferation, arms control and international security were, unfortunately, suspended in the aftermath of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. Their arms control talk is not resumed till July 2000, following their security consultation in Beijing in February.

    NMD Undermining Russia and China’s Security

    On 17 and 18 March 1999 respectively, the US Senate and House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved National Missile Defence System legislation, stating “That it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defence”.[6] This has evoked tremendous repercussions around the world, drawing negative responses from all other nuclear weapons states and even US allies in NATO.[7]

    According to the NMD plan, the US will deploy 100 interceptors in Alaska in its first configuration. Assuming a 1 in 4 rate of interception, the US could at most hit 25 incoming missiles, a more than sufficient capability to take care of the alleged threat from those “rogue” states’ said to be developing long-range ballistic missiles with which to target America. At later stages, the US would deploy further kinetic kill vehicles in North Dakoda in order to provide nationwide missiles defence.

    The US has stated clearly that China has not figured in its NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the US intentions in terms of NMD development. From China’s perspective, it is untenable that the US would spend 60-100 billion dollars on a system which has only “rogue” states in mind.

    Such capability of intercontinental strike by ballistic missile owned by “rogue” states does not yet exist. Excluding the P5, only Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran are currently believed to have medium-range missiles with ranges above 1,000km. Only four of these states, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran, may also have active programmes to develop intermediate-range missiles with ranges of over 3,000km.[8] It is highly unlikely that any of them will acquire an ICBM capability within a decade or so. The CIA’s classified 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Development recognised that the ICBM threat to the United States from so-called rogue states is unlikely to materialise before 2010, with the possible exception of DPRK.[9]

    Only Russia and China currently have the capability to hit the United States with nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Both the US and Russia have maintained their nuclear arsenals of thousands of deployed nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenals are at basically comparable levels in terms of quality and quantity. It is the ABM Treaty signed in 1972 that has prevented the US and the former Soviet Union from embarking on unlimited strategic arms race.

    The ABM Treaty does allow the US and the former Soviet Union (now Russia as its sole legitimate successor) to deploy limited anti-strategic ballistic missiles capability for the sake of incidental and/or unauthorised launches. It has doubly served strategic stability. First, for limited nuclear attack due to incidental/unauthorised launch, it permits limited capability to intercept. Second, for an all-out nuclear attack and counterattack, it assures the rivals of their mutual destruction. Indeed, the Treaty has helped dissuade the two nuclear weapons superpowers from further escalating their strategic offensive build-up.

    With Russia’s ongoing social and economic disruption, its military capability has been affected significantly. In the context of strategic offence-defence relationship, Russia is being pressed three-fold. First, a significant amount of Russia’s strategic force is ageing and has to be phased out. Therefore, Russia needs deep bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with the US, but it refuses to do this at the expense of revising ABM, permitting the change of balance of power in favour of the US. Second, START II would eliminate Russia’s land-based MIRVs. At a time of the US rhetoric of abrogating ABM anyway, the Russia has to reconsider the necessity to disarm its MIRVed weapons. Third, Russia’s missile defence, permitted under ABM, is eroding as its early warning satellite system can no longer provide full coverage.[10]

    As such the world is experiencing a double danger. Russia cannot properly execute its launch-on-warning of strategic force as it is unable to fully track missile launch and flight. Russia’s refusal to cut its nuclear force, when it has to cut it, also creates difficulty in nuclear disarmament. However, the latter issue is a result of the US missile defence build-up in violation of ABM Treaty.

    Consequently, the US NMD build-up will be harmful to US-Russia relations. It presses Russia to be hesitant in continuing strategic nuclear disarmament, and may force Moscow to strengthen its offensive capability. By revising or even abandoning the ABM Treaty, the US will seek absolute security regardless its negative effect on the security of other countries.

    From China’s perspective, the US national missile defence would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington. Though China has not publicly made its nuclear capability transparent, its CSS-4 ICBM force, capable of reaching the US with a range of 13,000 kilometres, is largely believed by the Western strategic analysts to number around 20.[11]

    China’s concern over the US national missile defence in violation of ABM has been expressed through various channels many times.[12] Primarily China is concerned about two issues. One is that the NMD will destabilise the world order, and harm the international relations. The other is that NMD will undermine China’s strategic deterrence, undermining China’s confidence in its strategic retaliatory capability.

    A limited anti-ballistic missile capability, as allowed by the existing ABM Treaty, would be enough to defend the strategic assets of the US against potential missile threats from outside the P5. Indeed the one-site base of anti-ballistic missile deployment under ABM framework cannot immunise the whole US from being hit. It is exactly this reason that has given Russia (as well as other nuclear weapons states) a confidence that they retain a credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the US. Theoretically, part of the US would thus be exposed to some missile threat from “rogue” states. However, either that threat has been too remote, or the overwhelming strength of the US in both nuclear and conventional weapons will be powerful enough to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities.

    Also the envisaged NMD cannot stop an all-out Russian nuclear attack, considering the thousands of strategic weapons at Russia’s disposal. Therefore, Beijing can only take the view that US NMD has been designed to effectively neutralise China’s strategic deterrence.

    Given the reported level of China’s full-range ICBM force (CSS-4), the NMD plans requiring ABM revision would (if successfully implemented as advertised) compromise China’s strategic capability in two respects. Geographically, it will protect the whole US from being deterred. Numerically, even interceptors deployed on a single site may be enough to knock out all Chinese CSS-4s.[13] Hence China’s national security interest is greatly endangered.

    To hold the US credibly deterred is just to reciprocate, to a much lower extent, what the US has long done against China during the nuclear age. In fact, it was US nuclear threats to PRC on a number of occasions that prompted Beijing to start its nuclear weapons programme.[14]

    Though the US has the most formidable nuclear arsenal and most powerful and sophisticated conventional arsenal, it retains the option of a first-strike with nuclear weapons as its deterrence policy. Now the US would even revise or abolish the ABM which assures nuclear weapons states of their mutual security.

    The PRC has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals and least advanced conventional weaponry among all the nuclear weapons states, but it still adopts a nuclear no-first-use policy, and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear weapons free zones.

    The PRC’s national security thus rests with what ABM provides. The US indeed can develop and deploy anti-strategic weapons capability, as permitted by the ABM, in order to gain certain sense of security against incidental and/or unauthorised attack by nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it ought to take into account the common security of all nuclear weapons states. When the US improves its own security at a time of ballistic missile proliferation, it should mind not to undermine the national security of others. Indeed there is an internationally acceptable limit that the US can pursue, i.e. developing its NMD capability in compliance with the Treaty.

    Addressing China’s Concern

    The US can argue that it is its sovereign rights to develop and deploy NMD beyond ABM Treaty. However, if the US were to go ahead regardless of the other states, it certainly would not create a win-win situation. Indeed, it would be counterproductive in terms of US interests.

    Some in the U.S. have been indifferent of the negative security impact the revision of AMB would bring upon other states. In this theory the US shall at most care to some extent Russia’s concern. As ABM involves the business between US and Russia, there seems no need to address China’s concern.

    The US shall understand the ABM is both a balancer of power between US and Russia, and, more fundamentally, a cornerstone of global security. In the latter context, China’s security is affected by the standing of ABM. The PRC has expressed its interest in multilateralising ABM, in the hope of expanding ABM membership.[15] This reflects Beijing’s interest in maintaining ABM by raising the stake of altering a multilateral treaty. Being a member of the ABM, Beijing would be situated in a better strategic position to enhance world stability.

    There have thus far been two interception tests of NMD systems. The first was carried out on 2 October 1999 and was found to have flaws.[16] The second test on 18 January 2000 was a complete failure due to a “plumbing leak”.[17] The US has self-imposed a deadline for making a decision on NMD deployment in June/July, after one more test. Even though future tests could be more or less “successful”, it would be still quite irresponsible to make a decision to go ahead.[18] It will be in neither America’s ultimate interest, nor the interest of the rest of the world.

    If the US insists on hurting the national interests of Russia and medium nuclear weapons states, it is hard to see how it will be possible to gather international support for non-proliferation initiatives in other fronts. The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FissBan) is an obvious example. Were the US to break the ABM Treaty, medium nuclear weapons states would be unlikely to give up their option of retaining the right to re-open production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, if they feel their deterrence is eroded.

    It should also be pointed out that there are ample means to defeat a missile defence.[19] Various means such as submunitions, high as well as low altitude countermeasures, balloon decoys, chaff and missile fragment decoys can all be considered. MIRVing and ASAT approaches might also be tempting. It goes without saying that if a state is able to independently develop a strategic missile capability, it should also be able to develop a capability to cost-effectively defeat missile defence.[20]

    Some argue that there is a growing threat from China as it is modernising its strategic forces. Looking at the CSS-4 force developed and China’s sea-based deterrence, one can hardly reach this conclusion. A land-based strategic force of about two dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a very small submarine-based missile force, is hardly any match for those of the United States.

    As China intends to adopt a no-first-use strategy, it serves China’s interest to keep a moderate force. However, China has a need to modernise its force as its defensive policy requires to do so, and as all other countries are doing the same. This is especially true at an age of precision-guided weaponry. An ICBM force of some two dozens of missile does not justify the US to revise or abolish ABM Treaty. Quite to the opposite, China’s moderate strategic force and moderate modernisation play a key role in assuring the US adequate security, which serves a stabilising role in terms of China-US relations, and world security.

    In sum, the United States does have legitimate concern over missile proliferation. That concern is shared by Chinese side. Major powers of the world, along with other countries, should work together to address such international problems, and to find solutions which serve both international stability and their respective national interests. Moving along the lines provided for by the ABM Treaty provides such a way forward. On the contrary, going ahead with damaging ABM and other countries’ interests can only be counterproductive.

     

    * Dingli Shen is a professor and Deputy Director of Fudan University’s Centre for American Studies, as well as Deputy Director of University Committee of Research and Development. He co-founded and directs China’s first university-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan. The views presented in this chapter are purely of his own. This piece is adopted and updated from a longer version, “BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY”, Jane’s Special Report, May 2000.

    [1] For instance, India has tested Agni and Prithvi, and Pakistan has tested Ghauri ballistic missiles a number of times in the 1990s. DPRK is alleged to have developed and tested No-dong and Taepo-dong intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Reportedly some other countries are developing their ballistic missile capabilities.
    [2] Edward N. Luttwak, “Clinton’s Missile Defense Goes Way Off Its Strategic Target”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 14, 2000, p.2.
    [3] “China’s National Defence”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, July 1998.
    [4] MTCR was set up in April 1987, and modified in July 1993 to target missiles capable of delivering any type of weapons of mass destruction.
    [5] “Joint United States-People’s Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation”, Washington, D.C., 4 October 1994.
    [6] The House version, sponsored by Curt Weldon (R-PA), was a bill of one-sentence as quoted in the text.
    [7] Joseph Fitchett, “Washington’s Pursuit of Missile Defense Drives Wedge in NATO”, International Harold Tribune, 15 February 2000, p.5.
    [8] “The Missile Threat: An Intelligence Assessment”, Issue Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 10 February 2000.
    [9] Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24.
    [10] David Hoffman, “Russia’s Missile Defense Eroding: Gaps in Early-Warning Satellite Coverage Raise Risk of Launch Error”, Washington Post, 10 February 1999, p.A1.
    [11] CIA put the number as about 20, see Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24, and, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.555; IISS estimated it as 15-20, see The Military Balance 1999-2000 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.186. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimated the number in 1993 as 4, see Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 4: Britain, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Westview Press: Boulder, 1994), p.11.
    [12] For instance, Sha Zhukang, “International Disarmament on A Crossroad”, World Affairs (Beijing), February 2000, p.17; Gao Junmin and Lü Dehong, “A Dangerous Move”, PLA Daily, 24 January 1999, p.4.
    [13] Assuming China has 20 CSS-4s, the 100 interceptors deployed on a single ABM site will be more than enough to hit all of them under a 1 in 4 interception ratio.
    [14] See, Dingli Shen, “The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies”, Princeton University/Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies Report No. 247, February 1990; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Random House: New York, 1988).
    [15] See luncheon speech of Ambassador Shu Zhukang at Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference: Repairing the Regime, 11-12 January 1999, Washington, D.C.
    [16] James Glanz, “Flaws Found In Missile Test That U.S. Saw As A Success”, New York Times, 14 January 2000, p.1.
    [17] Robert Suro, “Missile Defense System Fails Test”, Washington Post, 19 January 2000, p.1; Bradley Graham, “Plumbing Leak Foiled Anti-Missile Test”, Washington Post, 8 February 2000, p.A1.
    [18] However, Richard Garwin has pointed out that “the proposed NMD system would have essentially zero capability against the most likely emerging threat – an ICBM from North Korea”. See, “Effectiveness of Proposed National Missile Defense Against ICBMs from North Korea”, http://www.fas.org/rlg/990317-nmd.htm.
    [19] See description in Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel ed., The Last 15 Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger: Washington, D.C, 1996); Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program), April 2000.
    [20] See cost analysis in Dingli Shen, “Security Issues Between China and the United States”, IFRI Report (Institut Fran¹ais des Relations Internationales, Paris), to be published.

    Paper presented at the International Conference on “Challenges for Science and Engineering in the 21st Century” Stockholm, Sweden, June 14-18, 2000, Session D3