Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

  • CTBT Article XIV Conference

    This speech was delivered by Ellen Tauscher to the CTBT Article XIV Conference in New York City on September 23, 2011.


    As Delivered


    Ellen TauscherDistinguished Co-Presidents, High Commissioner, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,


    I am so pleased to be here representing the United States. When Secretary Clinton came to this conference two years ago, she ended a ten-year absence on the part of our nation. Today, I stand before you proud of the accomplishments that the Obama Administration has made thus far in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament.


    Since entering office, the Administration has achieved entry into force of the New START Treaty, released an updated Nuclear Posture Review, and helped to achieve a consensus Action Plan at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.


    The Administration also convened the successful 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, helped secure and relocate vulnerable nuclear materials, led efforts to establish an international nuclear fuel bank, and increased effective multilateral cooperation to prevent illicit nuclear activities.


    For the United States, this is just the beginning. One of our highest priorities is the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The Treaty is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, the vision President Obama articulated in Prague in April 2009.


    The CTBT is central to leading nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear competition. With a global ban on nuclear explosive tests in place, states interested in pursuing or advancing their nuclear weapons programs would have to either risk deploying weapons uncertain of their effectiveness or face international condemnation, and possible sanctions, for conducting nuclear explosive tests.


    A CTBT that has entered into force would benefit national and international security and facilitate greater international cooperation on other arms control and nonproliferation priorities. The United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing since 1992 and our policies are already consistent with the central prohibition of the treaty.


    It has been 12 years since our Senate failed to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the CTBT. Lack of support stemmed from two concerns: the verifiability of the Treaty and the continuing safety and reliability of America’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing.


    Today, there have been dramatic developments on both fronts and we have a much stronger case to make in support of ratification.


    The Treaty’s verification regime has grown exponentially over the last decade. Today, the International Monitoring System (IMS) is roughly 85 percent complete and when fully completed, there will be IMS facilities in 89 countries spanning the globe. At entry into force, the full body of technical data gathered via the International Monitoring System will be available to all States Parties. In addition, with the recent Fukushima nuclear crisis, we have already seen dramatic proof of the utility of the IMS for non-verification related purposes, such as tsunami warnings and tracking radioactivity from reactor accidents.


    We have continued to provide the full costs of operating, maintaining and sustaining 34 certified IMS stations among those assigned by the Treaty to the United States. We announced last month a voluntary in-kind contribution of $8.9 million to support projects that will accelerate development of the CTBT verification regime. This month, we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to contribute up to $25.5 million to underwrite the rebuilding of the hydroacoustic monitoring station on Crozet Island in the southern Indian Ocean.


    Together, U.S. extra-budgetary contributions to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization this year total $34.4 million, more than our annual assessed contribution. Given the tough budget climate in Washington and other capitals, those contributions clearly demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime.


    With regard to our nuclear deterrent, our extensive surveillance methods and computational modeling developed under the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the last 15 years have allowed our nuclear experts to understand how these weapons work and the effects of aging even better than when nuclear explosive testing was conducted. The United States can maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent without conducting nuclear explosive tests.


    With these advancements in verification and stockpile stewardship in mind, we have begun the process of engaging the Senate. We like to think of our efforts as an “information exchange” and are working to get these facts out to members and staff, many of whom have never dealt with this Treaty. We know that this is a very technical agreement and we want people to absorb and understand the science behind it. There are no set timeframes and we are going to be patient, but we will also have to be persistent.


    Of course, we do not expect people to be in receive-only mode, so we are eager to start a discussion. It is only through discussion and debate that we will work through questions and concerns about the Treaty and eventually get it ratified.


    Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentleman, the United States is committed to the CTBT and we intend to see it enter into force, but we cannot do it alone. As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to test. Congratulations to Guinea for becoming the 155th nation to ratify the CTBT just days ago. Also, congratulations to Ghana, Central African Republic, Liberia, Trinidad and Tobago, the Marshall Islands and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, all of whom have ratified the Treaty since our last conference. Your example adds important momentum to achieving the goal of ending nuclear explosive testing forever. We call on the remaining Annex 2 States to join us in moving forward toward ratification.


    We do not expect that the path remaining to entry into force will be traveled quickly or easily. For our part, we will need the support of the Senate and the American people in order to move ahead, but move ahead we will, because we know that the CTBT will benefit the security of the United States and that of the world.


    Thank you.

  • International Day Against Nuclear Tests: Translating Words Into Actions

    Tom CollinaOn behalf of ACA, I would like to thank the organizers of this meeting—the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Mission of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Geneva—for inviting me here today to speak.


    It is particularly fitting for Kazakhstan to be represented here, as it was twenty years ago—in 1991– that the people of Kazakhstan succeeded in closing the former Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk. This was followed by Soviet President Gorbachev’s declaration of a moratorium on nuclear testing, and then the United States announced its moratorium in 1992. The CTBT was then negotiated and signed in 1996.


    So in many ways it all began with Kazakhstan, and we owe them many thanks.


    But of course, 15 years later our work is not done, and I am glad we have such things as “international days against nuclear tests” to remind us that we must still bring the CTBT into force.


    Some might ask, why is the CTBT still important? Because the test ban is a crucial barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations AND to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.


    Indeed, the treaty is more important today than ever.


    By banning all nuclear tests, the CTBT prevents the established nuclear-weapon states from proof-testing new, more sophisticated warhead designs. And newer members of the nuclear club would not be able to perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads without testing.


    The treaty also serves to reinforce the nonproliferation system by serving as a confidence-building measure about a state’s nuclear intentions, and it can help head-off and de-escalate regional tensions.


    For these and other reasons, CTBT entry into force has long been considered a key part of fulfilling Article VI of the NPT.


    With the CTBT in force, capabilities to detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly greater. Entry-into-force is essential to making short-notice, on-site inspections possible and for maintaining long-term political and financial support for the monitoring system.


    How can we Accelerate Entry Into Force?


    Now, 182 states have signed the CTBT, an impressive number, but the treaty must still be ratified by nine states before it can formally enter into force —the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, and North Korea.


    In three weeks, states parties will gather in New York to speak about the value of the treaty and the need for prompt entry into force. We appreciate this effort, but actions speak louder than words. That conference must help produce a serious diplomatic action plan for getting the remaining hold out states on board.


    Ratification by the United States and China is particularly important. Given their existing nuclear test moratoria and treaty signatures, Washington and Beijing already bear most CTBT-related responsibilities, yet their failure to ratify has denied them—and others—the full security benefits of the treaty.


    In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama pledged to “immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of” the CTBT. He said, “After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.” We agree.


    But now, President Obama must translate those words into action and mount a serious public campaign to win the support of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate for ratification of the treaty.


    With the support of a wide array of NGOs in the United States and around the globe, the Obama administration can and must make the case that the Treaty enhances international security, is effectively verifiable, and is essential to curb the spread of nuclear weapons in the decades to come.


    The technical and political case for the CTBT is much stronger today than it was in 1999 when the Senate briefly considered the treaty. The Senate must honestly review the new evidence for the treaty rather than arrive at judgments based on old information.


    It is also time for China’s leaders to act. For years, Beijing has reported that the CTBT is before the National People’s Congress but has apparently taken no action on ratification. We note the January 19, 2011 Joint Statement by Presidents Hu Jintao and Obama stating that “… both sides support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”


    Washington’s renewed pursuit of CTBT ratification opens up opportunities for China and other Annex 2 states—such as Indonesia—to lead the way toward entry into force by ratifying before the United States. Action by Beijing would increase its credibility as a nonproliferation leader and improve the chances that other states would follow suit.


    India and Pakistan could advance the cause of nuclear disarmament and substantially ease regional tensions by converting their unilateral test moratoria into a legally binding commitment to end nuclear testing through the CTBT.


    With no shortage of conflict in the Middle East, ratification by Israel, Egypt and Iran would reduce nuclear-weapons-related security concerns in the region. It would also help create the conditions necessary for a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction.


    Likewise, if Israel were to ratify, it would get closer to the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream and help encourage other states in the region to follow suit.


    Iranian ratification could help reduce concerns that its nuclear program would be used to develop smaller, deliverable nuclear warheads. Iran’s failure to ratify the CTBT raises further questions about the nature of its nuclear activities.


    North Korea’s nuclear tests undermine Asian security. The DPRK should declare a halt to further testing pending the resumption of the Six-Party talks. The participants in those talks should make North Korea’s approval of the CTBT one of the key steps in the process.


    In closing, we sincerely urge all states that have not done so to ratify the CTBT. To those that have ratified, we thank you and ask you to contribute to the Article XIV Conference on Entry Into Force in September.


    ACA and supporters of the CTBT the world over stand ready to help bring the treaty into force.


    Thank you.