Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Bush

  • Treaties Don’t Belong to Presidents

    New Haven– President Bush has told the Russians that he will withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which gives both countries the right to terminate on six months’ notice. But does the president have the constitutional authority to exercise this power without first obtaining Congressional consent?

    Presidents don’t have the power to enter into treaties unilaterally. This requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and once a treaty enters into force, the Constitution makes it part of the “supreme law of the land” just like a statute.

    Presidents can’t terminate statutes they don’t like. They must persuade both houses of Congress to join in a repeal. Should the termination of treaties operate any differently?

    The question first came up in 1798. As war intensified in Europe, America found itself in an entangling alliance with the French under treaties made during our own revolution. But President John Adams did not terminate these treaties unilaterally. He signed an act of Congress to “Declare the Treaties Heretofore Concluded with France No Longer Obligatory on the United States.”

    The next case was in 1846. As the country struggled to define its northern boundary with Canada, President James Polk specifically asked Congress for authority to withdraw from the Oregon Territory Treaty with Great Britain, and Congress obliged with a joint resolution. Cooperation of the legislative and executive branches remained the norm, despite some exceptions, during the next 125 years.

    The big change occurred in 1978, when Jimmy Carter unilaterally terminated our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Senator Barry Goldwater responded with a lawsuit, asking the Supreme Court to maintain the traditional system of checks and balances. The court declined to make a decision on the merits of the case. In an opinion by Justice William Rehnquist, four justices called the issue a political question inappropriate for judicial resolution. Two others refused to go this far but joined the majority for other reasons. So by a vote of 6 to 3, the court dismissed the case.

    Seven new justices have since joined the court, and there is no predicting how a new case would turn out. Only one thing is clear. In dismissing Senator Goldwater’s complaint, the court did not endorse the doctrine of presidential unilateralism. Justice Rehnquist expressly left the matter for resolution “by the executive and legislative branches.” The ball is now in Congress’s court. How should it respond?

    First and foremost, by recognizing the seriousness of this matter. If President Bush is allowed to terminate the ABM treaty, what is to stop future presidents from unilaterally taking America out of NATO or the United Nations?

    The question is not whether such steps are wise, but how democratically they should be taken. America does not enter into treaties lightly. They are solemn commitments made after wide-ranging democratic debate. Unilateral action by the president does not measure up to this standard.

    Unilateralism might have seemed more plausible during the cold war. The popular imagination was full of apocalyptic scenarios under which the nation’s fate hinged on emergency action by the president alone. These decisions did not typically involve the termination of treaties. But with the president’s finger poised on the nuclear button, it might have seemed unrealistic for constitutional scholars to insist on a fundamental difference between the executive power to implement our foreign policy commitments and the power to terminate them.

    The world now looks very different. America’s adversaries may inveigh against its hegemony, but for America’s friends, the crucial question is how this country will exercise its dominance. Will its power be wielded by a single man ˜ unchecked by the nation’s international obligations or the control of Congress? Or will that power be exercised under the democratic rule of law?

    Barry Goldwater’s warning is even more relevant today than 20 years ago. The question is whether Republicans will heed his warning against “a dangerous precedent for executive usurpation of Congress’s historically and constitutionally based powers.” Several leading senators signed this statement that appeared in Senator Goldwater’s brief ˜ including Orrin Hatch, JesseHelms and Strom Thurmond, who are still serving. They should defend Congress’s power today, as they did in the Carter era.

    If they join with Democrats in raising the constitutional issue, they will help establish a precedent that will endure long after the ABM treaty is forgotten. Congress should proceed with a joint resolution declaring that Mr. Bush cannot terminate treaty obligations on his own. And if the president proceeds unilaterally, Congress should take further steps to defend its role in foreign policy.

    We need not suppose that the president will respond by embarking on a collision course with Congress. His father, for example, took a different approach to constitutionally sensitive issues. When members of Congress went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the Persian Gulf war, President George H. W. Bush did not proceed unilaterally. To his great credit, he requested and received support from both houses of Congress before making war against Saddam Hussein. This decision stands as one precedent for the democratic control of foreign policy in the post-cold war era. We are now in the process of creating another.

    *Bruce Ackerman is Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School and co-author of “Is Nafta Constitutional?”

  • Transcript: President Bush Speech on Missile Defense

    Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you being here.

    I also want to thank Secretary Powell for being here as well.

    My national security advisor, Condi Rice, is here, as well as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers. Appreciate Admiral Clark and General Ryan for being here as well. But most of all, I want to thank you, Admiral Gaffney, and the students for NDU for having me here today.

    For almost 100 years, this campus has served as one of our country’s premier centers for learning and thinking about America’s national security. Some of America’s finest soldiers have studied here: Dwight Eisenhower and Colin Powell. Some of America’s finest statesmen have taught here: George Kennan (ph).

    Today, you’re carrying on this proud tradition forward, continuing to train tomorrow’s generals, admirals and other national security thinkers, and continuing to provide the intellectual capital for our nation’s strategic vision.

    This afternoon, I want us to think back some 30 years to a far different time in a far different world. The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a hostile rivalry. The Soviet Union was our unquestioned enemy, a highly armed threat to freedom and democracy. Far more than that wall in Berlin divided us.

    Our highest ideal was and remains individual liberty. Their’s was the construction of a vast communist empire. Their totalitarian regime held much of Europe captive behind an Iron Curtain. We didn’t trust them, and for good reason. Our deep differences were expressed in a dangerous military confrontation that resulted in thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on hair-trigger alert.

    The security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations.

    We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be ensured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack. The threat was real and vivid. The Strategic Air Command had an airborne command post called the Looking Glass, aloft 24 hours a day, ready in case the president ordered our strategic forces to move toward their targets and release their nuclear ordnance.

    The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops deep in the heart of Europe, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany.

    We used our nuclear weapons, not just to prevent the Soviet Union from using their nuclear weapons, but also to contain their conventional military forces, to prevent them from extending the Iron Curtain into parts of Europe and Asia that were still free.

    In that world, few other nations had nuclear weapons, and most of those who did were responsible allies, such as Britain and France. We worried about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it was mostly a distant threat, not yet a reality.

    Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet Union. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union.

    Its government is no longer communist. Its president is elected. Today’s Russia is not our enemy, but a country in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors.

    The Iron Curtain no longer exists. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are free nations and they are now our allies in NATO, together with a reunited Germany. Yet, this is still a dangerous world; a less certain, a less predictable one.

    More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed a ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds, and a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.

    Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states — states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.

    They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.

    Like Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America.

    They hate our friends. They hate our values. They hate democracy and freedom, and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough to maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends.

    We must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to rethink the unthinkable and to find new ways to keep the peace. Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and defenses.

    We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them.

    We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together, we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.

    We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.

    We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past.

    No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.

    This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies.

    We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I’m committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.

    My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.

    Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative approaches.

    The secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere.

    We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited but effective defenses.

    We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses might take. We will explore all of these options further. We recognize the technological difficulties we face, and we look forward to I’ve made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies, who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

    This treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries.

    That’s why we should work together to replace this treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.

    This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense.

    It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.

    I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries.

    Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can address today’s threats and pursue today’s opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.

    This is a time for vision, a time for a new way of thinking, a time for bold leadership. The Looking Glass no longer stands its 24- hour-a-day vigil. We must all look at the world in a new, realistic way to preserve peace for generations to come.

    God bless. (APPLAUSE)

  • National Missile Defense Jeopardizes Foreign Relations

    Arguably the most important issue regarding US foreign policy is the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system (NMD). There is a general bipartisan agreement to engage a system of some kind, although when and to what extent (meaning size and complexity), are issues of continuing debate.

    Depending on the Bush administration’s decision, the consequences could be dire, ranging from a mere increase in anti-American sentiment to a full-blown arms race like that of the Cold War years. Thus, the most critical factor to be considered is the extent to which this decision will affect US international relations. In particular, the US has come a long way in improving relations with Russia. To upset this progress would jeopardize years of diplomatic efforts. Additionally, China and France have voiced strong opposition to NMD deployment.

    The current administration has proposed a massive NMD with land, sea, and space-based components. The possibility of an internationally accepted US defense system of this type is unfortunately very unlikely. Furthermore, as a world superpower, the United States also has a responsibility to lead by example. But the willingness of the present administration to advocate deployment of a NMD and thereby risk violation of international obligations sends the wrong message to the rest of the world.

    Continued U.S. commitments to arms reduction is of critical importance to maintaining positive international relations. The deployment of a NMD system could significantly affect the status of two of the most important treaties signed by both the United States and Russia ? the USSR at the time the treaties were signed ? in the history of nuclear disarmament: the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The disregard for these treaties is inconsistent with our responsibilities, and will not allow us to legitimately hold other countries to their obligations.

    The sole purpose of the ABM Treaty is to limit missile defense deployment. Some argue that provisions of the 29-year-old document are outdated and, as Henry A. Kissinger claims, do not address the “new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed.” By that same logic, one could dispute the validity of the 225-year-old United States Constitution, a concept unthinkable to those who ironically share Kissinger’s view.

    While the ABM Treaty would be altogether disregarded in the case of a comprehensive missile defense, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be undermined by a failure of the U.S. to consider the potential results of NMD deployment. The focus of this treaty is on the reduction of nuclear weapons, but a large-scale defense system would result in other nuclear powers feeling threatened in their capabilities of deterrence, thus triggering further weapons proliferation.

    Unfortunately, adherence to the commitments outlined in the ABM and NPT treaties is apparently not of utmost concern to US policy makers. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen has gone so far as to suggest complete withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if agreements between the US and Russia on its modification cannot be attained. This kid of attitude is not only reckless, it does not contribute to improving post-Cold War relations with our former adversaries.

    While some Third World countries have access to nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, the threat of attack is not significant enough to risk the deterioration of our relations with the rest of the world. In addition, diplomacy has been shown to have desirable outcomes when applied to arms reduction. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program between the US and Russia has helped Russia disable more than 4,900 nuclear warheads at cost of $3.2 billion to the US from 1992 to 2000.

    Without a doubt, the most serious current threat is that of individual rather than state-sponsored terrorist attacks. No missile defense system of any kind could protect American citizens from terrorists using delivery systems other than ballistic missiles. The recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and closer to home, the World Trade Center bombing are grim reminders of that possibility.

    On the international level, a policy of non-deployment of a NMD could help preserve years of improving relations with Russia achieved since the end of the Cold War. Regression to previous tensions and animosities could create much more of a threat than that which currently exists.

    Russia warned that during the Reagan years it had developed “programs to counteract asymmetrically” US missile defense systems, and should we continue to insist on deployment, Russia could “take them up again.” China has threatened to increase its arsenal at any cost to counter our defenses and urges the US to cease NMD plans. Otherwise, Chinese officials warn, “we’ll be ready.”

    By discontinuing NMD testing and development, we will avoid anti-American sentiment that could potentially spark future conflicts posing a much greater threat to US security than that which is currently perceived.

    As much as we have a responsibility to defend our nation, we also have a responsibility to stand by the promises we made under international treaties. In this age of globalization, we cannot afford the isolationist attitude that would be the result of ignoring international obligations and the concerns of those in the global community.

    In conclusion, the Bush administration should consider the impacts of the proposed National Missile Defense system and question whether it is worth the risk of jeopardizing US foreign relations and possibly the future security of our nation.

    *John Ginder is a senior at UCSB majoring in global studies with an emphasis in socioeconomics and politics. This piece appeared in the Voices section of the Santa Barbara News-Press, Sunday, April 29, 2001.

  • The Battle Lines Are Being Drawn over the International Criminal Court

    The battle lines are being drawn between those who believe in the rule of law and those who do not. A powerful and respected American voice that has been raised to support the establishment of the International Criminal Court. It rebuts the ill-informed and misguided views of those who denounce the proposed court as a threat to American interests and military personnel. It deserves the widest possible dissemination by those who support the ICC.

    Monroe Leigh has been Legal Adviser to both the State and Defense Departments. He is a past President of the American Bar Association and the American Society for International Law and is an outstanding authority. On Feb. 21, 2001, he wrote to Chairman Hyde, of the House Committee on International Relations, that the Bill introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (The American Service Member’s Protection Act S.2726, June 14, 2000) as a preemptive strike against the ICC, (and opposed by the State and Defense departments) was replete with misconceptions . Nonetheless, the Senator had managed to obtain signatures from, a dozen distinguished American leaders, including ex- Secretaries of State, CIA and National Security Advisers, in opposition to the ICC. Leigh, ever the gentleman, said the signatories were simply misinformed. In fact, assured Leigh, the ICC would offer greater protection to Americans in military service than now exits at home or abroad.

    Leigh warned that persistent efforts by U.S. negotiators to exempt American military personnel from legal restraints that other nations were being asked to accept could only exacerbate relations with our allies. To rebut the signatories assembled by Helms, ten former Presidents of the America Society of International Law, including its Honorary President Stephen Schwebel, added their names to the Leigh memo. These very distinguished American jurists – in their personal capacities – concluded that the U.S. should accept the Treaty for an ICC “without change in the text.”

    To top it off, Monroe Leigh wrote a COMMENT that will appear in the next issue of the prestigious American Journal of International Law (Vol.95.No.1, A. 2001). He analyzes the arguments put forward by those who would reject the ICC – described by Leigh as “the most important international juridical institution that has been proposed since the San Francisco Conference of 1945.” He notes that under existing international law the sovereign of the territory where a crime is committed has jurisdiction to try the captured offender. The notion that U.S. nationals cannot be tried for war crimes if their government is not a party to the ICC treaty is not supported by existing international law as recognized by the highest U.S. courts. Strident demands for exceptionalism can only reinforce suspicions about American hegemonic ambitions. Leigh notes ICC provisions that give national courts absolute priority to try the accused in a fair trial. He ridicules “the specter of the politically motivated Prosecutor” and spells out the many safeguards that will prevent abuse and protect the rights of the accused. He dismisses the criticism that the ICC might deny due process to U.S. service personnel as “totally misplaced.” His conclusion: “In sum, the United States can most effectively protect its national-security interests, as well as the individual interests of U.S. nationals, by accepting the Statute of Rome – better sooner than later.”

    Many others, of course, have spoken out in favor of the Court, including the excellent survey of legal experts by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.. The conclusion of that comprehensive study, articulated by Harvard Law Professors Abram Chayes and Anne-Marie Slaughter: “The United states should be taking the lead in shaping these new institutions. It is not too late.” Opponents of the ICC do not speak for the United States. Leigh, a conservative “establishment” man of impeccable credentials, has raised a respected voice in opposition to unsound harangues coming from uninformed adversaries.. (I am grateful to Heather Hamilton of the World Federalist Association for drawing my attention to the Leigh correspondence.)

    Despite the organized and vocal opposition to the ICC, President Clinton directed Ambassador Scheffer (who represented the U.S. at the U.N. with distinction) to sign the Treaty at the last moment. It was an important symbolic act – showing that the outgoing Administration favored the goals of the ICC, despite need for improvements. Opponents of the ICC howled with anger and threatened to erase the signature – a rather bizarre suggestion. The U.S. now sits silent at the U.N. deliberations. The new Republican Administration will have to be persuaded that the ICC is in our national interest. Let the voice of the informed public now be heard

  • An Alternate Approach to US and Global Security

    Missile Defense Aimed at Potential Threats

    The stated security concerns underlying current US interests in developing and deploying a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system focus on a small number of states with future potential to launch ballistic missile attacks against the US. These states (North Korea, Iran and Iraq) are described by the US as “states of concern” (formerly “rogue states”). The Rumsfeld Commission unanimously concluded in 1998: “Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.”

    The US claims to restrict its targets of missile defense to these states of concern, and has stated that its missile defense efforts are not meant to prevent missile attacks by Russia or China. These assurances have not been convincing to either Russia or China, and both countries have expressed strong concerns about US BMD plans. The US has focused its concerns on relatively weak states that currently present no ballistic missile threat to the US but may in the future. By moving forward with a missile defense system to protect against these states, the US is antagonizing much more powerful potential adversaries. US leaders have even expressed a willingness to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, a treaty widely considered to be a foundation of strategic stability in allowing the possibility of continued major reductions in nuclear armaments.

    Categories of Deterrence

    The US plan to proceed with a BMD system is an admission that deterrence cannot be trusted for security. The US is in effect stating that deterrence is insufficient to assure security – at least against these states of concern. The US is, therefore, creating deterrence categories. One category includes states that the US believes can be deterred by nuclear threat (Russia and China), and one category that the US believes cannot be deterred by such means (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). This categorization of deterrence into those who might or might not be deterred should raise fundamental questions about the value and reliability of all deterrence.

    The US plan to build a BMD system may be viewed as a secondary line of defense. If deterrence fails (but only against a small power), the US would be prepared to shoot down the attacking missiles. This would offer the US the benefit of greater degrees of freedom in its relations with the potentially offending states. If, for example, North Korea had ballistic missiles capable of threatening US territory, troops or allies, the US might be reluctant to initiate an attack against North Korea for fear of retaliation. This threat of retaliation by a smaller power would be nullified, or at least perceived to be nullified, by a BMD system. Thus, the deployment of a BMD system would provide the US with a wider range of options in dealing with a smaller hostile nation armed with a small number of ballistic missiles.

    Problems with BMD Deployment

    There are many problems related to the deployment of a US BMD system. These include:

    • it will be plagued with uncertainties as to its reliability;
    • it will undermine arms control in general and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in particular;
    • it will in all likelihood stimulate new nuclear arms races with Russia and China by undermining their deterrence capabilities;
    • it will not prevent the possibility of hostile countries delivering weapons of mass destruction by means other than ballistic missiles;
    • it will be divisive among US allies;
    • it will be a major diversion of monetary and scientific resources from other security and social priorities; and
    • it will undermine adherence to the promises made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    Alternative Means of Dealing with Security Risks

    Realistic and credible means of dealing with the security risks posed by North Korea, Iran, Iraq and other potentially hostile nations include:

    1. US leadership in developing an effective ballistic missile control regime to prevent the spread of this technology. This would require concessions by the nuclear weapons states to the phased dismantlement of their current arsenals of ballistic missiles.

    2. Cooperative agreements between the US and the states of concern. Negotiations have already had positive results in the relationship between the US and North Korea. Negotiations with the other states of concern can begin by simply opening discussions on problem areas. Mediation by neutral states or by the UN may be needed.

    3. The US and other nuclear weapons states must take steps to diminish the political importance of their nuclear arsenals. Such steps should include de-alerting all nuclear weapons, adopting clear policies of No First Use of these weapons, withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, and the opening of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

    US plans to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense system are rooted in fear. It is worth noting that the US, the most militarily and economically powerful nation on Earth, fears from far smaller nations what it itself threatens to do to others. If the US would make a firm commitment to leadership in a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, it could forego the limited system of ballistic missile defense that it has been pursuing. This course of action would also have risks, but on balance it would be a more meaningful and decent course of action, one that could inspire its own people and people everywhere and one that could free up important resources to build a more solid future for all humanity.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Mr. Bush, The World Doesn’t Want to be American

    MOSCOW -Dear Mr. Bush:

    I am writing to you as a citizen of our planet and someone who beholds the last remaining superpower. Can there be any doubt that the United States plays a major role in guiding our world? Only a fool could disregard that fact. To acknowledge this is a given, even though American spokesmen are perhaps somewhat overly inclined to press the point home to the rest of the world.

    For while America’s role is acknowledged throughout the world, her claim to hegemony, not to say domination, is not similarly recognized. For this reason, I hope, Mr. Bush, as the new American president, that you will give up any illusion that the 21st century can, or even should, be the “American Century.” Globalization is a given – but “American globalization” would be a mistake. In fact, it would be something devoid of meaning and even dangerous.

    I would go even further and say it is time for America’s electorate to be told the blunt truth: that the present situation of the United States, with a part of its population able to enjoy a life of extraordinary comfort and privilege, is not tenable as long as an enormous portion of the world lives in abject poverty, degradation and backwardness.

    For 10 years, U.S. foreign policy has been formulated as if it were the policy of a victor in war, the Cold War. But at the highest reaches of U.S. policy-making no one has grasped the fact that this could not be the basis for formulating post-Cold War policy.

    In fact, there has been no “pacification.” On the contrary, there has been a heightening of inequalities, tension and hostility, with most of the last directed toward the United States.

    Instead of seeing an increase in U.S. security, the end of the Cold War has seen a decline. It is not hard to imagine that, should the United States persist in its policies, the international situation will continue to deteriorate.

    It is also difficult to believe that, under present circumstances, relations between the United States, on the one hand, and China, India and all the rest of the earth that lives in abject poverty, on the other, could develop in a positive direction. Nor is it possible, on the basis of its present posture, for the United States to establish effective, long-term cooperation with its traditional allies, Europe first and foremost.

    Already we see numerous trade disputes, evidence of the conflicting interests separating the United States and the European Union. At the recent conference in The Hague, where the participants were supposed to come up with a common policy on limiting greenhouse effects, U.S. positions were far removed from those of all others. As a result, no decision was taken. This is clearly an example of a failure of “world governance.”

    From the standpoint of the Old World, the post-Cold War period ushered in hopes that now are faded. Over the past decade, the United States has continued to operate along an ideological track identical to the one it followed during the Cold War.

    Need an example? The expansion of NATO eastward, the handling of the Yugoslav crisis, the theory and practice of U.S. rearmament – including the utterly extravagant national missile defense system, which, in turn, is based on the bizarre notion of “rogue states.”

    Isn’t it amazing that disarmament moved further during the last phase of the Cold War than during the period after its end? And isn’t that because U.S. leadership has been unable to adjust to the new European reality? Europe is now a new, independent and powerful player on the world scene. To continue to regard it as a junior partner would be a mistake.

    Europe’s experience must serve as a lesson for future relations, but it can do so only if America and Europe build a genuine, equal partnership.

    Finally, it is hardly a secret that relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated over recent years. Responsibility for this must be shared between Russia and America. The present leadership of Russia appears ready to cooperate with the United States in framing a new agenda for relations. But it is unclear what your orientation will be.

    What we heard during the electoral campaign did not sound encouraging. If we truly want to build a new world order and further European unity, we have to recognize that this will not be possible without an active role for Russia. This recognition is the necessary basis for setting future Russian-American relations on the right path.

    The world is complicated, it contains and expresses a variety of interests and cultures. Sooner or later, international policy, including that of the United States, will have to come to terms with that variety. ‘

    *Mikhail Gorbachev was the last president of the former Soviet Union.