Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Article VI

  • Good Faith

    This article was originally published by NPT News In Review.

    A new paper by Judge Christopher G. Weeramantry looks deeply at the concept of good faith, an extremely important concept included in Article VI of the NPT and a central principle of international law. Judge Weeramantry, who served as Vice President of the International Court of Justice when it ruled on the illegality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in 1996, is uniquely qualified to address this topic.

    The Court reinforced the importance of good faith in 1996 when it pronounced: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    According to Weeramantry, “No higher legal pronouncement on a question of international law is possible than the unanimous opinion of the world’s highest court. No greater issue can come to a court than one involving the survival of humanity. No more all-embracing and respected concept exists in international law than the concept of good faith. The obligation spelled out by the Court straddled all these aspects of fundamental importance.”

    Modernization of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, comprehensively detailed in Reaching Critical Will’s report Still Assuring Destruction Forever, brings front and center the concept of good faith. Weeramantry does not mince words when he identifies these modernization programs as breach of good faith. He asks readers to consider whether “there has been not merely a violation of good faith but an actual manifestation of bad faith in this matter.”

    This breach of good faith through modernization programs is a shameful endless circle, with one country’s actions prompting the other nuclear powers to do likewise, escalating the level of departures from the duty of good faith. Such action has also, according to Weeramantry, prompted non-nuclear powers to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

    In the context of the NPT, good faith would start with an immediate halt to the modernization of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Good faith efforts must continue until the obligation of nuclear disarmament is achieved. As Judge Weeramantry concludes, “There can be no basis for the disregard or incomplete performance of an obligation so deeply ingrained in international law, so clearly undertaken by the nuclear powers, so carefully pronounced by the International Court of Justice and so definitely determining whether humanity will flourish or perish.”

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s briefing paper by Judge Weeramantry, Good Faith: Essential to Nuclear Disarmament and Human Survival, is available online atwww.wagingpeace.org/goto/goodfaith

    Rick Wayman is the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Director of Programs and Operations.

  • Review of From Omnicide to Abolition: Shifting the Mindset

    This article was originally published in Reaching Critical Will’s News In Review.

    Organized by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) and moderated by Rick Wayman, the panel consisted of five speakers who discussed the goal of shifting paradigms on nuclear weaponry and energy.

    David Krieger, NAPF President, defined “omnicide,” as the ability to destroy humanity and other complex life forms, calling it the most compelling reason to abolish nuclear weapons. He argued that because of the possibility for total destruction, nuclear weapons are not useful for war, only for political uses such as dominance and prestige.

    Mr. Krieger and fellow panelist Steven Starr both challenged nuclear deterrence in their statements. Mr. Starr pointed out that deterrence involves the assumption that leaders are rational, and Mr. Krieger added that omnicide was an incredibly high risk to take when tested against that assumption. Mr. Krieger also pointed out that there have been numerous near misses at nuclear war. Mr. Starr noted that deterrence has to work perfectly to justify nuclear weapons, and that it has to fail only once to cause a worldwide catastrophe.

    Mr. Starr and Alice Slater also discussed the environmental effects of nuclear technology. Mr. Starr concentrated upon the effects of usage of nuclear weapons, noting that a scientific modeling of a possible nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan using only low-yield weapons found that atmospheric pollution would block sunlight, lowering temperatures in North America by 2.5-4 degrees Celsius; this would limit crop viability in Canada and the United States. Mr. Starr argued that even the low-yield weapons used would cause the starvation of nearly one billion people.

    In addition to the 32 states with plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, states with nuclear power programs are also able to develop weapons in months without significant technological adaptation.

    Ms. Slater quoted former CIA Director George Tenet, who noted that the difference between a power program and a weapons program is “time and intent, not technology.” Ms. Slater, who argued against nuclear energy altogether, noted that renewable energy sources were sufficient to power the planet without usage of nuclear, coal or oil-based power. She noted that while there was an “inalienable right” to nuclear power in Article IV of the NPT, it could be overruled in future agreements as renewable power arrangements such as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) replaced nuclear power.

    Panelist Rob Green, who served as a commander in the British Navy before authoring Security Without Nuclear Deterrence, focused on the ‘indoctrination’ of military personnel and diplomats into the fallacy of nuclear deterrence. Green turned away from military leaders as a pilot in the 1960s, when he carried nuclear weapons until he realized that he would “destroy myself if I dropped it […] I was ordered to become a suicide bomber.”

    Multiple panelists noted the risk to democracy that nuclear weapons pose. Mr. Green warned that deference to leaders was a major obstacle to challenging the status quo and achieving total nuclear disarmament. Ms. Slater noted that the military and conservative allies in parliaments have provided universal “push-back” to disarmament, which limits debate and democratic decision-making.

    The final panelist, Kate Dewes, focused on current initiatives. Ms. Dewes, the Co-Director of the Disarmament and Security Centre, highlighted the Secretary-General’s 5-Point Plan on elimination of nuclear weapons and called upon civil society to continue pressuring the UN to proceed on the plan, which includes negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) and creation of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Joining Ms. Dewes in calling for negotiations to create a NWC, Mr. Starr also recommended that nuclear weapon states conduct health and environmental assessments. Mr. Green called for openness in discussion of nuclear weapons as a way of continuing this discussion. All five of the panelists highlighted the present NPT Review Conference as one of many places to continue the discussion, including delegates of governments, civil society and peace activists in the process.

  • Debating Article VI

    Debating Article VI

    Christopher Ford’s article, “Debating Disarmament, Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, November 2007), ends with a disclaimer, “The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the State Department or the U.S. government.” Ford’s views, however, seem extremely closely aligned with those of the State Department, which he joined in 2003 and where he currently serves as the United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation.

    Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” This article is the principal tradeoff in the NPT, in which the non-nuclear weapon states are given the promise that the playing field will be leveled by “negotiations in good faith on…nuclear disarmament.”

    When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in 1996, the judges unanimously concluded, based upon Article VI of the NPT, that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” [Emphasis added.]

    In his article, Ford seeks to substitute his judgment for that of the ICJ, the world’s highest judicial body. He dismisses the view of the Court on the nuclear disarmament obligation as mere dictum, “generally… regarded as having minimal authority or value as precedent.” But, in fact, the Court viewed this portion of its opinion as essential to close the gap in international law that they found in the threat or use of nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”

    Ford uses his impressive rhetorical skills to place emphasis on the word “pursue,” making the claim that “pursuit” of negotiation in good faith is all that is required of a party. He uses the term “pursue” to mean “to seek” or “to chase,” rather than in the sense of “to carry something out” or “to continue with something,” meanings that the ICJ likely had in mind in their reaching their opinion that negotiations must not only be pursued but brought “to a conclusion.”

    It seems unlikely that the non-nuclear weapon states would have been (or now would be) satisfied with Ford’s view of “pursue.” Like the bold lover on the Grecian Urn in Keat’s famous Ode, the non-nuclear weapon states would be denied their reward “[t]hough winning near the goal.” In other words, they could only watch as the nuclear weapons states pursued the goal of negotiations on nuclear disarmament without real hope that the goal would ever be reached.

    Article VI of the NPT makes far more sense when the emphasis is placed on the “good faith” of the parties in pursuing (as in carrying out) negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Ford’s parsing of words literally deprives Article VI of meaning as he seeks to exonerate the US for its failure to act in good faith.

    Ford is predictably also dismissive of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament that were adopted by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. He argues, “Structurally, contextually, and grammatically…the 13 Steps amount to no more than any other political declaration by a convocation of national representatives: their statement of belief, at that time, regarding what would be best.” Since the United States has also been dismissive of the 13 Practical Steps, Ford is certainly in line with US policy on this point.

    The 13 Practical Steps call for, inter alia, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, conclusion of START III, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and “[a]n unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    The United States has, in fact, failed to ratify the CTBT, explicitly not applied the principle of irreversibility in negotiating the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002, failed to negotiate START III with the Russians, withdrawn from the ABM Treaty to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization, and not made the “unequivocal undertaking…to which all states are committed under Article VI.”

    Despite Mr. Ford’s protestations concerning Article VI and his argument that “the United States has made enormous progress” on nuclear disarmament, the facts remain that the US still relies heavily on its nuclear arsenal, is the only country capable of leading the way toward a world free of nuclear weapons, and has not done nearly enough to rid the world nor its own citizens of the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons. The US, for example, has continued to maintain a significant portion of its nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert, has sought to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, has failed to initiate a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, and in 2007 voted against all 15 nuclear disarmament measures that came before the United Nations General Assembly.

    From a practical point of view, this means that other nuclear weapons states will continue to rely upon their nuclear arms for what they believe provides for their security. In fact, as the nuclear weapons states continue to rely upon these weapons, other states will choose to provide such “security” for themselves, and nuclear weapons will proliferate, eventually ending up in the hands of extremist organizations that cannot be deterred from using them against even the most powerful states. In other words, while Mr. Ford’s rationalizations and analysis (“…it would be unfair and inaccurate to extend any special Article VI compliance criticism to the United States”) may provide comforting justifications for some, they in fact contribute to a sense of nuclear complacency that undermines US security and progress on nuclear disarmament.

    It will not be possible to maintain indefinitely the double standards on which the NPT was formulated and which can only be cured by achieving the nuclear disarmament provision in Article VI of the treaty. This will require substantially more effort than pursuing good faith negotiations; it will require actual good faith. US leaders would do well to set aside Mr. Ford’s approach to papering over US failures to act in good faith with a thin veneer of rhetorical justifications and legal advocacy, and get down to the serious business of leading a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons before they eliminate us.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and is a Councilor of the World Future Council.

  • UK’s Failure on Nuclear Obligation: Letter to the Times of London Editor

    Sir, You take Iran to task for stalling on nuclear agreements (leading article, November 24) and you conclude: “Iran wants to be taken seriously by the international community, yet does not take its international obligations seriously. One is not possible without the other.”

    How very true.

    All the five “recognised” nuclear states: USA, Russia, UK, France and China, have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and thus (under Article VI) committed themselves to the abolition of their nuclear arsenals.

    Yet they have done nothing to show that they take their international obligations seriously.

    The UK is formally committed to nuclear disarmament, but it will not implement it as long as other states keep nuclear weapons. In the institution designated to deal with this issue, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, nobody is taking the initiative. The subject has been stalled for years, and is not even put on the agenda.

    With the re-election of George W. Bush, his nuclear policy – which includes the development of new nuclear warheads and their first-use, even pre-emptively if need be – is very likely to be pursued, leading to a new nuclear arms race.

    An initiative to implement the NPT is urgently needed and, for the reason stated above, the UK should feel obliged to take it.

    Yours faithfully, JOSEPH ROTBLAT, (President Emeritus of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs), 8 Asmara Road, West Hampstead, NW2 3ST. pugwash@mac.com November 24

  • An Open Letter to the Regents of the University of California

    An Open Letter to the Regents of the University of California

    The decision that you make on whether or not to bid to continue managing and overseeing the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories transcends ordinary university business decisions; it is a decision of profound moral consequence. The question that must be confronted is whether or not an institution of higher education should be involved in the creation and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction.

    While nuclear weapons are intended primarily for deterrence, the concept of deterrence itself is based on an implied assumption that the weapons might be used. Are the Regents of the University of California willing to continue to affiliate the University with laboratories that research and develop nuclear weapons, recognizing that the mass destruction of human beings could result? Although it may not be the intent, the potential use of nuclear weapons and larger implications of the university’s involvement cannot be denied.

    Your decision has vast legal, as well as moral dimensions. In a 1996 opinion, the International Court of Justice found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal if it violated international humanitarian law. This means that any threat or use of nuclear weapons that failed to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants or that caused unnecessary suffering would be illegal under international law. It is difficult to imagine any use of nuclear weapons that would not violate these rules of international humanitarian law.

    Although the actual decision to threaten or use nuclear weapons would be out of the hands of the University of California Regents and the scientists and technicians who contributed to the creation and maintenance of the weapons, the UC Regents and the scientists and technicians in the labs could be considered accomplices to future international crimes. The current work of the nuclear weapons laboratories in researching new and more usable nuclear weapons, such as “bunker busters” and low-yield nuclear weapons, also runs counter to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which calls for ending the nuclear arms race at an early date and for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    The University of California justifies its relationship to the nuclear weapons laboratories as “a national service.” But this so-called “service” of designing and improving weapons of mass destruction is unworthy of a great university. In fact, the “service” the University of California has provided is a fig leaf of respectability to the making and maintenance of these genocidal weapons. Should these weapons be used and destroy large civilian populations, the role of the UC would certainly be viewed as a national disgrace rather than a national service.

    If the nuclear weapons laboratories would focus their talented scientists on limiting their nuclear weapons activities to the dismantlement of these weapons and to maintaining the safety and security (rather than reliability) of these weapons while awaiting dismantlement, their efforts could indeed be considered a national service, even an international service. But under the present circumstances in which the US is moving forward with new nuclear weapon designs that make these weapons more usable, the UC should opt out of providing management and oversight to the labs. As UC Regents, you should base your decision on moral considerations, consistent with international law.

    I urge you also to make your decision to withdraw from your past role in management and oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons labs highly public. Doing so will influence the public and political discourse on the responsibility of the US to set an example in fulfilling obligations for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

    The University of California has a responsibility to pass on the accumulated knowledge of civilization to new generations. The continued engagement of UC in creating and maintaining weapons capable of destroying cities, civilization and most life on earth clearly contradicts the mission of the University, as well as its motto, “Let there be light.” There is no light in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, nor in the shroud of nuclear secrecy.

    I call upon you to take the high road and reconceptualize the national service of the University of California in terms of disarming and dismantling these terrible weapons of mass destruction, rather than creating and maintaining them. In 2005, the 60 th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 50 th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the 35 th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I urge you to take a principled stand for the future of humanity. Your decision could help change the course of our nation and the future of civilization.

    David Krieger is a founder and the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). For more information on campaign to end the University of California ‘s involvement with the nuclear weapons laboratories, visit www.ucnuclearfree.org.