Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • Human Radiation Experiments in the Pacific

    ” . . . protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; protect the health of the inhabitants . . .” (1)

    According to Marshallese folklore a half-bad and half-good god named Etao was associated with slyness and trickery.  When bad things happened people knew that Etao was behind it.  “He’s dangerous, that Etao,” some people said.  “He does bad things to people and then laughs at them.”(2)  Many in the Marshall Islands now view their United States patron as a latter day Etao.

    Castle-Bravo

    Castle Bravo Nuclear ExplosionSixty years ago this month the American Etao unleashed its unprecedented  fury at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.  It was nine years after the searing and indelible images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the world first learned about the dangers of radioactive fallout from hydrogen bombs that use atomic Hiroshima-sized bombs as triggers.

    Castle-Bravo, the first in a series of megaton-range hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll on March first of 1954, was nicknamed “the shrimp” by its designer – Edward Teller – because it was the first deliverable thermonuclear weapon in the megaton range in the U.S. nuclear holster.  We had beaten the Soviets in this key area of nuclear weapons miniaturization when the Cold War was hot and the United States did not need to seek approval from anybody, especially the Marshallese entrusted to them through the U.N.

    At fifteen megatons – 1,000 times the Hiroshima A-bomb – the Bravo behemoth was a fission-fusion-fission [3-F] thermonuclear bomb that spread deadly radioactive fallout over an enormous swath of the central Pacific Ocean, including the inhabited atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utrik in the Marshalls archipelago.  The downwind people of Rongelap [120 miles downwind of Bikini] and Utrik [300 miles east of Bikini] were evacuated as they suffered from the acute effects of radiation exposure.

    As an international fallout controversy reached a crescendo, a hastily called press conference was held in Washington in mid-March 1954 with Eisenhower and AEC chair Admiral Lewis [“nuclear energy too cheap to meter”] Strauss, his Administration’s top lieutenant in nuclear matters.

    Adm. Lewis Strauss:  “I’ve just returned from the Pacific Proving Grounds of the AEC where I witnessed the second part of a test series of thermonuclear weapons .  .  . For shot one [Bravo] the wind failed to follow the predictions, but shifted south of that line and the little islands of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utrik were in the edge of the path of the fallout . . . The 236 Marshallese natives appeared to me to be well and happy . . .The results, which the scientists at Los Alamos and Livermore had hoped to obtain from these two tests [Bravo and Union] were fully realized.  An enormous potential has been added to our military posture.”  Strauss added the caveat that “the medical staff on Kwajalein have advised us that they anticipate no illness, barring of course, diseases which may be hereafter contracted.” (3)

    Even former Sec. of State Henry Kissinger took note of the significance of Bravo and the new perils associated with widespread radioactive fallout contamination from megaton sized H-bombs, as might happen if the Soviets dropped The Big One on our nation’s capital and the fallout headed up the Eastern Seaboard.  Writing about nuclear weapons and foreign policy in 1957, Kissinger wrote:  “The damage caused by radiation is twofold:  direct damage leading to illness, death or reduced life expectancy, and genetic effects.”(4)

    Almira Matayoshi was one of the Rongelap “natives” referred to by Adm. Strauss.  When I interviewed her in 1981 in Majuro she recounted her experience with Bravo:

    The flash of light was very strong, then came the big sound of the explosion; it was quite a while before the fallout came.  The powder was yellowish and when you walked it was all over your body.  Then people began to get very weak and bean to vomit.  Most of us were weak and my son was out of breath.

    I have pains and much fear of the bomb.  At that time I wanted to die, and we were really suffering; our bodies ached and our feet were covered with burns and our hair fell out.  Now I see babies growing up abnormally and some are mentally disturbed, but none of these things happened before the bomb.  It is sad to see the babies now.(5)

    A persistent puzzle surrounds the question of intentionality.  In a 1982 New York Times interview, Gene Curbow (the former weather technician during Bravo) confessed that the winds did not “shift” according to the official U.S. explanation for the massive contamination during Bravo.  “The wind had been blowing straight at us for days before the test,” said Curbow.  “It was blowing straight at us during the test, and straight at us after the test.  The wind never shifted.”  When asked why it had taken so long to come forth with this important information, Curbow replied “It was a mixture of patriotism and ignorance, I guess.”(6)

    The late Dr. Robert Conard, head of the Brookhaven/AEC medical surveillance team for the islanders, wrote in his 1958 annual report on the exposed Marshallese: “The habitation of these people on Rongelap Island affords the opportunity for a most valuable ecological radiation study on human beings . . . The various radionuclides present on the island can be traced from the soil through the food chain and into the human being.”(7)

    In reference to the exposed Marshallese after Bravo, AEC official Merrill Eisenbud bluntly stated during a NYC AEC meeting in 1956, “Now, data of this type has never been available.  While it is true that these people do not live the way westerners do, civilized people, it is nonetheless also true that they are more like us than the mice.”(8)

    At present, the atoll communities of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap remain sociologically disrupted and uncertain about their future as their contaminated islands and lagoons have yet to be fully repatriated and restored for permanent human habitation.

    Kwajalein

    Following 67 A- and H-bombs at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946-58, the U.S. was not about to let go of its island capture, terminate the AEC-Brookhaven long-term human radiation studies at Rongelap and Utirk,  nor forfeit the valuable “catcher’s mitt” at Kwajalein for monthly incoming ICBMs from Vandenberg air base in California and Kauai.  In 1961 – following a polio outbreak on Ebeye, Kwajalein – Pres. Kennedy ordered a comprehensive review of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by his Harvard economist friend Anthony M. Solomon, head of the New York Reserve Bank.

    Correspondingly, JFK’s National Security Action Memorandum 145 of April 18, 1962 called for the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the U.S.(9)

    Through legerdemain and the inherent asymmetry of the relationship, the U.S. took every conceivable  advantage of its island wards, thus setting the stage for the ongoing human and ecological radiation studies and other Pentagon activities in perpetuity.

    To this end the Solomon Report recommended a massive spending program just prior to a future status plebiscite being planned for Micronesia.  “It is the Solomon Mission’s conclusion that those programs and the spending involved will not set off a self-sustaining development process of any significance in the area.  It is important, therefore, that advantage be taken of the psychological impact of the capital investment program before some measure of disappointment is felt.”(10)

    As the Pentagon and AEC used the isolated isles of the Marshalls to perfect its Cold War nuclear deterrent – replete with human subjects for longitudinal radiation studies – let us not forget the Pentagon’s ongoing project of missile defense, aka “Star Wars” at Kwajalein Atoll encompassing the world’s largest lagoon bull’s eye.

    Characterized as “hitting a bullet with a bullet,” ballistic missile defense has always had a reputation for fantasy and wish fulfillment, sold to Pres. Reagan with an exciting and glitzy video designed to parallel the then-sensation called  “Star Wars.”   Kwajalein and the fiction of Ballistic Missile Defense has tragically dumped good money after bad, notwithstanding the huge profits by Boeing, Raytheon, Northrup Grumman,  MIT’s Lincoln Lab, Aerojet, Booz Allen et al.  Between 1962 and 1996 the U.S. spent $100 billion.  And between 1996 and 2012 the total comes to $274 billion and still counting.(11)

    And what do we have to show for our nearly $300 billion missile defense boondoggle?  Last July 4th was also the planned launch date for a test of the BMD program.  The Ground Based Missile Defense system at Kwajalein Atoll failed again, despite the fact that the test was manipulated: “The intercept team knew ahead of time when to expect the incoming missile and all its relevant flight parameters. Such luxury is obviously not available in real-life combat. But even if the $214 million ‘test’ had worked it would not prove much.”(12)

    The collateral damage known as Ebeye Island at Kwajalein is infamously tagged throughout the region as the “slum of the Pacific.”  The appalling conditions on Ebeye for its 15,000 cramped residents and pool of cheap labor for the adjacent missile base are in stark contrast to the southern California-like setting on ten times as large Kwajalein Island for the 3,000 Americans manning the missile base.

    Likening it to South African apartheid, I recall my first encounter with Kwajalein and Ebeye as a young Peace Corps volunteer in 1976:

    Having spent the afternoon on Kwajalein yesterday left me feeling ashamed to be an American citizen.  The overt segregation of the American civilian and military employees on Kwajalein Island, and the cheap labor pool of Marshallese living on nearby Ebeye Island, makes me realize that racism is not confined to the American south.(13)

    And just to insure the longevity of the asymmetry, the American Etao embedded a little-noticed caveat into the 1963 Limited [Atmospheric] Test Ban Treaty that allows the U.S. to unilaterally resume nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, despite assurances to the contrary during the 1986 Compact status negotiations.  Safeguard “C,” as the provision is known, also calls for the readiness of Johnston Atoll and Kauai in the Hawaiian archipelago, and Enewetak Atoll in the Marshalls under the auspices of the DOE’s Pacific Area Support Office in Honolulu.(14)

    Several formerly inhabited atolls remain off limits due to lingering radioactivity decades after the last H-bomb shattered the peace on Bikini and Enewetak.  Imagine if the U.S. finally saw fit to do the right thing and pay their past-due $2 billion nuclear legacy bill, a small morsel of the annual Star Wars budget.(15)

    The recently discovered Mexican refugee fisherman on Ebon Atoll in the Marshall Islands drew world attention to these obscure coral formations atop extinct and submerged volcanoes where a continuous culture has survived and nearly thrived for the past two thousand years. And even though Jose Salvador Alvarenga said he had no idea where he was, Uncle Sam has always known where these tiny islands are, strategically located stepping stones in the bowels of the northwestern Pacific leading to Asia’s doorstep, now in the era of the pending Trans Pacific Partnership.

    Undoubtedly the legendary Etao is somewhere lurking in these once-pacific isles savoring the work of its American protégé . . .

    [Addendum:  PBS is sitting on an important 90-minute film about the radiation experiments in the Marshall Islands titled “Nuclear Savage:  The Islands of Secret Project 4.1” by Adam Horowitz.  Please contact PBS and urge them to air “Nuclear Savage,” a documentary film they funded and are keeping from the public’s view.  Also, please see these additional articles about the Marshall Islands: http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/06/01/nuclear-savages and PBS’ attempt to suppress this film.

    Endnotes

    1. United Nations.  Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.  Trusteeship Agreement. URL:  http://www.fsmlaw.org/miscdocs/trustshipagree.htm.  New York.  1947.  Article VI.
    2. Grey, Eve.  Legends of Micronesia.  Book Two. The sly Etao and the sea demon.   1951.  Honolulu:  Office of the High Commissioner.  TTPI, Dept. of Educations.  Micronesian Reader Series.  Pages 35-36.
    3. Adm. Lewis Strauss, chair-AEC.  Press conference about Bravo with Pres. Eisenhower, March 12, 1954, Washington, D.C.  The archival footage may be viewed in this clip @ 1:00-4:30 in Part 3 of O’Rourke’s Half Life.
    4. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.  Council on Foreign Relations.  Harper Bros.:  New York.  1957.  Page 75.
    5. Interview with Almira Matayoshi conducted by Glenn Alcalay in Feburary 1981 in Majuro, Marshall Islands.  This interview is online: http://archive.is/M5aH
    6. Judith Miller.  “Four veterans suing U.S. over exposure in ’54 atom test.”  New York Times.  Sept. 20, 1982.
    7. Robert Conard, M.D., et al.  March 1957 medical survey of Rongelap and Utrik people three years after exposure to radioactive fallout.  Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y.  June 1958.  Page. 22.
    8. Merrill Eisenbud.  Minutes of A.E.C. meeting.  U.S.A.E.C. Health and Safety Laboratory.  Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine.  January 13-14, 1956.  Page 232.
    9. Report by the U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI by Anthony M. Solomon, October 9, 1963.  Page 41.  The Solomon Report is online:  https://archive.org/stream/TheSolomonReportAmericasRuthlessBlueprintForTheAssimilationOf/micronesia3_djvu.txt
    10. Report by the U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI by Anthony M. Solomon, October 9, 1963.  Pages 41-42.  The Solomon Report is online:  https://archive.org/stream/TheSolomonReportAmericasRuthlessBlueprintForTheAssimilationOf/micronesia3_djvu.txt
    11. Stephen Schwartz.  “The real price of ballistic missile defenses.” The Nonproliferation Review.  April 13, 2012.
    12. Yousaf Butt.  “Let’s end bogus missile defense testing.”  Reuters.  July 16, 2013.
    13. Glenn Alcalay.  Journal entry of January 21, 1976.  Aboard the MV Militobi.  Peace Corps Journal, Marshall Islands 1975-77.
    14. David Evans.  “Safeguard ‘C’: U.S. spending millions on plan to re-start Pacific nuclear tests.”  Chicago Tribune.  August 26, 1990.
    15. Giff Johnson.  “At 60, legacy of Bravo still reverberates in Marshall Islands.”  Editorial.  Marshall Islands Journal.  February 28, 2014.

  • Building the Morale of Missileers

    A recent news story in the Global Security Newswire stated, “Top U.S. military leaders are personally reaching out to missileers at the Montana base that has become ground zero for an Air Force probe into exam cheating.”  It went on, “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Saturday called six launch officers during their shifts at underground launch control centers, according to a Pentagon press story. Speaking on the phone calls for roughly an hour, the defense chief voiced his assurance that the launch officers were up to the task of carrying out the U.S. nuclear mission, said Pentagon officials.” (Hagel, Air Force Brass Reach Out to Montana Missile Officers, GSN, February 4, 2014)

    One can only imagine what was said in those morale building talks.

    Hagel: Howdy, missileer, this is Chuck.  How’s everything down in your bunker?

    Missile Launch Officer: Just fine, sir, lit up like a shopping mall. Chuck who?

    Hagel: The Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel.

    MLO: Nice of you to call, sir.  I wasn’t expecting it.  Are you calling to give the order to turn my key?

    Hagel: No, nothing like that.  I just want to check in with you and see how your morale is doing.

    MLO: My morale is sky high, sir.

    Hagel: You’re not taking drugs, are you?

    MLO: Not now, sir.  I’m studying up for my next proficiency test.

    Hagel: I hope you know that you’re doing this country a great service.

    MLO: By studying for my proficiency test?

    Hagel: Well, there’s that, but I’m proud of you for being willing to turn your key when ordered and attack our enemies.

    MLO: Thank you, sir.  I’m ever vigilant, waiting for my orders.

    Hagel: That a boy.  Of course, we hope those orders will never come, but we must be ready 24 hours a day.

    MLO: Yes, sir, I couldn’t be readier.  I dream about being able to blow up the world.

    Hagel: That may be carrying it just a bit too far.

    MLO: Gotcha, Chuck, I don’t really dream about it.  Maybe I daydream about it sometimes.  But I’m ready to do it, for my country.

    Hagel: That’s the spirit, young man.  It sounds like your morale is just fine.

    MLO: Just give me the orders, and I’ll be ready.

    Hagel: What could I do to boost your morale even higher?

    MLO: Maybe you could have some movies for us while we’re on duty.  It gets awfully boring down here.

    Hagel:  Why not?  What’s your favorite movie, son?

    MLO: Dr. Strangelove, sir.  It’s the favorite of all the missile launch officers.

    Hagel: Son, it’s been good talking to you.

    MLO: And perhaps some munchies with the movies.

    Hagel: As I said, it’s been good talking with you.

    MLO: And allow us to bring dates into the bunkers for the movies.

    Hagel: That’s not going to happen.

    MLO: And perhaps an occasional visit by the president or first lady.

    Hagel: That’s unlikely.

    MLO: Sir, you’re wrecking my morale.

    Hagel: I’ve got to get on with my next call.

    MLO: I don’t feel like studying anymore.

    Hagel: Please, son.

    MLO: Call again any time.

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Speech in House of Representatives

    Earl BlumenauerMr. Speaker, before turning to the subject at hand, I really hope that people look at the CBO report that was referenced by my good friend from Pennsylvania, and you will find that the 2 million people who would no longer be working, are not going to increase unemployment. The unemployment rate will be lower. There are people who are trapped in the workforce now because they can’t afford health care. The Affordable Care Act will actually enable some people to retire who want to retire or stop working a second job. Read the report and find out that this is actually a very positive signal.

    But, Mr. Speaker, I am here today to reference something else that was in the newspapers. The papers are filled with scandal about the nuclear weapons program. The real scandal is not the cheating or drug use by people with their finger on the nuclear button. The scandal is that these people are there on the job at all, with these nuclear weapons; jobs and nuclear weapons that should no longer exist.

    Don’t get me wrong. The alleged drug use by the people who stand watch daily with a finger on the nuclear trigger, or that were cheating on their proficiency exams, is outrageous, but it is scandalous that we are frozen in time linked to a nuclear Cold War past and committed to wildly wasteful spending.

    These are weapons that have never been used in 69 years, that did not deter the 9/11 attackers, and cannot help us in our major strategic challenges today. They have never been used in battle since World War II, but they have almost been used by miscalculation and mistake.

    In Eric Schlosser’s recent book called “Command and Control,” there are terrifying examples of what were termed “broken arrows,” nuclear mishaps.

    A nuclear bomb was accidentally released over South Carolina, landing in Walter Greg’s backyard, leaving a 75-foot wide, 30-foot crater, leveling his home. Luckily, it failed to trigger the nuclear explosion.

    In North Carolina, a B-52 fell into a tailspin carrying two hydrogen bombs, each 250 times more powerful than Hiroshima.

    There were numerous instances when our bomber fleet, which used to be on the runway idling, on alert 24/7, was prone to catching on fire while packed with nuclear bombs.

    A few years ago, there was a B-52 which flew across the country unknowingly carrying six nuclear-armed air-launched missiles.

    By no stretch of the imagination, do we need these 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles on alert, plus nuclear armed bombers, all on top of our nuclear submarine-based missiles? We don’t need a fraction of this weaponry. At most, we need perhaps one scaled-down system. There is nobody left to deter. We are competing in Russia in the Winter Olympics right now.

    A small portion of one of these delivery systems is all the nuclear deterrence we could ever possibly need. The larger and more complex the infrastructure is not just more expensive, but more prone to mistake.

    We are talking about upwards of $700 billion over the next 10 years in operations, modernization, new systems, new nuclear submarines. It is outrageous. It is dangerous. Let me put that in context. $750 billion is more than the Federal Government will spend on education in its entirety in the next 5 years.

    It is time for Congress and the American people to put an end to this.
    Earl Blumenauer is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Portland, Oregon.

  • Missile Launching in the Dark

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

    David KriegerIn the early morning hours of December 17, under cover of darkness, the Air Force launched a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base. It was a test of a nuclear-capable missile. Despite the claims of the Air Force, such tests do not make us safer or more secure — only more terrifying to others, and when it comes to nuclear weapons we should be terrifying ourselves. These are weapons that could destroy civilization, and yet we have the hubris to play Russian roulette with them and continue to do so more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War.

    As General Lee Butler, former commander of the US Strategic Command, said, “Nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.” We would do well to pay attention to General Butler and get on with the hard and urgent work of negotiating to achieve Nuclear Zero globally, as we are required to do under international law.

    Following the test launch, Lt. Colonel Thomas Vance said, “The test launch is one demonstration of the professionalism and pride all members of Team Malmstrom take in executing our mission.”

    The Air Force seems excessively proud of its ability to have “successfully launched” the nuclear-capable Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. Is it pride in their ability to obey orders and carry out a mission fully capable of ending civilization should they be called upon to launch nuclear-armed Minuteman III missiles? The Air Force views its test launches as providing “data to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.” But neither the Air Force nor anyone in authority can assure that nuclear deterrence will be safe, secure or effective.

    Nuclear deterrence itself only provides a hypothesis about human behavior, the hypothesis being that if one threatens to totally destroy another, the other country will refrain from attacking. This hypothesis requires, at a minimum, rational political leaders, and not all political leaders behave rationally at all times and under all circumstances.

    Test launches of ICBMs do not make nuclear weapons safe, secure or effective. The capability to conduct murderous retaliation does not make us safe, should not make us feel secure, and is not effective in protecting us. Rather than protecting Americans, the Air Force is conducting test launches that are provocative, encourage nuclear proliferation and call into question the seriousness of the United States to fulfill its obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

  • Avoiding Needless Wars, Part 10: Iran

    Martin HellmanThe interim agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program has been praised by some as a diplomatic breakthrough and condemned by others as a prelude to nuclear disaster. A full appraisal must wait until we see what the follow-on agreements, if any, look like. In the meantime, here’s my take:

    1. The only alternative to negotiations is a military strike powerful and sustained enough to not only destroy Iran’s current nuclear program but also to prevent its resurrection. Such actions are impossible in the current political climate — and probably in any environment.

    Domestically, Americans are tired of wars, and our budget is already highly stressed. Internationally, we’ve developed a reputation as a bull in a china shop, so an American attack would be met with howls of indignation. It also would reinvigorate terrorism against Israel as Iran totally unleashed Hezbollah and Hamas.

    A strike which prevented Iran from ever developing a nuclear weapons would not be surgical or short lived and might be impossible. At a minimum, it would require hundreds of thousands of American “boots on the ground” for years on end, and cost trillions of dollars. It probably would cost tens of thousands of American lives and hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives.

    Even with that level of effort, an American invasion probably would fail to achieve its objective since Iran would be a more powerful adversary than either Iraq or Afghanistan, both of which have failed to produce anything that might be called an American victory.

    In 2010, TIME magazine explained why then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advised against attacking Iran: “Military action, Gates warned, would solve nothing; in fact it would be more likely to drive Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.”

    Gates’ warning was echoed last year by former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright: “If they [the Iranians] have the intent, all the weapons in the world are not going to change that. … They can slow it down. They can delay it, some estimate two to five years. But that does not take away the intellectual capital.”

    Also last year, Yuval Diskin, a former head of Israel’s internal security agency, Shin Bet, warned that, contrary to its intention, attacking Iran might accelerate its nuclear program.

    While a military strike is the only alternative to negotiations, the above arguments show that it is not a viable option. Diplomacy is our only real option, so the question becomes how to practice it most effectively.

    2. Given that diplomacy is our only viable option, we need to recognize that our past negotiating position – and the one Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is demanding be reinstated – is a non-starter.

    There’s no way Iran will dismantle its centrifuges and the rest of its nuclear program based on American promises of sanctions relief, especially when those promises might be rescinded by a new administration in 2015, over-ridden by Congress, or nullified by an Israeli attack.

    Our broken promises to Gaddafi add to Iran’s mistrust. In 2003, when he gave up his nuclear weapons program, President Bush promised that this good behavior would be rewarded. Yet, in 2011, our airstrikes played a key role in toppling and murdering Gaddafi.

    Iran also mistrusts us because we aided Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, even though we knew he was using chemical weapons – an action we later used as part of our tortured logic for deposing him.

    For diplomacy to work, we will have to prove that we have experienced a fundamental change of heart with respect to Iran and are prepared to follow through on the promises we make.

    3. Iran appears to be only months away from being able to make at least a crude nuclear weapon. While there’s plenty of blame to go around, Israel and the US need to stop putting all of the onus on Iran and recognize that we, too, played a part in creating the current mess.

    Repeatedly threatening to attack Iran, including with nuclear weapons (a possibility threatened in President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review) would have made even the most rational Iranian leaders seek a deterrent. And their leadership over the last 30 years has often been far from rational. Fortunately, the current leadership appears more reasonable, and that’s an opening we need to test. If, instead, we maintain a bellicose posture, we will pull the rug out from under the moderates and empower the hardliners in Iran. Former CIA analyst Paul Pillar recently warned that American and Israeli hawks who mistrust diplomacy may be intentionally trying to strengthen hard-liners in Iran since they, too, oppose diplomacy.

    While our intention was to halt nuclear proliferation, we have actually encouraged it – particularly in Iran and North Korea – with our militarized approach to foreign affairs.

    I don’t like leaving Iran so close to having a nuclear capability, but the alternatives appear  far worse. It’s time to admit that our Iranian policy thus far has been a disaster and try something new – real diplomacy.

    Suggestions for Further Reading

    Harvard’s Belfer Center has a summary of the best arguments both pro and con on the interim agreement.

    Dr. Abbas Milani, Co-Director of the Iran Democracy Project at Stanford’s Hoover Institution has an excellent article assessing Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani.

    Handout #5 from my Stanford seminar on “Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Hope” applies critical thinking to North Korea and Iran. All handouts are accessible from my Courses Page.

    This article was originally published by Defusing the Nuclear Threat.

  • Are Nuclear Weapons Really the U.S.’s Instruments of Peace?

    David KriegerThere are serious problems with communications in a society when mainstream media sources, such as the Washington Post, will publish articles touting nuclear weapons as instruments of peace and ignore serious rebuttals.  The Post recently published an op-ed, “Nuclear weapons are the U.S.’s instruments of peace,” by Robert Spalding, a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  The title really speaks for itself.  The article can be read here.

    I sent a response to the Washington Post in the form of a letter to the editor, but it was not published by them.  My letter, which is under their 200-word limit, sought to point out some of the fallacies in Mr. Spalding’s op-ed.  Here it is:

    “Robert Spalding’s enchantment with nuclear weapons would keep the US prepared to refight the Cold War for decades.  But nuclear weapons do not make the U.S. more secure.  Rather, they make us targets, and they spur nuclear proliferation.   A major nuclear war would destroy civilization and possibly all complex life on the planet.  A regional nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan using 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons each on the other side’s cities would put enough soot into the stratosphere to block warming sunlight, shorten growing seasons, cause crop failures and result in a billion deaths worldwide.

    “Nuclear deterrence is not foolproof because we humans, despite our best efforts, are fallible, as convincingly demonstrated at Fukushima.  Spalding is dead wrong.  It is not only through strength that peace can be obtained; it is also through diplomacy, cooperation, international law and a generosity of spirit in our foreign policy.  Nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral and ultimately uncontrollable.  They are a path not to peace, but to catastrophe.  In our own interests, the US should lead in negotiating their elimination from the planet.”

    Nuclear weapons place at risk everyone we love and everything we treasure.  They have no place in a civilized society, and US leaders should be doing all they can to fulfill our obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations for their total elimination from the planet.  But this will not happen if the mainstream media provides a one-sided view that “nuclear weapons are the U.S.’s instruments of peace.”  They are hardly that, and our continued reliance upon them will encourage nuclear proliferation and eventually result in nuclear war by accident or design.

  • Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

    Below is a link to the full text of the working draft of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

    http://fissilematerials.org/library/fmct-ipfm-sep2009.pdf

  • New START Treaty

    Below is a link to the full text of the New START Treaty:

    http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf

  • Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

    Below is the link for the full text of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

    http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

    Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

    Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

    In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

    Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

    Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

    Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

    Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

    Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

    Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

    Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

    Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

    Article II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

    Article III

    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

    2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

    3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

    4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

    Article IV

    1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

    2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

    Article V

    Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

    Article VI

    Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

    Article VII

    Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

    Article VIII

    1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

    Article IX

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

    Article X

    1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

    2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

    Article XI

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.