Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • 68 Leaders Call for the De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons

    The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
    The White House
    Washington, DC 20500

    The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
    The Kremlin
    Moscow, Russia

    Dear President Clinton and President Yeltsin:

    When you come together in your forthcoming meeting, we urge you to set a course so that Earth may enter the new millennium with all nuclear weapons taken off high alert status. One straightforward method to accomplish this would be to separate warheads from their delivery vehicles and place them in secure storage.

    We ask that the United States and Russia mutually commence the de-alerting process no later than January 1999 and complete the task no later than December 31, 1999. We ask you to work with the United Kingdom, France, and China so that they will likewise take their nuclear arsenals off alert within that time frame.

    With the Cold War over for nearly ten years, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain peaceful relations and carefully avoid military confrontation. Yet all five nations live in a condition of nuclear insecurity because of the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch of missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. They face the risk of attack by missiles launched on warning due to miscommunication or misinterpretation of data. By removing these dangers, mutual de-alerting will substantially enhance the national security of all the nuclear weapon states.

    Mutual de-alerting is an action which the two of you can carry out through executive action. This is what your predecessors, President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev, did in the fall of 1991 when they reduced the alert status of strategic bombers and a sizable number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1994 you two took a positive step when you agreed to stop aiming strategic missiles at each other’s country. It is well within the purview of executive authority to move now to de-alerting your respective nuclear arsenals.

    De-alerting carries the endorsement of a variety of groups, including the Canberra Commission (1996), a statement of 60 generals and admirals leaders from around the globe (1996), the National Academy of Sciences in the United States (1997), a statement of 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past and present heads of states and prime ministers (1998), and the recent New Agenda Declaration by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden (1998). This approach also has the support of a variety of religious bodies and numerous non-governmental organizations.

    De-alerting would be very welcome by all the people of Earth who would like to enter the new millennium free from the fear of nuclear destruction. We hope that you will take advantage of the opportunity to lead the world in this direction.

    Sincerely yours,

    Organizations from the United States
    Howard W. Hallman, Chair
    Methodists United for Peace with Justice

    Robert W. Tiller, Director of Security Programs
    Physicians for Social Responsibility

    Joe Volk, Executive Secretary
    Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

    Donnan Runkel, Executive Director
    Peace Links

    Christopher Ney, Disarmament Coordinator
    War Resisters League

    Anne Anderson, National Coordinator
    Psychologists for Social Responsibility

    Ellen Thomas
    Proposition One Committee

    Paul F. Walker, Ph.D., President
    Veterans for Peace

    Robin Caiola, Executive Director
    20/20 Vision

    Michael Mariotte, Executive Director
    Nuclear Information and Resource Service

    Gordon S. Clark, Executive Director
    Peace Action

    Susan Shaer, Executive Director
    Women’s Action for New Directions

    Daniel Plesch, Director
    British-American Security Information Council

    John Isaacs
    Council for a Livable World

    Tim Barner
    World Federalist Association

    David Krieger, President
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

    Clayton Ramey
    Fellowship of Reconciliation

    Mary H. Miller, Executive Secretary, and Rev. David Selzer, Chair
    Episcopal Peace Fellowship

    Marie Dennis, Director
    Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

    Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office
    United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society

    Curtis Ramsey-Lucas, Director of Legislative Advocacy
    National Ministries, American Baptist Churches

    Bishop Walter F. Sullivan, President
    Pax Christi USA

    Margaret N. Spallone, Recording Secretary
    Abolition 2000 Working Group of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the
    Religious Society of Friends

    L.William Yolton, Executive Secretary
    Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

    Kathy Thornton, RSM, National Coordinator
    NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

    Rev. Robert Moore, Executive Director
    Coalition for Peace Action (New Jersey)

    Ralph Hutchison, Coordinator
    Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (Tennessee)

    Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
    Tri-Valley CAREs (California)

    Byron Plumley, Disarmament Program Director
    American Friends Service Committee (Colorado Office)

    Greg Mello
    Los Alamos Study Group (New Mexico)

    David Buer, Interim Director
    The Nevada Desert Experience (Nevada)

    Jonathan Parfrey, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Los Angeles

    Wayne Shandera, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Houston

    Peter Wilk, MD, Co-President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Maine

    Ed Arnold, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Atlanta

    Robert M. Gould, MD, President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Greater San Francisco Bay Area

    Herbert M. Perr, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Nassau County

    Jennifer Aldrich, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Oregon

    Wendy Perron, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/New York City

    Josiah Hill III, PA, President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Oregon

    Daniel Kerlinsky, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/New Mexico

    Martin Fleck, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Washington

    Wells R. Staley-Mays, Director
    Peace Action/ Maine and Physicians for Social Responsibility/Maine

    Jonathan M. Haber
    Action Site to Stop Cassini Earth Flyby (Massachusetts)

    Harry Rogers, Nuclear Issues Coordinator
    Carolina Peace Resource Center (South Carolina)

    Organizations from other nations
    John Hallam
    Friends of the Earth
    Australia

    Zohl de Ishtar
    Women for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
    International Peace Bureau
    Australia

    Graham Daniell
    People for Nuclear Disarmament
    Western Australia

    Babs Fuller-Quinn, Coordinator
    Australian Peace Committee (National Office)
    Australia

    Irene Gale, Secretary
    Australian Peace Committee (South Australian Branch)
    Australia

    Pauline Mitchell, Secretary
    Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament
    Australia

    Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director
    Physicians for Global Survival
    Canada

    Norman Abbey, Director
    Nanoose Conversion Campaign
    Canada

    Joanna Miller
    Project Ploughshares
    Canada

    Peter Coombes, President
    End the Arms Race
    Canada

    Caterina Lindman, Chair
    St. Jerome’s University Social Justice Committee,
    Canada

    Peter G. Rasmussen, Co-chairperson
    Pax Christi
    Denmark

    Laura Lodenius, Press Secretary
    Peace Union of Finland
    Finland

    Malla Kantola, Secretary General
    Committee of 100
    Finland

    Regina Hagen
    Darmstaedter Friedensforum
    Germany

    David Wakim, Chairperson
    Pax Christi Trust
    Aotearoa-New Zealand

    Kate Dewes, Vice President
    International Peace Bureau
    Aotearoa-New Zealand

    Professor Bent Natvig
    Science and Responsibility in the Nuclear Age
    Norway

    Bengt Lindell, Secretary
    Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (SLMK)
    Sweden

    Commander Robert Green RN (Ret’d), Chair
    World Court Project
    United Kingdom

    Anni Rainbow and Lindis Percy
    Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases
    United Kingdom

    George Farebrother, Secretary
    World Court Project UK
    United Kingdom

    Dave Knight, Chair
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
    United Kingdom

  • 75 U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
    Contact: Dave Robinson
    814-453-4955 Ext. 235

    Erie, PA — Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it’s the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons, say 73 U.S. Catholic bishops in a report issued today by Pax Christi USA, the national Catholic peace and justice organization. The report, “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States,” critiques current U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral statement, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which allowed for the morality of nuclear deterrence on the condition that it only be an interim measure tied to progressive disarmament. Further Catholic Church teaching has since called for a concrete policy of nuclear elimination. “With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we feel our statement is both timely and prophetic,” says Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond, Va. and president of Pax Christi USA. “We hope it will help generate further discussions both within the Catholic community and in the policy-making circles of our government.”

    The report recognizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and offers a warning. “Because of the horrendous results if these weapons were to be used, and what we see as a greater liklihood of their use, we feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence,” the report states. Coming in the wake of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the report calls for the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process that will lead to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons the way that the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have banned those weapons.

    “What the Indian and Pakistani tests make clear is that the discriminatory nature of current nonproliferation efforts will not free the world of the threat posed by these weapons,” says Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Mich., and a leading expert on nuclear deterrence in the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. “The choice today is clear. Either all nations must give up the right to possess these weapons or all nations will claim that right. The events in India and Pakistan must be recognized as a sign of what is inevitable. We must act now to avoid a future where the nuclear threat becomes the currency of international security.”

    Citing the $60 billion Department of Energy program known as Stockpile Stewardship and Management, as well as current administration policies, the bishops conclude that the United States plans to rely on nuclear weapons indefinitely. “Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test, and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States (and the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new design and testing capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with ‘progressive disarmament’ and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely,” state the bishops.

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    The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
    An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States

    Issued on the 15th Anniversary of Challenge of Peace,
    God’s Promise and Our Response

    June 1998

    Dear Sisters and Brothers,

    We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.

    In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral Letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, grappled with the unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their use would not be morally justified.i We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military objective.

    Deterrence
    Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward progressive disarmament.

    Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It depended on three criteria:

    a) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy only. As we stated then, “We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace;”

    b) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim was only “to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;” and

    c) a reliance on deterrence must be used “not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament.”

    In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, we further specified that “progressive disarmament” must mean a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a concrete policy goal

    A New Moment
    In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were considered two historical forces against each other — capitalism in the West and communism in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each other’s ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no longer exists. The United States is now aiding its democratic successor, the Russian Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications and new missions to fulfill.

    But, with the end of the Cold War came new hope. World opinion has coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of this opinion we note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary, destabilizing and must be outlawed.vi We also note the historic International Court of Justice opinion of July 1996 that, “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The Court went on to say, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, “If biological weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear [weapon]. Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge.

    Unfortunately the monumental political changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely clear to us that the present US policy does not include a decisive commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. “Flexible targeting strategies” are aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons or other threats to US national interests.ix This expanded role of the US nuclear deterrent is unacceptable.

    A New Arms Race
    In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (which will ban full-scale underground nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with “progressive disarmament” and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.

    Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as well as other undefined vital US interests abroad.xii Does not this policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come? The Department of Energy’s own timetable for the Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop, test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983. Rather, it is the manifestation of the very reliance on nuclear nproliferation Treaty.

    In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats: “The United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons.”xv Nuclear deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to these goals.

    Inherent Dangers
    The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included the intention to use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and so-called “rogue nations.” The inherent instability in a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That danger can become manifest if but one so-called “rogue state” calls the deterrent bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of nuclear weapons. This must not be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.

    Moral Conclusions
    Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but rather has become the very “long-term basis for peace” that we rejected in 1983.

    b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of vital national interests abroad.

    c) although the United States and the republics that made up the former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the US intends to retain its nuclear deterrent into the indefinite future.

    Gospel Call of Love
    As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the words of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, “by their cost alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve.”xvi We speak out of love for both victims and the executioners, believing that “the whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5-14).

    It is out of this love that we raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in October 1997:

    “The work that this committee (1st Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention must be increased. Those nuclear weapons states resisting such negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. “This is a moral challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be met by the application of our humanity.”

    We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not. Instead, they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be used by someone.

    Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II’s warning that “violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence.”

    On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.

    May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
    Anthony S. Apuron, OFM, Cap.
    Archbishop of Agana, Guam

    Victor Balke
    Bishop of Crookston, MN

    William D. Borders
    Archbishop of Baltimore, MD (ret.)

    Joseph M. Breitenbeck
    Bishop of Grand Rapids, MI (ret.)

    Charles A. Buswell
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO (ret.)

    Matthew H. Clark
    Bishop of Rochester, NY

    Thomas J. Connolly
    Bishop of Baker, OR

    Patrick R. Cooney
    Bishop of Gaylord, MI

    Thomas V. Daily
    Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    James J. Daly
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY (ret.)

    Nicholas D’Antonio, OFM
    Bishop of New Orleans, LA (ret.)

    Joseph P. Delaney
    Bishop of Fort Worth, TX

    Norbert L. Dorsey, C.P
    Bishop of Orlando, FL

    Joseph A. Ferrario
    Bishop of Honolulu, HI (ret.)

    John J. Fitzpatrick
    Bishop of Brownsville, TX (ret.)

    Patrick F. Flores
    Archbishop of San Antonio, TX

    Joseph A. Fiorenza
    Bishop of Galveston-Houston, TX

    Raphael M. Fliss
    Bishop of Superior, WI

    Marion F. Forst
    Bishop of Dodge City, KS (ret.)

    Benedict C. Franzetta
    Auxiliary Bishop of Youngstown, OH (ret.)

    Raymond E. Goedert
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    John R. Gorman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    F. Joseph Gossman
    Bishop of Raleigh, NC

    Thomas J. Gumbleton
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI

    Richard C. Hanifen
    Bishop of Colorado Springs, CO

    Edward D. Head
    Bishop of Buffalo, NY (ret.)

    Joseph L. Howze
    Bishop of Biloxi, MS

    Howard J. Hubbard
    Bishop of Albany, NY

    William A. Hughes
    Bishop of Covington, KY (ret.)

    Raymond G. Hunthausen
    Archbishop of Seattle, WA (ret.)

    Joseph L. Imesch
    Bishop of Joliet, IL

    Michael J. Kaniecki, S.J.
    Bishop of Fairbanks, AK

    Raymond A. Lucker
    Bishop of New Ulm, MN

    Dominic A. Marconi
    Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NJ

    Joseph F. Maguire
    Bishop of Springfield, MA (ret.)

    Leroy T. Matthiesen
    Bishop of Amarillo, TX (ret.)

    Edward A. McCarthy
    Archbishop of Miami, FL (ret.)

    John E. McCarthy
    Bishop of Austin, TX

    Lawrence J. McNamara
    Bishop of Grand Island, NE

    John J. McRaith
    Bishop of Owensboro, KY

    Dale J. Melczek
    Bishop of Gary, IN

    Donald W. Montrose
    Bishop of Stockton, CA

    Robert M. Moskal
    Bishop of St. Josaphat in Parma, OH

    Michael J. Murphy
    Bishop of Erie, PA (ret.)

    P. Francis Murphy
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    William C. Newman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    James D. Niedergeses
    Bishop of Nashville, TN (ret.)

    Edward. J. O’Donnell
    Bishop of Lafayette, LA

    Albert H. Ottenweller
    Bishop of Steubenville, OH (ret.)

    Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S.
    Bishop of Gallup, NM

    A. Edward Pevec
    Auxiliary Bishop of Cleveland, OH

    Michael D. Pfeifer, O.M.I.
    Bishop of San Angelo, TX

    Kenneth J. Povish
    Bishop of Lansing, MI (ret.)

    Francis A. Quinn
    Bishop of Sacramento, CA (ret.)

    John R. Roach
    Archbishop of St. Paul /Minneapolis, MN (ret.)

    Frank J. Rodimer
    Bishop of Paterson, NJ

    Peter A. Rosazza
    Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford, CT

    Joseph M. Sartoris
    Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, CA

    Walter J. Schoenherr
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI (ret.)

    Roger L. Schwietz, OMI
    Bishop of Duluth, MN

    Daniel E. Sheehan
    Archbishop of Omaha, NE (ret.)

    Richard J. Sklba
    Auxiliary Bishop of Milwaukee, WI

    John J. Snyder
    Bishop of St. Augustine, FL

    George H. Speltz
    Bishop of St. Cloud, MN (ret.)

    Kenneth D. Steiner
    Auxiliary Bishop of Portland, OR

    Joseph M. Sullivan
    Auxiliary Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    Walter F. Sullivan
    Bishop of Richmond, VA

    Arthur N. Tafoya
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO

    Elliot G. Thomas
    Bishop of St. Thomas, VI

    David B. Thompson
    Bishop of Charleston, SC

    Kenneth E. Untener
    Bishop of Saginaw, MI

    Loras J. Watters
    Bishop of Winona, CA (ret.)

    Emil A. Wcela
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY

    __________________________________

    1 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, NCCB, 1983, No. 150. 
    2 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 186 
    3 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 185 & 188 (1) 
    4John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations Special Session On Disarmament, 1982,” #8 
    5 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    6 New York Times, December 6, 1996, Statement on Nuclear Weapons by 61 International Generals and Admirals. 
    7 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the (Il)legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996. 
    8 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    9 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.10 
    10 President William J. Clinton, Letter of Transmittal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate, Sept. 22, 1997. 
    11 Western States Legal Foundation, A Faustian Bargain: Why “Stockpile Stewardship” is Incompatible with the Process of Nuclear Disarmament, March 1998. 
    12 Reported in the Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1. 13 Information shared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Senior NIF Scientist, William J. Hogan with Pax Christi USA Delegation to LLNL, October 7, 1997. 
    14 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.9. 
    15 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    16 Giovanni Cheli, Permanent Representative for the Holy See Observer Mission to the United Nations, United Nations 1st Special Session on Disarmament, 1976. 
    17 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    18 Pope John Paul II, Address to Pax Christi International, May 29, 1995.

  • United States Policy and Nuclear Abolition

    An address to the Olaf Palme Institute in Stockholm, Sweden

    You are certainly aware that the United States is committed under Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith for nuclear disarmament. You are probably also aware that last year President Clinton approved a policy that nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone of U.S. security for the indefinite future. It is very difficult to reconcile these conflicting positions. Disarm or maintain a massive nuclear war fighting capability? It is impossible to do both. My purpose here is to explain why President Clinton made his decision, what it means to prospects for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and what can be done to promote progress toward a non-nuclear world.

    First, let me tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have been personally involved with these engines of destruction since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42 years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy a European target with a bomb that would have killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe, I was the officer responsible for the security, readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Russia, weapons which could never defend anything – only destroy everything. My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced me that they can never be used for any rational military or political purpose. Their use would only create barbaric, indiscriminate destruction. In the words of the Canberra. Commission, “Nuclear weapons create an intolerable threat to all humanity…”

    Now, to address the reasons for President Clinton’s decision concerning the U.S. nuclear posture. When the nuclear era opened in the U.S. the atom bomb was seen as a source of immense national power and as an essential contribution to efforts to thwart any expansionist efforts by Stalin’s Soviet Union. It was also seen by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force- as the key to service supremacy. The newly autonomous Air Force under General Curtis LeMay saw atomic warfare as its primary raison d’etre and fought fiercely for the dominant role in U.S. atomic plans. The Army and Navy feared that without atomic weapons in their arsenals they would become irrelevant adjuncts to strategic air power.

    This interservice rivalry led to the rapid proliferation of nuclear missions. Without going into needless detail, each service acquired its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for every conceivable military mission: strategic bombardment, tactical warfare, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank rockets and landmines, anti-submarine rockets, torpedoes and depth charges, artillery shells, intermediate range missiles and ultimately intercontinental range land and sea-launched ballistic missiles armed with multiple, thermo-nuclear warheads.

    The Soviet Union, starting more than 4 years behind America, watched this rapid expansion of our war fighting weapons with shock and fear and set out to match every U.S. capability. Despite the obvious fact that the USSR lagged far behind, alarmists in the Pentagon pointed at Soviet efforts as proof of the need for ever more nuclear forces and weapons and the arms race continued unabated for 40 years. During this wasteful dangerous competition the United States built 70,000 nuclear weapons plus air, land and sea-based delivery vehicles at a total cost of $4.000 billion dollars.

    As the Soviets’ arsenal grew, Mutual Assured Destruction became a fact and the two nations finally began tenuous arms control efforts in the 1960’s to restrain their competition. This effort was accelerated in the mid-1980 as a result of world-wide fears of nuclear war when President Reagan spoke of the Soviet

    Union as the “evil empire” and doubled U.S. military spending. Unfortunately, the excesses of the nuclear arms race had created an extremely powerful pro-nuclear weapons establishment in the United States. This alliance of laboratories, weapon builders, aircraft industries and missile producers wielded immense political power in opposition to nuclear disarmament proposals. Abetted by Generals and Admirals in the Pentagon this establishment was able to turn arms control efforts into a talk-test-build process in which talks went slowly and ineffectually while testing and building went on with great dispatch. This same establishment remains extremely powerful today and explains why the United States’ continues to spend more than $28,000 million dollars each year to sustain its nuclear war fighting forces and enhance its weapons despite the formal commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the establishment is the primary reason why in November, 1997, President Clinton decreed in Presidential Decision Directive #60 that nuclear weapons will continue to form the cornerstone of American security indefinitely. This directive also set forth a number of other policies that are directly contrary to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. He reaffirmed America’s right to make first use of nuclear weapons and intentionally left open the option to conduct nuclear retaliation against any nation, which employs chemical or biological agents in attacks against the United States or its allies. He went on to direct the maintenance of the triad of U.S. strategic forces (long range bombers, land-based ICBM’s and submarine-based SLBMs) at a high state of alert which would permit launch-on-warning of any impending nuclear attack on the U.S. This is the dangerous doctrine, which puts thousands of warheads on a hair trigger, thereby creating the risk of starting a nuclear war through misinformation and fear as well as through human error or system malfunction.

    Finally, his directive specifically authorized the continued targeting of numerous sites in Russia and China as well as planning for strikes against so-called rogue states in connection with regional conflicts or crises. In short, U.S. nuclear posture and planning remain essentially unchanged seven years after the end of the Cold War. The numbers of weapons are lower but the power to annihilate remains in place with 7,000 strategic and 5,000 tactical weapons.

    This doctrine would be bad enough alone but it is reinforced by continued efforts to extend and enhance the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. A major element of this process is benignly labeled the Stockpile Stewardship Program costing more than $4, 100 million per year to maintain weapons security as well as test and replace weapon components to insure full wartime readiness of approximately 12,000 strategic and tactical bombs and warheads. In March the U.S. Air Force dropped two B61-11 bombs from a B-2 bomber on a target in Alaska to complete certification of a new design for earth penetrating weapons, clear proof of U.S. intentions to improve its nuclear war fighting capabilities.

    Furthermore, the Los Alamos National Laboratory recently resumed the manufacture of plutonium triggers for thermo-nuclear weapons while the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is preparing a new capability called the National Ignition Facility where conditions within an exploding nuclear device can be simulated Supplemented with continuing sub-critical explosive tests in Nevada and extremely sophisticated computer modeling experiments, this new facility will give the U.S. means not available to other signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to develop and validate new nuclear weapons designs.

    To give even more evidence of the power of the pro-nuclear establishment, the U.S. will decide this year -on how and when to resume the production and stockpiling of tritium, the indispensable fuel for thermo-nuclear explosions. The fact is that the military has enough tritium on hand today for all of its weapons until the year 2006 and enough for 1,000 warheads and bombs at least until the year 2024. To invest thousands of millions of dollars for unneeded tritium is a waste of precious resources undertaken solely to placate and reward the nuclear establishment. It is particularly alarming and discouraging to see the United States investing heavily to perpetuate and increase its nuclear war fighting capabilities when only three years ago it was the dominant force promoting indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To encourage support for extension the U.S. led in the formulation of the important declaration of “Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” More clearly than Article VI of the NPT itself, this statement reaffirmed commitment to: “The determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons…” This renewed and strengthened pledge to reduce nuclear capabilities offered as an inducement for non-nuclear states to agree to extension of the NPT makes the current U.S. nuclear program an affront to all of the signatories. It is not only a direct violation of both the letter and spirit of the NPT; it is a provocation, which jeopardizes the goal of non-proliferation. The clear message is that the foremost nuclear power regards its weapons as key elements of security and military strength, a signal, which can only stimulate other nations to consider the need to create similar capabilities.

    What must those who favor nuclear abolition do to counter this threat to non-proliferation? First, as individuals and as organizations, we must redouble our efforts at home to publicize the dangers created by as many as 35,000 weapons still ready for use in the world. A broadly based global demand by all non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers must live up to the letter and spirit of the NPT extension agreement should precede the first review conference in the year 2000. A call for worldwide public demonstrations on the order and magnitude of those, which supported the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980’s, should be made. The nuclear powers must not be permitted to dictate the results of the review conference in the same manner the United States dominated the 1995 extension conference.

    The message to be stressed is that it is illogical and unrealistic to expect that five nations can legally possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons indefinitely while all other nations are forbidden to create a nuclear capability. Pressure to break-out of the Non Proliferation Treaty is further intensified because one of the nuclear powers is actively developing new, more threatening weapons and pronouncing them essential to its future security.

    A good strategy is to follow the lead of the 62 Generals and Admirals who signed an appeal for nuclear abolition in December of 1996. We stated that we could not foresee the conditions, which would ultimately permit the final elimination of all weapons, but we did recognize many steps, which could be safely begun now to start and accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal.

    As a first step toward nuclear disarmament, all nuclear powers should positively commit themselves to unqualified no-first use guarantees for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Their guarantees should be incorporated in a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the review conference in 2000.

    Concurrently, the process of actual reduction of weapons should begin with the United States and Russia. They should proceed immediately with START III negotiations, particularly since the implementation of START II has been delayed for four years. Even with the delay Russia cannot afford all of the changes required under that Treaty and has suggested willingness to proceed with additional reductions because far deeper reductions by both sides would be less costly.

    At the same time, both nations should agree to take thousands of nuclear warheads off of alert status. This action would reduce the possibility of a nuclear exchange initiated by accident or human error. Once fully de-alerted, warhead removal (de-mating) should commence and the warheads stored remotely from missile sites and submarine bases. Verification measures should include international participation to build confidence between the parties.

    Disassembly of warheads under international supervision should begin in the U.S. and Russia. When a level of 1,000 warheads is reached in each nation, Great Britain, France and China should join the process under a rigorous verification regime. De facto nuclear states, including Israel, should join the process as movement continued toward the complete and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. Finally, an international convention should be adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear explosive devices just as current conventions proscribe chemical and biological weapons. All fissile material should be safely and securely stored under international control.

    Verification of this entire process could best be accomplished by U.N. teams formed and operating in accordance with principles developed by UNSCOM teams operating in Iraq today. This model provides a precedent already accepted by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the nuclear powers.

    None of these progressive steps will happen until the community of nations comes together to make the United States understand that non-proliferation will ultimately fail unless the U.S. abandons its delusion that nuclear superiority provides long term security. Even when the dangers of this delusion are understood, progress toward the complete, final abolition of nuclear weapons will be painfully slow. Nevertheless, the effort must be made to move toward the day that all nations live together in a world without nuclear weapons because it is clear that our children cannot hope to live safely in a world with them.

     

  • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Fails to Ban Nuclear Tests

    President Clinton submitted the long sought Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) to the Senate for ratification, but it falls far short of its description as “comprehensive” and it doesn’t ban nuclear tests. Indeed, in 1997 and 1998, three so-called “sub-critical” nuclear test was conducted 1000 feet below the desert floor at the Nevada Test Site in which 3.3 pounds of deadly plutonium was blown up with chemical explosives without causing a chain reaction, hence “sub-critical”. Three more are scheduled for 1998 with more to come, as part of a thirteen year $60 billion “stockpile stewardship program” which will enable the weaponeers to design new nuclear bombs in computer simulated virtual reality. These computers are not laptops. The program includes the stadium sized $3.4 billion National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, computers as large as houses, and technology for prototyping new weapons and developing virtual manufacturing. The testing of a new post-cold war nuclear weapon, the B61-11 earth penetrating “bunker buster” in Alaska has been revealed, and a replacement for nuclear warheads on Trident submarines is in design, with plans for missile flight tests in 2002 and 2003.

    Clinton’s 1995 announcement supporting CTB negotiations was coupled with a promise to deliver on the stewardship program, ostensibly to secure the “safety and reliability” of the US arsenal. Yet in 1992, Clinton decided not to end a nine month moratorium, declaring that our weapons were safe and reliable and that the costs of resumed testing outweighed the benefits.

    Noted retired weapons designers, Ray Kidder (Livermore) and Richard Garwin (Los Alamos), agree that we can maintain the arsenal’s safety and reliability without the costly stewardship program. Kidder argues that the underground tests will raise international distrust of our good faith intentions to comply with the CTB and both Garwin and Kidder propose that the better option would be to maintain the capability to re-manufacture existing weapons, without the need for new designs which could create the need for ever more tests. Indeed, during the debate on whether to extend the 1992 moratorium, the Congressional Record revealed that since 1950 there were 32 airplane crashes with nuclear bombs aboard, and although two of the crashes resulted in the scattering of plutonium (over Thule Greenland and Palomares Spain), none of the weapons ever exploded! So much for safety. As to reliability, that goes to whether the weapons perform with the strength for which it is designed – a lethal and unnecessary exercise with the end of the cold war. Then why this deal with the labs?

    Clinton promised to provide the Pentagon and the weaponeers the ability to design new nuclear weapons in order to buy their acquiescence for Senate ratification of the CTB. History presents a sad parallel. In 1963, when President Kennedy sought ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Deborah Shapely notes, in Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara, that:

    The foes of the test ban in Congress, who were ready to do battle with Kennedy and expected to gain momentum from military testimony, were disappointed. The chiefs did testify for the treaty, because in the locked room they had demanded an enormous price: more funding for the weapons labs, preparation to test quickly in case the Soviets violated the agreement, and other conditions. The net effect was to strengthen the weapons labs, expand U.S. underground testing, and continue the arms race.

    The irony here is that continued design capacity for a new generation of nuclear weapons, in exchange for Pentagon support for CTB ratification, will undermine its international entry into force. For the CTB to become a binding agreement, the 44 nations with nuclear reactors on their soil must become signatories. (This unusual requirement is an acknowledgment of the bomb-making capacity of nations in possession of commercial reactors.) Countries such as India and Pakistan announced that they will not sign the CTB as long as the US continues its provocative program. Using our advanced technology to design nuclear weapons serves as an invitation to less developed countries to test and develop nuclear arsenals by more antiquated methods.

    India reacting to the July 1997 sub-critical test, stated that its opposition to the CTB as “not genuinely comprehensive” was vindicated as the pact contained “loopholes … exploited by some countries to continue their testing activity, using more sophisticated and advanced techniques”, and is a discriminatory non-proliferation measure that does not contribute to global nuclear disarmament. China also expressed its concern to the US.

    The American public is clearly opposed to such activities. A recent poll by Celinda Lake of Lake Sosin Snell and Associates indicates that 87% of all Americans think we should negotiate a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons just as the world has done for chemical and biological weapons. And 84% said they would feel safer if they knew for sure that all countries, including the US had eliminated their nuclear arsenals.

    Public concern is increasingly echoed by some of our most distinguished scientists and military leaders. The National Academy of Sciences called for much deeper cuts in the arsenal, going down to 1000 bombs and then to a few hundred each for Russia and the US. General Lee Butler, Commander of US Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear forces from 1992 to 1994 , has been joined by a number of other high ranking military leaders in saying that the continued possession of nuclear weapons increases international insecurity because the very existence of nuclear arsenals in some nations provides an incentive to other nations to acquire them. This warning, coupled with overwhelming public concern, should be a signal to the Clinton administration to support a “clean CTB” unencumbered by the baggage of the proposed $60 billion recipe for nuclear proliferation. Economists have calculated in 1995 that a passive curatorship program of the arsenal, while it awaits dismantlement, would cost only $100 million a year. It’s time to end this final chapter of the Cold War. (Copies of the Abolition 2000 public opinion poll on nuclear weapons are available at GRACE, 15 E. 26 St., NY, NY 10010; 212-726-9161 (tel); 212-726-9160 (fax); aslater@igc.apc.org)

  • Question and Answer Session at the National Press Club Newsmakers Luncheon with General Lee Butler

    USAF, (ret.), Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Air Command (1991-92); Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Command (1992-94)

    DOUG HARBRECHT (Moderator. National Press Club president and Washington news editor of Business Week): (Brief audio break) – [Do you think the U.S. should consider using nuclear weapons in] Iraq or in response to any chemical or biological weapon threat?

    GEN. BUTLER: At the risk of reiterating something I just said, I think it’s worth reiterating perhaps in a slightly different context. I had the opportunity to go through this calculus. When I was the director of strategic plans and policy in the 1989 to ’91 time frame, it was my direct responsibility to draw up the strategic objectives of our prospective war in the Persian Gulf, to imagine outcomes and to set war termination objectives.

    At the very heart of that calculus was to imagine the prospect of using nuclear weapons. And I would point out to those of you here who might have read Colin Powell’s memoirs that he goes through this himself in the latter stages of his book, because he was asked to imagine the kinds of targets in the Persian Gulf that might be struck with nuclear weapons. I share his reservations absolutely.

    The first issue, of course, is the one that I posed in my remarks. If we rightfully abhor and condemn the resort to the use of a weapon of mass destruction, how is it we could possibly justify — we, the United States, a democratic society — ourselves steeping to such ends?

    Number two, can you imagine the impact in a part of the world where we worked so assiduously for so many years to build our presence, to build support and credibility, of being the nation that used a nuclear weapon against Arab peoples? Only the second time in history that such a device had been used, and it would be the United States, and it would be in a part of the world where even today those actions raise powerful suspicions.

    Secondly, what would — thirdly, what would have happened to the coalition? How painstakingly we worked to put together a coalition of some 30 nations from very disparate points on the ideological and cultural compass in order to provide the proper underpinnings of the international community for that war. Can you imagine the impact on that coalition if we, the United States, had used a nuclear weapon, even in response to the use of a weapon of mass destruction by the Iraqis? It would have been devastating.

    There’s the question of targets. If you were the target planner for the use of a nuclear weapon in the Persian Gulf, what would be your choice? Surely it would not be the city of Baghdad. Would you hold hundreds of thousands of people accountable for the acts of their leader? Would it be an Iraqi division in the far western reaches of that nation? You might be interested to know the calculation of how many tactical nuclear weapons it requires to bring even one division to its knees when it’s spread over such a vast expanse.

    What would have happened to the fallout from the blast? If you want to do maximum damage, you use a (surface aspirant?). How is it that the fallout patterns would have arrayed themselves beyond the borders of Iraq, perhaps even to the south if the wind had been blowing in that direction?

    The real point of the exercise is that the United States has put itself happily in a position where it has no need to resort to weapons of mass destruction to respond to such provocation. We brought Iraq to its knees conventionally. We could have decimated that country. We could have occupied it as we did Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. We chose not to do that, but it was within our capacity to do so. And if we could do that in 1991, when they had the fourth-strongest army in the world and a significant air force, can you imagine the task today when we’ve reduced all of that by at least two-thirds? It is wrong from every aspect. It is wrong politically. It makes no sense militarily. And morally, in my view, it is indefensible.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, what happens to an officer — (applause). What happens to an officer who breaks, as you have, from the orthodoxy of our military? Is the military changing in this respect?

    GEN. BUTLER: It is, of course, very difficult and probably presumptuous in the extreme to answer on behalf of something called the military. And so I won’t pretend to do that. But I think that I can speak to it from this regard.

    It has been very gratifying over the last two years to receive countless phone calls and letters from colleagues who were on active duty with me, now retired, or who continue to serve, who support the arguments that I have tried to make, who believe, as I do, that it was near-miraculous that we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust, and that our number one foreign policy and national security priority should be the normalization of relations with the former Soviet Union and to walk back from the abyss that we created by the amassing of nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands.

    And, so, no, I would not pretend to speak for the military. And with regard to what happens, it’s also gratifying to have the comfort and to experience the fact that we live in a country where people can express their views freely. And while some, many, might take exception to them, no one in my experience has yet but to do anything but to applaud the fact that we’re trying to bring this issue back to the forefront of policy discourse in this country.

    MR. HARBRECHT: Do you also believe that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary or counterproductive?

    GEN. BUTLER: I don’t know. I don’t know. There are some historical eras into which I can put myself with some comfort; I’ve got the context right. But they’re really only those eras in which I actively participated. I was in uniform as an officer for 33 years. I understand that era very, very well.

    As an itinerant associate professor of political science, formerly with the Air Force Academy, and an historian, particularly a military historian, I have some understanding of the challenges that were faced by political leaders and military forces in early eras.

    It’s very difficult for me yet to recreate in my own mind the intensity of the period in which that decision was made by the president of the United States. And as I said in my speech, my purpose is not to accuse but to assess. It’s to try to understand the lessons that might be drawn from that. It’s to try and understand the consequences of having dropped atomic devices on Japan.

    At the time and today, we still believe that we spared the lives of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million U.S. and allied soldiers. But at the same time, we took the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. And now we have the opportunity, thank God, to step back, to pause and reflect on that in a different political, military and moral climate. And that’s what I’m trying to do. So I can’t make that judgment, but I certainly can try and draw my own observations.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, it’s widely believed that Israel not only possesses nuclear weapons but would use them if its survival depended upon them. Is Israel’s reliance on its nuclear weapons in the dangerous Middle East ill-advised?

    GEN. BUTLER: I think that it is a perfect illustration of the short-sightedness that tends to surround this issue of whether or not nations should acquire nuclear capability. What was it that prompted Iraq to try and acquire weapons of mass destruction, a nuclear weapon arsenal of their own? Could it have in any way been tied to the fact that Israel acquired such capability? And what of Syria or Iran? What of Libya?

    These things have causes and they have effects. They’re related. The circumstances in which nuclear weapons capability is created and sustained aren’t static. As a consequence, in my view, it is dangerous in the extreme that in the cauldron of animosities that we call the Middle East, one nation has armed itself, ostensibly, with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, and that that inspires other nations to do so. And, of course, that’s not the only regional conflict where we see this perilous confrontation.

    I will tell you what I do think. I cannot imagine any regional quarrel or conflict that is or will be made easier to resolve by the presence of the further introduction of nuclear weapons.

    MR. HARBRECHT: What can be done to persuade an emerging superpower like China to give up nuclear weapons? Would such a decision have to wait for the emergence of democracy in China?

    GEN. BUTLER: There’s a story, perhaps apocryphal, but it’s been in the literature for many years, as to why it was that the Chinese acquired nuclear weapons capability. The story goes that it was proposed to Mao and he said, “Why should I do this?” And he was told, “Well, other nations have them.” And his answer purportedly was, “Well, I guess we should have some.”

    If you look at the Chinese nuclear arsenal, it is far from modern. Their forces are not on alert. They’re struggling to bring up its safety and surity characteristics. China has avowed time and again that they are a no-first-use nation and that they are strongly on record in favor of nuclear abolition. I don’t know what it would take to persuade China to abandon their nuclear arsenals, but I am comforted by what they say.

    I believe that the keys to creating a climate in which the Chinas of the world — Great Britain, France, the non-declared states — are willing to join in a serious-minded, forthright and concrete series of commitments and steps to move steadfastly toward the abolition of nuclear weapons is for the United States and Russia to take the lead.

    I believe that we are missing priceless opportunities in what is perhaps a perishable window of opportunity to move forward much more swiftly and boldly in getting our forces off alert, bringing tactical nuclear weapons home from Europe, declaring no-first-use policies, and most importantly, reaching out to our friends in Russia and making the decision that it is time to get on with concrete measures for much more severe cuts in nuclear stockpiles than we’ve been willing to acknowledge to date.

    It is, in my view, a sad commentary on the current state of thinking on this issue that we are comfortable with a goal for reductions that would still have 3,500 operational nuclear weapons on alert 10 years from now. It is a dismal commentary on the current state of thinking that we still believe that distant nuclear arsenals that measure in the hundreds is a low number.

    It is time for the United States to act much more boldly and with stronger leadership with respect to getting on with getting the nuclear era to a close.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, do you ever feel any guilt for having been so integral a part of building the nuclear machine? Shouldn’t you have spoken up earlier?

    GEN. BUTLER: Well, this isn’t about guilt. This is about understanding. This is about reflection. I talked with Bob McNamara about this subject. He took a lot of heat when he published his recent book, “Vietnam.” And Bob may, in fact, be here today. I told him forthrightly that as a veteran of Vietnam, I was anguished by some of what he said. I felt like that perhaps he hadn’t shown enough guilt.

    And he said to me, “Lee, we were who we were and we were where we were.” He said, “I can’t change any of that.” He said, “But what I can do is to try and think through and make public and help others to understand the judgments and the pressures and the outcomes and how I see them now, not in order to assess blame, but in the hope that future generations of policymakers can read those lessons and not make the same mistakes.” That’s all. I’m trying to do here. (Applause.)

  • New U.S. Guidelines on Nuclear Warfare Should be Released to the Public

    New guidelines for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons were signed by the president in November 1997. These guidelines, which are contained in a four-page Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), have not been released to the public. Aspects of the guidelines, however, were leaked to the press and confirmed by administration officials. What is known about the new guidelines include the following:

    • they were developed entirely in secret without any public, or even Congressional, discussion;
    • they replace guidelines developed in 1981 during the Reagan presidency;
    • they provide that the U.S. will continue to rely on nuclear arms as the cornerstone of its national security for the indefinite future;
    • they no longer include a plan to fight and “win” a protracted nuclear war;
    • they reserve the right for the U.S. to be the first to use nuclear weapons;
    • they retain the option of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack, including by launch on warning;
    • they give the Pentagon increased flexibility to deter or retaliate against smaller states that might use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies;
    • they provide for the U.S. to maintain a triad of nuclear forces consisting of bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles;
    • they call for the U.S. to retain options to use nuclear weapons against Russia; and
    • they provide for increasing the number of sites to be targeted in China.

    On the positive side, the new guidelines have eliminated the foolish and hopeless idea that it was possible to fight and win a nuclear war. This is an idea that has been thoroughly discredited, even by President Reagan who stated publicly that “nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought.” It must also be considered positive that, due to the leak, we now know something about these guidelines, and can respond to what has been released. The negative aspects of these guidelines, however, are substantial. The fact that they were developed without involvement from the public and Congress is in the best tradition of a totalitarian state. On an issue of such major public importance as strategy for using nuclear weapons, it is reprehensible that no attempt would be made to solicit public or Congressional views.

    By indicating that the U.S. will continue to rely for the indefinite future on nuclear weapons for its national security, the U.S. is demonstrating its hypocrisy in relation to its promise in 1995, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was extended indefinitely, to pursue “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons….” Further, the International Court of Justice ruled in 1996 that there was an obligation to “bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects….” Indefinite reliance upon these genocidal instruments is not consistent with their ultimate elimination, nor with the obligation to conclude negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament.

    In China there was strong criticism of the new U.S. policy which increases U.S. targeting of China. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated, “Now that the Cold War is already over, the international situation has eased a lot. The United States still possesses a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. It stubbornly sticks to its policy of nuclear deterrence. It goes against the trends of peace, cooperation and development in our world.”

    The new guidelines reflect the continuation of U.S. policy to rely upon nuclear weapons as a central instrument of national security. These guidelines have not changed our policies of threatened first use or massive retaliation, which at their core are policies of nuclear genocide. First use, when coupled with launch on warning, commits us to risky, hair-trigger deployment of our nuclear arsenal with potentially catastrophic consequences.

    The Presidential Decision Directive demonstrates a lack of commitment to the elimination of our nuclear arsenal, as called for by international agreements and international law. The new guidelines will undoubtedly be heavily criticized by the international community, particularly by many of the other 185 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty when they meet in Geneva in April and May 1998.

    It would be appropriate for President Clinton to release in full the four-page Presidential Decision Directive so that the U.S. public can fully consider and debate the policy. U.S. citizens have a right to informed consent on decisions and policies that affect their security and well-being, as this policy surely does. The public and Congress should be involved in the process of determining whether or not the new policy is consistent with basic U.S. values as well as our obligations under international law and the new geopolitical reality brought on by the end of the Cold War. In the same vein, the public should be provided with targeting information for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This information would allow U.S. citizens to be aware of what populations are being threatened with mass murder in our names.

    While it may be appropriate and desirable for the President to keep details of his personal life from public view, the same cannot be said for policies related to nuclear arsenals that affect the life and future of every U.S. citizen as well as every other person in the world.

  • Nuclearism and Its Spread to Asia

    Introduction

    At its core, nuclearism is the belief that nuclear weapons and nuclear power are essential forms of progress that in the right hands will protect the peace and further the human condition. Nuclearism is a dangerous ideology — as dangerous as the technologies it has unabashedly and unreservedly promoted. In this belief system, “the right hands” have generally been synonymous with one’s own country, and “to further the human condition” has generally been synonymous with benefit to oneself, one’s country or one’s corporation. The key elements of nuclearism are:

    1. The belief that nuclear weapons keep the peace, and are a necessary evil. 2. The belief that nuclear power is a safe, reliable and inexpensive source of energy, and that the nuclear power industry is an absolute good. 3. The belief that, despite the expansion of the nuclear power industry, the diversion of nuclear materials from the nuclear fuel cycle to military uses can be prevented.

    The ideology and the technologies it has supported have created extraordinary dangers for all life on Earth. While the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are potentially more immediate and cataclysmic in scope, the insidious dangers posed by nuclear power reactors and their radioactive waste products are now already harming humankind, other forms of life, and the environment and this threat will continue for thousands of generations. Believers in nuclearism, to the extent that they acknowledge these dangers, argue that nuclear technology brings benefits that more than compensate for its inherent dangers.

    The dangers of nuclear technology may be summarized as follows:

    1. Nuclear deterrence is only a theory. It may fail causing many times more casualties and suffering than were experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 2. Nuclear weapons may be used by accident or miscalculation as well as by intention. The nuclear destruction of one city by one bomb could result in millions of deaths and casualties. A large-scale nuclear exchange could result in the annihilation of humankind and most other forms of life on Earth. 3. Nuclear weapons or the materials for making them may find their way into the hands of terrorists or irrational leaders of countries. 4. Nuclear power reactors are subject to catastrophic failures such as occurred at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and nearly occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States. Such failures could occur as a result of accident, human error, terrorist activity, or destruction by an enemy in time of war. 5. The spent fuel storage pools located at nuclear power reactors are particularly vulnerable to the release of radioactive materials as a result of terrorist or military attack. 6. Accidents occurring during the transportation of nuclear materials by highway, railway, ship, or air could result in hazardous releases of radioactive materials. 7. No long-term means of storage of radioactive waste materials currently exists to protect the environment and human health against the dangers of radiation release.

    Despite these dangers, the proponents of nuclearism have succeeded in many countries in obtaining large amounts of public funding to support the development, testing, deployment, and maintenance of nuclear weapons and/or the development and subsidization of the nuclear power industry. The costs of nuclear technology have included:

    1. Over $8 trillion spent on nuclear weapons and delivery systems by the nuclear weapons states over the past half century. 2. The diversion of generations of scientists and technologists to work on weapons of mass destruction rather than on projects of positive value to humankind. 3. The widespread contamination of the environment by radioactive pollutants created in the process of building and testing nuclear warheads over a fifty year period. Cleanup costs are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars, and it is understood that some areas of contamination will never be adequately restored to safe use. (In the United States, such areas are referred to as “national sacrifice zones.”) 4. Nuclear power reactors, once thought to be relatively inexpensive to build, now cost some $5 billion per 1000 megawatt reactor. This cost has priced nuclear reactors out of competitiveness in the United States despite enormous government (that is, taxpayer) subsidies. 5. Radioactive wastes generated by the military and nuclear power industry will need to be stored to prevent environmental pollution and subsequent health problems for tens of thousands of years. The bulk of this burden will fall to future generations.

    In this paper, I will review the development of nuclearism in the West, its roots in military technology, its linkage to commercialism, attempts to place a boundary between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the spread of nuclear weapons to Asian countries. I will then review the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reference to nuclear energy as an “inalienable right,” return to the nuclearist view that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil and nuclear power an absolute good, and discuss the need for new thinking about nuclear technologies, as called for by Albert Einstein. I will then review nuclearism in Asia, global nuclearism, and finally the pressing need and important opportunity that now exists to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclearism Is a Western Ideology

    Nuclearism is an ideology that originated in the West. The primary proponents of nuclearism have been the United States, Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union (now replaced by Russia). The “East-West” struggle of the Cold War described the division of Europe with Western Europe and the United States on one side of the divide, and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the other side. Both sides were proponents of nuclearism. Both sides believed that their nuclear deterrent forces prevented nuclear war and thereby kept the peace. Despite a lack of objective evidence that there was a causal connection between nuclear arsenals and the absence of a nuclear war, each side credited its expanding nuclear arsenal with keeping the peace. To underline this, the United States during the Reagan presidency named some of its powerful nuclear armed missiles “peacekeepers.”

    Both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are products of the West. Nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the ideology of nuclearism developed in the West and have spread throughout the world.

    Nuclearism Originated As a Military Technology

    Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States with the aid of European refugee scientists during World War II. The initial impetus for the U.S. effort was the fear that the Germans might develop similar weapons, and that these weapons would be necessary to deter the Germans from using theirs. However, by the time that the first U.S. nuclear weapons were developed, the Germans had already surrendered without having succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon.

    The first U.S. nuclear weapon test took place on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The war in the Pacific was still going on at that time, although the United States was aware that the Japanese were seeking to negotiate terms of surrender.(1) Just three weeks after the initial successful test of the weapon, it was used at Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945, and three days later at Nagasaki, Japan. At Hiroshima some 90,000 persons, mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 140,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. At Nagasaki some 40,000 persons, again mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 70,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. The suffering of the survivors, the hibakusha, continues to the present. The people of Japan were the first victims of this powerful new technology.

    The decision to use the newly developed weapon against the Japanese was made by U.S. President Harry Truman. When Truman received confirmation of the “success” of the use of the nuclear weapon dropped at Hiroshima, he is reported to have said, “This is the greatest day in history.”(2) One can imagine that the response to the devastation and mass killing of civilians was viewed somewhat differently in Japan.

    In the United States certain myths developed around the use of nuclear weapons.(3) The weapons were credited with ending the war and saving American lives. They were, therefore, generally perceived in a positive light. In Japan, these weapons were seen from the perspective of the victims, and the Japanese developed what has been described as a “nuclear allergy.” At the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park it says, “Never again! We shall not repeat this evil.”

    With these tragic events the United States brought the world into a new era, the Nuclear Age. Its hallmark was a determined effort that involved the subordination of science and technology to military purpose. The effort resulted in harnessing the power of the nucleus of the atom, and releasing a destructive force far greater than had previously been possible by manmade means. The Nuclear Age was born of a scientific enterprise with a military purpose — the creation of nuclear weapons — that was organized, funded and controlled by government. In this new age the destruction of cities by a single weapon became not only a possibility, but a reality. The destruction of humankind became imaginable and possible.

    Nuclearism and Commercialism

    While nuclearism may have begun as a military-based ideology, it soon also developed a commercial aspect related to the use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power. Thus, nuclearism became an ideology with two intertwined aspects, one aligned with military ends and one aligned with peaceful ends. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower took the lead in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for generating electricity with his “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations in 1953.(4)

    The promise of “Atoms for Peace” was virtually free and unlimited electric energy to power the world and provide the benefits of electric energy to the poor of the Earth. From this technology of death would come, Eisenhower prophesied, electricity so inexpensive that it would not need to be metered. It was the promise of something too good to be true, and in fact it was not true. It was the promise of creating virtually free electrical power for everyone everywhere. Nuclearism, like a modern alchemy, promised to convert the evil of a city-destroying weapons technology to a tool for powering the future.

    The promise of nuclear power would prove to be largely hyperbole based upon wishful thinking or outright fraud. The hope and dream of “Atoms for Peace” became, however, a central tenet of the ideology of nuclearism. By adopting this tenet of nuclearism, developed states were able to shift to taxpayers the financial responsibility for research and development of the so-called peaceful atom. Huge taxpayer subsidies authorized in the United States, Western European nations, and later Japan made possible the development and implementation of the nuclear power industry.

    The nuclear power industry continues to operate in the United States only due to Congressional legislation, the Price-Anderson Act, which transfers the majority of liability for a major accident from the corporations operating nuclear power plants to the taxpayers. Even so, there has been no nuclear power plant built in the United States since the early 1970s. In the early 1970s, the U.S. nuclear industry was forecasting 1000 nuclear power plants for the country by the year 2000. Today, however, there are only 110 such plants, and there are no plans to build more.

    Costs have been the major roadblock to the continued expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Initially it was estimated that the capital costs for building a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant would be a few hundred million dollars. By the early 1970s the costs had risen to approximately $5 billion per reactor.

    In true Cold War competitive style, the former Soviet Union raced ahead with its version of the “peaceful atom” by building nuclear power plants that would prove to be among the most dangerous in the world. This was dramatically demonstrated by the major accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This accident had serious consequences in Ukraine, Belarus, many parts of Europe, and even the United States.(5)

    Nuclearism Draws an Artificial Boundary Between Military and So-Called Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    Advocates of nuclearism have generally tried to walk a narrow line between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the one hand, they have sought to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. On the other hand, they have tried to promote the spread of nuclear energy to other states for research and commercial purposes. Since the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons is readily available and the nuclear materials needed for this purpose may be derived from the nuclear power industry, advocates of nuclearism needed to establish at least a facade of control over the nuclear power industry. They accomplished this goal through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with promoting nuclear energy internationally while providing safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. It is, of course, a clear conflict of interest to give promotional functions to a regulatory agency.

    The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

    The United States would have preferred to have maintained its early monopoly over nuclear technology. It was recognized from the outset, however, that this would not be possible. The U.S. scientific establishment badly miscalculated the length of time it would take the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons. Truman was advised that the development of nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union could take some twenty years, and in fact it occurred in just four years.

    The very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission that would develop a plan for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.(6) But early efforts and proposals to achieve international control of nuclear weapons failed, and by July 1946 the United States, then the only nuclear weapons state in the world, began an atmospheric testing program in the Pacific. Radioactivity from the testing spread throughout the world, but brought the greatest harm to the people of the Pacific.

    Until 1949, when the former Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon, the U.S. remained the sole nuclear weapons state in the world. From 1949 forward, until the end of the Cold War, the United States and former Soviet Union vied with each other for “nuclear supremacy,” a concept that some would define as beyond the bounds of reason. These two states would subsequently be joined by the United Kingdom, France, and China as declared nuclear weapons states. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and became the first Asian nation to possess nuclear weapons. A decade later, in 1974, India tested its first nuclear weapon, which it claimed was only for peaceful purposes. Subsequently, Pakistan is thought to have developed a nuclear weapons capability. Israel is the third of the threshold or undeclared nuclear weapons states.

    China is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to being threatened by nuclear weapons by the United States during the Korean War in 1954 and again during the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1958.(7) India is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to China doing so, and Pakistan is thought to have developed its capability in response to India doing so. Thus, there have been security concerns that have led to the spread of nuclear weapons into Asia. China did not want to find itself, as had Japan, the victim of nuclear weapons delivered by the United States or later by the Soviet Union. India feared the possibility of attack by China; Pakistan feared the possibility of attack by India. This is the faulty logic of deterrence, which has grave built-in dangers.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty: An “Inalienable Right” to Nuclear Energy?

    It was the general understanding by the U.S., former USSR, and the UK that the spread of nuclear weapons created a more dangerous world. These states considered it acceptable and reasonable that they would maintain their nuclear arsenals, but believed it to be too dangerous for other countries to follow their lead in developing and maintaining such arsenals. This led these leading nuclear weapons states to initiate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.(8) This treaty created two categories of states, those that had nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In the category of nuclear weapons states were the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. France and China, however, did not become parties to the NPT until the early 1990s.

    In the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states pledged not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapons states pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons or otherwise help non-nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear arsenals. On its face, this would appear to be an uneven and perhaps even unreasonable bargain. The nuclear weapons states, however, did sweeten the offer by agreeing in Article VI to have good faith negotiations on a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The nuclear weapons states also agreed that they would help other countries develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the treaty even refers in Article IV to peaceful nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.” Thus, in attempting to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the treaty actually promotes the use of nuclear technology for generating energy. The dual purpose nature of nuclear technology has opened a back door to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a number of countries have sought to walk through it.

    India and Pakistan were both able to develop their nuclear weapons through nuclear reactor programs that were purportedly being used for peaceful purposes. Iraq also came close to developing nuclear weapons in this way. What is needed to accomplish this, in addition to nuclear reactors for energy or research purposes, are facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium from spent fuel. Two countries in Asia with this capability are North Korea and Japan. North Korea is thought to possess enough plutonium for constructing one or two nuclear weapons. Japan has some 13,000 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, enough to potentially manufacture more than a thousand nuclear weapons.(9) South Korea and Taiwan have tried to acquire the necessary plutonium reprocessing technologies to develop nuclear weapons, but they have been kept from doing so by the United States.

    Nuclearists View Nuclear Weapons as a Necessary Evil and Nuclear Power an Absolute Good

    In the ideology of nuclearism, nuclear weapons are accepted as a necessary evil to maintain the peace. This evil, however, can only be tolerated in certain countries that can be trusted to control the weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen by the West as a threat in the hands of the former Soviet Union, but at least it was understood that they would take necessary steps to control their weapons. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union is viewed by many as a serious danger to world security due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials to unstable national leaders or terrorists. Apparently, though, it has not been considered a serious enough danger by the United States and its allies to make the control of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union a matter of highest priority with appropriate funding. Some funding has been provided, but the amounts are insufficient to the nature of the danger.

    In the view of nuclearists, world peace can be maintained by nuclear arms, which would be used only as a last resort. This intention, of course, could dramatically fail if weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union or any other state fell into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    It is also the view of nuclearists that nuclear power is an absolute good. They envision world markets being expanded by building highly capital intensive nuclear power plants throughout the developing world. It is a vision that encompasses the entire world, bringing the promise of nuclear power to rich and poor countries alike. It is unfortunately a vision that primarily benefits its promoters while bringing serious dangers to all who accept the technology.

    The public relations arm of the nuclear power industry, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, has painted the promise of safe, reliable, and inexpensive energy in glowing terms (pun intended), while skimming over the high capital costs, the need for huge subsidies, the danger of accidents, the added risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the unsolved problems of nuclear waste storage. These are the considerations borne from experience that have dampened enthusiasm for nuclear energy in the United States, Sweden, and other technologically advanced countries. The nuclear power industry has painted a picture of the benefits of nuclear energy that has attracted substantial interest from developing countries, many in Asia — countries that are eager to light their cities with this high-tech solution that they believe will be cheap and environmentally benign. Beneath the surface of the glittering promises, there is some sense that dangers are lurking, but these are easily overlooked in the hope of a quick fix for economies badly in need of inexpensive energy sources.

    Need for New Thinking

    Einstein, who had at first encouraged Franklin Roosevelt to establish a U.S. government project to develop nuclear weapons, was utterly distraught by what had occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He warned, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Einstein’s reflection remains the central challenge of the Nuclear Age.

    What will it take to change our modes of thinking with regard to nuclearism? One source of encouragement is that nuclearism does not seem to be an ideology with widespread support among the people of the world. It appears to be largely concentrated among those who stand to profit from it, and their supporters in government.

    The nature of nuclearism has been revealed in starker terms in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the end of communism as a state ideology in Russia, the West has continued to rely upon nuclear arsenals and to pursue policies of maintaining these arsenals, although at lower levels than in the Cold War period. But these arsenals do not assure global security, and many experts have argued that the breakup of the former Soviet Union has created serious dangers of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    In the West, nuclearism and militarism have forged a strong link. Most Western European countries have become partners of the United States, Britain, and France in relying upon nuclear weapons for security. Russia has also been reliant upon its nuclear arsenal, and recently has announced that it has adopted a first-use doctrine, similar to that of NATO countries, if it is threatened by attack.(10) Eastern European countries, that formerly fell under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, are now seeking to join NATO and place themselves under the NATO nuclear umbrella. NATO recently voted to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.

    This proposed expansion of NATO has placed Russia on the defensive, and could have the result of stopping all progress in the reduction of nuclear armaments. The nationalistic Russian Duma may not ratify START II if NATO is expanded eastward closer to Russia’s borders. George Kennan, an elder statesman of United States foreign policy and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has referred to the expansion of NATO as “the most fateful error in U.S. policy in the entire post Cold War era.”(11)

    The linkage of nuclearism and militarism has had huge financial implications. The United States alone has spent some $4 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and its delivery and command and control systems since the early 1940s. The former Soviet Union is thought to have spent nearly a like amount, which ultimately was a key factor in its economic collapse and disintegration.

    Nuclearism in Asia Today

    There is some hope, albeit slim, that from the geographic East, from Asia, there will be leadership for an end to nuclearism. The Japanese people, as the most prominent victims of nuclearism, have always opposed nuclear weapons. Their government, however, has been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and has also accumulated many tons of weapons-grade plutonium that could be fashioned into a sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal. The Japanese government has also built up a substantial nuclear power industry to reduce Japan’s reliance on imported oil. The Chinese have always had a better position on nuclear disarmament than their Western counterparts. The Indians and the Pakistanis argued for a universal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament in connection with the drafting of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but they were rebuffed by the West.

    Can Asian nations resist the temptations to nuclearism? Are they already too Westernized? Or, is there some aspect of Asian culture that is capable of rejecting nuclearism and leading the world back from the insane policies that were pursued during the Cold War and that continue to be relied upon today? These questions are worth exploring throughout Asia. If they can awaken new possibilities to dull the gleaming but false promises of nuclearism, they may help reverse recent historical trends that have the world on a collision course with disaster. A review of nuclearism in major Asian nations follows.

    China

    The major nuclear weapons state in Asia is China, which is thought to have some 400 nuclear weapons, of which some 250 are thought to be strategic weapons.(12) The remaining 150 weapons are thought to be tactical weapons for battlefield use. Since China’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted in great secrecy, it is possible that the size of their arsenal is considerably larger. It remains a relatively small arsenal, however, by comparison with those of the United States and Russia, which are each thought to currently contain some 10,000 nuclear weapons.(13)

    China has always said that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is the only one of the declared nuclear weapons states to make this pledge. China has also repeatedly called for nuclear disarmament, and said that it would go to zero nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states would do so as well. There is no reason to doubt that China is serious about these pledges as they would appear to be strongly in their interests given the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals.

    China also appears intent upon expanding its nuclear energy program. Today it has three nuclear power plants, and has expressed intentions of expanding to 100 nuclear power plants by the middle of the next century.(14)

    Japan

    Japan relies upon the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” for its defense. The close relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Japan in the post World War II period has allowed the U.S. to adopt a very lenient posture toward the Japanese accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium. While Japan does not have nuclear weapons, it has the materials, technological capability, and facilities to produce them rapidly in large numbers. This capacity has been referred to as “virtual deterrence.”(15)

    The Japanese government has consistently expressed its three non-nuclear principles — that it will not manufacture, nor possess, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons. In actual fact, however, the position of the government with regard to future Japanese possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more ambiguous than the position of the Japanese people, which is solidly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state.

    In Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the state renounces the right to make war:

    “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

    “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”(16)

    Despite this Constitutional provision, however, Japan now has the third largest military expenditures in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia. Japan is now spending some $50 billion per year on its military.(17) It has a very highly trained and well equipped military force, which it calls its “Self-Defense Forces.”

    Japan also has the largest concentration of nuclear power reactors in Asia with 53 units. These reactors supply some 28 percent of Japan’s energy. Japanese officials are seeking to increase this amount to 42 percent by 2010 in an effort to reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil and gas.(18) The Japanese have been developing fast-breeder reactors, which produce more nuclear fuel than they consume. This has provided the rationale for the country to accumulate large amounts of plutonium that could also be used for weapons. The Japanese have developed reprocessing facilities that give them the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. They also have agreements with France for the French to reprocess their spent fuel and provide them with reprocessed plutonium.

    A series of accidents at nuclear power plants over the past few years, including one at the Monju fast-breeder reactor, have undermined confidence in nuclear power among the people of Japan. This confidence was also undermined by the Kobe earthquake, and the knowledge that Monju and other reactors were built on earthquake faults. The Japanese government has tried to allay fears about nuclear power with a cartoon character, “our little friend Pluto,” who tells children that plutonium is safe enough to drink.(19)

    There is a growing anti-nuclear movement in Japan directed against nuclear power plants. In August 1996 Japanese voters in Maki, about 200 miles from Tokyo, participated in the first referendum in Japan on building a nuclear power plant. The Maki voters overwhelmingly rejected the plant with 61 percent voting against it.(20)

    The Japanese people have always strongly opposed nuclear weapons. In the international community the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have remained powerful and eloquent spokespersons for the victims of the bombings in those cities.

    North Korea

    North Korea, like Japan, has reprocessing facilities to create weapons-grade plutonium. It also has indigenous uranium supplies. It is thought that North Korea may have developed 12 to 15 kilograms of separated weapons-grade plutonium, enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Concern over this possibility led to an agreement in December 1995 in which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two 1000 megawatt light water nuclear reactors, to be financed by Japan and South Korea, and various other incentives.

    A top level defector from North Korea was recently quoted as saying that “North Korea could turn the capitalist South into a sea of flames and scorch Japan in a nuclear attack.”(21)

    South Korea

    South Korea has an active nuclear power program with ten reactors generating over 9000 megawatts of electricity. Forty percent of its electricity is provided from these plants. There are plans for an additional 15 reactors in the future.(22) South Korea has tried since the 1970s to acquire uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing facilities which would give it the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but it has been forestalled in these efforts by the United States.

    For many years the U.S. is thought to have maintained tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but it is now believed that these weapons have been withdrawn. Of course, the continued U.S. military presence in South Korea creates the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a potential conflict with North Korea.

    Taiwan

    Taiwan, like South Korea, has an active nuclear power program, and has tried to acquire facilities for uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing, but has not been successful in doing so. Also like South Korea, it has the technological competence to develop nuclear weapons if it obtained the materials to do so. Given its uneasy relationship with China, Taiwan would probably like to have a nuclear deterrent force against China’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

    Taiwan meets one-third of its energy needs by means of nuclear power. It has six nuclear power plants supplying some 5,000 megawatts of electricity.(23)

    India and Pakistan

    The Indian subcontinent presents one of the greatest dangers of nuclear war. Although both India and Pakistan deny it, they are both thought to have nuclear arsenals. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and is thought to have a few dozen nuclear weapons. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear weapon, but is thought to possess a similar number or somewhat less than India. Both countries consider the other an enemy, and they have clashed many times over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

    India has ten nuclear power reactors generating less than 2000 megawatts of electricity, while Pakistan has only one nuclear power reactor generating 125 megawatts of electricity. In 1991 the two countries signed an agreement not to preemptively strike each other’s nuclear facilities.(24)

    Global Nuclearism

    Nuclearism in Asia is clearly embedded in global nuclearism. It cannot be separated out and treated for its symptoms without also treating the systemic disease of global nuclearism. It is certain that China will not give up its nuclear arsenal while the U.S. and Russia retain their arsenals. Nor will Japan give up its nuclear option while China retains its nuclear weapons. The same is true of India, and it is equally certain that Pakistan will not give up its nuclear weapons capability while India maintains its capability. It is fair to say that Asian nuclearism has been a reaction to the West. The United States demonstrated what may be viewed as the “usefulness” of nuclear weapons in warfare and its willingness to use these weapons. But it is a far different scenario to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear armed opponent that is already virtually defeated, as the U.S. did in Japan, than it is to use nuclear weapons against an opponent in possession of nuclear weapons or one that could quickly develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.

    It is becoming abundantly clear that nuclear weapons can serve only one reasonable purpose, and that is to deter another state from using nuclear weapons. Once one state has used nuclear weapons against a nuclear armed opponent or the ally of a nuclear armed opponent, retaliation is likely, and this would make any first use untenable. If the only purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence, then it is clear that as long as any state has nuclear weapons other states will want to maintain theirs or acquire such weapons as a means of deterrence. Therefore, there are only two choices: proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons, or the elimination of all nuclear weapons. General Lee Butler, the former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has found that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.(25) How are we to proceed in this direction?

    Achieving a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    In 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, for an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under international law under any circumstances. Oral hearings on this question were held at the end of 1995. The three declared Western nuclear weapons states (U.S. UK, and France) and Russia all argued before the Court that the Court should decline to answer the question but, if it did choose to answer, it should find that under certain circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal. Some NATO allies of these nuclear weapons states supported their position. China chose not to participate in the hearings.

    Many non-aligned states argued before the Court that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be considered illegal under all circumstances. They argued that international humanitarian law did not permit any use of nuclear weapons because such law prohibited the use of excessively injurious weapons (and surely nuclear weapons fit this category) and that nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Nuclear weapons, in fact, have been targeted at civilian populations in policies known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

    After receiving written and oral testimony from states, the Court deliberated extensively, and released its opinion on July 8, 1996.(26) The Court found unanimously that the rules of international humanitarian law apply to any threat or use of nuclear weapons. They also found in a split vote, decided by the President of the Court, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal under the international law of armed conflict. The Court indicated that it was unable to determine one way or the other whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be allowed in an extreme case of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. With regard to this point, the President of the Court, M. Bedjaoui stated in his separate declaration, “I cannot sufficiently emphasize the fact that the Court’s inability to go beyond this statement of the situation can in no manner be interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”(27) He also referred to nuclear weapons as the “ultimate evil.”(28)

    The Court also interpreted Article VI of the NPT to the effect that the nuclear weapons states are under an obligation to complete good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. The Court stated: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”(29)

    Responding to the Court’s opinion, the United Nations General Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Court and called for the good faith negotiations to begin in 1997 for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons.(30) (See Appendix A.)

    Thus far, the nuclear weapons states have ignored the Court and the United Nations General Assembly. But the pressure is building around the world to force the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In December 1996, 58 generals and admirals from 17 nations released a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. They stated: “We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.”(31) The generals went on to urge that “long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”(32) (See Appendix B.)

    At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, representatives of citizen action groups from around the world gathered in New York to lobby the delegates for nuclear abolition. An Abolition Caucus was formed and drafted an important statement known as the Abolition 2000 Statement. (See Appendix C.) This statement calls for the nuclear weapons states to enter into a treaty by the year 2000 to eliminate nuclear weapons in a timebound framework. Based upon this statement an Abolition 2000 Global Network was formed that now has participation by over 700 citizen action groups around the world. It is a growing citizens movement advocating the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.(33)

    A Sunflower Story

    In June 1996 Ukraine, which had inherited nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, transferred the last of its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The defense ministers of Ukraine and Russia met with the Secretary of Defense of the United States at a former Ukrainian missile base which once housed 80 SS-19 missiles aimed at the United States. They celebrated the occasion by scattering sunflower seeds and planting sunflowers. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said: “Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil would insure peace for future generations.”(34)

    The sunflower has become the symbol of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a simple symbol that powerfully suggests the difference between a flower that is bright and beautiful and whose seeds provide nutrition on the one hand, and a missile that is armed with nuclear warheads that can incinerate the inhabitants of entire cities on the other hand. There should be no doubt that the sunflower is the right choice. It represents life rather than death, and the sun’s abundant radiant energy that can be used to benefit rather than destroy humanity.

    Conclusion

    Momentum is building throughout the world for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to counter the logic of death and destruction, the logic of the Cold War that ended many years ago, with a logic of hope for the future of humanity. If we are to give hope meaning in our time, we must seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War and move surely and rapidly to denuclearize our planet. Asia has an important role to play in this movement, which must be primarily a movement of people that will become so powerful that no government can stand in its way. Opposition to nuclearism provides an opportunity for humanity to unite around a common theme of assuring a future for our children and grandchildren. The time to act is now. There is far too much to do that is positive rather than to continue to spend our human, our scientific, and our financial resources on weapons of mass annihilation and nuclear power reactors that create radioactive poisons that will endanger the Earth for thousands of generations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been enough of a lesson for the world to learn. There is no need to wait until more cities are added to this unfortunate list. East and West, North and South face the common problem of nuclear terror. We can end that terror once and for all if enough of us will stand up, speak out, and demand an end to nuclearism. It is time to reject both nuclear weapons and the dangerous technology of nuclear energy with which weapons production is so intimately intertwined.

    * Paper prepared for conference, “Human Security and Global Governance,” sponsored by the Toda Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 5-8, 1997. The author would like to thank Lori Beckwith for her research assistance.

    ** David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He can be contacted at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; Fax: 805 568 0466; Web Site: https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com.

    ENDNOTES

    1. See, for example, President Truman’s personal journal, July 18, 1945. “Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in….”

    2. Wyden, Peter, Day One, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 289. Also quoted as “It is the greatest thing in history” in Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 23.

    3. For a good review of these myths, see: Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.

    4. Speech given by Dwight Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

    5. Yaroshinskaya, Alla, Chernobyl, The Forbidden Truth, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. See also “Chernobyl spawns crisis in Belarus,” by Angela Charlton, The Honolulu Advertiser, March 26, 1996.

    6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution I (1), January 24, 1946.

    7. Mack, Andrew, Proliferation in Northeast Asia, Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 28, July 1996, p. 6.

    8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161.

    9. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 2.

    10. “Russia Adopts ‘First Strike’ Nuclear Tactic,” Santa Barbara News Press, May 26, 1997.

    11. Kennan, George, “A Fateful Error, Expanding NATO Would Be a Rebuff to Russian Democracy,” New York Times, February 5, 1997.

    12. “British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1996, p. 64.

    13. Arkin, William M. and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1997 and May/June 1997.

    14. Farley, Maggie, “Asia and the Atom: Willing and Wary.” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1996.

    15. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 17.

    16. Asai, Motofumi, “Japan at the Crossroads: ‘Redefinition’ of the U.S.-Japan Security System,” Pacific Research, May 1996, p. 11.

    17. Mann, Jim, “Clinton Second Term Resembles Ike Redux,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1997.

    18. Watanabe, Teresa, “In Historic Vote, Japanese Town Rejects Nuclear Plant,” Los Angeles Times, August 6, 1996.

    19. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    20. Watanabe, Teresa, Loc. Cit.

    21. “Defector Suggests N. Korea Has Atom Arms, Paper Says,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1997.

    22. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    23. Pollack, Andrew, “Reactor Accident in Japan Imperils Energy Program.” New York Times, February 24, 1996.

    24. Kapur, Ashok, “Western Biases,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1995.

    25. General Lee Butler speaking at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., December 4, 1996.

    26. “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” United National General Assembly A/51/218, October 15, 1996.

    27. Ibid., 40.

    28. Ibid., 42.

    29. Ibid., 37.

    30. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M, December 10, 1996.

    31. “Statement on Nuclear Weapons By International Generals and Admirals,” December 5, 1996.

    32. Ibid.

    33. For more information on Abolition 2000, contact the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; (805)965-3443; e-mail: wagingpeace@napf.org. Information is also available on Worldwide Web at www.napf.org.

    34. “Sunflower Seeds Sown at Ukrainian Missile Site,” New York Times International, June 5, 1996.

     

    ——————————————————————————–

    Appendix A

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45M on Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons December 10, 1996

     

    Recalling its resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, in which it requested the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international law,

    Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

    Recalling its resolution 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, in which it called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

    Recalling also the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,

    Recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again, Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

    Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and welcoming every effort towards this end, Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,

    Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,

    Regretting the absence of multilaterally negotiated and legally binding security assurances from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states,

    Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth.

    Expresses its appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to the request made by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

    Takes note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996 (A/51/218);

    Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”;

    Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

    Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary assistance to support the implementation of the present resolution;

    Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item entitled “Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

    Sponsors:

    Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lesotho, Libyan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

     

    Appendix B

    Statement On Nuclear Weapons By International Generals And Admirals December 5, 1996

     

    We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

    Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

    We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever-unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

    The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

    Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

    Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a “reversible nuclear potential.” However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

    It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

    First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

    Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

    The United States and Russia should-without any reduction in their military security-carry forward the reduction process already launched by START-they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

    The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

    The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear- free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

    The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war-in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging-cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

    It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition it the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

    Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

    We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear- weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

    The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

    Signed,

    CANADA Johnson, Major General V. (ret.) Commandant, National Defense College DENMARK Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff FRANCE Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet GHANA Erskine, General Emmanuel (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief and former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFI (Lebanon) GREECE Capellos, Lt. General Richard (ret.) former Corps Commander Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (ret.) former Chief of Staff, Army Signals INDIA Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (ret.) former military advisor to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold and U Thant Surt, Air Marshal N. C. (ret.) JAPAN Sakoijo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security JORDAN Ajelilat, Major General Sahfiq (ret.) Vice President Military Affairs, Muta University Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (ret.) former Deputy Commander, Royal Jordanian Air Force NETHERLANDS van der Graaf, Henry J. (ret.) Director Centre Arms Control & Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters NORWAY Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic PAKISTAN Malik, Major General Ihusun ul Haq (ret.) Commandant Joint Services Committee PORTUGAL Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief, Army; former President of Portugal RUSSIA Belous, General Vladimir (ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky Military Academy Garecy, Army General Makhmut (ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff Gromov, General Boris, (ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs Committee, former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan, former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia Koltounov, Major General Victor (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Larinov, Major General Valentin (ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy Lebed, Major Alexander (ret.) former Secretary of the Security Council Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (ret.) former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (ret.) Deputy Chief, Komibyshev Engineering Academy Medvodov, Lt. General Vladimir (ret.) Chief, Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction Mikhailov, Colonel General Gregory (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Rokhilin, Lt. General Lev, (ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee, former Commander Russian 4th Army Corps Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Simonyan, Major General Rair (ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy Surikov, General Boris T. (ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry Teherov, Colonel General Nikolay (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Vinogadov, Lt. General Michael S. (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy SRI LANKA Karumaratne, Major General Upali A. (ret.) Silva, Major General C.A.M.M. (ret.) USF, U.S.A. TANZANIA Lupogo, Major General H.C. (ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces UNITED KINGDOM Beach, General Sir Hugh (ret.) Member U.K. Security Commission Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (ret.) Commander-in-Chief of East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-1973), Chief of Defense Staff (1973-1976) Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (ret.) former Director, Air Staff Briefing UNITED STATES Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (ret.) Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88), Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement (1992-93) Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (ret.) Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (ret.) Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea) (1976-78) Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-1992) Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (ret.) former Commander, Pacific Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991) former Commander, U.S. Space Command James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (ret.) Odom, General William E. (USA) (ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute Deputy Assistant and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (1981-1985), Director, National Security Agency (1985-1988) O’Meara, General Andrew (USA) (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army Europe Pursley, Lt. General Robert E. USAF (ret.) Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (ret.) former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (ret.) former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-1987) Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (ret.) former Director Army Control and Disarmament Agency Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (ret.) Director, Center for Defense Information Smith, General William Y. (USAF) (ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (ret.) former Polaris Submarine Captain

    Appendix C

    Abolition 2000 Statement April 25, 1995

    Statement of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Abolition Caucus at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference

    A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.

    Further, the inextricable link between the “peaceful” and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true “inalienable” right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.

    We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.

    We call upon all states(particularly the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto(to take the following steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:

    1) Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time- bound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.*

    2) Immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

    3) Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.

    4) Cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems.

    5) Prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    6) Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    7) Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring, and close all nuclear test sites.

    8) Create additional nuclear weapons free zones such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Raratonga.

    9) Recognize and declare the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.

    10) Establish an international energy agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.

    11) Create mechanisms to ensure the participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition.

    A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non- proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.

    * The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapon-usable radioactive materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate the measures listed above which should be implemented independently without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT.

  • Betrayal

    It’s as safe as mother’s milk, they’ll say When wanting to assure you that it’s all O.K. But mother’s milk can be a deadly dish If mom, a downwinder, eats Columbia River’s fish, Or consumes white snow – garden salads on the spot Then mother’s milk can become a deadly lot.

    So I fed poison to my nursing son With radioactive iodine-131. Just because we lived in the wrong place I maimed my babe for that nuclear race.

    This was written by a woman who has lived all of her life in Eastern Washington and remembers consuming local milk and produce around the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Her husband loved to fish the Columbia River downstream from Hanford. Her name withheld by request. She says, “When [my youngest son] was seven – and again when he was eight years old – I had two surgeries for thyroid cancers. I didn’t tell people because it would be hard on our children….

    “In 1985 my husband died quite suddenly. Early in 1986 word got out that radioactive iodine-131 and other pollutants had been released in large amounts by the government just to see what would happen to us downwinders from the nuclear plant at Hanford, Washington.

    With the injuries from my thyroid cancers and the worry over my husband’s bladder and bone cancers, I was very angry and felt betrayed by my government. They used us as guinea pigs but we weren’t even that good because the government never followed up to see what did happen to us downwinders. I write poems, but they are all too mild for my anger at my government.” [Reprinted from the Hanford Health Information Network.]

    This atrocity against all people is once again in the news.

    In an extraordinary but not surprising statement, the Department of Energy has admitted that an explosion of a toxic radioactive waste container at the plant on May 14, 1997 exposed workers and released toxic materials into the atmosphere, including plutonium. This from the supposedly “closed” plant, the former flagship of the Department of War’s nuclear bomb plants (that’s what the Defense Department used to be called until the name was changed after World War II – it makes easier to get money from the taxpayers when you are asking for a “defense” budget rather than a “war” budget). Hanford may now rival Chernobyl as the most toxic site on planet Earth, with cleanup costs (if cleanup is even possible for such a site) estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The site promises to be toxic for tens of thousands of years.

    The May 14th explosion and series of errors is just part of the legacy of this nightmarish place. We as human beings must be angry about that place and what it represents. We must learn what is going on there and use our power to get something done about it.

    Since 1943 when 600 square miles of land in Washington State was legally condemned and 1,500 residents of the towns of Richland, Hanford, and White Bluffs were ordered to leave their homes within 30 days, Hanford has released hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive iodine-131 and other radioactive by-products into the atmosphere. Between 1944 and 1972, Hanford released as much as 740,000 curies of iodine-131 into the air!

    For comparison, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant partial core meltdown in 1979 released 15 curies of radioactive iodine-131 into the air; the Chernobyl accident released 35 million to 49 million curies of iodine-131 in 1986.

    Thousands of lives have been adversely affected by this subtle, insidious, and mostly intentional radiation poisoning. Only today are some of these victims realizing what has given them cancer, killed their mates and children, and so horribly affected their lives. This information was kept secret until February 1986, when public pressure resulted in the release of 19,000 pages of U.S. Department of Energy documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

    During the 30 years of Hanford’s operation, a staggering 440 billion gallons of radioactive toxic wastes were dumped into the ground! Underground nuclear waste tanks have leaked hundreds of thousands of gallons of waste. No complete records of the exact contents of these waste containers were kept, so the clean-up teams don’t even know what they are dealing with most of the time.

    But the Cold War is over, you may say, right? Is it really. Is there anything behind the talk we hear of peace from our leaders? Has much of anything changed? It doesn’t appear so. In fact, it could be argued that things are much worse. Things are different, but the building of our nuclear arsenal has not stopped.

    Did you know that in 1990, the amount of plutonium in the civilian sector of the world was 654 metric tons and in the military was 257 metric tons? By the year 2010, the amount of military plutonium is expected to remain the same while the civilian plutonium will grow to 2,100 metric tons! Civilian plutonium is plutonium produced in power generating nuclear reactors. Plutonium is a by-product of these reactors and many countries are planning to use this deadly material to power other reactors. This plutonium could conceivably be used to make a nuclear bomb.

    We still spend over a trillion dollars world-wide on the military. Countries all over the world are building nuclear weapons stockpiles. The U.S continues to test nuclear weapons – they call them “sub-critical tests” to get around the current moratorium on testing – because the military wants to build a new generation of smaller, more powerful nuclear bombs. Scotland, of all places, is estimated to have as many as 266 Trident submarine warheads, many purchased from the U.S., each one a powerful nuclear weapon. It is estimated that Britain builds a new nuclear bomb every 8 days!

    Five countries have nuclear-powered naval vessels: Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. Even India is currently building a nuclear sub! The submarines of the Western countries typically have only one reactor on board, whereas two reactors power most Russian submarines. Excluding Russia, these nations have 132 nuclear submarines. Russia has 109 nuclear subs in its fleet. Britain has 13 nuclear subs, France has 11, and China has 6. The United States, the country of “peace,” has a staggering 101 nuclear submarines. Two hundred and forty one nuclear subs in the world!

    At least 20 nuclear bomb-carrying U.S. subs are at sea 24 hours a day, each ready to fire on virtually any target in 15 minutes. One U.S. Trident submarine carries the explosive power of 1,000 Hiroshima bombs. The locations of these subs is the most closely guarded of secrets.

    And we are still building more! Nine nuclear submarines are under construction in the U.S. alone. So much for the end of wartime.

    “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing,” said Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe and later President of the United States, referring to the atomic bomb dropped on Japan.

    And we must remember the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two cities murdered by the U.S. But we had to do this to end the war, didn’t we? Well, diaries and documents released since then tell a different story. It seems that President Truman and his senior staff did not believe that we needed to drop the bomb on Japan to end the war. They believed that Japan would surrender without an invasion. In fact, diplomatic contacts and decoded Japanese wireless transmissions proved that surrender was imminent. So why was the bomb used?

    Records suggest that Truman and his advisors believed that if they showed the world that they were willing to use the bomb, it would aid them in negotiating with Stalin over the future of Eastern and Central Europe. There was also a pervasive, racist disregard for Japanese life. The bomb was used to literally burn a memory into the minds of communist and non-European nations of an image of scientific and technological superiority for the Allied countries.

    So, for the sake of image and to test the effects of our new weapons, 200 000 human lives were horribly ended and since 1945, more than 680,000 people have died or have been affected by the radiation released in those blasts.

    These are sobering revelations. I wonder personally what to do with all this awareness. During an Environmental Science class I taught yesterday, I was trying to share environmental awareness with people who had never considered these issues before. Three of my students were police officers who, in the course of their duties, have witnessed the aftermath of illegal toxic spills and see the effects of a disconnected world daily. They fight each day for personal survival, let alone have the time for global thinking. I sometimes feel deflated at the daunting task of opening my fellow travelers’ eyes. But we must go on. We must love the beauty of this world and work towards stopping the folly.

    Nuclear madness must stop. We can stop it. Everyday, we should do these things:

    1. E-mail or write our elected representatives (the Resources section below will tell you how) and tell them to stop this nuclear madness.
    2. Not support nuclear power in any form. Governments and corporations cannot be trusted with that power. There is no way that the relatively small amount of electrical power that is produced can justify the nuclear waste, the excess plutonium, or the temptations to make bombs.
    3. Insist that our elected representatives do something NOW about those who are suffering from the effects of Hanford and all the other bomb-making plants in the country. Insist that they stop all the studies and simply use the abundant money available in the world to help these people. We must stop letting them whine about who should be responsible and simply make them take responsibility. (Still think that money is an issue? See the Resources section below.)
    4. All nuclear testing must stop. Now. The U.S. must show the world that it is willing to take the first step.
    5. The U.S. must get out of the arms business. We sell our weapons of destruction to other nations. This is nuts and it must stop.
    6. All nuclear submarines should come home NOW. Set them up in ports around the country, build impenetrable “caskets” around them (NASA has the technology to build these cases – they do for their deep space probes) as museums so that people can learn of how insane we can be.
    7. Refuse to trade with any country with nuclear war technology.

    But there are so many other horrors in our world? How can we invite this awareness into our lives and survive? I think we can, every day.

    • We must surround ourselves with this knowledge and awareness and get very very angry. Feel the obscenity of these numbers, feel the horror of these events.
    • Then, feel your feet firmly on the ground and take a deep breath. Center yourself. You have work to do.
    • Look at your own personal priorities. What does your day look like? Do you take the time to nurture yourself – take a bath, do something creative, take a nap, exercise? Do you take the time to spend meaningful moments with those in your life that you love? Or do you feel hopelessly driven from one activity to another, not really in control of your own time?
    • Change your priorities. Make the time for nurturing activities and communication with loved ones. Don’t wait for someone or something to come into your life that will allow this to happen. Do it now.
    • Decide what is important to you. What values do you want to have? What values do you want the world to have? What do you want to be remembered for when you are gone? What do you want children to think of you?
    • Make “mindfulness moments” part of your every day, time when you will fully allow the awareness horrors in the world to come in. Visualize the starving child, the suffering and frustrated person poisoned by Hanford, the homeless, the nuclear stockpiles, the Trident submarines traveling at sea, waiting to strike, and whatever else you have chosen to care about.
    • Take an action of some kind every day. Teach someone about what you know. Send e-mail messages to your elected representatives making your demands clear. Choose to not buy something from a socially irresponsible company and write them a note telling them about it. Use your power every day.
    • Allow yourself an occasional “day-off.” Bring your vision for change to mind in some quiet moments, pray for peace, and then go do something for yourself or your loved ones. After a while, you won’t need a day-off.
    • Look at each day as a precious, vital collection of moments that must be savored, for they will never occur again.

    Awareness does not have to be feared. Your day can include walking around the block in the morning, loving your partner, going to work, taking time to see the trees at lunch or wishing there were some, writing an e-mail message to your senator, and having dinner. We can make the desire for change a daily part of our life rather than a feared, unfulfilled dream.

    We must take our power now. Hanford will always be there to remind us of what can happen when people believe the unbelievable – that those in Washington have anything other than a personal agenda of terror and greed. And those nuclear subs will continue to sail – until we say STOP!

    Please, dear mother Earth, Help me to stand firm on my own two feet Drawing on the solid earth below me Help me to know the constancy of your strength the power that is you, oh dear mother earth Help me to walk with the blood of rivers in my veins and the dark crumbling soil of earth in my flesh let my muscles be strong as tree trunks that rise up out of your belly To dance in the sky and sing praises to the life all around Beating, pulsing, rich and full with your sweet energy. Oh dear mother earth live in this body today. Sing loudly in every breath I take Stretch wildly and flow freely with all the directions I move and come home with me, come home to my belly live deep in my soul oh mother earth, SING!

    — Stephanie Kaza

    Ah, not be cut off, not through the slightest partition shut out from the law of the stars. The inner – what is it? if not intensified sky, hurled through with birds and deep with the winds of homecoming.

    — Ranier Maria Rilke

    * Jackie Giuliano is a Professor of Environmental Studies for Antioch University, Los Angeles, the University of Phoenix, and the Union Institute College of Undergraduate Studies. He is also the Educational Outreach Manager for the Ice and Fire Preprojects, a NASA program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to send space probes to Jupiter’s moon Europa, the planet Pluto, and the Sun.

  • Chaining the Nuclear Beast

    When I became a private citizen and a businessman two and one-half years ago, it was my intention to close the journal of my military career and never to reopen it…. My decision to step back into public life is prompted by an inner voice I cannot still, a concern I cannot quiet. I am compelled by a growing alarm, born of my former responsibilities, and a deepening dismay as a citizen of this planet, with respect to the course of events governing the role of nuclear weapons after the Cold War.

    Over the last 27 years of my military career, I was embroiled in every aspect of American nuclear policy making and force posturing, from the councils of government to military command centers, from cramped bomber cockpits to the suffocating confines of ballistic missile submarines I have certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission and approved thousands of targets for potential nuclear destruction. I have investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a library of books and intelligence reports on the former Soviet Union and what were believed to be its capabilities and intentions…and seen an army of “experts” proved wrong. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing consequences of decisions which would invoke the very survival of our planet.

    Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have been more relieved than was I by the dramatic end to the Cold War. The reshaping of Central Europe, the democratization of Russia, and the rapid acceleration of arms control agreements were miraculous events SQ events that I never imagined would happen in my lifetime. Even more gratifying was the opportunity as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the United States’ military forces, and then as commander of its strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our defense posture, shrinking our arsenals, and scaling back huge impending Cold War driven expenditures. Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.

    Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgment which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

    The concern… which compels me to speak frankly… is that the sense of profound satisfaction with which I departed my military career has been steadily eroded in the ensuing months and years. The astonishing turn of events which brought a wondrous closure to my three and one-half decades of service, and far more importantly to four decades of perilous ideological confrontation, presented historic opportunities to advance the human condition. But now time and human nature are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are marginalized, as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War habits and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward into the dark world we so narrowly escaped without a thermonuclear holocaust.

    What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production?

    I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative, and is in fact growing daily. I see it in the reports issuing from highly respected institutions and authors; I feel it in the convictions of my colleagues on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; it finds eloquent voice in the Nobel prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash; and a strident frustration in the vehement protests against the recent round of nuclear tests conducted by France.

    Notwithstanding the perils of transition in Russia, enmities in the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling chorus of reason and resentment will eventually turn the tide. As the family of mankind develops a capacity for collective outrage, so soon will it find avenues for collective action. The terror-filled anesthesia which numbed rational thought, made nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation for the obscene power of a single nuclear weapon is taking a new hold on our consciousness, as we confront the nightmarish prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.

    Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests?

    First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.

    Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.

    Third, with respect to present and prospective arms control agreements given its crucial leadership role, it is imperative for the United States to undertake now a sweeping review, led by the President, of nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton administration’s 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the decks of some pressing force structure questions, the Review purposefully avoided the large policy issues. However, the Review’s justification for maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a hostile Russia is in my view regrettable from several respects. It sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security relationship with Russia is arguably the United States most important foreign policy concern. It codifies force levels and postures completely out of keeping with the profound transformation we have witnessed in world affairs. And, it perpetuates attitudes which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of strategic arms.

    Finally… I want to record my strong conviction that the risks entailed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave the prospects of their elimination solely within the province of governments. Highly influential opinion leaders like yourselves can make a powerful difference in swelling the tide of global sentiment that the nuclear era must end. I urge you to read the one page statement from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons…. Better still, read the Commission Report in full, reflect on its recommendations, communicate with influential colleagues and with the Canberra Commissioners. Take an active role in debating and supporting the practical steps we set forth in our Report, such as taking nuclear weapons off a hair trigger alert and placing the associated warheads in secure storage.

    These are steps which can be taken now, which will reduce needless risks and terminate Cold War practices which serve only as a chilling reminder of a world in which the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.

    Such a world was and is intolerable. We are not condemned to repeat the lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. The task is daunting but we cannot shrink from it.

    The opportunity may not come again.