Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • Bush “Stunned” by Size of US Nuclear Arsenal

    According to an article in the June 25th edition of Newsweek, President Bush was stunned when he was told in May of the size of the US nuclear arsenal. Bush was quoted as saying, “I had no idea we had so many weapons.”

    Like Bush, most Americans might be surprised to learn that, “The U.S. nuclear arsenal today includes 5,400 warheads loaded on intercontinental ballistic missiles at land and sea; an additional 1,750 nuclear bombs and cruise missiles ready to be launched from B-2 and B-52 bombers; a further 1,670 nuclear weapons classified as “tactical.” And just in case, an additional 10,000 or so nuclear warheads held in bunkers around the United States as a “hedge” against future surprises.” (Newsweek, 6/25/01)

    Bush called for unilateral reductions in the US nuclear arsenal during his campaign and again in his May 1, 2001 speech. General Lee Butler, a former head of the US Strategic Command, has been brought back, along with Reagan Defense official Richard Perle, to advise on efforts to reduce the US nuclear arsenal. General Butler is a recipient of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Distinguished Peace Leadership Award for his outspoken advocacy of nuclear weapons abolition.

    Perle, known during the Reagan administration as the Prince of Darkness for his hawkish policies, is quoted in the Newsweek article as saying, “I see no reason why we can’t go well below 1,000 [nuclear] warheads. I want the lowest number possible under the tightest control possible. The truth is we are never going to use them. The Russians aren’t going to use theirs either.”

    We would like Mr. Perle to know that “the lowest number possible” would be zero. At that level, the “tightest control possible” would be far less of an issue for US and global security.

  • National Missile Defense: Just Say No!

    Ballistic missile defense sounds on the surface like a good idea. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could just make those nasty nuclear weapons harmless? That is, their nuclear weapons, not ours. We don’t worry much about the threat posed by our own nuclear weapons, but these, of course, are not aimed at us. They are aimed at others or, more accurately, they are presently aimed at the oceans if we are to believe Mr. Clinton. They can, however, be reprogrammed to strike anywhere on only a moment’s notice.

    Our nuclear weapons still pose a security problem to us because relying on nuclear weapons for security means that there will be other countries that will do so as well, and the result will be that we are targeted by their nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense, if we are to believe its proponents, offers a technological solution to this dilemma. It is, however, an unproven and unprovable solution and comes at a high price, both monetarily and in terms of security.

    Ballistic missile defense was pushed by the Reagan administration. In that early incarnation it was derided “Star Wars.” Since then, it has gone through many more incarnations, the latest of which is a land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system that is intended to defend against an attack by relatively small and technologically unsophisticated countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya. None of these countries, however, currently has ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. No matter, we are told by proponents of NMD; it is better to be prepared for any eventuality.

    Despite repeated assurances from our government that an NMD would not be designed to protect the US against a Russian attack, the Russians are not convinced. From their perspective, an NMD would undermine their deterrence capability. Even though the NMD would have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles and the Russians would have more missiles than this aimed at the US, the Russians are concerned on two grounds. First, it would create the possibility that the US could initiate a first-strike nuclear attack against Russia and use the NMD simply to deal with the presumably small remaining number of Russian missiles that survived the attack. This scenario may sound far-fetched to us since we don’t envision ever doing such a thing. The Russians, however, cannot dismiss this scenario since they, like us, base their nuclear strategy on just such worst-case scenarios. The second reason for Russian concern about US deployment of a NMD system is that, although initially the system might have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, more could be added later.

    The Russians have made it clear that if the US goes forward in deploying an NMD system this could spell the end of arms control with the Russians. Implementation of an NMD system would require the US to abrogate or violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was entered into between the US and Russia in 1972. The purpose of the treaty was to prevent a defensive arms race that could lead to a renewed offensive nuclear arms race. The ABM Treaty has been at the heart of arms control efforts between the two countries for most of the past three decades. If the treaty fails due to US plans to deploy NMD, the Russians have said that they will withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), will pull out of the START II agreements, in which the two countries have agreed to lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 3,000 to 3,500, and will refuse to negotiate further nuclear reductions under proposed START III agreements.

    Under proposed START III agreements, the Russians have put forward a proposal for further reducing nuclear arsenals to 1,500 or less on each side. Thus far, the US has responded by saying that it is only willing to go down to 2,500 to 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

    The stakes of NMD deployment in our relationship with Russia are very high. They are no less so in our relations with China. Currently China has some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If the US deploys an NMD with 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, the Chinese have indicated that they will proceed with building and deploying more nuclear-armed missiles capable of overcoming this system and reaching the United States.

    You might ask: why would Russia or China take these steps since it is highly likely that a US NMD system would be ineffective? The answer is that the Russian and Chinese planners must plan for the system to work as the US plans it to work; to do less would be viewed by their security establishments as being irresponsible. Thus, whether or not a US NMD system works, it would be viewed by Russia and China as provocative and would most likely lead to new arms races.

    The arms races would not be limited to the three countries in question. If China increases its strategic nuclear arsenal, India (which views China as a potential threat) would probably follow suit. If India increases its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan would certainly follow suit. There has also been talk of Theater Missile Defense in North Asia, which could have similar effects throughout Asia, and of deploying a Theater Missile Defense in the Middle East, which would underline the nuclear imbalance in the region.

    Will the deployment of an NMD system make the US more secure? It is doubtful. Because of the geopolitical implications described above, it will probably make the US less secure. If this is true, why is there such a strong push within the US government to deploy an NMD system? Why did the Congress vote overwhelmingly to deploy such a system “as soon as technologically feasible”? I think there are two reasons. First, a NMD system plays well in Peoria. It gives the impression of improving security even if it does just the opposite. Second, it provides a welfare program for the military-industrial complex in the aftermath of the Cold War. It provides a way of transferring substantial funding (ranging from $60 to $120 billion or even higher) from the American taxpayer to the defense industry. This is a cynical way for politicians to fulfill their obligations under the Constitution to provide for the common security of the American people.

    But could the system actually work? Anything is possible theoretically, but it is highly unlikely. Up to the present, tests of defensive missiles have failed to consistently and reliably shoot down incoming missiles, even when there is only one missile to destroy and it is known when and from where the missile will be launched. Many experts have argued that it will be far easier for offensive missile attacks to overcome defensive systems by using decoys to trick the defensive missiles.

    Rather than pursuing the delusion of missile defense, US officials would be better off pursuing another course of action. First, they could seek to develop policies that would make friends of potential enemies. There seems to be some progress on this front in relation to US-North Korean relations. Second, and most important, the US should take a leadership role in fulfilling its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal and that all nuclear weapons states are obligated to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects.”

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, promises were made to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses, either nationally or regionally, are at odds with these promises. Also, at this Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states promised an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This is where the US, as the world’s economically and militarily most powerful country, must now provide needed leadership. Plans to deploy a US National Missile Defense will undermine this possibility. The results could be disastrous not only for US security but also for our credibility in the world.

    The articles that follow provide international perspectives on US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. They reinforce each other in the view that this would be a dangerous and foolhardy path for the United States to pursue.

     

  • We Could Learn from the Skeptics

    In a New York Times editorial on December 19, 2000, “Prelude to a Missile Defense,” they rightly point out that “no workable shield now exists” and that the diplomatic and financial costs are too high to begin construction of even a limited system “until the technology is perfected.”

    It is a great leap of faith to believe that this technology will ever be perfected. Experts repeatedly have warned us that even a moderately effective offense that includes decoys will always be able to overcome the type of defensive system we are capable of deploying.

    However, even if we were able to create a foolproof missile defense against Iraq, Iran and North Korea, we would still be at risk from nuclear weapons delivered by terrorist groups or nations by other means than missiles, such as by weapons carried into US harbors on boats. The geo-political damage that deployment of a National Missile Defense would do in our relations with Russia and China would also undermine any advantages such a system might provide.

    The editorial suggests that “Mr. Bush’s new foreign policy team should try to persuade skeptical countries that a limited defensive system can be built without wrecking existing arms control treaties or setting off a destructive new arms race.” To succeed in this persuasion, Mr. Bush’s new team will need either superhuman powers or excessive and dangerous arm twisting skills.

    They would be far wiser to listen carefully to the reasons why many of our closest allies, as well as Russia and China, are skeptical about our missile defense plans. By trying to understand rather than convert the skeptics, the Bush foreign policy team might learn that deploying a costly and unreliable Ballistic Missile Defense would create greater problems than it would solve.

    The new administration might more fruitfully concentrate its efforts on providing leadership in fulfilling the promises made by the nuclear weapons states at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for an “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. Such leadership would be a true gift to humanity. It would also do far more to assure American and global security in the 21st century.

  • National Missile Defense – Why Should We Care?

    To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, the continuing angry debate over the need for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system has polarized public opinion. Pros and cons are put forward in increasingly strident confrontations which lead not to understanding or accommodation but to divisive, emotional rejection of opposing views. What is there about NMD that produces heat – not light – when the issue arises?

    The answer to that question lies in the political schism between the true believers in NMD and those who counsel other measures to reduce nuclear dangers. The believers argue emotionally that American citizens deserve a defense against missile attack and reject out of hand attempts to raise rational objections to NMD. The opponents are denigrated and their patriotism impugned if they dare to question the need for or feasibility of NMD.

    This failure to discuss NMD in civil, factual terms is unfortunate because the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system raises fundamental issues of America’s role in the world. It involves our relationships not only with our adversaries but with our closest allies as well. It is not surprising that Russia and China are loud critics of NMD but Germany, France, Great Britain and other western nations are also questioning the wisdom of proceeding with a program which threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race. It may be possible to shrug off understandable criticism from potential enemies, but we must give thoughtful consideration and great weight to the same criticism from our friends. The need for public debate leading to a constructive decision has never been greater.

    For example, a final decision to deploy NMD must await careful evaluation of four criteria: 1) There must be a real threat; 2) We must have the technological means to address that threat effectively; 3) Our response must be affordable; and 4) NMD deployment must not do unacceptable damage to the stability of current and future international security arrangements. There are serious questions concerning each of these criteria .

    Threat

    As to the threat, it does not now exist. Although some say that North Korea could create a missile capable of reaching the United States by 2005, the consensus is that it will be years later, if ever, that they would have both the missile and a weapon which could be fitted to it. And why would they, or any rogue nation, invest in such a costly, challenging venture when there are far more feasible means of delivering a weapon against us? For example, a crude nuclear device (which could never be fitted to a missile) could easily be welded in the hull of a tramp steamer and sail unchallenged into any U.S. port. Furthermore, any missile fired at America carries a very clear return address, insuring massive U.S. retaliation. The fact is that NMD would be a defense against the least likely means of attack on America while providing no protection whatever against clandestine, less costly, more reliable means of attack.

    Technology

    To date, despite spending more than $60 billion on NMD since 1983, the technological challenges have not been met. Repeated tests have failed far more often than they have succeeded and even the successes have been limited or suspect. The decoy problem has not been solved nor has the required complex of space based sensors, “X” brand radars, interceptors and command and control facilities been designed and built. Many independent scientists have concluded that there will never be any way to test such a system realistically even when it is in place in order to have high confidence that it would work the first time it was needed.

    Cost

    As to cost, the only thing that has been demonstrated is that each estimate is higher than the previous one. As noted, after more than $60 billion have been spent, there is no assurance that another $60 or $120 billion will produce a reliable NMD. Nor is there any confidence that a competent adversary could not develop effective countermeasures to NMD at far less cost than we invest.

    Nuclear Stability

    Finally, the most important criterion remains unresolved; i.e., the need to maintain the current stability of the nuclear balance by protecting present and future arms control arrangements. What good does a defense system do if it weakens nuclear stability which rests on a hard-won arms control structure built over the last 30 years? Repeated U.S. threats to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 ignore the truth that there is a comprehensive arms control structure within which the individual treaties are interdependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement of 1972 (SALT I) was negotiated in tandem with the ABM Treaty as complementary measures, neither one possible without the other. Subsequently the SALT II agreement and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) were erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation. The existence of this stabilizing arms control structure was recognized by other nations (most importantly by China) and thereby inhibited the expansion of other nuclear arsenals as well as contributed to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. To pull out a keystone of arms control by abrogation of the ABM Treaty now will weaken nuclear stability worldwide, particularly in the sensitive area of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.

    Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly be a bar to progress on future arms control agreements which are essential to achieve genuine reductions in still bloated nuclear arsenals. President Jacques Chirac of France identified this problem when he declared: “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult when powerful countries are developing new technologies [NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities.” The great danger is that other nations, most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their own nuclear capabilities in response to the deployment of an American NMD system. In the political effort to justify deployment of defenses against a highly unlikely threat, the United States can undo significant arms control measures and end up facing much greater real nuclear dangers.

    This is why all Americans should care deeply about the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system. By such an action we will signal to the world that we are willing to pursue illusory defenses against non-existent threats even though we subject all nations to continued nuclear competition and increased risks of a future nuclear war.

  • Criticism and Protest Surround Anti-Missile System

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) conducted its first full system test of the national missile defense (NMD) system on 7 July 2000. However, this $100 million failed missile test did not escape criticism and protest.

    More than 120 people gathered at the front gate of the Vandenberg Air Force Base to exercise their first amendment rights on Saturday, 1 July 2000. Organizations that supported the event included: American Friends Service Committee (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Atomic Mirror, California Peace Action, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, Green Party (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Green Peace, Grey Panthers, Guadalupe Catholic Worker, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Peace & Environmental Council (San Luis Obispo), San Luis Obispo County Environmental Toxic Coalition, and Santa Cruz Center for Non-Violence.

    In the week leading up to the test, activists also held a vigil, coordinated by Greenpeace, at the front gate. Additionally, members of Greenpeace and the Santa Cruz Resource Center for Non-Violence infiltrated the military base and the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace vessel, entered the “hazardous zone” in waters off the California coastline in attempts to stop the missile from being launched. Almost a dozen activists were arrested during the activities.

    Other protests were also held throughout the US and the world to say no to the weaponization of space and a new arms race. Messages of solidarity were sent from Argentina, Australia, Fiji, the UK and many cities in the US, demonstrating broad consensus to halt plans to deploy the controversial anti-missile system.

    Late in the evening on 7 June 2000 PDT, after a two hour delay, a target missile, carrying a warhead and a decoy, was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Approximately twenty minutes after the target missile lifted off, an interceptor missile carrying a model “exoatomospheric kill vehicle,” designed by Raytheon Corporation, was launch from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and was directed toward the target, using data collected from the system’s radars. However, the “hit to kill” weapon fired from Kwajalein Atoll did not separate from the second stage of its liftoff rocket. Of the three tests that have been conducted, two have failed. The Pentagon has scheduled 16 more tests of the system in the next five years.

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) claims that the NMD system is needed to protect the US from incoming Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles that would be launched by “states of concern” such as North Korea. The estimated cost to deploy the system by the year 2005 is $60 billion. However, a report released in late June by the Welch Panel, an independent team of scientists, outlined the probability of the systems failure due to time and schedule constraints.

    The deployment of a national missile defense system would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between Russia and the US. The treaty is viewed as the cornerstone of arms control efforts and amendment or abrogation of the treaty will pose serious threats to international relations. After the failed missile test, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that President Vladimir Putin will try to persuade President Clinton to stop deployment of an anti-missile defense system during the G-8 summit, being held in Okinawa, Japan from 21-23 July. President Putin has also offered to reduce Russian and US nuclear arsenals to 1,000 to 1,500 on each side under a new START III agreement.

    On 22 June 2000, China attacked the proposed US national missile defense (NMD) system saying it would turn outer space into a “battlefield” and jeopardize global stability. China has also voiced opposition to amending the ABM Treaty. Both Russia and China have called for negotiations to ban the weaponization of outer space, but the US has refused to engage in any such discussions.

    President Clinton recently made a decision to defer a decision on deployment to the next presidential administration.* Plans for future non-violent demonstrations at Vandenberg Air Force Base and around the world are already being planned to continue voicing grassroots opposition to the deployment of any anti-missile system. The relentless pursuit by the US to deploy a national missile defense system that threatens to initiate a new nuclear arms race must be stopped. Rather than developing new technology that undermines global security, the US should uphold the commitments it has made in international law to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty Stays Alive – for now

    With the exception of a few cloistered academics, almost no one would seriously argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a safer place. Most individuals, including policy makers, understand that it is essential to future security to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Based on this understanding, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put forward and signed by the US, UK and USSR (three countries with nuclear weapons) in 1968. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since then the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the centerpiece of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently there are only four countries in the world that have not signed and ratified the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba. The first three of these have nuclear weapons.

    At the heart of the NPT is a basic bargain: the countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or otherwise develop these weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states agreeing to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals. This bargain is found in Article VI of the Treaty, which calls for “good faith” negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Many of the non-nuclear weapons states have complained over the years that the nuclear weapons states have not upheld their end of the bargain.

    In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely after powerful lobbying by the nuclear weapons states, these states promised the “determined pursuit” of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination. Over the next five years, however, these countries continued to rely upon their nuclear arsenals to the dismay of many countries without nuclear weapons.

    When the five-year Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in April and May 2000, the parties to the Treaty, including the nuclear weapons states, agreed to take a number of “practical steps” to implement promises under Article VI of the Treaty. Thirteen steps were listed. I would like to highlight just two. The first of these is an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….” The second is “early entry into force and full implementation of START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II] and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….”

    The “unequivocal undertaking” is language that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) has been pressing for, along with practical steps to achieve “the total elimination” of nuclear weapons. In essence this commitment is a reaffirmation of what the nuclear weapons states promised many years ago when they first signed the Treaty in 1968.

    Moving forward with START II and START III are also in the offing. After many years, the Russian Duma finally ratified START II, and President Putin has indicated that he is prepared to proceed with reductions to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads in START III. The US has responded for inexplicable reasons that it is only prepared to discuss reductions to the 2,500 level at this point, a response hardly in keeping with its promises to pursue good faith efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally.

    An even greater problem, however, lies in US determination to deploy a National Missile Defense. It can hardly do this and keep its promise of “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US has been trying unsuccessfully to convince the Russians that the ABM Treaty should be amended to allow the US to deploy a National Missile Defense. However, this is exactly what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, based on the reasoning that a strong defense would lead to further offensive arms races, and the Russians want nothing to do with altering the ABM Treaty.

    US officials have told the Russians that the National Missile Defense that the US seeks to deploy is aimed not at them, but at “states of concern” (the new US name for states they formerly referred to as “rogue states”). These officials have actually encouraged the Russians to keep their nuclear armed missiles on hair-trigger alert and not reduce the size of their arsenal below START III levels in order to be able to successfully overcome a US National Missile Defense. In their eagerness to promote the National Missile Defense, these officials are actually encouraging Russian policies that will make an accidental or unintended nuclear war more likely. Russia is not buying this, and has made clear that if the US proceeds with deployment of a National Missile Defense, thereby abrogating the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    US insistence on proceeding with a National Missile Defense will be even more destabilizing in Asia. The Chinese have made clear that their response to US deployment of a National Missile Defense will require them to further develop their nuclear forces (at present the Chinese have only 20 nuclear armed missiles capable of reaching US territory). Should China increase its nuclear capabilities, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan would likely follow India. How Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan would respond remain large question marks.

    At the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference the US committed itself to “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans to move forward with a National Missile Defense are incompatible with this promise. If the US wants to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the disintegration of this Treaty, it must act in good faith. This means finding another way to deal with potentially dangerous states than building an unworkable, provocative and hugely expensive missile defense system.

    The 2000 NPT Review Conference offered some promise of progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the fine words Final Document of the Conference notwithstanding, this promise will be dashed if the US continues in its foolhardy and quixotic attempt to put a shield over its head. Such a course will lead only to a leaky umbrella and global nuclear chaos. A far safer course for the US would be to carry out its promise of seeking “the total elimination” of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without US leadership this will not happen. With US leadership a nuclear weapons free world could become a reality in fairly short order. It is past time for this issue to enter the public arena and move up on the public agenda. The American people deserve to become part of this decision which will so dramatically affect their future and the future of the planet.

  • An Open Letter to the Next U.S. President: Abolish Nuclear Weapons

    The city of Hiroshima’s Peace Declaration on August 6, 2000 stated, “if we had only one pencil we would continue to write first of the sanctity of human life and then of the need to abolish nuclear weapons.” The citizens of Hiroshima have horrendous first-hand knowledge of the devastation of nuclear weapons. They became the unwitting ambassadors of the Nuclear Age.

    If we wish to prevent Hiroshima’s past from becoming our future, there must be leadership to reduce nuclear dangers by vigorous efforts leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons from Earth. This will not happen without US leadership, and therefore your leadership, Mr. President, will be essential.

    Also in the Peace Declaration of Hiroshima is this promise: “Hiroshima wishes to make a new start as a model city demonstrating the use of science and technology for human purposes. We will create a future in which Hiroshima itself is the embodiment of those ‘human purposes.’ We will create a twenty-first century in which Hiroshima’s very existence formulates the substance of peace. Such a future would exemplify a genuine reconciliation between humankind and the science and technology that have endangered our continued survival.”

    With this promise and commitment, Hiroshima challenges not only itself, but all humanity to do more to achieve a “reconciliation between humankind and science and technology.” The place where this challenge must begin is with the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the US and the other nuclear weapons states made an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” This commitment is consistent with the obligation in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and with the interpretation of that obligation as set forth unanimously by the International Court of Justice in its landmark 1996 opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

    In addition to moral and legal obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons, it is also in our security interests. Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to the existence of our nation and, for that matter, the rest of the world. The American people and all people would be safer in a world without nuclear weapons. The first step toward achieving such a world is publicly recognizing that it would be in our interest to do so. That would be a big step forward, one that no American president has yet taken.

    In the post Cold War period, US policy on nuclear weapons has been to maintain a two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” We have moved slowly on nuclear arms reductions and have attempted (unsuccessfully) to prevent nuclear proliferation. We have not given up our own reliance on nuclear weapons, and we have resisted any attempts by NATO members to re-examine NATO nuclear policy.

    One of the early decisions you will be asked to make, Mr. President, is on the deployment of a National Missile Defense. While this resurrection of the discredited “Star Wars” system will never be able to actually protect Americans, it will anger the Russians and Chinese, undermine existing arms control agreements, and most likely prevent future progress toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. The Russians have stated clearly that if we proceed with deploying a National Missile Defense, they will withdraw from the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This would be a major setback in US-Russian relations at a time when Russia has every reason to work cooperatively with us for nuclear arms reductions.

    In fact, Russian President Putin has offered to reduce to 1,500 the number of strategic nuclear weapons in START III. Well-informed Russians say that he is prepared to reduce Russia’s nuclear arsenal to under 1,000 strategic weapons as a next step. We have turned down this proposal, and told the Russian government that we are only prepared to reduce our nuclear arsenal to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic weapons in START III. This is hard to understand because reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, particularly the Russian nuclear arsenal, would have such clear security benefits to the United States.

    The Chinese currently have some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If we deploy a National Missile Defense, they have forewarned us that they will expand their nuclear capabilities. This would be easy for them to do, and it will certainly have adverse consequences for US-Chinese relations. Additionally, it could trigger new nuclear arms races in Asia between China and India and India and Pakistan.

    North Korea has already indicated its willingness to cease development of its long-range missile program in exchange for development assistance which they badly need. We should pursue similar policies with Iraq, Iran and other potential enemies. We should vigorously pursue diplomacy which seeks to turn potential enemies into friends.

    Rather than proceeding with deployment of a National Missile Defense, we should accept President Putin’s offer and proceed with negotiations for START III nuclear arms reductions to some 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on each side. Simultaneously, we should provide leadership for multinational negotiations among all nuclear weapons states for a Comprehensive Treaty to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. This would be a demonstration of the “good faith” called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    In addition to these steps, there are many more positive steps that require US leadership. Among these steps are de-alerting nuclear forces, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, providing assurances of No First Use of nuclear weapons, establishing an accounting for all nuclear weapons and weapons grade materials in all countries, withdrawing nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, and providing international monitored storage of all weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    The United States is a powerful country. It will have enormous influence, for better or for worse, on the future of our species and all life. Continuing on with our present policies on nuclear weapons will lead inevitably to disaster. Millions of Americans know that we can do better than this. Because these weapons are in our arsenal now does not mean they must always be, if we act courageously and wisely.

    We need to set a course for the 21st century that assures that it will be a peaceful century. The lack of leadership to end the nuclear threat to humanity’s future is unfortunately augmented by other unwise policies that we pursue. Our country must stop being the arms salesman to the world, the policeman for the world, and the chief trainer for foreign military and paramilitary forces.

    We need to become an exporter and promoter of democracy and decency, human rights and human dignity. If these values are to be taken seriously abroad, we must demonstrate their effect in our own society. To do this, we need to reduce rather than increase military expenditures. We are currently spending more on our military than the next 16 highest military spending countries combined. This is obscene and yet it goes unchallenged. It is another area where presidential leadership is necessary.

    We live in a world in which borders have become incapable of stopping either pollution or projectiles. Our world is interconnected, and our futures are interlinked. We must support the strengthening of international law and institutions. Among the treaties that await our ratification are the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Landmine Prohibition Treaty, the Treaty on the Rights of the Child, the Treaty on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Treaty for an International Criminal Court.

    Mr. President, I have watched many of your predecessors fail to act on these issues. You have the opportunity to set out on a new path, a path to the future that will bring hope to all humanity. I urge you to accept the challenge and take this path. Be the leader who abolishes nuclear weapons. It would be the greatest possible gift to humanity.

  • How Countries Can Work Together to Rid the World of Its Greatest Danger

    The US and Russia each have about 2,000 powerful nuclear weapons set for hair-trigger release. The enormous nuclear overkills of these weapons present the greatest danger to all countries.1 While groups working to rid the world of nuclear weapons such as Abolition 2000 are growing in size and number of supporters, still, much more remains to be done to achieve a nuclear free world. Hopefully, as more nations whose leaders become aware of what is the greatest danger to all countries, then the more they will work toward eliminating nuclear weapons. Their leadership could be invaluable.

    Nuclear Weapons Overkills

    The US and Russia each maintain enormous nuclear weapons overkills. A massive nuclear attack, whether intentional or accidental, by Russia or the US or both, could destroy all countries by turning the world into a dark, cold, silent, radioactive planet. Russia and the U.S. have more than 90 percent of the world’s strategic nuclear weapons.2

    Explosive Power – A nuclear warhead can be far more destructive than is generally realized. One average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead on an Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is:

    • Equal to 250,000 tons of dynamite (250 kilotons).3
    • Or 50,000 World War II type bombers each carrying 5 tons of bombs.
    • Or 20 Hiroshima size nuclear warheads.
    • One average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 400,000 tons of dynamite or 80,000 bombers each carrying 5 tons of bombs. The terrorists’ truck bombs that exploded at the NY World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City each had an explosive force equal to about 5 to 10 tons of dynamite.4

    Out Of Touch With Reality – When General Lee Butler (USAF Ret.1994) first became head of the US Strategic Air Command, he went to the Omaha headquarters to inspect the list of targets in the former Soviet Union. Butler was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow (as the Soviets once targeted Washington). At the time that the target list was contrived, US planners had no grasp of the explosions, firestorms and radiation effects from such an overkill. We were totally out of touch with reality. Butler said, “The war plan, its calculations, and consequences never took into account anything but cost and damage. Radiation was never considered.” 5

    If one average sized strategic nuclear bomb hit Washington DC today, in a flash it could vaporize Congress, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, and destroy many federal programs like Social Security. If another nuclear bomb hit New York City, it could vaporize the United Nations headquarters, international communication and transportation centers, the New York Stock Exchange, etc. And that would only take two of the more than 2,000 warheads that Russia has ready for hair-trigger release.

    One Percent Is Too Much – General Butler said, “..it is imperative to recognize that all numbers of nuclear weapons above zero are completely arbitrary; that against an urban target one weapon represents an unacceptable horror; that twenty weapons would suffice to destroy the twelve largest Russian cities with a total population of twenty-five million people — one-sixth of the entire Russian population; and therefore that arsenals in the hundreds, much less in the thousands, can serve no meaningful strategic objective.” 6

    Twenty nuclear warheads is less than one percent of the nuclear weapons that the US has set for hair-trigger release.

    Nuclear Winter – A nuclear exchange between Russia and the U.S. could destroy all 192 nations in the world by filling the sky with very dense smoke and fine dust thereby creating a dark, cold, hungry, radioactive planet. The late Dr. Carl Sagan and his associates estimated that a nuclear winter could be created with a nuclear explosive force equal to 100 million tons of dynamite. Such a force could ignite thousands of fires.7

    The US and Russia each have a nuclear explosive force many times more powerful than that needed to create a very dark, global nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions can produce heat intensities of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees Centigrade at ground zero. Nuclear explosions over cities could start giant flash fires leaving large cities and forests burning with no one to stop them. Nuclear explosions can lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, more than 100,000 tons of fine, dense, dust for every megaton exploded on a surface.8

    Why Nuclear Overkill

    It is hard to believe that nations would build a defense on something as crazy as the huge nuclear overkills that exist. One factor that allows the creation of suicidal overkills is that most people do not like to think about the possibility of mass destruction. While this reluctance is readily understandable, it allows the following factors to dictate humanity’s drift toward extinction: building and maintaining nuclear weapons provides profits and wages; nuclear weaponry is a complex technical subject; much of the nuclear weapons work is done in secrecy; and the end of the Cold War has given some the idea that the danger is past.

    Hopefully, if the leaders of governments and their staff start widely discussing the danger, and progress is made in getting rid of nuclear weapons, the world will be glad to join in supporting further agreements to rid the world entirely of nuclear weapons.

    Accidental Nuclear War

    The danger of launching based on a false warning could be growing. During a major part of each day Russia’s early warning system is no longer able to receive warnings. It has so decayed that Moscow is unable to detect US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches for at least seven hours a day, US officials and experts say. Russia also is no longer able to spot missiles fired from US submarines. At most, only four of Russia’s 21 early-warning satellites were still working.

    This means Russian commanders have no more than 17 hours — and perhaps as little as 12 hours — of daily coverage of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in silos in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming. Against Trident submarines, the Russians basically have no warning at all.9

    What makes the current situation so dangerous is that in the heat of a serious crisis Russian military and civilian leaders could misread a non-threatening rocket launch or ambiguous data as a nuclear first strike and launch a salvo.

    There have been at least three times in the past that the US and Russia almost launched to false warnings. Each time they came within less than 10 minutes of launching before learning the warnings were false. In 1979, a US training tape showing a massive attack was accidentally played.10 In 1983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signaled the launch of a US missile.11 In 1995, Russia almost launched its nuclear missiles because a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights was mistakenly interpreted as the start of a nuclear attack.12

    False warnings are a fact of life. During an 18-month period in 1979-80, the US had 147 false alarms in its strategic warning system. Two of those warnings lasted three minutes and one lasted six minutes before found to be false.13 How is Russia handling false alarms today? There is no certain nor reassuring answer.

    Low Awareness of the Danger

    There is a great need to increase public awareness of the danger in order to provide broad, long-term understanding and support for arms agreements that would rid the world of nuclear weapons. The following actions by the US and Russia show low awareness of the current danger. Only 71 out of 435 US Congressional representatives signed a motion calling for nuclear weapons to be taken off of hair-trigger alert.14 Former President Boris Yeltsin said on Dec. 10, 1999 when pressured about the Chechnya conflict, “It seems Mr. Clinton has forgotten that Russia is a great power that possesses a nuclear arsenal.”15 The US Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999.16 Moscow leaders say that the US arguments for changing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will provoke an arms race.17

    Despite US and Russian nuclear weapons presenting the greatest danger to all nations, reference to them in the mass media is not commensurate with the magnitude of the danger. Acting Russian President Putin signed into law a new national security strategy in January that lowers the threshold on first-use of nuclear weapons.18 And at arms control talks in Geneva this January, the US opposed a Russian suggestion that each country cut the size of its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads. James Runis, a US State Department spokesman, said a lower warhead figure would meet opposition from US generals, who would have to adjust their nuclear doctrine.19

    How confident should we be with defense planners who have not taken into consideration the self-destructive consequences of their current strategies?

    Drawing Attention To The Danger

    One way to draw the world’s attention to overkill danger is for the leaders of nations to ask the following questions of the US and Russia:

    “Why does Russia and the U.S. each maintain far more nuclear weapons than either can use without destroying all countries including their own?”

    “Can they refute any of the consequences of nuclear weapons use described above?”

    “If not, what are they doing to reduce the possibility of the accidental destruction of all?”

    The more that countries ask the US and Russia these questions, the more difficult it will be for the US and Russia to ignore them. This could be especially so if each nation’s leaders share copies of their questions and the answers they receive with the news media.

    General George Lee Butler has said that the world can immediately and inexpensively improve security by taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.20This action could also stop sending the message that we do not trust each other and could provide a better atmosphere for reaching an agreement in all nuclear arms reduction talks.
    ——————————————————————————–

    Reference and Notes

    1.Blair, Bruce C., Feiveson, Harold A. and Huppe, Frank.. “Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert,” Scientific American, Nov 97, p.78.

    2. Norris, Robert S. and Arkin, William, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, July/Aug 96. (The percent of all nuclear weapons that belong to the U.S. and Russian was calculated from this source.)

    3. Ibid.

    4. Babst, Dean. “Preventing An Accidental Armageddon,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, California, Sep 99.

    5. Grady, Sandy. “Can Nuclear Genie Be Stuffed Back In The Bottle,” San Jose Mercury News, Dec.8, 1996.

    6. Butler, Lee. Talk at the University of Pittsburgh, May 13, 1999, p. 12.

    7. Sagan, Carl. The Nuclear Winter, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Boston, MA, 1983. 8. Ibid

    9. Russia Update, The Sunflower No. 32 Feb 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif..

    10. Phillips, Alan E. “Matter of Preventive Medicine,” Peace Research, August 1998, p 204.

    11. “Twenty Minutes From Nuclear War,” The Sunflower, No. 17 Oct 98, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif.

    12. Blair, Op. Cit.

    13. Hart, Senator Gary and Goldwater, Senator Barry; Recent False Warning Alerts from the Nation’s Missile Attack Warning System, a report to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, 9 October 1980, pp. 4&5.

    14. The Sunflower, No. 31 Jan 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif.

    15. Burns, Robert. “U.S., Russian relations get chillier,” Contra Costa Times, Dec. 10, 1999.

    16. The Sunflower, No. 31 Jan 00, Op. Cit.

    17. Gordon, Michael R. “Russia rejects call to amend ABM treaty,” Contra Costa Times, Oct. 21, 1999.

    18. “New Russian Defense Plan Lowers Threshold for First Use,” The Sunflower No. 32 Feb 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Santa Barbara, Calif.

    19. “U.S. Opposes Extra Russian Arms Cut, ” Reuters News Service, Jan. 28, 2000.

    20. Schell, Jonathan, “The Gift Of Time,” The Nation, Feb. 9, 1998, p. 56.

     

  • A Nuclear Crisis

    This article appeared in the Washington Post, Editorials and Opinions Section.

    Every five years, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) comes up for reassessment by the countries that have signed it. This is the treaty that provides for international restraints (and inspections) on nuclear programs. It covers not only the nuclear nations but 180 other countries as well, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. An end to the NPT could terminate many of these inspections and open a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in states that already present serious terrorist threats to others.

    Now it is time for the 30-year-old NPT to be reviewed (in April, by an international assembly at the United Nations), and, sad to say, the current state of affairs with regard to nuclear proliferation is not good. In fact, I think it can be said that the world is facing a nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has had a good deal to do with creating it.

    At the last reassessment session, in 1995, a large group of non-nuclear nations with the financial resources and technology to develop weapons–including Egypt, Brazil and Argentina–agreed to extend the NPT, but with the proviso that the five nuclear powers take certain specific steps to defuse the nuclear issue: adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996; conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and “determined pursuit” of efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.

    It is almost universally conceded that none of these commitments has been honored. India and Pakistan have used this failure to justify their joining Israel as nations with recognized nuclear capability that are refusing to comply with NPT restraints. And there has been a disturbing pattern of other provocative developments:

    • For the first time I can remember, no series of summit meetings is underway or in preparation to seek further cuts in nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty concluded seven years ago by presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin has not been seriously considered for ratification by the Russian parliament.
    • Instead of moving away from reliance on nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and NATO have sent disturbing signals to other nations by declaring that these weapons are still the cornerstone of Western security policy, and both have re-emphasized that they will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted to this U.S. and NATO policy by rejecting its previous “no first use” commitment; strapped for funds and unable to maintain its conventional forces of submarines, tanks, artillery, and troops, it is now much more likely to rely on its nuclear arsenal.
    • The United States, NATO and others still maintain arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, including up to 200 nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
    • Despite the efforts of Gens. Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner and other military experts, American and Russian nuclear missiles are still maintained in a “hair-trigger alert” status, susceptible to being launched in a spur-of-the-moment crisis or even by accident.
    • After years of intense negotiation, recent rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a serious blow to global nuclear control efforts and to confidence in American leadership.
    • There is a notable lack of enforcement of the excessively weak international agreements against transfer of fissile materials.
    • The prospective adoption by the United States of a limited “Star Wars” missile defense system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which has prevailed since 1972. This could destroy the fabric of existing international agreements among the major powers.
    • There is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the NPT or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt to join the nuclear community.
    • The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has been recently abolished, removing an often weak but at least identifiable entity to explore arms issues.

    I believe that the general public would be extremely concerned if these facts were widely known, but so far such issues have not been on the agenda in presidential debates.

    A number of responsible non-nuclear nations, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have expressed their disillusionment with the lack of progress toward disarmament. The non-proliferation system may not survive unless the major powers give convincing evidence of compliance with previous commitments.

    In April, it is imperative that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be reconfirmed and subsequently honored by leaders who are inspired to act wisely and courageously by an informed public. This treaty has been a key deterrent to the proliferation of weapons, and its unraveling would exert powerful pressures even on peace-loving nations to develop a nuclear capability.

    All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.

    Just as American policy is to blame for many of the problems, so can our influence help resolve the nuclear dilemma that faces the world.

  • Questions to Ask US Political Candidates — Presidential or Congressional — in this Election Year

    Where do you stand on these issues?

    1. Do you favor or oppose reductions in spending for defense?
    2. Do you favor or oppose deployment of a ballistic missile defense for the US?
    3. Do you favor or oppose the sale of military weapons to countries that violate the human rights of their citizens?
    4. Do you favor or oppose US leadership to achieve a treaty for the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons?
    5. Do you favor or oppose US initiation of reciprocal unilateral steps to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal?
    6. Do you favor or oppose giving increased financial support to Russia to help control its nuclear arsenal?
    7. Do you favor or oppose the US signing and ratifying the international treaty to ban landmines?
    8. Do you favor or oppose US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
    9. Do you favor or oppose US participation in an International Criminal Court to hold individuals accountable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity?
    10. Do you favor or oppose full and timely payment of US dues to the United Nations?