Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • The Return of the Undead

    On March 9 and 10, the Los Angeles Times published some of the classified portions of the US Nuclear Posture Review presented to Congress on January 8. The two most important revelations from this document were: American plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons against a list of seven potential adversaries in the event of military conflict, and, closely related, proposals for the development of a new class of smaller nuclear weapons that would be “useable” against military targets with minimum civilian “collateral damage”.

    The notion of “useable” nuclear weapons is not recent, but like the Undead in an Anne Rice novel, just keeps resurfacing each generation when everyone thought it discredited. In the ’50’s and ’60’s, it was “battlefield” nuclear weapons. Two problems, their guidance systems were imprecise and they weren’t small enough to avoid getting your own guys.

    Then in the ’70’s there was the so-called “neutron bomb” (actually a mini – H-bomb), which NATO was going to deploy until forced to stop by public opinion (primarily German, this battle put the Green Party there on the map).

    Under Reagan, it was “escalation dominance”, in which “tactical” nukes were part of an overall strategy of strategic nuclear warfighting. Reagan’s confident public pronouncements that the US could “prevail” in a nuclear war gave birth to a massive new peace movement (those were the days when we got 100, 000 marching across the Burrard bridge).

    The point is that the twin notions of first – use and nuclear warfighting have been part of US doctrine since the beginning of the nuclear age (the Pentagon’s own documents now declassified in the National Security Archive prove this beyond any doubt).

    After the Cold War ended, most analysts assumed (especially given such dramatic battle proven advances in “smart” conventional weapons) that Clinton would move away from existing nuclear doctrine and abandon reliance on nuclear weapons. But after the fiasco over policy about gays in the military, and Clinton’s inability to keep his pants zipped, he never again took on the military on any issue and nuclear policy treaded water for eight years.

    Now the old gang is back, every retread from the Reagan, the Ford, and yea, even the Nixon Administration, and they are nuclear True Believers one and all. They’ve been certain that nuclear weapons are an essential political as well as military currency for the US since they were weaned.

    Ominously, this time around the technology will soon catch up with the concept, and, with a bit more testing, real nuclear warfighting will become “feasible” to the sort of people who populate the Bush Administration. So goodbye to the dream of nuclear disarmament, and hello to the ghost of General Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command during much of the ’50’s and early’60’s. He once said to a reporter re: the Middle East and Vietnam that the President should “just nuke the gooks and ragheads”, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis he’s on tape as virtually calling Kennedy a coward to his face for not invading Cuba (which we now know would have triggered nuclear use). The Undead have returned to Washington once more, and are clearly in charge again.
    *Michael D. Wallace is Professor of Political Science and Faculty Fellow at the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament at the University of British Columbia.

  • Preventing An Accidental Armageddon

    Overview

    “There is no doubt that, if the people of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them.” This conclusion appeared in the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

    Although international relations have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the U.S. continue to keep the bulk of their nuclear missiles on high-level alert. The U.S. and Russia remain ready to fire a total of more than 5,000 nuclear weapons at each other within half an hour. These warheads, if used, could destroy humanity including those firing the missiles. A defense that destroys the defender makes no sense. Why then do Russia, the U.S., and other countries spend vast sums each year to maintain such defenses? Since 400 average size strategic nuclear weapons could destroy humanity, most of the 5,000 nuclear weapons that Russia and the U.S. have set for hair-trigger release, present the world with its greatest danger — an enormous overkill, the potential for an accidental Armageddon.

    Consequences Never Considered

    When General Lee Butler became head of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), he went to the SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska to inspect the 12,000 targets. He was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow (as the Soviets once targeted Washington). The US planners had no grasp of the explosions, firestorms and radiation from such overkill. “We were totally out of touch with reality,” Butler said. “The war plan, its calculations and consequences never took into account anything but cost and damage. Radiation was never considered.”

    No Long-Range Plan

    Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says there was no long-range war plan. The arms race was mainly a race of numbers. Neither Russia or the U.S. wanted to get behind. Each side strove to build the greatest number. “The total far exceeded the requirements of any conceivable war plan,” according to McNamara.

    Since Russia and the U.S. have each built enormous nuclear weapon overkills with little thought as to the consequence of their use, it is imperative to assess what would happen if these weapons were used. Humanity’s fate could depend upon it.

    It is proposed that a Conference on the Consequence of Nuclear Weapons Use be held soon. Conference news reports could increase public awareness of the dangers. It is also hoped that such a conference could help create a Consequence Assessment Center within the United Nations. By working together, many countries would have confidence in the accuracy of the assessments. The cost of consequence studies could be relatively small and could be done fairly quickly.

    A Preliminary Assessment of the Consequences

    A preliminary assessment of the consequences of nuclear weapons use in relation to the number of nuclear weapons used show them to be far more destructive than most people realize. Let’s examine the effects of one nuclear weapon, hundreds of nuclear weapons and, as the SAC had planned and targeted for use, thousands of nuclear weapons.

    One Nuclear Weapon

    One average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead can be carried in an average size truck. Such a nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 20 Hiroshima size nuclear bombs, or to 250,000 tons of dynamite or 25,000 trucks each carrying 10 tons of dynamite. An average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 32 Hiroshima size bombs, or 40,000 trucks bombs each carrying 10 tons of dynamite. By comparison, the terrorists’ truck bombs exploded at the World Trade Center in New York and the federal building in Oklahoma City each had an explosive force equal to about 10 tons of dynamite.

    If one average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead was detonated over Washington, D.C., it could vaporize Congress, the White House, the Pentagon, and headquarters for many national programs. One U.S. nuclear warhead detonated over Moscow could be similarly devastating. Is it any wonder that General Butler was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow?

    If one nuclear bomb were exploded over New York City it could vaporize the United Nations headquarters, communication centers for NBC, CBS, ABC, Fox, etc., the New York Stock Exchange, world bank centers, international transportation centers and other centers for international trade and investments where billions of dollars are being exchanged daily. A nuclear explosion would also leave the areas hit highly radioactive and unusable for a long time. Where the radioactive fallout from the mushroom cloud would land in the world would depend upon the direction of the wind and rain conditions at the time of the explosion.

    Hundreds Of Nuclear Weapons

    The late Dr. Carl Sagan and his associates, in their extensive studies, found that a nuclear explosive force equal to 100 million tons of dynamite (100 megatons) could produce enough smoke and fine dust to create a Nuclear Winter over the world leaving few survivors. A nuclear bomb blast can produce heat intensities of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees Centigrade at ground zero which, in turn, could start giant flash fires leaving large cities and forests burning with no one to fight them. Also, nuclear explosions can lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, more than 100,000 tons of fine dust for every megaton exploded in a surface burst.

    Since an average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 250,000 tons of dynamite it would take 400 warheads to have an explosive power equal to 100 megatons or enough to destroy the world. It would take less Russian strategic nuclear warheads to destroy the world since they are more powerful. Any survivors in the world would have to contend with radioactive fallout, toxic gases such as carbon monoxide, cyanides, dioxins, furans, etc. from burning cities, and increased ozone burnout.

    Thousands of Nuclear Weapons

    Russia and the U.S. have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. Many of their nuclear missiles are set on high-level alert so that within half an hour of receiving a warning of an attack more than 5,000 nuclear weapons could be launched. While the U.S. and Russia no longer have their nuclear weapons aimed at each other, they can re-target each other within minutes.

    Analyzing Overkill

    The consequence of nuclear weapons use needs to be widely publicized to help efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

    Overkill Doesn’t Deter. Being able to destroy another country more than once serves no purpose for deterrence. How many times can one country destroy another?

    Overkill Is Self-Destructive. The larger the number of nuclear weapons used to carry out a “first strike” or a “launch-on warning” defense, the greater the certainty of self-destruction.

    Overkill Increases Danger Of Accidental War. The more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the greater is the probability of their accidental use.

    Overkill Encourages Nuclear Proliferation By Example.

    Overkill Wastes Money. Spending billions of dollars per year to maintain an ability to destroy the world is the worst possible waste of money.

    Accidental Nuclear Wars

    The Canberra Commission stated “… that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used, accidentally or by decision, defies credibility. The only complete defense is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.” The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, when formulating the New Agenda Coalition, agreed with the Canberra Commission statement.

    If any one of the following three near-accidental nuclear wars had occurred it could have been the end of humanity.

  • Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    As bad as September 11th may have been, it could have been far worse. Had terrorists attacked with nuclear weapons, the death toll could have risen into the millions. It is likely that even one crude nuclear weapon would have left Manhattan utterly destroyed, and with it the financial and communications centers of the country. Were terrorists to obtain one or more nuclear weapons and use them on New York, Washington or other cities, the United States could cease to exist as a functioning country. The stakes are very high, and yet the US is creating new nuclear policies that increase the likelihood that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons.

    A bipartisan commission, headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the United States should be spending some $3 billion per year over the next ten years to help Russia control its nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials. Rather than spend less than one percent of the current defense budget on dramatically curtailing the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists or unfriendly regimes, the Bush administration is trying to save money in this area. It is spending only one-third of the proposed amount to help Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons and materials and find alternative work for nuclear physicists a woefully inadequate amount if we are truly attempting to quell nuclear proliferation.

    The administration’s frugality with regard to protecting potential “loose nukes” in Russia should be compared with its generosity for defense spending in general and for missile defenses in particular. The president has recently asked for another $48 billion for defense for fiscal 2003, following an increase of $33.5 billion this year. This year’s budget for ballistic missile defense is $8.3 billion. Since the likelihood of a terrorist using a missile to launch a nuclear attack against the United States or any other country is virtually zero, it would appear that the administration’s budget priorities are way out of line in terms of providing real security and protecting the US and other countries from the threat of nuclear terrorism.

    The administration’s approach to nuclear disarmament with the Russians is to place warheads taken off active deployment onto the shelf so that they can later be reactivated should our current president or a future president decide to do so. While the Russians have made it clear that they would prefer to destroy the weapons and make nuclear disarmament irreversible, they will certainly follow the US lead in also shelving their deactivated warheads. This will, of course, create even greater security concerns in Russia and make it more likely that these weapons will find their way into terrorist hands.

    So what is to be done? The United States must change its nuclear policies and make good on its promise to the other 186 parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. This goal can only be achieved with US leadership, and it is a goal that is absolutely in the interests of the people of the United States. When the parties to the NPT meet again this April, the US is sure to come under heavy criticism for its notice of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its new strategy to make nuclear disarmament reversible, and its recent announcement that it is rescinding its security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.

    In the end, the country that faces the greatest threat from nuclear terrorism is the United States, and it is a threat that cannot be counteracted by missile defenses or threats of retaliation. Terrorists, who cannot be easily located and who may be suicidal anyway, will simply not be deterred by nuclear threat.

    If the Bush administration truly wants to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism against US cities and abroad, it must reverse its current policy of systematically dismantling the arms control agreements established over the past four decades. It must instead become a leader in the global effort to urgently and dramatically reduce the level of nuclear weapons throughout the world and bring the remaining small arsenals of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials under effective international controls.
    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Bush Can’t Operate as a One-Man Band

    Within one short month, President Bush has launched two major assaults on our system of checks and balances. Without gaining statutory approval from Congress, he announced his plan to punish terrorists with military commissions. And now he claims the right to act unilaterally once again terminating the Antiballistic Missile Treaty without gaining legislative approval.

    In both cases, Bush is on weak constitutional ground. Basic principles require the president to gain the consent of Congress on matters of high importance.

    When President Roosevelt created military tribunals during World War II, he did so under express statutory authorization and after an express declaration of war. But Bush proposes to proceed solely in his capacity as commander in chief and without a formal declaration of war. While the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Roosevelt’s action, its decision cannot be readily stretched to support the constitutionality of Bush’s bare assertion of power.

    The same is true with the ABM treaty. The leading case involves President Carter’s unilateral termination of a defense treaty with Taiwan. In response, Sen. Barry Goldwater (RAriz.) convinced many of his colleagues to join him in a lawsuit before the Supreme Court.

    Senior Republicans such as Sens. Orrin Hatch, Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond signed Goldwater’s brief protesting “a dangerous precedent for executive usurpation of Congress’ historically and constitutionally based powers.”

    But in his plurality opinion, Justice William Rehnquist called the case a “political question” and left the matter for resolution “by the Executive and Legislative branches.” This is hardly an endorsement of presidential unilateralism.

    Seven new justices have joined the high court since Goldwater’s challenge, and there is no predicting the outcome of a new case. Even more has happened since the dark days of World War II when the court upheld FDR’s military commissions. As a new round of judicial challenges come to court, the justices will begin to see a troubling pattern, and perhaps they will have the courage to call a halt.

    This happened once before, when President Truman asserted a unilateral power, as commander in chief, to seize private steel mills during the Korean War. The court declared this unilateral action unconstitutional. Perhaps it may find the courage to do so again.

    But rather than waiting for the court to save us by a vote of 5 to 4, we should be asking fundamental questions now.

    The Bush administration would like to treat each new unilateral adventure as an isolated problem; defending its military commissions by invoking the president’s power as commander in chief; treaty termination by expanding his power “to conduct foreign affairs” (despite the fact that no such power is explicitly delegated to him by the Constitution).

    But there is a larger question involved: Why is Bush persistently pushing the constitutional envelope? We are only in the first year of his presidency. If this tendency is allowed to go unchecked, many more constitutional surprises may be in store for us.

    There is nothing inevitable about the administration’s present course. Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft has begun to retreat after Senate hearings. He has chosen to prosecute the suspected “20th terrorist” before an ordinary federal court.

    Similarly, the Senate should call the secretary of State for hearings on the ABM treaty. The issue is not merely the future of a missile system. If Bush can terminate our treaty with the Russians, we may wake up one morning to hear some future president canceling our treaty commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization or Israel or the United Nations.

    Senate hearings will not only serve to emphasize these broader questions. They will help create a climate of public opinion uncongenial to more presidential unilateralism.

    The only effective cure is to enlarge the debate and convince the administration that the public does indeed take the Constitution seriously.
    *Bruce Ackerman is a professor of constitutional law at Yale.

  • The US Nuclear Posture Review: Putting the Promise of Disarmament on the Shelf

    The US Nuclear Posture Review: Putting the Promise of Disarmament on the Shelf

    The Bush administration has conducted the first Nuclear Posture Review since 1994, and has released a classified version of the report to Congress. The report, which has not been made public, provides an updated strategic nuclear plan for the United States. It helps to clarify Bush’s promise to President Putin to reduce the deployed US strategic nuclear arsenal by two-thirds to between 2,200 and 1,700 over a ten-year period.

    The Bush nuclear posture stands on three legs. First, deactivated nuclear weapons will be kept in storage rather than destroyed. Second, the nuclear weapons that are deactivated will be replaced by powerful and accurate conventional weapons. Third, missile defenses will be deployed ostensibly to protect the US from attack by a rogue state or terrorist.

    Despite the planned reductions in the nuclear arsenal, the Bush administration intends to retain a flexible responsive capability by putting a portion (perhaps most) of the deactivated warheads into storage, making them available for future use. The problem with this approach is that it will encourage the Russians to follow the same path and to also keep deactivated nuclear warheads in storage. This means that the promised disarmament will not be disarmament at all. It will not lead to the destruction of the nuclear warheads, nor will it be irreversible, as called for by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will be subject to reversal at any time for any reason, by the Russians as well as the US.

    In essence, the Bush administration is hedging its bets, and simply putting nuclear weapons on the inactive reserve list, ready to be activated should they decide circumstances warrant doing so. It is sending a message to the Russians that we do not trust them and that we do not intend to any longer follow the path of irreversible reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries set forth in verifiable treaties. The Russians will likely follow our lead and also put deactivated nuclear weapons into reserve stocks, where they will be subject to diversion by terrorists. This would be highly unfortunate since the Russians would prefer to make the nuclear reductions permanent and irreversible.

    The new nuclear posture also calls for cutting down the time necessary to reinstate a full-scale US nuclear testing program should the administration decide to do so. This also fits the pattern of flexible response. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Recognizing that the world can change in dangerous and unpredictable ways, we are putting more emphasis than we have in the last 10 or 15 years on that underlying infrastructure that allows you, including in the nuclear area, to rebuild capabilities or build new ones if the world changes.”

    A second factor driving the Bush administration’s nuclear posture is its belief that conventional weapons now have the capability to replace nuclear weapons in deterring an enemy from attacking. Again, according to Mr. Wolfowitz, “We’re looking at a transformation of our deterrence posture from an almost exclusive emphasis on offensive nuclear forces to a force that includes defenses as well as offenses, that includes conventional strike capabilities as well as nuclear strike capability.” It is anticipated that many of the nuclear warheads being placed in storage will be replaced, particularly on the submarine force, by highly accurate, precision-guided conventional warheads, capable of doing enormous damage.

    A third factor figuring prominently in the Bush administration’s nuclear posture is its plan to deploy missile defenses. Over the continuing objections of Russia, China and many US allies, President Bush has made clear that he intends to move forward with deployment of ballistic missile defenses that will violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In December, President Bush gave formal notice to the Russians that the US will withdraw from this treaty in six months.

    The Bush administration argues that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and deployment of ballistic missile defenses will make the US safer, but this is a very unlikely proposition. Instead, it makes the Russians nervous about US intentions, and this nervousness must be increased by the Nuclear Posture Review’s emphasis on retaining the deactivated US nuclear warheads in storage. US deployment of ballistic missile defenses will also force the Chinese to expand their nuclear deterrent force with increased targeting of the US. Increases in the Chinese nuclear arsenal may also touch off a new nuclear arms race in Asia.

    The bottom line of the new US nuclear posture is that it is built on smoke and mirrors. It will reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons, but it will put them on the shelf ready to be reinstated on short notice. It will also retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy any country and annihilate its people. Recent computer-based estimates generated by the Natural Resources Defense Council indicate that eliminating Russia as a country would take 51 nuclear weapons and China would require 368 due to its large population. On the other hand, the US could be destroyed as a country with 124 nuclear weapons and all NATO countries, including the US, could be destroyed with approximately 300 nuclear warheads.

    The recent Nuclear Posture Review tells us that US policymakers are still thinking that nuclear weapons make us safer, when, in fact, they remain weapons capable of destroying us. Their desire to retain flexibility is in reality a recipe for ending four decades of arms control. Their push for ballistic missile defenses is a formula for assuring that US taxpayers enrich defense contractors while diverting defense expenditures from protecting against very real terrorist threats. The Bush promise of nuclear weapons reductions turns out to be a policy for missing the real opportunities of the post Cold War period to not only shelve these weapons but eliminate them forever.
    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Press Release Regarding the the January 9 Nuclear Posture Review

    Issued January 2002

    On 9 January, the US Department of Defense released a classified version of the first Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It is the first NPR since 1994. Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review released in September 2001, the NPR provides a blueprint for the changing role of US strategic nuclear forces with as few treaty restrictions as possible.

    Despite international obligations to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons under Article VI of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPR upholds nuclear weapons as central to US national security policy. Following on Bush’s pledge at the Crawford Summit in November, the NPR calls for unilaterally reducing strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next ten years. However, the proposal would simply put the deactivated warheads in storage, making them available for future use. The US will also maintain the capability to modify existing or develop new nuclear weapons.

    The NPR also notes that the Bush administration will not change its position on nuclear testing. While for the time being the Bush administration will continue to adhere to the moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing, it will also continue to oppose ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The NPR does not make a formal recommendation to resume nuclear testing, however it calls on the Department of Energy to accelerate the time it would take to prepare a full scale test, which is currently two years.

    David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, stated, “The recent Nuclear Posture Review tells us that US policymakers are still thinking that nuclear weapons make us safer, when, in fact, they remain weapons capable of destroying us. Their desire to retain flexibility is in reality a recipe for ending four decades of arms control. Their push for ballistic missile defenses is a formula for assuring that US taxpayers enrich defense contractors while diverting defense expenditures from protecting against very real terrorist threats. The Bush promise of nuclear weapons reductions turns out to be a policy for missing the real opportunities of the post Cold War period to not only shelve these weapons but eliminate them forever.”

    The NPR announces a New Triad in which the traditional strategic nuclear triad will become a subset bolstered by missile defenses, advanced conventional weapons, and improved command, control and intelligence capabilities to increase the US deterrent capability. Although Russia, China and even some allies oppose US plans to develop and deploy missile defenses, the NPR reaffirms the US resolve to move forward with missile defenses regardless of international consequences.

  • Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty Threatens US and International Security

    The Bush Administration’s announcement on 13 December to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to proceed with plans to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses threatens both US and international security. The announcement that the US will withdraw from the accord negotiated with the former USSR is a signal that the US is willing to act unilaterally and outside the jurisdiction of international law. US withdrawal from the ABM treaty may provoke arms races, including in Outer Space, and undermine international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

    The deployment of ballistic missile defenses is not an effective means to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The deployment of ballistic missile defenses will only produce instability and insecurity in critical regions of the world, including in North East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia.

    Although the proposed US missile defense systems would have been utterly useless in the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Pentagon and other proponents of the systems have continued to call for increased funding for missile defense in the US 2002 fiscal year (FY 2002). The FY 2002 Defense Authorization Bill includes $7 to $8.3 billion for missile defense spending (the President is provided authority to spend $1.3 billion either for missile defense or to combat terrorism, a $3 billion or 57% increase over the authorized FY 2001 budget.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international non-profit, non-partisan education and advocacy organization, believes that a much better option to increase global cooperation and security is to preserve the ABM Treaty until something more comprehensive can replace it. While the stated purpose of ballistic missile defense systems is to defend against missile attacks, it is unlikely that they could do so effectively.

    Additionally, the inherent link between the deployment of ballistic missile defense and the weaponization of outer space means that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will allow the US to continue conduct tests of space weapons. A far better option for the US would be to take the lead on long-promised negotiations for the abolition of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation urges Congress oppose the President’s announced withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Foundation also urges the US, Russia, China, and other countries to renew and fulfill their commitments to multilateral agreements, in particular all nuclear weapons states should fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    For more information on global initiatives to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles and abolish weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, please visit the website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com.

  • Depleted Uranium Weapons – A Threat to Human Health?

    The use of Depleted Uranium (DU) Weapons in the Gulf War, and more recently in the Balkan Wars, has drawn a lot of attention.

    This short review will explain what is DU, for what purpose DU weapons have been manufactured, and how many of them were used, first in the Gulf War and then later on in the Balkan Wars in Herzegovina and Kosovo.

    Widespread leukemia and other ailments have been claimed in the media. They were mostly attributed to the radioactivity of DU and partially to the chemical effects of the heavy metal. A critical analysis of these claims needs a brief review of basic physics and relevant radiation regulations as well as legal limits on toxic chemicals. How is DU ammunition dispersed on impact, and how can minute particles find their way into the human body. Possible health risks will be put in perspective and compared with other risks in war and in daily life. The question is raised, if DU weapons can be called still conventional or if they fit better the definition of radiological and chemical weapons. DU weapons and their “efficiency” have to be seen also in the context of treaties on so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which are signed and even ratified, but do not yet have an implementation procedure or the political will to enact.

    1. What is Depleted Uranium (DU)?

    1.1 Activity of Uranium Ore Before and After Extraction

    Uranium is a chemical element that is more abundant than silver, gold, mercury and cadmium and is contained by 2 to 4 millionths in the Earth’s crust. It can be found on surface and in ore mines in many countries, among them Zaire, South Africa, and Canada and also in the Czech Republic. One ton of ore contains on the average about 3 kg of uranium.

    Uranium comes essentially in three isotopic forms. Isotopes are any of two or more forms of an element having the same atomic number (i.e. the same chemical property) but different atomic weights due to a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. Natural uranium contains 99.274% of 238U, 0.720% of 235U, and 0.0055% of 234U, they all have 92 protons in the nucleus, but 146, 143 and 142 neutrons, respectively. The half-life of 238U, 235U, and 234U is 4.49·109, 7.10·108, and 2.48·105 years, respectively, ranging from billion to million years. The longer the half-life the less radioactive decay products appear in a given time interval and could effect human health. When uranium is dug out of the Earth its radioactive decay products come along. However, in the chemical process of uranium extraction of the three isotopes from the ore, all radioactive daughter products in the radioactive decay series’ 238U and 235U are eliminated, with the exception of the radiogenic isotope 234U.

    In short, radiation background in mines and in extraction facilities is different and so are the health risks. There is an extensive evidence of excess lung cancers in underground uranium miners caused by the decay products of the radioactive gas radon (222Rn). But uranium mill workers have not shown increased mortality or excess lung cancers despite their increased exposure to uranium dust and radon decay products. There is no obvious explanation for this difference.

    1.2 Enriched and Depleted Uranium

    The extraction of energy from uranium for peaceful or military purposes asks for well-defined ratios of the two isotopes. In order to sustain the chain reaction of nuclear fission, uranium has to be enriched by the fissible isotope 235U to a reactor grade of 3.2 – 3.6% or weapon grade (90%+) uranium. This process not only produces the enriched product, but also a waste stream depleted in 235U, typically to less than 0.3%, which is often called the tail. The 235U content in the depleted uranium in the U.S. are lowered to 28% of its content in natural uranium.

    Depleted uranium is a byproduct of uranium enrichment process, with a relatively small contribution from reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel. In addition to the 3 natural isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U, depleted uranium from this latter source also contains a minute quantity (0.003%) of a man-made isotope 236U. The specific activity of DU is 15,902 Bq/gram (for definitions of radioactive units see annex). Traces of 236U were found in Kosovo after the war and gave rise to – unjustifiable – concern in various press reports.

    Based on the measured isotopic composition of depleted uranium, the total activity (a-particles = helium nuclei, b-particles = electrons, g-rays) can be calculated as 22% less and the a-activity as 43% less compared to natural uranium.

    The gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of the fissible isotope 235U is used in the United States. This process requires uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), primarily because the compound can be used in the gas form for processing, in the liquid form for filling containers, and in the solid form for storage. At atmospheric pressure, UF6 is solid at temperatures below 57°C and a gas above this temperature.

    Workers in metal processing plants, including those who make DU penetrators, do not exhibit increased mortality or excess cancers.

    2. Application of DU

    Depleted Uranium is a low cost material that is readily available, since it was produced during the separation of weapon grade uranium. The Department of Energy in the U.S., as of June 1998, is in possession of almost 3/4 of a million metric tons (725·103 tons) stockpile of depleted uranium hexafluoride. This corresponds to a total activity of 527,000 Ci and a-activity 193,000 Ci. The a-activity per mass amounts to 0.389 mCi/kg.

    Depleted uranium’s high density (19.05 g/cm3, 1.7 times more than 11.35 g/cm3 for lead) and its high atomic number Z = 92 also provide useful solution for g-radiation shielding. It has been used at various occasions at particle accelerators, e.g. at CERN in the UA2 detector.

    Control surfaces on wide body aircraft require heavy counterweights. Tungsten (with density 19.3 g/cm3) or DU is ideal materials for this application where volume constraints prohibit the use of less dense metals. An airplane such as Boeing 747 needs 1,500 kg of counterweight. However, DU for this purpose gets out of fashion due to a few accidents and problems with surface embrittlement.

    2.1 DU Ammunition

    The US Army considered high-density materials such as tungsten and DU as metal in kinetic energy penetrators and tank armor already in the early 1970’s. DU was ultimately selected due to its availability and pyrophoricity. While 50% of tungsten has to be imported, mainly from China (US$ 150/kg in 1980), DU is provided for free to arms manufacturers. Tungsten also has much higher melting point than uranium and lacks pyrophoricity. DU penetrators contain no explosives; they act only by impact and immediate ignition of the dust (500°C). Conventional ammunition does not penetrate DU armor, however DU projectiles are capable of piercing it.

    2.2 Proliferation of DU Weapons

    The United States is no longer the only country with DU munitions. 17 countries including Britain, France, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries have acquired depleted uranium weapons. Probably NATO countries will follow soon. These weapons were extensively tested on at least 14 sites in the U.S. and also in Britain.

    As of early 1994 already more than 1.6 million tank penetrators and 55 million small caliber penetrators had been manufactured in the U.S. and another 200 million rounds (some part made out of tungsten) had been ordered by 1998. The approximate cost per shell of a 120-mm tank round is US$ 3,300, implying that handling of DU and manufacturing of ammunition takes the lion’s share, whereas the material itself comes almost for free.

    3. Combat and Accidents

    The US military used depleted uranium ammunition on the battlefield for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991. The amount of DU munitions released in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm totals to 860,550 rounds and corresponds to 294,500 kg DU, for a total activity of 312 Ci and a-activity of 115 Ci. In addition, 9,720 DU aircraft rounds and 660 DU tank rounds (6,430 kg of DU) burned as a result of a monstrous fire in the ammunition storage area and motor pool at the US Army base in Kuwait.

    Data on the use of DU ammunition are still less well known for the war in Bosnia in 1994-1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. They are estimated to 11,000 and 31,000 rounds, corresponding to a total of 10,000 kg of DU.

    4. Effects of Depleted Uranium

    4.1 Effects of DU Penetrator Impact

    When a depleted uranium penetrator impacts armor, 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into dust. The DU oxide aerosol formed during the impact has 50 – 96% of respirable size particles (with diameter less than 10 mm, conditions very similar to “desirable” particle size for efficiency in chemical or biological warfare), and 17 – 48% of those particles are soluble in water. Particles generated from impact of a hard target are virtually all respirable. While the heavier non-respirable particles settle down rapidly, the respirable DU aerosol remains airborne for hours.

    The solubility of the uranium particles determines the rate at which the uranium moves from the site of internalization (lungs for inhalation, gastrointestinal tract for ingestion, or the injury site for wound contamination) into the blood stream. About 70% of the soluble uranium in the blood stream are excreted in urine within 24 hours without being deposited in any organ and the remainder primarily depositing in the kidneys and bones. The kidney is the organ most sensitive to depleted uranium toxicity. When DU particles of respirable size are inhaled, roughly 25% of the particles become trapped in the lungs, where the insoluble particles can remain for years. Approximately 25% of the inhaled DU is exhaled (particle diameters between 1 and 5 mm) and the remaining 50% is subsequently swallowed.

    4.2 Radiological effects

    4.2.1 The Regulations

    The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the US (NRC) mandates an occupational annual dose equivalent for the whole body no more than 5 rem/year and no more than 10 rem in 5 years. No short-term health effects are detectable at this dose equivalent.

    The non-occupational annual dose equivalent limit for the general public is selected as 100 mrem/year, which is comparable to the average background of 363 mrem/year.

    There are well-defined legal limits for inhalation and digestion of DU.

    4.2.2 Calculated and measured doses

    The impact of one 120-mm tank round with the 5.35 kg DU penetrator on an armored target, with 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod oxidizing into aerosol, is taken as an example. The initial contaminated area from the impact of one DU tank round inaccessible to general public (50 m radius circle) is about 0.8 hectares. If contamination spreads with weather elements up to 38 hectares become inaccessible to general public, with 0.9 nCi/m2 the allowed surface contamination for general public.

    The air contamination after the impact and before the DU dust settles can be estimated to maximum of soluble uranium 16 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 3,500 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public. The maximum air concentration of insoluble uranium is 800 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 180,000 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public.

    The residual contamination in Iraq 8 years after the end of the Golf War in the oil fields north of Kuwait was measured. It showed radiation levels 35 times above the background over parts of the battlefield and 50 times above the background over the rusting tanks hit by DU ammunition.

    The accumulated dose equivalent becomes significant when spent but unexploded DU penetrators are worn by army personnel as war souvenirs in direct contact with the skin (1,800 rem/year) or when used by children as toys. The skin dose equivalent limit of 50 mrem/year for radiation workers would be reached in about 10 days.

    4.3 Chemical Toxicity

    4.3.1 Uranium Effects on Kidney

    The RAND review on radiological and toxic effects of uranium puts the overall maximum permissible concentration, i.e. concentration of metal in the kidney associated with no significant increase in the frequency of kidney malfunction, at 3 mg/kg of kidney for uranium and calls it a de facto standard.

    Soluble uranium, which is absorbed in the blood circulation within the body, is eliminated rapidly through the kidney in urine. About 67% are excreted within the first day without being deposited in any organ. Approximately 11% is initially deposited in the kidney and excreted with a 15-day half-life. Most of the remaining 22% is initially deposited in the bone (up to 20%), which is the principle storage site in the body, and the rest is distributed to other organs and tissues.

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) established occupational limits for inhalation of heavy metals. The values for tungsten, lead, uranium in soluble form are 1, 0.05, and 0.05 mg/m3, for insoluble form 5, 0.10, and 0.25 mg/m3, respectively. Current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards set the values at 44 mg/l for groundwater and 20 mg/l for drinking water.

    4.4.2 Gulf War Illness

    An estimate for exposure of a veteran from the Gulf War is difficult to make and studies on the illness came not yet to a final conclusion. More than 10,000 veterans (out of a total of 695,000) reported mysterious illnesses, like muscle and joint pain, chronic fatigue, depressed immune systems, neurological disorders, memory loss, chemical sensitivities, rashes. They may have exceeded the OSHA limit for inhalation of DU by a factor of 3 and the ATSDR minimal risk level intake for general public by 17 times.

    Many factors may have contributed to the ailments, such as·

    • Multiple vaccinations against anthrax and botulinum toxoid
    • Medical treatment with pyridostigmine bromide to counter effects of potential chemical exposure
    • Petroleum from oil fire
    • Pesticide and insect repellants
    • Tropical parasites such as leishmaniasis
    • Depleted uranium dust and shrapnel from DU ammunition and armor.

    It is not clear to which extend DU contributed to the reported illnesses.

    However, there is ample evidence to show that contact with DU ammunition had consequences, especially for children, among them an increase of childhood leukemia in southern Iraqi provinces by a factor of 3 between 1989 – 93, while in the Central Provinces the incidence remained normal. Local concentrations of DU may have been exceedingly high producing this high incidence of leukemia.

    It appears premature to attribute reported illnesses of military personnel to effects of DU ammunition in Kosovo. In Kosovo, similar to Iraq, many parameters may have played a role in producing symptoms, that could be also attributed to the release of chemicals after bombing of factories.

    A study of possible health effects has been made [2], assuming that 100 tons of DU were distributed uniformly over a one-kilometer-wide strip along 100 kilometers on the “Highway of Death” between Kuwait City and Basra, a city in southern Iraq [2]. Under this assumption average dose for someone who lived in the area for a year would be about one millirem – or about 10 percent of the dose from uranium and its decay products already naturally occurring in the soil. The authors came to the conclusion that an individual’s estimated added risk of dying from cancer from such a dose would be about one in 20,000. The doses for heavy metal effects are probably also far below the exposure limits set by OSHA. However, since no exposure and urine tests had been done for two years after the war, it is now too late to draw any conclusions.

    5. Comparison of DU with other risks

    DU is a dangerous material when used as ammunition in war fighting. Obviously, the driver of an armored tank or vehicle, that is hit by a DU penetrator, has a high chance to die from the blast and/or the heat immediately, and he is no longer subject to the consequences of inhaling or digesting DU.

    The spread of DU weighs on the environment and the population, civil or military, in the vicinity of the impact as a long-term consequence. For DU, and likewise for chemical, biological or radiological weapons, the local concentration and time constants of the dispersed material play the important role.

    The legal limit for exposure to chemicals and radioactivity is set such, that values just beyond are not detrimental to human health or the environment. Only an excess value by order(s) of magnitude should give rise to serious concern.

    The consequences of the use of DU ammunition pale in comparison with the other direct and indirect effects of war. As an example may serve the estimated 30,000 unexploded fragmentation bomblets lying on Kosovo’s ground, adding substantial danger to the not yet cleared land mines.

    In order to put the danger from radioactive exposure into perspective the following example may be instructive.

    The risks associated with radioactivity and irradiation in general are, usually, measured in Sieverts. For most people, even scientists, this unit has no real meaning. Therefore, following a suggestion [3], a comparison is made with the risk with similar consequence of producing cancer. Cigarette smoking is such a case. The data are based on the following dose-effect relations: 0.04 lethal cancers per Sievert, 1 lethal cancer per eighty thousand cigarette packs.

    Comparison between effects of some irradiation exposures and cigarette smoking
    Annual dose in millisieverts Equivalent number of annual cigarette packs
    Natural total irradiation
    3
    9
    Radon
    2
    6
    Cosmic Rays
    0.3
    0.9
    Medical X-rays
    0.4
    1.2

     

    Comparison of allowed doses of irradiation to effects of cigarette smoking
    Maximum allowed dose in millisieverts/year Equivalent in cigarette packs/year
    Professionals 20 60
    Public 1 3

     

    6. Conclusions

    Depleted uranium produced as a by-product of uranium enrichment is classified as radioactive and toxic waste and it is subjected to numerous regulations for handling and disposal. Yet the US regulatory limits for general public exposure are exceeded – at least locally and temporarily – up to five orders of magnitude for airborne radioactive emissions and up to 3 orders of magnitude for residual radioactive contamination when DU ammunition has been used in battlefield. The use of DU ammunition, perhaps the most effective new weapon, was not publicly revealed until a year after the Gulf War. These weapons have an indiscriminate character and can have adverse health effects not only on combatants but also on the population at large. Precautions could have been taken to limit possible health effects for the combatants and the civil population, and immediate medical tests could have removed a lot of ambiguities of the effects of DU ammunition.

    Cancer can be the expected long-term consequence of both the radiological and toxic effects of depleted uranium exposure, albeit with an extremely low probability.

    In 1996 the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution in which they “urged all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb production and spread of weapons of mass destruction or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium”.

    If nothing else, the double standard for DU in radiation protection and handling of low radioactive waste in the civilian sector on one hand and by the military on the battlefield on the other is morally and legally untenable.

    The manufacturing and use of DU weapons is a new man-made problem that should be addressed by the international community on an appropriate level. However, it pales compared to major, other unsolved problems in arms control. There is not yet an implementation program for the biological weapons convention (BWC, ratified in 1972!)! The elimination of enormous stockpiles of chemical weapons may take decades, but there is at least a working implementation body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The number of nuclear warheads does not shrink, only some of their delivery vehicles are being discarded, slowly approaching the limit set in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) is in danger to be discarded, the Test-Ban Treaty (TBT) is not yet ratified by all Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs), and major possessors of land mines have not signed up to the Ottawa Treaty.

     

    7. Some Selected References

    [1] Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium Compiled by Vladimir S. Zajik, July 1999 http://members.tripod.com/vzajic/

    [2] After the dust settles Steve Fetter & Frank von Hippel The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, pp. 42-45

    [3] Global warming or nuclear waste – which do we want? H. Nifenecker and E. Huffer europhysics news March/April 2001, pp. 52- 55

    Some radiation units:

    1 Curie = 1 [Ci] = 37·109 decays/second or = 37·109 Becquerel = 37·109 [Bq] 1 milliCurie-of-intensity-hour = 1 Sievert = 1 [Sv] 1 Sievert corresponds approximately to 8.38 Roentgen

    1 rem = roentgen equivalent man
    The dose equivalents for the uranium isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U and their decay products uniformly distributed in the whole body are 1.28, 1.30, 1.32 [(mrem/year)/(pCi/kg)].

  • Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Presidents Bush and Putin announced jointly that their countries “have overcome the legacy of the Cold War.” While the new cooperative relationship between the US and Russia is to be applauded, what their Presidents said and what was left unsaid about nuclear arms reductions still resonated with Cold War logic.

    President Bush announced that he would be reducing the US arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds from some 7,000 weapons to somewhere between 2,200 and 1,700 over a ten-year period. President Putin said, “we will try to respond in kind.” These cuts, which need to be viewed in the context of the post Cold War world, will not make us two-thirds safer.

    It was Presidents Bush Sr. and Yeltsin that agreed back in 1993 in the START II agreements to cut long-range nuclear arsenals to 3,500 each by the beginning of 2003. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin moved this date back to the end of 2007, but also agreed in principle to go beyond this in a next step to 2,500 long-range nuclear weapons in START III negotiations.

    Since entering office, President Putin has let it be known that he is prepared to reduce the long-range nuclear arsenals of the two sides to 1,500 or less. Some of his aides have said privately that President Putin was prepared to go down to 1,000 or less. Chances are he still is prepared to move to lower levels.

    Still lower levels of nuclear armaments would be consistent with leaving behind the legacy of the Cold War, while improving the security of both countries. If the US and Russia are no longer using these weapons to deter each other from attacking (since there is no reason to do so), for what reason do they need these weapons at all? It is widely understood that nuclear weapons have no military utility other than deterrence, and even this was shown to be ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks on September 11th.

    China has a minimal deterrent force of only some 500 weapons with only some 20 missiles capable of reaching the United States. India and Pakistan also have small nuclear arsenals, but surely they pose no threat to the US or Russia. The UK, France and Israel also have small nuclear arsenals, but pose no threat to either the US or Russia.

    North Korea, Iran and Iraq have neither nuclear weapons nor missiles with which to attack the US or Russia, and they would certainly be foolish to do so, given the conventional military power alone of these two countries.

    The greatest danger posed to both countries is not from each other or any other country. It is from terrorists, but terrorists cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Certainly this was one crucial lesson of September 11th.

    The US and Russia need to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. The best way to do this is to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in all states to a level that can be controlled with certainty and to institute controls on weapons-grade fissile materials.

    To achieve such controls, which are truly in the security interests of both countries, will require even deeper cuts made with far more sense of urgency. Such cuts are necessary to keep Russian “loose nukes” out of the hands of terrorists and to demonstrate to the world the US and Russia are truly committed to achieving the nuclear disarmament they promised when they signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty more than three decades ago.

    Presidents Bush and Putin have also left some important things unsaid in regard to nuclear arms. They have made no mention of the continued high alert status of their nuclear weapons. Currently each country has some 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched within moments of an order to do so. This tempts fate unnecessarily, and could lead to an accidental nuclear war.

    Neither have the two Presidents made reference to tactical nuclear weapons, the smaller battlefield nuclear weapons that would be most likely to be used and that could most easily fall into the hands of terrorists. Nor has President Bush made mention of the serious implications for global stability if the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is amended or abrogated, as the US is seeking, to allow for the testing of space based weaponry.

    President Bush has said that he is prepared to reduce the US nuclear arsenal unilaterally, but this means that it is also possible to reverse this decision unilaterally. Several thousand US and Russian nuclear warheads will be dismantled in the coming ten years, but their nuclear cores will presumably be stored and available for reassembly on short notice. The decision to reduce nuclear arsenals should be committed to writing and made irreversible, such that the nuclear cores are unavailable for future use and subsequent administrations in both countries will be bound by the commitment.

    In the year 2000, the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed that the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia also agreed, along with the UK, France and China, to an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    If the US and Russia truly want to prevent future nuclear terrorism, this is the time for leadership to accomplish the “total elimination” that has been promised. The US and Russia are the only countries capable of providing this leadership, but it is unlikely that they will do so unless pressed by the American and Russian people. And this will only happen if our peoples grasp the extent of the nuclear dangers that still confront us.

    We should not be lulled into thinking that reductions of long-range nuclear weapons to 2,200 to 1,700 in ten years time are sufficient. Such arsenals will continue to place at risk our cities as well as civilization and most of life.

    *David Krieger, an attorney and political scientist, is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Nuclear Weapons and Homeland Security

    Nuclear weapons do not make us safer. They make us less secure.

    The greatest vulnerability of the United States and the rest of the industrialized world is not to terrorists who hijack planes or disperse biological agents. It is to terrorists with nuclear weapons.

    September 11th was a shocking reminder of the futility of relying on nuclear weapons for security. Nuclear weapons cannot deter a suicidal terrorist, but a suicidal terrorist with nuclear weapons could destroy the United States.

    US nuclear policies make it more likely that terrorists will be able to attack the United States with nuclear weapons. In general, the US has pursued a nuclear weapons policy of “Do as I say, not as I do.” We have set the wrong example for the world, continuing to rely upon nuclear weapons long after the end of the Cold War.

    The US has slowed the process of nuclear disarmament, leaving many thousands of nuclear weapons potentially available to terrorists. If we want to prevent a nuclear holocaust by terrorist nuclear bombs in American cities, the US must take leadership in a global effort to bring all nuclear weapons and nuclear materials under control. This will require significant policy changes.

    To gain control of nuclear weapons, the numbers of nuclear weapons in the world must be dramatically reduced. Numbers need to be brought down from the over 30,000 currently in the arsenals of the US and Russia to far more reasonable numbers capable of being effectively controlled in each of the eight nuclear weapons states, on the way to zero.

    The numbers being discussed by the Bush administration of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons are far too high and will send a signal to the world that the US is not serious about nuclear disarmament. The Russians have already proposed many times joint reductions to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons. Even this number is too high. Just one of these weapons in the hands of terrorists could do immeasurable damage.

    To gain control of nuclear materials, a global inventory of all nuclear weapons and materials must be established immediately. We must know what nuclear materials exist in order to establish a rational plan to guard and eliminate them.

    All nuclear weapons should immediately be taken off hair-trigger alert and policies of launch on warning should be abandoned. The US and Russia still have some 4,500 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. This is an accidental nuclear holocaust waiting to happen, particularly given the gaping holes in the post Cold War Russian early warning system. Smart and determined terrorists could potentially trick one of the nuclear weapons states into believing it was being attacked by another nuclear weapons state, leading to retaliatory strikes by one nuclear power against another.

    The US should forego its plan to build a national missile defense system, and reallocate these funds to more immediate security risks. US deployment of a national missile defense will lead Russia and China to rely more heavily on their nuclear arsenals and to develop them further. No so-called rogue state currently has nuclear weapons or long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States. Nor could a national missile defense system protect us from terrorists.

    The US should rejoin the international community in supporting a treaty framework to control and eliminate nuclear weapons. We should fulfill our treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to eliminate all nuclear weapons. We should stop threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We should honor the Outer Space Treaty, and stop seeking to weaponize outer space. We should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and move forward with START III negotiations. Finally, we must stop putting up obstacles to nuclear disarmament in the United Nations and its Disarmament Commission, and instead actively assist them in their efforts.

    Since September 11th, the US government has made only one change in our nuclear weapons policy. It removed the sanctions on India and Pakistan that were put in place in response to their testing nuclear weapons in 1998. That change was a move in the wrong direction, away from nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

    President Bush made campaign promises, which he has reiterated since assuming office, to move forward with unilateral reductions and de-alerting of our nuclear arsenal. But unilateral actions are not sufficient.

    The US must lead the way in bringing all nuclear weapons states to act swiftly and resolutely in dramatically reducing all nuclear arsenals and assuring that no nuclear weapons or materials fall into the hands of terrorists. If the US fails to provide this leadership, efforts to achieve homeland security could fail even more spectacularly than they did on September 11th.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international organization on the roster of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.