Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • A Response to Brown and Deutch

    A Response to Brown and Deutch

    On November 19, 2007, Harold Brown, a former Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, and John Deutch, a former CIA Director in the Clinton administration, published an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal. The title of their piece was “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy.” Their article began by pointing out that the end of the Cold War has led “several former senior foreign policy officials who wrote on this page [that is, the Wall Street Journal opinion page]…to make the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a principal U.S. foreign policy goal….”

    Brown and Deutch were referring to an article published in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, co-authored by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn. The article was entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” and the authors made the case for US leadership for a nuclear weapons-free world. They argued, “Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. US leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage – to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

    Disturbingly, Brown and Deutch were dismissive of even the aspirational goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. They quoted Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obligates parties to good faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons, but dismissed it, stating “hope is not a policy.”

    According to Brown and Deutch, “Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated.” But if these weapons are not “empty symbols,” what is it that they symbolize? A power beyond our ability to control? Human folly? A pinnacle of destructive achievement? They based their arguments on “the important deterrent role” of nuclear weapons, but never bother to mention who exactly is being deterred by the current US arsenal of 10,000 nuclear weapons.

    Rather than looking for a new direction for US nuclear policy more than 15 years after the Cold War, Brown and Deutch seem convinced that nuclear weapons are here to stay, and with their approach they will make this outcome inevitable. Without US leadership, there will be no possibility of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. With US leadership, it is a possibility.

    No country would benefit more from a world free of nuclear weapons than the United States. These are the only weapons that could destroy this country, and perhaps will if we continue to rely upon them for phantom deterrence. Nuclear weapons are really weapons of the weak, giving great asymmetrical advantage to smaller, less powerful nations or to extremists. If the US continues to rely upon these weapons, they will eventually proliferate to extremists who cannot be deterred, and they will be used against us.

    Brown and Deutch’s vision looks directly into a rearview mirror toward the 20th century. Their vision will sustain a future of nuclear threat and make nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war more likely. We desperately need a new vision in our country – a vision that we can lead the world in a more positive direction based upon human security and encompasses ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity.

    To view the Brown/Deutch article and see other responses to it, click here.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Are You With Us…Or Against Us

    Originally published at www.tomdispatch.com

    The journey to the martial law just imposed on Pakistan by its self-appointed president, the dictator Pervez Musharraf, began in Washington on September 11, 2001. On that day, it so happened, Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed, was in town. He was summoned forthwith to meet with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who gave him perhaps the earliest preview of the global Bush doctrine then in its formative stages, telling him, “You are either one hundred percent with us or one hundred percent against us.”

    The next day, the administration, dictating to the dictator, presented seven demands that a Pakistan that wished to be “with us” must meet. These concentrated on gaining its cooperation in assailing Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which had long been nurtured by the Pakistani intelligence services in Afghanistan and had, of course, harbored Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps. Conspicuously missing was any requirement to rein in the activities of Mr. A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear arms, who, with the knowledge of Washington, had been clandestinely hawking the country’s nuclear-bomb technology around the Middle East and North Asia for some years.

    Musharraf decided to be “with us”; but, as in so many countries, being with the United States in its Global War on Terror turned out to mean not being with one’s own people. Although Musharraf, who came to power in a coup in 1999, was already a dictator, he had now taken the politically fateful additional step of very visibly subordinating his dictatorship to the will of a foreign master. In many countries, people will endure a homegrown dictator but rebel against one who seems to be imposed from without, and Musharraf was now courting this danger.

    A public opinion poll in September ranking certain leaders according to their popularity suggests what the results have been. Osama bin Laden, at 46% approval, was more popular than Musharraf, at 38%, who in turn was far better liked than President Bush, at a bottom-scraping 7%. There is every reason to believe that, with the imposition of martial law, Musharraf’s and Bush’s popularity have sunk even further. Wars, whether on terror or anything else, don’t tend to go well when the enemy is more popular than those supposedly on one’s own side.

    Are You with Us?

    Even before the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq, the immediate decision to bully Musharraf into compliance defined the shape of the policies that the President would adopt toward a far larger peril that had seemed to wane after the Cold War, but now was clearly on the rise: the gathering nuclear danger. President Bush proposed what was, in fact if not in name, an imperial solution to it. In the new dispensation, nuclear weapons were not to be considered good or bad in themselves; that judgment was to be based solely on whether the nation possessing them was itself judged good or bad (with us, that is, or against us). Iraq, obviously, was judged to be “against us” and suffered the consequences. Pakistan, soon honored by the administration with the somehow ridiculous, newly coined status of “major non-NATO ally,” was clearly classified as with us, and so, notwithstanding its nuclear arsenal and abysmal record on proliferation, given the highest rating.

    That doctrine constituted a remarkable shift. Previously, the United States had joined with almost the entire world to achieve nonproliferation solely by peaceful, diplomatic means. The great triumph of this effort had been the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under which 183 nations, dozens quite capable of producing nuclear weapons, eventually agreed to remain without them. In this dispensation, all nuclear weapons were considered bad, and so all proliferation was bad as well. Even existing arsenals, including those of the two superpowers of the Cold War, were supposed to be liquidated over time. Conceptually, at least, one united world had faced one common danger: nuclear arms.

    In the new, quickly developing, post-9/11 dispensation, however, the world was to be divided into two camps. The first, led by the United States, consisted of good, democratic countries, many possessing the bomb; the second consisted of bad, repressive countries trying to get the bomb and, of course, their terrorist allies. Nuclear peril, once understood as a problem of supreme importance in its own right, posed by those who already possessed nuclear weapons as well as by potential proliferators, was thus subordinated to the polarizing “war on terror,” of which it became a mere sub-category, albeit the most important one. This peril could be found at “the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” otherwise called the “nexus of terror and weapons of mass destruction,” in the words of the master document of the Bush Doctrine, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

    The good camp was assigned the job not of rolling back all nuclear weapons but simply of stopping any members of the bad camp from getting their hands on the bomb. The means would no longer be diplomacy, but “preventive war” (to be waged by the United States). The global Cold War of the late twentieth century was to be replaced by global wars against proliferation — disarmament wars — in the twenty-first. These wars, breaking out wherever in the world proliferation might threaten, would not be cold, but hot indeed, as the invasion of Iraq soon revealed — and as an attack on Iran, now under consideration in Washington, may soon further show.

    …Or Against Us?

    Vetting and sorting countries into the good and the bad, the with-us and the against-us, proved, however, a far more troublesome business than those in the Bush administration ever imagined. Iraq famously was not as “bad” as alleged, for it turned out to lack the key feature that supposedly warranted attack — weapons of mass destruction. Neither was Pakistan, muscled into the with-us camp so quickly after 9/11, as “good” as alleged. Indeed, these distinctions were entirely artificial, for by any factual and rational reckoning, Pakistan was by far the more dangerous country.

    Indeed, the Pakistan of Pervez Musharraf has, by now, become a one-country inventory of all the major forms of the nuclear danger.

    *Iraq did not have nuclear weapons; Pakistan did. In 1998, it had conducted a series of five nuclear tests in response to five tests by India, with whom it had fought three conventional wars since its independence in 1947. The danger of interstate nuclear war between the two nations is perhaps higher than anywhere else in the world.

    *Both Iraq and Pakistan were dictatorships (though the Iraqi government was incomparably more brutal).

    *Iraq did not harbor terrorists; Pakistan did, and does so even more today.

    *Iraq, lacking the bomb, could not of course be a nuclear proliferator. Pakistan was, with a vengeance. The arch-proliferator A.Q. Khan, a metallurgist, first purloined nuclear technology from Europe, where he was employed at the uranium enrichment company EURENCO. He then used the fruits of his theft to successfully establish an enrichment program for Pakistan’s bomb. After that, the thief turned salesman. Drawing on a globe-spanning network of producers and middlemen — in Turkey, Dubai, and Malaysia, among other countries — he peddled his nuclear wares to Iran, Iraq (which apparently turned down his offer of help), North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others. Seen from without, he had established a clandestine multinational corporation dedicated to nuclear proliferation for a profit.

    Seen from within Pakistan, he had managed to create a sort of independent nuclear city-state — a state within a state — in effect privatizing Pakistan’s nuclear technology. The extent of the government’s connivance in this enterprise is still unknown, but few observers believe Khan’s far-flung operations would have been possible without at least the knowledge of officials at the highest levels of that government. Yet all this activity emanating from the “major non-NATO ally” of the Bush administration was overlooked until late 2003, when American and German intelligence intercepted a shipload of nuclear materials bound for Libya, and forced Musharraf to place Khan, a national hero owing to his work on the Pakistani bomb, under house arrest. (Even today, the Pakistani government refuses to make Khan available for interviews with representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency.)

    *Iraqi apparatchiks could not, of course, peddle to terrorists, al-Qaedan or otherwise, technology they did not have, as Bush suggested they would do in seeking to justify his war. The Pakistani apparatchiks, on the other hand, could — and they did. Shortly before September 11, 2001, two leading scientists from Pakistan’s nuclear program, Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, the former Director General of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and Chaudry Abdul Majeed, paid a visit to Osama bin Laden around a campfire in Afghanistan to advise him on how to make or acquire nuclear arms. They, too, are under house arrest.

    If, however, the beleaguered Pakistani state, already a balkanized enterprise (as the A.Q. Khan story shows) is overthrown, or if the country starts to fall apart, the danger of insider defections from the nuclear establishment will certainly rise. The problem is not so much that the locks on the doors of nuclear installations — Pakistan’s approximately 50 bombs are reportedly spread at sites around the country — will be broken or picked as that those with the keys to the locks will simply switch allegiances and put the materials they guard to new uses. The “nexus” of terrorism and the bomb, the catastrophe the Bush Doctrine was specifically framed to head off, might then be achieved — and in a country that was “for us.”

    What has failed in Pakistan, as in smashed Iraq, is not just a regional American policy, but the pillars and crossbeams of the entire global Bush doctrine, as announced in late 2001. In both countries, the bullying has failed; popular passions within each have gained the upper hand; and Washington has lost much of its influence. In its application to Pakistan, the doctrine was framed to stop terrorism, but in that country’s northern provinces, terrorists have, in fact, entrenched themselves to a degree unimaginable even when the Taliban protected Al-Qaeda’s camps before September 11th.

    If the Bush Doctrine laid claim to the values of democracy, its man Musharraf now has the distinction, rare even among dictators, of mounting a second military coup to maintain the results of his first one. In a crowning irony, his present crackdown is on democracy activists, not the Taliban, armed Islamic extremists, or al-Qaeda supporters who have established positions in the Swat valley only 150 miles from Islamabad.

    Most important, the collapsed doctrine has stoked the nuclear fires it was meant to quench. The dangers of nuclear terrorism, of proliferation, and even of nuclear war (with India, which is dismayed by developments in Pakistan as well as the weak Bush administration response to them) are all on the rise. The imperial solution to these perils has failed. Something new is needed, not just for Pakistan or Iraq, but for the world. Perhaps now someone should try to invent a solution based on imperialism’s opposite, democracy, which is to say respect for other countries and the wills of the people who live in them.

     

    Jonathan Schell is the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute, and a visiting lecturer at Yale University


  • Protest Against the Reliable Replacement Warhead

    Although Congress has been dealing with the Bush administration’s proposal to develop the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) for much of 2007, it’s remarkable that the new weapon, a hydrogen bomb, has attracted little public protest or even public attention.

    After all, for years opinion polls have reported that an overwhelming majority of Americans favor nuclear disarmament. A July 2007 poll by the Simons Foundation of Canada found that 82.3 percent of Americans backed either the total elimination or a reduction of nuclear weapons in the world. Only 3 percent favored developing new nuclear weapons.

    And yet, RRW is a new nuclear warhead, the first in two decades, and – if the Bush administration is successful in obtaining the necessary authorization from Congress – it will be used widely to upgrade the current U.S. nuclear arsenal. In this fashion, RRW won’t only contradict the U.S. government’s pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to move toward nuclear disarmament, it will actually encourage other nations to jump right back into the nuclear arms race.

    Of course, peace and disarmament groups – including Peace Action, the Council for a Livable World, and Physicians for Social Responsibility – have sharply criticized RRW in mailings to their supporters and on their websites. Public protests have taken place, including hunger strikes and other demonstrations at the University of California in May 2007 and a demonstration at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in August 2007.

    But these protests have been small. And the general public hasn’t noticed RRW. Why?

    A key reason is that peace groups and the public are preoccupied by the Iraq War and by the looming war with Iran. The actual use of weapons is always more riveting (and certainly more destructive) than their potential use. And weapons are being employed every day in Iraq, while nuclear weapons represent merely a potential danger – albeit a far deadlier one. Thus, in certain ways, the nuclear disarmament campaign faces a situation much like that during the Vietnam War, when the vast carnage in that conflict distracted activists and the public from the ongoing nuclear menace.

    Another reason is that it’s hard to involve the public in a one-weapon campaign. To rouse people from their lethargy, they need to sense a crucial turning point. When atmospheric nuclear testing and the development of the hydrogen bomb riveted public attention on the danger of wholesale nuclear annihilation in the late 1950s, or when the Reagan administration escalated the nuclear arms race and threatened nuclear war in the early 1980s, people felt they had come to a crossroads. By contrast, RRW appears rather arcane and perhaps best left to the policy wonks.

    Finally, the mass communications media have done a good deal to distort and/or bury nuclear issues since the end of the Cold War. Yes, at the behest of the Bush administration they trumpeted the supreme dangers of Iraqi nuclear weapons, even when those weapons didn’t exist. But they did a terrible job of educating the U.S. public about nuclear realities. A 1999 Gallup poll taken a week after the U.S. Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty found that, although most Americans favored the treaty, only 26 percent were aware that it had been defeated! Similarly, a 2004 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that the average American thought that the U.S. nuclear stockpile, which then numbered more than 10,000 weapons, consisted of only 200. Given the very limited knowledge that Americans have of the elementary facts about nuclear issues, it’s hardly surprising that relatively few are busy protesting against the development of RRW.

     

    Lawrence S. Wittner is a member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Advisory Council and is Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany.

  • Sanctifying Mass Destruction

    The toxic terms of discourse of the nuclear debate have insidiously intruded into the public’s mind and distorted its moral perspective.

    Whatever the final fate of the India-United States nuclear deal, it is undeniable that the media-driven debate over it has had a profound impact on public consciousness. Thus, not just television anchors, but even college students, are mouthing phrases like the “historic opportunity” (the agreement offers to India to become a world power) through a “strategic partnership” with the U.S., and promoting India’s “national interest” (which self-evidently lies in superpowerdom and in containing China) and “energy security” via nuclear power development (as if there were no alternatives).
    One notion that is rapidly becoming part of middle-class commonsense is that the deal undoes the iniquitous technology-denial sanctions imposed on India since the 1970s and rewards it as a “responsible” nuclear weapons state (NWS), or, as the July 2005 agreement put it, “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”.
    “Responsible” nuclear weapons state? Can this be anything but an oxymoron? NWSs not only possess the ability to kill millions of non-combatant civilians instantly but are prepared and willing to use that capability in cold blood. Indeed, they make their security dependent upon keeping scores of these weapons of terror ready to be fired at short notice.
    All NWSs, regardless of intent or the size and lethality of their arsenals, and despite their professed faith in nuclear deterrence, have doctrines for the actual use of nuclear weapons to incinerate whole cities — that is, to commit unspeakably repulsive and condemnable acts of terrorism against unarmed civilians. The world’s greatest terrorist act was not the Twin Towers attack (which killed 3,600 people), but Hiroshima (where 140,000 perished).
    Yet, those who erase this terrible, yet fundamental, truth from their consciousness still justify the idea that India is a “responsible nuclear power”. They advance six claims in support. First, India has an impeccable non-proliferation record and has never diverted civilian nuclear materials to military use or participated in clandestine nuclear commerce. Second, India practices exemplary nuclear restraint through its “minimum deterrence” doctrine and its policy of no-first-use.
    Third, India has always responded positively to, if not advocated, proposals for non-discriminatory and equal treaties for arms control and disarmament. Fourth, India’s foreign policy orientation is strongly multilateralist; New Delhi rejects collusive bilateral agreements in favor of multilateral, universal treaties leading to disarmament. This derives from the view that the nuclear threat/danger is global.
    A fifth claim is that India abhors any policy or action that will start or aggravate a nuclear arms race, especially in its neighborhood. It has not triggered such a race and will never do so. Finally, India is a peaceful, mature, stable and law-abiding democracy, which respects human rights and can be trusted to act with restraint – unlike, say, Pakistan.
    All these claims are questionable, if not altogether specious. True, India has never run an A.Q. Khan-style “nuclear Wal-Mart” or willingly proliferated nuclear technology. But, India has been an active proliferator and has participated in clandestine as well as open nuclear commerce with a host of countries to develop its military and civilian programs.
    Right from its very first nuclear reactor, Apsara, to the latest pair under construction (at Koodankulam), India has bought, borrowed and both overtly and covertly procured nuclear technology, equipment or material from states as varied as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and later Russia, France, China, and even Norway.
    The basic design of its mainline power generator is Canadian – the pressurized heavy water reactor named CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium). India’s very first power reactors, at Tarapur, were donations from the U.S. Agency for International Development and were executed as a turnkey job by General Electric and Bechtel. The much-touted Fast Breeder Test Reactor, the only such reactor to operate in India, was developed with French assistance.
    India used spent fuel from CIRUS (Canada-India Research Reactor, to which the U.S. supplied heavy water, adding to the acronym) for military purposes by reprocessing plutonium from it. This was used in the 1974 Pokhran blast. CIRUS was designed and built by the Canadians.
    A condition for Canadian and U.S. assistance was that the products of CIRUS would only be used “for peaceful purposes”. India blatantly violated this and, to evade legal liability, declared Pokhran-I a “peaceful nuclear explosion”.
    India also clandestinely imported heavy water from Norway and, later, from China. We do not know what price was paid for these transactions, but it is unlikely to have been purely monetary in the Chinese case.
    None of this speaks of “responsibility” or strict adherence to legality, leave alone of India’s “clean hands” as far as dubious nuclear trade goes. In truth, nuclear materials are among the world’s well-traded/transferred commodities. Many countries have participated in such trade. India is no exception and cannot pretend to be Simon-pure.
    Second, the restraint claim is belied by India’s official nuclear doctrine, which commits it to a large triadic (land, sea and air-based) nuclear arsenal with no limits whatsoever on technological refinement. This super-ambitious plan sits ill with the profession of “minimum nuclear deterrent”, which is generally understood as a few dozen weapons. (How many does it take to flatten half-a-dozen Chinese or Pakistani cities?)
    India has also diluted its no-first-use commitment by excluding from it states that have military alliances with NWSs and including retaliation against other mass-destruction weapons. In practice, given the lack of strategic distance from Pakistan, it is doubtful if no-first-use has much meaning.
    Besides, the nuclear deal will allow India to expand its nuclear arsenal substantially by stockpiling huge amounts of weapons-grade plutonium.
    Third, India has refused to sign any multilateral nuclear restraint/disarmament agreement since the mid-1960s. In the 1980s and 1990s, India also turned down at least seven Pakistani proposals for regional nuclear restraint or renunciation, including mutual or third-party verification — without making a single counter-proposal to “call Pakistan’s bluff”.
    Fourth, the very fact of India’s signature of the bilateral nuclear deal with the U.S. puts paid to its professed multilateralist commitment. The deal marks a major departure from New Delhi’s earlier insistence on international and universal non-discriminatory treaties on arms control/disarmament. But this bilateral agreement is now meant to be imposed upon the multilateral International Atomic Energy Agency and the plurilateral Nuclear Suppliers 7; Group for their approval — a procedure that India would have strongly objected to in the past.
    India has taken a parochial course, which in future could mean giving the go-by to multilateral approaches in favor of expedient bilateral ones.
    Fifth, a considerable likely expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal, which the deal facilitates, will inevitably escalate the regional nuclear arms race. There is evidence that in response to the India-U.S. deal, Pakistan is building at least one (and probably two) plutonium reprocessing plants, which will help it maximize the production of weapons-grade material with its limited uranium reserves. That is what a nuclear arms race is all about.
    More worrisome, as India builds up its arsenal to the same level as the lower range of estimates of China’s nuclear weapons (250 or so), Beijing can be expected to make more warheads and missiles. This spells a dangerous nuclear arms race. Yet, as U.S. strategists see it (see Ashley Tellis’s quote in Frontline, August 10), a major purpose of the deal is precisely to help India amass more nuclear weapons to deter China — via an arms race.
    Finally, it stretches credulity to contend that India’s behavior towards its neighbors has been exemplarily benign and peaceful. India’s past record of belligerence towards Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal (on which it imposed an economic blockade in the late 1980s) negates that claim, as does its annexation of Sikkim in 1975.
    India is, of course, a democracy, but it is by no means a rule-of-law state. India’s human rights record is deeply flawed — not just in Kashmir and the northeastern region, but also in respect of religious minorities, Dalits and Adivasis, and more generally, numerous underprivileged groups. One only has to recall the 2002 Gujarat carnage, the 1992-93 Mumbai communal clashes, the savage repression under way against the tribals of Chhattisgarh through Salwa Judum, and police brutality against mere suspects in countless terrorist attacks.
    Our history of strategic misperception and miscalculation (for instance, during 1987-88, 1990 and 1999) also bears recalling. At any rate, having a democratic government is no guarantee that a country will not use mass-destruction weapons.
    The only state to have ever used nuclear weapons was the democratic U.S. It would be tragic if our citizens look for Washington’s recognition of India as a “responsible” nuclear power while deadening their own moral sensibilities against weapons of terror.


  • Nuclear Bombs on a Free Trip Across the U.S.A.

    It was something like a sequel to “Dr Strangelove” the black humor of Stanley Kubrick’s blockbuster from the 60’s with the genial Peter Sellers. Six armed nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown across the U.S., mounted on the wings of a B-52 bomber – the same type of plane portrayed in Kubrick’s movie.

    The news of this unthinkable event, which occurred during the last days of August, was mentioned only briefly in the media. There are more “important” matters; the latest scandal of the rich and famous or the misfortunes of disgraceful politicians.

    But this blunder from the U.S. Air Force must be extensively examined and investigated. The cruise missiles, each one with nearly 10 times the destructive force that annihilated Hiroshima, were hanging on the bomber for a 1,500 miles trip from North Dakota to Louisiana, with the flight crew totally unaware.

    The explanation given by Lt. Colonel Ed Thomas, a U.S. Air Force spokesman stated that, “All evidence we have seen so far points to an isolated mistake. The error was discovered during internal checks. The weapons remained in air force control and custody at all times.”

    In other words we don’t need to worry, everything is under control. But a different point of view was expressed by Rep. Edward J. Markey, senior member of the Homeland Security Committee: “This was absolutely inexcusable. Nothing like this has ever been reported before and we have been assured for decades that it was impossible.”

    Is this the same kind of control we have in Iraq?

    We, at the NAPF believe that this kind of “mistake” could lead to a nuclear nightmare. This is another example of why the nuclear arsenals are the “sword of Damocles” hanging over the head of all of us. A most powerful reason to continue our tireless campaign to eliminate the nuclear weapons before they eliminate the human race.

    Ruben Arvizu is Director for Latin America for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)
  • Nuclear Weapons and the University of California

    Nuclear Weapons and the University of California

    It is perhaps the least talked about and most worrying irony of our time. The United States has a massive defense budget, but spends relatively little addressing the most immediate danger to humanity.

    Global security is vital to family life, the growth of business, the wise husbanding of resources and the environment. And yet, all our hopes and plans for the future exist under the shadow of a catastrophic threat – one that could kill millions of people in a few moments and leave civilization in shambles.

    Although there are other significant threats, such as global warming and infectious diseases, it is nuclear weapons that are the greatest immediate danger confronting our species. We must stop ignoring this threat and start providing leadership to eliminate nuclear arsenals around the globe.

    Let’s look at some of the facts about nuclear weapons. They are the only weapon capable of destroying civilization and the human species. They kill indiscriminately, making them equal opportunity destroyers. In the hands of terrorists, they could destroy a country as powerful as the United States. A nuclear 9/11 could have resulted in deaths exceeding one million and the collapse of the US and world economies.

    There are currently some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and 12,000 of these are deployed. Of these, 3,500 nuclear weapons are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments.

    Nine countries currently possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. More than 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world are in the arsenals of the US and Russia. The UK, France, China and Israel are estimated to have arsenals numbering a few hundred each. India and Pakistan are thought to have arsenals under 100, and North Korea to have up to 12 nuclear weapons. As many as 35 other countries have the technological capability to become nuclear weapons states, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran and Egypt.

    Nuclear weapons give a state sudden clout in the international system. India, Pakistan and North Korea all increased their stature in the international system after testing nuclear weapons. Recently, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva emphasized the perceived prestige that nuclear weapons potential gives a country. He said: “Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as a nation — as the power we wish to be.”

    Nearly all countries in the world are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Only three countries have not signed the treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan. A fourth country, North Korea, withdrew from the NPT in 2003. All of these countries have developed nuclear arsenals.

    The NPT obligates the nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has interpreted this to mean that negotiations must be concluded “leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.”

    As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States can lead the way in fulfilling this obligation. It has failed to do so. The US missile defense program has been provocative to other countries, particularly Russia and China, and has resulted in these countries improving their offensive nuclear capabilities. The US has also sought to upgrade and improve its nuclear arsenal, and has proposed replacing every thermonuclear weapon in the US arsenal with the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead. The US has, in effect, said to the world that it intends to rely upon its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

    In addition, the US has failed to provide legally binding security assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. In fact, the US indicated in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review that it was developing contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries – two nuclear weapons states (Russia and China) and five non-nuclear weapons states (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea, which at the time was not thought to have nuclear weapons).

    US nuclear policy undermines the security of its people. The more the US relies on nuclear weapons, the more other countries will do so. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated: “The more that those states that already have [nuclear weapons] increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to their national security, the more other states feel that they too must have them for their security.” Reliance on nuclear weapons will assure their proliferation.

    The more nuclear weapons in the world, the more likely they will end up in the hands of terrorist extremists incapable of being deterred. The longer nations rely on nuclear weapons for security, the more likely it is that they will be used, by accident or design.

    The US needs to work urgently for a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons under strict international control, just as we have already done with chemical and biological weapons. To do this requires political will, which has not been demonstrated by the current US administration. Continuing with existing US nuclear policies is a recipe for disaster. The Cold War ended more than 15 years ago, and new problems now confront humanity. It is time for a drastic change in US nuclear policy – change that will require strong and effective leadership.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

  • The Decision to Risk the Future: Harry Truman, the Atomic Bomb, and the Apocalyptic Narrative

    From Japan Focus, an Asian Pacific e-journal, posted July 23, 2007.

    In his personal narrative Atomic Quest, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Arthur Holly Compton, who directed atomic research at the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory during the Second World War, tells of receiving an urgent visit from J. Robert Oppenheimer while vacationing in Michigan during the summer of 1942. Oppenheimer and the brain trust he assembled had just calculated the possibility that an atomic explosion could ignite all the hydrogen in the oceans or the nitrogen in the atmosphere. If such a possibility existed, Compton concluded, “these bombs must never be made.” As Compton said, “Better to accept the slavery of the Nazis than to run a chance of drawing the final curtain on mankind.”[1] Certainly, any reasonable human being could be expected to respond similarly.
    Three years later, with Hitler dead and the Nazis defeated, President Harry Truman faced a comparably weighty decision. He writes in his 1955 memoirs that, on the first full day of his presidency, James F. Byrnes told him the U.S. was building an explosive “great enough to destroy the whole world.”[2] On April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Brigadier General Leslie Groves gave Truman a lengthy briefing in which Stimson reiterated the warning that “modern civilization might be completely destroyed” by atomic bombs and stressed that the future of mankind would be shaped by how such bombs were used and subsequently controlled or shared.[3] Truman recalled Stimson “gravely” expressing his uncertainty about whether the U.S. should ever use the bomb, “because he was afraid it was so powerful that it could end up destroying the whole world.” Truman admitted that, listening to Stimson and Groves and reading Groves’s accompanying memo, he “felt the same fear.”[4]

    Others would also draw, for Truman, the grave implications of using such hellish weapons. Truman noted presciently in his diary on July 25, 1945, after being fully briefed on the results of the Trinity test, that the bomb “may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.”[5] Leading atomic scientists cautioned that surprise use of the bomb against Japan could precipitate an uncontrollable arms race with the Soviet Union that boded future disaster for mankind. The warnings reached Truman’s closest advisors if not the President himself. Truman nevertheless authorized use of atomic bombs against Japan, always insisting he felt no “remorse” and even bragging that he “never lost any sleep over that decision.”[6] For over sixty years, historians and other analysts have struggled to make sense of Truman’s and his advisors’ actions and the relevance of his legacy for his successors in the Oval Office.
    In an incisive and influential essay, historian John Dower divides American interpretations of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into two basic narratives–the “heroic” or “triumphal” and the “tragic.”[7] The “heroic” narrative, shaped by wartime science administrator James Conant and Stimson, and reaffirmed by all postwar American presidents up to and including Bill Clinton, with only Eisenhower demurring, justifies the bombing as an ultimately humane, even merciful, way of bringing the “good war” to a rapid conclusion and avoiding an American invasion against a barbaric and fanatically resistant foe. Although Truman initially emphasized revenge for Japan’s treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor, subsequent justifications by Truman, Conant, Stimson, and others stressed instead the tremendous number of Americans who would have been killed and wounded in an invasion.[8] As time passed, defenders of the bombing increasingly added generous estimates of the number of Japanese who the atomic bombings saved. While highlighting the decisive role of atomic bombs in the final victory had the unfortunate consequence of downplaying the heroic efforts and enormous sacrifices of millions of American soldiers, it served American propaganda needs by diminishing the significance of Soviet entry into the Pacific War, discounting the Soviet contribution to defeating Japan, and showcasing the super weapon that the United States alone possessed.[9]
    This victor’s narrative privileges possible American deaths over actual Japanese ones.[10] As critics of the bombing have become more vocal in recent years, projected American casualty estimates have grown apace–from the War Department’s 1945 prediction of 46,000 dead to Truman’s 1955 insistence that General George Marshall feared losing a half million American lives to Stimson’s 1947 claim of over 1,000,000 casualties to George H.W. Bush’s 1991 defense of Truman’s “tough calculating decision, [which] spared millions of American lives,”[11] to the 1995 estimate of a crew member on Bock’s Car, the plane that bombed Nagasaki, who asserted that the bombing saved six million lives–one million Americans and five million Japanese. The recent inclusion of Japanese and other Asian casualties adds an intriguing dimension to the triumphal narrative, though one that played little, if any, role in the wartime calculations of Truman and his top advisors.
    To this triumphal narrative, Dower counterposes a tragic one. Seen from the perspective of the bombs’ victims, the tragic narrative condemns the wanton killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the inordinate suffering of the survivors. Although Hiroshima had some military significance as a naval base and home of the Second General Army Headquarters, as Truman insisted, American strategic planners targeted the civilian part of the city, maximizing the bomb’s destructive power and civilian deaths. It produced limited military casualties. Admiral William Leahy angrily told an interviewer in 1949 that although Truman told him they would “only…hit military objectives….they went ahead and killed as many women and children as they could which was just what they wanted all the time.”[12] The tragic narrative, in contrast to the heroic narrative, rests on the conviction that the war could have been ended without use of the bombs given U.S. awareness of Japan’s attempts to secure acceptable surrender terms and of the crushing impact that the imminent Soviet declaration of war against Japan would have.
    Each of these narratives has its own images. The mushroom cloud, principal symbol for the triumphal narrative, has been almost ubiquitous in American culture from the moment that the bomb was dropped. Showing the impact of the bomb from a distance, it effectively masks the death and suffering below.[13]

    Survivors on the ground, however, unlike crew members flying above, vividly recall the flash from the bomb (pika), which signifies the beginning of the tragic narrative, and, when combined with the blast (don), left scores of thousands dead and dying and two cities in ruins. No wonder many Japanese refer to the bomb as pikadon and the mushroom cloud that so pervades the American consciousness has been superseded in Japan by images of the destruction of the two cities and the dead and dying.

    The Smithsonian’s ill-fated 1995 Enola Gay exhibit was doomed when Air Force Association and American Legion critics demanded the elimination of photos of Japanese bombing victims, particularly women and children, and insisted on removal of the charred lunch box containing carbonized rice and peas that belonged to a seventh-grade schoolgirl who disappeared in the bombing. Resisting efforts to humanize or personalize the Japanese, they objected strenuously to inclusion of photos or artifacts that would place human faces on the bombs’ victims and recall their individual suffering. For them, the viewpoint should have remained that of the bombers above the mushroom cloud, not the victims below it. It is worth noting that, prior to the change in military policy in September 1943, U.S. publications were filled with photos of Japanese war dead, but no U.S. publication carried photos of dead American soldiers.[14]

    For one who has confronted the still-smoldering hatred that some American veterans feel toward the Japanese six decades after the U.S. victory, it is stunning how little overt anti-Americanism one finds in Japanese discussions of the bombings. The Japanese, particularly the hibakusha (bomb-affected persons), have focused instead on their unique suffering. Drawing on the moral authority gained, they have translated this suffering into a positive message of world peace and nuclear disarmament. In fact, a vigorous debate about Japan’s responsibility for its brutal treatment of other Asian peoples began in the early 1980s, picked up steam with the revelations by comfort women in the early 1990s, and has raged unabated, especially among Japanese intellectuals and politicians, since 1995, fueled, in part, by regular criticism from China and South Korea.[15]

    In recent summers, I have been startled, during my annual study-abroad course in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by the frequency with which some Japanese, particularly college students, justify the atomic bombings in light of Japan’s wartime butchery and the emperor’s culpability for Japan’s colonialism and militarism. Perhaps this should be expected given the multi-layered silence imposed on Japan in regard to atomic matters–first by Japan’s own government, humiliated by its defeat and inability to protect its citizens, then by official U.S. censorship, which banned publication of bomb-related information, then by the political exigencies of Japanese dependence on the U.S. under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which blunted criticism of U.S. policy, and finally by the silence of many bomb victims, who faced discrimination in marriage and employment when they divulged their backgrounds.

    Many hibakusha remain incensed over their treatment by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), which the U.S. set up in Hiroshima in 1947 and Nagasaki in 1948 to examine but not treat the bomb victims.

    Adding insult to injury, the ABCC sent physical specimens, including human remains, back to the U.S. and did not share its research results with Japanese scientists or physicians, results that could have been helpful in treating atomic bomb sufferers.[16] Anthropologist Hugh Gusterson, who spent three years studying weapons scientists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, explains the process of dehumanization whereby American scientists turned “the dead and injured bodies of the Japanese into bodies of data” and then sought additional American subjects for further experimentation. By turning human beings into dismembered body parts and fragments and calculating damage instead of wounds, coldly rational scientific discourse allowed Americans to study Japanese victims without ever reckoning with their pain and suffering. One scientist even got annoyed with Gusterson for saying the victims were “vaporized” when the correct term was “carbonized.”[17]
    Although Dower is undoubtedly correct that the heroic and tragic narratives, those of victors above and victims below the mushroom clouds, dominated the discussions surrounding the 50th anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these two narratives by no means exhaust the range of interpretive possibilities. Missing from much of the debate has been consideration of what I call the apocalyptic narrative, a framework for understanding U.S. actions that has even greater relevance to today’s citizens who must continue to grapple with the long-term ramifications of nuclear war, particularly the threat of extinction of human life. While this third narrative has important elements in common with the tragic narrative, maintaining, as did much of America’s top military command, that surrender could have been induced without the use of atomic bombs, it does not see the Japanese as the only victims and holds Truman, Byrnes, and Groves, among others, to a much higher level of accountability for knowingly putting at risk all human and animal existence.
    Nor does the apocalyptic narrative have the kind of easily identifiable images associated with the other two narratives. Unlike the religious association with Armageddon or the images of alchemical transmutation in which destruction leads to rebirth and regeneration, nuclear annihilation is random, senseless, final, and universal. As with the end-of-the-world images associated with the existential crisis of 1929-1930, the post-apocalyptic nothingness resulting from nuclear annihilation is devoid of redemptive possibilities. The late 1920s and early 1930s cosmological theories coupling the concept of heat death with that of the expanding universe anticipated, in the distant future, a barren, lifeless planet drifting aimlessly through time and space in a universe indifferent to human existence. Such a vision, popularized by British astronomers James Jeans and Arthur Eddington, was reflected in the work of influential American thinkers like Joseph Wood Krutch and Walter Lippmann. Although the proximate causes differ, with nuclear annihilation resulting from human technological rather than natural destruction, the symbolism, once human life and consciousness have been expunged in Truman’s “fire destruction,” is in other respects similar.[18]
    By unleashing nuclear weapons on the world as the U.S. did in 1945, in a manner that Soviet leaders, as expected, immediately recognized as ominous and threatening, Truman and his collaborators were gambling with the future of life on the planet. Scientists at Chicago’s Met Lab had issued reports and circulated petitions emphasizing just this point before the bombs were tested and used, warning against instigating a “race for nuclear armaments” that could lead to “total mutual destruction.”[19] In order to force immediate surrender and save American lives by delivering a knockout blow to an already staggering Japan, or, as Gar Alperovitz alternatively argues, to brandish U.S. might against and constrain the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia, or, as Tsuyoshi Hasegawa contends, to exact revenge against Japan while limiting Soviet gains in Asia, Truman willingly risked the unthinkable. He did so without even attempting other means to procure Japanese surrender, such as clarifying the surrender terms to insure the safety and continued “rule” of Emperor Hirohito as Stimson and almost all of Truman’s other close advisors urged him to do, but which he and Byrnes resisted until after the two atomic bombs had been dropped; allowing Stalin to sign the Potsdam Proclamation, which would have signaled imminent Soviet entry into the war; or announcing and, if necessary, demonstrating the existence of the bomb. What terrified many scientists from an early stage in the process was the realization that the bombs that were used to wipe out Hiroshima and Nagasaki were but the most rudimentary and primitive prototypes of the incalculably more powerful weapons on the horizon–mere first steps in a process of maximizing destructive potential.

    Physicist Edward Teller impressed this fact on the group of “luminaries” Oppenheimer assembled in the summer of 1942, looking past the atomic bomb, which he considered as good as done, toward development of a hydrogen bomb, thousands of times more powerful, which became the focus of most of their efforts that summer.[20] Not all scientists shared Teller’s enthusiasm over this prospect. As Rossi Lomanitz recalled: “Many of us thought, ‘My God, what kind of a situation it’s going to be to bring a weapon like that [into the world]; it might end up by blowing up the world.’ Some of us brought this up to Oppenheimer; and basically his answer was, ‘Look, what if the Nazis get it first?’”[21]
    In July 1945, physicist Leo Szilard drafted a petition signed by 155 Manhattan Project scientists urging the President not to act precipitously in using atomic bombs against Japan, warning: “The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for the purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”[22] Arthur Compton observed, “It introduces the question of mass slaughter, really for the first time in history.”[23] Stimson, whose finest moment would come in his desperate postwar attempt to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, told the top decision makers, including Groves and Byrnes, on May 31, 1945, that the members of the Interim Committee did not view the bomb “as a new weapon merely but as a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the universe…; that the project might even mean the doom of civilization or it might mean the perfection of civilization; that it might be a Frankenstein which would eat us up.”[24] Oppenheimer correctly pointed out to the participants in that same Interim Committee meeting that within 3 years it might be possible to produce bombs with an explosive force between 10 and 100 megatons of TNT — thousands of times more powerful than the bomb that would destroy Hiroshima.[25]
    Hence, the apocalyptic narrative, applying an ethical standard to which leaders of the time could realistically be held, and an understanding of short-term and long-term consequences that should be expected of policymakers, indicts Truman, Byrnes, and Groves not only for the wholesale slaughter of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki but for behaving recklessly and thoughtlessly in inflicting a reign of terror on the rest of humankind. In 1942, Compton assessed the odds of blowing up the world and decided it was not worth the risk. In 1945, Truman contemplated the prospect of future annihilation but apparently gave it little serious consideration. To make matters worse, he did next to nothing to make amends for his wartime shortsightedness when the opportunity to control nuclear weapons presented itself again during the first year of the postwar era.
    Throughout that first year, Henry Wallace, who Roosevelt had asked to stay on as Secretary of Commerce after Truman replaced him as Vice President, struggled valiantly to avert an arms race and ease the threat of nuclear war . When Wallace persisted in criticizing administration policy toward the Soviet Union and the bomb, Truman ousted him from the Cabinet. In his address to a national radio audience on the night he submitted his letter of resignation, Wallace again voiced the theme that provoked Truman’s ire, charging that the U.S. government’s present course may mean “the extinction of man and of the world.”[26] That Truman bears so much responsibility for creating this perilous state of affairs, regardless of his conscious intentions, justifies the application of such a harsh standard of judgment and demands a closer look at the man and his early presidency. For if Harry Truman, a relatively decent man, could behave so irresponsibly, what assurance is there that future presidents, under comparable circumstances, might not do the same? In fact, several have already come frighteningly close.

    II

    Truman always accepted personal responsibility for the bomb decision. In his memoirs, however, he states that the Interim Committee chaired by Stimson recommended that “the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done….without specific warning and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength.” This decision was supported by the scientific advisors to the committee and, Truman insists, by not only British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, but also by Truman’s own “top military advisors.” But, Truman adds, “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”[27] Truman made the same point in a 1948 letter to his sister Mary: “On that trip coming home [from Potsdam] I ordered the Atomic Bomb to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was a terrible decision. But I made it.”[28]
    Although Truman left office with abysmally low approval ratings, he is now widely viewed as one of America’s near great presidents and treated as a political and moral paragon by leaders of both major political parties, including George W. Bush. President Bush’s national security advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who Bush credits with telling “me everything I know about the Soviet Union,” named Truman her man of the century to Time.[29] Some historians have been equally impressed with the man and his legacy, none more than David McCullough, whose lavishly praiseful and historiographically vapid biography won the Pulitzer Prize.[30]
    Truman did not learn of the atomic bomb project until Stimson told him, following the April 12 emergency Cabinet meeting, that the U.S. was working on “a new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power.”[31] Over the next few hours, days, and weeks, Truman made a series of decisions that would set the course for his presidency and for the future of much of the world. Whereas Roosevelt took counsel from people of diverse views and ultimately exercised independent judgment on foreign affairs, Truman, inexperienced in these areas, turned almost exclusively to more conservative thinkers who harbored animosity toward the Soviet Union. Never comfortable with visionaries, idealists, or intellectuals, he sought advice from people who confirmed his own parochial instincts. His dependence on segregationist Byrnes, a man with considerably less formal education than even Truman himself, is a case in point. With the exception of Wallace, whose popularity and independent political base made him temporarily untouchable, New Dealers and more progressive holdovers from the Roosevelt administration were quickly marginalized by the new president and, before long, either ousted or pressured to leave the administration.
    The fact that the bomb project had generated so much momentum by the time Truman became president that it would have taken bold leadership on his part to avoid using these new weapons has led some observers to minimize his personal responsibility. On several occasions, Groves insisted that Truman was swept along by the tide of events. “As far as I was concerned,” Groves wrote, “his decision was one of non-interference–basically, a decision not to upset the existing plans….As time went on, and as we poured more and more money and effort into the project, the government became increasingly committed to the ultimate use of the bomb…”[32] On another occasion, Groves commented, “Truman did not so much say ‘yes’ as not say ‘no.’ It would indeed have taken a lot of nerve to say ‘no’ at that time.”[33] He saved his most demeaning assessment for a 1963 article in Look Magazine, in which he described Truman as “a little boy on a toboggan.”[34]
    Truman relied heavily upon the advice of Groves and Byrnes, both of whom were strongly committed to using the bombs and both of whom saw their use as a means of firing a warning shot across the Soviet bow. Byrnes made his anti-Soviet motives abundantly clear at his May 28, 1945 meeting with scientists Leo Szilard, Harold Urey, and Walter Bartky. Groves reiterated this sentiment when he acknowledged: “There was never from about two weeks from the time I took charge of this Project any illusion on my part but that Russia was our enemy, and the Project was conducted on that basis. I didn’t go along with the attitude of the country as a whole that Russia was a gallant ally.”[35]
    Not only did Truman rely on fervent proponents of using the bomb, he ignored the entreaties of Stimson, State Department Japan expert and former Ambassador Joseph Grew, Admiral William Leahy, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and other knowledgeable insiders who urged him to change the surrender terms and inform the Japanese that they could keep the emperor. Indeed, this is precisely what the U.S. ultimately did—but only after dropping the two atomic bombs in the US arsenal. Several scholars have argued that such modifications of surrender terms could have significantly expedited Japanese surrender, saving numerous Japanese and American lives, and obviating use of the bombs,[36] especially if combined with announcement of the impending Soviet declaration of war, a development that Japanese leaders dreaded. General Douglas MacArthur told former President Herbert Hoover that, if Truman had acted upon Hoover’s May 30, 1945 memo and changed the surrender terms, the war would have ended months earlier. “That the Japanese would have accepted it and gladly,” he averred, “I have no doubt.”[37] Hoover believed the Japanese would have negotiated as early as February.[38]
    Truman ordered the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki despite the fact that he and his top advisors were aware that the Japanese had abandoned hope for military victory and were seeking an end to the war. Prince Konoe Fumimaro had affirmed the view held by many Japanese leaders when he informed Emperor Hirohito in February 1945 that “defeat is inevitable.”[39] Japan’s military desperation was apparent to Americans who analyzed the intercepted July exchanges between Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori in Tokyo and Ambassador Sato Naotake in Moscow. The Pacific Strategic Intelligence Summary for the week of Potsdam meeting reported: “it may be said that Japan now, officially if not publicly, recognizes her defeat. Abandoning as unobtainable the long-cherished goal of victory, she has turned to the twin aims of (a) reconciling national pride with defeat, and (b) finding the best means of salvaging the wreckage of her ambitions.”[40] As Colonel Charles “Tick” Bonesteel III, chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, recalled: “the poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia.”[41] OSS official Allen Dulles briefed Stimson on Japanese peace feelers at Potsdam. Dulles wrote in The Secret Surrender: “On July 20, 1945, under instructions from Washington, I went to the Potsdam Conference and reported there to Secretary Stimson on what I had learned from Tokyo–they desired to surrender if they could retain the Emperor and the constitution as a basis for maintaining discipline and order in Japan after the devastating news of surrender became known to the Japanese people.”[42] That such indications of Japanese intentions were not lost on Truman and Byrnes is apparent not only in Truman’s July 18 diary entry referring to “the telegram from the Jap Emperor asking for peace“[43] but in the August 3 diary entry by Byrnes’s assistant Walter Brown, who recorded, “Aboard Augusta/ President, Leahy, JFB agrred [sic] Japas [sic] looking for peace.”[44] Byrnes publicly admitted as much when he spoke to the press on August 29. The New York Times reported, “…Byrnes challenged today Japan’s argument that the atomic bomb had knocked her out of the war. He cited what he called Russian proof that the Japanese knew that they were beaten before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.”[45] Similar comments by Forrestal, McCloy, and Stimson show how widespread this realization was. But, at Potsdam, when Stimson tried to persuade Truman to alter his approach and provide assurances on the emperor in the Potsdam Proclamation, Truman told his elderly Secretary of War that, if he did not like the way things were going, he could pack his bags and return home.

    Truman also decided to issue the Potsdam Proclamation without Stalin’s signature, despite Stalin’s eagerness to sign and Truman’s understanding that Soviet entry into the war would deeply demoralize Japan and end Japan’s misguided hopes of securing better surrender terms through Soviet intercession.[46] Soviet entry also destroyed the possibility that Japan’s Ketsu-go strategy would succeed in inflicting heavy casualties on the Allied invading force, ultimately leaving the Japanese with little choice but surrender. Truman insisted that firming up Soviet involvement was his principal reason for going to Potsdam. Upon receiving Stalin’s confirmation, he exulted, Stalin will “be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.”[47] Several intelligence estimates drew the same conclusion, including a June 30 War Department report that stated, “The entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.”[48]

    In the end, the Soviet invasion proved a far more powerful inducement to surrender than did the atom bombs. Japanese leaders, many demonstrating little concern for the suffering of their own people, had already witnessed U.S. firebombing and often near-total destruction of 64 cities without ending the war.

    The U.S. had shown it could level Japanese cities almost at will in the months preceding Hiroshima. Whether the U.S. did so with hundreds of bombers or with one plane and one bomb did not fundamentally alter the strategic situation in the eyes of Japanese leaders. Even Army Minister Korechika Anami’s startling announcement on August 9 that he had intelligence indicating that the U.S. might have more than 100 additional atomic bombs and that Tokyo would be the next target did not change the views of members of the War Cabinet who remained deadlocked 3-3 over whether to simply demand retention of the emperor system or to add three additional conditions.[49] While contradictory postwar statements by Emperor Hirohito and other Japanese leaders about whether the atomic bombings or the Soviet invasion ultimately proved decisive have provided ammunition for both sides in this debate, it seems clear that the powerful and rapidly advancing Soviet invasion definitively undermined both the Japanese military and diplomatic strategies far more profoundly and fundamentally than did the evisceration, however total and horrific, of the 65th and 66th destroyed Japanese cities. As Prime Minister Suzuki explained on August 13, when asked why they couldn’t delay surrender for a few days, “If we miss today, the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea, Karafuto, but also Hokkaido. This would destroy the foundation of Japan. We must end the war when we can deal with the United States.”[50]
    Top U.S. military leaders recognized Japan’s growing desperation, prompting several to later insist that the use of atomic bombs was not needed to secure victory. Those who believed that dropping atomic bombs on Japan was morally repugnant and/or militarily unnecessary included Admiral William Leahy, General Dwight Eisenhower, General Douglas MacArthur, General Curtis LeMay, General Henry Arnold, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, Admiral Ernest King, General Carl Spaatz, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Admiral William “Bull” Halsey. Groves admitted that he circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff to avoid, in part, “Admiral Leahy’s disbelief in the weapon and its hoped-for effectiveness; this would have made action by the Joint Chiefs quite difficult.”[51] In reflecting on his opposition, Leahy, who chaired the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and served as Truman’s personal chief of staff, emphasized the barbaric nature of the atomic bombs, not doubts about their effectiveness, chillingly proclaiming, “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender….My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”[52]
    Eisenhower was equally appalled, writing in his 1963 Mandate for Change that when he learned from Stimson at Potsdam that use of the bomb was imminent, “I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’”[53] Eisenhower told biographer Stephen Ambrose that on July 20, three days after learning this shocking news from Stimson, he met with Truman and his advisors and directly recommended that they not use the bombs.[54] Other military leaders drew similar conclusions about the imminence of Japanese surrender without use of atomic bombs. Air Force Chief of Staff General Henry Arnold wrote, “it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.”[55] General Curtis LeMay argued that his conventional bombing had already ended the war: “Even without the atomic bomb and the Russian entry into the war, Japan would have surrendered in two weeks.”[56] Brigadier General Bonner Fellers wrote shortly after VJ day: “Neither the atomic bombing nor the entry of the Soviet Union into the war forced Japan’s unconditional surrender. She was defeated before either of these events took place.”[57] Brigadier General Carter Clarke, who was in charge of preparing MAGIC summaries in 1945, later stated, “we brought them down to an abject surrender through accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.”[58] Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, the Navy representative to the Interim Committee, recommended, before leaving the government on July 1, that the U.S. not use the bombs without warning given the clear evidence that Japan was already militarily defeated and trying to surrender and the devastating blow that would be struck by the Soviet declaration of war. Such considerations led Admiral Leahy to conclude that an invasion would not have been necessary. Leahy explained, “I was unable to see any justification, from a national-defense point of view, for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan.”[659]
    Even more surprising than the dissenting views of so many respected military leaders is the intense criticism by influential postwar conservatives. While moral outrage over the atomic bombings is now widely considered to be a left or “revisionist” position, ethical conservatives used to be equally condemnatory. Herbert Hoover wrote to a friend on August 8, 1945, “The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul.”[60] Such attacks mounted over the next decade and a half, leading Medford Evans to write in a 1959 article in William F. Buckley’s National Review, “The indefensibility of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima is becoming part of the national conservative creed…”[61] Even the notorious hawk Edward Teller would later insist, somewhat disingenuously, that he too had opposed use of the bomb, explaining, in 1970, to Harvard biologist and Nobel laureate George Wald, “My reason for opposing the dropping of the bomb on Japan was that this action seemed to be wrong and unjustified.”[62]
    No one can say with absolute certainty that assuring the Japanese about the emperor, notifying them about Soviet entry, and alerting them to or demonstrating the bomb would have brought about Japanese surrender. But the chances that this formula would have succeeded seem very good, despite the vacillation by the emperor and the obstinacy of some of Japan’s military leaders.[63] There is even a chance that taking these steps might have sped up the end of the war and saved American lives. However, the relevant question is why the president of the United States, given his expressed understanding of the potentially cataclysmic nature of these weapons, would not seek to avoid unveiling weapons “great enough to destroy the whole world” in a way that would dramatically increase the chances for future disaster or, as he himself put it, for “the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era after Noah and his fabulous ark.”
    Paul Boyer has cogently demonstrated that the American public responded to news of Hiroshima with an eerie sense of foreboding and widespread perception that American cities could one day suffer the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and worse–much, much worse.[64] News commentators, editorial writers, and journalists, instead of celebrating the military use of the bombs against Japanese cities, foresaw the dire implications for the future of the American people and the world. On the evening of August 6, NBC radio news commentator H.V. Kaltenborn declared, “For all we know, we have created a Frankenstein! We must assume that with the passage of only a little time, an improved form of the new weapon we use today can be turned against us.”[65]
    The St. Louis Post-Dispatch went even further the next day, warning that science may have “signed the mammalian world’s death warrant and deeded an earth in ruins to the ants.”[66] On August 7, John Campbell, editor of Astounding Science Fiction, told readers of PM that, having contemplated this development for 15 years, he was “scared” because this wasn’t just a new bomb. It was “the power to kill the human race.”[67] CBS radio commentator Edward R. Murrow captured the national sense of fear and foreboding on August 12, reporting, “Seldom, if ever, has a war ended leaving the victors with such a sense of uncertainty and fear, with such a realization that the future is obscure and that survival is not assured.”[68] Following the announcement that Hiroshima had been bombed, G. Bromley Oxnam and John Foster Dulles of the Federal Council of Churches issued a statement contending that “If we, a professedly Christian nation, feel morally free to use atomic energy in that way, men elsewhere will accept that verdict. Atomic weapons will be looked upon as a normal part of the arsenal of war and the stage will be set for the sudden and final destruction of mankind.”[69] Much of the public concurred. Twenty-six percent of respondents to an August Gallup Poll thought it “likely” that “some day experiments in smashing atoms will cause an explosion which will destroy the entire world.”[70] Reflecting on the “almost infinite destructive power” of this “demonic invention,” which it placed at a “stage of development comparable to that of artillery at the Battle of Crecy,” the Washington Post noted on August 26, the life expectancy of the human species had “dwindled immeasurably in the course of two brief weeks.”[71]

    But it was the scientists who best understood the nightmarish implications of the process that Truman had initiated. In September 1945, Arthur Compton alerted Henry Wallace, who the scientists considered their most trustworthy ally in the administration, of the impending doomsday scenario. Four scientists had separately and independently approached Compton with theoretical plans for building a super bomb. The cat was clearly out of the bag. An effort comparable to the Manhattan Project, he felt, would have a good chance of success. But he and the scientists believed “that this development should not be undertaken because we should prefer defeat in war to a victory obtained at the expense of the enormous human disaster that would be caused…” He calculated the potential damage as follows: “area completely destroyed by 1 atomic bomb, 4 square miles. Area completely destroyable by 1000 atomic bombs, as in a future war, 4000 square miles. Area completely destroyable by 1000 super bombs, about 1,000,000 square miles. Area of continental United States, about 3,000,000 square miles.”[72]
    The fundamental transformation wrought by dropping atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945 was apparent at the time and has not been lost sight of by subsequent generations. The atomic evisceration of downtown Hiroshima with the uranium bomb “Little Boy” on August 6 and the even more gratuitous obliteration of the Urakami district of Nagasaki three days later by the plutonium bomb “Fat Man” have merged in memory as one of history’s watershed events. Two separate polls conducted in 1999 confirm its enduring significance. The first, sponsored by the Freedom Forum’s Newseum, asked 67 veteran journalists to rank the 100 most important news events of the past century. The judges chose the atomic bombings as the number one news story of the 20th century. In the second, New York University’s Department of Journalism asked 36 experts to identify the best works by American journalists of the past 100 years. The 19 journalism faculty members and 17 other journalism professionals placed John Hersey’s 1946 New Yorker essay and book Hiroshima, which humanized Japanese victims with literary images that would haunt Americans for decades, atop their list.[73]
    On his way back from Potsdam aboard the USS Augusta, Truman received news that the city of Hiroshima had been virtually wiped off the map. He proclaimed that “This is the greatest thing in history!”[74] There is little evidence that, despite his statements indicating awareness of the forces he had unleashed, he ever gave the bomb decision the serious thought it deserved. In 1946, when MGM sent him a copy of the script of its upcoming docudrama about the production and use of the bomb, The Beginning or the End, for his approval, Truman voiced no objection to the scene where he decides to drop the bomb. It was only the insistence of Walter Lippmann, who during a subsequent screening found the president’s flip decision “shocking,” that stirred the White House to request changes.[75] The original version appears to have been more authentic. When an interviewer asked Truman whether the decision was morally difficult to make, he responded, “Hell no, I made it like that,” snapping his fingers.[76] In fact, Truman never publicly acknowledged doubts or misgivings. When Edward R. Murrow asked him in a 1958 interview if he had any regrets about using the bomb or about any of his other presidential decisions, Truman responded, “Not the slightest–not the slightest in the world.”[77]
    Nor did he welcome others expressing doubts. Upon meeting Oppenheimer for the first time on October 25, 1945, Truman, with his typical insecurity-masking bluster, asked Oppenheimer to guess when the Soviets would develop a bomb. When Oppenheimer admitted that he did not know, Truman declared that he did: “Never.” Unnerved, Oppenheimer said at one point, “Mr. President, I feel I have blood on my hands.” Truman responded angrily. “I told him the blood was on my hands—to let me worry about that,” he recounted to David Lilienthal. Truman liked this story enough to repeat it on several occasions, his responses varying slightly, but his contempt for Oppenheimer always evident. He told Acheson, “I don’t want to see that son-of-a-bitch in this office ever again,” and another time called him a “cry-baby scientist.”[78]
    Stimson was much less sanguine about his role in enabling the bomb decision, a problem he wrestled with incessantly in the final months of the war. In his wartime diary, he referred to the bomb as “the dreadful,” “the terrible,” “the dire,” “the awful,” and “the diabolical” and spoke of it constantly with other top policymakers.[79] He wrote in his diary on May 28, 1945, “I have made up my mind to make that subject my primary occupation for these next few months, relieving myself so far as possible from all routine matters in the Department.”[80] He brought Arthur Page to the Pentagon and gave him little to do, wanting him, Page realized, always on hand “to talk about the atom.”[81] He later regretted that he was “the victim” Conant had chosen to defend the bomb decision in his 1947 Harper’s article.
    “Conant,” Stimson explained to Felix Frankfurter, “felt very much worried over the spreading accusation that it was entirely unnecessary to use the atomic bomb.” Stimson admitted, “I have rarely been connected with a paper about which I have so much doubt at the last moment.”[82] He, more than most, understood the possibility that changing surrender terms might end the war without using atomic bombs or invading and struggled unsuccessfully to convince Truman to do so. In his memoir, he and Bundy admitted, “history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war.”[83] During the final months of the Pacific War, he was wracked with doubts about the wisdom and propriety of using the bomb and seemed to grasp the terrible significance of the new world he had helped to usher in. He drove the point home forcefully in the final paragraph of his “official” defense, writing: “In this last great action of the Second World War we were given final proof that war is death. War in the twentieth century has grown steadily more barbarous, more destructive, more debased in all its aspects. Now, with the release of atomic energy, man’s ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete.”[84] Yet, much as with his de facto acquiescence in a strategic bombing policy he abhorred, he failed to impede Truman, Byrnes, and Groves from their desired use of atomic bombs against Japan.
    Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill recognized the problem of defending use of the bombs. Churchill visited Truman as the end of his presidency neared. Truman threw a small dinner to which he invited Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, Omar Bradley, and Dean Acheson. Margaret, the President’s daughter, describes the scene:

    Everyone was in an ebullient mood, especially Dad. Without warning, Mr. Churchill turned to him and said, “Mr. President, I hope you have your answer ready for that hour when you and I stand before Saint Peter” and he says, “I understand you two are responsible for putting off those atomic bombs. What have you got to say for yourselves?”[85]

    Lovett intervened to save Truman from embarrassment. The judgment of history will not be that easy to evade.

    III

    Hiroshima counted 140,000 dead by the end of 1945 and perhaps as many as 200,000 by 1950. Nagasaki lost over 70,000. Tens of thousands more have died since as a result of bomb-related injuries from blast, fire, and radiation.[86] Although both cities are now thriving modern metropolises, magnificent testaments to the resiliency of the human spirit, their citizens have made sure that their special places in history are remembered. The people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led by the hibakusha, have engaged in a valiant struggle against forgetting. Akira Kurosawa expresses their dilemma in Rhapsody in August, his powerful 1995 film about the younger generation’s encounter with the history of Nagasaki, in a voice-over during a scene where sightseers casually stroll around and photograph monuments in the Nagasaki Peace Park. The narrator observes, “But nowadays, for most people… Nagasaki happened once upon a time. As the years pass, people are apt to forget…even the most dreadful things.” Many never learn them in the first place. Public opinion polls show that over one-third of U.S. citizens don’t know that Hiroshima was the site of the first atomic attack, with the numbers rising to well over 40 percent among those aged 18-29. Or consider the jubilation of many Indians and Pakistanis upon learning that their countries had successfully tested nuclear weapons in 1998, a reaction that reflects the growing belief that acquisition of nuclear weapons is the quickest route to international respectability. Equally uncomprehending was General Mirza Aslam Berg, retired chief of Pakistan’s armed forces, who dismissed fears of nuclear war between those two nuclear powers, commenting, “I don’t know what you’re worried about. You can die crossing the street, hit by a car, or you could die in a nuclear war. You’ve got to die someday, anyway.”[87] Even more ominous is the Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which virtually eliminates the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and dramatically lowers the bar to nuclear weapons’ use, in March 1946, Lewis Mumford, already horrified by the orgy of destruction Truman had unleashed and appalled by the announcement of additional bomb tests, published a passionate piece in Saturday Review that charged,
    We in America are living among madmen. Madmen govern our affairs in the name of order and security. The chief madmen claim the titles of general, admiral, senator, scientist, administrator, Secretary of State, even President. And the fatal symptom of their madness is this: they have been carrying through a series of acts which will lead eventually to the destruction of mankind, under the solemn conviction that they are normal responsible people, living sane lives, and working for reasonable ends.
    Soberly, day after day, the madmen continue to go through the undeviating motions of madness: motions so stereotyped, so commonplace, that they seem the normal motions of normal men, not the mass compulsions of people bent on total death. Without a public mandate of any kind, the madmen have taken it upon themselves to lead us by gradual stages to that final act of madness which will corrupt the face of the earth and blot out the nations of men, possibly put an end to all life on the planet itself.[88]
    Stanley Kubrick came to the same realization two decades later, understanding that he had to make Dr. Strangelove as a black comedy because planning for nuclear annihilation had to be the work of madmen. Year after year, when I started taking my students to the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Museum, I caught myself copying the same label because in its ludicrous disproportionality it represented the logical culmination of the process unleashed by Truman in 1945–that by 1985 the destructive power of the world’s nuclear arsenals had reached the equivalent of 1.47 million Hiroshima bombs.

    The point of the apocalyptic narrative is not simply to blame Harry Truman for the present nuclear insanity. Clearly, many share responsibility for a state of affairs in which nine nations have nuclear weapons, and numerous others are maneuvering to join this not-so-exclusive club. Nor is it to question Americans’ wartime valor, downplay Japan’s responsibility for its cruel treatment of other Asian peoples and of Allied prisoners, overlook Stalin’s interest in keeping the Pacific War going until the Soviet invasion of Manchuria had at least begun, or minimize the culpability of Emperor Hirohito and other Japanese leaders for prolonging the war in complete disregard of the well-being of the Japanese people. Similarly, it is not simply to condemn the needless death and ongoing suffering of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian victims, whose anguish and misery must be remembered and mourned along with the death and suffering of tens of millions of victims on all sides. The real lesson is that Harry Truman chose to use atomic bombs instead of attempting other potentially viable means to end the war despite his understanding, on some level, of what his decision augured for the future.
    Is there any reason, particularly given the fact that postwar presidents have almost unanimously applauded Truman’s decision, to think that other presidents would not have acted as Truman did or that future presidents won’t respond similarly when confronted with difficult circumstances? Is there any reason to think that George W. Bush, for example, would show greater restraint in using nuclear weapons? Is George Bush more ethical than Harry Truman? More compassionate? More knowledgeable? Wiser? More contemplative? Less impulsive? More nuanced in his understanding of foreign affairs? More inclined toward diplomacy? Can one really have confidence in the clarity and depth of Bush’s understanding of world affairs when he astonishingly claims he decided to invade Iraq after he gave Saddam Hussein “a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn’t let them in?”[89] Should such a man really have veto power over the future existence of the human species?
    The same could be asked about most postwar presidents, whose accession to power has depended, like Truman’s, much more on cronyism with and willingness to do the bidding of political, military, and financial elites than on intellectual and moral qualifications. And it could certainly be asked about the heads of state of other nuclear powers.
    Such concerns are reinforced by the fact that use of atomic bombs has been seriously contemplated and/or threatened by almost every postwar president–by Truman during the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, by Truman and Eisenhower over Korea, by Eisenhower administration officials in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, by Eisenhower during the Lebanon crisis in 1958 and in response to a threatened Chinese invasion of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1958, by Kennedy during the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, by Johnson to defend marines at Khe Sanh, Vietnam in 1968, by Nixon and Kissinger against the North Vietnamese between 1969 and 1972, by Nixon to deter Soviet actions on several occasions between 1969 and 1973, by Carter in Iran in 1980, by George H.W. Bush and Clinton in Iraq, and by George W. Bush in wholesale fashion in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and afterwards. As Daniel Ellsberg has astutely argued, it is a mistake to say that the U.S. has not “used” nuclear weapons since Nagasaki. Ellsberg contends, “Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, U.S. nuclear weapons have been used, for quite different purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.”[90]
    Hence, the likelihood exists that, so long as nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the United States and other nations, they will be used and with consequences potentially far more dire than the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That Harry Truman could act in so malign a fashion, provoking the outrage and condemnation of military, religious, and scientific leaders, as well as ordinary citizens, in the U.S. and abroad, only suggests what other world leaders will be capable of doing if such weapons remain at their disposal.

     

    Peter Kuznick, author of Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America, is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University.
    This article was written for Japan Focus. Posted July 23, 2007.

    Acknowledgments
    I would like to thank Bart Bernstein, Herbert Bix, Daniel Ellsberg, Michael Flynn, Uday Mohan, Mark Selden, Martin Sherwin, and Yuki Tanaka for their thoughtful comments and astute editorial suggestions.

    Notes
    [ 1] Arthur Holly Compton, Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 128. Scientists never completely ruled out the possibility of this ultimate catastrophe. At the Trinity test, Enrico Fermi and others still contemplated the minuscule chance this could occur and James Conant, stunned by the “enormity of the light,” momentarily feared they had ignited the world. James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 232.
    [2] Harry S. Truman, 1945: Memoirs: 1945 Year of Decisions, Vol. 1 (New York: New American Library, 1955), 21.
    [3] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 634-5.
    [4] Harry S. Truman, “Why I Dropped the Bomb,” Parade, 4 December 1988. Bart Bernstein, who brought this article to my attention, cautions that Margaret Truman’s editing may have influenced the wording.
    [5] Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980), 55.
    [6] Sadao Asada, “The Mushroom Cloud and Natioinal Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the Atomic Bomb Decision, 1945-1995,” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 179. For an interesting discussion of Truman’s repeated use of the “sleep” metaphor, see Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 176. Some scholars have suggested that Truman was more conflicted about this decision than he admitted. See Lifton and Mitchell, 148-9, 188-192 and Gar Alperovitz, “Was Harry Truman a Revisionist on Hiroshima?” Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 29(June 1998), 1-9.
    [7] John W. Dower, “Triumphal and Tragic Narratives of the War in Asia,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 37-51. For an expanded version of this analysis, see John W. Dower, “Three Narratives of Our Humanity,” in Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 63-96.
    [8] Lifton and Mitchell, 6-7. Truman’s anger toward the Japanese surfaced frequently. Shortly after Nagasaki, Truman defended the bombings in a letter to the Federal Council of Churches, explaining, “I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast.” Quoted in Barton J. Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs 74(January/February 1995), 152.
    [9] Michael S. Sherry, “Patriotic Orthodoxy and American Decline,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 143-4, 149; Lifton and Mitchell, 240.
    [ 10] George H. Roeder, “Making Things Visible: Learning from the Censors,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 89.
    [1 1] Barton J. Bernstein, “A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42(June/July 1986), 38-40; Bernstein, “Reconsidering ‘Invasion Most Costly’: Popular-History Scholarship, Publishing Standards, and the claim of High U.S. Casualty Estimates to Help Legitimize the Atomic Bombings,” Peace and Change 24(April 1999), 220-248; Asada, “The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches,” 182; Sherry, “Patriotic Orthodoxy and American Decline,”144. For one of many challenges to Bernstein’s “low-end casualty estimates,” see Michael Kort, “Casualty Projections for the Invasion of Japan, Phantom Estimates, and the Math of Barton Bernstein,” Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 34(December 2003), 4-12.
    [12] Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: And the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 326. [Hereafter referred to as Decision.]
    [ 13] Lane Fenrich, “Mass Death in Miniature: How Americans Became Victims of the Bomb,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 127.
    [ 14] George H. Roeder, Jr., The Censored War: American Visual Experience During World War Two (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 14; Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “Commemoration and Silence: Fifty Years of Remembering the Bomb in America and Japan,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 25.
    [15] Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits”; Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to ‘Correct’ History”; Laura Hein and Mark Selden, “The Lesson of War, Global Power, and Social Change” all in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
    [ 16] Monica Braw, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Voluntary Silence,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 158.
    [ 17] Hugh Gusterson, “Remembering Hiroshima at a Nuclear Weapons Laboratory,” in Hein and Selden, eds., Living With the Bomb, 264,267.
    [18] See Robert Jay Lifton, “The Image of ‘The End of the World’: A Psychohistorical View,” Michigan Quarterly Review 24(Winter 1985), 70-90; Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection (New York, 1979), especially chapters 22 and 23; Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Ira Chernus, Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age (Albany, 1991); James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (New York, 1930); Arthur Eddington, The Expanding Universe (Cambridge, 1933); Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper: A Study and a Confession (New York, 1929); Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York, 1929).
    [ 19] For the full report of the Committee on Social and Political Implications chaired by James Franck, see the appendix to Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and A Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America: 1945-47 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 560-572.
    [20] Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 73. Bethe and Teller recalled that immediate development of the hydrogen bomb was a principal topic of conversation between Oppenheimer and Compton in their summer 1942 meeting. Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976), 116-119.
    [21] Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus; The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 188.
    22] Text of petition in Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds., The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present 1939-1984 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 67.
    [23] Quoted in Barton J. Bernstein, “Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 18(No.2, 1988), 236.
    [24] Henry L. Stimson diaries, May 31, 1945, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
    [25] Bird and Sherwin, 293.
    [26] John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 630.
    [27] Harry S. Truman, 462.
    [28] Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1973), 5.
    [29] Steve Kettmann, “Politics 2000,” www.salon.com/politics2000/feature/2000/03/20/rice.
    [30] For a discussion of the controversy sparked by McCullough’s biography, see Philip Nobile, “On the Steps of the Smithsonian: Hiroshima Denial in America’s Attic,” in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995), lxii-lxv. For a more reliable treatment of Truman, see Arnold S. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
    [31] Harry S. Truman, 20.
    [32] Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 265.
    [33] Robert Jungk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, Inc.), 208.
    [34] Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, “The Fight Over the Atom Bomb,” Look 27(August 13, 1963), 20. For Groves’s explanation to Truman, see Alperovitz, Decision, 780, n39.
    [35] Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Random House, 1977), 62.
    [36] See Alperovitz, Decision; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race (New York: Random House, 1987); Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995). For somewhat more tempered views, see J. Samuel Walker, Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).
    [37] Douglas MacArthur to Herbert Hoover, December 2, 1960, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Presidential Papers, Individual File Series, Box 129 G. Douglas MacArthur 1953-1964 folder [3212 (3)]. I thank Uday Mohan for bringing this letter to my attention. MacArthur’s insistence on this point never wavered over the years. After a long talk with MacArthur in May 1946, Hoover had written in his diary: “I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.” Alperovitz, Decision, 350-51.
    [38] Barton J. Bernstein, “The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative,” in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995), 142.
    [49] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and Japan’s Surrender in the Pacific War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 37.
    [40] “Russo-Japanese Relations (13-20 July 1945), Publication of Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Commander-In-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, 21 July 1945, SRH-085, Record Group 457, Modern Military Branch, National Archives.
    [41] Alperovitz, Decision, 27.
    [42] Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 255-256.
    [43] Ferrell, 53.
    [44] Alperovitz, Decision, 415. Walter Brown wrote in his diary on July 24, 1945, “JFB told more about Jap peace bid to Russia. Japanese Ambassador to Russia warned his government that same thing which happened to Germany would happen to Japan if she stayed in the war. Emperor had said they would fight to the last man unless there was some modifications of unconditional surrender.” Hasegawa, 157; Richard Frank downplays the influence on U.S. policymakers of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages signaling Japan’s willingness to surrender if the U.S. guaranteed the status of the emperor, citing General John Weckerling’s dismissive July 13 analysis in which Joseph Grew concurred. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, however, disputes Frank’s interpretation, noting that Stimson, Forrestal, McCloy, and Naval Intelligence drew very different conclusions from Togo’s July 12 telegram. Richard Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 221-247; Hasegawa, 134.
    [45] “Japan Beaten Before Atom Bomb, Byrnes Says, Citing Peace Bids,” New York Times, 30 August 1945, 1.
    [46] Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 160-165; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War Against Japan: Which Was More Important on Japan’s Decision to Surrender in the Pacific War?” paper delivered at workshop “The End of the Pacific War Revisited,” Santa Barbara, California, April 2001.
    [47] Ferrell, 53.
    [48] Alperovitz, Decision, 124. In his “two-step logic,” Alperovitz argues that policymakers understood that the combination of Soviet declaration of war against Japan and mitigation of the demand for unconditional surrender would likely have produced Japanese surrender without use of the bombs. Alperovitz, Decision, 114-115.
    [49] Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 208.
    [50] Ibid., 237.
    [51] Groves, 271. Leahy made his ideas known to several people prior to the use of the bomb. It is likely, though not certain, that he expressed his views directly to Truman. For the circumstantial evidence supporting this thesis, see Alperovitz, Decision, 325-326.
    [52] William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 441. Historians have discovered no convincing evidence that Leahy shared his ethical abhorrence of the atomic bomb with Truman or his military colleagues prior to its use on Hiroshima, but, for indications that he may have expressed his views, see Alperovitz, Decision, 324-326.
    [53] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 312-313.
    [54] Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 426. After maintaining the accuracy of this account for over a decade, Ambrose informed Gar Alperovitz in 1995 that he now doubted that Eisenhower spoke directly to Truman, despite Eisenhower’s insistence that he did so. See, Alperovitz, Decision, p.358.
    [55] H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 598.
    [56] “Giles Would Rule Japan A Century,” New York Times, 21 September 1945, 4.
    [57] Barton J. Bernstein, “Hiroshima, Rewritten,” New York Times 31 January 1995, 21.
    [58] Alperovitz, Decision, 359.
    [59] Leahy, 384-385.
    [60] Herbert Hoover to John Callan O’Laughlin, 8 August 1945, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, Post-Presidential Papers, Individual File Series, Box 171. For an extensive review of the conservative critique of the atomic bombings, see Leo Maley III and Uday Mohan, “An Extraordinary Reversal: American Conservatives and Hiroshima,” paper presented at the American Historical Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 9 January 1999.
    [61] Medford Evans, “Hiroshima Saved Japan,” National Review, 14 February 1959, 525.
    [62] Edward Teller to George Wald, December 12, 1969, “Teller, Edward” Folder, Box 19, George Wald Papers, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
    [63] Studies by Herbert Bix, Sadao Asada, Bart Bernstein, and Richard Frank cast doubt on the assertion that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender prior to Hiroshima, though Bix doubts they would have held out until the November start date for the invasion and Bernstein believes that a combination of factors would “very likely” have ended the war prior to November 1 without the atomic bombs. Groundbreaking recent scholarship by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, making use of Japanese, Russian, and American archival sources, demonstrates that Soviet entry into the war had a far more profound effect on Japanese leaders than did the atomic bombings. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 487-530; Bix, “Japan’s Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation,” Diplomatic History 19 (Spring 1995), 197-225; Sadao Asada “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67(November 1998), 477-512; Barton Bernstein, “Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory,” Diplomatic History 19 (Spring 1995), 227-273; Frank, Downfall; Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy; Hasegawa, “The Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War Against Japan.”
    [64] Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985).
    [65] Boyer, 5.
    [66] Ibid.
    [67] Donald Porter Geddes, ed., The Atomic Age Opens (New York: Pocket Books, 1945), 159.
    [68] Boyer, 7.
    [69] “Oxnam, Dulles Ask Halt in Bomb Use,” New York Times, 10 August 1945, 6.
    [70] Lifton and Mitchell, 33.
    [71 “Last Judgment,” Washington Post, 8 August, 1945, 4B.
    [72] Arthur Compton to Henry A. Wallace, September 27, 1945. Copy in Arthur Compton Papers, Washington University in St. Louis Archives. I am grateful to Daniel Ellsberg for bringing this document to my attention.
    [73] Felicity Barringer, “Journalism’s Greatest Hits: Two Lists of a Century’s Top Stories,” New York Times, 1 March 1999, C1; Ran Fuchs, “Journalism names Top 100 works of the century,” Washington Square News, 2 March 1999, 1.
    [74] Harry S. Truman, 465.
    [75] Nathan Reingold, “Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Meets the Atom Bomb,” in Terry Shinn and Richard Whitley, eds., Expository Science: Forms and Functions of Popularisation (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985), 238-239.
    [76] John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 (New York: Random House), 766n.
    [77] Wayne Phillips, “Truman Disputes Eisenhower on ‘48,” New York Times, 3 February 1958, 16.
    [78] Bird and Sherwin, 332.
    [79] Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston, 1960), 618.
    [80] Stimson diaries, May 28, 1945.
    [81] Morison, 618.
    [82] Hershberg, 295.
    [83] Stimson and Bundy, 629.
    [84] Henry Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Harper’s 194(February 1947), 107.
    [85] Margaret Truman, 555.
    [86] Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualty estimates very widely and are difficult to determine precisely. See John Dower, “Three Narratives of Our Humanity,” in Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past (New York:Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 1996), 79 Note 28. For somewhat lower estimates, see Frank, Downfall, 285-287.
    [87] “Life on the Nuclear Edge,” Nation, 24 June 2002, 3.
    [88] Lewis Mumford, “Gentlemen: You Are Mad!” Saturday Review of Literature 29(2 March 1946), 5.
    [89] Dana Priest and Dana Milbank, “President Defends Allegation On Iraq: Bush Says CIA’s Doubts Followed Jan. 28 Address,” Washington Post, 15 July 2003, 1.
    [90] Daniel Ellsberg, “Introduction: Call to Mutiny,” in E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., Protest and Survive (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), i. For discussion of the occasions on which such used was considered, see pp. v-vi. The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum lists several other occasions in which the U.S. considered using nuclear weapons, including against Soviet forces stationed in Iran in 1946, in response to the shooting down of an American plane over Yugoslavia later that year, at the inauguration of the president of Uruguay in 1948, to prevent Guatemala’s aligning with the Soviet Union in 1954, when North Korea seized the American vessel Pueblo in 1968, and during the invasion of Syrian troops into Jordan in 1970.

  • The Greatest Immediate Threat to Humanity

    The Greatest Immediate Threat to Humanity

    It is perhaps the least talked about and most worrying irony of our time. The United States has a massive defense budget, but spends relatively little addressing the most immediate danger to humanity.

    Global security is vital to family life, the growth of business, the wise husbanding of resources and the environment. And yet, all our hopes and plans for the future exist under the shadow of a catastrophic threat – one that could kill millions of people in a few moments and leave civilization in shambles.

    Although there are other significant threats, such as global warming and infectious diseases, it is nuclear weapons that are the greatest immediate danger confronting our species. We must stop ignoring this threat and start providing leadership to eliminate nuclear arsenals around the globe.

    Let’s look at some of the facts about nuclear weapons. They are the only weapon capable of destroying civilization and the human species. They kill indiscriminately, making them equal opportunity destroyers. In the hands of terrorists, they could destroy a country as powerful as the United States. A nuclear 9/11 could have resulted in deaths exceeding one million and the collapse of the US and world economies.

    There are currently some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and 12,000 of these are deployed. Of these, 3,500 nuclear weapons are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments.

    Nine countries currently possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. More than 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world are in the arsenals of the US and Russia. The UK, France, China and Israel are estimated to have arsenals numbering a few hundred each. India and Pakistan are thought to have arsenals under 100, and North Korea to have up to 12 nuclear weapons. As many as 35 other countries have the technological capability to become nuclear weapons states, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran and Egypt.

    Nuclear weapons give a state sudden clout in the international system. India, Pakistan and North Korea all increased their stature in the international system after testing nuclear weapons. Recently, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva emphasized the perceived prestige that nuclear weapons potential gives a country. He said: “Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as a nation — as the power we wish to be.”

    Nearly all countries in the world are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Only three countries have not signed the treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan. A fourth country, North Korea, withdrew from the NPT in 2003. All of these countries have developed nuclear arsenals.

    The NPT obligates the nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has interpreted this to mean that negotiations must be concluded “leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.”

    As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States can lead the way in fulfilling this obligation. It has failed to do so. The US missile defense program has been provocative to other countries, particularly Russia and China, and has resulted in these countries improving their offensive nuclear capabilities. The US has also sought to upgrade and improve its nuclear arsenal, and has proposed replacing every thermonuclear weapon in the US arsenal with the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead. The US has, in effect, said to the world that it intends to rely upon its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

    In addition, the US has failed to provide legally binding security assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. In fact, the US indicated in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review that it was developing contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries – two nuclear weapons states (Russia and China) and five non-nuclear weapons states (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea, which at the time was not thought to have nuclear weapons).

    US nuclear policy undermines the security of its people. The more the US relies on nuclear weapons, the more other countries will do so. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated: “The more that those states that already have [nuclear weapons] increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to their national security, the more other states feel that they too must have them for their security.” Reliance on nuclear weapons will assure their proliferation.

    The more nuclear weapons in the world, the more likely they will end up in the hands of terrorist extremists incapable of being deterred. The longer nations rely on nuclear weapons for security, the more likely it is that they will be used, by accident or design.

    The US needs to work urgently for a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons under strict international control, just as we have already done with chemical and biological weapons. To do this requires political will, which has not been demonstrated by the current US administration. Continuing with existing US nuclear policies is a recipe for disaster. The Cold War ended more than15 years ago, and new problems now confront humanity. It is time for a drastic change in US nuclear policy – change that will require strong and effective leadership.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

  • We Want Results on Disarmament

    Speech to Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC

    Thank you very much for that welcome and for those very kind words,

    I expect that many – perhaps all – of you here today read an article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal at the start of this year. The writers would be as familiar to an audience in this country as they are respected across the globe: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn.

    The article made the case for, and I quote, “a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage”. That initiative was to re-ignite the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to redouble effort on the practical measures towards it.

    The need for such vision and action is all too apparent.

    Last year, Kofi Annan said – and he was right – that the world risks becoming mired in a sterile stand-off between those who care most about disarmament and those who care most about proliferation. The dangers of, what he termed, such mutually assured paralysis are dangers to us all. Weak action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our interests. And any solution must be a dual one that sees movement on both proliferation and disarmament – a revitalisation, in other words, of the grand bargain struck in 1968, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was established.

    What makes this the time to break the stand-off ?

    Today the non-proliferation regime is under particular pressure. We have already seen the emergence of a mixture of further declared and undeclared nuclear powers. And now, two countries – Iran and North Korea, both signatories of the NPT – stand in open defiance of the international community. Their actions have profound and direct implications for global security. Each of them also raises the serious prospect of proliferation across their region.

    In the case of Iran, in particular, if the regime is trying to acquire nuclear weapons – and there are very few either in that region or outside it who seriously doubt that that is the goal – then it is raising the spectre of a huge push for proliferation in what is already one of the most unstable parts of the world.

    That alone makes the debate on disarmament and non-proliferation we have to have today different in degree: it has become more immediate and more urgent.

    On top of that, we must respond to other underlying trends that are putting added pressure on the original non-proliferation regime. One of those, just one, is the emergence of Al Qaeda and its offshoots – terrorists whom we know to be actively seeking nuclear materials.

    Another though is the anticipated drive towards civil, nuclear power as the twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy policy across the world. How can we ensure this does not lead to either nuclear materials or particularly potentially dangerous nuclear know-how – particularly enrichment and reprocessing technologies – being diverted for military use or just falling into the wrong hands? How do we do so without prejudice to the economic development of countries that have every right under the NPT to develop a civil, nuclear capability.

    And last there are some very specific triggers for action – key impending decisions – that are fast approaching. The START treaty will expire in 2009. We will need to start thinking about how we move from a bilateral disarmament framework built by the US and Russia to one more suited to our multi-polar world.

    And then in 2010 we will have the NPT Review Conference itself. By the time that is held, we need the international community to be foursquare and united behind a global non-proliferation regime. We can’t afford for that conference to be a fractured or fractious one: rather we need to strengthen the NPT in all its aspects.

    That may all sound quite challenging – I meant it to. But there is no reason to believe that we cannot rise to that challenge.

    Let’s look at some of the facts. Despite the recent log-jam, the basic non-proliferation consensus is and has been remarkably resilient. The grand bargain of the NPT has, by and large, held for the past 40 years. The vast majority of states – including many that have the technology to do so if they chose – have decided not to develop nuclear weapons. And far fewer states than was once feared have acquired and retained nuclear weapons.

    Even more encouragingly, and much less well known outside this room, many more states – South Africa, Libya, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Argentina, Brazil – have given up active nuclear weapons programmes, turned back from pursuing such programmes, or – as the case of the former Soviet Union countries – chosen to hand over weapons on their territory.

    And of course the Nuclear Weapons States themselves have made significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, which I will come to later.

    So we have grounds for optimism; but we have none for complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by accident but by applied effort. And we will need much more of the same in the months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine commitment and to concrete action on nuclear disarmament.

    Given the proliferation challenges we face, it is not surprising that so much of our focus should be on non-proliferation itself.

    For the reasons I gave a moment ago, stopping and reversing nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran has to remain a key priority for the whole international community.

    With North Korea the best hope to reverse their nuclear programme remains patient multilateral diplomacy underpinned by sanctions regimes.

    As for Iran, the generous offer the E3+3 made in June 2006 is still on the table. Sadly Iran has chosen not to comply with its international legal obligations, thereby enabling negotiations to resume. That forced us to seek a further Security Council Resolution. And we will do so again if necessary.

    The US contribution on Iran has, naturally, been critical. It made the Vienna offer both attractive and credible – showing that the entire international community was willing to welcome Iran back into its ranks provided that it conformed to international norms on the nuclear file and elsewhere. And I have no doubt that the close co-operation between the US, Europe, Russia and China has been a powerful point of leverage on the Iranians. We must hope that it succeeds.

    The US has also taken the lead on much of the vital work that is going on to prevent existing nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists and rogue states. That framework is perhaps more robust than ever before – the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and efforts to prevent the financing of proliferation.

    Meanwhile, there is some imaginative work going on aimed at persuading states that they can have guaranteed supplies of electricity from nuclear power without the need to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies. For example, the work on fuel supply assurances following the report of the IAEA expert group; the US’s own Global Nuclear Energy Partnership initiative on more proliferation-resistant technologies; and the UK’s own proposal for advanced export approval of nuclear fuel that cannot subsequently be revoked – the so-called “enrichment bond”.

    But the important point is this: in none of these areas will we stand a chance of success unless the international community is united in purpose and in action.

    And what that Wall Street Journal article, and for that matter Kofi Annan, have been quite right to identify is that our efforts on non-proliferation will be dangerously undermined if others believe – however unfairly –that the terms of the grand bargain have changed, that nuclear weapon states have abandoned any commitment to disarmament.

    The point of doing more on disarmament, then, is not to convince the Iranians or the North Koreans. I do not believe for a second that further reductions in our nuclear weapons would have a material effect on their nuclear ambitions.

    Rather the point of doing more is this: because the moderate majority of states – our natural and vital allies on non-proliferation – want us to do more. And if we do not, we risk helping Iran and North Korea in their efforts to muddy the water, to turn the blame for their own nuclear intransigence back onto us. They can undermine our arguments for strong international action in support of the NPT by painting us as doing too little too late to fulfil our own obligations.

    And that need to appear consistent, incidentally, is just as true at the regional level. The international community’s clear commitment to a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in successive UN resolutions has been vital in building regional support for a tough line against Iran.

    So what does doing more – and indeed being seen to do more – on disarmament actually mean?

    First, I think we need to be much more open about the disarmament steps we are already taking or have taken. Here in the long-standing, and perhaps understandable, culture of increased secrecy that surrounds the nuclear world we may be our own worst enemy. There is little public remembrance or recognition of the vast cuts in warheads – some 40 000 – made by the US and the former USSR since the end of the Cold War. Nor, for that that matter, the cuts that France and the UK have made to our much smaller stocks. We all need to do more, much more, to address that. And I welcome the US State Department’s recent moves in that direction.

    But we would be kidding ourselves if we thought that this was a problem only of perception– simply of a failure to communicate, although that failure is very real. The sense of stagnation is real enough. The expiry of the remaining US-Russia arms control deals; the continued existence of large arsenals; the stalemate on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. They all point to an absence of debate at the highest levels on disarmament and a collective inability thus far to come up with a clear, forward plan.

    What we need is both vision – a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action – progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment are too weak.

    Let me start with the vision because, perhaps, that is the harder case to make. After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve today?

    More I think than you might imagine. Because, and I’ll be blunt, there are, I was going to say some, but I think many who are in danger of losing faith in the possibility of ever reaching that goal.

    That would, I think, be a grave mistake. The judgement we made forty years ago, that the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons was in all of our interests – is just as true today as it was then. For more than sixty years, good management and good fortune have meant that nuclear arsenals have not been used. But we cannot rely just on history to repeat itself.

    It would be a grave mistake for another reason, too. It underestimates the power that commitment and vision can have in driving action.

    A parallel can be drawn with some of those other decades-long campaigns conducted as we’ve striven for a more civilised world.

    When William Wilberforce began his famous campaign, the practice of one set of people enslaving another had existed for thousands of years. He had the courage to challenge that paradigm; and in so doing helped with many others to bring an end to the terrible evil of the transatlantic slave trade.

    Would he have achieved half as much, would he have inspired the same fervour in others if he had set out to ‘regulate’ or ‘reduce’ the slave trade rather than abolish it? I doubt it.

    Similarly the Millennium Development Goals, the cancellation of third-world debt, increased overseas aid were all motivated by the belief that one day, however far off it might seem, we could “Make Poverty History”.

    So too with nuclear weapons. Believing that the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons is possible can act as a spur for action on disarmament. Believing, at whatever level, that it is not possible, is the surest path to inaction. If there will always be nuclear weapons, what does it matter if there are 1000 or 10 000?

    And just as the vision gives rise to action, conversely so does action give meaning to the vision. As that Wall Street Journal article put it, and again I quote: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair and urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible”

    By actions, I do not mean that the nuclear weapons states should be making immediate and unrealistic promises – committing to speedy abolition, setting a timetable to zero.

    The truth is that I rather doubt – although I would wish it otherwise – that we will see the total elimination of nuclear weapons perhaps in my lifetime. To reach that point would require much more than disarmament diplomacy, convoluted enough though that is in itself. It would require a much more secure and predictable global political context.

    That context does not exist today. Indeed it is why, only a few months ago, the UK took the decision to retain our ability to have an independent nuclear deterrent beyond the 2020s.

    But acknowledging that the conditions for disarmament do not exist today does not mean resigning ourselves to the idea that nuclear weapons can never be abolished in the future. Nor does it prevent us from taking steps to reduce numbers now and to start thinking about how we would go about reaching that eventual goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

    That is why in taking the decision to retain our ability to have nuclear weapons, the UK government was very clear about four things. First that we would be open and frank with our own citizens and with our international partners about what we were doing and why. It is all being done upfront and in public – not as in the past, behind the scenes. Second that we would be very clear and up front that when the political conditions existed, we would give up our remaining nuclear weapons. Third that we were not enhancing our nuclear capability in any way and would continue to act strictly in accordance with our NPT obligations. And fourth that we would reduce our stock of operationally available warheads by a further 20 per cent – to the very minimum we considered viable to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent.

    This was our way – and I can assure you it was a difficult process – to resolve the dilemma between our genuine commitment to abolition and our considered judgement that sadly now was not the time to take a unilateral step to totally disarm.

    It’s the same dilemma every nuclear weapons state faces. And we can all make the same choices in recommitting to the goal of abolition and taking practical steps towards achieving that goal.

    Practical steps include further reductions in warhead numbers, particularly in the world’s biggest arsenals. There are still over 20 000 warheads in the world. And the US and Russia hold about 96 per cent of them.

    Almost no-one – politician, military strategist or scientist – thinks that warheads in those numbers are still necessary to guarantee international security. So it should not be controversial to suggest that there remains room for further significant reductions. So I hope that the Moscow Treaty will be succeeded by further clear commitments to significantly lower numbers of warheads – and include, if possible, tactical as well as strategic, nuclear weapons.

    Since we no longer live in a bipolar world, those future commitments may no longer require strict parity. They could be unilateral undertakings. Certainly the UK experience – and indeed the United States’ own experience with the reduction of its tactical weapons in Europe – is that substantial reductions can be achieved through independent re-examination of what is really needed to deter: that approach has allowed the UK to reduce our operationally available warheads by nearly half over the last ten years from what was already a comparatively low base. We have also reduced the readiness of the nuclear force that remains. We now only have one boat on patrol at any one time, carrying no more than 48 warheads – and our missiles are not targeted at any specific sites.

    Commitments like these need not even be enshrined in formal treaties. The UK’s reductions, after all, are not. But clearly both the US and Russia will require sufficient assurance that their interests and their strategic stability will be safeguarded. Part of the solution may be provided by the extension of the most useful transparency and confidence building measures in the START framework, should the US and Russia agree to do so.

    And I should make clear here again, that when it will be useful to include in any negotiations the one per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons that belong to the UK, we will willingly do so.

    In addition to these further reductions, we need to press on with both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Both limit – in real and practical ways – the ability of states party to develop new weapons and to expand their nuclear capabilities. And as such they therefore both play a very powerful symbolic role too – they signal to the rest of the world that the race for more and bigger weapons is over, and that the direction from now on will be down and not up. That’s why we are so keen for those countries that have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT. The moratoriium observed by all the nuclear weapon states is a great step forward; but by allowing the CTBT to enter into force – and, of course, US ratification would provide a great deal of impetus – we would be showing that this is a permanent decision, a permanent change and in the right direction.

    At the same time, I believe that we will need to look again at how we manage global transparency and global verification. This will have to extend beyond the bilateral arrangements between Russia and the US. If we are serious about complete nuclear disarmament we should begin now to build deeper relationships on disarmament between nuclear weapon states.

    For our part, the UK is ready and willing to engage with other members of the P5 on transparency and confidence building measures. Verification will be particularly key – any future verification regime for a world free of nuclear weapons will need to be tried and tested. In my opinion, it will need to place more emphasis on the warheads themselves than the current arrangement which focuses primarily on delivery systems. That will become particularly true as numbers of warheads drop.

    And we have to keep doing the hard diplomatic work on the underlying political conditions – resolving the ongoing sources of tension in the world, not least in the Middle East and between Pakistan and India. We also need to build a more mature, balanced and stable relationship between ourselves and Russia.

    And since I have the non-proliferation elite gathered in one room, let me emphasise the importance this and future UK governments will place on the agreement of an international and legally binding arms trade treaty. Conflicts across the globe are made more likely and more intense by those who trade all arms in an irresponsible and unregulated way. And an arms trade treaty would contribute to a focus on arms reduction and help build a safer world.

    And when it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To be, as it were, a “disarmament laboratory”.

    As far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that study and provide funding for one of their workshops, focussing on some of the crucial technical questions in this area.

    The study and subsequent workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice. What weapons and facilities will have to go before we can say that nuclear weapons are abolished? What safeguards will we have to put in place over civil nuclear facilities? How do we increase transparency and put in place a verification regime so that everyone can be confident that no-one else has or is developing nuclear weapons? And finally – and perhaps this is perhaps the greatest challenge of all – what path can we take to complete nuclear disarmament that avoids creating new instabilities themselves potentially damaging to global security.

    And then we have these new areas of practical work. This will concentrate on the challenge of creating a robust, trusted and effective system of verification that does not give away national security or proliferation sensitive information.

    Almost a decade ago, we asked the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment to begin developing our expertise in methods and techniques to verify the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We reported on this work throughout the last Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle. Now we intend to build on that work, looking more deeply at several key stages in the verification process – and again report our findings as soon as possible.

    One area we will be looking at further is authentication – in other words confirming that an object presented for dismantlement as a warhead is indeed a warhead. There are profound security challenges in doing that. We need to find ways to carry out that task without revealing sensitive information. At the moment we are developing technical contacts with Norway in this area. As a non-nuclear weapons state they will offer a valuable alternative perspective on our research.

    Then we will be looking more closely at chain of custody issues – in other words how to provide confidence that the items that emerge from the dismantlement process have indeed come from the authenticated object that went into that process to begin with. Here we face the challenge of managing access to sensitive nuclear facilities. We have already carried out some trial inspections of facilities to draw lessons for the handling of access under any future inspections regime.

    And last we intend to examine how to provide confidence that the dismantled components of a nuclear warhead are not being returned to use in new warheads. This will have to involve some form of monitored storage, with a difficult balance once again to be struck between security concerns and verification requirements. We are currently working on the design concepts for building such a monitored store, so that we can more fully investigate these complex practical issues.

    The initiatives I have announced today are only small ones. But they are, I hope you will agree, in the right direction – a signal of intent and purpose to ourselves and to others. We will talk more and do more with our international partners – those who have nuclear weapons, and those who do not – in the weeks and months to come.

    I said earlier that I am not confident, cannot be confident, that I would live to see a world free of nuclear weapons. My sadness at such a thought is real. Mine, like yours, is a generation that has existed under the shadow of the bomb – knowing that weapons existed which could bring an end to humanity itself. We have become almost accustomed to that steady underlying dread, punctuated by the sharper fear of each new nuclear crisis: Cuba in 1962, the Able Archer scare of 1983, the stand-off between India and Pakistan in 2002.

    But there is a danger in familiarity with something so terrible. If we allow our efforts on disarmament to slacken, if we allow ourselves to take the non-proliferation consensus for granted, the nuclear shadow that hangs over us will lengthen and it will deepen. And it may, one day, blot out the light for good.

    So my commitment to that vision, truly visionary in its day, of a world free of nuclear weapons is undimmed. And although we in this room may never reach the end of that road, we can take thos first further steps down it. For any generation, that would be a noble calling. For ours, it is a duty.

  • The Creation of a Student Oversight Committee for the US Nuclear Weapons Laboratories

    For more than five years the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, through its Youth Empowerment Initiative, has conducted a UC Nuclear Free Campaign. The purpose of the campaign is to educate and inform students at the University of California that their University has provided management and oversight to United States nuclear weapons laboratories since the beginning of the Nuclear Age, and that every weapon in the United States nuclear arsenal has been designed and developed under the auspices of the University of California. The Foundation has worked to motivate the students to examine the relationship between their University and the most devastating weapons of mass destruction ever created. We have encouraged the students to speak out for severance of the University’s relationship with the nuclear weapons laboratories.

    Over the years that we have engaged with the UC students, we have found that many students do not even know that their University provides management and oversight to the nuclear weapons laboratories. Often, when students learn of the relationship, they are surprised that their University would use its prestige to provide legitimacy to the design and development of weapons capable of destroying cities, countries and civilization. Such a relationship seems incompatible with the University’s mission of education, teaching and public service.

    Recently, a group of students at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) came up with the idea that there should be a Student Oversight Committee for the nuclear weapons laboratories. They wrote up a bill to create such a committee and presented it to the Legislative Council of the UCSB Associated Students. On April 18, 2007, the bill was heard for the first time. A number of students spoke in favor of it. I was present at the meeting and had a chance to speak to the Council and add my support for the bill. Many of the students present had been to past meetings of the UC Regents, and could report first-hand that the Regents do not seem to take seriously student input in relation to the management and oversight of the nuclear weapons laboratories.

    At the initial vote of the Legislative Council, there was a majority in favor of establishing the Student Oversight Committee, but not the two-thirds majority needed for it to pass. The students supporting the bill were disappointed but undaunted. They came back the next week in larger numbers and made their case even more powerfully. Will Parrish, the Foundation’s Youth Empowerment Initiative Director, spoke to the Council about the history of devastation caused by the US nuclear weapons program. He emphasized the effects of the 67 US tests in the Marshall Islands. The radiation released there was equivalent to the detonation of one Hiroshima bomb daily for 12 years, and continues to cause untold suffering to the islanders.

    At the April 25, 2007 meeting of the Legislative Council, the students supporting the bill brought Shigeko Sasamori, a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing, to address the Council. Ms. Sasamori told her story, and emphasized that she was speaking out so that her fate and that of her city would never be visited on other people and their cities in the future. A fourth year student, Cricket Clarke, brought Japanese paper cranes, a symbol of peace, and shared the story of Sadako, a young girl in Hiroshima who had died from leukemia caused by radiation from the atomic bomb dropped on her city. In the end, the Council voted unanimously to create the Student Oversight Committee.

    Now the students will seek to provide their own oversight of the nuclear weapons laboratories, and report to their fellow students on their findings. Under the authority of the UCSB Legislative Council, they will investigate what goes on in the laboratories and examine the ethical issues involved in the design, development, testing, manufacture, deployment and use of new nuclear weapons. Thus, the students will amplify their voices regarding what their University supports. They will be able to make recommendations on the appropriateness of supporting the nuclear weapons laboratories. If the Student Oversight Committee takes its responsibility seriously, which it certainly seems poised to do, it will be in a position to challenge the authority and complacency of the UC Regents on the oversight of these laboratories that are so central to the US nuclear weapons program.

    The Student Oversight Committee will also be in a position to speak nationally on the issue of nuclear dangers. It can be a voice for youth in the much needed debate on the future of US nuclear policy. The current generation of college students is on a collision course with potential nuclear catastrophe. Sane nuclear policies, led by the United States, could dramatically reduce the risks of future nuclear devastation. As the bill creating the Student Oversight Committee pointed out, “as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States is required ‘to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament….’”

    The creation of the Student Oversight Committee is a breakthrough moment. The students are making it known to University authorities and to national authorities that they want a voice in shaping their future. Surely, they are entitled to that. Other UC campuses are taking steps to establish their own Student Oversight Committees. Student leadership in providing oversight to the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories may help to awaken the nation to the dangers of current US nuclear policies and projects that threaten our common future.

     

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.