Category: US Nuclear Weapons Policy

  • Processing Our History, Maintaining Critical Space

    In December 2007, I was invited to Japan by faculty at Meiji Gakuin University to speak about student nuclear abolition activism in the United States, and more specifically at the University of California (UC), the institution from which I recently graduated. My lectures focused on the University of California’s historical and pivotal role in the development of nuclear weapons for the United States government, student resistance to the UC’s management of nuclear weapons laboratories, and issues of privatization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and greater military industrial complex. My trip began in Tokyo, where I had the opportunity to speak on two separate occasions, first during a symposium on nuclear weapons issues organized by the Institute for International Studies at the Meiji Gakuin University campus in the nearby city of Yokohama. As my first audience was made up primarily of young University students, without extensive knowledge of nuclear weapons issues or much experience in student activism, I tried to focus my first talk on the basic narrative of UC management of nuclear weapons laboratories and student resistance to the continuation of lab management. So as to elucidate the substance of my lectures and to contextualize the primary purpose of my trip, I’ll briefly recount that narrative.

    The UC has managed the two primary nuclear weapons laboratories in the U.S. since the labs’ inception in 1945 (LANL) and 1952 (LLNL), through contracts with the United States Department of Energy. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were built through The Manhattan Project by a team of UC scientists, led by UC Berkeley physicist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Every nuclear weapon which has ever been built by the United States was developed by UC-employed scientists at LANL in New Mexico, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California. LLNL was established with the specific mission of developing the hydrogen bomb. The perpetual management of the nuclear labs by the UC Regents, the governing body of the University, has faced resistance among UC students and faculty for decades.

    The faculty and many students in Japan were interested in the state of the nuclear abolition movement among students in the United States, and while I could not offer them much in terms of a cohesively organized, widespread, student nuclear abolition movement throughout the country, there does exist a growing network of young nuclear abolition activists, known as the Think Outside the Bomb network, which convenes through a series of conferences organized through the Youth Empowerment Initiative at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Regarding the issue of student nuclear abolition activism, I was happy to speak about the technically informed and focused abolition movement at the University of California, which has historically focused on the UC’s direct structural connection to the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. This movement has additionally derived the support of several local non-profit organizations including, for the last five years, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s UC-Nuclear Free program.

    In the spring of 2007, students and their supporters at UC Santa Barbara convinced the UCSB Associated Students Legislative Council to unanimously vote to establish a committee known as the Student Department of Energy Lab Oversight Committee (DOELOC). The primary purpose of the committee is to inform the UC student body, faculty, and surrounding community about the UC-managed nuclear labs through research and investigation and to give students an institutionalized means for overseeing the activities of the nuclear labs to which their University’s name is attached. Students involved in the DOELOC intend to facilitate its official establishment on other UC campuses in the near future.

    In an attempt to pressure the UC Regents to sever the University’s ties with the nuclear weapons laboratories, the UC student movement for severance with the labs organized a non-violent direct action in May 2007. The action involved hundreds of UC students and community members, at least 40 of whom underwent varying levels of fast, ranging from liquid only to total abstention from all sustenance besides water, for nine days. While I was a UC student at the time, and despite my shared desire for nuclear abolition and UC-nuclear lab severance with those who did take part in that action, I chose not to fast. However, my proximity to and support of those who were involved proffered me much insight into that action in particular, as well as the opportunity to become further involved in the UC student nuclear abolition movement in general.

    At Meiji Gakuin’s Tokyo campus, I had the opportunity to speak to an older, more technically informed audience made up of scholars, NGO representatives and older University students. Within that context, I was able to speak to the phenomenon of privatization sweeping through the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, the U.S. military, Academia, and other traditionally public spheres. After six decades of sole UC management, the U.S. Department of Energy revoked the UC’s status as sole manger of the nuclear labs, and put the labs up for bid. The University of California subsequently partnered with Bechtel, Washington Group International, and BWX Technologies, major firms already engaged in the most extensive operations throughout the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and won the new contracts for the management of LANL and LLNL. Lab management now falls under the auspices of two limited liability corporations with even less transparency and even more immense lobbying power than the labs experienced under UC’s sole management. These new contracts are indicative of the further monopolization of the nuclear production chain, from enrichment, to design and infrastructure construction, to production, to waste disposal.

    The privatization of the laboratories is part of a greater phenomenon of military privatization occurring under the Bush Administration. This development is worrisome as privatization of conventional and nuclear military production and operations creates a greater structural imperative for war, the expansion of military and nuclear activities, and the testing and use of conventional military and nuclear products, as these firms, like any other corporations, have imperatives of profit and growth to fulfill. During the question and answer period following my talk in Tokyo, I was asked by an audience member to clarify what I meant by “privatization of national laboratories,” as he professed that such a phenomenon in Japan would be “unheard of.” Furthermore, I was told later by my translator that he had a difficult time translating the concept, since the actual linguistic structure of the concept appeared to be a contradiction in terms. I didn’t have many answers for them besides the basics of government contracting and corporate subcontracting, as I’m similarly dismayed by the contradiction inherent to the concept of “privatized, national laboratories.” But I could offer them one point: As more governments adopt the neo-liberal economic prescriptions coming out of Washington, Japan not excluded, privatization may be coming to a public institution near you. Throughout my tour of Tokyo, Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Yokohama in Japan, I had the opportunity to speak with many people, young and old, regarding these issues.

    I also met many Japanese peace activists throughout my travels working on a wide variety of important campaigns, all interwoven with the common threads of nuclear abolition and demilitarization. Several organizations and many individuals are working to strengthen and promote Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution — through which the Japanese government has officially renounced war as a tool of foreign policy — and extend its spirit and legal framework abroad. Additionally, there is a thriving movement against the continuing occupation by the United States military, through its maintenance of several military bases stationed on the Japanese archipelago. Demilitarization activists are working to prevent the expansion of these bases through non-violent direct action, focusing their attention especially on the controversial base on the island of Okinawa. I was truly inspired by the dedication and bravery of those who shared their stories and struggles with me, and I found rejuvenation and strength in the existence of a global network of individuals all working for a very different world.

    Nevertheless, as an American, I found it personally difficult to travel through a country almost entirely destroyed through American firebombings and atomic bombings of Japanese cities during World War II, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, not to mention the continuing occupation by the United States in the form of ever-expanding military bases. I spoke to many young Japanese citizens who shared with me their experiences of the same sense of responsibility and remorse when traveling throughout China and Korea, countries which were exploited and ravaged by Imperial Japan. I recently encountered the same phenomenon when traveling throughout South America and befriending young German citizens carrying the weight of their country’s history on their shoulders. In a world that seems closer together and smaller every day, young people are finding it necessary to acknowledge the unpleasant history of their homelands, both as a means of healing as well as disassociating themselves, as individuals, from those horrible legacies.

    Indeed I find it difficult to go anywhere in the world today without the reputation of the current and past foreign actions of my country’s government, no matter what their contextual justification may be, hanging over my head, despite my own personal disassociation with many facets of that government as my legitimate representative. While I was welcomed with open arms throughout my travels in Japan, most especially by those individuals who lived through the bombings and subsequent occupation, and are most aware of the current imperialist exploits of the U.S. government, I always felt like I ought to apologize even for that which I’m not personally responsible. I never did offer an apology on behalf of the U.S. government, as I’m not its delegate, but I hope that through my words and actions, my counterparts across the Pacific were reassured that there exists a movement in my country that parallels their own, and that the actions of the U.S. government less and less represent the will of its people. Throughout the rest of this piece, I recount some of my experiences traveling through Japan as a young abolitionist. I offer a critique based on my own conception of the problems, to which Japan is no stranger, which urgently confront my generation and the very existence of our world.

    Kyoto, Japan, the country’s center of religious worship and cultural history, allows one to witness first-hand the all-too-familiar struggle that plagues the world’s centers of cultural heritage: the maintenance of indigenous tradition and culture in the face of corporate globalization. The spires of its many temples and shrines rise majestically above the city, sharing the skyline with apartment complexes and department stores, and drawing throngs of eager worshipers and international tourists at their foundations. Especially throughout the blooming of the cherry blossoms in the spring and the kaleidoscopic withering of the maple trees in autumn, the afternoon crush threatens to exceed the capacity of the anachronistically narrow, cobble-stoned alleyways between the sites. Yet it serves as a boon to the many local sweet and craft shops fortunate enough to have staked out a location close to the various site exits so as to justify the annual rent appreciation. Unlike the relics of ancient cultures throughout the Western world, which increasingly unabashedly share their plazas with the golden arches and feature a Starbucks or two within sight, Kyoto continues to struggle to maintain its local authenticity and historical heritage even as its intensively-branded center expands outward. Kyoto was one of the largest population centers in Japan to be mostly spared the U.S. B-29 fire bombings during World War II, which killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians and almost wholly destroyed the infrastructure of most Japanese Imperial cities — subsequently reconstructed under occupation by the allied powers, and primarily by the United States. As money poured into the reconstruction projects in post-war Japan, the introduction of the Capitalist market system and Western lifestyle by the United States and Western Europe allowed for the type of development of the new Japanese economy to largely parallel the corporate structure of Western business. Kyoto’s visible perseverance in maintaining ancient cultural traditions and infrastructure is therefore an increasingly unique and important phenomenon both throughout the country and around the globe in the face of destructive warfare and increasingly pervasive corporate globalization.

    Kyoto has also lent its moniker to the first, albeit relatively modest, international treaty on reducing global carbon emissions in the form of the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in Kyoto in 1997 but not coming into force until early in 2005 following ratification by Russia. However, without the support and participation of the United States, responsible for more than 25% of overall carbon emissions, the treaty will not suffice to significantly alter the course of global warming. Given the United States’ superpower geopolitical status and highly disproportionate consumption rates, any sweeping international initiative regarding any global issue, from global warming to the disarmament of nuclear weapons, requires multilateral cooperation and benevolent leadership by the U.S. government. Unfortunately, the United States’ rogue history of arrogance and unilateralism — displayed most prominently through gunship diplomacy and the usurping of various international treaties and UN resolutions on test bans, environmental preservation, nuclear disarmament, and demilitarization — has resulted in a lack of overall human progress toward a more just and peaceful society.

    The eco-systemic finitude of the Japanese archipelago has its share of environmental woes, from over-fishing in its surrounding waters to the noxious air quality over Tokyo throughout the last century. But in a way microcosmically representative of the entire globe, the obvious finitude of Japan’s ecosystem has not prevented the corporate globalization model based on limitless quantitative economic growth from being allowed to continue practically unabated, just as it is around the world. And in response to its historical air pollution crisis and ever-increasing need for domestic power generation to fuel its growth, Japan relies on nuclear energy for over 30% of its energy production, presenting the seismically active and heavily populated island nation another pressing set of problems. Japan’s nuclear plants have experienced fires, reactor failures, spillage and leaks of radioactive materials into the environment, as well as the same exorbitant investment costs in reactors and enrichment facilities and the same lack of any safe means of permanent nuclear waste disposal that plagues the entire world. Despite the sustained existence of the same disastrous issues that the global nuclear energy industry and affected communities have always faced, many industry officials around the world continue to speak of a nuclear renaissance and tout nuclear energy as a clean solution to global warming despite its catastrophic history of environmental contamination.

    The irony was not lost on me as I took advantage of the high-powered electric Shinkansen (bullet-train) on which I sped across the country, peering out the window across rice fields, farming towns, industrial cities, and a picturesque mountain landscape, on my way from Kyoto to Hiroshima, the site of the world’s first glimpse of the nuclear age. On first face, the Shinkansen appears as a beacon of mass transit technology in a chaotic sea of carbon-spewing automobiles, allowing commuters to speed across long distances safely and efficiently, decreasing street traffic congestion, with a carbon output far below that of aircraft or car travel. In its current manifestation in Japan, however, the technology is largely dependent on centralized sources of high-yield energy output; and when proponents abroad sell the idea of high-speed rail and point to Japan’s Shinkansen as a model, the idea is often coupled with the derivation of power through nuclear energy, all under the guise of fabricating a greener infrastructure with a smaller carbon footprint. Certainly, mass transit need not be tied to nuclear energy, and the Shinkansen is a modern engineering marvel for human transportation. But as high-speed, mass transit technologies require such massive flows of electricity, interested parties should be wary of the de facto partnership made conceptually between the technologies in some promotional literature as well as the actual overlapping interests of companies like Mitsubishi and Hitachi. Both of these corporations are primarily responsible throughout Japan and in some areas abroad for the design, construction, and maintenance of both nuclear reactors and high-speed rail infrastructure. High-speed mass transit technology should be part of a solution to global warming, but nuclear power never has been, and never will be.

    Upon exiting the Shinkansen terminal in Hiroshima, I was immediately received and whisked away by my hosts through the busy streets of Hiroshima. On first face, the modern, bustling façade of the city is little different from the rest of the urban centers throughout Japan. It at first appeared that without some knowledge of the historical significance attached to the city, the unique and horrific history of the area would be hidden in a familiar sea of corporate billboards, busy salary-men shuffling silently through the streets on their way to work, and stylish young mall denizens ogling designer jeans in the windows of Western branded shops. Hiroshima hosts the growth of the same corporatized veneer spreading throughout the world through the vehicle of globalization, promoting the fetishization of a young, branded, bourgeois aesthetic and a culture of consumerism as the foundations of a new global youth culture premised upon immediate gratification and a skewed conception of civilized progress—a vision completely divorced from the physical limits of our Earth’s ecosystem. The same linear conception of progress as continuous growth, completely divorced from the reality of eco-systemic finitude, coupled with an anthropocentric value system promoting a vision of endless human mastery over the environment, allowed the world to be catapulted into the Nuclear Age and has helped sustain it throughout the decades. During my stay in this incredible city, however, I would come to learn that Hiroshima will never allow its citizens or the rest of the world to forget the city’s terrible history as the site of the world’s first human experiment with atomic weaponry. For in the wake of atomic terror, a new consciousness of peace and actual societal progress based on truth, compassion, and liberty from oppression was formulated, and a highly unique and increasingly rare public space was created and enshrined in the center of a city so that its citizens could hand down the city’s history and knowledge through the generations. Even after the last of the Hibakusha has passed on, the world will never be allowed to forget what happened on August 6th, 1945 at 8:15am in the city of Hiroshima, Japan, because the city’s very infrastructure is devoted to spreading its message of peace and hope that a different world, without the threat of nuclear weapons and all that they signify, can and must be realized.

    I spent my first hours in Hiroshima guest lecturing on nuclear weapons issues and youth activism in the United States to a peace and international studies class at Shudo University. I was assisted by a young translator involved with Hiroshima’s “Never Again” campaign, which helps to empower young people to spread Hiroshima’s message of peace and disarmament. In my experience, Japanese university students are in many ways very similar to their counterparts across the Pacific Ocean. A few are interested in politics and change of the status quo, but unfortunately, most can barely wait to leave campus, grab some KFC or a mocha latte, and go to the mall. In Japan, I encountered many of the same impediments to social change I encounter in the United States. Certainly, many young citizens of advanced industrialized countries are simply not aware of certain issues or have been denied the tools of critical systemic analysis required to piece together the geopolitical history necessary for an informed understanding of current events and issues. Even if they are aware of local institutions’ ties to warfare, the existence of military bases, or the practices of various military contractors with operations in their communities, they are unsure of what to do with that knowledge or whether they even should be doing anything at all. After all, critical systemic analysis of global issues and events can be downright depressing, and there is an entire world of opportunities for distraction for middle and upper class urban youth within advanced industrialized countries who have a bit of cash in their pockets.

    Just as in cities around the world, and in the metropolises of Tokyo and Yokohama, where I had spoken at both campuses of Meiji Gakuin University, Hiroshima’s downtown district keeps plenty on offer for the distraction of Japanese youth. They are similarly bombarded with glossy ads from every direction, which beg them to sink comfortably into the contrived bourgeois lifestyles depicted in storefronts and on the sides of buildings. In a country that is 98% Japanese, the ads often glorify the images of tall, blonde, Caucasian women in glamorous drab, seductively urging young shoppers to the various brands’ closest outlet stores. The almost kilometer-long downtown district of Hiroshima consists of an intensively branded strip of multinational outlets as well as Pachinko centers serving the lucrative and ever-growing gambling phenomenon across the country.

    The existence of these sensorially and emotionally stimulating centers of consumerism throughout the cities of advanced industrialized countries fills a void present in urban youth, which I would argue, is largely rooted in disempowerment. I often encounter young people who, while they may not possess a critical systemic understanding of global issues and events, know at some intuitive level that something is very wrong in their world. And I often meet knowledgeable, studious, young people who care deeply about the state of the world and the precariousness of our future. They understand that the confluence of a plethora of ecological disasters, disease, mass migration, war, exploitation, and the production and existence of many thousands of nuclear weapons in the world shrouds our generation in insecurity about our own future and the future of our Earth. But they are hopeless about change; they feel powerless. Or the situation is just too big to worry about when compared to the slew of personal difficulties one faces each day in just trying to survive. They have to work, go to school, care for sick or elderly family, and still have some fun somewhere in between. That leaves little time for changing the world. So for many, it’s so much easier to forget about it all and follow the simple advice given by President Bush to scared Americans within days of the attacks on September 11, 2001: go about business as usual and go shopping.

    But as corporate-driven globalization attempts to convince the world that it is just carrying out the inevitable, linear path of historical progress and that it is so much more convenient, cooler, and more fun to just go with it, there exists a dedicated, growing counter-movement for peace and justice, also globalized, working for a very different world. As one of the fulcrums of the global peace movement, Hiroshima draws thousands of tourists every year to an increasingly rare, central public space preserved for the critical reflection, intellectual expansion, and emotional expression of global citizens maintaining hope for a world free from nuclear weapons and imperialist war. Mere blocks away from the bustling downtown district, the Peace Park offers an expansive memorialization of the U.S. atomic bombing on August 6th, 1945. That bombing was followed by the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 8th, 1945, and a second U.S. atomic bombing of Nagasaki on August 9th, 1945.

    Various monuments dedicated to victims of the atom bomb are erected throughout the tranquil park, including a memorial for the incinerated children who were not in school that day because they were commissioned by the Japanese military to build fire breaks. There is a memorial dedicated to the Korean slaves, approximately ten percent of those killed by the atomic bomb, who were incinerated while toiling in the factories of the Japanese imperial military. And there is, of course, the memorial for Sadako, a young, female survivor of the atomic bombing who, like many other survivors, contracted radiation-induced leukemia shortly afterwards. She believed, according to an old Japanese tale, that if she could fold one thousand paper cranes, that her wish for peace would come true. She died of her radiation-induced sickness before she could finish her project. But her story lives on, and children around the world still fold paper cranes in her memory and as symbols of hope for a world without wars and bombs.

    Each day throughout my stay in Hiroshima, I stood for a while and meditated in the area of the preserved A-bomb memorial dome, one of the few buildings near the hypocenter not completely obliterated by the atomic fireball unleashed across the city. That daily ritual during my stay in Hiroshima kept me centered and the space provided in memorial of the bombing offered me something that is less and less allowed for in urban centers throughout the world: a safe space to just feel. As the A-bomb dome and the peace park are in the center of the city, Hiroshima’s citizens cannot go a day without a reminder of their city’s history. But the preservation of the dome, its surrounding, reflective space, and the museum have helped the city to heal and empower itself as a center for change and anti-war activism. Current events and issues seen through the eyes of a citizen of Hiroshima must pass through the filter of its own history, proclaimed truthfully, and bestowing upon the successive generations the responsibility for its preservation.

    Only by way of an accurate internalization of our history can we hope to understand our contemporary world and its processes. Our historical knowledge allows us to sift through the rhetoric of elites and build a systemic understanding of our world that informs our interpretations of events and determines our reactions to them. The expansive and open public space in the middle of the city provides Hiroshima’s citizens and it’s visitors something which everyday is disappearing throughout the urban centers on Earth: a safe, public space, without distraction, where occupants are actually encouraged and trusted to come together and feel and think critically, and where one’s anger, outrage, and sadness at the fact that human beings could commit such horrific acts against each other are allowed to seep out and be psychologically processed through acknowledgement and comfort from the very infrastructure of the city. Through that processing and recognition, people are allowed to heal, giving their spirits renewed determination to focus on action for systemic change.

    Nicholas Robinson is the Program Associate at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He graduated from the University of California, Santa Barbara in Spring 2007.

  • A Criminal Idea

    Originally appeared in The Guardian’s Comment Is Free, January 25, 2008

     

    Attacking other countries to stop them acquiring nuclear weapons repudiates a key principle of international law

    Five former Nato generals, including the former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, have written a “radical manifesto” which states that “the West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the ‘imminent’ spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.”

    In other words, the generals argue that “the west” – meaning the nuclear powers including the United States, France and Britain – should prepare to use nuclear weapons, not to deter a nuclear attack, not to retaliate following such an attack, and not even to pre-empt an imminent nuclear attack. Rather, they should use them to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear state. And not only that, they should use them to prevent the acquisition of biological or chemical weapons by such a state.

    Under this doctrine, the US could have used nuclear weapons in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to destroy that country’s presumed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons – stockpiles that did not in fact exist. Under it, the US could have used nuclear weapons against North Korea in 2006. The doctrine would also have justified a nuclear attack on Pakistan at any time prior to that country’s nuclear tests in 1998. Or on India, at any time prior to 1974.

    The Nuremberg principles are the bedrock of international law on war crimes. Principle VI criminalises the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression …” and states that the following are war crimes:

    “Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation of slave labor or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.”

    To state the obvious: the use of a nuclear weapon on the military production facilities of a non-nuclear state will mean dropping big bombs on populated areas. Nuclear test sites are kept remote for obvious reasons; research labs, reactors and enrichment facilities need not be. Nuclear bombs inflict total devastation on the “cities, towns or villages” that they hit. They are the ultimate in “wanton destruction”. Their use against a state with whom we are not actually at war cannot, by definition, be “justified by military necessity”.

    “The west” has lived from 1946 to the present day with a nuclear-armed Russia; no necessity of using nuclear weapons against that country ever arose. Similarly with China, since 1964. To attack some new nuclear pretender now would certainly constitute the “waging of a war of aggression …” That’s a crime. And the planning and preparation for such a war is no less a crime than the war itself.

    Next, consider what it means to determine that a country is about to acquire nuclear weapons. How does one know? The facilities that Iran possesses to enrich uranium are legal under the non-proliferation treaty. Yes, they might be used, at some point, to provide fuel for bombs. But maybe they won’t be. How could we tell? And suppose we were wrong? Ambiguity is the nature of this situation, and of the world in which we live. During the cold war, ambiguity helped keep both sides safe: it was a stabilising force. We would not use nuclear weapons, under the systems then devised, unless ambiguity disappeared. But the generals’ doctrine has no tolerance for ambiguity; it would make ambiguity itself a cause for war. Thus, causes for war could be made to arise, wherever anyone in power wanted them to.

    The generals’ doctrine would not only violate international law, it repudiates the principle of international law. For a law to be a law, it must apply equally to all. But the doctrine holds that “the west” is fundamentally a different entity from all other countries. As the former Reagan official Paul Craig Roberts has pointed out, it holds that our use of weapons of mass destruction to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not, itself, an illegal use of weapons of mass destruction. Thus “the west” can stand as judge, jury and executioner over all other countries. By what right? No law works that way. And no country claiming such a right can also claim to respect the law, or ask any other country to respect it.

    Conversely, suppose we stated the generals’ doctrine as a principle: that any nuclear state which suspects another state of being about to acquire nuclear weapons has the right to attack that state – and with nuclear weapons if it has them. Now suppose North Korea suspects South Korea of that intention. Does North Korea acquire a right to strike the South? Under any principle of law, the generals’ answer must be, that it does. Thus their doctrine does not protect against nuclear war. It leads, rather, directly to nuclear war.

    Is this proposed doctrine unprecedented? No, in fact it is not. For as Heather Purcell and I documented in 1994, US nuclear war-fighting plans in 1961 called for an unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, as soon as sufficient nuclear forces were expected to be ready, in late 1963. President Kennedy quashed the plan. As JFK’s adviser Ted Sorensen put it in a letter to the New York Times on July 1, 2002:

    “A pre-emptive strike is usually sold to the president as a ‘surgical’ air strike; there is no such thing. So many bombings are required that widespread devastation, chaos and war unavoidably follow … Yes, Kennedy ‘thought about’ a pre-emptive strike; but he forcefully rejected it, as would any thoughtful American president or citizen.”

    It’s not just citizens and presidents who are obliged to think carefully about what General Shalikashvili and his British, French, German and Dutch colleagues now suggest. Military officers – as they know well – also have that obligation. Nuremberg Principle IV states:

    “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.”

    Any officer in the nuclear chain of command of the United States, Britain or France, faced with an order to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state would be obliged, as a matter of law, to ponder those words with care. For ultimately, as Nuremberg showed, it is not force that prevails. In the final analysis, it is law.

    James K Galbraith holds the Lloyd M Bentsen Jr chair of government/business relations at the Lyndon B Johnson school of public affairs, the University of Texas at Austin. He is a senior scholar with the Levy Economics Institute, and chair of the board of Economists for Peace and Security, an international association of professional economists.


  • At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    The latest Wall Street Journal article by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” published on January 15, 2008, has a greater sense of urgency than their first joint article a year earlier. They express grave concerns that we are at a nuclear “tipping point” with “a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.” As if these weapons are not already in dangerous enough hands. The former policy makers and Cold Warriors are warning us that, without change, nuclear dangers will worsen. They leave to our imaginations what will happen in a world in which “deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.”

    As the former Cold Warriors soberly suggest, we can no longer count on the threat of retaliation with overwhelming nuclear force to prevent those unnamed “dangerous hands” from detonating nuclear weapons in our cities or the cities of our friends and allies. In other words, our nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to prevent nuclear attacks against us. It is not like the tense days of the Cold War, when at least we knew who the enemy was and where he was located. Now we have shadowy and slippery enemies and our thermonuclear weapons provide no defense against such enemies.

    Actually, thermonuclear weapons never did provide a defense, even during the Cold War. Deterrence is not defense – it is only a psychological pseudo-barrier, a wish and a prayer. Against nuclear weapons, there is no defense, not even so-called missile defenses, which are easily overcome. Even Henry Kissinger gets it now and is speaking out, or at least lending his name, to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Zero nuclear weapons. None for anyone, including us. The US must lead the way, must convene the other nuclear powers. There are steps that must be taken, which the former policy makers outline. Their suggestions are sensible, although they do not go far enough, nor is there any real hope that Washington under the Bush administration will respond to them rapidly enough. The situation may be even more urgent than the former Cold Warriors grasp.

    Nuclear weapons do not make us safer. They leave us more exposed. They are military equalizers. Minor foes, terrorist groups and small countries, can inflict horrendous damage on even the most powerful states. What is to be done? The former Cold Warriors offer the following: Work with Russia to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons by saving the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty of 1991; pursue further reductions in nuclear arms than agreed upon in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; increase warning and decision times for the launch of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; discard Cold War plans for massive attacks; develop cooperative multilateral ballistic missile defense and early warning systems; secure nuclear weapons, including those designed for forward deployment, and weapons-grade nuclear materials; strengthen monitoring of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.

    The former Cold Warriors also call for broadening the dialogue on an international scale. Here they will find that many countries without nuclear weapons have been trying to send a message to the nuclear weapons states for a long time, urging them to do all that Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn seek and more. Progress has been blocked since the end of the Cold War by the lack of political will of US leaders. That is where it continues to be blocked. The Bush administration’s approach to a world free of nuclear weapons is to place as many obstacles in its way as possible.

    As the former Cold Warriors point out, “Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal.” They have made that statement. It is doubtful, though, if it will have any effect on the current US administration, perhaps the darkest, most criminal administration in US history. Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues must look beyond George W. Bush, and hope for a new president of the United States who will be prepared to climb the mountain with them, rather than trying to blow it up. But they are absolutely right to speak up now, and to continue to strongly promote the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As Albert Camus said immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima, “Before the terrifying prospects now available to humanity, we see even more clearly that peace is the only battle worth waging.” Wage on, Henry Kissinger!

    To read the 2008 Wall Street Journal article by the aforementioned authors, click here.

    To read their 2007 Wall Street Journal article, click here.

    To read David Krieger’s “A Bipartisan Plea for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,” click here.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Ronald Reagan: A Nuclear Abolitionist

    Ronald Reagan: A Nuclear Abolitionist

    With the USS Ronald Reagan in Santa Barbara, it is worth reflecting on Ronald Reagan’s legacy with regard to nuclear weapons. According to his wife, Nancy, “Ronnie had many hopes for the future, and none were more important to America and to mankind than the effort to create a world free of nuclear weapons.”

    President Reagan was a nuclear abolitionist. He believed that the only reason to have nuclear weapons was to prevent the then Soviet Union from using theirs. Understanding this, he argued in his 1984 State of the Union Address, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?”

    Ronald Reagan regarded nuclear weapons, according to Nancy, as “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.”

    In 1986, President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev met for a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. In a remarkable quirk of history, the two men shared a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Despite the concerns of their aides, they came close to achieving agreement on this most important of issues. The sticking point was that President Reagan saw his Strategic Defense Initiative (missile defenses) as being essential to the plan, and Gorbachev couldn’t accept this (even though Reagan promised to share the US missile defense system with the then Soviet Union). Gorbachev wanted missile defense development to be restricted to the laboratory for ten years. Reagan couldn’t accept this.

    The two leaders came heartbreakingly close to ending the era of nuclear weapons, but in the end they couldn’t achieve their mutual goal. As a result, nuclear weapons have proliferated and remain a danger to all humanity. Today, we face the threat of terrorists gaining possession of nuclear weapons, and wreaking massive destruction on the cities of powerful nations. There can be no doubt that had Reagan and Gorbachev succeeded, the US and the world would be much safer, and these men would be remembered above all else for this achievement.

    The USS Ronald Reagan has the motto, “Peace through Strength.” President Reagan, like the ship bearing his name, was known for his commitment to this motto, but he never saw nuclear weapons as a strength. In his book, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Paul Lettow quotes Reagan as saying, “I know that there are a great many people who are pointing to the unimaginable horror of nuclear war…. [T]o those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, ‘I’m with you.’” Lettow also quotes Reagan as stating, “[M]y dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.”

    In the 18th and 19th centuries, individuals struggled for the abolition of slavery because they understood that every man, woman and child has the right to live in freedom. Through the efforts and persistence of committed individuals like William Wilberforce in Great Britain and Frederick Douglass in the United States, slavery was brought to an end, and humanity is better for it. In today’s world, we confront an issue of even more transcending importance, because nuclear weapons place civilization and the human species itself in danger of annihilation.

    Ronald Reagan was a leader who recognized this, and worked during his presidency for the abolition of these terrible weapons. He believed, according to Nancy, that “as long as such weapons were around, sooner or later they would be used,” with catastrophic results. He understood that nuclear weapons themselves are the enemy.

    Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan died before seeing his goal of abolishing nuclear weapons realized. It is up to those of us still living to complete this job. It is not a partisan issue, but rather a human issue, one that affects our common future.

    Working to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons would honor the memory of President Reagan, our only recent president with the vision to seek the total elimination of these weapons. He was a president who understood that US leadership was essential to achieving this goal. It behooves us as citizens of the United States to assure that our next president shares President Reagan’s vision on this issue, picks up the baton of nuclear weapons abolition from him and carries it forward.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Required Reading for Assuring the Future

    Required Reading for Assuring the Future

    Few people have looked as deeply into the nuclear abyss, seen the monster of our own making and grappled with it as has the writer Jonathan Schell. But Schell is more than a writer. He is also a philosopher of the Nuclear Age and an ardent advocate of caging the beast and rendering it harmless. Schell’s first book on the subject, The Fate of the Earth, awakened many people to the breadth and depth of the nuclear danger and is now a classic. He has returned to the issue of nuclear dangers (nuclear insanity?) in several of his other books, always providing penetrating insights into the confrontation between humanity and its most deadly invention.

    His latest book, The Seventh Decade, The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, may be Schell’s most important book yet. In this book, he examines the roots of the Nuclear Age and its current manifestations. He unearths the truth, which once brought to light seems obvious, that the bomb began as a construct in the mind. “Well before any physical bomb had been built,” he says, “science had created the bomb in the mind, an intangible thing. Thereafter, the bomb would be as much a mental as a physical object.”

    One of the key concepts of the Nuclear Age is deterrence, the belief that the threat of nuclear retaliation can prevent nuclear attack. Schell takes a hard-headed look at deterrence, and finds the concept “half-sane and half-crazy.” While it seems sane to seek to forestall a nuclear attack, the half-crazy part (perhaps more than half), “consists of actually waging the war you must threaten, for in that event the result is suicide all around.” That suicide writ large becomes what philosopher John Somerville termed “omnicide,” the death of all. “In short,” Schell deduced, “to threaten seems wise, but to act is deranged.”

    In the post-Cold War period, deterrence has become even more complex and less certain, tilting toward the “deranged.” It is no longer the mental task of threat and counter threat aimed at keeping a fixed and powerful opponent at bay, as it was during the Cold War standoff between the US and USSR. Now, states must consider the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups, not locatable and not subject to being deterred. In such circumstances, the rationality of deterrence is shattered and even great and powerful states are placed at risk of nuclear devastation by far weaker opponents. In such circumstances, overwhelming nuclear superiority is of no avail.

    The “bomb in the mind” can only do so much. It cannot deter those who cannot be located or are suicidal. Despite their devastating power, nuclear weapons in the hands of powerful states are actually a tepid threat. Yet, they stand as a major impediment to the post-Cold War imperial project of the United States, a project failing on many fronts, but poised to fail far more spectacularly if nuclear weapons find their way into the hands of terrorist groups.

    In today’s world, when deterrence has for nearly all sane thinkers lost its magical power in the mind (although in truth it was always a highly risky venture), it has become far harder to justify nuclear arsenals, and the United States has resorted to the vague possibility of a reemergent threat. In considering this, Schell finds, “In the last analysis, the target of the U.S. nuclear arsenal became history and whatever it might produce – not a foe but a tense, the future itself.”

    Schell correctly concluded that the George W. Bush administration had far more ambitious and sinister plans for the US nuclear arsenal. Although there was no clearly definable enemy, there was a strongly held vision and normative goal of US global dominance, set forth in the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Nuclear weapons were required, in Schell’s careful study of the NPR “to dissuade, deter, defeat or annihilate – preventively, preemptively, or in retaliation – any nation or other grouping of people on the face of the earth, large or small, that militarily opposed, or dreamed of opposing, the United States.”

    Schell examines the US imperial project under George W. Bush and its role in shaping US nuclear policy. He points out that the Bush administration ordered its nuclear threats in this way: Iraq, with whom it went to war; Iran, with whom it threatened war; North Korea, which withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and developed nuclear weapons; and Pakistan, which already had nuclear weapons and a chaotic political environment. Of course, Bush chose exactly the wrong order in terms of the actual security threats posed by these nations. Schell found, “In responding to the universal danger posed by nuclear proliferation, the United States therefore had two suitably universalist traditions that it could draw on, one based on consent and law, the other based on force. Bush chose force. It was the wrong choice. It increased the nuclear danger it was meant to prevent.”

    In the final section of his book, Schell, who is himself an ardent nuclear abolitionist, reviews earlier attempts to achieve abolition of these weapons. He goes into heartbreaking detail of the efforts of Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The two leaders, acting on their own initiative, without the advice or support of their aides (George Shultz is an exception), were incredibly close to agreement to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, but as we know faltered on the issue of missile defenses, which Reagan saw as key and which Gorbachev couldn’t accept. After coming so close to agreement on a plan for abolition, the world settled back to nuclear business as usual. As Schell pointed out, after the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit at Reykjavík, “Nuclear arsenals may remain not so much because anyone wants them as because a world without them is outside the imagination of the leadership class.”

    The possibilities of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism led Schell to the conclusion that “with each year that passes, nuclear weapons provide their possessors with less safety while provoking more danger. The walls dividing the nations of the two-tiered [nuclear] world are crumbling.” The Reagan-Gorbachev vision has new advocates in former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn. Their basic premise is that deterrence can no longer be the foundation for 21st century security.

    Schell suggests that should the will for nuclear abolition materialize – something already favored by the majority of Americans – the following principles could guide the effort:

    1. At the outset, adopt the abolition of nuclear arms as the organizing principle and goal of all activity in the nuclear field;
    2. Join all negotiations on nuclear weapons – on nuclear disarmament, on nonproliferation, and on nuclear terrorism – in a single forum;
    3. Think of abolition less as the endpoint of a long and weary path of disarmament and more as the starting point for addressing a new agenda of global action;
    4. Design a world free of nuclear weapons that is not just a destination to reach but a place to remain.

    Schell concludes that the “bomb in the mind,” with us from the outset of the Nuclear Age, will remain with us, but that this is not necessarily a detriment. He points out, “even in a world without nuclear weapons, deterrence would, precisely because the bomb in the mind would still be present, remain in effect. In that respect, the persisting know-how would be as much a source of reassurance as it would be a danger in a world without nuclear weapons.”

    Jonathan Schell has provided an essential book for our time. He peels back the layers of veils and myths surrounding nuclear dangers and strategies, and offers a sound set of guidelines for moving to a nuclear weapons-free world. This book can help to create the necessary political will to achieve this end. It is required reading for every person on the planet who cares about assuring the future.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Another Perspective on the RRW “Victory”

    It was recently reported that funding for the so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead” (RRW) had been zeroed out in the FY 2008 budget passsed by the U.S. Congress. I quickly wrote this two-part response to the announcement of the RRW “victory” (see, for example http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=3065&issue_id=2), in response to an inquiry from a young colleague. I wrote the second part after reading the Summary and Explanatory Statement that accompany the joint House-Senate omnibus appropriations bill, the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. I offer it as an alternative and distinctly “outside the beltway” point of view.

    Part I: Here’s my basic perspective. This *may* be an important symbolic victory – time will tell, especially following the rejection of the RNEP. It seems to signal that Congress is uncomfortable with the idea of funding *new* nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it is a *very* small thing. Over the years since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapon types specifically named in budget line items have been zeroed out several times, reappearing under different names or buried in more vaguely identified budget categories. ALSO, remember that there is an officially acknowledged *black budget* about which we know nothing. And, bear in mind that even with a few million cut from RRW, the overall nuclear weapons R&D budget is enormous, and still higher than during the average Cold War years. MOST IMPORTANTLY, zeroing out the RRW this year doesn’t fundamentally change *anything* about U.S. nuclear weapons policy, posture, readiness, capability, threat or lethality. Here are a few examples:

    • The Stockpile Life Extension Program is going forward. Last I checked the Labs were working on the W-76 warhead, giving it an enhanced ground burst capability, which would improve its first strike capability. “Life extensions” are planned for other warhead models. This begs the question of what “new” means, when talking about a nuclear warhead.
    • Despite the claim made by the U.S. representative to the First Committee of the United Nations in October, that U.S. nuclear weapons are not now and have *never* been on “hair trigger” alert, they do, in fact, remain on high alert status and have taken on an even more central role in U.S. “Global Strike” planning, which has as much or more to do with the delivery systems than the warheads. (See Hans Kristenson’s rebuttal at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/kristensen-rebuttal_oct07.pdf) According to Bruce Blair’s rebuttal: “Both the United States and Russia today maintain about one-third of their total strategic arsenals on launch-ready alert. Hundreds of missiles armed with thousands of nuclear warheads the equivalent of about 100,000 Hiroshima bombs — can be launched within a very few minutes. The end of the Cold War did not lead the United States and Russia to significantly change their nuclear strategies or the way they operate their nuclear forces.” (See http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm.)
    • The U.S. is on the only nuclear weapon state that deploys nuclear weapons on foreign territory. It is reliably estimated that 350 U.S. B-61 nuclear bombs are deployed at the following NATO bases in Europe: Aviano, Italy (50); Ghedi, Italy (40); Peer, Belgium (20); Uden, The Netherlands (20); Vulkaneiffel, Germany (20); Incirlik, Turkey (90); Lakenheath, UK (110) (Source: The Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/nato.htm.)
    • In response to an Op-ed signed by 8 European mayors who want the U.S. nukes removed from their territories, the NATO Chief announced that there are no plans to change NATO’s nuclear policy. (The Op-ed is posted at: http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/319. The article about NATO’s response is at: http://www.refdag.nl/artikel/1325579/NAVO+houdt+vast+aan+kernwapens.html.)
    • Almost nobody talks about the delivery systems or the long planning horizons *always* in place for nuclear weapons systems. Consider the following: “Advisers to U.S. Strategic Command this month urged the Defense Department to begin research and development soon for a new nuclear-weapons submarine, according to the Navy…. The review anticipated that a new program would have to begin around 2016 for the first submarine to be fielded in 2029. However, defense sources have told GSN that it now appears initial funding would be sought by 2010.” (See http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_11_29.html – 05F6F768. Note the reliance on the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, widely dismissed by the arms control community at the time as a mere “wish list.”)
    • The details are in the fine print. With everyone continuing to sing the praises of Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn for their call for a “nuclear weapon free world,” Kissinger and Shultz have endorsed Sidney Drell’s position that “research work on new RRW designs should certainly go ahead.” (See http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_11_15.html – C8DB7944.) The history of military research and development strongly suggests that research and development efforts are not necessarily limited to specific weapon designs, and that even if a particular design in terminated, R&D may very well lead to new weapons concepts or modifications. It’s not over till its over.
    • The draft EIS for “Complex Transformation” (formerly Complex 2030) is expected in early January. I predict with a high degree of confidence that it will not include a plan for closing down the nuclear weapons infrastructure because the RRW isn’t currently funded. So what are they planning to spend that $150 billion on over the next 25 years?
    • The RRW vote not withstanding, the United States is not in any way shape or form acting in good faith with regard to its NPT Article VI obligation to negotiate “in good faith” the end of the arms race “at an early date” and “nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.” Here I offer two resources. One is the statement I made on behalf of the NGOs to the First Committee of the UN in October. (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com07/statements/26octcabasso.pdf.) The second is a debate between U.S. diplomat and lawyer Christopher Ford and John Burroughs of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, on what Article VI of the NPT legally requires of states. (http://cns.miis.edu/cns/activity/071129_nprbriefing/index.htm)
    • Finally, as I wrote in a paper presented at a recent international conference on the challenge of abolishing nuclear weapons: The Encarta Encyclopedia describes militarism as “advocacy of an ever-stronger military as a primary goal of society, even at the cost of other social priorities and liberties.” And it relates militarism to chauvinism, fascism, and national socialism. As uncomfortable as it may be for many, this chilling definition accurately describes the historical trajectory and current reality of U.S. national security policy. The threatened first use of nuclear weapons remains at the heart of that policy. While it’s important to celebrate small “victories,” we need to keep our eyes on the prize.
    • Much more detailed analysis is included in our book, Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? U.S. Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis and Paths to Peace, available at http://www.wmdreport.org/.

    Part II: It is not at all certain that this outcome is the result of efforts by anti-nuclear activists. There are a couple of Congressmembers, Hobson and Visclosky, who didn’t like the RRW from the beginning, for reasons of their own. I believe it would be intellectually dishonest to proclaim this a major victory. After I wrote my initial response, I read the summary and explanatory statement that accompany the joint House-Senate omnibus appropriations bill, the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. I found no surprises. According to the official summary, the nuclear weapons budget is the same as FY 2007 and the RRW isn’t even gone, it’s just on hold. (http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/EnergyandWaterOmnibus.pdf) Excerpt:

    “Weapons Programs: $6.3 billion, the same as 2007 and $214 million below the President’s request.

    • Reliable Replacement Warhead: Prohibits the development of a reliable replacement warhead until the President develops a strategic nuclear weapons plan to guide transformation and downsizing of the stockpile and nuclear weapons complex.”

    The explanatory statement, starting at p. 44 (PDF p. 88) provides a detailed breakdown of the funded nuclear weapons activities, including further description of the RRW and a *new* science campaign called “Advanced Certification,” and goes on to talk about the Stockpile Life Extension Program. Under “Warhead Dismantlement” you will find funding for the Device *Assembly* Facility at the Nevada Test Site, for “additional missions.” Read on to discover funding for the “enhanced test readiness program,” Inertial Confinement Fusion including the National Ignition Facility at the Livermore Lab and the Z machine at Sandia, Advanced Simulation and Computing, *including academic partnerships*, and pit manufacturing and certification. And it goes on. (http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/omni/jes/jesdivc.pdf)

    To sum up, from my perspective, one small line item was cut, the FY 2007 funding level was maintained, and the deck chairs were rearranged on the Titanic. I believe that it is imperative to broaden our approach, and to educate ourselves and the public about the profound historical and economic underpinnings of the military-industrial-academic complex. Imagine a scenario in which tens or hundreds of thousands of people around the country were calling unambiguously for the abolition of nuclear weapons *and war* and *demanding* meaningful leadership from the United States. What kind of political space might be opened up, and what kind of results might one expect? Certainly not less than eliminating 3 letters (RRW) from the NNSA’s vocabulary. We might actually get *more* and in the process begin to generate a real national debate on the *purpose* of and therefore the future of nuclear weapons, and the requirements for genuine human and ecological security.

    Jackie Cabasso is Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation (www.wslfweb.org)

  • Foiled Again: The Defeat of the Latest Bush Administration Plan for New Nuclear Weapons

    Originally published on History News Network (www.hnn.us)

     

    Advocates of a U.S. nuclear weapons buildup received a significant setback on December 16, when Congressional negotiators agreed on an omnibus spending bill that omitted funding for development of a new nuclear weapon championed by the Bush administration: the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Coming on the heels of Congressional action in recent years that stymied administration schemes for the nuclear “bunker buster” and the “mini-nuke,” it was the third–and perhaps final–defeat of George W. Bush and his hawkish allies in their attempt to upgrade the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal.

    The administration’s case for building the RRW–a newly-designed hydrogen bomb–pivoted around the contention that the current U.S. nuclear stockpile is deteriorating and needs to be replaced by new weaponry.

    But studies by scientific experts revealed that this stockpile would remain reliable for at least another fifty years. In addition, critics of the RRW scheme pointed to the fact that building new nuclear weapons violates the U.S. commitment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue nuclear disarmament and that such a violation would encourage other nations to flout their NPT commitments.

    Naturally, peace and disarmament organizations were among the fiercest opponents of the RRW, arguing that it was both unnecessary and provocative. Groups like the Council for a Livable World, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Peace Action, and Physicians for Social Responsibility published critiques of the administration plan, mobilized their members against it, and lobbied in Congress to secure its defeat. Activists staged anti-RRW demonstrations and, despite the nation’s focus on the war in Iraq, managed to draw headlines with protests at the University of California and elsewhere.

    Members of Congress also were skeptical of the value of the RRW, particularly its utility in safeguarding U.S. security in today’s world, where the Soviet Union–once the major nuclear competitor to the United States–no longer exists. “Moving forward on a new nuclear weapon is not something this nation should do without great consideration,” noted U.S. Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN), chair of the House subcommittee handling nuclear weapons appropriations. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of terrorism, the U.S. government needed “a revised stockpile plan to guide the transformation and downsizing of the [nuclear weapons] complex . . . to reflect the new realities of the world.”

    But is the defeat of the RRW a momentous victory for nuclear disarmers? After all, the U.S. government still possesses some 10,000 nuclear weapons, with thousands of them on launch-ready alert. Moreover, the Bush administration is promoting a plan to rebuild the entire U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Called Complex 2030 and intended to provide for U.S. nuclear arsenals well into the future, this administration scheme is supposed to cost $150 billion, although the Government Accountability Office maintains that this figure is a significant underestimate.

    Also, the RRW development plan might be revived in the future. Brooding over the Congressional decision to block funding for the new nuclear weapon, U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM)—a keen supporter of the venture–remarked hopefully that he expected the RRW or something like it to re-emerge “sooner rather than later.”

    This situation, of course, falls short of the 1968 pledge by the United States and other nuclear powers, under article VI of the NPT, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament.” It falls even farther short of their subsequent pledge, made at the NPT review conference of 2000, to “an unequivocal undertaking . . . to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    Thus, this December’s Congressional decision to zero out funding for the RRW is only a small, symbolic step in the direction of honoring U.S. commitments and fostering nuclear sanity. If the United States and other nations are serious about confronting the menace of nuclear annihilation that has hung over the planet since 1945, it will require not only the scrapping of plans for new nuclear weapons, but the abolition of the 27,000 nuclear weapons that already exist in government arsenals, ready to destroy the world. Until that action occurs, we will continue to default on past promises and to live on the brink of catastrophe.

    Dr. Lawrence S. Wittner is Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany. His most recent book, co-edited with Glen H. Stassen, is Peace Action: Past, Present, and Future (Paradigm Publishers).


  • An Explanation of Nuclear Weapons Terminology

    Discussions of nuclear weapons and the policies which guide them often utilize terminology which lacks standardized definition. Much of the nuclear jargon consists of words or phrases which are essentially descriptive terms whose meaning is generally agreed upon, but in fact do not have precise technical definitions in any military or civilian dictionaries. Such imprecision in language has created confusion among those trying to comprehend nuclear issues and has even hindered the process of negotiation among nations.

    This problem of imprecision exists for a variety of reasons. Some terms may not be listed in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) online Dictionary of Military Terms (see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/) because they refer to policies, such as “launch-on-warning”, which the U.S. government does not wish to acknowledge or discuss. Other terms, such as “high-alert status”, “hair-trigger alert” and “de-alerting”, may be regarded as useless by military officers who would wish to regard their forces as always “alert”.

    Although civilians and the military may approach the use of such terminology from different perspectives, it is important that they at least be able to understand each other when conversing. A lack of precise terminology will continue to plague discussions of nuclear policy until adequate definitions are finally agreed upon by all parties.

    The U.S. recently employed imprecision in terminology as a tactic during the 2007 General Conference on Disarmament at the United Nations, when it announced, “The fact is that U.S. nuclear weapons are not and have never been on “hair-trigger alert”. By repeatedly using the term “hair-trigger” (which lacks technical meaning but is commonly used to describe fire-arms and bad tempers), the U.S. deliberately muddied the semantic waters in an attempt to avoid serious discussion about the true status of its nuclear arsenal[1].

    The U.S. apparently chose this strategy because the governments of New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Nigeria and Chile had put forward a Resolution to the General Assembly which called for the removal of all nuclear weapons from “high-alert status”[2]. This left many of the delegates at the U.N. scrambling for a means to decipher exactly what was being debated.

    Because I had been asked to speak in support of the New Zealand Resolution[3], I decided to present the delegates with definitions for commonly used nuclear terms. I found, however, that very few published definitions are available for such terms, and so I instead developed a list of what I believe are valid explanations for commonly used nuclear jargon (copied below). It is my hope that eventually all these words and phrases can be assigned standardized definitions usable by both civilians and military authorities.

    “Operational”, “Active” and “Deployed” nuclear weapons

    • Fully functional nuclear weapons which are either mated to delivery systems or available for immediate combat use.
    • There are about 11,800 operational/active/deployed nuclear weapons in the global nuclear arsenal (mostly U.S. and Russian).

    Note: The DOD has a rather confusing definition for “Deployed Nuclear Weapons” available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01632.html “Reserve” or “Inactive/Responsive” nuclear weapons

    • Nuclear weapons not immediately available for combat. They are kept in long-term storage as spares, as a source of parts for remanufacture or the manufacture of other weapons, or held in reserve as a responsive force that may augment deployed forces. These weapons can lack some component which renders them inoperable unless that component is replaced.
    • There are 13,500 reserve nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals. Should they choose to do so, the U.S. and Russia could use these reserves to essentially double the number of operational nuclear weapons in their arsenals within a relatively short period of time.

    Note: The great irony of “arms control” negotiations is that the reductions which have occurred through the SALT, START and SORT treaties have focused only upon the destruction of missile silos and submarine launch tubes – not on eliminating nuclear warheads or even missiles, but only upon reducing the total number of operational delivery systems. Consequently, as the delivery systems were eliminated, many of the warheads were taken out of active service and placed in the “reserve” arsenals of the U.S. and Russia.

    “Low-yield” nuclear weapons

    • Generally refers to simple fission weapons, first described as “atomic bombs”, which have a nominal explosive power of about 15 kilotons, roughly the size of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These are the type of weapons which would be made by emerging nuclear weapon states such as India and Pakistan or by terrorists (using Highly Enriched Uranium).

    “Tactical” nuclear weapons

    • This is an older term which is no longer useful in describing the explosive size of nuclear weapons (many modern versions of these weapons can have large yields). “Tactical” now infers that the weapon is used for limited, or “theater” military operations, but not long-range intercontinental missions. Thus, the term “non-strategic weapon” is more appropriate.

    “Strategic” nuclear weapons

    • Often referred to as “high-yield” or “thermonuclear” nuclear weapons. The first generations of these weapons were called “hydrogen bombs” because they used (and still use) atomic bombs as triggers to generate enough heat to cause the nuclear fusion of hydrogen atoms (fusion is the same process which powers the Sun). Most modern thermonuclear weapons are 20 to 50 times more powerful than the Hiroshima-size bombs, although weapons more than 1000 times as powerful still exist in the global nuclear arsenal.
    • Strategic nuclear weapons generally have an explosive power of at least 100 kilotons yield, i.e. 100,000 tons of TNT.
    • There are 7200 strategic nuclear weapons in the global nuclear arsenal.
    • For a detailed explanation of nuclear weapon design, look it up at Wikipedia, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design

    Note: The DOD actually has a definition for thermonuclear weapons, see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/05511.html

    High-alert status” or “Launch-ready alert”

    • Commonly refers to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) armed with strategic nuclear warheads, able to be launched in a matter of 15 minutes or less. Can include any missile or weapon system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead in this time frame.
    • Maximum flight time of 30 minutes or less for U.S. and Russian ICBMs and SLBMs to reach their targets.
    • Total time required to launch high-alert ballistic missiles and have their nuclear warheads reach their targets = 45 minutes or less. With high-alert nuclear forces a nuclear war can be ordered, launched and completed in less than one hour.

    Note: A definition of high-alert requires no specific explosive power of the weapon on the missile, but in general, most high-alert missiles are armed with strategic nuclear weapons with yields equal to or greater than 100 kilotons. The U.S. and Russia have for decades possessed solid fuel ICBMs and SLBMs capable of being launched in 2 or 3 minutes. The U.S. “Minuteman” ICBM earned its name for its quick-launch capability.

    Nuclear forces now at “High-alert status”

    A large fraction of the following forces, including at least 2600 to 3500 strategic nuclear warheads:

    • U.S. land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles = 1050 strategic nuclear warheads
    • 4 U.S. Trident submarines kept at “hard alert”, carrying a total of 600 high-yield warheads
    • Russian land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles = 1843 strategic nuclear warheads
    • Russian nuclear subs in port (virtually all year) carrying a total of 624 high-yield warheads

    Note: for published references on 2007 U.S. and Russian nuclear forces see the NRDC Nuclear Notebook at the website of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The URL for the U.S. arsenal is http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/91n36687821608un/fulltext.pdf; for Russia see http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d41x498467712117/fulltext.pdf. And also stay tuned for my new website, www.globalnucleararsenal.com .

    “De-alerting” nuclear weapons

    • De-alerting prevents the rapid use of nuclear weapons by introducing physical changes to nuclear weapon systems which lengthen the time required to use the nuclear weapons in combat. Such changes are made in order to allow more time for rational decision-making processes to occur and hopefully avoid nuclear conflict.
    • De-alerting is a reversible process which can be used to rapidly implement existing arms control agreements ahead of schedule. In other words, arms control agreements create a timetable to introduce irreversible reductions of weapon systems, but these changes generally occur incrementally over the course of a number of years. De-alerting can be utilized to rapidly implement the entire range of negotiated reductions in a reversible fashion (which over time are then made irreversible), thereby bringing the benefits of the negotiated reductions into being much more rapidly.
    • Examples of de-alerting: (1) Placing large, visible barriers on top of missile silo lids which would be difficult to rapidly remove, (2) Removing or altering firing switches of missiles to prevent rapid launch, (3) Removing warheads from missiles and storing them in a separate, monitored location.
    • De-alerting may require negotiations and verification procedures in order to accomplish symmetrical force reductions on both sides. However, de-alerting can occur rapidly if sufficient political will exists, e.g., the 1991 Bush and Gorbachev Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
    • De-alerting nuclear forces would prevent a false warning from triggering a retaliatory nuclear strike (accidental nuclear war) via launch-on-warning policy (see next definition).

    Note: It would be worthwhile to define separate stages of de-alerting which would refer to specific increments of time required to return a weapon system to high-alert status. For example, Stage 1 de-alerting would require 24 hours to bring the weapon system back to high-alert status; Stage 2 de-alerting would require a week; Stage 3 de-alerting would require a month or more to reconstitute the weapon system.

    Launch-on-Warning (LoW) policy

    • The Cold War policy of launching a retaliatory nuclear strike to a perceived nuclear attack only on the basis of electronic Early Warning System data before the reality of the perceived attack is confirmed by nuclear detonations from the incoming warheads.
    • Under LoW policy, a false warning misinterpreted as a true attack could trigger a retaliatory nuclear strike, and thus cause an accidental nuclear war.
    • Under LoW policy, the 30 minute (or less) flight time of ballistic missiles dictates that only a few minutes are available to evaluate Early Warning System data and act upon it before the arrival of incoming nuclear warheads. If the attack warning is accepted as accurate, top U.S. or Russian military commanders would contact their President to advise him, and the president would then be allowed only a few minutes to decide whether or not to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike – before the perceived attack arrives.
    • Launch-on-Warning capability can be eliminated by introducing physical changes to nuclear weapon systems which prevent their rapid use (de-alerting). In other words, Launch-on-Warning requires high-alert forces that can be launched in 15 minutes or less. If you remove nuclear forces from high-alert, you CANNOT Launch-on-Warning.
    • Launch-on-Warning policy can be ended overnight by Presidential decree.
    • By replacing LoW policy with a policy of Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation (RLOAD), a false warning misinterpreted as a true attack could no longer cause an accidental nuclear war.

    For a more detailed analysis on LoW and its alternatives, see “Replace Launch on Warning Policy” by Phillips and Starr at www.RLOAD.org

    Note: The U.S. presently maintains that it does not operate under the policy of Launch-on-Warning (LoW). Although the U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms lacks a definition for LoW, it does define Launch Under Attack (LUA, see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/l/03079.html) – with a definition exactly the equivalent to the commonly used definition of LoW! Perhaps we should ask the U.S. if it operates under LUA? Furthermore, Russian military experts (writing in English) use LUA to mean something significantly different than the U.S. DOD definition. Russian usage of LUA refers to the delivery of a retaliatory nuclear strike “in response to an actually delivered strike”, i.e. after nuclear detonations have been confirmed (see Valery Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003, pp. 28 -30.)

    Launch-on-Warning (LoW) capability

    • Early Warning Systems (EWS), high-alert nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and nuclear command and control systems, all working together, provide the U.S. and Russia the capability to Launch-on-Warning.

    Launch-on-Warning (LoW) status

    • The combination of Launch-on-Warning capability with Launch-on-Warning policy has created what is commonly referred to as Launch-on-Warning status.
    • LoW capability + LoW policy = LoW status

    Note: This is my own opinion and definition. I felt obligated to come up with the explanation for “LoW status” because the term has often been used by non-governmental observers to describe the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. and Russia.

    “Hair-trigger alert”

    • “Hair-trigger alert” is a figurative term sometimes used to describe strategic nuclear weapons at Launch-on-Warning status and in particular the condition of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals, see “A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces” by Bruce Blair at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm
    • “Hair-trigger alert” has been used to confuse the debate about the status of nuclear arsenals. For purposes of diplomacy, it may be wise to use non-figurative and more technical terms to describe nuclear policy and nuclear weapon systems.

    Footnotes

    [1] The text of the Oct. 9, 2007, U.S. statement at the U.N. can be viewed at http://reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com07/statements/9octusa.pdf Two authoritative rebuttals to the U.S. Statement are posted on the internet at the website of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, see: http://www.lcnp.org/ These include, “A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on Nuclear Weapons Alert, Dismantlements and Reductions”, by Dr. Hans M. Kristensen, the Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, see http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/kristensen-rebuttal_oct07.pdf and, “A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces”, by Dr. Bruce Blair, President of the World Security Institute, see http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm
    [2] The Resolution passed by the vote of 124 to 3, with only the U.S., the U.K. and France voting against it. The U.S. voted against the Resolution because it said the Resolution was “meaningless” (see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM07/week4.html#opstatus

    [3] Our Oct. 16th panel, which discussed the Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons, also included speeches by the Ambassadors of New Zealand and Sweden, and a presentation by John Hallam of Australia, with Ms. Rhianna Tyson of the Global Security Institute as moderator.

    Steven Starr is an independent writer who has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. He recently retired from the medical profession to work as an educator and consultant on nuclear weapons issues.

  • The High Price of Arrogance and the Bitter Harvest of Hypocrisy

    The Twin Horsemen of the New Apocalypse:

    Slowly, the nuclear genie escapes from the carefully constructed bottle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, threatening the world with annihilation.

    Inexorably, global warming advances across the decades as temperatures climb, fires rage, glaciers melt, droughts escalate, hurricanes intensify, habitats shrink, species disappear.

    These, then are the twin horsemen of the new apocalypse: the prospect of nuclear war and the reality of global warming.

    No biblical prophesy this. The pale riders mounted upon these steeds are men, and they wait eagerly at the gate, their time come at last. Arrogance is their vehicle; hypocrisy their fuel.

    We are Become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds

    Imagine a world in which more than twenty-five countries possessed nuclear weapons, instead of the nine that do now. Imagine that number relentlessly growing, decade by decade until a hundred or more nations – all but the very poorest – were capable of detonating a nuclear device and initiating a nuclear holocaust. In such a world, the unthinkable would become the inevitable.

    The only reason we’re not living in that world today is that in 1968, the international community seized a rare moment of sanity and produced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stuffing the nuclear genie back in its bottle.

    Led by Ireland and Finland, 189 states signed the treaty.

    The NNPT was supposed to work as follows: Nations who had not yet developed nuclear weapons agreed not to pursue a nuclear arsenal. In return, nations possessing nuclear weapons agreed “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    In short, the treaty was a quid-pro-quo. Nuclear have-nots agreed not to obtain nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear haves agreeing to take real, verifiable steps to get rid of theirs.

    Now imagine a nation that broke this grand bargain, and risked bringing forth death and destruction of biblical proportion. That nation exists. It is US.

    Listen.

    At the time of the treaty, South Africa, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, and several other countries who were actively developing nuclear weapons suspended their programs. Five nations – the US, Russia, Britain, China, and France agreed to suspend active programs and begin negotiations to dismantle their stockpile. Countries capable of constructing nuclear weapons, including Australia, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Finland, South Korea, and host of others then had no incentive to initiate programs, and the world was moved a little further from the brink of a nuclear insanity. There have been leaks. Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all developed nuclear weapons.

    But for years, the dream of a nuclear free world was a powerful card the world could play in constraining the spread of this deadly ambition.

    No longer.

    The nuclear haves – led by the US – have steadfastly ignored their responsibilities under this treaty. Indeed, under Bush, the US has scrapped the ABM treaty, sought funding for a new generation of nuclear weapons, and proposed to resume testing of nuclear devices, even as we’ve insisted that others abandon efforts to produce them. Thus, we approach the world as an arrogant hypocrite, and seem surprised that it is not working.

    Climate: the slow-motion nuclear war

    Forget wars, famine, pestilence and death. They are merely the stepchildren of global warming.

    Hyperbole?

    Consider this. The cumulative energy embedded in all fossil fuels is on the same order of magnitude as the energy that would be released from detonating all of the world’s nuclear devices. So if we burn all of those reserves, in terms of energy, it is the equivalent of an all out nuclear war. But wait, you say, even if we were to burn all those reserves, it would take place over three centuries, hardly the same as a nuclear conflagration.

    Fair enough, but try this little thought experiment, and in the words of Aldo Leopold, think like a mountain. In terms of geologic time, three centuries is virtually indistinguishable from an instant.

    Over the four and a half billion years the earth has existed, the systems that sustain us have been sculpted carefully from the ether. Life appeared some 3.8 billion years ago – simple procaryotes living off of methane and sulfur. Oxygenators became dominant about a billion years later, and slowly, the orange sky turned blue. Painstakingly, the world we know evolved until a scant million years ago hominids something like ourselves appeared. Homo Sapiens – man the wise – evolved about fifty thousand years ago, and in the last ten thousand years, blessed with a relatively benign climate, we began our march towards civilization.

    Now we look through the lens of our own life span and declare three centuries to be a long time. But to that mountain, the blinding death-flash of a nuclear holocaust, and the three hundred year combustion of fossil fuels are less distinguishable, and the consequences may be too. In a very real sense, climate change could play out like a slow-motion nuclear war, sans radioactive fallout.

    Just as with the nuclear threat, the US is the biggest impediment to progress, and the biggest cause of the problem. In 2005, the US released 7.1 billion tons of GHGs. To put that in context, the US – with about five percent of the world’s population – emitted about twenty five percent of the world’s greenhouse gasses. Cumulatively, the US contribution to global warming dwarfs any other country’s, and it will do so long after China supplants us as the largest annual emitter.

    The Origins of Arrogance

    Given the fact that we sit astride this heinous record of disregarding all elements of a sane world, on what basis do we now object to Iran or any country seeking to develop a nuclear capability? Certainly not moral grounds.

    How do we, the worlds biggest energy pig, justify our failure to ratify the Kyoto climate accords, and our failure to honor our obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which we did sign and ratify?

    Do we simply assert that we are different? Special in some way?

    A sizable number of neocons take precisely that point of view, referring to the US as the “Exceptional Nation.” Indeed, it is this notion which has animated our foreign policy to one degree or another since the fall of the Soviet Union. Under Bush, it has become an almost religious conviction.

    Presumably, this exceptionalism gives us the right to retain our nuclear weapons, expand our arsenal, and prevent anyone else – even those we threaten – from developing them. It could even be used to justify the fact that we continue to spew out GHG at more than six times the global per capita average.

    It’s worth examining the roots of this notion of the US as the exceptional nation. It was coined by De Tocqueville in the 1830’s, and predicated on his observation that the US was unique in that it had no feudal tradition, was more centered on rights, merit, religious beliefs, and was more egalitarian. This, according to De Tocqueville, set us apart from the more state-centered societies of Europe, and allowed democracy to flourish here, more than anywhere else.

    But it’s a big leap to go from there, to where the neocons would take us – the US as exempt from the civilizing treaties of the global community, by virtue of this exceptionalism.

    Of course, the problem with this arrogant stance is that it only works if other countries accept the neocons’ self-designated version of the US as “exceptional.”

    If they don’t – and why should they?- then our wholesale rejection of civilizing agreements such as the Land Mine Treaty, the Tobacco Treaty, the World Court, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Kyoto Climate Protocol looks less like De Tocqueville’s exceptionalism and more like ignorant and arrogant jingoism.

    Add to this list of ignominy that the US supports trade agreements that exploit labor and harm the environment and that, under Bush, we have consistently bad-mouthed the UN, essentially ignored the Geneva Conventions, preemptively invaded a sovereign nation, scuttled the chemical and biological weapons treaties, ignored our obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (to which we are a signatory) and publicly defended torture (water boarding is defined as torture in our own laws and in international laws) and “rendition,” as well as acted to limit the freedom and rights of our own citizens by subverting both the First and Fourth Amendments, and the necon case for exceptionalism becomes little more than a weak justification for a destructive form of jingoism that does more to limit freedom than champion it.

    The Harvest of Hypocrisy

    With a record of hypocrisy like this is it any wonder that a foreign policy based on arrogance is a complete failure? Might it not be at least a partial answer to the question, why do they hate us and, more to the point, why do they hate us even more now than they did in 2001? Certainly, arrogance without portfolio is the weakest platform from which to negotiate and lead.

    We the People of the United States have a choice about our country’s and the world’s destiny, and we will make that choice in the 2008 elections. On the one hand, we can choose to elect leaders who will continue to act as if we are not subject to the civilizing rules of the international community, while insisting others are. Down this path lies permanent confrontation, continuous wars and occupations, inevitable nuclear proliferation and nuclear brinksmanship, destruction of the climate that has sustained us since we appeared on the planet, a US that is increasingly isolated in the international community, and a world that is hurtling towards nuclear devastation and environmental destruction.

    On the other hand, we can choose to be truly exceptional, not simply by honoring our international obligations, but by actively leading the world community toward peace, prosperity and sustainability. This is not only ethically correct, it is strategically smart, and it would make the US a leader in all the ways mere military might cannot.

    Imagine a world in the process of destroying its nuclear weapons instead of its climate. Imagine the stature and influence that would accrue to the country leading that effort.

    It would have a moral authority that would be unambiguous and undeniable.

    Ghandi defeated Great Britain with the that kind of moral authority. Imagine, now, a nation with the military and economic power the US possesses, but blessed with Ghandi’s ethical leverage, too.

    Such a nation could walk across the world stage a colossus, and others would be forced to follow. It would be capable of building coalitions, blessed with allies, and capable of being a force for good that would be virtually unprecedented in human history. It would indeed be an exceptional nation.

    There is, in fact, only one country capable of becoming that nation. Us. If we were to choose this path, we would truly deserve to be known as the exceptional nation, and it would be others who designated us so, not an arrogant and belligerent claim we made on our own behalf.

    That’s the real opportunity cost of the Bush administration and the Republican doctrine; that’s the prize that will be lost if we allow the Democratic Party to be led by men and women of little vision and less courage, more interested in following polls than leading nations.

    There is no other country that can deliver us from this apocalypse; there is no other time we can choose to lead. It happens now, or it can’t happen. If we fail to call our nation to meet its destiny, the twin horses of the new apocalypse will ride, and we will sit astride them.

    Our votes and our voices will determine which it will be.

    This is either the blessing or the tragedy of our time.

    John Atcheson’s writing has appeared in the Washington Post, the Baltimore Sun, the San Jose Mercury News, the Memphis Commercial Appeal, as well as in several work journals.

  • No Nukes, No Proliferation

    The rising anxieties about nuclear weapons are rooted in two major and parallel developments: a renaissance of nuclear power and a resurgence of old-fashioned national security threats that supposedly had ebbed with the end of the Cold War.

    After the well publicized accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986, opposition to nuclear power was so strong that many reactor plants were shut down, plans for new ones were canceled and virtually no new reactor was built over the past decade. With the spiraling price of oil caused by a spike in demand and disruptions to supply, the economics of nuclear power has changed. With the accelerating threat of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions, the balance of environmental risk has shifted. Adding technological developments, the politics of constructing and operating nuclear power reactors has also altered.

    The net result is plans for building several reactors to add to the 435 reactors in 30 countries that provide 15 percent of the world’s electricity today. Asia will account for 18 of the 31 planned new reactors. The spurt in Chinese and Indian demand is a function of booming economic growth and population. In Japan and South Korea interest in nuclear power arises from lack of indigenous oil and gas resources and the desire for energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

    This throws up three clusters of concern:

    • How do we ensure that the plants are operated with complete safety?
    • How do we secure the plants against theft, leakage and attacks of weapons-sensitive material, skills and knowledge?
    • How do we build firewalls between civilian and weapons-related use of nuclear power?

    These concerns extend also to the international trade in nuclear material, skills and equipment. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, observed in 2004 that “Nuclear components designed in one country could be manufactured in another, shipped through a third, and assembled in a fourth for use in a fifth.”

    The challenge on the national security front is fourfold. First, the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-licit nuclear powers–Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States–have ignored their NPT obligation to disarm. Instead they are busy enlarging, modernizing and upgrading their nuclear arsenals and refining nuclear doctrines to indicate retention and expanded use of these weapons for several decades yet. The lesson to others? Nuclear weapons are indispensable in today’s world and becoming more useful for dealing with tomorrow’s threats.

    Second, three states outside the NPT–India, Israel and Pakistan–have been accepted, more or less, as de facto nuclear weapons powers.

    Third, as an intergovernmental agreement, the NPT doesn’t cover nonstate groups, including terrorists, who might be pursuing nuclear weapons. The turmoil in Pakistan, with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf playing the “loose nukes” card to retain U.S. backing, highlights the related danger of links between rogue elements of security forces and extremists.

    Fourth, some countries may be cheating on their NPT obligations and seeking nuclear weapons by stealth. The drumbeats of war being sounded in Washington on Iran bring back memories of 2002-03. This is a story we’ve heard before. We didn’t like the ending the first time and are unlikely to like it any better the next time round.

    The disquieting trend of a widening circle of NPT-illicit and extra-NPT nuclear weapons powers in turn has a self-generating effect in drawing other countries into the game of nuclear brinksmanship. The renaissance of nuclear power cannot be explained solely by the interest in nuclear energy for civilian uses.

    What might be the solution? Of the 27,000 nuclear weapons in existence today, 12,000 are deployed and ready for use, with 3,500 on hair-trigger alert. To begin with, some practical and concrete measures are long overdue: Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force; negotiating a verifiable fissile materials treaty; retrenching from launch-on-warning postures, standing down nuclear forces. That is, reviving, implementing and building on agreements for reducing the role, readiness and numbers of nuclear weapons in defense doctrines and preparations.

    But these amount to tinkering, not a bold and comprehensive vision of the final destination. What we need are rules-based regimes on the principles of reciprocity of obligations, participatory decision-making and independent verification procedures and compliance mechanisms.

    U.S. presidential hopeful Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., declared, “America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons.” In January, three former U.S. secretaries of defense and state–George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger–and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, called on Washington to take the lead in the abolition of nuclear weapons. The national security benefits of nuclear weapons, they argued, are outweighed by the threats posed to U.S. security by uncontrolled proliferation.

    The symbiotic link between nonproliferation and disarmament is integral to the NPT, the most brilliant half-successful arms control agreement in history. The number of countries to sign it–188–embraces virtually the entire family of nations. But the nuclear arsenals of the five NPT nuclear powers expanded enormously. With almost four decades having elapsed since 1968, the five NPT nuclear powers are in violation of their solemn obligation to disarm, reinforced by the advisory opinion of the World Court in 1996 that the NPT’s Article 6 requires them to engage in and bring to a conclusion negotiations for nuclear abolition.

    Despite this history and background, a surprising number of arms control experts focus solely on the nonproliferation side to demand denial of technology and materiel to all who refuse to sign and abide by the NPT, and punishment of any who cross the threshold. The term “nonproliferation ayatollahs” is applied pejoratively to them. The latest episode in this long-running and tired serial is the United States, Britain and France threatening Iran with war to stop it from acquiring–not using, merely acquiring–nuclear weapons. From where do the leaders of nuclear-armed Britain and France derive the moral authority to declare that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable?

    Nuclear weapons could not proliferate if they did not exist. Because they do, they will. The policy implication of this logic is that the best guarantee of nuclear nonproliferation is nuclear disarmament through a nuclear weapons convention that bans the possession, acquisition, testing and use of nuclear weapons, by everyone. This would solve the problem of nonproliferation as well as disarmament. The focus on nonproliferation to the neglect of disarmament ensures that we get neither. If we want nonproliferation, therefore, we must prepare for disarmament.

    Too many, including the government of Japan, have paid lip service to this slogan, but not pursued a serious program of action to make it a reality. The elegant theorems, cogent logic and fluent reasoning of many authoritative international commissions, including the Tokyo Forum, have made no discernible dent on the old, new and aspiring nuclear powers. A coalition between nuclear-armed and nonnuclear countries, led perhaps by India–which has crossed the threshold from a disarmament leader to a hypocritical nuclear power–and Japan, the only country to have suffered an atomic attack, might break the stalemate and dispel the looming nuclear clouds.

    Time is running out for the hypocrisy and accumulated anomalies of global nuclear apartheid. Either we will achieve nuclear abolition or we will have to live with nuclear proliferation followed by nuclear war. Better the soft glow of satisfaction from the noble goal realized of nuclear weapons banned, than the harsh glare of the morning after of these weapons used.

    Ramesh Thakur, distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo in Canada, is the author of The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006).