Category: Nuclear Threat

  • April: This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    April 7, 1954 – An article in the New York Times by William Lawrence titled, “Cobalt Bomb Can Be Built,” was published on this date.  The article quoted Albert Einstein and Manhattan Project scientist Leo Szilard who both expressed concern that 400 one-ton deuterium-cobalt bombs could release enough radiation to end all life on Earth.  About ten months after this article appeared, German nuclear scientist Otto Hahn publicly noted that only ten very large cobalt bombs could also trigger global catastrophe.  Comments:  Over the past seven-plus decades of the Nuclear Age, there have been many real and imagined ways for humanity to commit omnicide.  However, as Daniel Ellsberg’s 2017 book, “The Doomsday Machine:  Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner,” points out that due to the discovery in the early 1980s of the nuclear winter scenario by Carl Sagan and his colleagues and subsequent reinforcing studies by Rutgers Professor Alan Robock and other scholars, we can realize today that such exotic doomsday devices like those envisioned in the Fifties aren’t required to extinguish the human race, or at least destroy global civilization.  Because we now know that only a small fraction, perhaps 200 or so warheads, of the existing stocks of global nuclear arsenals (which now number over 10,000 devices) can do the trick.  So, even in a so-called “limited” nuclear exchange between say India and Pakistan, dozens of warheads exploding in a period of a few hours or a day could inject millions of tons or more of smoke and debris into the upper atmosphere, cooling the Earth significantly and triggering the subsequent collapse of global agriculture and the ensuing starvation of billions of people.  Unfortunately, this critical information largely has not been conveyed to the general public, especially the American people, by the mainstream news media.   Instead, American cable news networks and an array of mainstream newspapers has conveyed to the public a warped fascination with the spy vs. spy and tit-for-tat cyber warfare “games” played by both America and Russia, Trump and Putin.  As for doomsday scares, the American media loves to stoke fear and anger toward Russia every chance it gets.  For instance, recently a plethora of media sources pointed out that the Pentagon revealed that Russia is developing a “ultra-deep, stealthy nuclear-armed undersea, autonomous torpedo,” which it plans to deploy off the eastern coast of the United States.  Mainstream media viewers are told that the torpedo carries a highly radioactive cobalt warhead that could contaminate large areas of the East Coast making the region unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for a long period of time.  While, of course, this is a frightening threat, the 800-pound gorilla in the room, that both America and Russia as well as most of the other nuclear weapons states can trigger global nuclear winter and thereby extinguish 99 percent of our species without resort to exploding one alleged doomsday weapons system, is at the same time ignored or downplayed.  However, a growing movement of global citizenry and an increasing number of scientists, politicians, and military leaders are performing a public service by describing the unvarnished truth about the nuclear threat while also arguing for drastic reductions and the eventual elimination of extremely dangerous global nuclear arsenals.

    (Sources:  Jeffrey Lewis. “Putin’s Doomsday Machine.”  Foreign Policy.  Nov. 12, 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins-doomsday-machine-nuclear-weapon-us-russia/ and Lucy Pasha-Robinson. “U.S. Says Russia Developing ‘Doomsday’ Autonomous Nuclear Torpedo as Trump Administration Announces More Aggressive Stance to Moscow.”  The Independent.  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/russia-doomsday-nuclear -armed-undersea-torpedo-pentagon-defense-department-nuclear-posture-review-a8192541.html both accessed March 16, 2018.)

    April 10, 1945 – Three months before the first-ever test of an atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16th, the medical staff of the U.S. Manhattan (Project) Engineering District in Oak Ridge, Tennessee secretly injected highly radioactive plutonium into the bodies of victims of an automobile accident without their consent.  It was the first of over a dozen other injections of unknowing human subjects over the next two years in order to gather vital information for U.S. military and civilian scientists on how much exposure to the deadly substance would cause harm.  Over a period of 40 years and perhaps longer, the U.S. Department of Energy catalogued over 48 different radiation experiments conducted not only on adults but also on children including racial and ethnic minorities, the indigent, as well as the mentally ill, pregnant women and their fetuses, all in the name of national security.  Comments:  Such experiments represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of countless purposeful experiments, tests, and radioactive exposures inflicted on civilians and soldiers by representatives of the nine nuclear weapons states and possibly other nations that considered or are today considering acquiring nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials.  It is also extremely possible that these secret experiments may still be occurring through perhaps more subtle or hidden methodologies.  This is yet another paramount reason why nuclear weapons and nuclear power should be dramatically reduced and eliminated entirely (except for legitimate medicinal uses or every limited internationally-sanctioned civilian nuclear fusion reactor research) by 2030.

    (Sources:  U.S. Department of Energy.  “Human Radiation Experiments:  The Department of Energy Roadmap to the Story and Records.” Document Number DOE/EH-0445, February 1995 and Eileen Welsome. “The Plutonium Files:  America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War.”  New York:  Dial Press, 1999.)

    April 12, 2018 – The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) 2018 Capstone Conference, the final conference of the 2017-2018 PONI Conference Series, now in its 14th year, sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Washington, DC, will be held at the Offutt Inn at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  “The conference will feature presentations from emerging nuclear experts covering topics such as nuclear strategies, rising threats in the East, arms control and proliferation challenges, and threats to alliances and institutions.  The PONI Conference series, which is unique in its emphasis on featuring rising experts and young professionals in the nuclear field, draws emerging thought leaders from across the nuclear enterprise and provides them a visible platform for sharing their new thinking on a range of nuclear issues.”  Comments:  One of the key cogs of the Congressional-military-industrial-corporate-think tank complex are academic-sounding conferences like this meeting held annually at one of the most secure U.S. military bases in the world, where anti-nuclear activists would not have direct access (although of course, protest actions are still possible outside the main gates of the base).  The list of speakers and the agenda are not provided and STRATCOM’s website notes that, “Conference presentations and keynote speakers are off-the-record.”  However, the site does mention that the keynote address will be given by General John E. Hyten, current commander of U.S. STRATCOM.  But the media and the public does have access to the 2016 PONI Capstone Conference comments of a former commander of STRATCOM, Admiral Cecil D. Haney who remarked that, “…we must be thoughtful going forward, because deterring in today’s multi-polar world requires us to view threats across the “spectrum of conflict,” where escalation may occur with more than one adversary, and will be transregional, multi-domain and multifunctional…Strategic deterrence is a complex subject that is foundational to our nation’s security.  Deterrence depends on the situation and one size never fits all, yet it is bounded in the understanding that adversaries will not gain the benefit they seek…Adversaries cannot escalate their way out of a failed conflict…the U.S. will respond in a time, place, and domain of our choosing.”  Admiral Haney also noted that, “Our strategic capabilities are routinely demonstrated or exercised,” and referred to B-2 bomber threats against North Korea (which he specifically mentioned as “B-2 deployment to U.S. Pacific Command”) and remarked that, “we flight-tested two ICBMs from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota” (which most of the world’s population sees no differently than such tests staged irregularly by China, Russia, or North Korea, as rehearsals for a nuclear Armageddon).  Of course, no speech by STRATCOM’s commander would be complete without a pitch to Congress for more doomsday weaponry as the Admiral added that, “We must not jeopardize strategic stability by failing to sustain, to modernize, and, in some cases, expand our deterrent forces.  In the 2020s to 2030s recapitalization (a euphemism for a new generation of nuclear bomb-making with more sophisticated and thus actually more globally destabilizing weapons and nuclear platforms) will grow to between six and seven percent (of the annual bloated U.S. military budget), a modest price to pay to deter Russia and North Korea.”  The only other speaker mentioned on the website for this year’s conference is of course a representative of the “corporate” or “think-tank” sponsor of the 2018 PONI Capstone Conference – The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), whose trustees include top Cold Warriors from past presidential administrations such as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Richard Armitage, and Brent Scowcroft.  The conference speaker for CSIS is Rebecca Hersman, a former assistant secretary of defense and Congressional staffer for the House Armed Services Committee, whose body of work includes papers that support “Building a Compelling Rationale for the Role and Value of U.S. Nuclear Weapons” (2016), and an article on the February 2018 Trump Administration’s nuclear posture review (NPR), which she characterizes as, “the retention and modernization of the current nuclear triad largely proposed and supported by the Obama Administration.”  Professor Edward Herman’s 1989 work “The Terrorism Industry” and many more recent academic and journalistic accounts have proven that think-tanks like CSIS have extensive direct ties to U.S. weapons contractors as well as the U.S. intelligence community.  It is clear that such conferences reinforce and justify, in terms of public perceptions, that “American exceptionalism” and U.S. global nuclear hegemony go hand-in-hand and will continue indefinitely (as its adherents fervently hope) as did other “enlightened” hegemons in history like the Roman and British empires.  However, as disastrous as it was for the world when those past empires fell, the growing likelihood of nuclear Armageddon today threatens the very existence of our species and countless others on the planet.  Thankfully, a growing consensus of world leaders and global citizenry are committed to preventing that from happening.  When the majority of U.S. leaders join the movement to rid the world of nuclear weapons and if, in fact, that goal is someday reached thanks largely to American leadership, then perhaps on that day one can really embrace the rhetoric of “American exceptionalism.”

    (Sources:  “Nuclear Calendar” Natural Resources Defense Council. http://www2.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendarindex.php, “PONI 2018 Capstone Conference.” https://www.CSIS.org/events/poni-2018-capstone-conference, “Project on Nuclear Issues Capstone Conference, April 13, 2016. http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/986478/project-on-nuclear-issues-capstone-conference/(2016)back all of which were accessed March 16, 2018.)

    April 19, 2015 – On this date, two former Cold War adversaries published an op-ed in the New York Times titled, “How to Avert a Nuclear War.”  U.S. Marine Corps General James E. Cartwright, the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, and Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, a former director of the research institute of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, both of whom then worked on the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, argued that, “Russia and the United States are still living with the nuclear strike doctrine of the Cold War which dictated three strategic options:  first strike, launch-on-warning, and post-attack retaliation.”  The two Cold Warriors noted particularly that, “For either side, the decision to launch-on-warning…after an alert of an apparent attack must be made in minutes.  This is therefore the riskiest scenario, since provocations or malfunctions can trigger a global catastrophe.  Since computer-based information systems have been in place, the likelihood of such errors has been minimized.  But, the emergence of cyber warfare threats has increased the potential for false alerts in early warning systems.  The possibility of an error cannot be ruled out.”  These military experts also point to another related concern that due to the loss of all of Russia’s early warning satellites, that nation’s haphazard system of prefabricated border radars allow even less time to react to false warning of a potential U.S. nuclear first strike.  Generals Cartwright and Dvorkin concluded that, “Launch-on-warning puts enormous strain on the nuclear chains of command in both countries…the risk, however small, of cataclysmic error remains…This risk should motivate the presidents of Russia and the United States to decide in tandem to eliminate the launch-on-warning concept from their nuclear strategies, (for it) is a relic of Cold War strategy whose risk today far exceeds its value…Our leaders…need…(to) agree to scrap this obsolete protocol before a devastating error occurs.”  Comments:  Over the last few years, other military and civilian leaders in the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have shocked the Congressional-military-industrial complex by pushing for the elimination of all land-based ICBMs, the establishment of a no-first use policy, and other restrictions limiting any use of nuclear weapons including post-attack retaliation, low threshold bunker-busting bombs, or other smaller yield nuclear devices that some have proposed using to attack Iranian or North Korean underground nuclear facilities.  But the Nuclear Genie’s minions continue their solitary focus on continuing past risky behavior as “defense” contractors, their CEOs, and other institutions continue to profit despite their flawed perception that the chance of accidental or unintentional nuclear war is so infinitesimally small that they are justified in supporting “the maintenance of robust deterrence.”  And unfortunately today, three years after Cartwright and Dvorkin’s op-ed, the presidents of Russia and the United States both take every opportunity to rattle their nuclear sabers and err on the side of pushing for more nukes, more options for their use, and more strategic instability to counterintuitively ‘make Russia and America great again.’

    (Source:  Numerous mainstream and alternative news media sources and http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/how-to-avert-a-nuclear-war-html?_r=0 accessed March 16, 2018.)

    April 26, 1986 – At the Chernobyl Nuclear Complex located about 130 kilometers (80 miles) north of Kiev, capital of the then Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the U.S.S.R., a fire developed in the core of the number four reactor unit which triggered an explosion that blew the roof off the building resulting in the largest ever release of radioactive material from a civilian reactor, with the possible exception of the Fukushima Dai-chi accident on March 11, 2011 in northeast Japan.  Two were killed and 200 others hospitalized, but the Soviet government did not release specific details of the nuclear meltdown until two days later when Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and other European neighbors detected abnormally high levels of radioactivity.  8,000 died and 435,000 people were evacuated from the region in the ensuing days, weeks, months, and years.  Although West Germany, Sweden, and other nations provided assistance to the Soviet Union to deal with the deadly, widespread radioactive fallout from the accident, some argue today that the U.S., China, Russia, France, Japan, and other nations should establish a permanent, multilateral civilian-military-humanitarian response force to quickly address such serious nuclear and natural disasters in a time-urgent, nonpartisan manner.  In November of 2016, a massive shelter, costing 1.5 billion euros and measuring 843 feet wide and 354 feet tall, which was constructed by 10,000 workers, was sealed shut over the number four reactor unit at Chernobyl.  Inside the deadliest radioactive structure on the planet is approximately 200 tons of radioactive corium, 30 tons of contaminated dust, and a very large indeterminate amount of uranium and plutonium.  Radiation levels inside the shelter still run as high as 5,000 to 10,000 roentgens per hour.  A 2016 report by Greenpeace on the local and regional impacts of the disaster found that in many cases, in grain stocks for instance, radiation levels in the contaminated zone surrounding the shelter where about five million people live today, are still surprisingly high.  According to scientific testing conducted by Greenpeace consultants and experts, overall contamination from key isotopes such as cesium-137 and strontium-90 may have fallen somewhat, but continue to linger at prohibitive levels especially in forested areas of the contaminated zone.  Comments:  In addition to the dangerous risk of nuclear power plant accidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima, and others too numerous to list here, the tremendously out-of-control civilian and military nuclear waste sequestration, remediation, and permanent storage conundrum as well as terrorist targeting potential, the economic unsustainability of civilian nuclear power, and the potential for nuclear proliferation points logically to an accelerated phase-out of global civilian nuclear power plants over the next decade as well as an absolute halt to massive plans by most of the nuclear weapons states to accelerate production of fissile materials in order to build a new, unneeded generation of destabilizing nuclear weaponry, while polluting our fragile ecosphere with more radioactivity.

    (Sources:  “Nuclear Scars: The Lasting Legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima.” Greenpeace.  March-April 2016. http://greenpeace.org/france/PageFiles/266171/Nuclear_Scars_report_WEB_final_version_20160403.pdf and Gleb Garanich. “30 Years After Chernobyl, Locals Still Eating Radioactive Food.” Reuters (also published on Newsweek website). March 9, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/30-years-after-chernobyl-locals-still-eating-radioactive-food-435253 and “Chernobyl Arch Moved into Place in Historic Engineering Feat.”  World Nuclear News. Nov. 14, 2016. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-Chernobyl-arch-moved-into-place-in-historic-engineering-feat-14111602.html all of which were accessed March 16, 2018.)

    April 30, 1998 – The U.S. Senate, by a vote of 80-19, approved NATO’s eastern expansion to the former Soviet Warsaw Pact military alliance countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the 17th, 18th and 19th members of the Alliance, a move that was later formalized at a ceremony at NATO headquarters in Brussels on March 16, 1999.  Nevertheless, there were and still are dissenting opinions about how unchecked NATO expansion is interpreted as a threat to Moscow.  Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR), who after retiring from Congress became the director of the Center for Defense Information, noted that, “We are forcing them to rely more and more heavily on nuclear weapons (to make up for the advantage over Russia in conventional arms deployed on or near Russia’s western borders by larger and larger numbers of NATO countries).  And the more you rely on nuclear weapons, the lower the hair trigger for nuclear war.”  As the years passed several other European nations, most of them also former Warsaw Pact countries, joined NATO which has now increased its membership to 29 nations.  NATO expansion, which has correlated with increasing tensions between the Alliance and Russia as illustrated in the recent Crimea-Ukraine Crisis and renewed episodes, over the last several years, of close aerial and naval encounters between NATO and Russian craft, has proven Bumpers and many other observers correct as nuclear war risks have escalated leading scholars to refer to contemporary times as “a second Cold War.”  Comments:  Tensions are still on the rise as seen by the comments in 2016-17 of many observers including former Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev who warned, “The world has never been closer to nuclear war than it is at present.”  At the same time, German politicians including Social Democrats and Christian Democrats accused NATO of “war mongering.”  Even a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, joined the chorus of voices against Alliance threats, “NATO is threatening and trying to provoke a nuclear war in Europe by putting bombers and nuclear missiles on the border with Russia.”  Although tensions seemed to have relaxed a bit after President Trump took office due to his complimentary rhetoric about Russian President Vladimir Putin, more recently relations have sunk much deeper with revelations of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the poisoning of a Russian émigré Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Britain, stepped up U.S. economic sanctions, British expulsions of Russian diplomats, counter responses by Russia, and renewed nuclear threats by Trump and Putin as both leaders announced further qualitative and quantitative increases in long-term nuclear weapons modernization programs.

    (Sources:  Jack Mendelsohn and David Grahame, editors.  “Arms Control Chronology.” Washington, DC:  Center for Defense Information, 2002, pp, 133-134 and numerous articles from mainstream and alternative news media websites.)

  • The Use and Misuse of the Language of Self-Defense

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    Is the first use of nuclear weapons just? Is it morally right? This question applies not only to presidential first use but to first use by any state or non-state actor. Here is an ancient motto that has recently taken on an ominous new meaning: Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus (“Let justice be done, though the world perish”). Sometimes this motto is phrased as Fiat iustitia, ruat caelum (“Let justice be done, though the heavens fall”). Both versions urge that you should do what is right no matter how horrendous the consequence might be.

    In the 16th century the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I chose that first motto and used it as his armies fought the invading forces of the Ottomans led by Suleiman the Magnificent. Ferocious as those battles were, however, Ferdinand could never have imagined that the world would in fact perish as a result of his fighting what he thought was a just war.

    Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the metaphors of the world perishing or the heavens falling have taken on far more literal meanings. When we think about justice and war, three main views prevail. One is the so-called realist view that war is hell, that justice is not an issue in war and never has been. The second is the pacifist view that wars are never just. The third is Just War Theory, which argues that there can be morally acceptable wars if they are waged for justifiable purposes such as national self-defense, but only if going to war is the last resort, and if war never explicitly targets noncombatants or uses inhumane weapons. Nuclear war cannot meet any of the conditions for a just war, because it would obliterate the distinctions between self-defense and aggression, combatants and noncombatants, and more or less inhumane weapons.

    Michael Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, put it this way: “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war.” Any use of nuclear weapons is unjust because it endangers vast numbers of civilians and employs the most inhumane of weapons. Any first use of such weapons is precisely not launched as a last resort. Can we say the same, however, about policies that merely warn of or threaten the resort to nuclear weapons?

    Proponents of first use argue that there should be no moral constraints on what a nation can do or threaten in self-defense and that threatening to use nuclear weapons is quite different from actually doing so; in their view, such threats are a form of deterrence. Ordinary moral constraints should allow for limited exceptions as a last resort when self-defense is at issue. Invoking self-defense as justification for going to war rests on a longstanding analogy between nations defending themselves and individuals doing so by means of violence as a last resort if need be.

    But we need look no further back than to the wars in Vietnam and Iraq to see misuses of that language of self-defense. Those misuses led the United States and other nations to violate the most basic moral constraints regarding engaging in war as a last resort and in a way that spares civilians and prohibits inhumane weapons.

    Just as wagers of wars past once took for granted that God was on their side, so self-defense and national security are invoked today even for aggressive ventures far beyond national borders. Such actions are hardly analogous to what an individual might rightfully do as a last resort when faced with direct assault. Indeed, the ferocity of today’s weapons and the genuine threat those weapons pose to national survival now lead governments often to argue that every action they take to reinforce their own power or to diminish that of their enemies contributes to self-defense.

    During the 1980s, when the world lived with a balance of terror, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) insisted on retaining a policy of first use. The member nations argued that nuclear deterrence by itself might not suffice if Soviet conventional forces moved into Europe. NATO’s only way to guard against such a move would be to rely on the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, there was growing unrest in Europe, caused by the fear that the great powers intended Europe to be the theater where they would clash. Peace movements were mobilizing, calls were made for more complete test bans, for nuclear-free zones, for the elimination of the use of cruel weapons and cruel methods of warfare, and for the rejection of first-use policies.

    In 1982 McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith published an influential article that urged that the time had come for NATO to reconsider the policy of first use. “We think a policy of no-first-use, especially if shared with the Soviet Union, would bring new hope to everyone in every country whose life is shadowed by the hideous possibility of a third great twentieth-century conflict in Europe—conventional or nuclear.” Thirty-five years later, the fear of a third great conflict to which they referred as a hideous possibility has returned.

    Kofi Annan, secretary general of the United Nations from 1997 to 2005, recently recalled his feeling of great relief at the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the sudden sense that, “with the end of the Cold War, the UN could do what it was set up to do, without one country vetoing the other”; world leaders would realize that “cross-border cooperation was the only way to solve crises.” Yet now, Annan said, “we seem to be back to where we were in ’89.” He added that men in high places “don’t always seem to understand the risks we are all in,” and warned: “All that we need is one miscalculation … and all bets are off.”

    That same sense of urgency and high risk was expressed by the Norwegian Nobel Committee when awarding the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The Nobel Committee’s citation explained that “we live in a world where the risk of nuclear weapons being used is greater than it has been for a long time.” The number of states with nuclear weapons has increased and so has the intense distrust among nuclear adversaries. There is greater risk than ever that nuclear weapons might be launched accidentally, in error, or utterly irrationally. Just as the popular movement in Europe contributed to public debate and to bringing about change during the 1980s, so ICAN is today joining with environmental and other kinds of groups to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of nuclear weapons.

    By drawing attention to the catastrophic consequences for the peoples of the world of any use of nuclear weapons, these groups aim to raise awareness of what genuine concern for collective self-defense calls for on the part of the peoples around the world. This is a use of the language of self-defense that we need to support: the collective self-defense of all the people who might be the victims of horrendous nuclear catastrophe. As President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev jointly declared in 1985: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

  • Nuclear Weapons Use in South Asia

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    My topic is nuclear weapons in South Asia. The United States was the first nation to build nuclear weapons, and the US first use of nuclear weapons was itself their first ever use. The United States was not under imminent threat of attack when they used nuclear weapons on Japan. The US explained the atomic bomb to the world as a weapon of awesome power that was harnessing the power of the sun and as the future of warfare. No wonder others wanted it. If the United States could use this weapon and claim that it turned the tide of war, then they wanted it too. This lesson took root in South Asia and today both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons.

    The image above was taken by an astronaut. The bright yellow line snaking up the middle is the border between India on the right and Pakistan on the left. The bright shiny spot way at bottom left is the city of Karachi, population roughly 20 million. Imagine the distance from that city of 20 million people to the border with India (it is at most a few hundred miles). It would take a missile three hundred seconds to fly from an Indian military base to a target in Pakistan and vice versa. By the time Pakistan or India knows that the missile is coming, the better part of a hundred seconds is already gone. That leaves you two hundred seconds to figure out what’s happening. Is it real? What do we do? Who decides? Two hundred seconds. You can almost hold your breath for that long. Almost.

    The Indians and the Pakistanis have tried to put in place systems to manage decision-making about nuclear weapons, but those systems are completely removed from reality. On paper, they have very proper procedures about who will be the members of the committee that will decide whether to launch a nuclear attack. Those committees are chaired by prime ministers or their designated appointees; they include cabinet ministers and generals who are supposed to decide collectively. But could you gather them together or even on the phone in two hundred seconds in the middle of the night in a crisis situation?

    In the Pakistani case, the fantasy of having a prime minister chair the committee that will decide about the use of nuclear weapons beggars belief. In any committee where the prime minister of Pakistan and the chief of the army sit at the same table, it will not be the prime minister who gets to decide. Pakistan has had three periods of military dictatorship, and those periods of military dictatorship saw the beginnings of nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s, the achievement of a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability in the early 1980s, and the establishment of a large nuclear arsenal with an array of missiles in the early 2000s. The Pakistan army is used to being in charge of everything that matters when it comes to warfare, and prime ministers know to get out of the way.

    The Pakistani plan for the use of nuclear weapons is the first use of nuclear weapons as a deliberate strategy. Their nuclear strategy is that if they are in a war with India, they will turn a conventional war into a nuclear war as soon as they fear they are losing the conventional war. And Pakistani decision-makers expect to lose, unless there is international intervention, because the Indians have more soldiers and more tanks. The Indian response to this has been that if Pakistan uses nuclear weapons against their soldiers anywhere, including on the Indian side of the border, then they will launch massive retaliation. The Indian position is not that they will use nuclear weapons first, but that if those weapons are used against them, the Indian response will not be proportionate. If you attack our soldiers, then we destroy your cities.

    I recently debated a retired Indian vice admiral who had been in charge of India’s nuclear weapons and asked him about the following scenario. Suppose that Pakistan uses a nuclear weapon against some Indian soldiers and tanks in the desert because Pakistan thinks they are going to lose the battle here. Is India going to massively retaliate against Pakistani cities? Is India going to kill millions upon millions of civilians because Pakistan kills some soldiers and destroys some tanks? (Nuclear weapons, by the way, are not very good at destroying tanks.) He said, yes, we will destroy Pakistani cities because that is the only way to deter.

    Where did this insanity come from? It began when the United States was trying to recruit allies in the Cold War. Indian leaders said no. The US then asked Pakistan’s leaders to become allies, and they agreed, in exchange for guns and funds. The US sent both. In the 1950s, the US expected the next war to be against the Soviet Union and to go nuclear. The US military sent a Nuclear Warfare Team to Pakistani military training academies to teach them how to fight a nuclear war. American military planning in the 1950s for the fighting of the next war envisaged the early use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces, because of the belief that the Soviets would overwhelm the US in any conventional war.

    Little has changed. Now, instead of relying on American nuclear weapons, the Pakistanis have built their own and plan to use them based on the lessons that the Americans taught them so long ago. The Pakistani military will control decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Because India has overwhelming conventional force, its stated policy is against first use of nuclear weapons. The Indian military by and large doesn’t particularly like this idea. They want to be able to go first. But Indian politicians have held the line against first use, at least so far.

    Until the United States changes how it thinks about nuclear weapons, it’s very hard to imagine any other nuclear-weapons state rethinking its position on their use. If you are an anti-nuclear activist talking to leaders in Pakistan or in India they will tell you, look, if the Americans think they need nuclear weapons, surely we do; if the Americans think that they need to use nuclear weapons first, then surely we should be able to do so too. The future of nuclear decision-making in all the other nuclear-weapons states hinges on how the United States begins to think about changing its policy.

    There is now a new international treaty open for signature to prohibit nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. The world believes by and large that the use of nuclear weapons is not acceptable (122 countries out of the 192 members of the United Nations supported the new treaty). The debate about the use of nuclear weapons needs to begin with the understanding that the threat and use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a crime in international law. Any policymaker willing to make the decision to use nuclear weapons or threaten their use should be considered an international war criminal.

  • Nuclear North Korea: 1999 and 2017

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    William Perry
    Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry.

    In 1998, North Korea launched a long-range missile. The test happened to be unsuccessful, but the fact that they were testing caused great concern that they were cheating on the 1994 Agreed Framework, by which they agreed to shut down their nuclear program at Yongbyon. We believed that they must still have some nuclear developments underway, because an ICBM doesn’t make much sense unless it’s carrying a nuclear weapon. The test led people in Congress to believe that we had to pull out of the Agreed Framework. In that turmoil, President Clinton asked me if I would temporarily come back into government and serve as his special representative on dealing with North Korea.

    I foolishly accepted the assignment. The first thing I did was brief Congress about my new assignment and my goal to stop any nuclear developments that might be still underway in North Korea, as well as their development of long-range missiles. Not all the members were thrilled, but they seemed to accept it. I then asked the Japanese prime minister and the South Korean president to appoint an equivalent person to work with me so that this would be a tripartite process rather than an American process. The three of us spent the next several months working and then released a report that laid out a diplomatic path for approaching North Korea.

    The single most important statement in that report was that we must “deal with North Korea as it is, not as we might wish it to be.” I believe that statement is as true today as it was when the report came out, in 1999. I then requested a meeting with the North Korean leaders and they granted it. They allowed me to fly an Air Force plane directly into Pyongyang, which is so unusual that, as we flew into North Korea, I was looking down wondering whether the air defense people on the ground had gotten the word that it was all right for this US Air Force plane to fly in there. After a very interesting four days in Pyongyang, we ended with a comprehensive verbal agreement about what North Koreans would not do; what the US would do to provide additional security assurances to North Korea; and what Japan and South Korea would offer in the way of economic incentives.

    This was followed by a series of actions in North Korea, some of which were quite encouraging, including allowing North Korean athletes to march with South Korean athletes in the Olympics—a symbolic gesture, but a very nice one. Kim Jong-il sent his top military aide, vice marshal Jo Myong-rok, back to the United States to see if we could come to a formal agreement. He asked me if he could stop at Stanford on the way so that I could show him around Silicon Valley, which I did. I arranged to take him to companies where the CEOs happened to be Korean Americans so that they could speak to him in his own language.

    Jo’s meeting in Washington was successful. He met with both the secretary of state and the president and we reached a final agreement. The signing was nominally set for a month or two in the future, whenever Clinton and Kim Jong-il could get their schedules worked out. The meeting happened in October of 2000. The next month, a new US administration was elected. Initially, the Bush administration said they would continue the effort, but in fact two months later President Bush cut off all discussions with North Korea. For two years there were no discussions at all, and the whole process collapsed.

    The Bush Administration believed that they could get a better agreement. By 2017 that had resulted in North Korea having 20 to 30 nuclear weapons, a few of them thermonuclear, and a couple of hundred ballistic missiles, most of them capable of reaching South Korea and some of them capable of reaching Japan. And North Korea was developing missiles capable of reaching the United States.

    The purpose of these nuclear weapons in my considered judgment is to deter the United States from making a military attack on North Korea. They want to sustain their regime and, more broadly, the Kim dynasty. Each of the three leaders of North Korea has essentially been an emperor with absolute power, including the power to summarily execute someone if they decide to do so. North Korean leaders have absolute power over international decisions.

    The current North Korean regime in my judgment is ruthless, including to their own people, and reckless. But I do not believe they are suicidal. I do not believe they are crazy. They’re seeking to stay in power, and therefore, in my judgment, they will use the nuclear weapons only in response to an attack. Nuclear weapons are useful to them, but only if they do not use them. Once they use them, the leaders understand that they will die and their country will be devastated.

    I therefore think that the US fear of an unprovoked attack by North Korea is groundless. But still, it’s a very dangerous situation. North Korea will use nuclear weapons if attacked, and there certainly has been ample talk in the United States of making a preemptive attack on them. North Korea may even use nuclear weapons if they believe they’re about to be attacked.

    Consider the consequences. North Korea has Seoul and Tokyo and other cities within range of their nuclear weapons. If they attack those cities, they will destroy them. Millions of people will die. This is not hyperbole. Putting on my technical hat as former secretary of defense and former under secretary of defense for research and engineering, I can confidently say that we could avenge such an action, but we cannot defend against it. We do not have a defense capable of protecting against a missile attack on Tokyo and Seoul.

    Our policy should be to ensure that this does not happen. How do we do that? We have to get serious about diplomacy. I’m convinced that there is a diplomatic path available to us. The path to Pyongyang is through Beijing. We should start our diplomacy with China so that the US and China can agree on the dangers and how to deal with them. We also need to address China’s concern about having American troops along the Yellow River, which is one of the big factors holding them back from taking meaningful action.

  • Presidential First Use: Introduction

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    This article was originally published by The Nation.

    Among the things we know about nuclear weapons, two features are our focus today.

    The first is the spectacular level of injury that nuclear weapons can inflict on the earth and all its inhabitants, human, animal, and plants. On our ground and on our sky.

    Recent work on nuclear winter shows that if even a tiny fraction of the worldwide current arsenal is used—not 1 percent but 3/100th of 1 percent of the total blast power—20 million people will die on the first afternoon and 1 billion in the first months. That research, by scientist Alan Robock, has appeared in leading science journals.

    It is for this reason that the International Committee of the Red Cross has said that, if even a single city is hit, its worldwide resources will not be sufficient to help.

    Every study reaches the same conclusion. Even if the weapon should be still smaller—reduced so that it is 3/10,000 of 1 percent of the total nuclear blast power available today, the injuries will be beyond our reach. A study in the Netherlands showed that a single small nuclear weapon arriving in Rotterdam will kill 70,000 people. Ten thousand survivors will be severely burned. Yet in all of Netherlands there are only 100 burn beds. If the discrepancy between the number burned and the number of treatment beds seems uncivilized, recognize that Mass General, a leading hospital in Boston, has seven burn beds.

    As the size of the weapon increases, so too do the injuries. According to a report by Steven Starr, Lynn Eden and Ted Postol in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, if an 800-kiloton weapon should be detonated above Manhattan, the center of the blast will be four times the temperature of the sun and within “tens of minutes,” a firestorm will cover 90 to 150 square miles.

    So the first feature is the unconscionable level of injury, injuries that cannot be repaired. Only injuries that have not yet happened can be undone. Once they have happened it is too late to be indignant.

    Even more central to our discussion: The second feature of the nuclear arsenal is that this capacity for unthinkable levels of injury resides in the hands of a solitary person, or a small handful of persons, in the United States as well as in the other nuclear states. Nuclear weapons strategy in the United States is designed around “presidential first use,” an arrangement that enables one man, the president, to kill and maim many millions of people in a single afternoon.

    The key features of nuclear architecture are, then, this unthinkably magnified level of injury at one end of the weapon and at the other end of the weapon, an unthinkably small number of men who determine our collective fate and the fate of the planet.

    What remains to be seen is whether the people of our own country—and more generally the people of the earth—will permit these weapons and these arrangements for presidential first use to remain in place.

    And then there is a second key question: If the people of this country do not wish these arrangements to remain in place, are there legal and constitutional tools that can help dismantle those arrangements?

    It will be helpful to keep in mind that the nuclear architecture is a physical architecture, but the physical architecture is accompanied by a mental architecture and it is this mental architecture that keeps the physical architecture in place.

    Let me say a few words about each.

    As for the physical architecture, we can see from this chart that 93 percent of the world’s total arsenal is possessed by the United States and Russia. The small wedge at one o’clock is the portion of the arsenal owned by the other seven nuclear states. North Korea has, by the most accurate estimates, fissile material for fewer than 20 warheads. (Here and there estimates have come in as high as 60 warheads, but Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists—over time the single most reliable voice on weapons count—judges 20 or fewer to be still the best estimate.)

    The legend on the chart tells us that each icon represents five warheads. To get an accurate picture of the world arsenal, we need to multiply the field of icons fivefold.

    In attempting to comprehend the vast scale of the United States arsenal, we are assisted by The New York Times, which recently provided a compelling set of graphics. It calculated what portion of the US stockpile would be needed to “decimate” Libya, what portion to “decimate” North Korea, what portion to “decimate” Syria, Iraq, Iran, China, Russia, and then showed how many weapons would be left over after we had killed one-fourth of the population in those seven countries. Their answer: Seventy percent of the US arsenal would remain.

    It takes thousands of painstaking small steps to put a physical arsenal into place, and 99 percent of those steps have already been completed. We’re not waiting for something to start; we’re very late, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’s 2 ½-minutes-to-midnight tells us. Only the last of the thousand steps—the launch itself—remains.

    For example, specific cities all over the world have specific targets assigned to them. Weapons are assigned not just to our opponents but to our potential opponents, and even to our non-opponents. During the most-recent Bush administration, Vice President Cheney became curious about how many are assigned to each city: “Tell me, I said to the planners, how many warheads are going to hit Kiev under the current plan. It was a difficult question to get an answer to because I don’t think anybody had ever asked it before, but I finally got a report back that under the current targeting plan, we had literally dozens of warheads targeted on this single city.”

    Until the Clinton administration, the longitude and latitude of those cities were programed into the missiles before they were loaded into the Ohio-class submarines. Out of fear that a hacker would initiate a launch, this practice was changed so that instead of the geographical coordinates of cities, the longitude and latitude of uninhabited regions of ocean were programed into the missiles. It is noteworthy that this ethical change was brought about not by the application of moral reasoning—not by the demands of the citizenry or councils of government—but by the very real possibility of a hacker. Throughout this enlightened shift to open-ocean targeting, what never changed was the assignment of specified weapons to specified cities.

    What about the mental architecture that has kept this physical architecture in place?

    The mental architecture requires first and foremost that little information be given to the citizenry. In turn, attempts of the citizenry to protest can be silenced by pointing out that they are speaking without knowledge or information. This blackout of information imperils citizenship in the same way that in earlier centuries depriving people of the art of reading and writing imperiled citizenship. It has acted as a firm piece of social control.

    Many Americans believe that our nuclear weapons will be used only in response to a nuclear attack by another country. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have had first-use arrangements and a first-use policy throughout the 70 years of the nuclear age.

    Most Americans believe that the only time following Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the United States came close to launching a nuclear weapon was during the Cuban missile crisis.

    We now know that Eisenhower twice considered using an atomic weapon in the Taiwan Straits in 1954 and again in Berlin in 1959; that the Kennedy administration, according to Robert McNamara, three times came within “a hair’s breadth” of war with Russia; that Lyndon Johnson considered using a nuclear weapon against China to prevent that country from getting a bomb; and that Nixon, by his own account, four times contemplated using a nuclear weapon. The record stops there because only after a 30-year-time-lag when presidential papers are released do we learn what our leaders planned.

    Our current president, President Trump, is for many of us in the country and for many people throughout the world a particularly reckless figure. Yet the presidential first-use structure is catastrophic even in the hands of the best of men. Yes, it is wildly dangerous if someone is openly reckless and irrational; but it continues to be fatal even in the hands of those who are nominally rational because it is itself a deeply irrational and reckless architecture.

    One great silencer against questions or complaints has been deterrence, an incoherent doctrine whereby nuclear war is best prevented not by ceasing to have, but by having nuclear weapons.

    Gen. Lee Butler, commander in chief of the US Strategic Command from 1992 to 1994, punctures the concept of deterrence most succinctly, deploring the way over decades “the nuclear priesthood extolled its virtues and bowed to its demands”:

    Appropriated from the lexicon of conventional warfare, this simple prescription for adequate military preparation thus became in the nuclear age a formula for unmitigated catastrophe … it was premised on a litany of unwarranted assumptions, unprovable assertions, and logical contradictions.

    A third feature of this disabling mental architecture is the erroneous belief that nuclear weapons cannot be unmade. Assurance that they can be unmade comes from many quarters. The entire Southern Hemisphere is blanketed with nuclear-weapons-free treaties: the Treaty of Pelindaba, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty of Rarotonga. The nuclear architecture takes place across a north-south divide; nuclear states reside only in the Northern Hemisphere. A study made in Scotland of the timetable for eliminating the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal by John Ainslie—a timetable judged reasonable by leading military experts in our own country such as former missile-launch officer Bruce Blair—shows the simple and straightforward steps that can be followed (some completed in hours, others requiring several years). Compared to the problem of global warming, the steps for dismantling nuclear weapons are straightforward and eminently doable.

    Is the question that we are asking today—about the legality, constitutionality, or justness of presidential first use—a narrow question (as some people have said to me)?

    Or is it instead, as I believe, a question whose answer is profound and deep and has the potential to strike a fatal blow to the nuclear architecture?

  • Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? It is just?

    Nuclear weapons strategy in the United States is designed around “presidential first use,” an arrangement that enables one person, the president, to kill and maim many millions of people in a single afternoon. Is presidential first use legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just? At a November 4, 2017, conference held at Harvard University and co-chaired by Elaine Scarry of Harvard and Jonathan King of MIT, gathers international and constitutional scholars and politicians to examine the nature of presidential first use in the United States alongside parallel arrangements in the other eight nuclear states. The conference exposed the grave illegality of first use, the likelihood of its occurring, and the way citizens can step forward to dismantle it.

    Transcript of Presentations

    Elaine Scarry: Introduction

    Congressman Jim McGovern: Presidential First Use vs. Congress

    William J. Perry: Nuclear North Korea: 1999 and 2017

    Bruce G. Blair: Protocol for a US Nuclear Strike

    Rosa Brooks: Nuclear Weapons and the Deep State

    Kennette Benedict: Congress and the Citizenry

    John Burroughs: International Law and First Use of Nuclear Weapons

    Bruce Ackerman: Presidential Lawlessness

    Zia Mian: Nuclear Weapons Use in South Asia

    Hugh Gusterson: Democracy, Hypocrisy, First Use

    Sissela Bok: The Use and Misuse of the Language of Self-Defense

  • March: This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    March 1, 1954 – After more than three years of research and development by physicists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and despite strong opposition from many former Manhattan Project scientists like J. Robert Oppenheimer, the “super” or hydrogen bomb was first detonated on this date in a test designated Bravo as part of the Operation Castle series of nuclear tests at the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.  Quoting a 2013 Alex Wellerstein article from the blog NuclearSecrecy.org, Daniel Ellsberg’s book “The Doomsday Machine” described the impact and significance of the first U.S. thermonuclear weapon, “The yield for the first droppable H-bomb…was fifteen megatons. That is a million times more explosive power than the largest blockbusters in World War II…The yield was 250 percent greater than the largest yield that had been predicted for it, six megatons resulting – along with an unexpected shift of wind – in heavy radioactive fallout contaminating inhabitants of the Marshall Islands and the crew of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon, one of (the crew of 23 hospitalized sailors) whom died.  The reason for the great underestimate of yield, with its serious human consequences, was precisely the kind of scientific error or unforeseen reactivity that (Manhattan Project scientist Enrico) Fermi had feared in the connection with the possibility of atmospheric ignition (impacting the entire surface of the Earth) from the Trinity test (the first atomic bomb blast on July 16, 1945 near Alamogordo, New Mexico).  Los Alamos bomb designers had neglected or greatly underestimated the contribution of the production of neutrons and to the yield from one of the isotopes including in the hydrogen fuel, lithium-7, which had been thought to be relatively inert but proved not to be under the unprecedented condition of the dry-fuel thermonuclear detonation.”  Bravo produced a crater in the atoll with a diameter of 6,000 feet and a depth of 240 feet as the blast created a fireball four miles wide and a mushroom cloud 60 miles across.  Comments:  The frightening 1949 characterization of such doomsday machines by nuclear bomb designers Enrico Fermi and I. I. Rabi justify renewed efforts by global citizenry today to eliminate these weapons before it is too late, “By its very nature, it cannot be confined to a military objective but becomes a weapon which in practical effect is almost one of genocide.  It is clear that the use of such a weapon cannot be justified on any ethical ground which gives a human being a certain individuality and dignity even if he (or she) happens to be a resident of an enemy country.”

    (Sources:  Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Milton M. Hoenig. “Nuclear Weapons Databook:  Volume II, Appendix B.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Cambridge, MA:  Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987, p. 154 and Daniel Ellsberg.  “The Doomsday Machine:  Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.”  New York:  Bloomsbury, 2017, pp. 285; 289-290.)

    March 11, 1999 – Retired General George Lee Butler, who was selected as head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command on Jan. 25, 1991 and served in that capacity until stepping down in 1994 and became one of the first high-ranking U.S. military officers to call for the elimination of nuclear weapons in a December 1996 speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, gave a speech on this date to the staff and supporters of the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons in Montreal.  In his remarks, Butler described the Pentagon’s nuclear war plan or SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) in this manner, “With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan, this was the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life.”  Comments:  In his later years, General Butler said this about nuclear weapons, “Rather than being concerned about the moral implications of these devices, we continue to pursue them as if they were our salvation – as opposed to the prospective engine of our utter destruction…As long as these weapons exist, and people hold them in such high regard for reasons of national esteem, they act as a brake on our capacity for advancing our humanity…The cold hard fact of the matter is that a nuclear weapon is, at its very core, anti-ethical…Nuclear conflict is essentially an irrational activity, because essentially what you’re doing is signing your own death notice.”

    (Sources:  George Lee Butler.  “General Lee Butler Addresses The Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons.”  WagingPeace.org. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.  March 11, 1999 https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/general-lee-butler-addresses-the-canadian-network-against-nuclear-weapons/ accessed Feb. 15, 2018 and Norman Kempster. “Ex-Chief of U.S. Nuclear Forces Seeks Total Ban.”  Los Angeles Times, Dec. 5, 1996.)

    March 15, 1980 – One of four SS-N-6 Serb (R-27 Zyb) submarine-launched-ballistic-missiles, launched as part of a training exercise from a Soviet submarine sailing in the Sea of Okhotsk bordering the Pacific Ocean between the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island in the far northeastern zone of the Soviet Union, pursued a trajectory that potentially threatened Japan or Alaska.  This quickly resulted in the U.S. Strategic Air Command convening a threat assessment conference which determined that no Soviet missile attack was in progress.  Comments:  Many of the numerous false warnings of nuclear attack (another prominent example being the Jan. 25, 1995 Black Brant Incident involving a Norwegian sounding rocket which almost caused Russian President Boris Yeltsin to launch a nuclear counterstrike) that have occurred in all nine nuclear weapons states over the decades since the dawn of the nuclear age, have taken the world to the edge of global catastrophe.  This state of affairs represents one of the most powerful rationales for eliminating world nuclear arsenals.

    (Source:  John Pike, et al., “Chicken Little and Darth Vader:  Is the Sky Really Falling?” Federation of American Scientists, Oct. 1, 1991, p. 61.)

    March 20, 2003 – The United States began a large-scale air assault and land invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq on this date.  After the collapse of Hussein’s government, efforts to find substantial evidence of weapons of mass destruction however proved unsuccessful (proving what representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency had confirmed after more than a decade of in-country inspections).  Eventually the dissolution of the Iraqi military helped fuel a long-term, robust and deadly insurgency that went on bloody year after bloody year.  By the time of large-scale U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December of 2011, there were almost 4,500 U.S. soldiers and anywhere between 150,000 and one million Iraqi soldiers and civilians killed.  Many millions of other Iraqis were wounded or forced to flee the country as refugees.  Over 32,000 U.S. soldiers were wounded in the fighting with at least 10,000 suffering the effects of PTSD.  The cost estimates for the war, which include ongoing long-term medical treatment for tens of thousands of U.S. troops, range from one to three trillion dollars.  Comments:  Despite former President Barack Obama’s statement that, “The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made America stronger,” it is likely that the “cure” for the problem of suspected, surviving WMD (which were not destroyed by U.S./allied forces in the first Persian Gulf War of 1991 or thereafter by intermittent air strikes in the years preceding the second Gulf War) in Iraq was worse than the “disease.”  Hopefully the lesson of the U.S. experience in Iraq that military invasion and occupation is not a wise course of action to prevent nuclear proliferation will convince the Trump Administration not to go the same route in North Korea and/or Iran.  But even smaller-scale conventional or tactical nuclear strikes on those nations’ nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure will likely only fuel long-term conflict and heighten the risk of acts of terrorism, particularly WMD terrorism.  A better solution is to embrace the new United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and work toward universal ratification of this treaty and other verifiable nuclear weapons elimination agreements to reduce the chance of perpetual conventional war or a nuclear doomsday.

    (Sources:  Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes. “The True Cost of the Iraq War: $3 Trillion and Beyond.” Washington Post, Sept. 5, 2010 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/03/AR2010090302200.html accessed Feb. 19, 2018 and numerous mainstream and alternative news media sources.)

    March 28, 1960 – On this date, the French oceanographer, explorer, and co-inventor of the Aqua-Lung, Jacques Cousteau (1910-1997) appeared on the cover of Time magazine.  Cousteau devoted his life to studying and preserving diverse ocean environments on our planet and promoting responsible treatment of the flora and fauna of the seas by recording his trips on the ABC-TV series The Undersea World of Jacques Cousteau.  He was one of the first environmentalists to witness the negative impact of global warming on fragile ocean ecosystems and Cousteau also opposed the building of nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants because of their deleterious impacts on humanity and the environment.  In 1959, he helped organize the First World Oceanic Congress and a year later he lobbied his native France and other countries to stop dumping radioactive waste into the Mediterranean Sea which led to an eventual ban on such activities.  In 1977 he was awarded the United Nations International Environmental Prize.

    (Sources:  “Jacques Cousteau.”  Biography.com http://www.biography.com/people/jacques-cousteau-9259496 and The Gale Group.  “Opposing Viewpoints In Context:  Environmental Science In Context:  Radioactive Waste.” 2009.)

    March 31, 1998 – The United Kingdom withdrew from service the last of its estimated 100 WE-177 tactical nuclear free-fall bombs, making the U.S. the only nation with tactical nuclear weapons deployed outside its own territory.  Comments:  While the U.S. drastically reduced the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons deployed outside U.S. borders from several thousand during the height of the Cold War to its current total of approximately 150 warheads stationed in five European countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey), there nevertheless remain serious concerns of the increased risk of unauthorized, accidental, or unintentional nuclear war with Russia.  Many scholars and arms control experts today feel that NATO’s expansion (and the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons ever closer to Russia’s western borders) since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and increased tensions relating to recent crises in Crimea and Ukraine, have helped trigger a renewed Cold War.  Also, there is speculation that with the recent release of the Trump Administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review this past February, which supports building smaller yield, more usable tactical weapons (and possibly deploying them in places like South Korea and Japan where they might be used against North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile sites), that the overall risk of nuclear war has actually increased.

    (Sources:  Jack Mendelsohn and David Grahame, editors.  “Arms Control Chronology.”  Washington, DC:  Center for Defense Information, 2002, p. 57 and Kingston Reif. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Raise Alarms.”  Arms Control Association, November 2017.)

  • With Nuclear Weapons, Evacuation Is Not an Option

    This article was originally published by The Hill.

    My wife and I and other members of our family have been living through the nightmarish disaster that struck our community of Montecito. First came the fire and then came the floods.

    The fire, named the Thomas Fire, turned out to be the biggest in California history. At one point, it reached the top of the road where we live, and the firefighters, with some help from the shifting direction of the winds, were able to hold the line. The firefighters were heroic.

    The Thomas Fire burned in the hills above Montecito, CA in December 2017. Photo copyright by Rick Carter.

    We were under mandatory evacuation from our home for 12 days, and then were evacuated from the place we were staying as the evacuation zone was expanded. The fire roared on in the backcountry, continuing to spew ash from the dry brush and trees it was consuming.

    Throughout the area, people were wearing masks to keep from breathing in the ash. The sky was a sickening yellow-gray. It looked and felt like we were survivors of a nuclear attack. We were living with apprehension day to day, glued to the news, except when the electricity went out.

    The fire was finally brought under greater control, and we were allowed to return to our homes. But a few weeks later, the expectation of heavy rains and possible flooding caused us to again be put under mandatory evacuation. We left our home again, thinking this would be a short and easy evacuation and we would soon be able to return. This was not the case.

    The floods overwhelmed our community, causing treacherous debris flows, at least 21 deaths, and hundreds of destroyed homes. Our community looked like a war zone. Trees were uprooted and, along with huge boulders, had been swept down from the fire-denuded mountains and fallen upon our quiet community of Montecito. The rescue workers were again heroic.

    Now we wait for the teams of utility workers to get the various utilities up and running. For the time being, electricity, gas and water are all turned off. The disaster of it all looms large in my mind. The results were not predictable. Lives and homes were lost in both the mandatory and voluntary evacuation zones. Death and destruction did not discriminate. Nature only did what nature does. It was mostly beyond our control.

    I have thought so many times during this double disaster of the song lyrics, “there but for fortune go you or go I.” So many close calls for so many people. So many fateful decisions. For some, so much pain and grief, and for others so much relief.

    While still evacuated and feeling the pain of our community’s disaster, news came that on Jan. 13 a worker at the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency accidentally released an Emergency Alert warning that a ballistic missile was inbound to the state and that the people should seek immediate shelter. The alert emphasized, “THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” It was all too believable.

    People scurried to be with loved ones or to call them to tell them they loved them and to say goodbye. The threat seemed very real, but the solution offered by the authorities was ridiculous. Shelter does not protect against thermonuclear weapons.

    Nothing protects against thermonuclear weapons: not shelter, not nuclear deterrence, not missile defenses.

    Thirty-eight minutes later came the message that the warning had been a “false alarm.” This is yet another reminder that accidents happen and humans are fallible, even in the best designed systems.

    In our community, we have been living through radical uncertainty from forces of nature. But we also live daily with the radical uncertainty of nuclear survival, which is not a force of nature, but rather a man-made threat. It is a threat entirely of our own making, and it can be remedied by facing it and doing something about it, namely convening the nuclear-armed countries to negotiate the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of these weapons. And, as a step prior to this, or simultaneously, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which includes prohibitions on the development, deployment, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.

    Also, during the period of evacuation and devastation of our community, a copy of the newly drafted U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was leaked. The review calls for a “safe, secure and effective” nuclear deterrent force. But nuclear weapons are not safe or secure by their nature, and it doesn’t really matter how safe and secure the U.S. nuclear forces are, if another country’s nuclear arsenal is not.

    The greatest issue, though, arises with “effective” nuclear deterrent force. This falls into the category of radical uncertainty. No one can claim a deterrent force is effective, because it is always subject to failure. If it were clearly effective, missile defenses would not be needed. Neither would civil defense drills and warnings.

    In addition, the draft Nuclear Posture Review calls for modernizing the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal at great cost; for the development of new, smaller, more usable nuclear weapons; and for using nuclear weapons against a wide range of non-nuclear attacks against the U.S. and its allies. These steps will provoke other nuclear-armed countries, as well as potential proliferators, to follow our lead.

    I would hate to see the catastrophe experienced by our community played out on a global nuclear battlefield, but that is the direction in which the world is heading. The time ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity is now, before it is too late. The draft Nuclear Posture Review should be scrapped and replaced with the commitment to take nuclear weapons off high alert status; to implement pledges of No First Use; and to commit to negotiate to achieve the only number that makes sense in a nuclear context: Zero.

    With nuclear weapons, evacuation is not an option.

    David Krieger is a founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and has served as its president since 1982.

  • February: This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    February 1, 2006 – In one of the twenty known incidents of the attempted illicit sale of Russian bomb-grade fissile material in the last 25 years, especially since the breakup of the Soviet Union, law enforcement officials arrested a number of suspects in Tbilisi, Georgia, a former Soviet republic, on this date, for the attempted sale of 79.5 grams of highly enriched uranium to one or more buyers, who were in actuality undercover security forces.  In April 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Deputy Director Anne Harrington testified at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Strategic Forces that, “Of the roughly 20 documented seizures of nuclear explosive materials since 1992, all have come out of the former Soviet Union.”  Despite recent assurances from Rosatom, the state-owned corporation that runs Russia’s nuclear energy and weapons plants, that their nuclear materials, “are always strictly controlled” and accounted for, a Center for Public Integrity November 2015 investigative report concluded that, “In fact, some 99 percent of the world’s weapons-grade materials have been secured.  But one percent or more is still out there, and it amounts to several thousand pounds that could be acquired by any one of several terrorist organizations.”  Comments:  Although some significant progress in securing and protecting nuclear materials from theft or diversion has been allegedly confirmed by Russia and other Nuclear Club nations at the four biennial nuclear security summits (2010-16), much more needs to be accomplished in the U.N. and other international fora, as well as bilaterally by the Trump and Putin administrations, to prevent the use of fissile materials in dirty bombs or primitive small-yield fission weapons whether the material diverted comes from civilian nuclear plants or military nuclear weapons facilities.  In addition to concerns about the resulting mass casualties and short- and long-term radioactive contamination from such a catastrophe, there is also the frightening possibility that in times of crisis, such an attack might inadvertently trigger nuclear retaliation or even precipitate a nuclear exchange.  (Source: Douglas Birch and R. Jeffrey Smith. “The Fuel for a Nuclear Bomb is in the Hands of an Unknown Black Marketeer from Russia, U.S. Officials Say.”  Center for Public Integrity, Nov.12, 2015 reprinted in Courier: The Stanley Foundation Newsletter, Number 86, Spring 2016, pp. 7-14.)

    February 5, 1987 – The Soviet Union ended a nuclear testing moratorium due to continued U.S. testing but expressed a willingness to revisit such a moratorium if the Americans followed suit.  Forty-four months later, on October 24, 1990, the Soviets conducted their last of an estimated total of 715 nuclear explosive tests that began in 1949.  The French, British, and Americans later committed to end their testing programs (the last U.S. test was Sept. 23, 1992) and although the Russian Duma ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed by the U.S., Russia, and more than sixty other nations on Sept. 24, 1996) on April 21, 2000, the U.S. Congress has failed to do so since the Senate rejection of the CTBT by a vote of 51-48 on Oct. 13, 1999.  Comments:  The testing of over 2,050 nuclear devices over the last seven decades by nine nuclear weapons states has inflicted extremely harmful short- and long-term health impacts to global populations, especially native peoples and veterans who participated in observing tests at a relatively close range.  Increased cancer rates, groundwater contamination, destruction of land and ocean ecosystems, and other detrimental health and environmental impacts still plague large numbers of people due to nuclear testing.  President Trump should convince the Senate to ratify the CTBT, which would increase international pressure on North Korea to cease their nuclear testing program.  (Source:  Jack Mendelsohn and David Grahame, editors.  “Arms Control Chronology.”  Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2002, pp. 13-15; 19; 22.)

    February 11, 2004 – Bruce Blair’s Nuclear Column on the Center for Defense Information website which featured an article titled, “Keeping Presidents in the Dark – Episode 1:  The Case of the Missing Permissive Action Links,” was published on this date.  Along with information provided in Daniel Ellsberg’s new book “The Doomsday Machine:  Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner,” we learned that after John H. Rubel, deputy director of defense research and engineering, discovered that operators of Minuteman nuclear-tipped ICBMs had circumvented a design feature to protect against a possibly unauthorized launch of World War III by a single launch control center, he urged then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to require an electronic lock on the missiles.  Decades later, a former Minuteman launch control officer and now prominent nuclear weapons expert and scholar, Dr. Bruce Blair, notified a retired McNamara, “…that the locks had been installed, but everyone knew the combination.  The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha quietly decided to set the ‘locks’ to all zeros in order to circumvent this safeguard…SAC remained far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of wartime launch orders.  And so, the ‘secret unlock code’ during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at 00000000.”  Daniel Ellsberg, famously known for his release of the Pentagon Papers to the media in 1971, who earlier in his career served as a Rand Corporation analyst, a consultant to the Pentagon and White House, and drafted McNamara’s plans for nuclear war in 1961, noted that, “…the Joint Chiefs of Staff tolerated the shortcomings of the (nuclear command and) control system (in order) to put up fierce and prolonged resistance to measures that would tighten control of nuclear weapons up and down the line.  That was their distrust, above all in a crisis, of the judgement of civilian commanders and their staff and advisors, especially their willingness to launch nuclear attacks when military commanders believed them to be urgently necessary.  That distrust had emerged under Harry Truman during the Korean War and intensified under Eisenhower (both presidents vetoed the use of nuclear weapons in Korea and in other crises)…It was to become even more intense under JFK and McNamara.”  Comments:  Today serious concerns still exist on how to prevent the unauthorized, accidental, or irrational use of nuclear weapons and unfortunately not much has changed, in terms of U.S. nuclear policy, since the early decades of the Nuclear Age as Ellsberg explained, “The basic elements of American readiness for nuclear war remain today what they were almost sixty years ago:  Thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert…The declared official rationale for such a system…the supposed need to deter…an aggressive Russian first strike…That widely believed public rationale is a deliberate deception…The nature, scope, and posture of our strategic nuclear forces has always been shaped by the requirements of quite different purposes:  to attempt to limit the damage to the U.S. from Soviet or Russian retaliation to a U.S. first strike against the U.S.S.R. or Russia.  This capability is, in particular, intended to strengthen the credibility of U.S. threats to initiate limited nuclear attacks, or escalate them – U.S. threats of ‘first use’ – to prevail in regional, initially non-nuclear conflicts involving Soviet or Russian forces and their allies.”  (Sources:  Daniel Ellsberg. “The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.” New York:  Bloomsbury, 2017, pp. 12, 61-63 and Bruce Blair’s 2004 article is available at http://www.webarchive.org/web/20120511191600/http://www.cdi.org/blair/permissive-action-links.cfm)

    February 16, 1904 – George F. Kennan, a U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union who became famous for his “Mr. X” July 1947 article in Foreign Affairs magazine titled, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” that recommended the policy of “containment” rather than war with America’s former World War II ally, was born on this date.  The Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at  Princeton University for six decades, who passed away on March 17, 2005, wrote several books but one of the most prominent and relevant in the Nuclear Age and beyond was his 1982 work, “The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age.”  In this book, Kennan noted that, “War itself as a means of settling differences…will have to be in some ways ruled out; and with it there will have to be dismantled the greater part of the vast military establishments now maintained…the recognition that the weapons of this age – even the so-called conventional ones – are of such great destructiveness that there can be no clear line between the discriminate ones and the weapons of mass destruction.”  Comments:  Even a war fought in this technologically advanced 21st century, without resorting to the use of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons, have had devastating human, environmental, societal, and financial impacts as have been proven in many conventional wars fought since World War II.  The use of depleted uranium munitions, phosphorous bombs, modern precision-guided weapons such as Hellfire missiles, cluster bombs, and many other devices such as the Assad regime’s use of barrel bombs have not only killed and injured large numbers of combatants and civilians, but also caused cancers and other long-term mortal diseases.  It also seems increasingly likely that when a regime’s survival is at stake, nuclear weapons will also likely be used.  Therefore not only must we reduce dramatically and eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as enforce existing treaty prohibitions against the use of chemical and biological weapons, but we must also redouble global efforts to make war itself illegal, untenable, and obsolete as a means of settling disputes.  In return, our global civilization will prosper as trillions of dollars in military expenditures are redirected to fighting climate change, eliminating poverty and malnutrition, providing a free education to every person, finding cures for cancer and other chronic diseases, and insuring the survival of the human race indefinitely.  (Source:  George F. Kennan.  “The Nuclear Delusion:  Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age.” New York: Pantheon, 1982 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1982-12-01/nuclear-delusion-soviet-american-relations-atomic-age accessed Jan. 20, 2018.)

    February 20, 1950 – A New York Times article published on this date titled, “Second Capital Urged in Atom Era: Underground Plan to Be Broached,” reported that Congressmen Chet Holifield and John Rankin, cognizant that a recent Atomic Energy Commission report concluded that three atomic bombs of the yield dropped on Hiroshima would “tear the guts out of Washington,” proposed creating an alternative seat of government located possibly in an underground cave such as Kentucky’s Mammoth Cave.  Ten months later on Dec. 1, 1950, President Truman signed Executive Order 10186 establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (which in 1958 merged with the military’s Office of Defense Mobilization to become a new agency, the Office of Defense and Civil Mobilization, which eventually became the Federal Emergency Management Agency).  Comments:  For almost seventy years, the U.S. and the other eight nuclear weapons states have spent many billions of dollars on programs to preserve their nations’ leadership or at least a representative sample of such leadership in the midst of a nuclear or WMD attack.  Over several decades, the U.S. government built a top secret Congressional bomb shelter under The Greenbrier resort hotel in West Virginia and secret bunkers for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at Raven Rock near Camp David, Maryland, Mount Weather, Virginia and at dozens of other locations.  A 24-hour airborne command post dubbed Looking Glass was created along with other extensive means of maintaining Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations (COOP).  The rest of us, the vast majority of American and global populations were left to fend for ourselves, to find a large public shelter or build our own private bunker.  But the dirty little secret, long indisputably known by all thinking persons around the world, is that surviving a nuclear war is virtually impossible, an unviable option when we consider that even a so-called “limited” nuclear war can destroy global agriculture and result in the starvation of billions.  Now after the false “incoming ballistic missile” alerts in Hawaii on Jan. 13th and in Japan on Jan. 16th, as well as the Center for Disease Control’s recent public relations boondoggle of informing Americans what to do in a nuclear war, it seems clear that continuing to waste even more of our global treasure on not only preparing for nuclear war but surviving such a unprecedented catastrophe is illogical and counterproductive.  This is obviously yet another reason why global citizenry should continue to pressure the leaders of the nine nuclear weapons states to reverse course, eliminate these doomsday weapons, and redouble international efforts to demilitarize the planet.  (Source:  Garrett M. Graff. “Raven Rock:  The Story of the U.S. Government’s Secret Plan to Save Itself – While the Rest of Us Die.”  New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017, p. 31.)

    February 29, 2012 – A supposed breakthrough occurred on this date when U.S. negotiators convinced those from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to sign on to an agreement in which all North Korean missile and nuclear testing would be suspended in exchange for extensive food aid assistance (targeting the poorest, most disadvantaged population groups in that nation).  However, somewhat predictably and not unlike a plethora of other agreements between the U.S. and its allies and the North Korean regime over the last several decades, this deal collapsed when a satellite launched by the North Koreans in April of 2012 was interpreted not as a commercial scientific advance, but as another step towards militarizing its ballistic missile capabilities.  Comments:  What many politicians, military leaders, arms control experts, and a growing segment of the global public see as a top U.S. priority – ending the Korean War with a peaceful, nonmilitary solution that not only demilitarizes but unites the two Koreas, rebuilding the North’s economy and redoubling its technological and commercial ties with Western and other nations – is apparently not a priority of the Trump Administration.  The 45th President’s extreme rhetoric and military-focused responses have ratcheted up tensions on the Korean peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia since he took office.  However, recent bilateral successes by the two Koreas, including peaceful cooperation in the upcoming Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, hold promise, long-term, for a peaceful end to the seven-decade long Korean Conflict.  (Sources: Suzanne DiMaggio. “Learn from Iran, Engage North Korea,” pp. 37-40 in Tom Z. Collina and Geoff Wilson, editors. “10 Big Nuclear Ideas for the Next President.”  Ploughshares Fund Study Report No. 2, The Ploughshares Fund, November 2016 and Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang Hun.  “North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S. to Give Aid.”  New York Times.  Feb. 29, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/us-says-north-korea-agrees-to-curb-nuclear-work.html accessed Jan. 20, 2018.)

  • The Deterrence Myth

    In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.

    After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’ Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation.

    Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny.

    Let’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked. Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high. Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.

    There are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now.

    Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one. There is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened. In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: ‘But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’ We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace.

    What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable.

    It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it.

    Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic. Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them.

    In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases.

    Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs.

    In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not.

    Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefited anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries.

    Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.

    In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US.

    All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.

    It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting.

    First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.

    Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.

    Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.

    In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are especially intense – an irrational act, including a lethal one, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him.

    Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.

    Finally, there is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons makes money for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space.

    Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the technological accomplishments of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise insecure leaders and countries, then, once again, there is no rational way to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the law of diminishing returns, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’.

    In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’

    The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car.

    Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the least likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’ (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity, and could lead to ‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened. There have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch.

    The above describes only some of the inadequacies and outright dangers posed by deterrence, the doctrinal fulcrum that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.