Category: Nuclear Threat

  • World Medical Association Condemns Nuclear Weapons

    The World Medical Association, at its 50th WMA General Assembly, held in Ottawa, Canada, unanimously adopted the following Declaration on Nuclear Weapons:

    Preamble

    In October 1990, the World Medical Association (WMA) adopted a WMA Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons (Document 17.Y) in which it condemned and asked asked all governments to refrain from the development and use of these weapons, and urged national medical associations to join the WMA in actively supporting the Declaration. In adopting the Declaration, the WMA acknowledged the dangers and health hazards of the use of these weapons, including the indiscriminate and long lasting effects on civilian populations and on the environment, and argued that existing health care services, technology and manpower may be helpless to relieve the suffering caused by the weapons.

    The effects of nuclear weapons may be even more catastrophic, more indiscriminate, and longer lasting than chemical and biological weapons. These effects, based on studies of the affected populations and on studies of the consequences of radioactive fallout from nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, have been widely documented over the years.

    At least 40% of the population of Hiroshima and 26% of the population of Nagasaki were killed in the nuclear attacks on these two cities. Modern nuclear weapons are much more destructive and the casualties today would be much higher.

    Apart from the immediately lethal effects of blast, heat and radiation, many of the “survivors” would perish from the latent effects of ionising radiation, (leukaemia, cancer and genetic effects) as well as infectious diseases like cholera, tuberculosis and dysentery, arising from the breakdown in local services.

    Sunlight-absorbing particulate matter, generated by fires following a massive nuclear attack involving many weapons exploding at different sites, would reduce the penetration of sunlight to the earth’s surface and change the physical properties of the earth’s atmosphere, leading to prolonged periods of darkness and devastating effects on agricultural production.

    The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed many health professionals, destroyed all hospitals and infrastructure, such as electricity and water supply, and made it impossible for medical services to function at a time when they were most needed.

    The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its recent advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, has declared that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.

    The ICJ, in view of the current state of international law, however, could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

    The WMA Declarations of Geneva (Document 17.A), of Helsinki (Document 17.C) and of Tokyo (Document 17.F) make clear the duties, responsibilities and sacred mission of the medical profession to preserve and safeguard the health of the patient and to consecrate itself to the service of humanity.

    Recommendations

    The WMA considers that, with its unique position of influence in society, it has a duty to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In accord with this duty, the WMA:

    i) condemns the development, testing, production, deployment, threat and use of nuclear weapons; ii) requests all governments to refrain from the development, testing, production, deployment, threat and use of nuclear weapons, and to work in good faith towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

    iii) requests all national medical associations to join the WMA in supporting this Declaration and to press their respective governments to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

  • Excerpt from Senator Douglas Roche’s first speech in Canada’s Senate

    …Third, I draw the attention of honourable senators to the high potential for a significant Canadian contribution to international peace and security. We are an important middle-power country, and our leadership is needed in addressing the most compelling problem faced by the world community today. The continued existence of 30,000 nuclear weapons almost a decade after the end of the Cold War is an affront to humanity. Five thousand of these weapons are on alert status, meaning they are capable of being fired on 30 minutes’ notice.

    The New England Journal of Medicine recently warned:

    The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale. I was part of a Project Ploughshares team that conducted roundtables on the subject of nuclear weapons for community leaders in 16 cities in 10 provinces during the month of September. These two-and-a-half-hour roundtables were attended by 378 persons representing a wide range of Canadians: members of Parliament, members of provincial legislatures, mayors, municipal councillors, school board members, business and religious leaders, and so on. These informed Canadians want the Government of Canada to take an unambiguous stand in support of new, worldwide efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

    The International Court of Justice, the highest legal authority in the world, says nations are obliged to conclude negotiations leading to such elimination. Former military leaders, presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers around the world are calling for a global ban. The Abolition 2000 movement, supported by 1,000 non-governmental organizations, many of them right here in Canada, want negotiations completed by the year 2000. That would lead, then, to an international treaty that would take, perhaps, a quarter of a century to implement. The essential point is that failure to negotiate future eliminations now is leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    By testing their nuclear weapons a few months ago, India and Pakistan have exposed the cracks in the non-proliferation regime. As long as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China – maintain their arsenals of nuclear weapons, other states will naturally seek to acquire them.

    Since nuclear weapons have become the currency of power, how can we expect aspiring states not to acquire them? The current breakdown in the preparatory process for the 2000 review of the non-proliferation treaty reveals the central problem the world faces: Either there will be a global ban on nuclear weapons or they will spread to more nations, with escalating danger to the world.

    Thus, a New Agenda Coalition of eight important states – Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden – was formed this summer to seek an unequivocal commitment from the states possessing nuclear weapons to start immediately a process of negotiation leading to the elimination of those weapons.

    Canada has so far refused to join this new coalition. Why? Because NATO continues to insist, despite the logic of the post-Cold War era, that nuclear weapons are “essential.” That is NATO’s word. Trying to be loyal to NATO, Canada thus votes against resolutions at the United Nations calling for the commencement of negotiations. That has to stop. The vast majority of Canadians want an end to the terrible spectre of nuclear weapons. They want Canada to take a leading role in working with like-minded states to get negotiations going. I support the efforts of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

    This week, the Middle Powers Initiative, a network of seven prominent, international, non-governmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament, sent a delegation to Ottawa. They were met by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and were received by the Prime Minister. The delegation urged the Government of Canada to vote at the United Nations this fall for a new resolution sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition which would call upon states possessing nuclear weapons to start and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Canada should vote “yes” on this resolution.

    There is not a shred of justification for NATO to keep its nuclear weapons in this new age of east-west partnership. NATO, which still has a valuable role to play in security questions, does not need nuclear weapons, and Canada should work to get nuclear weapons out of NATO.

    Honourable senators, 14 years ago, I made what I thought was my last speech in Parliament. Taking my leave of the House of Commons after 12 years of service, I said:

    Canada, with its history and geography, its freedom and democracy, its resources and technology, and its space and industry, is ideally placed to work for the conditions of peace.

    By the unforeseen twists of fate, I now re-enter Parliament, and my first words are to repeat my call for Canada to work for peace, reconciliation and social justice in the world.

    In my career as a journalist, author, parliamentarian, diplomat, and educator, I have been in every region of the world. There is no land more blessed than Canada.

    The United Nations regularly attests to that fact. I love this country. I love Alberta, my home province. I love Quebec, the province of my birth. My children live in four different cities across Canada. I love St. John’s, and the whole of Newfoundland. I love Victoria, British Columbia, and the whole of Vancouver Island. I want this country to stay together. I want our people to work together. I want our political process to come together.

    There is too much alienation in our society, too much polarization, too much confrontation. I want to contribute to a spirit of reconciliation, an atmosphere of healing, a new basis of hope, as we prepare for the third millennium.

    We simply must find ways of offering genuine hope to young people so that they can truly benefit from a more equitable economy, a reformed Senate and a more dynamic role in world affairs.

    Conscious that I am only one person, I will contribute all my strength to moving Canada forward. Together, we in this historic place can help build Canada anew.

  • US Threatens Australia and Aotearoa: “Increase Military Ties Or Else…”

    Women for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
    International Peace Bureau, Oceania Representative

    United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Defence Secretary William Cohen recently visited Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand to do some very heavy threatening about military alliances. They made it clear that Aotearoa would not be allowed to rejoin the ANZUS (Aust/NZ/US) Alliance unless it rejects its nuclear free legislation. In Australia they made it clear what that alliance actually means.

    Meeting with Australia’s Defence Minister Ian McLachlan and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, they threatened that if Australia doesn’t substantially upgrade its military hardware. Unless Australia engages in the same technology, doctrines and training opportunities it will not be able to keep up with US developments, undermining its ability to participate in joint operations. This would result in Australia losing its status as a “valuable” US ally and be unable to participate in wars, training, etc., with the US.

    They insisted that Australia increase its military budget accordingly, and establish a “joint defence acquisition committee” with the US. This committee would enable US and Australian experts to consult, cooperate and collaborate so that technology and information gaps are eliminated and Australia had the ability to function under a US controlled alliance.

    The US is developing a combination of satellite and laser technology that goes far beyond that witnessed during the Operation Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1991. Their plans to militarise and control space, outlined in a document called “Vision for 2020”, require the development of ground-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), space-based ASATs and space-based earth strike weapons. This systems, as with all weapons systems, are controlled and coordinated by ground bases such as those in Australia, Ka Pae’aina, Marshall Islands and other nations. This is requires an incredible military budget which is greater than the economy of all South-East Asia countries combined.

    In exchange Australia will be allowed to upgrade its involvement in the US new space-based missile early-warning and monitoring system. This includes stationing Australian defence personnel at Colorado Springs, HQ of the US early-warning system.

    Increased weaponry and other facilities would strengthen Australia’s readiness for future cooperation in the Middle East, specifically against Iraq. It would also enhance Australia’s ties with the Central and Atlantic commands, and therefore with the US army command, and increase its involvement with the US Pacific Command, based in Ka Pae’aina/Hawai’i, which provides training with naval and air components. Part of the package is that the USAF facility at Nurrungar in South Australia will close after 30 years, but that it will be replaced by two new antennas to be built at Pine Gap, the CIA intelligence stations near Alice Springs. The antenna will link into the new geostationary satellites targeted to pick up on tactical and intermediate range missiles (like those of Iraq, India and Pakistan), as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles. The data collected by these antenna will be sent directly to Colorado, rather than to Nurrungar as before.

    Sources:
    “US warns of defence risk”, The Australian, Greg Sheridan, 31 July 1998.

    “Star Wars Returns to Dominate Space”, Bombs Away. Newsletter of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, Vol 12, No 1, Spring 1998. p3.

  • The End of Imagination

    “The desert shook,” the Government of India informed us (its people). “The whole mountain turned white,” the Government of Pakistan replied. By afternoon the wind had fallen silent over Pokhran. At 3.45pm, the timer detonated the three devices. Around 200 to 300m deep in the earth, the heat generated was equivalent to a million degrees centigrade – as hot as temperatures on the sun. Instantly, rocks weighing around a thousand tons, a mini mountain underground, vapourised… shockwaves from the blast began to lift a mound of earth the size of a football field by several metres. One scientist on seeing it said, “I can now believe stories of Lord Krishna lifting a hill.”

    India Today, May 1998.

    It’ll go down in history books, provided of course we have history books to go down in. Provided, of course, we have a future. There’s nothing new or original left to be said about nuclear weapons. There can be nothing more humiliating for a writer of fiction to have to do than restate a case that has, over the years, already been made by other people in other parts of the world, and made passionately, eloquently and knowledgeably.

    I am prepared to grovel. To humiliate myself abjectly, because, in the circumstances, silence would be indefensible. So those of you who are willing: let’s pick our parts, put on these discarded costumes and speak our second-hand lines in this sad second-hand play. But let’s not forget that the stakes we’re playing for are huge. Our fatigue and our shame could mean the end of us. The end of our children and our children’s children. Of everything we love. We have to reach within ourselves and find the strength to think. To fight.

    Once again we are pitifully behind the times – not just scientifically and technologically (ignore the hollow claims) but more pertinently in our ability to grasp the true nature of nuclear weapons. Our Comprehension of the Horror Department is hopelessly obsolete. Here we are, all of us in India and in Pakistan, discussing the finer points of politics and foreign policy, behaving for all the world as though our governments have just devised a newer, bigger bomb, a sort of immense hand grenade with which they will annihilate the enemy (each other) and protect us from all harm.

    How desperately we want to believe that. What wonderful, willing, well-behaved, gullible subjects we have turned out to be. The rest of humanity may not forgive us, but then the rest of the rest of humanity, depending on who fashions its views, may not know what a tired, dejected, heart-broken people we are. Perhaps it doesn’t realise how urgently we need a miracle. How deeply we yearn for magic. If only, if only nuclear war was just another kind of war. If only it was about the usual things – nations and territories, gods and histories. If only those of us who dread it are worthless moral cowards who are not prepared to die in defence of our beliefs. If only nuclear war was the kind of war in which countries battle countries, and men battle men. But it isn’t. If there is a nuclear war, our foes will not be China or America or even each other. Our foe will be the earth herself.

    Our cities and forests, our fields and villages will burn for days. Rivers will turn to poison. The air will become fire. The wind will spread the flames. When everything there is to burn has burned and the fires die, smoke will rise and shut out the sun. The earth will be enveloped in darkness. There will be no day – only interminable night. What shall we do then, those of us who are still alive? Burned and blind and bald and ill, carrying the cancerous carcasses of our children in our arms, where shall we go? What shall we eat? What shall we drink? What shall we breathe?

    The Head of the Health, Environment and Safety Group of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Bombay has a plan. He declared that India could survive nuclear war. His advice is that in the event of nuclear war we take the same safety measures as the ones that scientists have recommended in the event of accidents at nuclear plants.

    Take iodine pills, he suggests. And other steps such as remaining indoors, consuming only stored water and food and avoiding milk. Infants should be given powdered milk. “People in the danger zone should immediately go to the ground floor and if possible to the basement.”

    What do you do with these levels of lunacy? What do you do if you’re trapped in an asylum and the doctors are all dangerously deranged? Ignore it, it’s just a novelist’s naiveté, they’ll tell you, Doomsday Prophet hyperbole. It’ll never come to that. There will be no war. Nuclear weapons are about peace, not war. “Deterrence” is the buzz word of the people who like to think of themselves as hawks. (Nice birds, those. Cool. Stylish. Predatory. Pity there won’t be many of them around after the war. Extinction is a word we must try to get used to.) Deterrence is an old thesis that has been resurrected and is being recycled with added local flavour. The Theory of Deterrence cornered the credit for having prevented the cold war from turning into a third world war. The only immutable fact about the third world war is that, if there’s going to be one, it will be fought after the second world war. In other words, there’s no fixed schedule. The Theory of Deterrence has some fundamental flaws. Flaw Number One is that it presumes a complete, sophisticated understanding of the psychology of your enemy. It assumes that what deters you (the fear of annihilation) will deter them. What about those who are not deterred by that? The suicide bomber psyche – the “We’ll take you with us” school – is that an outlandish thought?

    How did Rajiv Gandhi die? In any case who’s the “you” and who’s the “enemy”? Both are only governments. Governments change. They wear masks within masks. They moult and re-invent themselves all the time. The one we have at the moment, for instance, does not even have enough seats to last a full term in office, but demands that we trust it to do pirouettes and party tricks with nuclear bombs even as it scrabbles around for a foothold to maintain a simple majority in Parliament.

    Flaw Number Two is that deterrence is premised on fear. But fear is premised on knowledge. On an understanding of the true extent and scale of the devastation that nuclear war will wreak. It is not some inherent, mystical attribute of nuclear bombs that they automatically inspire thoughts of peace. On the contrary, it is the endless, tireless, confrontational work of people who have had the courage to openly denounce them, the marches, the demonstrations, the films, the outrage – that is what has averted, or perhaps only postponed, nuclear war. Deterrence will not and cannot work given the levels of ignorance and illiteracy that hang over our two countries like dense, impenetrable veils.

    India and Pakistan have nuclear bombs now and feel entirely justified in having them. Soon others will too. Israel, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Nepal (I’m trying to be eclectic here), Denmark, Germany, Bhutan, Mexico, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Burma, Bosnia, Singapore, North Korea, Sweden, South Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan… and why not? Every country in the world has a special case to make. Everybody has borders and beliefs.

    And when all our larders are bursting with shiny bombs and our bellies are empty (deterrence is an exorbitant beast), we can trade bombs for food. And when nuclear technology goes on the market, when it gets truly competitive and prices fall, not just governments but anybody who can afford it can have their own private arsenal – businessmen, terrorists, perhaps even the occasional rich writer (like me). Our planet will bristle with beautiful missiles. There will be a new world order. The dictatorship of the pro-nuke elite.

    But let us pause to give credit where it’s due. Who must we thank for all this? The men who made it happen. The Masters of the Universe. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States of America! Come on up here folks, stand up and take a bow. Thank you for doing this to the world. Thank you for making a difference. Thank you for showing us the way. Thank you for altering the very meaning of life. From now on it is not dying we must fear, but living.

    All I can say to every man, woman and sentient child in India, and over there, just a little way away in Pakistan, is: take it personally. Whoever you are – Hindu, Muslim, urban, agrarian – it doesn’t matter. The only good thing about nuclear war is that it is the single most egalitarian idea that man has ever had. On the day of reckoning, you will not be asked to present your credentials. The devastation will be indiscriminate. The bomb isn’t in your backyard. It’s in your body. And mine. Nobody, no nation, no government, no man, no god has the right to put it there. We’re radioactive already, and the war hasn’t even begun. So stand up and say something. Never mind if it’s been said before. Speak up on your own behalf. Take it very personally.

    In early May (before the bomb), I left home for three weeks. I thought I would return. I had every intention of returning. Of course things haven’t worked out quite the way I had planned.

    While I was away, I met a friend whom I have always loved for, among other things, her ability to combine deep affection with a frankness that borders on savagery. “I’ve been thinking about you,” she said, “about The God of Small Things – what’s in it, what’s over it, under it, around it, above it…”

    She fell silent for a while. I was uneasy and not at all sure that I wanted to hear the rest of what she had to say. She, however, was sure that she was going to say it. “In this last year – less than a year actually – you’ve had too much of everything – fame, money, prizes, adulation, criticism, condemnation, ridicule, love, hate, anger, envy, generosity – everything. In some ways it’s a perfect story. Perfectly baroque in its excess. The trouble is that it has, or can have, only one perfect ending.”

    Her eyes were on me, bright with a slanting, probing brilliance. She knew that I knew what she was going to say. She was insane. She was going to say that nothing that happened to me in the future could ever match the buzz of this. That the whole of the rest of my life was going to be vaguely unsatisfying. And, therefore, the only perfect ending to the story would be death. My death.

    The thought had occurred to me too. Of course it had. The fact that all this, this global dazzle – these lights in my eyes, the applause, the flowers, the photographers, the journalists feigning a deep interest in my life (yet struggling to get a single fact straight), the men in suits fawning over me, the shiny hotel bathrooms with endless towels – none of it was likely to happen again. Would I miss it? Had I grown to need it? Was I a fame-junkie? Would I have withdrawal symptoms?

    The more I thought about it, the clearer it became to me that if fame was going to be my permanent condition it would kill me. Club me to death with its good manners and hygiene. I’ll admit that I’ve enjoyed my own five minutes of it immensely, but primarily because it was just five minutes.

    Because I knew (or thought I knew) that I could go home when I was bored and giggle about it. Grow old and irresponsible. Eat mangoes in the moonlight. Maybe write a couple of failed books – worstsellers – to see what it felt like. For a whole year I’ve cartwheeled across the world, anchored always to thoughts of home and the life I would go back to.

    Contrary to all the enquiries and predictions about my impending emigration, that was the well I dipped into. That was my sustenance. My strength. I told my friend there was no such thing as a perfect story. I said that in any case hers was an external view of things, this assumption that the trajectory of a person’s happiness, or let’s say fulfilment, had peaked (and now must trough) because she had accidentally stumbled upon “success”. It was premised on the unimaginative belief that wealth and fame were the mandatory stuff of everybody’s dreams.

    You’ve lived too long in New York, I told her. There are other worlds. Other kinds of dreams. Dreams in which failure is feasible, honourable, sometimes even worth striving for. Worlds in which recognition is not the only barometer of brilliance or human worth. There are plenty of warriors I know and love, people far more valuable than myself, who go to war each day, knowing in advance that they will fail. True, they are less “successful” in the most vulgar sense of the word, but by no means less fulfilled.

    The only dream worth having, I told her, is to dream that you will live while you’re alive and die only when you’re dead. (Prescience? Perhaps.) “Which means exactly what?” (Arched eyebrows, a little annoyed.) I tried to explain, but didn’t do a very good job of it. Sometimes I need to write to think. So I wrote it down for her on a paper napkin. This is what I wrote: To love. To be loved. To never forget your own insignificance. To never get used to the unspeakable violence and the vulgar disparity of life around you. To seek joy in the saddest places. To pursue beauty to its lair. To never simplify what is complicated or complicate what is simple. To respect strength, never power. Above all, to watch. To try and understand. To never look away. And never, never to forget.

    I’ve known her for many years, this friend of mine. She’s an architect too. She looked dubious, somewhat unconvinced by my paper napkin speech. I could tell that structurally, just in terms of the sleek, narrative symmetry of things, and because she loves me, her thrill at my “success” was so keen, so generous, that it weighed in evenly with her (anticipated) horror at the idea of my death. I understood that it was nothing personal… Just a design thing. Anyhow, two weeks after that conversation, I returned to India. To what I think/thought of as home. Something had died but it wasn’t me. It was infinitely more precious. It was a world that has been ailing for a while, and has finally breathed its last. It’s been cremated now. The air is thick with ugliness and there’s the unmistakable stench of fascism on the breeze.

    Day after day, in newspaper editorials, on the radio, on TV chat shows, on MTV for heaven’s sake, people whose instincts one thought one could trust – writers, painters, journalists – make the crossing. The chill seeps into my bones as it becomes painfully apparent from the lessons of everyday life that what you read in history books is true. That fascism is indeed as much about people as about governments. That it begins at home. In drawing rooms. In bedrooms. In beds.

    “Explosion of self-esteem”, “Road to Resurgence”, “A Moment of Pride”, these were headlines in the papers in the days following the nuclear tests. “We have proved that we are not eunuchs any more,” said Mr Thackeray of the Shiv Sena (Whoever said we were? True, a good number of us are women, but that, as far as I know, isn’t the same thing.) Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they were talking about the bomb – “We have superior strength and potency.” (This was our Minister for Defence after Pakistan completed its tests.)

    “These are not just nuclear tests, they are nationalism tests,” we were repeatedly told.

    This has been hammered home, over and over again. The bomb is India. India is the bomb. Not just India, Hindu India. Therefore, be warned, any criticism of it is not just ant-national but anti-Hindu. (Of course in Pakistan the bomb is Islamic. Other than that, politically, the same physics applies.) This is one of the unexpected perks of having a nuclear bomb. Not only can the government use it to threaten the Enemy, they can use it to declare war on their own people. Us.

    When I told my friends that I was writing this piece, they cautioned me. “Go ahead,” they said, “but first make sure you’re not vulnerable. Make sure your papers are in order. Make sure your taxes are paid.”

    My papers are in order. My taxes are paid. But how can one not be vulnerable in a climate like this? Everyone is vulnerable. Accidents happen. There’s safety only in acquiescence. As I write, I am filled with foreboding. In this country, I have truly known what it means for a writer to feel loved (and, to some degree, hated too). Last year I was one of the items being paraded in the media’s end-of-the-year National Pride Parade. Among the others, much to my mortification, were a bomb-maker and an international beauty queen. Each time a beaming person stopped me on the street and said “You have made India proud” (referring to the prize I won, not the book I wrote), I felt a little uneasy. It frightened me then and it terrifies me now, because I know how easily that swell, that tide of emotion, can turn against me. Perhaps the time for that has come. I’m going to step out from under the fairy lights and say what’s on my mind. It’s this:

    If protesting against having a nuclear bomb implanted in my brain is anti-Hindu and anti-national, then I secede. I hereby declare myself an independent, mobile republic. I am a citizen of the earth. I own no territory. I have no flag. I’m female, but have nothing against eunuchs. My policies are simple. I’m willing to sign any nuclear non-proliferation treaty or nuclear test ban treaty that’s going. Immigrants are welcome. You can help me design our flag.

    My world has died. And I write to mourn its passing. India’s nuclear tests, the manner in which they were conducted, the euphoria with which they have been greeted (by us) is indefensible. To me, it signifies dreadful things. The end of imagination. On the 15th of August last year we celebrated the 50th anniversary of India’s independence. Next May we can mark our first anniversary in nuclear bondage.

    Why did they do it? Political expediency is the obvious, cynical answer, except that it only raises another, more basic question: Why should it have been politically expedient? The three Official Reasons given are: China, Pakistan and Exposing Western Hypocrisy.

    Taken at face value, and examined individually, they’re somewhat baffling. I’m not for a moment suggesting that these are not real issues. Merely that they aren’t new. The only new thing on the old horizon is the Indian government. In his appallingly cavalier letter to the US president our prime minister says India’s decision to go ahead with the nuclear tests was due to a “deteriorating security environment”. He goes on to mention the war with China in 1962 and the “three aggressions we have suffered in the last 50 years [from Pakistan]. And for the last 10 years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it . . . especially in Jammu and Kashmir.”

    The war with China is 35 years old. Unless there’s some vital state secret that we don’t know about, it certainly seemed as though matters had improved slightly between us. The most recent war with Pakistan was fought 27 years ago. Admittedly Kashmir continues to be a deeply troubled region and no doubt Pakistan is gleefully fanning the flames. But surely there must be flames to fan in the first place?

    As for the third Official Reason: Exposing Western Hypocrisy – how much more exposed can they be? Which decent human being on earth harbours any illusions about it? These are people whose histories are spongy with the blood of others. Colonialism, apartheid, slavery, ethnic cleansing, germ warfare, chemical weapons, they virtually invented it all. They have plundered nations, snuffed out civilisations, exterminated entire populations. They stand on the world’s stage stark naked but entirely unembarrassed, because they know that they have more money, more food and bigger bombs than anybody else. They know they can wipe us out in the course of an ordinary working day. Personally, I’d say it is arrogance more than hypocrisy.

    We have less money, less food and smaller bombs. However, we have, or had, all kinds of other wealth. Delightful, unquantifiable. What we’ve done with it is the opposite of what we think we’ve done. We’ve pawned it all. We’ve traded it in. For what? In order to enter into a contract with the very people we claim to despise.

    All in all, I think it is fair to say that we’re the hypocrites. We’re the ones who’ve abandoned what was arguably a moral position – ie. We have the technology, we can make bombs if we want to, but we won’t. We don’t believe in them.

    We’re the ones who have now set up this craven clamouring to be admitted into the club of superpowers. For India to demand the status of a superpower is as ridiculous as demanding to play in the World Cup finals simply because we have a ball. Never mind that we haven’t qualified, or that we don’t play much soccer and haven’t got a team.

    We are a nation of nearly a billion people. In development terms we rank No 138 out of the 175 countries listed in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (even Ghana and Sri Lanka rank above us). More than 400 million of our people are illiterate and live in absolute poverty, more than 600 million lack even basic sanitation and more than 200 million have no safe drinking water.

    The nuclear bomb and the demolition of the Barbi Masjid in Ayodhya are both part of the same political process. They are hideous byproducts for a nation’s search for herself. Of India’s efforts to forge a national identity. The poorer the nation, the larger the numbers of illiterate people and the more morally bankrupt her leaders, the cruder and more dangerous the notion of what that identity is or should be.

    The jeering, hooting young men who battered down the Babri Masjid are the same ones whose pictures appeared in the papers in the days that followed the nuclear tests. They were on the streets, celebrating India’s nuclear bomb and simultaneously “condemning Western Culture” by emptying crates of Coke and Pepsi into public drains. I’m a little baffled by their logic: Coke is Western Culture, but the nuclear bomb is an old Indian tradition? Yes, I’ve heard – the bomb is in the Vedas [ancient Hindu scriptures]. It might be, but if you look hard enough you’ll find Coke in the Vedas too. That’s the great thing about all religious texts. You can find anything you want in them – as long as you know what you’re looking for.

    But returning to the subject of the non-vedic 1990s: we storm the heart of whiteness, we embrace the most diabolical creation of western science and call it our own. But we protest against their music, their food, their clothes, their cinema and their literature. That’s not hypocrisy. That’s humour.

    It’s funny enough to make a skull smile. We’re back on the old ship. The SS Authenticity & Indianness. If there is going to be a pro-authenticity/anti-national drive, perhaps the government ought to get its history straight and its facts right. If they’re going to do it, they may as well do it properly.

    First of all, the original inhabitants of this land were not Hindu. Ancient though it is, there were human beings on earth before there was Hinduism. India’s tribal people have a greater claim to being indigenous to this land than anybody else, and how are they treated by the state and its minions? Oppressed, cheated, robbed of their lands, shunted around like surplus goods. Perhaps a good place to start would be to restore to them the dignity that was once theirs. Perhaps the government could make a public undertaking that more dams of this kind will not be built, that more people will not be displaced.

    But of course that would be inconceivable, wouldn’t it? Why? Because it’s impractical. Because tribal people don’t really matter. Their histories, their customs, their deities are dispensable. They must learn to sacrifice these things for the greater good of the Nation (that has snatched from them everything they ever had).

    Okay, so that’s out.

    For the rest, I could compile a practical list of things to ban and buildings to break. It’ll need some research, but off the top of my head here are a few suggestions.

    They could begin by banning a number of ingredients from our cuisine: chillies (Mexico), tomatoes (Peru), potatoes (Bolivia), coffee (Morocco), tea, white sugar, cinnamon (China) . . . they could then move into recipes. Tea with milk and sugar, for instance (Britain).

    Smoking will be out of the question. Tobacco came from North America. Cricket, English and Democracy should be forbidden. Either kabaddi or kho-kho could replace cricket. I don’t want to start a riot, so I hesitate to suggest a replacement for English. (Italian? It has found its way to us via a kinder route: marriage, not imperialism.)

    All hospitals in which western medicine is practised or prescribed should be shut down. All national newspapers discontinued. The railways dismantled. Airports closed. And what about our newest toy – the mobile phone? Can we live without it, or shall I suggest that they make an exception there? They could put it down in the column marked “Universal”? (Only essential commodities will be included here. No music, art or literature.)

    Needless to say, sending your children to university in the US, and rushing there yourself to have your prostate operated upon will be a cognisable offence.

    It will be a long, long list. It would take years of work. I could not use a computer because that wouldn’t be very authentic of me, would it? I don’t mean to be facetious, merely to point out that this is surely the short cut to hell. There’s no such thing as an Authentic India or a Real Indian. There is no Divine Committee that has the right to sanction one single, authorised version of what India is or should be.

    Railing against the past will not heal us. History has happened. It’s over and done with. All we can do is to change its course by encouraging what we love instead of destroying what we don’t. There is beauty yet in this brutal, damaged world of ours. Hidden, fierce, immense. Beauty that is uniquely ours and beauty that we have received with grace from others, enhanced, re-invented and made our own. We have to seek it out, nurture it, love it. Making bombs will only destroy us. It doesn’t matter whether we use them or not. They will destroy us either way.

    India’s nuclear bomb is the final act of betrayal by a ruling class that has failed its people.

    However many garlands we heap on our scientists, however many medals we pin to their chests, the truth is that it’s far easier to make a bomb than to educate four hundred million people.

    According to opinion polls, we’re expected to believe that there’s a national consensus on the issue. It’s official now. Everybody loves the bomb. (Therefore the bomb is good.)

    Is it possible for a man who cannot write his own name to understand even the basic, elementary facts about the nature of nuclear weapons? Has anybody told him that nuclear war has nothing at all to do with his received notions of war? Nothing to do with honour, nothing to do with pride. Has anybody bothered to explain to him about thermal blasts, radioactive fallout and the nuclear winter? Are there even words in his language to describe the concepts of enriched uranium, fissile material and critical mass? Or has his language itself become obsolete? Is he trapped in a time capsule, watching the world pass him by, unable to understand or communicate with it because his language never took into account the horrors that the human race would dream up? Does he not matter at all, this man?

    I’m not talking about one man, of course, I’m talking about millions and millions of people who live in this country. This is their land too, you know. They have the right to make an informed decision about its fate and, as far as I can tell, nobody has informed them about anything. The tragedy is that nobody could, even if they wanted to. Truly, literally, there’s no language to do it in. This is the real horror of India. The orbits of the powerful and the powerless spinning further and further apart from each other, never intersecting, sharing nothing. Not a language. Not even a country.

    Who the hell conducted those opinion polls? Who the hell is the prime minister to decide whose finger will be on the nuclear button that could turn everything we love – our earth, our skies, our mountains, our plains, our rivers, our cities and villages – to ash in an instant? Who the hell is he to reassure us that there will be no accidents? How does he know? Why should we trust him? What has he ever done to make us trust him? What have any of them ever done to make us trust them?

    The nuclear bomb is the most anti-democratic, anti-national, anti-human, outright evil thing that man has ever made. If you are religious, then remember that this bomb is Man’s challenge to God. It’s worded quite simply: We have the power to destroy everything that You have created. If you’re not religious, then look at it this way. This world of ours is four thousand, six hundred million years old.

    It could end in an afternoon.

     

  • India’s Nuclear Testing is a Wake-up Call to the World

    India’s nuclear tests are a wake-up call to the world, and particularly to the nuclear weapons states. The meeting of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Geneva, which concluded on May 8th, attracted near zero press attention and achieved near zero results. It was virtually a non-event. On the other hand, India’s tests three days later immediately got the world’s attention.

    The message of India’s tests is that we can have a world in which many countries have nuclear weapons or a world in which no countries have nuclear weapons, but we will not have a world in which only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Israel retain nuclear weapons in perpetuity. India has long argued that it is unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons option so long as the current nuclear weapons states fail to make a commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a timebound framework. The Indians underlined this position in 1996 when they refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

    Following their recent nuclear tests, however, the Indians have offered to sign the CTBT, but only if the nuclear weapons states agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a timebound framework and cease all subcritical and laboratory nuclear weapons testing. The Indian position is reasonable. They are calling for a world in which no state, including themselves, has nuclear weapons.

    What is not reasonable is the way in which the nuclear weapons states and their allies have treated India’s position as non-negotiable. The nuclear weapons states have consistently failed to this day to show the good faith in seeking nuclear disarmament that they promised in 1968 in Article VI of the NPT.

    Ironically, the only nuclear weapons state to consistently call for nuclear weapons abolition is China, but it, too, has been rebuffed by the other nuclear weapons states. It is ironic because India’s testing was, at least in part, a response to China’s possession and improvement of its nuclear arsenal.

    Despite their promises in 1995 for the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapons states have been largely impeding nuclear disarmament. If they are serious about stopping India, Pakistan and other states from becoming full fledged nuclear powers, they had better reverse their course of action and begin serious and good faith negotiations to rid the world of nuclear arms. This is the only course of action with a chance of success to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

    The knee-jerk reaction of the U.S., Japan and other industrialized states to impose economic sanctions on India will not stop the Indians from developing a nuclear arsenal. It will only result in greater hostility in a world divided not only between rich and poor, but also between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.”

    India’s testing is not only an Indian problem. It is a problem of the international system that leads the country of Gandhi to follow a nuclear weapons path. There is only one way out of the dilemma, and that is a commitment by all nuclear weapons states SQ now including India SQ to the abolition of their nuclear arsenals. According to a 1996 unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice, the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals is the legal obligation of the nuclear weapons states under international law.

    Nuclear weapons abolition is also the solution called for by military and civilian leaders and citizen action groups throughout the world. The Abolition 2000 Statement of over 1000 citizens organizations around the world calls upon the nuclear weapons states to “Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.”

    In crisis there is opportunity. If India’s nuclear tests lead to sufficient pressure on the nuclear weapons states to reverse their course and become serious about ending the nuclear weapons era, we may still be able to enter the 21st century with a treaty in place to accomplish this goal. If the nuclear weapons states hold firm to their present positions, however, India may be only the first of many states to become new members in the nuclear weapons club.

  • India Press Statement

    As announced by the Prime Minister this afternoon, today India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurement have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974.

    These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems. Further, they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary.

    The Government is deeply concerned, as were previous Governments, about the nuclear environment in India’s neighbourhood. These tests provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians would also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear option have been passed on to them in this the 50th year of our independence.

    It is necessary to highlight today that India was in the vanguard of nations which ushered in the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 due to environmental concerns. Indian representatives have worked in various international forums, including the Conference on Disarmament for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangements for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The Government would like to reiterate its support to efforts to realise the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as related experiments described as ‘sub-critical’ or ‘hydronuclear.’

    India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.

    We would like to reaffirm categorically that we will continue to exercise the most stringent control on the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and commodities – especially those related to weapons of mass destruction. Our track record has been impeccable in this regard. Therefore we expect recognition of our responsible policy by the international community.

    India remains committed to a speedy process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention is evidence of our commitment to any global disarmament regime which is non-discriminatory and verifiable. We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament.

    In our neighbourhood we have many friends with whom relations of fruitful cooperation for mutual benefit have existed and deepened over a long period. We assure them that it will be our sincere endeavour to intensify and diversify those relations further for the benefit of all our peoples. For India, as for others, the prime need is for peaceful cooperation and economic development.

     

  • 20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War

    Ever since the two adversaries in the Cold War, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., realized that their nuclear arsenals were sufficient to do disastrous damage to both countries at short notice, the leaders and military commanders have thought about the possibility of a nuclear war starting without their intention or as a result of a false alarm. Increasingly elaborate accessories have been incorporated in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to minimize the risk of unauthorized or accidenta launch or detonation. A most innovative action was the establishment of the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow in 1963 to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the supreme commanders.

    Despite all precautions, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to an unpredicted sequence of events remained as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. That is the reason I am prepared to spen the rest of my life working for abolition of nuclear weapons.

    One way a war could start is a false alarm via one of the warning systems, followed by an increased level of nuclear forces readiness while the validity of the information was being checked. This action would be detected by the other side, and they would take appropriate action; detection of that response would tend to confirm the original false alarm; and so on to disaster. A similar sequence could result from an accidental nuclear explosion anywhere. The risk of such a sequence developing would be increased if it happened during a period of increased international tension.

    On the American side many “false alarms” and significant accidents have been listed, ranging from trivial to very serious, during the Cold War. Probably many remain unknown to the public and to the research community because of individuals’ desire to avoid blame and maintain the good reputation of their unit or command. No doubt there have been as many mishaps on the Soviet side.

    Working with any new system, false alarms are more likely. The rising moon was misinterpreted as a missile attack during the early days of long-range radar. A fire at a broken gas pipeline was believed to be enemy jamming by laser of a satellite’s infrared sensor when those sensors were first deployed.

    The risks are illustrated by the following selection of mishaps. If the people involved had exercised less caution, or if some unfortunate coincidental event had occurred, escalation to nuclear war can easily be imagined. Details of some of the events differ in different sources: where there have been disagreements, I have chosen to quote those from the carefully researched book “The Limits of Safety” by Scott D. Sagan. Sagan gives references to original sources in all instances.

    1956, November 5: Suez Crisis coincidence
    British and French forces were attacking Egypt at the Suez Canal. The Soviet Government had suggested to U.S. that they combine forces to stop this by a joint military action, and had warned the British and French governments that (non-nuclear) rocket attacks on London and Paris were being considered. That night the U.S. military HQ in Europe received messages that:
    (i) unidentified aircraft were flying over Turkey and the Turkish
    air force was on alert
    (ii) 100 Soviet MIG-15’s were flying over Syria
    (iii) a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria
    (iv) the Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. It is reported that in U.S.A. General Goodpaster himself was concerned that these events might trigger the NATO operations plan for nuclear strikes against U.S.S.R.

    The 4 reports were all shown afterwards to have innocent explanations. They were due, respectively, to:
    (i) a flight of swans
    (ii) a routine air force escort (much smaller than the number reported) for the president of Syria, who was returning from a visit to Moscow
    (iii) the Canberra bomber was forced down by mechanical problems
    (iv) the Russian fleet was engaged in scheduled routine exercises.

    1961, November 24: BMEWS communication failure
    On the night of 24 November, 1961, all communication links went dead between SAC HQ and NORAD, and so cut SAC HQ off from the three Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites (BMEWS) at Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Filingdales (England). For General Power at SAC HQ, there were two possible explanations: either enemy action, or the coincidental failure of all the communication systems which had redundant and ostensibly independent routes including commercial telephone circuits. All SAC bases in U.S.A. were therefore alerted and B-52 nuclear bomber crews started their engines, with instructions not to take off without further orders. Radio communication was established with an orbiting B-52 on airborne alert which was near Thule. It contacted the BMEWS station by radio and could report that no attack had taken place.

    The reason for the “coincidental” failure was that the redundant routes for telephone and telegraph between NORAD and SAC HQ all ran through one relay station in Colorado. At that relay station a motor had overheated and caused interruption of all the lines.

    THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS LASTED FOR THE TWO WEEKS 14-28 OCTOBER 1962. MANY DANGEROUS EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN RELATION TO THE CRISIS, SOME OF THEM BECAUSE OF CHANGES MADE TO ENHANCE MILITARY READINESS. ELEVEN HAVE BEEN SELECTED:

    1962, August 23: B-52 Navigation Error
    SAC Chrome Dome airborne alert route included a leg from the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, SW across the Arctic Ocean to Barter Island, Alaska. On 23 August,1962, a B-52 nuclear-armed bomber crew made a navigational error and flew a course 20 deg. too far north. They approached within 300 miles of Soviet airspace near Wrangel island, where there was believed to be an interceptor base with aircraft having an operational radius of 400 miles.

    Because of the risk of repetition of such an error, in this northern area where other checks on navigation are difficult to obtain, it was decided to fly a less provocative route in future. However, the necessary orders had not been given by the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, so throughout that crisis the same northern route was being flown 24 hours a day.

    August-October 62: U2 flights into Soviet airspace
    U2 high altitude reconnaissance flights from Alaska occasionally strayed unintentionally into Soviet airspace. One such episode occurred in August 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 the U2 pilots were ordered not to fly within 100 miles of the Soviet airspace.

    On the night of 26 October, for a reason irrelevant to the crisis, a U2 pilot was ordered to fly a new route, over the north pole, where positional checks on navigation were by sextant only. That night the aurora prevented good sextant readings and the plane strayed over the Chukotski Peninsula. Soviet MIG interceptors took off with orders to shoot down the U2. The pilot contacted his U.S. command post and was ordered to fly due east towards Alaska. He ran out of fuel while still over Siberia. In response to his S.O.S., U.S. F102-A fighters were launched to escort him on his glide towards Alaska, with orders to prevent the MIG¹s from entering U.S. airspace. The U.S. interceptor aircraft were armed with nuclear missiles. These could have been used by any one of the F102-A pilots at his own discretion.

    1962, October 24: Russian satellite explodes
    On 24 October a Russian satellite entered its parking orbit, and shortly afterwards exploded. Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank observatory wrote in 1968: “the explosion of a Russian spacecraft in orbit during the Cuban Missile Crisis… led the U.S. to believe that the USSR was launching a massive ICBM attack.” The NORAD Command Post logs of the dates in question remain classified, possibly to conceal the reaction to this event. Its occurrence is recorded, and U.S. space tracking stations were informed on 31 October of debris resulting from breakup of “62 BETA IOTA”.

    1962, October 25: Duluth intruder
    At around midnight on 25 October, a guard at Duluth Sector Direction Center saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it, and activated the “sabotage alarm”. This automatically set off sabotage alarms at all bases in the area. At Volk Field, Wisconsin, the alarm was wrongly wired, and the Klaxon sounded which ordered nuclear-armed F-106A interceptors to take off. The pilots knew there would be no practice alert drills while DEFCON 3 was in force, and they believed World War III had started.

    Immediate communication with Duluth showed there was an error. By this time aircraft were starting down the runway. A car raced from the command center and successfully signalled the aircraft to stop.

    The original intruder was a bear.

    1962, October 26: ICBM Test Launch
    At Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, there was a program of routine ICBM test flights. When DEFCON 3 was ordered all the ICBM’s were fitted with nuclear warheads except one Titan missile that was scheduled for a test launch later that week. That one was launched for its test, without further orders from Washington, at 4 a.m. on 26 October.

    It must be assumed that Russian observers were monitoring U.S. missile activities as closely as U.S. observers were monitoring Russian and Cuban activities. They would have known of the general changeover to nuclear warheads, but not that this was only a test launch.

    1962, October 26: Unannounced Titan missile launch
    During the Cuba Crisis, some radar warning stations that were under construction and near completion were brought into full operation as fast as possible. The planned overlap of coverage was thus not always available.

    A normal test launch of a Titan-II ICBM took place in the afternoon of 26 October, from Florida towards the S. Pacific. It caused temporary concern at Moorestown Radar site until its course could be plotted and showed no predicted impact within the United States. It was not until after this event that the potential for a serious false alarm was realized, and orders were given that radar warning sites must be notified in advance of test launches, and the countdown be relayed to them.

    1962, October 26: Malmstrom Air Force Base
    When DEFCON 2 was declared on 24 October, solid-fuel Minuteman-1 missiles at Malmstrom Air Force Base were being prepared for full deployment. The work was accelerated to ready the missiles for operation, without waiting for the normal handover procedures and safety checks. When one silo and the first missile were ready on 26 October no armed guards were available to cover transport from the normal separate storage, so the launch- enabling equipment and codes were all placed in the silo. It was thus physically possible for a single operator to launch a fully armed missile at a SIOP target.

    During the remaining period of the Crisis the several missiles at Malmstrom were repeatedly put on and off alert as errors and defects were found and corrected. Fortunately no combination of errors caused or threatened an unauthorized launch, but in the extreme tension of the period the danger can well be imagined.

    October 1962: NATO Readiness
    It is recorded in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan¹s diary for 22 October that in order to avoid provocation of U.S.S.R., he and the NATO Supreme Commander, General Lauris Norstad, agreed not to put NATO on alert. When the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered DEFCON 3 Norstad was authorized to use his discretion in complying. Norstad therefore did not order a NATO alert. However, several NATO subordinate commanders did order alerts to DEFCON 3 or equivalent levels of readiness at bases in West Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Britain. This seems to have been largely due to the action of General Truman Landon, CINC U.S. Air Forces Europe, who had already started alert procedures on 17 October in anticipation of a serious crisis over Cuba.

    October 1962: British Alerts
    When U.S. SAC went to DEFCON 2, on 24 October, Bomber Command was carrying out an unrelated readiness exercise. On 26 October Air Marshall Cross, C-in-C Bomber Command, decided to prolong the exercise because of the Cuba crisis, and later increased the alert status of British Nuclear forces so that they could launch within 15 minutes.

    It seems likely that Soviet intelligence would perceive these moves as part of a coordinated plan in preparation for immediate war. They could not be expected to know that neither the British Minister of Defence nor Prime Minister Macmillan had authorized them.

    It is disturbing to note how little was learned from these errors in Europe. McGeorge Bundy wrote in Danger and Survival (New York: Random House 1988) “the risk [of nuclear war] was small, given the prudence and unchallenged final control of the two leaders.”

    1962, October 28: Moorestown false alarm
    Just before 9 a.m. on 28 October, the Moorestown, N.J., radar operators informed national command post that a nuclear attack appeared to be under way. A test tape simulating a missile launch from Cuba was being run, and simultaneously a satellite came over the horizon. Operators became confused and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ that impact was expected 18 miles west of Tampa at 9.02 a.m. The whole of NORAD was alerted, but before irrevocable action had been taken it was reported that no detonation had taken place at the predicted time, and Moorestown operators reported the reason for the false alarm.

    During the incident overlapping radars that should have confirmed or disagreed were not in operation. The radar post had not received routine information of satellite passage because the facility carrying out that task had been given other work for the duration of the Crisis.

    1962, October 28: False warning due to satellite sighting
    At 5.26 p.m. on 28 October, the Laredo radar warning site had just become operational. Operators misidentified a satellite in orbit as two possible missiles over Georgia, and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ. NORAD was unable to identify that the warning came from the new station at Laredo and believed it to be from Moorestown, and therefore more reliable. Moorestown failed to intervene and contradict the false warning. By the time C-in-C NORAD had been informed, no impact had been reported and the warning was “given low credence”.

    END OF CUBA CRISIS EVENTS

    1962 November 2: The Penkovsky False Warning
    In the Fall of 1962 Col. Oleg Penkovsky was working in Russia as a double agent for the (U.S.) CIA. He had been given a code by which to warn the CIA if he was convinced that a Soviet attack on the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, one minute apart, and only blow into the receiver. Further information was then to be left at a “dead drop” in Moscow.

    The prearranged code message was received by the CIA on 2 November, 1962.

    It was not known at CIA that Penkovsky had been arrested on 22 October. Penkovsky knew he was going to be executed. It is not known whether he had told KGB the meaning of the code signal or only how it could be given, nor is it known exactly why or with what authorization KGB staff used it. When another CIA agent checked the dead drop he was arrested.

    1965, November: Power failure and faulty bomb alarms
    Special bomb alarms were installed near military facilities and near cities in U.S.A. so that the locations of nuclear bursts would be transmitted before the expected communication failure. The alarm circuits were set up to display a red signal at command posts the instant that the flash of a nuclear detonation reached the sensor and before the blast could put it out of action. Normally the display would show a green signal, and yellow if the sensor was not operating or was out of communication for any other reason.

    During the commercial power failure in NE United States in November 1965, displays from all the bomb alarms for the area should have shown yellow. In fact two of them from different cities showed red because of circuit errors. The effect was consistent with the power failure being due to nuclear weapon explosions, and the Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert. Apparently the military did not.

    1968, January 21: B-52 crash near Thule
    Communication between NORAD HQ and the BMEWS station at Thule had 3
    elements:
    1. Direct radio communication.
    2. A “bomb alarm” as described above.
    3. Radio communication relayed by a B-52 bomber on airborne alert.

    On 21 January, 1968, fire broke out in the B-52 bomber on airborne alert near Thule. The pilot prepared for an emergency landing at the base. However the situation deteriorated rapidly, and the crew had to bale out. There had been no time to communicate with SAC HQ, and the pilotless plane flew over the Thule base before crashing on the ice 7 miles offshore. Its fuel and the high explosive component of its nuclear weapons exploded, but there was no nuclear detonation.

    At that time, the “one point safe” condition of the nuclear weapons could not be guaranteed, and it is believed that a nuclear explosion could have resulted from accidental detonation of the high explosive trigger. Had there been a nuclear detonation even at 7 miles distant, and certainly if much nearer the base, all three communication methods would have given an indication consistent with a successful nuclear attack on both the base and the B-52 bomber. The bomb alarm would have shown red, and the two other communication paths would have gone dead. It would hardly have been anticipated that the combination could have been caused by accident, particularly as the map of the routes for B-52 airborne alert flights approved by the president showed no flight near to Thule. The route had apparently been changed without informing the White House.

    October 73: False alarm during Middle East crisis
    On 24 October, 1973, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire intended to end the Arab-Israeli war was in force, further fighting started between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai desert. U.S. intelligence reports and other sources suggested that U.S.S.R. was planning to intervene to protect the Egyptians. President Nixon was in the throes of the Watergate episode and not available for a conference, so Kissinger and other U.S. officials ordered DEFCON 3. The consequent movements of aircraft and troops were of course observed by Soviet intelligence. The purpose of the alert was not to prepare for war, but to warn U.S.S.R. not to intervene in Sinai. However, if the following accident had not been promptly corrected then the Soviet command might have made a more dangerous interpretation.

    On 25 October, while DEFCON 3 was in force, mechanics were repairing one of the Klaxons at Kinchloe Air Force Base, Michigan, and accidentally activated the whole base alarm system. B-52 crews rushed to their aircraft and started the engines. The duty officer recognized that the alarm was false, and recalled the crews before any took off.

    1979 November 9: Computer Exercise Tape
    At 8.50 a.m. on 9 November, 1979, duty officers at 4 command centres (NORAD HQ, SAC Command Post, the Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center) all saw on their displays a pattern showing a large number of Soviet missiles in a full-scale attack on U.S.A. During the next 6 minutes emergency preparations for retaliation were made. A number of Air Force planes were launched, including the president’s National Emergency Airborne Command Post, though without the president! The president had not been informed, perhaps because he could not be found.

    No attempt was made to use the hot line either to ascertain the Soviet intentions or to tell the Russians the reason for the U.S. actions. This seems to me to have been culpable negligence. The whole purpose of the “Hot Line” was to prevent exactly the type of disaster that was threatening at that moment.

    With commendable speed, NORAD was able to contact PAVE PAWS early warning radar and learn that no missiles had been reported. Also, the sensors on satellites were functioning that day and had detected no missiles. In only 6 minutes the threat assessment conference was terminated.

    The reason for the false alarm was an exercise tape running on the computer system. U.S. Senator Charles Percy happened to be in NORAD HQ at the time and is reported to have said there was absolute panic. A question was asked in Congress. The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation, and an off-site testing facility was constructed so that test tapes did not in future have to be run on a system that could possibly be in military operation.

    June 80: Faulty Computer Chip
    The warning displays at the Command Centers mentioned in the last episode included windows that normally showed

    0000 ICBMs detected 0000 SLBMs detected

    At 2.25 a.m. on 3 June, 1979, these displays started showing various numbers of missiles detected, represented by 2’s in place of one or more 0’s. Preparations for retaliation were instituted, including nuclear bomber crews starting their engines, launch of Pacific Command’s Airborne Command Post, and readying of Minuteman missiles for launch. It was not difficult to assess that this was a false alarm because the patterns of numbers displayed were not rational.

    While the cause of that false alarm was still being investigated 3 days later, the same thing happened and again preparations were made for retaliation.

    The cause was a single faulty chip that was failing in random fashion. The basic design of the system was faulty, allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive display at several command posts.

    This selection represents only a fraction of the false alarms that have been reported on the American side. Many probably remain unreported, or are hidden in records that remain classified. There are likely to have been as many on the Soviet side which are even more difficult to access.

    The extreme boredom and isolation of missile launch crews on duty must contribute to occasional bizarre behaviour. An example is reported by Lloyd J.Dumas in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol.36, #9, p.15 (1980) quoting Air Force Magazine of 17 Nov.71. As a practical joke, a silo crew recorded a launch message and played it when their relief came on duty. The new crew heard with consternation what appeared to be a valid launch message. They would not of course have been able to effect an actual launch under normal conditions, without proper confirmation from outside the silo.

    COMMENT AND NOTE ON PROBABILITY

    The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the occasions listed may have been small, due to planned “failsafe” features in the warning and launch systems, and to responsible action by those in the chain of command when the failsafe features had failed. However, the accumulation of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks adds up to serious danger.

    There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these mishaps but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only 1 in 100, it is a mathematical fact that the chance of surviving all 20 would have been 82%, i.e. about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger at Russian roulette played \ with a 6-shooter. With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger. If the risk in some of the events had been as high as 1 in 10, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have been less than 50:50.

    The following incident is added to illustrate that even now, when the Cold War has been over for 8 years, errors can still cause concern. Some have said this incident brought the world very close to an accidental nuclear war. That is debatable, but there are still 30,000 nuclear weapons deployed, so grave danger would exist if two nuclear weapons states should get into a hostile adversarial status again.

    January 95: Norwegian Meteorological Missile
    On 25 January, 1995, the Russian early warning radars detected an unexpected missile launch near Spitzbergen. The estimated flight time to Moscow was 5 minutes. The Russian President, the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff were informed. The early warning and the control and command systems switched to combat mode. Within 5 minutes, the radars determined that the missile’s impact point would be outside the Russian borders.

    The missile was carrying instruments for scientific measurements. On 16 January Norway had notified 35 countries including Russia that the launch was planned. Information had apparently reached the Russian Defense Ministry, but failed to reach the on-duty personnel of the early warning system.

    Principal Sources

    Sagan, Scott D.: The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
    University Press, 1993).
    Peace Research Reviews, vol.IX, 4, 5 (1984); vol.X, 3,4(1986) (Dundas,
    ON.: Peace Research Institute, Dundas).
    Calder, Nigel: Nuclear Nightmares (London: British Broadcasting
    Corporation, 1979).
    Britten, Stewart: The Invisible Event (London: Menard Press, 1983)

    Acronyms

    BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site
    CIA Central Intelligence Agency
    CINC Commander in Chief
    DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition
    (DEFCON 5 is the peacetime state;
    DEFCON 1 is maximum war readiness)
    HQ Headquarters
    ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (land based)
    KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopaznosti
    (Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence)
    NORAD North American Air Defense Command
    PAVE PAWS Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System
    SAC Strategic Air Command
    SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
    SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

  • Nuclear Weapons: A Call for Public Protest

    Nuclear weapons, which are instruments of genocide, incinerate human beings. The Peace Memorial Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki display gruesome evidence of the atomic bombings of those cities; one can see walls where human shadows remain after the humans who cast those shadows were incinerated into elemental particles.

    During World War II the Nazis put their victims into gas chambers and then incinerated them in ovens. While the Nazis took their victims to the incinerators, those who possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons plan to take these weapons, that are really portable incinerators, to the victims. Nuclear weapons eliminate the need for gas chambers. They provide a one-step incineration process — for those fortunate enough to die immediately.

    The behavior of the Nazis leading up to and during World War II is universally condemned. The German people are often criticized for failing to oppose the atrocities of the Nazi regime. How much more culpable would be the citizens of the states that now possess nuclear weapons should these instruments of genocide be used again!

    The German people lived in fear of the Nazis. The same cannot be said for the citizens of the nuclear weapons states, particularly the Western nuclear weapons states. Their silence in the face of their governments’ reliance upon these portable incinerators makes them virtual accomplices in planned crimes against humanity.

    It is no excuse to say that these instruments of genocide exist only to deter an enemy. In the first place, there are no enemies among nuclear weapons states in the aftermath of the Cold War. More important, there is no justification for threatening to murder hundreds of millions of people in the name of national security. Deterrence is only a theory, and on many occasions, most famously the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has come close to breaking down.

    The International Court of Justice has found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal, and that it would be virtually impossible to use nuclear weapons without violating the laws of armed conflict and particularly international humanitarian law. The Court in 1996 reaffirmed that all nuclear weapons states have an obligation under international law to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects.”

    Given the immorality and illegality of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, where is the public outrage at the continued reliance upon these weapons by the governments of nuclear weapons states in the aftermath of the Cold War? Many people seem to believe that the threat of nuclear holocaust ended with the end of the Cold War, but this is far from the actual situation. Despite some bilateral phased reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, there are still some 36,000 nuclear weapons in the possession of the nuclear weapons states, with the largest number still stockpiled by the former Cold War enemies, the U.S. and Russia.

    Worse yet, our nation’s foreign policy is still wedded to the threatened use of these weapons. In late 1997 President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive reserving the right for the United States to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and giving the Pentagon increased flexibility to retaliate against smaller states that might use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies. This Presidential Decision Directive was prepared in secret with no public discussion, and came to public light only because it was leaked to the press.

    Another secret study that has recently come to light reveals a frightening approach to nuclear arsenals within the U.S. military command. The study, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” was prepared by the U.S. Strategic Command, and was released only after a freedom of information request by a non-governmental organization concerned with security issues.

    The study states, “Because of the value that comes from the ambiguity of what the U.S. may do to an adversary if the acts we seek to deter are carried out, it hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed.” It continues, “The fact that some elements (of the U.S. government) may appear to be potentially `out of control’ can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary’s decision makers. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries.”

    In effect, this study by the U.S. Strategic Command says that the U.S. should not only continue to base its national security on threatening to retaliate with nuclear weapons, but its decision makers should also act as though they are crazy enough to use them. One is left with the eerie feeling that these supposedly rational planners advocating irrationality may be just crazy enough to actually use these weapons if an opponent was crazy enough to call their bluff or appeared to them to do so.

    Military leaders in the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states are not giving up their reliance upon their nuclear arsenals. There is little reassurance in their secret studies that argue for portraying themselves as “irrational and vindictive.”

    A former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler, has made many strong public pleas for nuclear weapons abolition since his retirement from the Air Force in 1994. He recently stated, “I think that the vast majority of people on the face of this earth will endorse the proposition that such weapons have no place among us. There is no security to be found in nuclear weapons. It’s a fool’s game.”

    General Butler was also a member of a prestigious international commission organized by the Australian government, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. This commission issued a report in 1996 stating, “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used — accidentally or by decision — defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.”

    If the American people and the citizens of other nuclear weapons states want to end their role as unwilling accomplices to threatened mass murder of whole nations, they must make their voices heard. They must demand that their governments proceed with nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects,” as called for by the International Court of Justice.

    If we fail to protest our reliance upon these instruments of genocide, and if these weapons are ever used, it will be “We, the People” who will stand culpable before history of even greater crimes than those committed by the Nazis. We will not have the excuse that we, like most Germans in the Nazi era, did not protest because we feared for our lives. It will be our indifference when we could have made a difference that will be the mark of our crime against humanity.

     

  • Nuclear Weapons: The Global Dialogue

    Nuclear weapons, which might more appropriately be called “instruments of genocide,” are the ultimate weapons of mass annihilation. Global dialogue, on the other hand, is an engaged series of communications that seeks a deeper understanding and reconciliation of differences as well as peaceful solutions to conflicts affecting the international community. Nuclear weapons necessitate global dialogue.

    Throughout the Nuclear Age, most of the exchange on nuclear weapons within the nuclear weapons states has been insular, technical and restricted to an elite group of political, military, industrial and academic participants–hardly a dialogue. It has been restricted to what kind of nuclear weapons to create, how to deploy them, how they should be developed and tested, and how many are needed. This non-dialogue has taken place within national security establishments, generally behind closed doors, with little public involvement. The result has been the development of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, reliance on untestable theories of deterrence, and security policies with the crudeness and finality of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

    Even in democratic societies such as the U.S., Britain and France, the public has never been offered a significant role in decisions on nuclear policy. The public has managed to intrude itself in the discourse only in extreme circumstances. One such circumstance occurred from the mid-1950s through the early 1960s when the public, with leadership from men like Albert Einstein, Linus Pauling, Bertrand Russell, and Albert Schweitzer, became justifiably worried about the health effects of the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Public protests of atmospheric testing in the U.S. and elsewhere led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the oceans, the atmosphere and outer space.

    In the U.S., the public again entered the discourse on nuclear weapons issues in the early 1980s when Cold War rhetoric reached alarming levels. Ronald Reagan was referring to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” and dialogue between the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union had all but vanished. Large numbers of people became active in a campaign to freeze nuclear arsenals as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Civic and religious organizations throughout the nation added their voices in support of the freeze. On June 12, 1982 some one million people gathered in New York in support of the nuclear freeze movement.

    In the mid-1980s, when the nuclear freeze movement was active in the United States, Europeans were protesting the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles on their territories. People throughout Europe feared that with the emplacement of these nuclear-armed missiles on their soil, Europe would become the primary battleground for a nuclear war between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

    Each of these periods of public involvement opened the door to dialogue between the U.S. and Soviet governments on arms control issues. Unfortunately, the governments chose to take only small steps rather than significant strides. They ceased atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, but continued their testing underground. In doing so, they immediately reduced the environmental threat to humanity, but they failed to take the more important step of ending the nuclear arms race. The nuclear freeze movement led to a resumption of dialogue between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, a leader with surprising vision, had become the head of the USSR. He and Ronald Reagan almost agreed to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals at a face to face meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986. For a few hours the two leaders, without their national security subordinates, actually engaged in a serious dialogue on eliminating their nuclear weapons. In the end, they were unable to reach an accord due to President Reagan’s commitment to building a missile defense system. A few years later, however, they began the process of strategic arms reductions. The U.S. and USSR were also able to agree to the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, leading to the removal of U.S. cruise and Pershing missiles from Europe.

    Among governments in the international community, a dialogue on nuclear weapons began almost immediately after the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. at the end of World War II. The very first resolution of the United Nations in January 1946 called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission with the task of eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals. Early efforts to achieve the international control of nuclear weapons at the United Nations failed, however, and the U.S. began atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific in mid-1946. Three years later the USSR began testing its own nuclear weapons.

    In 1968 the international community reached agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This agreement defined two classes of states, those with nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In effect, this treaty divided the world into nuclear “haves” (U.S., USSR, UK, France and China), and nuclear “have-nots” (all other countries). It effectively established a system of nuclear apartheid. In Article VI of this treaty, the nuclear weapons states promised the other states that they would proceed with good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Today, 30 years later, many non-nuclear weapons states rightfully question the good faith of the nuclear weapons states.

    In 1995 the dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament continued when the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) held a review and extension conference. At this conference, the nuclear weapons states sought an indefinite extension of the treaty, and brought much pressure to bear on non-nuclear weapons states to achieve this goal. A number of the non-nuclear weapons states argued for extensions for periods of time (such as 5 to 25 years) with renewals contingent upon progress by the nuclear weapons states in keeping their Article VI promises. In the end, the nuclear weapons states prevailed and the treaty was extended indefinitely.

    Certain non-binding commitments, though, strongly advocated by the non-nuclear weapons states, were agreed to by the nuclear weapons states. These were: adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, undertaking negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and the promise to engage in the “determined pursuit… of systematic and progressive efforts” to achieve nuclear disarmament. A CTBT was adopted in 1996, but negotiations have yet to begin on a fissile material cut-off. The “determined pursuit… of systematic and progressive” efforts by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament is not apparent.

    There are encouraging developments of more recent public involvement in the global dialogue on nuclear weapons. In the mid-1990s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) came to the NPT Review and Extension Conference and lobbied for a commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals. When their lobbying of the nuclear weapons states fell largely on deaf ears, these NGOs prepared and adopted the Abolition 2000 Statement, which calls for negotiating a treaty by the year 2000 for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. The goal of these NGOs was to enter the 21st century with such a treaty in place. These NGOs and others formed themselves into a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons, which is called Abolition 2000. Organizations in the network have attempted to enter into a dialogue with states on the issue of abolishing nuclear arsenals.

    Another major citizen activity that brought the public into the global dialogue on nuclear weapons was the World Court Project. This project sought a decision from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Over 600 NGOs lobbied at the United Nations and around the world in support of taking this matter to the ICJ. They succeeded in getting both the World Health Organization and the UN General Assembly to ask the Court for an advisory opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

    Oral hearings at the Court took place in October and November 1995. The nuclear weapons states and their NATO allies argued that the Court should not issue an opinion but, if it did, it should rule that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal under certain circumstances. Nearly all of the other states that came before the Court argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal under international law under any circumstances.

    On July 8, 1996 the Court issued its opinion. It found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal. Based upon the facts before it and the current state of international law, however, the Court was unable to conclude whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal or illegal in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. The Court also said that any threat or use of nuclear weapons that violated international humanitarian law would be illegal. Thus, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, when its very survival was at stake, a state would still have to use nuclear weapons in such a way as not to injure or kill civilians and not to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Because of the nature of nuclear weapons (instruments of genocide) this would not be possible.

    The Court concluded its opinion by stating: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The nuclear weapons states have thus far largely ignored this obligation. The UN General Assembly has responded by referring to this obligation in annual resolutions calling upon “all States immediately to fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations … leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.” These resolutions have been adopted by the UN general Assembly in 1996 and 1997.

    Currently, many prominent voices are being heard in a decidedly one-sided attempt at global dialogue. These include distinguished international personalities–including U.S. General Lee Butler, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, British Field Marshall Lord Carver, former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat–who were called together by the Australian government in the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. This commission made a strong plea for the elimination of nuclear arsenals in their 1996 report. They stated, “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used–accidentally or by decision–defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.”

    Some 60 former generals and admirals from throughout the world, also joined the call for the abolition of nuclear weapons in late 1996. The generals and admirals argued, “We believe… that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters. It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

    “First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    “Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

    “Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

    In early 1998 over 100 international civilian leaders, including some 50 current or past heads of state or heads of government, also joined in the call for eliminating nuclear arsenals. These civilian leaders argued that the following six steps should be taken immediately:

    1. Remove nuclear weapons from alert status, separate them from their delivery vehicles, and place them in secure national storage.

    2. Halt production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

    3. End nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    4. Launch immediate U.S./Russian negotiations toward further, deep reductions of their nuclear arsenals, irrespective of START II ratification.

    5. Unequivocal commitment by the other declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states to join the reduction process on a proportional basis as the U.S. and Russia approach their arsenal levels, within an international system of inspection, verification, and safeguards.

    6. Develop a plan for eventual implementation, achievement and enforcement of the distant but final goal of elimination.

    Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 impacted the global dialogue, underscoring the Indian position that they will live in a world with no nuclear weapons, but not in a world of nuclear apartheid. It reflects the failure of the global dialogue that states as poor as India and Pakistan would find it necessary to devote any of their resources to nuclear weapons when so many of their people are without adequate food, shelter, education, and health care.

    Over the years, religious organizations have from time to time spoken out on nuclear weapons issues. Some 75 U.S. Catholic Bishops associated with Pax Christi USA issued an important statement in June 1998 in which they challenged the theory of deterrence. Their statement concluded, “[T]he time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.”

    In June 1998, eight middle power nations, referring to themselves as the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden), called for entering the new millennium with a commitment in place to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. In important respects, the call of the New Agenda Coalition echoed that of Abolition 2000. “The international community must not enter the third millennium,” the eight nation declaration asserted, “with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the Governments of each of the nuclear-weapons States and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.”

    While the chorus of voices seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons is growing and includes many significant leaders, a real dialogue is not yet occurring. The nuclear weapons states are not taking seriously the calls for abolition, and they are not responding to these calls. For the most part, the acts of the nuclear weapons states constitute a continuation of the status quo. By the behavior of the nuclear weapons states, including their lack of dialogue, one would think that the Cold War had not ended nearly ten years ago.

    We appear to be in a dialogue of the deaf. The people speak, but their voices are still weak. The political leaders and national security establishments of the nuclear weapons states do not respond. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have been practically moribund with regard to their own nuclear dialogue. By their work to extend the NPT indefinitely and to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, they have, arguably, only sought to perpetuate nuclear apartheid. They also pushed back the date for completing the START 2 nuclear arms reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007.

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin certainly have not moved decisively toward eliminating the nuclear threat to humanity or reducing their own arsenals. I believe that they will be judged harshly in the future for missing this historic opportunity. It is unfortunate that they are now being judged harshly for their respective addictions rather than for their abdication of responsibility on this issue of greatest importance to humanity’s future.

    Dialogue is a characteristic of a healthy society. People must speak and listen to each other. Without dialogue, democracy fails. Without dialogue, needs go unmet and preventable disasters occur. In a global society, with technologies as powerful as nuclear weapons, dialogue is essential if we are to prevent major catastrophes.

    We can learn from the history of the Nuclear Age that when enough people speak with a strong and unified voice the political leaders will respond. However, if the people do not speak, their political leaders will be unlikely to alter the status quo by themselves. This is one of the great tragedies of our time. Our political leaders have led by following. This places additional responsibility on people everywhere. More and more people must again make their voices heard on nuclear disarmament. They must demand an end to secrecy and elitism with regard to decisions on nuclear armaments. But most of all, they must demand an end to the nuclear weapons era. They must demand negotiations on the elimination of nuclear armaments, and the conclusion of a treaty to complete this process.

    The future of humanity and much of life remains in jeopardy of annihilation by nuclear arsenals. The promises of the nuclear weapons states for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament remain to be fulfilled. The people of the world, and particularly the people of the nuclear weapons states, must demand that the promise of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament, be kept.

    There are hopeful signs. The growth of Abolition 2000 to over 1,100 organizations is a sign of hope. In Japan, in only three months, over 13 million people signed the Abolition 2000 International Petition calling for ending the nuclear threat, signing a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, and reallocating resources to meet human needs. Abolition 2000’s goal of achieving an international treaty on nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 has now been echoed by the eight nations of the New Agenda Coalition. It is a reasonable goal. It provides an immediate focus for a global dialogue on nuclear disarmament. The missing actors in this dialogue are the leaders of the nuclear weapons states. The people must now lead them to the negotiating table.

     

  • The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence

    Part II of II

    Chapter I PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES Article I

    The Purposes of the United Nations are:

    1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

    2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

    3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

    4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

    Certainly, all of these Purposes of the United Nations would be defeated and set at naught in the event that nuclear weapons were actually used.

    In the above-quoted Paragraph 48 of the Advisory Opinion the Court appears to condemn nuclear deterrence once again in no uncertain terms, and to include within this rubric the possession of nuclear weapons with the intention and imminent capability to use them. Hence, such possession of nuclear weapons is clearly illegal and, I might add, criminal as well. This conclusion by the World Court as to the illegality of the possession of nuclear weapons goes far beyond anything argued in most of the scholarly literature produced on this subject during the past two decades. For this reason, Paragraph 48 stands as a resounding vindication to that handful of courageous scholars who have taken the position that the possession of nuclear weapons is illegal despite enduring the guffaws and ridicule of their so-called colleagues.

    Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War

    In regard to the defense of anti-nuclear resisters, the next critical passage of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion becomes Paragraph 77:

    77. All this shows that the conduct of military operations is governed by a body of legal prescriptions. This is so because “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” as stated in Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations relating to the laws and customs of war on land. The St. Petersburg Declaration had already condemned the use of weapons “which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men or make their death inevitable”. The aforementioned Regulations relating to the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, prohibit the use of “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering” (Art. 23).

    It is clear, therefore, that the laws of war likewise apply to the threat and use of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclear weapons are “unlimited” in their effects. Nuclear weapons also uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men and women and make their deaths inevitable. Nuclear weapons also cause unnecessary suffering.

    Hence, t. The United States government is a contracting party to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 and its annexed Regulations, which constitute a “treaty” and thus the “supreme Law of the Land” under Article VI of the United States Constitution. Therefore, current U.S. nuclear deterrence policies stand in anticipatory breach of Hague Convention No. IV and are therefore illegal and criminal.

    Nuclear Deterrence and International Humanitarian Law

    Paragraph 78 of the Advisory Opinion is directly on point with respect to maintaining the illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including therein nuclear deterrence:

    78. The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.

    The Court would likewise refer, in relation to these principles, to the Martens Clause, which was first included in the Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology. A modern version of that clause is to be found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, which reads as follows:

    “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”

    In conformity with the aforementioned principles, humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use would also be contrary to that law.

    The World Court clearly said: “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” Yet, to the contrary, U.S. strategic nuclear weapons systems do indeed make civilians the direct object of attack, and because of their incredible explosive power are also incapable of distinguishing between civilians and military targets.

    The Court then goes on to say: “According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants.” But clearly the use of nuclear weapons would cause unnecessary suffering to both combatants and to civilians, the latter of whom remain absolutely protected at all times. The well-documented human suffering in the aftermath of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provides conclusive evidence of the validity of this proposition.

    The Court concludes Paragraph 78 by stating: “If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use would also be contrary to that law.” In other words, nuclear deterrence itself is illegal. For example, a nuclear weapons state such as the United States cannot lawfully threaten mass extermination when mass extermination itself would be clearly illegal and criminal. Here once again, the World Court implicitly condemns the whole doctrine of nuclear deterrence as being illegal and, I might add, criminal.

    Referring explicitly to the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions in Paragraph 79 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court held as follows: “Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.” Of course, the United States government has ratified Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 and the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and so is bound to observe them a fortiori.

    Nuclear Weapons and Nuremberg Accountability

    In this regard, it is also significant that in Paragraph 80 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court invokes and affirms the authority of the 1945 Nuremberg Judgment during the course of analyzing the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law. Furthermore, in Paragraph 81 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court repeats with implicit approval the official assertion by the United Nations Secretary General that the Nuremberg Charter of 8 August 1945, inter alia, represents “‘…part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law…’” Thus, in Paragraphs 80 and 81 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court deliberately and directly raises the specter of personal criminal responsibility under the Nuremberg Charter, the Nuremberg Judgment, and I might add the Nuremberg Principles, for government decision-makers bearing command responsibility, aiding and abetting, or otherwise complicit in their country’s plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons. Since I have already discussed these matters at great length elsewhere, I will not bother to repeat any of that analysis here.

    Nuclear Weapons and International Humanitarian Law

    The Court then turns directly to the question of the applicability of international humanitarian law to the threat and use of nuclear weapons and concludes in Paragraphs 85, 86 and 87 that the aforementioned principles of international humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons just as they apply to any other weapon of warfare:

    85. …In the view of the vast majority of States as well as writers there can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons.

    86. The Court shares that view. … In this respect it seems significant that the thesis that the rules of humanitarian law do not apply to the new weaponry, because of the newness of the latter, has not been advocated in the present proceedings. On the contrary, the newness of nuclear weapons has been expressly rejected as an argument against the application to them of international humanitarian law:

    ….

    None of the statements made before the Court in any way advocated a freedom to use nuclear weapons without regard to humanitarian constraints. Quite the reverse; it has been explicitly stated,

    “Restrictions set by the rules applicable to armed conflicts in respect of means and methods of warfare definitely also extend to nuclear weapons” (Russian Federation, CR 95/29, p. 52);

    “So far as the customary law of war is concerned, the United Kingdom has always accepted that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the general principles of the jus in bello” (United Kingdom, CR 95/34, p. 45); and

    “The United States has long shared the view that the law of armed conflict governs the use of nuclear weapons — just as it governs the use of conventional weapons” (United States of America, CR 95/34, p. 85.)

    87. Finally, the Court points to the Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and applicability is not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons.

    Thus, consistent with its longstanding position going back to the U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 of 1956, the United States government expressly conceded before the World Court that international humanitarian law applies to the use of nuclear weapons. But as the World Court has consistently pointed out so far in this Advisory Opinion, it would be difficult to imagine any circumstances in which the threat and use of nuclear weapons would not violate international humanitarian law. Once again, the conclusion becomes inexorable that the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including therein nuclear deterrence, is illegal and, I might add, criminal.

    Violation of the International Laws of Neutrality

    The World Court then turned to the question of whether or not the threat and use of nuclear weapons violate the international laws of neutrality. Generally put, the essence of the international laws of neutrality can be found in Hague Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907, and Hague Convention No. XIII Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War of 1907. The United States government is a contracting party to both Hague Neutrality Conventions. In addition, both of the Hague Neutrality Conventions of 1907 constitute customary international law on the rules of neutrality in wartime.

    No point would be served by reviewing the contents of these two treaties in detail. Suffice it to say here that their basic requirement is that belligerents are bound to respect the territory and the sovereign rights of neutral states during wartime. As Article 1 of Hague Convention No. V. Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907 put it: “The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.” In Paragraph 89 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court found that these principles of neutrality apply “…to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be used.” In other words, states must respect the international laws of neutrality and the territory and the sovereign rights of neutral states when it comes to the threat and use of nuclear weapons.

    But this simply cannot be done given the devastating effects of nuclear weapons upon the surrounding environment irrespective of national borders; given the transnational effects of nuclear fallout; and given the transgenerational effects of nuclear radiation. In any event, it is certainly clear that the nuclear weapons states have paid absolutely no attention whatsoever to the customary or conventional international laws of neutrality when it comes to formulating their currently existing plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including therein nuclear deterrence. In other words, the nuclear weapons states are currently threatening to violate the international laws of neutrality and thus stand in anticipatory breach of these two Hague Neutrality Conventions and the customary international laws of neutrality. Once again, this is certainly the type of ongoing inchoate criminal activity that anti-nuclear resisters have the right to oppose by necessary and proportionate means.

    Furthermore, many states such as the United States have enacted domestic implementing legislation that is purposefully designed to incorporate into their municipal legal systems the customary and conventional international laws of neutrality on pain of criminal penalty for their violation. Once again, anti-nuclear resisters have the right to oppose such ongoing inchoate criminal activities by their own government officials acting in gross violation of customary international law, international treaties, and domestic statutes that were expressly intended to criminalize such behavior. Papers to that effect have already been drawn up by my friend, former client, Plowshares resister, convicted felon, fellow graduate of the Harvard Law School, fellow attorney, and co-counsel Katya Komisaruk, Esquire, of Oakland, California–a real American Hero!

    Conclusion on International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons

    In Paragraph 91 of the Advisory Opinion, the World Court referred to, but refused to endorse, the legality of even “…the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas…” as advocated by the United Kingdom and the United States during the course of these proceedings. And in Paragraph 94 of the Opinion, the World Court even goes so far as to expressly refuse to endorse “…the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, including the ‘clean’ use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons…” Here the Court’s analysis implies that even such “limited” uses of tactical nuclear weapons would have to comply with international humanitarian law and the international laws of neutrality, assuming that could be done. Even then, the legality vel non of the tactical use of low yield nuclear weapons would also depend upon “…whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons.” (Advisory Opinion, Paragraph 94.) Once again, it is difficult to imagine any such circumstances.

    The Court utters its final condemnation of nuclear weapons in Paragraph 95 of the Opinion as follows:

    …Thus, methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use of such weapons in fact seem scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements. …

    So once again the World Court expressly recognizes the proposition that it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where the threat and use of nuclear weapons would be lawful.

    The World Court’s Non-Pronouncement in Paragraph 97

    Originally, the General Assembly had asked the World Court to answer the following question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?” The World Court finally got around to answering this precise question in Paragraph 95 of the Advisory Opinion by employing the following language:

    …Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.

    For obvious reasons, the World Court could not possibly have envisioned and considered all the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might conceivably be used. Consequently, the Court observed in Paragraph 97 of the Advisory Opinion that “…it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.” This is because of the factual uncertainties surrounding this hypothetical conjecture that had been mentioned in Paragraph 95 of the Advisory Opinion as quoted above.

    I will discuss the Court’s non-pronouncement mentioned in Paragraph 97 of the Advisory Opinion in more detail below when analyzing the Opinion’s dispositif. Suffice it to say here that in this entire Advisory Opinion, the World Court did not tolerate, or approve, or sanction, or condone any threat or use of nuclear weapons for any reason. The Court simply refused to express “…a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake…” because of the factual uncertainties surrounding this purely hypothetical conjecture. Like any other court in the world today, the World Court operates on two basic principles, inter alia: Never say never! And: It all depends upon the facts!

    Nuclear Disarmament

    In Paragraph 99 of the Advisory Opinion, the Court quotes Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as follows:

    “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    The Court interpreted NPT Article VI to contain a twofold obligation (1) to pursue and (2) to conclude negotiations for nuclear disarmament in good faith as follows:

    ….

    The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result — nuclear disarmament in all its aspects — by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.

    See Advisory Opinion, para. 99.

    And in Paragraph 100 of the Advisory Opinion, the Court clearly states that: “This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the 182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community.”

    Since 1968 it cannot be said that the world’s nuclear weapons states have ever pursued negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. Indeed, since 1968, except perhaps for the 1986 Gorbachev proposals, not one of the nuclear weapons states has ever given any serious consideration to their solemn legal obligation of nuclear disarmament, let alone general and complete disarmament, as required and called for by NPT Article VI. Hence, all of the nuclear weapons states currently stand in material breach of these twin obligations under NPT Article VI and customary international law as authoritatively determined by the World Court itself in Paragraph 99 of its Advisory Opinion.

    The Dispositif

    The Court then issued its formal rulings in Paragraph 105 of the Advisory Opinion, the so-called “dispositif.” I will not bother to repeat or analyze all of its elements here. But for the purposes of defending anti-nuclear resisters the critical provisions of the dispositif will be discussed below. For the sake of convenience I will first examine these “unanimous” rulings adopted by the International Court of Justice in the dispositif of this Advisory Opinion.

    Unanimous Ruling on the U.N. Charter

    In Paragraph 105(2)(C) of the Opinion the Court ruled unanimously that: “A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;”

    In his Dissenting Opinion at page 3, Judge Weeramantry interpreted Paragraph 105(2)(C) of the Advisory Opinion as follows:

    (iv) Paragraph 2(C) – (Unanimous)

    The positive features of this paragraph have already been noted. The Court, in this paragraph, has unanimously endorsed Charter-based pre-conditions to the legality of nuclear weapons, which are diametrically opposed to the results of the use of the weapon. I thus read paragraph 1(C) [sic: must read “2(C)” because there is no 1(C)] of the dispositif as rendering the use of the nuclear weapon illegal without regard [sic: add “to”] the circumstances in which the weapon is used – whether in aggression or in self defence, whether internationally or internally, whether by individual decision or in concert with other nations. A unanimous endorsement of this principle by all the judges of this Court takes the principle of illegality of use of nuclear weapons a long way forward from the stage when there was no prior judicial consideration of legality of nuclear weapons by any international tribunal.

    Those contending that the use of nuclear weapons was within the law argued strongly that what is not expressly prohibited to a state is permitted. On this basis, the use of the nuclear weapon was said to be a matter on which the state’s freedom was not limited. I see the limitations laid down in paragraph 1(C) [sic: must read “2(C)” because there is no 1(C)] as laying that argument to rest.

    In this passage, Judge Weeramantry has provided us with an authoritative interpretation of Paragraph 105(2)(C) not only because he is a sitting Judge of the World Court but also because he is one of the world’s leading experts on nuclear weapons and international law.

    The import of this unanimous ruling by the World Court in Paragraph 105(2)(C) of the Advisory Opinion should be crystal clear by now. It is almost impossible to imagine any threat or use of nuclear weapons that would be compatible with Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and that meets all the requirements of Article 51, especially the principles of necessity and proportionality. Indeed, in their current plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including therein nuclear deterrence, the world’s nuclear weapons states have paid absolutely no meaningful attention whatsoever to the requirements of Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and especially the principles of necessity and proportionality. Hence, all of the current plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons by the world’s nuclear weapons states, including therein nuclear deterrence, are “unlawful” and, I might add, criminal.

    Unanimous Ruling on International Humanitarian Law

    In Paragraph 105(2)(D) of the Opinion’s dispositif, the World Court ruled unanimously that: “A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;”

    In his Dissenting Opinion at page 3, Judge Weeramantry interpreted Paragraph 105(2)(D) of the Advisory Opinion as follows: (v) Paragraph 2(D) – (Unanimous)

    This paragraph, also unanimously endorsed by the Court, lays down the further limitation of compatibility with the requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict, and particularly with the rules of international humanitarian law and specific treaty obligations.

    There is a large array of prohibitions laid down here.

    My Opinion will show what these rules and principles are, and how it is impossible, in the light of the nature and effects of nuclear weapons, for these to be satisfied.

    If the weapon is demonstrably contrary to these principles, it is unlawful in accordance with this paragraph of the Court’s Opinion.

    Once again, in this passage Judge Weeramantry has provided us with an authoritative interpretation of Paragraph 105(2)(D) not only because he is a sitting Judge of the World Court, but also because he is one of the world’s leading experts on nuclear weapons and international law.

    The import of this unanimous ruling by the World Court in Paragraph 105(2)(D) of the Advisory Opinion should also be crystal clear by now. It is almost impossible to imagine any threat or use of nuclear weapons that would not grossly violate the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, whether customary or conventional. Indeed, in their current plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including therein nuclear deterrence, the nuclear weapons states have paid absolutely no meaningful attention whatsoever to the requirements of international humanitarian law, whether customary or conventional. Hence, all of the current plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons by the world’s nuclear weapons states, including therein nuclear deterrence, are illegal and, I might add, criminal.

    Unanimous Ruling on Nuclear Disarmament

    Finally, in Paragraph 105(2)(F) of the Opinion’s dispositif, the World Court ruled unanimously: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Quite obviously, since 1968 not one of the nuclear weapons states has discharged these twin obligations of both customary and conventional international law. Consequently, all of the world’s nuclear weapons states currently stand in material breach of NPT Article VI as well as these identical twin obligations under customary international law.

    The Court’s Ruling on the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons

    The World Court then ruled on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the Advisory Opinion’s dispositif as follows:

    E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote,

    It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

    However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

    IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczgh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereschetin, Ferrari Bravo;

    AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins.

    According to Article 55 of the ICJ Statute, in the event of a tie in the number of votes by the World Court Judges, it is for the President of the Court to cast the deciding vote. For this reason, President Bedjaoui’s separate Declaration appended to the Opinion bears special importance for the interpretation of this component of the dispositif.

    According to President Bedjaoui, Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the Advisory Opinion’s dispositif must not “in any way be interpreted as leaving the way open to the recognition of the lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” See Declaration of President Bedjaoui, at para. 11. In this regard, President Bedjaoui drew attention to the fact that in Paragraph 79 of the Advisory Opinion, the Court had already held that the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law (i.e., the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions) “…constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.” In other words, since these principles are “intransgressible,” to use the precise word of the Court, then they can never be violated, even in extreme circumstances, when the very survival of the state is at stake. See Declaration of President Bedjaoui, at para. 21.

    The Importance of Paragraph 104

    Likewise, in interpreting this element of the dispositif, it is crucial to recall to mind once again the text of Paragraph 104 of the Advisory Opinion, which immediately precedes the entirety of the dispositif found in Paragraph 105, as follows:

    104. At the end of the present Opinion, the Court emphasizes that its reply to the question put to it by the General Assembly rests on the totality of the legal grounds set forth by the Court above (paragraphs 20 to 103), each of which is to be read in the light of the others. Some of these grounds are not such as to form the object of formal conclusions in the final paragraph of the Opinion; they nevertheless retain, in the view of the Court, all their importance.

    In other words, the elements of the dispositif set forth in Paragraph 105(2)(E) must be read and interpreted by reference to Paragraphs 20 to 103 of the Advisory Opinion, which have already been extensively analyzed above.

    Therefore, it would be an incorrect interpretation of the Advisory Opinion to focus simply upon Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the dispositif. Rather, by means of Paragraph 104 the Court makes it crystal clear that the dispositif, including Paragraph 105(2)(E), does not mean to take back or call into question any of its findings set forth in Paragraphs 20 to 103. Paragraphs 20 to 103 “retain, in the view of the Court, all their importance” despite the non-pronouncement found in Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the Advisory Opinion.

    Interpreting Paragraph 105(2)(E)

    In his Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry criticized the entirety of Advisory Opinion Paragraph 105(2)(E) as follows:

    (ii) Paragraph 2(E) – (7 votes to 7. Casting vote in favour by the President)

    I am in fundamental disagreement with both sentences contained within this paragraph.

    I strongly oppose the presence of the word “generally” in the first sentence. The word is too uncertain in content for use in an Advisory Opinion, and I cannot assent to a proposition which, even by remotest implication, leaves open any possibility that the use of nuclear weapons would not be contrary to law in any circumstances whatsoever. I regret the presence of this word in a sentence which otherwise states the law correctly. It would also appear that the word “generally” introduces an element of internal contradiction into the Court’s Opinion, for in paragraphs 2(C) and 2(D) of the Court’s Opinion, the Court concludes that nuclear weapons must be consistent with the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, and the principles of humanitarian law, and, such consistency being impossible, the weapon becomes illegal.

    The word “generally” admits of many meanings, ranging through various gradations, from “as a general rule; commonly”, to “universally; with respect to all or nearly all”. [Footnote omitted.] Even with the latter meaning, the word opens a window of permissibility, however narrow, which does not truly reflect the law. There should be no niche in the legal principle, within which a nation may seek refuge, constituting itself the sole judge in its own cause on so important a matter.

    The main purpose of this Opinion is to show that, not generally but always, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law and, in particular, to the principles and rules of humanitarian law. Paragraph 2(E) should have been in those terms, and the Opinion need have stated no more.

    The second paragraph of 2(E) states that the current state of international law is such that the Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of the weapon would or would not be lawful in extreme circumstances of self defence. It seems self-evident to me that once nuclear weapons are resorted to, the laws of war (the ius in bello) take over, and that there are many principles of the laws of war, as recounted in this Opinion, which totally forbid the use of such a weapon. The existing law is sufficiently clear on this matter to have enabled the Court to make a definite pronouncement without leaving this vital question, as though sufficient principles are not already in existence to determine it. All the more should this uncertainty have been eliminated in view of the Court’s very definite findings as set out earlier.

    See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, at pp. 2-3. Once again, Judge Weeramantry’s comments constitute an authoritative interpretation of Paragraph 105(2)(E) because he is a sitting Judge of the World Court and also because he is one of the world’s leading experts on nuclear weapons and international law.

    The First Paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E)

    Quite obviously, there should not be any problem interpreting the meaning of the first paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E):

    It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

    …. Notice that the World Court expressly found that both “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law…” In other words, nuclear deterrence itself “would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law…” Here I might add that since nuclear deterrence violates the laws of war and international humanitarian law, nuclear deterrence is thus criminal.

    Likewise, in this regard, Judge Shi Jiuyong (from China, a nuclear weapons state) points out in his Declaration that nuclear deterrence has “no legal significance.” Similarly, on page 2 of his Declaration Judge Ferrari Bravo (from Italy, allied with three nuclear weapons states in the NATO Alliance) states that nuclear deterrence has no juridical value, and observes: “On pourrait arriver à dire que l’on est en présence d’un anti-droit, si on pense aux effets qu’elle a eus sur la Charte des Nations Unies.” In other words, nuclear deterrence is “anti-law,” that is the very negation of international law and especially of the United Nations Charter.

    In a similar vein, Judge Fleischhauer (from Germany, allied with three nuclear weapons states in the NATO Alliance) states in Paragraph 2 of his Separate Opinion: “The nuclear weapon is, in many ways, the negation of the humanitarian considerations underlying the law applicable in armed conflict and the principle of neutrality.”

    President Bedjaoui made a similar observation in Paragraph 20 of his Declaration: “…Nuclear weapons, the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law which is the law of the lesser evil. The existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a challenge to the very existence of humanitarian law. …Nuclear war and humanitarian law seem by consequence to be two antitheses which exclude each other radically, the existence of the one necessarily supposes the inexistence of the other.”

    Simply put, nuclear weapons are to international law what the so-called Anti-Christ is to the Christian religion. Indeed, I personally know many devout Christians who sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are the Anti-Christ. Typically, anti-nuclear resisters oppose nuclear weapons because of a mixture of religious, moral, and legal considerations. Their admixture of motivations is given legal significance by the so-called Martens Clause as set forth, for example, in the Preamble to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907, to which the United States government is a contracting party:

    Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.

    Certainly the dictate of the public conscience around the world is against the threat and use of nuclear weapons. As Judge Shahabuddeen put the matter on page 27 of his Dissenting Opinion:

    In the result, on the basis of what the Court finds to be the state of the public conscience, it will be able to say whether the Martens Clause operates to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. On the available material, it would be open to the Court to hold that the Clause operates to impose such a prohibition.

    Interpreting The Second Paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the Advisory Opinion

    The real problem with Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the Advisory Opinion comes from the proper interpretation to be accorded its second paragraph:

    ….

    However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

    At the very outset of his Dissenting Opinion Judge Koroma (of Sierre Leone) had the following observations to make about the second paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E):

    It is a matter of profound regret to me that I have been compelled to append this Dissenting Opinion to the Advisory Opinion rendered by the Court, as I fundamentally disagree with its finding – secured by the President’s casting vote – that:

    “in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”.

    This finding, in my considered opinion, is not only unsustainable on the basis of existing international law, but, as I shall demonstrate later, is totally at variance with the weight and abundance of material presented to the Court. The finding is all the more regrettable in view of the fact that the Court had itself reached a conclusion that:

    “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”.

    A finding with which I concur, save for the word “generally”. It is my considered opinion based on the existing law and the available evidence that the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance would be unlawful under international law. That use would at the very least result in the violation of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, and would therefore be contrary to that law.

    ….

    See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, at p. 1.

    Likewise, in her Dissenting Opinion at Paragraph 29, Judge Higgins (from the United Kingdom, a nuclear weapons state) criticizes the second paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E) in the following language:

    29. …Through this formula of non-pronouncement the Court necessarily leaves open the possibility that a use of nuclear weapons contrary to humanitarian law might nonetheless be lawful. This goes beyond anything that was claimed by the nuclear weapon States appearing before the Court, who fully accepted that any lawful threat or use of nuclear weapons would have to comply with both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello (see para. 86).

    Judge Higgins is certainly correct to point out that the nuclear weapons states are still bound to adhere to their position on this matter that they formally articulated during the course of the World Court proceedings. It has been the longstanding position of the nuclear weapons states that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with both the United Nations Charter (the jus ad bellum, or right to go to war) as well as with the laws of war and international humanitarian law (that is, the jus in bello, or laws of war). The non-pronouncement found in the second paragraph of Paragraph 105(2)(E) of this Advisory Opinion did not and indeed could not alter the validity of those legal obligations which flow from both customary and conventional international law.

    Likewise, in Paragraph 12 of her Dissenting Opinion Judge Higgins stated most emphatically: “…It is in any event absolutely prohibited to attack civilians, whether by nuclear or other weapons.” Even when considering attacking legitimate military targets, a state must not attack “if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack.” See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, at para. 20. Applying this principle of proportionality to nuclear weapons, Judge Higgins opines: “One is inevitably led to the question of whether, if a target is legitimate and the use of a nuclear weapon is the only way of destroying that target, any need can ever be so necessary as to occasion massive damage upon civilians.” See id.

    Finally, in Paragraph 23 of her Dissenting Opinion Judge Higgins enunciates a third principle of international humanitarian law with respect to the threat and use of nuclear weapons: “Very important also in the present context is the requirement of humanitarian law that weapons may not be used which are incapable of discriminating between civilian and military targets.” Once again, it is extremely difficult to conceive of any circumstances surrounding the current plans for the threat and use of nuclear weapons by the world’s nuclear weapons states that would not violate any one, or more, or all three of these fundamental principles of international humanitarian law that were articulated by Judge Higgins in her Dissenting Opinion.

    The Dissenters to Paragraph 105(2)(E)

    As can be seen from the above analysis, of the seven World Court Judges registering dissenting votes to Paragraph 105(2)(E) of the dispositif of the Advisory Opinion, Judge Weeramantry and Judge Koroma dissented because it did not, in their Opinions, go far enough to expressly condemn the threat and use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. The same can be said for Judge Shahabuddeen in his Dissenting Opinion. The grounds for Judge Oda’s Dissenting Opinion were that he did not believe the World Court should have responded to the General Assembly’s Request for this Advisory Opinion in the first place.

    Therefore, of the seven dissenters to Paragraph 105(2)(E), only Judge Schwebel (from the United States), Judge Higgins (from the United Kingdom) and Judge Guillaume (from France) had any substantive problem with its general condemnation of the threat and use of nuclear weapons. Notice that these three dissenters were all from the three nuclear weapons states that are allied with each other by means of the NATO Pact. Thus, it is not surprising that these three Judges voted on Paragraph 105(2)(E) in a manner consistent with the fact that their respective states of nationality possess nuclear weapons. In the practice of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, there has always been a high degree of correlation between a Judge’s vote and the position advocated by his or her state of nationality before the World Court despite the vaunted independence of the World Court from outside political pressures. Nevertheless, by comparison, Judge Vereschetin from Russia and Judge Shi from China did not dissent from Paragraph 105(2)(E) despite the fact that their respective states of nationality were indeed nuclear weapons states.

    In light of these three dissenting votes on Paragraph 105(2)(E) by Judges Schwebel, Higgins and Guillaime, let us assume an extreme case of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter where a state’s “very survival would be at stake.” Even then, according to Paragraph 79 of the Opinion, the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions “constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.” As pointed out by Judge Bedjaoui, then President of the World Court, in his appended Declaration, such intransgressible principles can never be violated, even in extreme circumstances, where the very survival of a state is at stake. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances where the actual use of nuclear weapons would not violate either the Hague Conventions or the Geneva Conventions. In other words, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where the actual use of nuclear weapons would not violate “intransgressible principles of international customary law.”

    Furthermore, as already noted above, the United States government has ratified Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 and the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and so is bound to observe them a fortiori and without any exceptions whatsoever. The same is true for the other acknowledged nuclear weapons states: Britain, China, France and Russia. The non-pronouncement found in the World Court’s Advisory Opinion cannot alter those undeniable facts and the legal conclusions that flow inevitably from them.

    Conclusion

    It is obvious from reading the World Court’s Advisory Opinion that any currently contemplated threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States government is illegal under international humanitarian law, and therefore I would add criminal. Hence all that needs to be done in order to defend an anti-nuclear resister is to apply the World Court’s Advisory Opinion to the actual nuclear weapons system that was the object of the anti-nuclear resister’s action. By applying the teachings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion to the actual facts of the case, it should become clear that the specific nuclear weapons system and its related strategy are illegal and criminal.

    Hence, there is no need to deal with the question of the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons as an abstract proposition. Rather, simply apply the language of the Advisory Opinion, together with the analysis of the Opinion as set forth above, to the specific nuclear weapons system that was the object of the anti-nuclear resister’s action: e.g., NAVSTAR/Trident 2/Delta 5. Once you demonstrate the mission and the capabilities of the specific nuclear weapons system, its illegality and criminality should become blatantly obvious to the jury.

    Indeed, this contextual approach to the problem coincides quite nicely with the contextual argument twice made by the United States government in its Written Observations on the Request by the General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion that was submitted to the International Court of Justice during the course of the World Court proceedings:

    …As in the case of other weapons, the legality of use depends on the conformity of the particular use with the rules applicable to such weapons. This would, in turn, depend on factors that can only be guessed at, including the characteristics of the particular weapon used and its effects, the military requirements for the destruction of the target in question, and the magnitude of the risk to civilians…

    By following this contextual approach to the actual nuclear weapons system at issue, you are only taking seriously and applying the contextual approach recommended by the United States government itself to the International Court of Justice. Certainly a judge and a jury anywhere in the United States of America should have the exact same right and duty to take into consideration the entire context surrounding the threat and use of the particular nuclear weapons system that motivated any act of anti-nuclear resistance.

    Basically, then, the defense strategy in all these anti-nuclear trials has been to shift the jury’s focus of attention away from the act of anti-nuclear resistance over to the specific nuclear weapons system involved. In other words, put the nuclear weapons system on trial instead of the anti-nuclear resisters. The critical factor in all these cases has been to get both the legal evidence and the technical evidence about the specific nuclear weapons system involved to be considered by the jury. The precise tactics, theories and strategies whereby this has been done have never mattered so much as whether or not the jury heard this legal evidence and the technical evidence in the first place.

    Optimally, the successful defense of an anti-nuclear resister requires testimony at trial and before the jury by two experts: one on international law, the other on the technical characteristics of the specific nuclear weapons system involved. Of course, if you only have one expert or the judge will permit only one expert witness to testify, then that expert will have to do double duty. In this case, it is probably better to have your international law expert bone up on the facts surrounding the specific nuclear weapons system. You can usually get your international law expert qualified as an expert on nuclear weapons policies as well. By comparison, you will not be able to get your technical expert qualified as an expert on international law. So when faced with a choice, use the international law expert.

    Of course, the judge might decide to strip you of all your expert witnesses, both technical and legal. If the judge does this, there is a good chance that such a ruling will constitute reversible error on appeal. Nevertheless, even if you are stripped of all your experts at trial, you must not despair! There have been several instances of anti-nuclear resisters obtaining hung juries by means of their own testimony. I know of other cases where different types of protesters have been able to obtain outright acquittals by means of their own testimony alone.

    In any event, prior to trial anti-nuclear resisters and their lawyers must spend a good deal of time preparing their testimony in chief. During the course of their direct testimony, anti-nuclear resisters must explain their basic understanding and knowledge of the technical characteristics of the specific nuclear weapons system that they acted against. In addition, they should also try to explain in their own words that at the time they undertook their act of anti-nuclear resistance, this specific nuclear weapons system stood in gross violation of the United Nations Charter; the Nuremberg Charter, the Nuremberg Judgment, and the Nuremberg Principles; the Genocide Convention and its Implementation Act; the Hague Regulations; the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I; the Hague Neutrality Conventions; U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 (1956); the 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion; as well as basic principles of international humanitarian, the laws of war, and international environmental law. Their act of anti-nuclear resistance was intended and designed for the express purpose of terminating ongoing inchoate criminal activity under well recognized principles of international law that have been fully subscribed to by the United States government itself.

    Once again, I cannot over-emphasize enough that when facing any serious criminal charges, an anti-nuclear resister is well advised to be represented by an attorney. Even with representation by counsel, it will be difficult enough as it is to set up the defense of an anti-nuclear resister using international law, let alone to pull it off successfully. Based upon my experience with doing anti-nuclear protest cases since 1982, anti-nuclear resisters do themselves no favor by foregoing the services of an attorney–with all due respect to them. In some cases, they might even hurt the anti-nuclear cause that they seek to promote by proceeding to trial without adequate counsel and representation by a lawyer.

    Quite obviously, there is a lot more I could say about defending anti-nuclear resisters under international law. But for a variety of reasons, I believe I have said enough for the time being. Good luck to you!

    F.A.B.

    * Francis A. Boyle is Professor of International Law and Advisor to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

    © Copyright 1999-2000 BY FRANCIS A. BOYLE. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.