Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Nuclear Threat

  • The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Top Five Nuclear Accidents in 2001

    *Issued January 2002. This list is subject to modification as documents are declassified in the future revealing other accidents that occurred in the year 2001.

    1. A nuclear explosion in a Russian factory leaves four dead and three injured.
    2. After being kept secret for some six months, The Romanian National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities (CNCAN) reported on 12 December that nine workers were exposed to serious levels of radiation while dismantling a smelting plant in western Romania.
    3. A serious accident at the Chapelcross nuclear reactor in Annan, Scotland sent 24 radioactive fuel rods crashing to the floor, nearly causing the death of plant workers and the release of a radioactive cloud which would have contaminated the entire region.
    4. Russia loses contact with four military satellites for part of the day on 10 May after a fire ravages a ground relay station southwest of Moscow.
    5. Local Officials reveal in May that a nuclear reactor at the Nuclear Cycle Development Institute in Fukui (185 miles northwest of Tokyo) has been leaking radioactive tritium since January.

    1. Nuclear Explosion in Russian Factory Leaves Four Dead and Three Injured

    According to a report from the Russian Ministry released on 22 June, a nuclear explosion on 21 June caused four deaths and three injuries. A previous report stated that there was only one death and seven injuries. The explosion, which was reportedly self-generated, occurred in the calcium reprocessing area of the Tchepetski factory in Glazov, Russia. The factory specializes in manufacturing zirconium alloys and enriched uranium.

    2. Romanian Workers Exposed to High Radiation

    The Romanian National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities (CNCAN) reported on 12 December that nine workers were exposed to serious levels of radiation while dismantling a smelting plant in western Romania last June. The men have been hospitalized since June, but the incident was kept secret while police conducted an investigation. The nine workers were employed to dismantle two furnaces at the Victoria Calan plant, which has been closed since the fall of communist rule in the country in 1989. CNCAN Director Anton Coroianu stated, “They wore no protective clothes. They got a huge dose of radiation from Cobalt 60, which could have killed them at once.” Cobalt 60 is a man-made radioactive isotope which serves many medical and industrial uses. An 1,100-square-foot area around the furnaces has been sealed off to everyone except authorized personnel, including investigators, who must wear protective clothing before entering the site.

    3. Nuclear Accident Highlights Folly of Nuclear Energy

    A serious accident at the Chapelcross nuclear reactor in Annan, Scotland sent 24 radioactive fuel rods crashing to the floor, nearly causing the death of plant workers and the release of a radioactive cloud which would have contaminated the entire region. The accident occurred when engineers were routinely removing irradiated uranium fuel rods by remote control from reactor three. After trying to attach a cylinder containing 24 rods to a crane, the cylinder came loose and fell two-and-a-half feet onto the shaft door. Authorities at the nuclear power plant are currently working on how to retrieve the fuel rods which are lying where they fell on 5 July. Normal fueling operations were suspended at Chapelcross and its sister station, Calder Hall at Sellafield.

    Chapelcross is Scotland’s oldest nuclear power station and is operated by British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL). The plant houses four 50-megawatt reactors and a secret military plant which produces radioactive tritium for Trident warheads. Two months ago another accident occurred at Chapelcross during de-fueling when a grab-release mechanism failed. In 1999 alone there were four pollution incidents at the plant. One of those incidents caused contamination in the surrounding community. In May 1967 radioactivity was released into the environment when fuel caught fire in a reactor and it suffered a partial meltdown.

    News of the accident was not publicized in Scotland, which alarmed environmentalists and politicians alike. They are calling for stricter regulations and say that this accident further demonstrates the folly of nuclear energy and the British government’s plan to build new nuclear reactors.

    4. Fire Raises Concern Over Russia’s Early Warning System

    Russia lost contact with four military satellites for part of the day on 10 May after a fire ravaged a ground relay station southwest of Moscow. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, a short circuit triggered the fire in the complex located underground. The fire demonstrated rising concern about failures in Russia’s aging early-warning satellite system, which provide assurances against false nuclear launch alerts. Without an early-warning system, false alerts could lead to an accidental retaliatory nuclear launch. The most recent incident occurred in 1995 when Russia briefly mistook a scientific rocket launch from Norway for a US nuclear missile launch.

    5. Japanese Nuclear Reactor Leaks Radioactive Material

    Local officials revealed in May that a nuclear reactor at the Nuclear Cycle Development Institute in Fukui (185 miles northwest of Tokyo) leaked radioactive tritium since January. The facility has been in operation since 1979 and is used to develop new fuel and research plutonium usage.

    A Fukui prefectural government official stated that “A small leak [of] tritium is natural. But this leak was slightly over the normal amount.” The reason for the leak is unknown. Operation at the facility has been temporarily halted to conduct inspections.

    On 30 September 1999, a radiation leak at the Tokaimura fuel reprocessing plant killed two workers and injured many others. Two workers who, in trying to save time, mixed excessive amounts of uranium in buckets instead of using designated mechanized tanks, triggered the leak. Six former reprocessing plant officials have been charged with negligence in the leak.

    Japan has 51 nuclear reactors which provide approximately one third of the nation’s energy supply. Nuclear power is promoted as the solution to Japan’s energy needs, but accidents and mishaps have heightened public concern over the safety of the nuclear industry.

  • The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Top Five List of Events Related to Nuclear Terrorism in 2001

    On 11 September, terrorists hijacked four US jetliners, crashing two into the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and one in Pennsylvania. In the aftermath of 11 September, the question of nuclear terrorism became a serious international concern. The following are the top five nuclear terrorism related events of 2001.

    1. In exercises designed to test security, US Army and Navy Teams successfully penetrate nuclear facilities and obtain nuclear materials. The US takes legislative measures to increase security at and around nuclear facilities.

    2. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf orders an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations.

    3. The UK Ministry of Defense publishes details about the transport of nuclear weapons and plutonium throughout the country on the Ministry of Defense website, raising controversy over offering potential terrorists a guide to the rail lines, roads and airports used for nuclear materials.

    4. As a precaution against suicide attacks, France increases the number of surface-to-air missiles near La Hague, Europe’s largest nuclear waste reprocessing plant.

    5. Weapons experts testify to attendees of the International Atomic Energy Agency conference in Vienna, Austria that terrorists could use a nuclear device.

     

    1. US Nuclear Facilities Fail Security Drills

    A report released in October by a non-governmental watchdog organization, Project on Government Oversight (POGO), found that the ten US nuclear weapons research and production facilities are vulnerable to a terrorist attack and failed about half of recent security drills. In exercises designed to test security, US Army and Navy teams successfully penetrated nuclear facilities and obtained nuclear materials. US government security regulations require that nuclear facilities defend themselves against the theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or through sabotage. According to Dannielle Brian, POGO Director, the repeated security breaches are serious cause for concern because Department of Energy employees were warned before each security exercise but still failed to stop the would-be terrorists in more than half the drills.

    Nine of the ten weapons facilities are within 100 miles of cities with more than 75,000 people. Eight of the ten weapons facilities contain a total of 33.5 metric tons of plutonium. It only takes a few pounds of plutonium to create a nuclear bomb. Regarding security at the nuclear weapons facilities, Brian stated that no one thought it really mattered until 11 September. A spokesperson from the National Nuclear Security Administration declined to comment on the report. The full report can be accessed online at POGO’s website http://www.pogo.org/.

    In related news, Representative Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) introduced legislation on 14 November requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to have supplies of potassium iodide within 200 miles of each of the 103 operating nuclear power plants in the US. If passed, the bill would also require the government commission to stock potassium iodide at individual homes and public facilities within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant. Potassium iodide has been shown to protect the body’s thyroid gland from diseases related to radiation exposure and must be taken within several hours after exposure to be effective.

    In addition, Markey is urging US lawmakers to pass measures that would increase security at nuclear power plants in the wake of the 11 September events. Markey stated, “In this new era of terrorism, in which the threat of an intentional release of radioactivity can no longer be ignored, we should waste no more time.”

    On 15 November, US Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-New York) and Harry Reid (D-Nevada) announced that they will introduce legislation to federalize security guards at the 103 nuclear power plants across the US. Currently, nuclear power plant operators hire private guards. The guards carry weapons, but they do not have police power. Since the events of 11 September, local police, and state police and, in some states, National Guard troops have augmented security at the nation’s nuclear power plants.

    While conservatives in the Senate will likely object to federalizing guards, according to Senator Clinton, “We can no longer leave the security at our nation’s nuclear power plants to chance.” Senator Reid noted that Congress just agreed to federalize passenger and baggage screeners at airports. He stated, “It’s time we focus the same energy to improve safety at nuclear power plants.”

    2. Pakistan Restructures Nuclear Arsenal and Military to Avoid Nuclear Terrorism

    On 10 November, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was moved for fear of theft or strikes against the country’s nuclear facilities and also to remove its nuclear arsenal from bases that might be used by the US.

    Musharraf also reorganized military oversight of the nuclear forces in the weeks after joining the US in its campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. On 7 October, Musharraf created the new Strategic Planning Division, headed by a three-star general to oversee operations as part of a top military and intelligence restructuring designed to marginalize officers considered too sympathetic to the Taliban and other extremist factions. General Khalid Kidwai is now the director of operational security for the country’s nuclear sites and weapons and he answers directly to Musharraf.

    Reports from the US Central Intelligence Agency and other sources have stated that Pakistan stores its nuclear warheads and missiles separately but it is unknown whether in the emergency conditions of the months following the 11 September events whether the equipment was repositioned for easier assembly. Intelligence sources believe that Pakistan has between 30-40 warheads and it has test-fired intermediate range ballistic missiles. US officials fear that if Musharraf is assassinated or ousted in a military coup, extremists could gain control of the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or share knowledge about them with hostile organizations or regimes.

    3. UK Ministry of Defense Releases Details of Nuclear Transports Despite Threat Posed by Nuclear Terrorism

    The UK Ministry of Defense published details about the transport of nuclear weapons and plutonium throughout the country on the Ministry of Defense website in November intended to assist police, fire brigades and city councils in drafting emergency plans in case of an accident. The Ministry of Defense has received criticism for the report entitled “Defence Nuclear Materials Transport Contingency Arrangements,” because opponents argue that the report could offer potential terrorists a guide to the rail lines, roads and airports used for nuclear materials. It also raised controversy in light of Home Secretary David Blunkett’s attempts to prevent nuclear terrorism. The report challenges one of Secretary Blunkett’s proposed measures that makes it an offense punishable by seven years in jail to disclose any information that “might prejudice the security of any nuclear site or of any nuclear material.”

    The report details security for nuclear convoys. It also lists UK military nuclear reactor factories and test sites and for the first time where “special nuclear materials” such as weapons-grade uranium and plutonium would travel. In addition, the publication reveals that a warhead is unstable if heated. According to the report, “If weapon is jetting (flames under pressure) explosion may be imminent, debris may be scattered within 600 m[eter] radius.”

    Stewart Kemp, Secretary of the Nuclear Free Local Authorities stated, “If the government judges that there is an increased terrorist threat then the right thing to do is to stop the transports altogether.”

    The full report can be obtained online at http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=2474.

    4. France Deploys Missiles to Defend Nuclear Waste Reprocessing Plant

    As a precaution against suicide attacks, France increased the number of surface-to-air missiles near La Hague, Europe’s largest nuclear waste reprocessing plant in November. In October, the French Defense Ministry announced that radar systems capable of detecting low-flying planes and surface-to-air missiles had been positioned at La Hague as well as at Il Longue, a military base for nuclear submarines off the Brittany coast in northwest France.

    A top regional official stated that the deployment of surface-to-air missiles was placed a mile from the plant and the measure was purely precautionary in light of the events of 11 September in the US.

    5. IAEA Calls for Global Nuclear Security Standards to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

    Weapons experts told attendees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Vienna, Austria on 2 November that terrorists could use a nuclear device. Speakers at the conference suggested that western countries, in particular the US, should accelerate efforts to protect nuclear materials that could, if they haven’t already, fall into the hands of terrorists. Morten Bremer Maerli, a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affaris, stated, “The only strategy is to protect the material where it is, but this kind of implementation strategy doesn’t exist.”

    Maerli and other experts testified to a shocking lack of security and control to prevent the theft or purchase of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities in many countries, especially Russia. Since 1993, the IAEA has reported 175 cases of nuclear materials trafficking, including 18 cases involving small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. In these cases, law enforcement agencies seized the materials, but records at the facilities from which the materials were stolen, most of them Russian, did not show anything missing. According to Matthew Bunn, Assistant Director of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, up to 60 percent of nuclear material remains inadequately secured in Russia.

    Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, stated “The controls on nuclear material and radioactive sources are uneven. Security is as good as its weakest link and loose nuclear material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world.” According to ElBaradei, in the wake of the 11 September events, the IAEA has expanded its concerns about nuclear materials getting into clandestine weapons programs, not only in states that sponsor terrorism, but also into the hands of extremist groups.

    ElBaradei called for international unity to create universal minimum security standards for nuclear plants and materials. Currently, standards are largely left to individual countries. The IAEA also requested $30 million to $50 million to step up safety work in securing nuclear materials globally.

  • The History of Defense Systems and Remarks on the National Missile Defense

    “Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided missiles and misguided men.”

    Martin Luther King, Jr.

    1. Introduction

    This is a timeless article, for there has never been a time in history when some tribe or nation has not been contemplating actions and policies that lead to war or peace. During the history struggle arose frequently between families, clans, small and large population groups, first about chasing ground for animals, then possession of arable land, and finally about mineral resources. Local fights spread with time to larger areas. Was it first fists and teeth the main weapons, soon humans learned to prepare special tools for fighting each other. In parallel they developed means of body protection by armor, and to surround their living quarters with fortifications. Each advance in offensive weapons was countered by defensive structures, mostly in this time sequence. First all developments stretched over longer periods, but intervals are getting smaller and smaller with progress in technologies and science. It is the aim of this talk to describe briefly the major defense systems, culminating in the proposed Star War idea, developed by President Reagan, who claimed that it would make all other weapons obsolete. This claim had already been made for other weapons at earlier times in history. Will the National Missile Defense idea do what is advertised, or will it lead only to new arms race? Are we willing to learn from historical precedents?

    There is another underlying pattern to defense policy. Soldiers and statesmen are forever laying the pavements of good intentions that lead to the hell of military conflict. The process is endless and will not be interrupted before there is societal understanding of the patterns that lead to destruction and a modification of the behavior on the basis of that understanding. One such pattern is the predilection of tribes and nations to choose their statesmen from the ranks of a military hero [1]. The transition from soldier to statesman may occur at any phase of the career. We all know of the political path taken by General Eisenhower, Captain Truman, Lieutenant Kennedy, Corporal Hitler, and Shepherd David as they make the transition from military hero to national leader. We see the same pattern with General Powell, becoming Secretary of State, and perhaps in four years time President of the strongest nation in the world. It looks that the training, temperament and skills of the soldier are diametrically opposed to the training, temperament and skills of the statesman.

    2. Lifetime and efficiency of defense systems

    Built-up of defense systems is as old as any offense activity. There is no defense system that could withstand forever attack, and no defense system is even at the start perfect. To quote Hellmuth von Moltke: Offence is the straight way to the goal, whereas the defense is the long way around. A few of such systems will be briefly discussed:

    2.1 The Great Wall

    The Chinese Great Wall can be considered as the longest living defense system. It stretched over a length of 6’300 km from the Yalu River (Gulf of Chihli) to Jiayuguan (Central Asia). It has been built and rebuilt during almost 2’000 years, beginning with the interconnection of walls which surrounded small kingdoms. The major construction periods start with the 4th century BC, were accelerated by the first Chinese Emperor Qin 220-206 BC, using almost a million compulsory labor including some 300’000 soldiers. Maintenance work in the 7th century caused a death toll of half a million workers within ten days. A major upgrade was made during 1368-1644 in the Ming Dynasty (5’660 km). The fortification consisted of a 9-meter high wall and about twenty-five thousand alarms towers 13-meters high. Signals could be transmitted over a distance of 2’000 km in 24 hours. During the Qin reign 180 million cubic meters rammed earth provided for the core of the wall (10 meter thick, 5 meter high). The aim of the Wall was to protect against Huns. However, this fortification never performed properly as defense line. In 1208 Dschingis-Khan broke through the Wall and China was liberated again only in 1368. In 1644 the Wall was opened by the treason of a general near Shanghaiguan, where it had the formidable height of 16 meter and a width of 8 meters. The Wall degraded and its remains are since not more than a tourist attraction.

    2.2 The Roman Limes

    In comparison the Roman Limes was a much less ambitious defense building. The best known part was in the western part of Germany spanning between the Rhine and Danube Rivers. Building had been started in 9 AD, and it was reinforced between 117-161 AD. It had a length of 480 km, and consisted of a 3-meter high palisades and watch towers. It fulfilled its intended function only until 260 AD, when Alemanni broke through. Romans built similar Limes in Great Britain, Anatolia, and Syria in 2nd century AD, again with relatively short lifetimes.

    2.3 Castles and city walls

    Castles and city walls were the preferred fortifications for small city-states. Their efficient lifetime was at the best a couple of hundred years, before they were destroyed with the help of gunpowder, canons, and fireballs. Metallic armor of mercenaries turned out to reduce mobility, could not protect the horses of the horsemen, and got soon out of fashion.

    2.4 Defense lines in the 20th century

    The lifetime of fortifications built in the first half of the 20th century decreased rapidly.

    2.4.1 The French Maginot Line connected some modern fortresses, which hold out during World War I. Built in the 1930s, it presented a tremendous advance over previous fortifications and had all imaginable comfort for the defenders to offer. It was built along the French-German border, but not extended to the French-Belgium border, assuming Germans would respect in any conflict the neutrality of Belgium and The Netherlands. Germany did not behave as expected in World War II and its troops marched in 1940 through the northern flank into France, attacking the fortifications from the rear side.

    2.4.2 The counter part of the Maginot Line was the German West-Wall, a much less elaborated defense structure. It was not needed at the very beginning of World War II, but demonstrated some efficiency towards its end in 1945.

    2.4.3 Following the occupation of France in 1940 Germany built up the Atlantic-Wall. Its major fortifications were built near the smallest part of the English Channel, where it was expected that allied troops would try to land. This turned out to be a miscalculation by the German headquarters combined with an underestimation of air troopers that could land behind the Atlantic Wall.

    2.4.4 Antiaircraft canons, developed between the two World Wars, became increasingly worthless due to countermeasures in form of chaff (aluminized paper) used in WW II, that distorted radar images and simulated planes where there were none. High-flying planes flying could only be reached with insufficient accuracy.

    2.4.5 Reagan’s Star War program did not get beyond a preliminary design study, since scientists showed that laser canons could neither produce nor send the desired energy density towards incoming missiles to destroy them.

    The above examples show that time intervals are getting shorter between building of new defense systems and for their efficient use. This very preliminary study of some major defense systems and their “effective” lifetime has been made in order to find out if there is a pattern that might help to predict the performance of future developments. Any such development starts slowly, rises to maturity, and then declines in its efficiency. Rise and decline time may vary considerably from case to case, may have a steep rise and a slow decline, or vice versa, or may be Gaussian. A reasonable scientific description could be done by fitting the data by a Gaussian-like curve and define the efficiency by the full-width at halve maximum. This was not (yet) done for the present study. Instead best estimates for the start-up and complete demise were given. Figure 1 shows a plot (for convenience on a double logarithmic scale) of the so defined useful lifetime of defense installations/methods over two-and-a-half thousand years. In this plot is indicated for each system by whom or by which technical development the system became obsolete. A straight line can represent the data. No effort has yet been made to evaluate error bars, to define the slope, and to represent this line by an equation.

    Since this eyeball-fitted line represents so well the events during a very long period of human history, temptation is great to extrapolate it into the future. Doing so leads to the conclusion that defense mechanisms will become obsolete almost immediately after putting them into place. Taking an extreme view, it could mean that the National Missile Defense would not even see the light of the day before being made obsolete by countermeasures.

    Only time will show the validity of our extrapolation.

    2.5 Shift of warfare from ground to air

    A change in theory and practice of warfare becomes obvious during the later part of the 20th century. Was the practice in earlier epochs mainly composed of political, economic and military elements, it is now increasingly influenced by technological, scientific and psychological elements. In previous centuries the theory of warfare had been subdivided into a strategic part, considering wide spaces, long periods of time, large amount of forces as a prelude to battlefield, and the tactic part, which was just the opposite to the former. A distinction between strategic and tactic blurred since World War I (WW I) and especially during World War II (WW II). Surprisingly to the author, this distinction between strategic and tactic is still kept for nuclear weapons, and finds expression in the START and INF treaties.

    Whereas warfare during WW I was mainly on ground and at sea, and airplanes played only a secondary role for recognition purposes, a dramatic shift occurred during WW II. Weapon systems reached further and beyond front lines.

    Defense systems crumbled, anti aircraft canons became militarily impotent during massive air raids. German V1 and V2 rockets reached almost unimpeded their targets on the British Island. The only defense against these rockets in the forties was to bombard their launch pads. The recent Kosovo War demonstrated even more vividly that defense against planes, now flying at considerably higher altitudes, by anti-aircraft canons is a hopeless enterprise.

    The second half of the 20th century witnessed a dramatic improvement of the rudimentary German WW II rocket technology, promoted on the other side of the Atlantic and now common knowledge in most industrialized countries. These missiles can transport nuclear warheads, and of less military value, chemical and biological weapons [2]. A majority of people condemns these weapons, called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and demands their elimination. However, some countries believe they need WMDs for deterrence, but deny their possession for others. The escalation of the arms race during the Cold War led to plan for comprehensive antimissile defense systems for both super powers. Fortunately, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), concluded in 1972, limited drastically, and still does, such an out-of-control development.

    3. Missile defense activities since the 1980s

    President Reagan’s speech on March 23, 1983 was the starting point for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The military-industrial complex eagerly picked up the idea. Even the industry in several NATO countries was encouraged to get involved, however not in their desired way in front-element technologies.

    Concerned, eminent scientists made feasibility studies, culminating in the “Report to The American Physical Society of the study group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons” [3]. Soviet scientists made a similar study [4]. Both groups came to the conclusion that most of the systems would not work as advertised or even not at all. The latter is the case for space-based laser canon [5]. The software aspects cause another tremendous hurdle [6]. A discussion of the results of these two documents is beyond the scope of the present paper. The reader is referred to the original literature, which remains a valid document up to date.

    Considerable amount of money was wasted during the years following Reagan’s proposal. Deception of the public about supposed successes played a role in promoting SDI [7, 8]. However, the topic did for several years no longer make any headlines. Public awareness was reawakened only during the first Gulf War. Unfounded success stories and tests were then sold to the public, which does mostly not understand the basic science and technology behind such claims. During CNN broadcasts, the military commanders claimed a widely exaggerated success rate of the Patriot missile in shooting down Scud missiles coming from Iraq. The General Accounting Office found that only nine percent of the Patriot-Scud engagements are supported by the strongest evidence that an engagement resulted in a warhead kill. The Patriot’s supposedly near-flawless performance may be one of the greatest myths in weapons history. As Winston Churchill once said “In war truth is such a precious good that it has to be surrounded by a strong body guard of lies”.

    The Patriot was originally designed to shoot down aircraft. In the 1980s, it was given an upgrade and a modified warhead to give it a limited capability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles. The Scuds were flying over 3,600 km per hour faster than the Patriot had been designed to deal with. The Patriot must detonate when it is within a few meters of the Scud to have a high probability of destroying the warhead [9-11].

    During the Clinton presidency SDI was revived, now only under another name, as National Missile Defense (NMD). An excellent description of all aspects of NMD, written for general public, can be found in [12]. NMDs task is advertised as a defense against a small number of missiles coming from rogue states. NMD consists actually out of two components: the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). A shift of SDI from Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) to Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW) occurred [13, 14].

    NMD does no longer rely on space-based laser canons, in so far becoming more realistic. It is supposed to destroy warheads in mid-course, but this policy may still change to the easier boost-phase interception [15].

    NMD is planned to protect against both, so-called theatre missiles and strategic (intercontinental) missiles. Such a development is seen by the departing and the incoming administration of the U.S. as a positive step in the right direction, but by a majority of other countries as counterproductive and giving rise to an unlimited arms race [16-20].

    3.1 Countermeasures

    First tests of BMD are very far from successful [21-23]. Will the BMD system be effective? The answer will depend among many other questions to be solved on the effect of countermeasures on the kill probability. It appears to be highly impossible to protect entire countries against missile attacks, as it is claimed by the United States.

    The kill probability is one of the key technical parameters for evaluating the effectiveness of a missile defense system. The higher the kill probability is, the more effective the defense system will be. Inevitably, a missile defense system will be challenged by countermeasures, which may decrease the kill probability. There are three different kinds of them against THAAD system: infrared stealth, radar interference and decoys. A brief qualitative discussion of these measures follows.

    3.1.1 Infrared stealth

    The endgame phase of an intercept begins when the infrared (IR) sensor built in interceptor’s kill vehicle (KV) acquires the target. The distance between the KV and the target at the beginning of the endgame is the so-called acquisition range. During the whole endgame phase, the KV maneuvers according to target’s trajectory information provided by the IR sensor to put itself on a path that leads to a direct hit with the target. For realizing a hit, enough endgame time, which is to say large enough acquisition range, is needed for the KV to correct its current velocity and position errors.

    Against IR sensors, there may exist several kinds of countermeasures; among which to shorten the acquisition range to an unacceptable level is a common one, known as IR stealth. For a given IR sensor and background noise, the acquisition range depends mainly on temperature, material and sizes of the target. The most effective way of realizing IR stealth is to chill the target to very low temperature since IR radiation decreases quickly with temperature. Dry ice or liquid nitrogen will do the job, being filled into the space between shroud and thermally insulated layers.

    3.1.2 Radar interference

    The X band ground based radar (GBR) is one of the most important components of the THAAD system. The GBR detects, acquires and tracks targets before interceptors could launch. When a certain tracking accuracy is achieved, interceptors are committed to their targets and launched, then the GBR continues to track the targets and issues updated target information through BMC4I system to the interceptors and KVs to guide their boost phase flights and midcourse flights respectively. When a KVs midcourse flight finishes and its endgame flight begins, the KV is delivered to the hand over point where the IR sensor of the KV is expected to acquire the target. The so-called hand over point is actually an error basket in space. To achieve a successful intercept, the basket has to satisfy two conditions: (1) at the hand-over point, the KV is at the position where it can acquire the target, (2) the KV’s position and velocity vector at the moment insures that the resulting zero effort miss distance (ZMD) error is within the KV’s maneuvering capability. On the one hand, the above two conditions depend mainly on the GBR’s capability to accurately predict the trajectory of the target. On the other hand, the KV’s capability of removing ZMD error is limited by the amount of fuel it carries and the total time of flight (TOF) during the endgame that is available for the KV to maneuver.

    In addition to GBR information obtained from satellites may be used for tracking. Their jamming could then be also being an effective countermeasure.

    3.1.3 Decoys

    Decoys or false targets are a most commonly used countermeasure. They are required to simulate some physical characteristics of the real reentry vehicle (RV), like size, shape, and temperature, speed etc., according to their task. The discrimination distance plays an important role. KP drops as discrimination distance decreases.

    Typical velocities of strategic targets are 7 km/s, and for theater targets 5 km/s. Calculations show that the KV with a speed of about 5 km/s will have nearly the same kill probability against strategic missiles as against theater missiles. It strongly suggest that a defense system with same performances would be nearly as capable in intercepting strategic missiles as in dealing with theater missiles if its performances and reliability are proved in testing against theater missile targets. The KV should explode when it is at about 4 meters away from the target. This requires timing within a fraction of a millisecond.

    3.2 Kill what and when?

    There is no doubt that weapons attain more destructive power over time, as was the case with the switch from TNT to nuclear explosives. There is no longer a strong relation between power and number of weapons as in a classical war. The population agglomeration gets denser, and therefore the vulnerability of the civil population increased and effects them physically and morally.

    BMD is advertised as an efficient means to protect the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It assumes that the main threat is coming from missiles, which could transport nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. The author has argued that delivery of biological and chemical agents this way is extremely inefficient and highly improbable [2]. The main danger is originating from nuclear warheads. They are getting so compact that countries of concern or terrorists can choose many other ways for transportation.

    Whatever the load the warhead contains, an intercept with a kill vehicle can cause two effects, which are rarely discussed in detail: Firstly, it can destroy either the propulsion part of the weapon (if any is still connected with the warhead), or the warhead itself, or both. Secondly, it could leave the warhead intact, but gives an additional momentum to it, causing a deviation of its trajectory.

    Can warhead destruction always considered to be an advantage or can it have detrimental effects?

    The destruction of the warhead will leave debris behind, which will essentially follow the original trajectory. The parts will hit ground somewhere. Since an intercept will happen at high altitude, chemical or biological material will be distributed over wide space. The agent will probably not have severe effects on humans, since its density at ground level will not reach the necessary, critical value to cause adverse health effects. An exception might be with plutonium, where strong negative long-term effects at ground level might be expected.

    In case the warhead remains intact and its trajectory is changed in an unpredictable way, effects during landing at another than the originally targeted place may be advantageous or not for the attacked country.

    4. Who should make decisions?

    Clemenceau once said: Modern war is too serious a business to entrust it to soldiers. This statement could be modified and enlarged: “Preparation for peace through building of defense systems is too serious a business to be handled by military heroes, since it may lead to modern war.”

    The 20th century has seen already one hero as statesman, Adolf Hitler, who considered himself as the greatest strategist of all times (Grösster Feldherr aller Zeiten). The world experienced the consequences of his ‘leadership’. The 21st century needs diplomats and not heroes, heads of state who are able to address questions of the international economy, market interventions, unanticipated crisis, all by peaceful methods.

    Fortunately, no decision on NMD had been made during the Clinton administration [24, 25]. However, the probability for a rush into failure at the beginning of the Bush administration looms on the horizon. A starting point of the new government could have been to limit the influence of military people in the decision making process. However, the choice of a military hero, General Colin Powell, to head the State Department, points in the wrong direction. General Powell is three things Mr. Bush is not: a war hero, worldly wise and beloved by Afro-Americans. That gives him a great deal of leverage. It means that Mr. Bush can never allow him to resign in protest over anything. The Bush team will be serious about what the Clinton team was not serious about, which is about intervening militarily [26]. This is the way generals are trained for.

    There should be an open discussion within the largest existing military pact, the NATO, on its necessity after the end of the Cold War and of its eventual dissolution. Building new defense systems should not jeopardize disarmament treaties. In particular the cornerstone, the ABM Treaty, should be maintained.

    For some four decades, deterrence was at the center of U.S. defense policy. There were three important features to it. First, it sounded robust without being reckless. Second it was hard to think of a better way to make sense of a nuclear inventory. Third, it seemed to work. A re-evaluation started with Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, which was based on the idea that it was better ‘to protect than avenge’. The problem with NMD is that it is likely to aggravate other problems, in particular the already tense relations with Russia and China. Worse, it could provide an illusion of security that, if ever tested, might come tragically apart. It may be wise to use deterrent threats only sparingly, but it can hardly make sense never use them at all [28.29].

    Many prominent scientists should reevaluate, if deemed necessary, their assessment of SDI and extend it to NMD. Scientists in the big weapon laboratories should be given tasks that are addressing more urgent problems of society, such as changes in means of energy production, protection of the environment, to name a few challenging tasks. Scientific evaluation, like the one that had been done by a group of prominent experts in the case of SDI, should get more weight than the judgement of military heroes.

    Should the American government pay more attention to the will of the people? Answers during a recent poll in the U.S. [18] on the question “Which of the following do you think is the most important issue facing the country today: Education, Medicare, health care, fight crimes/drugs, economic growth, crack down on illegal guns, cut taxes, strong military, national missile defense?” show that NMD has an extremely low priority of 1 percent, and a strong military a marginal 4 percent. This overwhelming disinterest is a clear sign that the drive for NMD is to search elsewhere. A good candidate may be the military-industrial complex.

    5. Conclusion

    There are an infinite number of better and necessary actions to be taken by any responsible government than to build the equivalent of a “National Missile Defense”, that has a high chance not to work at all. Not long ago a well-known physicist had to testify on the feasibility and efficiency of such a system during a hearing at an U.S. Senate’s Committee. He had been asked if NMD would work. It is reported that he thought for a short while, then came up with a resounding “YES”, and after a pause he added, “provided the adversary collaborates.” Even such an answer seems to me still too optimistic.

    6. References:

    [1] Hero as Statesman, Political Leadership in Military Defense Edited by John P. Craven Readings for Leaders, Harland Cleveland, Volume I Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University Press of America, 1988

    [2] The Concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Chemical and Biological Weapons, Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment, Gert G. Harigel Seventh ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Xi’an, October 8-13, 2000,

    [3] Report to The American Physical Society of the study group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons N. Bloembergen, C.K.N. Patel, P. Avizonis, R.G. Clem, A. Hertzberg, T.H. Johnson, T. Marshall, R.B. Miller, W.E. Morrow, E.E. Salpeter, A.M. Sessler, J.D. Sullivan, J.C. Wyant, A. Yariv, R.N. Zare, A.J. Glass, L.C. Hebel Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol.59, No.3, Part II, July 1987, S0- S201

    [4] Space-Strike Arms and International Security, Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Piece, Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow October 1985

    [5] Physics and Technical Aspects of Laser and Particle Beam Weapons for Strategic Defense, R.L. Garwin, 1986, submitted to Physikalische Blätter

    [6] Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems, David Lorge Parnass, American Scientist, Volume 73, 432-440, September-October 1985

    [7] Aspin Confirms Deception Plan Existed to Promote SDI Program Dunbar Lockwood Arms Control Today, October 1993, pg. 18

    [8] Strategic ‘Deception’ Initiative John Pike Arms Control Today, November 1993, pp. 3-8

    [9] The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor John Conyers, Jr. Arms Control Today, November 1992, pp. 3-10

    [10] The Patriot Debate: Part 2, Letter to the Editor Frank Horten Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 26/27 Author’s Response, Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 27, 29

    [11] The Patriot Debate: Part 3, Letter to the Editor Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis Arms Control Today, March 1993, pg. 24

    [12] Defense Mechanisms Kosta Tsipis The Sciences, November/December 2000, pp. 18-23

    [13] Theater Missile Defense Programs: Status and Prospects John Pike Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 11-14

    [14] The Clinton Plan for Theater Missile Defenses: Costs and Alternatives David Mosher and Raymond Hall Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 15-20

    [15] Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative Richard L. Garwin Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 8-11

    [16] Missile Defense: The View From the Other Side of the Atlantic Camille Grand Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 12-18

    [17] A Pause in Unilateralism? Jack Mendelsohn Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 21-23

    [18] No Pressure From the People Mark S. Mellman, Adam Burns, Sam Munger Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 19, 20, 23

    [19] Security: The Bottom Line Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 17, 18, 24

    [20] Facing the China Factor Banning Garrett Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 14-16

    [21] Ballistic Missile Defense: Is the U.S. ‘Rushing to Failure’? John Pike Arms Control Today, April 1998, pp. 9-13

    [22] Mixed Results in U.S. TMD Tests Wade Boese Arms Control Today, September 2000, pg. 29

    [23] Officials Testify on National Missile Defense, Assess Program Wade Boese Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 25, 29

    [24] National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty And the Future of START II Arms Control Association press conference, Arms Control Today, November/December 1998, pp. 3-10

    [25] Where Do We Go From Here? Harold Brown Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 12-13

    [26] Powell, a Serious Man to Be Tested Before Long Thomas L. Friedman International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2000

    [27] Does Deterrence Have a Future? Lawrence Freedman Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 3-8

    [28] Finding the Right Path Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 11, 24

    Years “Efficient lifetime” of defense systems

    2000 – ————– Chinese Great Wall – Huns

    1000 –

    500 –

    —- Upgraded Great Wall – Traitor 200 – — Roman Limes — Complete metal armor – Horses unprotected Alemanni — Castles in Europe – Gun powder

    100 –

    50 –

    20 – Antiaircraft canons – Planes too high

    10 – — Maginot Line – Attack from behind

    5 – – German West Wall – limited efficiency (‘Siegfried Line’) – Atlantic Wall – Disembarkation in Normandy

    2 – – SDI – Scientists

    1 –

    0.5 – – Safeguard ABM – Maintenance cost

    0.2 – NMD ? Decoys Jamming Cooling of radars of missiles

    0.1 500 500 1000 1500 1800 1900 1950 1980 1990 1995 1998 2000 BC AC Year

    Forum on “The Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missiles Defense: Technology, Strategic Stability and Impact on Global Security”

    Istituto Diplomatico “Mario Toscano” and Parliament, Library Room “Il Refettorio” Rome, Italy, 18-19 January 2001

  • A Terrorist Threat – The Movement of Black Market Nuclear Materials into the United States

    “What is the problem? The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear materials scattered throughout the newly independent states and increased the potential for the theft of the those materials, and for organized criminals to enter the nuclear smuggling business. As horrible as the tragedies in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were, imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been a small-scale nuclear device exploded there.”

    — President William Jefferson Clinton

    Overview

    The problem is recognizing that the nuclear threat from terrorists acquiring weapons grade fissile material is greater than all the other threats combined and that it has to be treated independently for the specific set of threats it poses.

    Biological and chemical threats are scalable in their level of threat because they create damage in proportion to the amount of material distributed over a given geographical area. The effects, while deadly, are relatively short term and perishable with proper treatment. Also, they are dependant on effective distribution systems and environmental conditions. They can be used in small amounts in small areas quite easily but use in large areas requires techniques that lend themselves to detection and prevention. If an event occurs, rapid response can mitigate their effects substantially in a relatively short time.

    In comparison, the nuclear threat is that it will cause the greatest damage over a large area from a single point with a small amount of material. A nuclear blast is its own distribution system and its effects are persistent over larger areas for longer periods. Rapid response to an event will offer little in the mitigation of the effects other than defining the areas of destruction and contamination. It will create its own environment for distribution as it expands into the prevailing environment.

    Level of Threat

    Dealing with nuclear terrorism requires an understanding of what the potential threats are, at what level they exist and what their consequences will be. The most formidable characteristics of terrorism are variability and unpredictability. Target selection, time of use, degree of destruction and psychological impact are all open questions.

    Where any nuclear threat is perceived, maximum effort has to be expended to verify its potential and prevent the occurrence of an event. There are no options to this action. However, reaction at this level will require a mobilization of resources in a given area in a very short period of time. Therefore, the overall consequences of a nuclear threat by terrorists have to be evaluated within its probability of occurrence. Multiple threats of nuclear events would quickly paralyze the response systems and produce wide scale vulnerabilities, increasing the probability of a successful terrorist event at some location .

    Specific scenarios of prevention and reaction need to be developed by posing postulates for as many methods of acquisition, assembly and deployment as can be imagined. Unfortunately, it appears that no focused effort in this regard has coalesced. The most discernible appreciation for the nuclear threat seems to be to prepare for an after-the-fact reaction to it.

    Background

    Proliferation in the production of fissile materials in many countries has increased the probability that such materials will fall into the hands of terrorist groups who have the capability for assembling crude nuclear weapons.

    During the Cold War, nuclear materials were highly controlled by the nations that developed them. With the end of the Cold War, the controls have slipped to an unacceptable level; security for nuclear inventories has been dangerously degraded. In fact, there are unknown amounts of fissile material for which there has been no accountability. Locations for these materials are scattered and, for the most part, unknown. Additionally, inventory control at many of the existing storage warehouses for nuclear materials is lacking and security measures are generally unsophisticated and inadequate.

    The major threat these unaccounted for materials present is that they will fall into the hands of terrorist groups whose purpose is to bring about, for their own cause, destruction, distraction from national purpose and general social upheaval. Secondary threats will be the creation of unbridled fear, distrust, economic instability and the sense of a loss of personal security should the possession become known.

    Preventive Measures

    The imperative for detecting and controlling these materials is recognizing that for them to be useful for terrorist purposes the materials must be moved from their points of origin or storage to points of utilization. If a concentrated effort is directed toward identifying potential transfer methodologies and routes of distribution then it might be possible to interdict the materials before they can be transformed into weapons status.

    In the area of import/export accountability there is much work to be done. There are no international standards that can be effectively applied for maintaining control during the transportation of nuclear materials and, even if there were, It would take a prodigious effort to oversee the extremely complex interconnected network of international transportation and commerce. The proliferation of the drug traffic throughout the world presents strong evidence of this fact. Gaps in import/export controls almost insure that distribution of fissile materials will occur undetected.

    Once the material is in the distribution system the unknown factors increase – Where did it go? To whom? And for what purpose? Even when lost it bequeaths a set of hazardous conditions that are unacceptable in normal commerce.

    Yet, movement is a key to interdiction. To be useful, the materials must be sent to a central location for additional processing and assembly. At some point sufficient material must be present to construct a nuclear device. Movement of large quantities of fissile material to a construction site is unlikely because it presents a greater possibility for interdiction than do small quantities. Also, large scale movements present additional hazards to the handling facilities because of the possibilities of radioactive leakage and accidental detection.

    Movement of small quantities of the material, on the other hand, afford a greater probability that the movement will be undetected by conventional means and will be delivered successfully to a destination of choice. Smaller shipments are more likely to remain undetected during transport.

    Established commercial conveyance systems probably will be used where small quantities of fissile material can be shipped using various packaging techniques and routes to a single destination. Because of the increased detection probabilities, quantities of fissile material will not be shipped in a given container to a single destination.

    Some possibilities for moving this type of material are:

    (1) – Superimpose the shipment of small, well-shielded packages on established drug and contraband routes.

    (2) – Ship materials conventionally in well-shielded, small containers through a surreptitious network of widely dispersed handlers.

    (3) – Man carry many small quantities across the mostly porous borders of the United States.

    (4) – Use diversified distribution techniques (routes and conveyances) by requiring multiple way-points and altering the characteristics of external shipping containers at each point.

    (5) – Mix materials and legitimate products for routine deliveries.

    The formidable nature of the tasks required to detect and identify well packaged fissile materials in small quantities renders the likelihood of detection highly questionable.

    The most complex of the above projections is No. 4. Presuming an originating point in Asia, a small package could be shipped with little notice through Cambodia to the island of Palau into Micronesia or the Phillipines, then through the small Kiribati Islands to the Cook Islands, then to Hawaii and then to the mainland USA through Mexico, Canada or directly through an open area of the US borders. There are literally hundreds of such routes that could be set up and utilized. The detection and surveillance of these multiple transfer shipping points would require the participation of hundreds of specialists examining all arriving and departing packages – a near impossible task, thereby essentially insuring a successful delivery for most attempts.

    The virtual impossibility of providing surveillance at the many points of exit in the Far East and the many potential points for entry into the United States makes this an imposing task but nevertheless it has to be undertaken. It is almost a given that, once in the United States, the free and open access to our highway network and relatively unsecured transportation system, make it a simple task to transport dangerous materials throughout the United States without any great fear of interdiction.

    Where nuclear materials are concerned, individuals involved with national security need to become focused on more effective prevention strategies than ever before. This new era of terrorism demands a dramatic shift in thinking with regard to the possibility of a small-scale, but dramatic and destructive, nuclear catastrophe. No longer are they faced with decisions about extensive arrays of military weapons with comprehensive destructive capabilities, but rather, they are faced with the likelihood of attacks by small covert bands of individuals with crude nuclear weapons which can still deliver substantial destructive power.

    New methodologies incorporating sophisticated sensing devices are needed for the tasks of detecting, containing, and eliminating small-scale movements of nuclear material in order to prevent such terrorist events. The face of war is changing from that of a well-equipped soldier in uniform to that of the nondescript member of a dedicated cult whose very nature is to deceive and remaine hidden from view until their targets are most vulnerable and the political climate is confused.

    Conclusion:

    There are no easy solutions or quick fixes.

    “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, as we drift toward unparalleled catastrophes.”

    – Albert Einstein

    A number of experts predicted that some catastrophic event similar to the Oklahoma City bombing disaster would be needed to energize the international community to work in concert to eliminate this problem. It has happened in New York and Washington. The unfortunate fact is that the US government, as well as other governments, and the American people found themselves in situations for which they were not prepared. This has to change.

    The danger is so great, and the threat so immediate, that US policymakers and the public need to recognize that the diversion of fissile materials is as critical and urgent a national security priority as controlling the theft of a complete nuclear weapon. This will require top-level commitment to public education and sufficient resource allocation if, eventually, we are to prevail in this new security challenge.

    One can only hope that a nuclear tragedy will not be necessary for galvanizing world action, and that we will achieve progress toward an international consensus that it is in no one’s interest to allow these materials to be expropriated for terrorist purposes. The need is to concentrate an effort within existing political structures to build a collective regional security, capped by the United Nations, that would promote collaboration among nuclear weapons states to establish methods and records of control over the inventories of fissile materials.

    In examining current efforts on how to stop the illegal distribution of these materials, it is hard to see how any current strategy, no matter how clever the concept or broad the implementation, could do more than raise the level of awareness of the problem. The responsibility is so fragmented among sovereign states and among competing agencies within these sovereignties that viable methods of control are either paralyzed or, for practical purposes, nonexistent. Because of this, problems in managing the inventories of these materials are too diverse and complex to solve in the short term. Consequently, without international cooperation, the United States cannot expect to control the misappropriation of fissile material that is inherent in nuclear proliferation and inappropriate nuclear disarmament methodologies.

    The reality is that a number of states are actively seeking the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. Their main requirement is getting the materials to do so. Unfortunately, because of some very lax attitudes toward the security of weapons grade nuclear materials during the current disarmament process, the materials already exist in the Black Market. Indifference to this fact seems to be continuing and will contribute to the likelihood that, within the next two-to-three years, there will be a political crisis involving a terrorist group and nuclear materials.

    Slow progress has been made in establishing global and regional non proliferation measures. Commensurately, little effort has been expended for controlling the illegal movement of fissile materials. There appears to be a blindness to the fact that, in this imperfect world, while no system can be developed that will stop all the determined terrorists; a high level of effort must be expended for understanding the dimensions of the problem and correcting deficiencies. In some measure, all civilized nations should be prepared to respond as effectively as possible when terrorist threats of any kind occur but, especially, where nuclear materials are concerned.

    During the Cold War, high technology warheads sat atop powerful delivery systems. Targeting was a known factor. The world was at risk of a hair-trigger response but the realization of a mutually assured destruction kept these systems under “reasonable” control. Today, the potential weapon size is speculative and the delivery system in all probability will have feet. The targets are completely unpredictable – they can be anything, anywhere, at any time. No negotiating. No advanced warning. No clues of impending danger. Nothing is rational in the equation.

    Ultimately, there can be no foolproof system short of eliminating all inventories of the materials. However, it is an immediate and critical imperative that all nations work in collaboration to eliminate the spread of fissile materials. Control will require the continuous and simultaneous exercise of multiple measures including international intelligence gathering, international cooperation for conflict resolution, import/export accountability, and selective, proportional coercive measures including the use of force. Eventually, a comprehensive set of measures will have to be developed for the international community that will allow it to exercise the political will to stop and ultimately eliminate the threat of a catastrophe involving terrorist and nuclear materials.

    George Washington said, “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” Again, it is time to listen to one of our founding fathers.

    *Gene R. Kelly is a human factors engineer who has consulted for government and industry on issues of nuclear security for the past 22 years.

  • Time to Shut Down the Nation’s Nuclear Plants

    In the aftermath of the horrific September 11 attack on the World Trade Center there has been considerable discussion in the US media about the threat of a future chemical or biological attack. Meanwhile, the much greater threat posed by a successful terrorist attack on a US nuclear reactor has passed almost without notice. Currently there are about 110 operational nuclear reactors in the United States. And virtually every one of these electrical generating facilities is vulnerable to terrorism. Indeed, from the standpoint of the terrorist it would be hard to imagine a more ideal target than a nuclear reactor. These plants are uniquely vulnerable by virtue of their design. A successful assault on even one nuclear reactor could produce a catastrophe that would make the recent tragedy in New York seem puny by comparison.

    Such terrorism would be much easier to mount than the attack on the World Trade Center. No need to hijack a commercial jet liner. A small plane would suffice, and could be legally rented at any of a hundred airports in the US. The plane could be flown to a remote air strip located, say, on a rented farm, there loaded with explosives or even gasoline, before being pointed in kamikaze fashion at a nuclear plant.

    Such an attack, planned by someone with the necessary expertise, and staged by a handful of determined men, would be extremely difficult to stop. Current operational safeguards at US nuclear plants are designed to protect against truck bombs. But apparently no thought has been given to the sort of aerial assault that toppled the World Trade Center.

    The objective of such terrorism would be to disable the nuclear plant’s safety (cooling) systems, triggering a worst-case scenario: a nuclear melt-down.

    A partial melt-down of uranium fuel did occur at Three Mile Island in 1979, and, again, at Chernobyl in 1986. However, serious as these accidents were, especially Chernobyl, the long-term consequences of a full-scale melt-down would be immeasurably worse, worse even than the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Why? Because the core of a nuclear reactor contains many times as much uranium fuel as the largest nuclear bomb. Hence the potential for the release of far more radiation.

    Try and imagine, if you can, the hellish scenario that would result from such an attack. A full scale melt-down is a runaway nuclear reaction in the core of a nuclear reactor. It leads to a “China Syndrome,” where the “hot” uranium fuel literally melts its way through the floor of the reactor’s containment vessel, then sinks into the earth until it reaches ground water; whereupon a gigantic plume of intensely radioactive material rises like death into the air and begins to spread with the winds over a vast area.

    Let us assume such an attack near a large US city — a fair assumption given that many nuclear plants are located near metropolitan areas. With the prevailing winds, a melt-down at a plant in Pennsylvania, say, or in Virginia, would contaminate a large portion of the eastern seaboard with lethal radiation, killing untold numbers of people, and necessitating the evacuation of tens of millions of others. Large areas would be rendered uninhabitable for centuries. Entire cities, including New York and even the nation’s capital, might have to be permanently vacated. The human cost in lives, not to mention the vast disruptions to American society, would be on a scale that is impossible to comprehend.

    Yet the danger is all too real. Although the inherent vulnerability of nuclear reactors to terrorism has been understood for many years, the threat has not been taken seriously — until now — for reasons of hubris and greed.

    From the day of their election President Bush and Vice President Cheney have touted a new generation of “clean” and “safe” nuclear power reactors that, we are told, will solve the nation’s latest energy crisis. The two most powerful men in the land have, in short, been doing everything in their power to magnify the problem, and have played straight into the hands of Osama bin Ladin.

    No doubt, Bush and Cheney’s support for nuclear has been driven by politics. They have sought to reward those in industry who supported their candidacy. Make no mistake, the only reason nuclear power has survived is because of federal subsidies. Corporate welfare has been its life-blood. In a truly free marketplace nuclear energy would long ago have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

    In the wake of the disaster in New York the nation must finally come to terms with the true risks of nuclear energy. We must face the reality that there is no way to adequately safeguard these plants. When terrorists are willing to die they are very difficult to stop. The only solution is prevention: phase out nuclear power as soon as possible in an orderly transition to wind and solar energy; which are immune to terrorism, in addition to being cost-effective and environmentally friendly.

    *Mark Gaffney is the author of a pioneering study of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Mark is currently preparing a briefing paper “Will the Next Mid-East War Go Nuclear?” for the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council. He can be reached at: PO Box 100 Chiloquin, OR 97624 541-783-2309

  • U.S. Needs a Contigency Plan For Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal

    There is growing concern, and evidence for concern, that the instability in Afghanistan could quickly spread to neighboring Pakistan and undermine the security of that country’s nuclear arsenal. Of all of the negative consequences this turn of events might bring, none would be more dangerous and catastrophic than nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

    Until Sept. 11, the Pakistani regime and the Taliban were very close, and there have been reports out of Pakistan that military officers assisted the Taliban in preparing for U.S. airstrikes—counter to direct orders from Pakistan’s leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Top military officers, including the head of Pakistan’s intelligence services, recently have been sacked, reportedly for their pro-Taliban views.

    Violence in the streets, while not widespread beyond the border area with Afghanistan, speaks to the tensions inside Pakistan. A Newsweek poll this week found that 83% of Pakistanis polled sympathized with the Taliban in the current conflict. It is possible, therefore, that Pakistani forces assigned to protect Pakistan’s nuclear forces could be compromised.

    This is surely the nightmare scenario, and immediate steps should be taken to prevent such a turn of events from coming to pass.

    Pakistan possesses enough nuclear material for close to 40 nuclear weapons, if not more. The U.S., however, knows very little about how this material is stored, what security measures are applied to its protection, how personnel with access to nuclear weapons and materials are screened and where the material is located.

    Pakistan has a responsibility to ensure that its assets are adequately protected and to convince other countries that this responsibility is taken seriously. Other countries and organizations have a responsibility to help Pakistan keep these materials secure, without in any way assisting that country in modernizing or deploying its nuclear capability.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, a U.N.-affiliated organization, has decades of experience in developing and verifying security measures associated with nuclear weapons-usable materials. The agency routinely assists countries in ensuring that their peaceful nuclear programs are adequately protected. Despite its lack of membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan could receive advice and assistance from the IAEA.

    In addition, the U.S. and other IAEA members have extensive experience—publicly available—on how to protect nuclear materials and on how to ensure that weapons-usable uranium or plutonium cannot be diverted without being detected. States could make equipment available to Pakistan that did not directly assist in its development or control of nuclear weapons, such as alarm systems and polygraph equipment for personnel screening. In addition, corporations and nongovernmental organizations with significant expertise in nuclear matters could provide Pakistan with assistance on security.

    Pakistan has resisted any outside attempts to help secure its nuclear materials. There is the risk that receiving assistance for its nuclear program from outside powers might further destabilize the current situation. Yet Pakistan has already made its strategic decision to throw in with the West against terrorism. Taking this additional step, while difficult, may be part of the price it pays to reestablish itself as a responsible global partner.

    If Pakistan does not agree to these types of programs, the U.S. should begin to work immediately on contingency plans should the Islamabad regime lose control over its nuclear arsenal. These plans should include the ability to rapidly deploy forces to Pakistan to find and regain control of any lost nuclear materials and, only as a last option in a crisis, remove them from Pakistan to a secure location.

    These steps might seem extreme. Yet when faced with the real possibility of losing control of nuclear weapons to the types of organizations capable of the destruction seen Sept. 11, they could be considered realistic and even prudent. The consequences of not being prepared to act are too great for us to imagine, even with our new ability to imagine the horrible.

    *Jon B. Wolfsthal is an associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s nonproliferation program and a former nonproliferation policy advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy.

  • Preventing a Terrorist Mushroom Cloud

    The images of the hijacked planes crashing into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania are nightmare images of unspeakable horror that will forever be a part of our reality.

    Imagine, however, another nightmare — that of a mushroom cloud rising over an American city. This is a threat we can no longer ignore. Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness to attack US cities and the possibility of them doing so with nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. After September 11th, citizens and leaders alike should be better able to understand the seriousness of the nuclear threat.

    The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were powerful warnings. They signaled that determined terrorists are prepared to sacrifice their lives to harm us, that future attacks could involve weapons of mass destruction, and that nuclear dangers are increasing because of terrorist activity.

    Our leaders have failed to grasp that our present nuclear weapons policies contribute to the possibility of nuclear terrorism against our country. We are simply not doing enough to prevent nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.

    A US blue ribbon commission, headed by former Senate majority leader Howard Baker, has called for spending $3 billion a year over the next ten years to maintain control of the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists in the former Soviet Union. Yet, the Bush administration has proposed funding cuts for this program from $1.2 billion to $800 million next year.

    The Bush Administration’s primary response to the nuclear threat has been to push for a national missile shield costing billions of dollars, the technology of which is unproven, and which would at best be years away from implementation. A missile shield would likely do irreparable harm to our relations with other countries, countries that we need to join us in the fight against international terrorism.

    The mad nuclear arms race during the Cold War, and the paltry steps taken to reverse it since the end of the Cold War, have left tens of thousands of nuclear weapons potentially available to terrorists. Today there is no accurate inventory of the world’s nuclear arsenals or weapons-grade fissile materials suitable for making nuclear weapons. Estimates have it, however, that there are currently more than 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world. We simply don’t know whether these weapons are adequately controlled, or whether some could already have fallen into the hands of terrorists.

    Osama bin Laden claims to possess nuclear weapons. His claim is feasible. Former Russian Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed has stated that some 80 to 100 suitcase-size nuclear weapons in the one kiloton range are missing from the Russian arsenal. This claim was reiterated by Alexey Yablokov, an advisor to former Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

    The Russian government has denied the claims of missing Russian nuclear weapons, but former US Deputy Energy Secretary Charles Curtis has expressed doubt about these assurances. According to Curtis, “We believe we have a full accounting of all of Russia’s strategic weapons, but when it comes to tactical weapons – the suitcase variety – we do not know, and I’m not sure they do, either.”

    More than ten years after the end of the Cold War we and the Russians still have more than 10,000 nuclear weapons each with a total of some 4,500 of them on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments. Russia has been urging the US to move faster on START 3 negotiations to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals in both countries, but US leaders had been largely indifferent to their entreaties.

    In November 2001, President Bush announced that the US was prepared to reduce its arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons to between 2,200 and 1,700 over the next ten years. President Putin indicated that Russia would make commensurate cuts. These steps are in the right direction, but they still indicate reliance on Cold War strategies of deterrence. They also do not address tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, which are the most likely weapons to be used and to fall into the hands of terrorists.

    Large nuclear arsenals, measured in the thousands, on hair-trigger alert are Cold War relics. They do not provide deterrence against terrorist attacks. Nor could a missile shield have prevented the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, or protect against future nuclear terrorism.

    From the outset, the Bush administration’s foreign policy course has been based on unilateral US actions and indifference bordering on hostility to international law. Since September 11th, the administration seems to have recognized that we cannot combat terrorism unilaterally. A multilateral effort to combat terrorism will require the US to change its policies and embrace multilateral approaches to many global problems, including the control and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

    The global elimination of nuclear weapons can no longer be a back-burner, peace activist issue. It is a top-priority security issue for all Americans, and it will require US leadership to achieve.

    *David Krieger, an attorney and political scientist, is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • America’s Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself

    No sane nation hands to a wartime enemy atomic weapons set to go off within its own homeland, and then lights the fuse.

    Yet as the bombs and missiles drop on Afghanistan, the certainty of terror retaliation inside America has turned our 103 nuclear power plants into weapons of apocalyptic destruction, just waiting to be used against us.

    One or both planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11, could have easily obliterated the two atomic reactors now operating at Indian Point, about 40 miles up the Hudson.

    The catastrophic devastation would have been unfathomable. But those and a hundred other American reactors are still running. Security has been heightened. But all are vulnerable to another sophisticated terror attack aimed at perpetrating the unthinkable.

    Indian Point Unit One was shut long ago by public outcry. But Units 2 & 3 have operated since the 1970s. Back then there was talk of requiring reactor containment domes to be strong enough to withstand a jetliner crash. But the biggest jets were far smaller than the ones that fly today. Nor did those early calculations account for the jet fuel whose hellish fire melted the critical steel supports that ultimately brought down the Trade Center.

    Had one or both those jets hit one or both the operating reactors at Indian Point, the ensuing cloud of radiation would have dwarfed the ones at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

    The intense radioactive heat within today’s operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. So are the hellish levels of radioactivity.

    Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl, which ran only four years before it exploded.

    Some believe the WTC jets could have collapsed or breached either of the Indian Point containment domes. But at very least the massive impact and intense jet fuel fire would destroy the human ability to control the plants’ functions. Vital cooling systems, backup power generators and communications networks would crumble.

    Indeed, Indian Point Unit One was shut because activists warned that its lack of an emergency core cooling system made it an unacceptable risk. The government ultimately agreed.

    But today terrorist attacks could destroy those same critical cooling and control systems that are vital to not only the Unit Two and Three reactor cores, but to the spent fuel pools that sit on site.

    The assault would not require a large jet. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a wide range of easily deployed small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the operating work force. Dozens of US reactors have repeatedly failed even modest security tests over the years. Even heightened wartime standards cannot guarantee protection of the vast, supremely sensitive controls required for reactor safety.

    Without continous monitoring and guaranteed water flow, the thousands of tons of radioactive rods in the cores and the thousands more stored in those fragile pools would rapidly melt into super-hot radioactive balls of lava that would burn into the ground and the water table and, ultimately, the Hudson.

    Indeed, a jetcrash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing winds from the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New York City and east into Westchester and Long Island.

    But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds ultimately shifted around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas with the devastating poisons released by the on-going fiery torrent. At Indian Point, thousands of square miles would have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created or imagined, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever.

    In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores more, infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Virtually all pregnant women would spontaneously abort, or ultimately give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple organ failure, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinance, sterility and impotence, asthma, blindness, and more would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not millions. A terrible metallic taste would afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New England, a ghoulish curse similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaskai, by those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and Nevada, and by victims caught in the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

    Then comes the abominable wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented, and new dimensions of agony will beg description.

    Indeed, those who survived the initial wave of radiation would envy those who did not.

    Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Bridges and highways would become killing fields for those attempting to escape to destinations that would soon enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted.

    Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At Chernobyl, pilots flying helicopters that dropped boron on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions would be a sure ticket to death. Their utility would be doubtful as the molten cores rage uncontrolled for days, weeks and years, spewing ever more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees were forced through Chernobyl’s seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up. They are dying in droves. Who would now volunteer for such an American task force?

    The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the vast Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and into the jetstream, surging through the west coast of the United States within ten days, carrying across our northern tier, circling the globe, then coming back again.

    The radioactive clouds from Indian Point would enshroud New York, New Jersey, New England, and carry deep into the Atlantic and up into Canada and across to Europe and around the globe again and again.

    The immediate damage would render thousands of the world’s most populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable. All five boroughs of New York City would be an apocalyptic wasteland. The World Trade Center would be rendered as unusable and even more lethal by a jet crash at Indian Point than it was by the direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in human capital would be forever lost.

    As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water and plant life have been hopelessly irradiated, natural eco-systems on which human and all other life depends would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed,

    Spiritually, psychologically, financially, ecologically, our nation would never recover.

    This is what we missed by a mere forty miles near New York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this.

    There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse now operating in the United States. They generate just 18% of America’s electricity, just 8% of our total energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of time with no appreciable impact on life in New York. Already an extremely expensive source of electricity, the cost of attempting to defend these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the competitive scale.

    Since its deregulation crisis, California—already the nation’s second-most efficient state—cut further into its electric consumption by some 15%. Within a year the US could cheaply replace virtually with increased efficiency all the reactors now so much more expensive to operate and protect.

    Yet, as the bombs fall and the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking a form of legal immunity to protect the operators of reactors like Indian Point from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack.

    Why is our nation handing its proclaimed enemies the weapons of our own mass destruction, and then shielding from liability the companies that insist on continuing to operate them?

    Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation?

    If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

    * Harvey Wasserman is author of The Last Energy War and co-author of Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation.

  • Preventing an Accidental Nuclear Winter

    Nuclear Winter

    In a study made by the World Health Organization, they found that a nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia could kill one billion people outright. In addition, it could produce a Nuclear Winter that would probably kill an additional one billion people. It is possible that more than two billion people, one-third of all the humans on Earth would be destroyed almost immediately in the aftermath of a global thermonuclear war. The rest of humanity would be reduced to prolonged agony and barbarism. These findings are from a study chaired by Sune K. Bergstrom (the 1982 Nobel laureate in physiology and medicine) nearly 20 years ago. (1)

    Subsequent studies have had similar findings. Professor Alan Robock says, “Everything from purely mathematical models to forest fire studies shows that even a small nuclear war would devastate the earth.” (2)

    Rich Small’s work, financed by the Defense Nuclear Agency, suggests that burning cities would produce a particularly troublesome variety of smoke. The smoke of forest fires is bad enough. But the industrial targets of cities are likely to produce a rolling, black smoke, a denser shield against incoming sunlight. (3)

    Nuclear explosions can produce heat intensities of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees Centigrade at ground zero. Nuclear explosions can also lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, creating more than l00,000 tons of fine, dense, radioactive dust for every megaton exploded on the surface. (4) The late Dr. Carl Sagan said the super heating of vast quantities of atmospheric dust and soot will cover both hemispheres. (5) For those who survive a nuclear attack, it would mean living on a cold, dark, chaotic, radioactive planet.

    A nuclear warhead is far more destructive than is generally realized. For example, just one average size U.S. strategic 250 Kt nuclear warhead has an explosive force equal to 250,000 tons of dynamite or 50,000 World War II type bombers each carrying 5 tons of bombs. The truck bombs that terrorists exploded at the New York World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City each had an explosive force equal to about 5 tons of dynamite. (6)

    Accidental Nuclear War

    The U.S. and Russia each have more than 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads set for hair-trigger release. If launched they could be delivered to targets around the world in 30 minutes. They would have an explosive force equal to l00,000 Hiroshima size bombs. (7) Russia and the U.S. have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. The more automated and shorter the decision process becomes the greater is the possibility of missiles being launched to false warnings.

    The U.S. is trying to decide whether to build an anti-missile “star wars” defense or not. In order for an anti-ballistic missile to hit another missile traveling at incredible speed that can come from many different directions, it would be necessary to have a very complex computerized system.

    President Reagan’s Defense Secretary, Casper Weinberger, said that since an anti-missile defense would require decisions within seconds, completely autonomous computer control is a foregone conclusion. There would be no time for screening out false alarms and a decision to launch would have to be automated—there would be no time for White House approval. (8)

    A highly automated defense system that has no time for determining whether a warning is false or not is highly likely to launch to a false warning. There are always false warnings. For example, during 1981, 1982 and 1983 there were 186, 218 and 255 false alarms, respectively, in the U.S. strategic warning system. (9)

    There have been at least three times in the last 20 years that the U.S. and Russia almost launched to false warnings. Fortunately there was enough time to determine that the warnings were false before decision time ran out.

    In 1979, a U.S. training tape showing a massive attack was accidentally played.

    In 1983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signaled the launch of a U.S. missile.

    In 1995, Russia almost launched its missiles because of a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights. (l0)

    If the U.S. builds an anti-missile defense it appears certain that missiles would be launched to false warnings because no time is available for determining whether a warning is false or not.

    Preventive Action Needed

    Plans to build an anti-missile defense need to be carefully researched as to how it could increase the danger of an accidental nuclear war. As the research progresses, the findings need to be widely discussed in the news media. The more widely and clearly the danger is made known the more concerned the public should be for agreements to greatly reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons from the world.

    As humanity’s safety becomes more and more dependent upon technology, the technological dangers need to be guarded against. Technical errors in one system may trigger errors in others. When researching missile defense dangers the following types of factors need to be included in the assessments, e.g. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)), “Dead Hand” control of missiles, High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP), Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO). Russia’s blind spots in its satellite warning system also need to be included in this research.

    The U.S. and Russia are in a position where either can destroy humanity in a flash and yet there appears to be little recognition of this peril hanging over the world. Only 71 out of 435 U.S. congressional representatives signed a motion calling for nuclear weapons to be taken off of hair-trigger alert. (11) The U.S. Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. (12)

    Queen Noor al Hussein, of Jordan, said “The sheer folly of trying to defend a nation by destroying all life on the planet must be apparent to anyone capable of rational thought.” (13) There is a need to greatly increase public awareness of the danger in order to provide broad, long-term understanding and support for arms agreements ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

    Reference and Notes

    1. Sagan, Carl. The Nuclear Winter, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Boston, MA, 1983.

    2. Robock, Alan. “New models confirm nuclear winter,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September l989, pp 32-35.

    3. Blum, Deborah. “Scientists try to predict nuclear future from forest fires,” The Sacramento Bee, November 28, 1987.

    4. Sagan, Op.Cit.

    5. Ibid

    6. Babst, Dean, Preventing An Accidental Armageddon,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, February 2000,

    7. Blair, Bruce. “Nuclear Dealerting: A Solution to Proliferation Problems,” The Defense Monitor, Volume XXXIX, No.3, 2000.

    8. Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons, hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 25, 1984, pp. 69-74.

    9. Letter from Air Force Space Command headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, February 16, 1984.

    10. Babst, Op.Cit.

    11. The Sunflower, No. 31, Jan. 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif.

    12. Gordon, Michael R. “Russia rejects call to amend ABM treaty,” Contra Costa Times, Oct. 2l, 1999.

    13. Hussein, Queen Noor al. “The Responsibilities of World Citizenship,” Waging Peace Series, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif., Booklet No 40, July 2000.

    *Dean Babst is a retired government research scientist and Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Accidental Nuclear War Studies Program. The author acknowledges the helpful suggestions of David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Bob Aldridge, who heads the Pacific Life Research Center, and Andy Baltzo, who is Founder of the Mount Diable Peace Center in northern California.

  • The Power of an Early Visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

    I first visited Hiroshima and its Peace Memorial Museum when I was 21 years old. The visit changed the course of my life.

     

    I was in Japan on an exchange program, and the program included a trip to Hiroshima around Hiroshima Day in 1963. I was apprehensive about going to Hiroshima. I thought the people of Hiroshima would be angry with Americans, probably hostile and perhaps even violent. After all, we Americans had dropped an atomic bomb on the city just 18 years before, killing well over 100,000 people.

     

    My fears proved to be unfounded. If the people of Hiroshima were hostile to Americans, they didn’t show it. They were kind and welcoming to young Americans, as were people throughout Japan.

     

    Here is what I had learned in high school and college about Hiroshima: The American military dropped an atomic bomb on the city, followed by the dropping of another atomic bomb on Nagasaki, and these bombings brought World War II to an end.

     

    Here is what I learned at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum when I was 21 years old: There were people under that bomb we dropped on Hiroshima. Most were civilians. The bomb slaughtered its victims, killing men, women and children indiscriminately. I also learned that many of the people killed by the bomb were burned alive, some were incinerated. These were powerful details – details that were certainly not emphasized in the story we learned in school in the United States.

     

    One of the strongest impressions on me was the shadow on the wall that was left behind where someone had been sitting at the time the bomb was dropped. The person was incinerated and only his shadow remained.

     

    Visiting the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum had a strong influence on my views on war, and particularly nuclear war. The museum, which was filled with artifacts and photographs, powerfully demonstrated the futility of nuclear warfare. Hiroshima’s past was eloquent testimony to an intolerable future.

     

    The course of my life made a subtle shift. I was set on a course of wanting to do something to end the tragedy of war. Later, when I returned to the United States, other events would solidify the shift in my life, particularly my experience in the army and my fight in court against orders to go to Vietnam.

     

    Some 20 years later I was a founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, where I have served as president for almost 20 years. Hiroshima has never left my mind. I have written many poems and articles about the tragedy that occurred there and its meaning for our lives. I have worked for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have done all that I can to further this goal. I was a founder of Abolition 2000, now a global network of over 2000 organizations working to abolish nuclear weapons. I have traveled around the world speaking out for realizing the dream of Hiroshima and the survivors of the bombing — the abolition of nuclear weapons.

     

    I believe that museums matter. They capture moments in time and freeze them for the future to examine. Of course, it is important for museums to be honest. It is possible for museums to be deceptive by overt acts or by omission. There is a museum about the first atomic bombs that I visited at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. That museum celebrates only the technology. There are no photographs or displays of the people who were killed and injured in the bombings. The museum is steely and antiseptic. In visiting this museum, one would have no emotional connection with or even knowledge of the suffering and death caused by the bombings.

     

    It would be more than 35 years before I visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum again. When I did return in 1998, it was to give a speech at the museum. I began my speech with these words: “It is with profound appreciation and gratitude that I return to this city of peace, this sacred city of Hiroshima. This city was made sacred not by the tragedy which befell it, but by the rebirth of hope which emerged from that tragedy. From the ashes of Hiroshima, flowers of hope have blossomed, bringing forth a renewed spirit of possibility, of peace, to a world in which hope has been too often crushed for too many.”

     

    In another visit to the museum early in the year 2000, the museum director, Minoru Hataguchi, showed my wife and me through the museum. He was carrying with him a small box. At one point, he stopped and opened the box. He told us that this was the first time he had shared the contents of the box with visitors to the museum. The box contained the pocket watch and belt buckle of his father. Mr. Hataguchi had been in utero when the bomb fell. His father had been a train conductor, and had been near ground zero. The pocket watch and belt buckle were all that his mother recovered. We were very moved that he shared his father’s story and the artifacts with us.

     

    In Fall 2000, our Foundation sponsored an exhibit in Santa Barbara, California from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Museums. Mr. Hataguchi was one of the representatives of the two cities that came to Santa Barbara to open the exhibit. By bringing the exhibit to our city, we were able to share with members of our community an important perspective on Hiroshima with which many were unacquainted.

     

    In 1995, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation commemorated the 50th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by creating a peace garden in our community. We called it Sadako Peace Garden after Sadako Sasaki, a young girl who had been exposed to the bombing of Hiroshima at age 2 and had died at age 12 of leukemia. Sadako had been inspired by the Japanese legend that one’s wish will come true if one folds 1,000 paper cranes, and she had attempted to fold paper cranes to regain her health and to further world peace. She wrote: “I will write peace on your wings, and you will fly all over the world.” Each year on August 6th, the Foundation holds a public event at Sadako Peace Garden to commemorate the anniversary of Hiroshima with music, poetry and reflection.

     

    I am quite certain that my first visit to Hiroshima at the age of 21 left a strong enough impression on me to guide the course of my life. I am dedicated to ending the nuclear weapons era, and bringing the spirit of Hiroshima and its survivors, the hibakusha, to people everywhere.

     

    If a visit to the Peace Memorial Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a requirement of office for all leaders of nuclear weapons states, it just might change the world.

     

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.