Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Nuclear Threat

  • Were the Atomic Bombings Necessary?

    David KriegerOn August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered and World War II was over.  American policy makers have argued that the atomic bombs were the precipitating cause of the surrender.  Historical studies of the Japanese decision, however, reveal that what the Japanese were most concerned with was the Soviet Union’s entry into the war.  Japan surrendered with the understanding that the emperor system would be retained.  The US agreed to do what Truman had been advised to do before the bombings:  it signaled to the Japanese that they would be allowed to retain the emperor.  This has left historians to speculate that the war could have ended without either the use of the two atomic weapons on Japanese cities or an Allied invasion of Japan.


    The US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that, even without the use of the atomic bombs, without the Soviet Union entering the war and without an Allied invasion of Japan, the war would have ended before December 31, 1945 and, in all likelihood, before November 1, 1945.  Prior to the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US was destroying Japanese cities at will with conventional bombs.  The Japanese were offering virtually no resistance.  The US dropped atomic bombs on a nation that had been largely defeated and some of whose leaders were seeking terms of surrender.


    Despite strong evidence that the atomic bombings were not responsible for ending the war with Japan, most Americans, particularly those who lived through World War II, believe that they were.  Many World War II era servicemen who were in the Pacific or anticipated being shipped there believed that the bombs saved them from fighting hard battles on the shores of Japan, as had been fought on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.  What they did not take into account was that the Japanese were trying to surrender, that the US had broken the Japanese codes and knew they were trying to surrender, and that, had the US accepted their offer, the war could have ended without the use of the atomic bombs.


    Most high ranking Allied military leaders were appalled by the use of the atomic bombs.  General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Europe, recognized that Japan was ready to surrender and said, “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.” General Hap Arnold, commander of the US Army Air Corps pointed out, “Atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.”


    Admiral William Leahy, Truman’s chief of staff, put it this way: “The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.  The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.  In being the first to use it, we adopted an ethical standard common to barbarians of the Dark Ages.  Wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”


    What Truman had described as “the greatest thing in history” was actually, according to his own military leaders, an act of unparalleled cowardice, the mass annihilation of men, women and children.  The use of the atomic bombs was the culmination of an air war fought against civilians in Germany and Japan, an air war that showed increasing contempt for the lives of civilians and for the laws of war. 


    The end of the war was a great relief to those who had fought for so long.  There were nuclear scientists, though, who now regretted what they had created and how their creations had been used.  One of these was Leo Szilard, the Hungarian émigré physicist who had warned Einstein of the possibility of the Germans creating an atomic weapon first and of the need for the US to begin a bomb project.  Szilard had convinced Einstein to send a letter of warning to Roosevelt, which led at first to a small project to explore the potential of uranium to sustain a chain reaction and then to the Manhattan Project that resulted in the creation of the first atomic weapons.


    Szilard did his utmost to prevent the bomb from being used against Japanese civilians.  He wanted to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt, but Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945.  He next tried to meet with the new president, Harry Truman, but Truman sent him to Spartanburg, South Carolina to talk with his mentor in the Senate, Jimmy Byrnes, who was dismissive of Szilard.  Szilard then tried to organize the scientists in the Manhattan Project to appeal for a demonstration of the bomb rather than immediately using it on a Japanese city.  The appeal was stalled by General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, and did not reach President Truman until after the atomic bombs were used.


    The use of the bomb caused many other scientists to despair as well.  Albert Einstein deeply regretted that he had written to President Roosevelt.  He did not work on the Manhattan Project, but he had used his influence to encourage the start of the American bomb project.  Einstein, like Szilard, believed that the purpose of the U.S. bomb project was to deter the use of a German bomb.  He was shocked that, once created, the bomb was used offensively against the Japanese.  Einstein would spend the remaining ten years of his life speaking out against the bomb and seeking its elimination.  He famously said, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

  • Fear of Nuclear Weapons

    David KriegerI was recently asked during an interview whether people fear nuclear weapons too much, causing them unnecessary anxiety.  The implication was that it is not necessary to live in fear of nuclear weapons.


    My response was that fear is a healthy mechanism when one is confronted by something fearful.  It gives rise to a fight or flight response, both of which are means of surviving real danger.


    In the case of nuclear weapons, these are devices to be feared since they are capable of causing terrifying harm to all humanity, including one’s family, city and country.  If one is fearful of nuclear weapons, there will be an impetus to do something about the dangers these weapons pose to humanity.


    But, one might ask, what can be done?  In reality, there is a limited amount that can be done by a single individual, but when individuals band together in groups, their power to bring about change increases.  Individual power is magnified even more when groups join together in coalitions and networks to bring about change.


    Large numbers of individuals banded together to bring about the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in South Africa.  The basic building block of all these important changes was the individual willing to stand up, speak out and join with others to achieve a better world.  The forces of change have been set loose again by the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement across the globe.


    When dangers are viewed rationally, there may be good cause for fear, and fear may trigger a response to bring about change.  On the other hand, complacency can never lead to change.  Thus, while fear may be a motivator of change, complacency is an inhibitor of change.  In a dangerous world, widespread complacency should be of great concern. 


    If a person is complacent about the dangers of nuclear weapons, there is little possibility that he will engage in trying to alleviate the danger.  Complacency is the result of a failure of hope to bring about change.  It is a submission to despair.


    After so many years of being confronted by nuclear dangers, there is a tendency to believe that nothing can be done to change the situation.  This may be viewed as “concern fatigue.”  We should remember, though, that any goal worth achieving is worth striving for with hope in our hearts.  A good policy for facing real-world dangers is to never give up hope and never stop trying.


    Nuclear weapons threaten the future of the human species and other forms of complex life on the planet.  Basically, we have three choices: active opposition to nuclear weapons, justification of the weapons, and complacency.  These are three choices that confront us in relation to any great danger. 


    It is always easier to choose, often by default, justification or complacency than it is to mount active opposition to a danger.  But dangers seldom melt away of their own accord and there is no reason to believe that policies of reliance on nuclear weapons will do so.  These policies need to be confronted, and such confrontation requires courage.  Fear can be most useful when it gives rise to the courage and commitment to bring about change for a safer and more decent future for humanity.

  • Nuclear Insanity: A Brief Outline

    David KriegerAlbert Einstein, at the request of his friend and fellow physicist, Leo Szilard, sent a letter dated August 2, 1939 to President Franklin Roosevelt, in which he expressed concern about the potential for an atomic weapon and the possibility that the Germans would develop such a weapon.  Einstein recommended increased scientific efforts and better funding in the US.  This led to the establishment of a low-budget Uranium Project and then, in 1942, to the large-scale Manhattan Engineering Project to develop atomic weapons.


    The Nuclear Age began in the summer of 1945 with the first test of a nuclear device at Alamogordo, New Mexico, followed within a month by the destruction of two undefended Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The bombings demonstrated the direct effects of nuclear weapons: blast, fires and radiation.  Approximately 90,000 people in Hiroshima died immediately and 145,000 by the end of 1945.  Approximately 40,000 people in Nagasaki died immediately and 75,000 by the end of 1945.  The survivors of these bombings continue to suffer from radiation-related illnesses.


    By early 1946 the US had tested nuclear weapons in its Trust Territory, the Marshall Islands.  For the next three years, until the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapons, the US engaged in a unilateral nuclear arms race.  Between 1946 and 1958, the US conducted 67 nuclear weapons tests in the Marshall Islands with the equivalent explosive power of one-and-a-half Hiroshima bombs each day for 12 years.  The Marshall Islanders continue to suffer from radiation-related illnesses.


    In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon, breaking the US nuclear monopoly and opening the way for a nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union. 


    In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force.  The parties to the treaty agreed that, in exchange for non-nuclear weapon states committing not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states would engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.


    At the height of the nuclear arms race, in 1986, there were over 70,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with over 97 percent in the arsenals of the US and Soviet Union.


    In 1995, 25 years after the NPT entered into force, the parties to the treaty held a Review and Extension Conference, at which they agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely, despite the fact that the nuclear weapon states had made virtually no progress toward fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations. 


    A year later, in 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion to the United Nations General Assembly in which they stated, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”


    In 2012, some 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been reduced, but there remain more than 19,000 of them, 95 percent of which are in the arsenals of the US and Russia, but some of which are in the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.


    From the beginning of the Nuclear Age to the present, the US alone has spent more than $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons, their delivery vehicles and their command and control systems.  The US is continuing to spend some $50 to $70 billion annually on its nuclear arsenal.  All nuclear weapon states, including the US, are engaged in modernizing (qualitatively improving) their nuclear arsenals.


    In the 1980s, scientists warned of Nuclear Winter, but their models were not highly sophisticated and were challenged.  In the past several years, though, their findings have been validated using more sophisticated models.


    Leading atmospheric scientists now warn of nuclear famine from the effects of even a small nuclear war.  They modeled a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each side detonates 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons on the other side’s cities.  Smoke from the burning cities would rise into the stratosphere, where it would reduce warming sunlight for up to ten years, dropping temperatures on Earth to the lowest levels in the past 1,000 years and shortening growing seasons across the planet.  The result would be crop failures and a nuclear famine, which could result in the deaths of hundreds of millions to a billion people globally.


    In the modeled India-Pakistan nuclear exchange, less than one-half of one percent of the explosive power in the deployed nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia would be used.  A nuclear war between the US and Russia, in which the cities and industrial areas of the two countries were attacked, could result in lowering global temperatures to those of the last Ice Age 18,000 years ago, leading to the extinction of most or all complex life on the planet. 


    Launch-ready, land-based nuclear-armed missiles are particularly dangerous, because there would be very little time for decision makers to determine whether an alarm were real or false.  The presidents of the US and Russia would have 12 minutes or less to decide whether to launch a retaliatory attack to what could be a false warning.


    Nuclear weapons and human fallibility are a dangerous mix, particularly when extinction could be the result of human or technological error.


    The possibility of nuclear famine makes nuclear weapons abolition imperative, since the future of human survival on the planet may well depend upon it.


    To end the threat of nuclear omnicide (death of all) by means of nuclear famine, a three-step process is needed.


    First, a major education program to warn policy makers and the public of the dangers of nuclear famine.


    Second, an advocacy program to obtain commitments from the nuclear weapon states of No Use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and No First Use of the weapons against other nuclear weapon states.  If no country used their nuclear weapons first, they would not be used.


    Third, an advocacy program to achieve a new treaty for complete nuclear disarmament, as required by the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.  The new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, would provide for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.


    Achieving such a treaty will require leadership from the US, the only country to have used nuclear weapons and the most technologically advanced country on the planet.  Pressure from US citizens and from non-nuclear weapon states will be needed in support of US leadership.


    To put pressure on the nuclear weapon states to commit to No First Use and a Nuclear Weapons Convention, bold action is needed.  At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, we propose that, if the nuclear weapon states have not already begun negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the start of the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the non-nuclear weapon states boycott the Review Conference and initiate a process for negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

  • Nuclear Weapons as Instruments of Peace?

    Richard FalkA few days ago I was a participant in a well-attended academic panel on ‘the decline of violence and warfare’ at the International Studies Association’s Annual Meeting held this year in San Diego, California. The two-part panel featured appraisal of the common argument of two prominent recent publications: Steven Pinker’s best-selling The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined and Joshua Goldstein’s well-researched, informative, and provocative Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide. Both books are disposed to rely upon quantitative data to back up their optimistic assessments of international and domestic political behavior, which if persuasive, offer humanity important reasons to be hopeful about the future. Much of their argument depends on an acceptance of their interpretation of battlefield deaths worldwide, which according to their assessments have declined dramatically in recent decades. But do battlefield deaths tell the whole story, or even the real story, about the role and dangers of political violence and war in our collective lives?


    My role was to be a member of the Goldstein half of the panel. Although I had never previously met Joshua Goldstein I was familiar with his work and reputation as a well regarded scholar in the field of international relations.  To offer my response in the few minutes available to me I relied on a metaphor that drew a distinction between a ‘picture’ and its ‘frame.’ I found the picture of war and warfare presented by Goldstein as both persuasive and illuminating, conveying in authoritative detail information about the good work being doing by UN peacekeeping forces in a variety of conflict settings around the world, as well as a careful crediting of peace movements with a variety of contributions to conflict resolution and war avoidance. Perhaps, the most enduringly valuable part of the book is its critical debunking of prevalent myths about the supposedly rising proportion of civilian casualties in recent wars and inflated reports of casualties and sexual violence in the Congo Wars of 1998-2003. These distortions, corrected by Goldstein, have led to a false public perception that wars and warfare are growing more indiscriminate and brutal in recent years, while the most reliable evidence points in the opposite direction.


    Goldstein is convincing in correcting such common mistakes about political violence and war in the contemporary world, but less so when it comes to the frame and framing of this picture that is conveyed by his title ‘winning the war on war’ and the arguments to this effect that is the centerpiece of his book, and accounts for the interest that it is arousing. For one thing the quantitative measures relied upon do not come to terms with the heightened qualitative risks of catastrophic warfare or the continued willingness of leading societies to anchor their security on credible threats to annihilate tens of millions of innocent persons, which if taking the form of a moderate scale nuclear exchange (less than 1% of the world’s stockpile of weapons) is likely to cause, according to reliable scientific analysis, what has been called ‘a nuclear famine’ resulting in a sharp drop in agricultural output that could last as long as ten years and could be brought about by the release of dense clouds of smoke blocking incoming sunlight.  <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php>


    Also on the panel were such influential international relations scholars as John Mearsheimer who shared with me the view that the evidence in Goldstein’s book did not establish that, as Mearsheimer put it, ‘war had been burned out of the system,’ or that even such a trend meaningfully could be inferred from recent experience. Mearsheimer widely known for his powerful realist critique of the Israeli Lobby (in collaboration with Stephen Walt) did make the important point that the United States suffers from ‘an addiction to war.’ Mearsheimer did not seem responsive to my insistence on the panel that part of this American addiction to war arose from role being played by entrenched domestic militarism a byproduct of the permanent war economy that disposed policy makers and politicians in Washington to treat most security issues as worthy of resolution only by considering the options offered by thinking within militarist box of violence and sanctions, a viewpoint utterly resistant to learning from past militarist failures (as in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Iran). In my view the war addiction is real, but can only be treated significantly if understood to be a consequence of this blinkering of policy choice by a militarized bureaucracy in nation’s capital that is daily reinforced by a compliant media and a misguided hard power realist worldview sustained by high paid private sector lobbyists and the lure of corporate profits, and continuously rationalized by well funded subsidized think tanks such as The Hoover Institution, The Heritage Foundation, and The American Enterprise Institute. Dwight Eisenhower in his presidential farewell speech famously drew attention to the problem that has grown far worse through the years when he warned the country about ‘the military-industrial complex’ back in 1961.


    What to me was most shocking about the panel was not its overstated claims that political violence was declining and war on the brink of disappearing, but the unqualified endorsement of nuclear weapons as deserving credit for keeping the peace during Cold War and beyond. Nuclear weapons were portrayed as if generally positive contributors to establishing a peaceful and just world, provided only that they do not fall into unwanted hands (which means ‘adversaries of the West,’ or more colorfully phrased by George W. Bush as ‘the axis of evil’) as a result of proliferation. In this sense, although not made explicit in the conversation, Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons set forth at Prague on April 5, 2009 seems irresponsible from the perspective of achieving a less war-prone world. I had been previously aware of Mearsheimer’s support for this position in his hyper-realist account of how World War III was avoided in the period between 1945-1989, but I was not prepared for Goldstein and the well regarded peace researcher, Andrew Mack, blandly to endorse such a conclusion without taking note of the drawbacks of such ‘a nuclear peace.’ Goldstein in his book writes on p.42, “[n]uclear deterrence may in fact help to explain why World War III did not occur during the Cold War—certainly an important accomplishment.” Goldstein does insist that this role of nuclear weapons has problematic aspects associated with some risk of unintended or accidental use and cannot by itself explain other dimensions of the decline of political violence, which rests on a broader set of developments that are usefully depicted elsewhere in the book. These qualifications are welcome but do not offset a seeming willingness to agree that nuclear weapons seemed partly responsible for the avoidance of World War III or the liberal internationalist view, perhaps most fully articulated by Joseph Nye, that an arms control approach is a sufficient indication that the threat posed by the possession and deployment of nuclear weaponry is being responsibly addressed. [Nye, Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986)] 


    Steven Pinker in his book takes a more nuanced position on nuclear weapons, arguing that if it were indeed correct to credit nuclear weapons with the avoidance of World War III, there would be grounds for serious concern. He correctly asserts that such a structure of peace would be “a fool’s paradise, because an accident, a miscommunication, or an air force general obsessed with precious bodily fluids could set off an apocalypse.”  Pinker goes on to conclude that “[t]hankfully, a closer look suggests that the threat of nuclear annihilation deserves little credit for the Long Peace.” (p.268) Instead, Pinker persuasively emphasizes the degree to which World War III was discouraged by memories of the devastation experienced in World War II combined with the realization that advances in conventional weaponry would make a major war among leading states far more deadly than any past war even if no nuclear weapons were used.


    Pinker also believes that a ‘nuclear taboo’ developed after World War II to inhibit recourse to nuclear weapons in all but the most extreme situations, and that this is the primary explanation of why the weapons were not used in a variety of combat settings during the 67 years that have passed since a single atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. But Pinker does not raise deeply disturbing questions about the continued possession and threat to use such weaponry that is retained by a few of the world’s states. Or if the taboo was so strong, why this weaponry remains on hair trigger alert more than 20 years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and why on several occasions a threat to use nuclear weapons was used to discourage an adversary from taking certain actions. (see for instance, Steven Starr, “On the overwhelming urgency of de-alerting US & Russian missiles, http://ifyoulovethisplanet.org/?p=3358) And it the taboo was so valued, why did the United States fight so hard, it turns out unsuccessfully, to avoid having the International Court of Justice pronounce on the legality of nuclear weapons? (see ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996; < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf>) And why has the United States, along with some of the other nuclear weapons states, refused to declare ‘a no first use policy.’ The taboo exists, to be sure, but it is conditional and has been contested in times of international crisis, and its strength rests on the costs associated with any further use of nuclear weapons, including creating a precedent that might work against future interests.


    Most surprising than these comments on how the presence of nuclear weapons dissuaded the United States and the Soviet Union from going to war, was the failure of my co-panelists to surround their endorsement of the war-avoiding presence of nuclear weapons with moral and prudential qualifiers. At minimum, they might have acknowledged the costs and risks of tying strategic peace so closely to threatened mass devastation and civilizational, and perhaps species, catastrophe, a realization given sardonic recognition in the Cold War by the widely used acronym MAD (mutually assured destruction). The questions put by the audience also avoided this zone of acute moral and prudential insensitivity, revealing the limits of rational intelligence in addressing this most formidable challenge if social and political construction of a humane world order was recognized as a shared goal of decent people. It is unimaginable to reach any plateau of global justice without acting with resolve to rid the world of nuclear weaponry; the geopolitical ploy of shifting attention from disarmament to proliferation does not address the moral depravity of relying on genocidal capabilities and threats to uphold vital strategic interests of a West-centric world (Chinese nuclear weapons, and even those few possessed by North Korea, although dangerous and morally objectionable, at least seem acquired solely for defensive and deterrent purposes).


    I doubt very much that such a discussion of the decline of war and political violence could take place anywhere in the world other than North America, and possibly Western Europe and Japan. Of course, this does not by itself invalidate its central message, but it does raise questions about what is included and what is excluded in an Americans only debate (Mack is an Australian). Aside from the U.S. being addicted to war I heard no references in the course of the panel and discussion to the new hierarchies in the world being resurrected by indirect forms of violence and intervention after the collapse of colonialism, or of structural violence that shortens life by poverty, disease, and human insecurity. I cannot help but wonder whether some subtle corruption has seeped into the academy over the years, especially at elite universities whose faculty received invitations to work as prestigious consultants by the Washington security establishment, or in extreme cases, were hosts to lucrative arrangements that included giving weapons labs a university home and many faculty members a salary surge. Princeton, where I taught for 40 years, was in many respects during the Cold War an academic extension of the military-industrial complex, with humanists advising the CIA, a dean recruiting on behalf of the CIA, a branch of the Institute for Defense Analysis on campus doing secret contract work on counterinsurgency warfare, and a variety of activities grouped under the anodyne heading of ‘security studies’ being sponsored by outside financing. Perhaps, such connections did not spillover into the classroom or induce self-censorship in writing and lecturing, but this is difficult to assess.


    The significance of this professional discussion of nuclear weaponry in 2012, that is, long after the militarized atmosphere of the Cold War period has happily passed from the scene, can be summarized: To witness otherwise perceptive and morally motivated scholars succumbing to the demons of nuclearism is a bad omen; for me this nuclearist complacency is an unmistakable sign of cultural decadence that can only bring on disaster for the society, the species, and the world at some indeterminate future point. We cannot count on our geopolitical luck lasting forever! And we Americans, cannot possibly retain the dubious advantages of targeting the entire world with these weapons of mass destruction without experiencing the effects of a profound spiritual decline, which throughout human history, has always been the prelude to political decline, if not collapse. David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and I explore this range of issues in our recently published book, The Path to Zero: Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012).

  • Flaws in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence

    2012_04_04_avery_deterrence.pdf

  • References on High Alert and Nuclear Famine Dangers

    Bruce Blair, “Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark,” Bruce Blair’s Nuclear Column (Episode #2:  The SIOP Option that Wasn’t), Feb. 16, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/blair/launch-on-warning.cfm

    Bruce G. Blair,”A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces,” October 13, 2007. Retrieved from http://lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm

    Bruce G. Blair, Harold Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, “Who’s Got the Button? Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert,” Scientific American, November 1997. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/aboutcdi/SciAmerBB

    False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks during 1979-80 Led to Alert Actions for U.S. Strategic Forces; National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 371 Posted – March 1, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb371/index.htm

    Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs. Retrieved from http://icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-ii-2.html

    Nathan Hodge and Sharon Weinberger, “The Ever-Ready Nuclear Missileer,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 14-21 DOI: 10.2968/064003005. Retrieved from http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064003005.pdf

    ICAN Nuclear Weapons Convention: http://icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-convention

    M.Mills, O. Toon, R. Turco, D. Kinnison and R. Garcia, “Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted Following Regional Nuclear Conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), Apr 8, 2008, Vol 105(14), pp. 5307-12. Retrieved from http://www.pnas.org/content/105/14/5307.abstract

    A. Robock, L. Oman and G. Stenchikov, “Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research – Atmospheres, Vol. 112, No. D13, 2007. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf

    A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen and R. Turco, “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007, p. 2003-2012. Retrieved from http://www.atmos-chem-phys.org/7/2003/2007/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf

    O.B.Toon, R. Turco, A. Robock, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. Stenchikov, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 1973-2003. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

    O.B. Toon and A. Robock, “2010:  Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering,”  Scientific American, 302, 74-81. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf

    O. Toon, A. Robock and R. Turco, “The Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War,” Physics Today, vol. 61, No. 12, 2008. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf

    S. Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009. Retrieved from http://icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf

    S. Starr, “Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Nations and Peoples,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, August 2011. Retrieved from https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf

    http://www.nucleardarkness.org

  • The Myth of Nuclear Safety

    Martin HellmanIn memory of the first anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged that his government had failed by believing in “a myth of safety” about nuclear power. Before an even worse tragedy befalls us, we need to disabuse society of a similarly dangerous myth regarding the safety afforded by nuclear weapons. Political and military leaders, routinely talk of maintaining a safe, secure nuclear arsenal, as if just uttering those words makes it so. 


    As one example, consider President Obama’s famous 2009 Prague speech in which he committed America “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He goes on to say, “I’m not naive. … As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.” (emphasis added)


    How safe is it to threaten to destroy civilization in order to achieve much less important national objectives? If you agree that the myth of nuclear safety might apply to nuclear weapons as well as Fukushima, please sign my petition asking Congress to authorize a risk analysis of nuclear deterrence, and encourage friends to do the same. Let’s not make the same mistake twice, with even more horrific consequences.

  • Open Letter on NATO Missile Defense Plans and Increased Risk of Nuclear War

    To President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev:


    Recent U.S. decisions to deploy an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, coupled with the continued expansion of NATO and its military activities, have created increasingly sharp divisions and distrust between the Russian Federation and the United States.[i] This process now threatens to destroy the New START agreement and reverse previous progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations could result in a return to the perilous nuclear postures of the Cold War.


    Although the “Phased Adaptive Approach” missile defense system is being installed under the auspices of NATO, it is perceived by Russia to be “a U.S. system on European soil.”[ii] This system is regarded with apprehension by Russia, particularly since later phases include plans to deploy very advanced-stage Standard Missile-3 land-based interceptors, which have the potential to effectively target Russian strategic nuclear missiles. Russia consequently regards the proposed and ongoing deployments as no more than “an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defense system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any missile attack.”[iii]
     
    The official U.S. political rationale for these deployments is that they are necessary to defend against yet-to-be-developed Iranian long-range ballistic missiles. Yet American scientists have stated that forward-based European radar systems give the U.S. the ability to track Russian ICBMs very early after a launch and to guide interceptors against them.[iv] Russian leaders have expressed specific concerns that the U.S./NATO missile defense system could be used for such a purpose and continue to question at whom the system is directed.
     
    Fundamental mutual distrust stems from the fact that both the U.S. and Russia still maintain strategic war plans that include large nuclear strike options, with hundreds of preplanned targets that clearly include cities in each other’s nation.[v] Both nations keep a total of at least 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons mounted on launch-ready ballistic missiles, which can carry out these strike options with only a few minutes’ warning.
     
    Thus, many in Russia believe the final stages of deployment of the U.S./NATO missile defense system are designed to have the capability of greatly reducing or eliminating Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Continued technological advances in hypersonic missiles,[vi] which would greatly enhance interceptor missile capabilities, combined with the possibility that nuclear warheads could be installed in missile interceptors, will only serve to exacerbate Russian fears about U.S./NATO European missile defense.[vii]


    Mutual suspicion has prevented true cooperation in joint missile defense, just as it has with the still defunct U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center, which was supposed to share information about U.S. and Russian missile launches.[viii] The failure to include Russia in a joint missile defense also reflects the fact that NATO has not made Russia a full partner in the alliance, despite the end of the Cold War.
     
    It is only natural that Russia should consider NATO a potential threat, particularly since NATO has greatly expanded eastward, has actively recruited and included former members of the Warsaw Pact and has engaged in extensive military campaigns in Europe, Africa and South Asia.  The combination of NATO expansion with the deployment of a massive missile defense system that surrounds Russia has triggered a strong political reaction in Russia.  From a Russian perspective, a U.S./NATO missile defense system in Europe undermines their perceived nuclear deterrent, decreases U.S. vulnerability and increases Russian vulnerability to a U.S. nuclear first-strike attack.
     
    In November, President Medvedev made his most forceful political statement against the U.S. and NATO to date.[ix]  Included in the speech was a specific warning that Russia would withdraw from the New START agreement should the U.S./NATO missile defense system continue to move forward.  This is not new information—the Russian Federation issued an unambiguous statement in April 2010 when New START was signed, making clear that both quantitative and qualitative limitations on the U.S. missile defense program were so essential that Russia would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty if these limitations were not honored.[x]
     
    A Russian withdrawal from New START would likely precipitate a fully-renewed nuclear arms race and thus completely reverse movement toward a world without nuclear weapons. Many of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would also regard the collapse of the New START process as an explicit violation of the NPT; this could lead to the collapse of the NPT and extensive nuclear proliferation.
     
    In his November speech, President Medvedev also issued a number of explicit instructions to his military forces that essentially amounted to military threats against the U.S. and NATO.  He stated, “I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data and guidance systems, if need be ….  [I]f the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe.”[xi]
     
    Although many political analysts in the West have discounted this warning as merely a way to put pressure on the U.S. and NATO to change course, this statement by President Medvedev must be taken seriously. Russia will certainly carry out the directives of its President.
     
    The leaders of the U.S., NATO and Russia must seriously consider the possibility that the current course of political events is pushing them towards an eventual military confrontation and conflict.  Further expansion of NATO, its “nuclear umbrella” and missile defense system to the very borders of Russia increase the odds that any conventional military confrontation would quickly escalate into nuclear war.


    If Russia decided “to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe,” as threatened by President Medvedev, would not such an action be likely to lead to nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia?  According to recent peer-reviewed studies, the detonation of the launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth virtually uninhabitable for more than a decade.[xii]  Such a war would lead to global famine and starvation of most of the human race.[xiii]


    We suggest the following steps, both as a way out of the immediate crisis and to advance the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free-world. These are not the only steps that could be helpful, but we are hopeful that leaders on both sides might be willing to act upon them:



    1. There should be a freeze on U.S./NATO deployment of missile defenses in Europe pending an open, joint U.S.-Russian quantitative assessment of the threats that missile defense is supposed to counter, and of the threats posed by U.S. and Russian tactical and strategic nuclear forces.[xiv] The threats posed by missile defense and its effectiveness should be studied and integrated into the previously-mentioned assessment. It is essential that this analysis include a thorough scientific evaluation of the long-term effects of nuclear conflict upon the global environment, climate and human agriculture.[xv]
    2. It is essential, not only for the creation of a peaceful and secure Europe but for the continuation of civilization and the human species itself, that launch-ready nuclear arsenals be immediately stood-down, that nuclear war be avoided, and that nuclear arsenals be eliminated. This is a priority that must trump all other priorities, including what are seen as the most pressing security priorities of major world powers.

    We reiterate strongly that differences of opinion over missile defense must not be allowed to de-rail progress to zero nuclear weapons, or worse, to put that progress into reverse and instead reinstate Cold War security postures, as would be precipitated by the collapse of New START.


    In pursuing a solution, it is vital that both sides feel their concerns are being respected and that their security interests have been properly taken into account. An outcome that advantages one side only, or that is perceived as doing so, is no solution at all.


    The elimination of nuclear weapons must take place not in some far-off utopian future, but at an early date, as demanded by the vast majority of the world’s governments in resolution after resolution at the United Nations.  It is quite clear that the ordinary citizens of every nation no longer wish to live under the shadow of imminent nuclear destruction and see no reason why massive nuclear arsenals should continue to exist when they clearly represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race.


    Signed:


    Organizations


    Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (France)
    Artistes pour la Paix (Canada)
    Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (Australia)
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Canadian Pugwash Group (Canada)
    Daisy Alliance (USA)
    Footprints for Peace (Australia)
    Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space (USA)
    International Association of Peace Messenger Cities
    International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – Kenya (Kenya)
    Just Peace Queensland (Australia)
    Los Alamos Study Group (USA)
    Medact (UK)
    Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)
    No2nuclearweapons (Canada)
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
    Pax Christi Metro New York (USA)
    Pax Christi Montreal (Canada)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW (Australia)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament WA (Australia)
    Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)
    Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)
    Project Ploughshares (Canada)
    Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire (France)
    Science for Peace (Canada)
    Scientists for Global Responsibility (UK)
    Swedish Peace Council (Sweden)
    Transnational Foundation (Sweden)
    Tri-Valley CAREs (USA)
    US Peace Council (USA)
    Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada)
    West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – U.S. Section (USA)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – Vancouver (Canada)


    Individuals (Organizational affiliation for identification purposes only)


    Lynn Adamson (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Janis Alton (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Marcus Atkinson (International Coordinator, Footprints for Peace, Australia)
    Rosalie Bertell (Regent, International Physicians for Humanitarian Medicine, Switzerland)
    Amanda Bresnan (Member, Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, Australia)
    Adele Buckley (Executive Committee, Canadian Pugwash Group, Canada)
    Yousaf Butt (Federation of American Scientists, USA)
    Helen Caldicott (Co-Founder, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Australia)
    Lisa Clark (Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Italy)
    Gill Cox (West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Phyllis Creighton (Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Canada)
    Wilfred Dcosta (Indian Social Action Forum, India)
    Roberto Della Seta (Member, Senate of the Republic, Italy)
    Dale Dewar (Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada)
    Kate Dewes (Disarmament & Security Centre, New Zealand)
    Jayantha Dhanapala (Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, 1998-2003, Sri Lanka)
    Gabriele Dietrich (National Alliance of People’s Movements, India)
    Dennis Doherty (Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, Australia)
    Gordon Edwards (President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Canada)
    George Farebrother (Secretary, World Court Project, UK)
    Gregor Gable (Shundahai Network, USA)
    Bruce K. Gagnon (Coordinator, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, USA)
    Joseph Gerson (American Friends Service Committee, USA)
    Bob Gould (President, Physicians for Social Responsibility – San Francisco, USA)
    Jonathan Granoff (President, Global Security Institute, USA)
    Ulla Grant (Hall Green Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Commander Robert Green (Royal Navy, ret., New Zealand)
    Jenny Grounds (President, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia)
    Mark Gubrud (University of North Carolina, USA)
    Luis Gutierrez-Esparza (Latin American Circle of International Studies, Mexico)
    Regina Hagen (Darmstädter Friedensforum, Germany)
    John Hallam (People for Nuclear Disarmament, Australia)
    David Hartsough (PEACEWORKERS, USA)
    John Hinchcliff (President, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Herbert J. Hoffman (Vice President, Maine Veterans for Peace Chapter 001, USA)
    Inge Höger (Member of Parliament, Germany)
    Kate Hudson (General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Cesar Jaramillo (Program Officer, Project Ploughshares, Canada)
    Pierre Jasmin (President, Artistes pour la Paix, Canada)
    Birgitta Jónsdóttir (Member of Icelandic Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Iceland)
    Martin Kalinowski (Chairman, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, Germany)
    Sergei Kolesnikov (Member of Russian Parliament and President of the Russian affiliate of IPPNW, Russia)
    David Krieger (President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Harry Kroto (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Steve Leeper (Chairman, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Japan)
    Mairead Maguire (Nobel Peace Laureate, Peace People, N. Ireland)
    Ak Malten (Pro Peaceful Energy Use, Netherlands)
    Willem Malten (Director, Los Alamos Study Group, USA)
    Alfred Marder (International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, USA)
    Bronwyn Marks (Hiroshima Day Committee, Australia)
    Jean-Marie Matagne (President, Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire, France)
    Ibrahim Matola (Member of Parliament, Malawi)
    Lisle Merriman (Palestine-Israel Network, USA)
    Natalia Mironova (President, Movement for Nuclear Safety, Russia)
    Sophie Morel (Board member, Réseau Sortir du Nucleaire, France)
    Peter Murphy (Coordinator, SEARCH Foundation, Australia)
    Abdul Nayyar (President, Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
    David Norris (Senator, Ireland)
    Rosemarie Pace (Director, Pax Christi Metro New York, USA)
    Sergei Plekhanov (Professor, York University, Canada)
    Pavel Podvig (Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Russia)
    John Polanyi (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Ernie Regehr (Research Fellow, University of Waterloo, Canada)
    Barney Richards (New Zealand Peace Council, New Zealand)
    Bob Rigg (Former Chair, New Zealand National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament, New Zealand)
    Bruce A. Roth (Daisy Alliance, USA)
    Joan Russow (Global Compliance Research Project, Canada)
    Kathy Wanpovi Sanchez (Tewa Women United, USA)
    Mamadou Falilou Sarr (African Center for Global Peace and Development, Senegal)
    Wolfgang Schlupp-Hauck (Chairman, Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen, Germany)
    Jürgen Schneider (Professor, Universität Göttingen, Germany)
    Sukla Sen (Committee for Communal Amity, India)
    Steven Starr (Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility and Associate, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Kathleen Sullivan (Program Director, Hibakusha Stories, USA)
    P K Sundaram (DiaNuke.org, India)
    Terumi Tanaka (Secretary General, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, Japan)
    Desmond Tutu (Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, South Africa)
    Hiro Umebayashi (Special Advisor, Peace Depot, Japan)
    Jo Vallentine (Chairperson, Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia, Australia)
    Dirk Van der Maelen (Member of Parliament, Belgium)
    Achin Vanaik (University of Delhi, India)
    Alyn Ware (International Representative, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Elizabeth Waterston (International Councilor, Medact, UK)
    Rick Wayman (Director of Programs, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Dave Webb (Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Tim Wright (Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia)
    Col. Valery Yarynich (Soviet Missile Forces – ret., Russia)
    Uta Zapf (Member of the Bundestag, Germany)


    Endnotes:


    [i] To date, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic have agreed to participate in this deployment. Patriot missiles have been deployed in Poland on the border of the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad and X-band radar is also likely to be deployed in Turkey. Medium- and intermediate-range interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed on U.S. warships in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.
    [ii] Tom Collina, “NATO Set to Back Expanded Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/NATOMissileDefense.
    [iii] Rusian Pukhov, “Medvedev’s Missile Threats are only his Plan B,” The Moscow Times, December 1, 2011, retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/medvedevs-missile-threats-are-his-plan-b/448992.html.
    [iv] Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense” (2011), FAS Special Report No. 1, Federation of American Scientists, September 2011, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf.
    [v] U.S. strategic targets include Russian military forces, war supporting and WMD infrastructure, and both military and national leadership. Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists Brief, February 2010, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf.
    [vi] The U.S. has successfully tested non-ballistic missiles which have traveled at speeds up to mach-20 (16,700 mph or 27,000 km per hour). See http://www.examiner.com/military-technology-in-washington-dc/the-usaf-x51-a-and-the-u-s-army-ahw-both-test-november-2011.
    [vii] “Hypersonic missile: who is the target?” Voice of Russia, November 28, 2011, retrieved from http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/28/61168605.html.
    [viii] JDEC was agreed on and ratified by both the U.S. and Russia, with the purpose of preventing accidental nuclear war between them as a result of a false warning of attack. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/000604-warn-wh3.htm. However, neither side appeared willing to share the “raw” or unfiltered data from their early warning systems because of concerns it would reveal too much to the other side about its warning system capabilities. Thus, the facility was never opened; an empty building in Moscow where the center was supposed to be stands as a testament to the continued failure to cooperate.
    [ix] Text of Medvedev’s November 23, 2011 speech translated from the Russian version, retrieved from http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115:
       First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.
       Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.
       Third, the new strategic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advance missile penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.
       Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems, if need be.
       These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.
       Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defence system in Europe.
       One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region.
       Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
       Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.
    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for the withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty.
       But let me stress this point, we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence, and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.  However, this can only be achieved by establishing a clear, legal basis for cooperation that would guarantee our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account.  We are open to dialogue and hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.
    [x] Missile defense is explicitly discussed in the preamble and in Article 5 of New START. The preamble recognizes the “relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” and stipulates that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” Thus, the ongoing deployment of U.S./NATO missile defense systems is, in the eyes of Russia, at least a violation of the spirit of New START.
    [xi] Ibid.
    [xii] Steven Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009, retrieved from http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf.
    [xiii] Steven Starr, “U.S .and Russian Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Peoples and Nations,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2011, retrieved from /wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf.
    [xiv] Specific proposals for such assessments have already been published. See B. Blair, V. Esin, M. McKinzie, V. Yarynich, P. Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science & Global Security, 2011, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 167-194, and H. Kristensen, R. Norris, and I. Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, April 2009, p. 15, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf.
    [xv] O. B. Toon and A. Robock, “Local nuclear war, global suffering,” Scientific American, 302, 74-81 (2010), retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf.

  • Breaking Free from Nuclear Deterrence

    2011_12_16_10th_kelly_lecture.pdf

  • McCain Threatens Putin

    Martin HellmanToday’s Moscow News quotes Senator John McCain as warning Putin that he could meet Gaddafi’s fate. I was so shocked by such an incendiary remark from a former presidential candidate that I checked out the alleged threat on McCain’s Twitter feed. Sure enough, yesterday McCain tweeted, “Dear Vlad, the Arab Spring is coming to a neighborhood near you.” Later (presumably after this Moscow News article appeared), he tweeted again, “The Post agrees: ‘Spring is in the Russian air’” with a link to a Washington Post article reporting on demonstrations by Russians opposed to Putin.


    Another McCain tweet had a link to a BBC tweet, that stated “@SenJohnMcCain is no fan of Putin’s Russia: ‘We have an obligation to speak up when we see evil prevailing in the world’ he tells us.” Further searching led me to an October Businessweek article that said:



    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other “dictators” may be “nervous” after the death of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, U.S. Senator John McCain said. “I think dictators all over the world, including Bashar al-Assad, maybe even Mr. Putin, maybe some Chinese, maybe all of them, may be a little bit more nervous,” McCain said in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp. late yesterday. “It’s the spring, not just the Arab spring.” Qaddafi was killed yesterday after an eight-month armed conflict that left thousands dead.


    These comments by McCain helped me better understand an earlier, March 29 article in Mir Novosti, that quoted General Leonid Ivashov as saying:



    I have no doubts that our people, like Libyans did, will demand changing the degradation course for a development course, and that it will ask the current authorities to quit. However, when that moment comes, they will hardly bomb Russia as they are currently bombing Libya. … The availability of nuclear weapons in this country is a factor that, in case of possible public protests, may cause international concern. International community may want to take control of our nuclear weapons under the pretext of the need to eliminate unsanctioned use. For that NATO forces may penetrate our territory and take control of our most important infrastructure facilities.


    While the translation is a bit shaky, it still highlights the risk inherent in our exceeding the UN resolution’s mandate to protect Libyan civilians and going instead for regime change. Mr. McCain’s threatening Putin adds to that risk in a significant way.