Category: Nuclear Disarmament

  • Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons by Retired Pakistani and Indian Armed Forces Personnel

    Recent developments in South Asia in the field of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery are a serious threat to the wellbeing of this region.

    The fact that India and Pakistan have fought wars in the recent past and do not as yet enjoy the best of relations, makes this development all the more ominous. The signatories of this statement are not theoreticians or arm-chair idealists; we have spent many long years in the profession of arms and have served our countries both in peacetime and in war.

    By virtue of our experience and the positions we have held, we have a fair understanding of the destructive parameters of conventional and nuclear weapons. We are of the considered view that nuclear weapons should be banished from the South Asian region, and indeed from the entire globe.

    We urge India and Pakistan to take the lead by doing away with nuclear weapons in a manifest and verifiable manner, and to confine nuclear research and development strictly to peaceful and beneficient spheres.

    We are convinced that the best way of resolving disputes is through peaceful means and not through war – least of all by the threat or use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan need to address their real problems of poverty and backwardness, not waste our scarce resources on acquiring means of greater and greater destruction.

    Signed

    Air Marshal Zafar A. Choudhry (Pakistan)
    Admiral L. Ramdas (India)
    Lt. Gen Gurbir Mansingh (India)

  • 68 Leaders Call for the De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons

    The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
    The White House
    Washington, DC 20500

    The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
    The Kremlin
    Moscow, Russia

    Dear President Clinton and President Yeltsin:

    When you come together in your forthcoming meeting, we urge you to set a course so that Earth may enter the new millennium with all nuclear weapons taken off high alert status. One straightforward method to accomplish this would be to separate warheads from their delivery vehicles and place them in secure storage.

    We ask that the United States and Russia mutually commence the de-alerting process no later than January 1999 and complete the task no later than December 31, 1999. We ask you to work with the United Kingdom, France, and China so that they will likewise take their nuclear arsenals off alert within that time frame.

    With the Cold War over for nearly ten years, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain peaceful relations and carefully avoid military confrontation. Yet all five nations live in a condition of nuclear insecurity because of the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch of missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. They face the risk of attack by missiles launched on warning due to miscommunication or misinterpretation of data. By removing these dangers, mutual de-alerting will substantially enhance the national security of all the nuclear weapon states.

    Mutual de-alerting is an action which the two of you can carry out through executive action. This is what your predecessors, President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev, did in the fall of 1991 when they reduced the alert status of strategic bombers and a sizable number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1994 you two took a positive step when you agreed to stop aiming strategic missiles at each other’s country. It is well within the purview of executive authority to move now to de-alerting your respective nuclear arsenals.

    De-alerting carries the endorsement of a variety of groups, including the Canberra Commission (1996), a statement of 60 generals and admirals leaders from around the globe (1996), the National Academy of Sciences in the United States (1997), a statement of 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past and present heads of states and prime ministers (1998), and the recent New Agenda Declaration by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden (1998). This approach also has the support of a variety of religious bodies and numerous non-governmental organizations.

    De-alerting would be very welcome by all the people of Earth who would like to enter the new millennium free from the fear of nuclear destruction. We hope that you will take advantage of the opportunity to lead the world in this direction.

    Sincerely yours,

    Organizations from the United States
    Howard W. Hallman, Chair
    Methodists United for Peace with Justice

    Robert W. Tiller, Director of Security Programs
    Physicians for Social Responsibility

    Joe Volk, Executive Secretary
    Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

    Donnan Runkel, Executive Director
    Peace Links

    Christopher Ney, Disarmament Coordinator
    War Resisters League

    Anne Anderson, National Coordinator
    Psychologists for Social Responsibility

    Ellen Thomas
    Proposition One Committee

    Paul F. Walker, Ph.D., President
    Veterans for Peace

    Robin Caiola, Executive Director
    20/20 Vision

    Michael Mariotte, Executive Director
    Nuclear Information and Resource Service

    Gordon S. Clark, Executive Director
    Peace Action

    Susan Shaer, Executive Director
    Women’s Action for New Directions

    Daniel Plesch, Director
    British-American Security Information Council

    John Isaacs
    Council for a Livable World

    Tim Barner
    World Federalist Association

    David Krieger, President
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

    Clayton Ramey
    Fellowship of Reconciliation

    Mary H. Miller, Executive Secretary, and Rev. David Selzer, Chair
    Episcopal Peace Fellowship

    Marie Dennis, Director
    Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

    Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office
    United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society

    Curtis Ramsey-Lucas, Director of Legislative Advocacy
    National Ministries, American Baptist Churches

    Bishop Walter F. Sullivan, President
    Pax Christi USA

    Margaret N. Spallone, Recording Secretary
    Abolition 2000 Working Group of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the
    Religious Society of Friends

    L.William Yolton, Executive Secretary
    Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

    Kathy Thornton, RSM, National Coordinator
    NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

    Rev. Robert Moore, Executive Director
    Coalition for Peace Action (New Jersey)

    Ralph Hutchison, Coordinator
    Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (Tennessee)

    Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
    Tri-Valley CAREs (California)

    Byron Plumley, Disarmament Program Director
    American Friends Service Committee (Colorado Office)

    Greg Mello
    Los Alamos Study Group (New Mexico)

    David Buer, Interim Director
    The Nevada Desert Experience (Nevada)

    Jonathan Parfrey, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Los Angeles

    Wayne Shandera, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Houston

    Peter Wilk, MD, Co-President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Maine

    Ed Arnold, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Atlanta

    Robert M. Gould, MD, President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Greater San Francisco Bay Area

    Herbert M. Perr, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Nassau County

    Jennifer Aldrich, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Oregon

    Wendy Perron, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/New York City

    Josiah Hill III, PA, President
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Oregon

    Daniel Kerlinsky, MD
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/New Mexico

    Martin Fleck, Executive Director
    Physicians for Social Responsibility/Washington

    Wells R. Staley-Mays, Director
    Peace Action/ Maine and Physicians for Social Responsibility/Maine

    Jonathan M. Haber
    Action Site to Stop Cassini Earth Flyby (Massachusetts)

    Harry Rogers, Nuclear Issues Coordinator
    Carolina Peace Resource Center (South Carolina)

    Organizations from other nations
    John Hallam
    Friends of the Earth
    Australia

    Zohl de Ishtar
    Women for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
    International Peace Bureau
    Australia

    Graham Daniell
    People for Nuclear Disarmament
    Western Australia

    Babs Fuller-Quinn, Coordinator
    Australian Peace Committee (National Office)
    Australia

    Irene Gale, Secretary
    Australian Peace Committee (South Australian Branch)
    Australia

    Pauline Mitchell, Secretary
    Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament
    Australia

    Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director
    Physicians for Global Survival
    Canada

    Norman Abbey, Director
    Nanoose Conversion Campaign
    Canada

    Joanna Miller
    Project Ploughshares
    Canada

    Peter Coombes, President
    End the Arms Race
    Canada

    Caterina Lindman, Chair
    St. Jerome’s University Social Justice Committee,
    Canada

    Peter G. Rasmussen, Co-chairperson
    Pax Christi
    Denmark

    Laura Lodenius, Press Secretary
    Peace Union of Finland
    Finland

    Malla Kantola, Secretary General
    Committee of 100
    Finland

    Regina Hagen
    Darmstaedter Friedensforum
    Germany

    David Wakim, Chairperson
    Pax Christi Trust
    Aotearoa-New Zealand

    Kate Dewes, Vice President
    International Peace Bureau
    Aotearoa-New Zealand

    Professor Bent Natvig
    Science and Responsibility in the Nuclear Age
    Norway

    Bengt Lindell, Secretary
    Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (SLMK)
    Sweden

    Commander Robert Green RN (Ret’d), Chair
    World Court Project
    United Kingdom

    Anni Rainbow and Lindis Percy
    Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases
    United Kingdom

    George Farebrother, Secretary
    World Court Project UK
    United Kingdom

    Dave Knight, Chair
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
    United Kingdom

  • Humanity at a Crossroads

    In response to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, Henry Kissinger provided new insights into his “realist” view of rationality. Referring to Indian and Pakistani tests, he said: “They live in a rough neighborhood. They don’t think the number of bombs makes war more likely. In a perfectly rational world, you’d think more nuclear weapons makes war less likely.”Self-proclaimed “realists,” including Henry Kissinger, have argued that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated. But these same realists have been responsible for creating and maintaining some basic nuclear fictions that have been with us for decades. The first of these, a legal fiction, was written into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. This fiction said that the only states to be considered nuclear weapons states were those that had detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967; in other words, the only nuclear weapons states were the US, USSR, UK, France, and China.

    The fiction proclaimed by the “realists” was that only these five states were nuclear weapons states. Israel, India, and Pakistan, all widely understood to have nuclear weapons, were referred to as “threshold” states, meaning states with the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

    Another fiction of the “realists” was that it would be possible to simultaneously promote the peaceful atom and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, nuclear programs for supposedly peaceful purposes have served as the cover for efforts to develop nuclear weapons in Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Africa and elsewhere. These efforts succeeded in India, Israel, South Africa, and possibly North Korea.

    With the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, it has become far more difficult to maintain these fictions. It cannot be denied that India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states, regardless of the date set forth in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Conducting nuclear weapons tests is a solid indicator that a state has nuclear weapons. And Israel, as has been adequately revealed, is a nuclear weapons state with or without tests.

    So where does this leave us? On one level, we are in an Alice in Wonderland world of “realists” who create fictions to serve their view of reality. On another level, most people in the world can now clearly see that the number of nuclear weapons states is growing.

    We have reached a crossroads. The choice before us is to continue to live in the world of make believe, as the “realists” would encourage us to do, or to work for an unequivocal commitment from all nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals under strict and effective international controls.

    The unrealistic dream that the “realists” profess to believe in is that the nuclear weapons states can keep their arsenals forever without these weapons ever being used by accident or design. This view was implicitly criticized by the prestigious Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which stated in its 1996 report, “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by decision – defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.”

    The good news is that the Indians have made clear that they would prefer a world with no nuclear weapons states, and that they are willing to work for this. The Chinese have also made this commitment. Leadership is lacking primarily from the three Western nuclear weapons states and Russia. It is in these countries that the so-called “realists” have maintained their grip on the national security apparatus.

    What is real for the twenty-first century is what we will make real. If we choose to continue to maintain the fiction that nuclear weapons provide for our security, this will be our reality right up until the time a nuclear weapon explodes in one of our major cities or until a nuclear war breaks out.

    On the other hand, if we choose to accept the reality that a nuclear weapons-free world is possible, we will take the necessary steps to achieve such a world. We will begin the good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will negotiate a plan for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons on Earth, and we will begin “systematic and progressive efforts” to implement this plan.

    Moving ahead to achieve this new reality are eight nations, led by Ireland, calling themselves the New Agenda Coalition. They have urged us to enter the third millennium with an unequivocal commitment in place to achieve total nuclear disarmament. The call of the New Agenda Coalition is in line with the goal of the more than 1100 citizen organizations around the world supporting the Abolition 2000 Global Network’s goal of a treaty banning nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

    There is no doubt that this path is the one that humanity must choose to assure its future. The choice should be easier now that the fictions of so-called “realists” have been exploded along with the detonations by India and Pakistan.

  • The Legal Case for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

    The legal case for abolishing nuclear weapons is only one of many that can and should be made. Nuclear weapons place the future of humanity, indeed of all life, in jeopardy. They are not even weapons in any traditional sense. They kill indiscriminately. They cause unnecessary suffering that affects present and future generations. They have no legitimate use in warfare. They are instruments of genocide that no sane person or society would contemplate using.

    The questions that I will address are these: Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal under international law? Is the United States under a legal obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenal? The answer to both questions is Yes, and it seems to me remarkable that the U.S. media has been nearly silent with regard to these issues.

    A small breakthrough in this area occurred in June 1998 when Max Frankel, the distinguished columnist and former editor of the New York Times, wrote in the New York Times Magazine: “If I and other observers had resisted the nuclear club’s double standard and exposed its hollow assumptions about human nature, the world might by now have devised more effective international controls over atomic weapons. The have-nots might have been appeased if they had been given a major voice in a strong international inspection agency and the right to pry even into the monopolists’ stockpiles — including ours. Instead we have wasted the half century since Hiroshima and provoked a chain reaction that is truly prolific.”

    Let me offer a syllogism, an expression of logic: All states are subject to international law. The United States is a state. Therefore, the United States is subject to international law.

    Unfortunately, not everyone agrees with the logic that our country is subject to international law. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, for example, was recently quoted in the Los Angeles Times as stating, “To hell with international law….You’ve got a choice to make. You’re either with us or against us, and I only hope for your sake you make the right choice.”

    One choice is the rule of law. The other is the rule of force. I would argue that the right choice is international law. It is in the interests of our country and all countries to abide by the rule of law. Either way, we can be assured that other countries will follow our lead.

    International law is made in two ways — by treaties, which require the agreement of nations, and by such widespread agreement on issues of law that the law is accepted as customary international law. Both means carry the force of law in the international system.

    The treaty which is most relevant to the abolition of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states which did not possess them prior to January 1, 1967. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., Russia, UK, France and China) are the states recognized in the NPT as possessing nuclear weapons prior to this date.

    In return for the non-nuclear weapons states promising not to acquire nuclear weapons, the five nuclear weapons states promised in Article VI of the NPT to pursue good faith negotiations for a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament.

    When the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, the nuclear weapons states promised the “determined pursuit…of systematic and progressive efforts” to achieve nuclear disarmament. For most states in the world, as reflected in their votes in the UN General Assembly, the efforts of the nuclear weapons states in this regard have been far from satisfactory.

    The customary international law most relevant to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is international humanitarian law. This is part of the law of armed conflict, and was developed to set limits on the use of force in armed conflict for humanitarian purposes. The basic premise is that the means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited. Put another way, all is not fair (or legal) in warfare.

    Under international law, a state cannot use weapons that fail to discriminate between civilians and combatants. Nor can a state use weapons that cause unnecessary suffering to combatants such as dum-dum bullets.

    In December 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice, the highest judicial body in the world on matters of international law, for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The exact question asked was: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

    The United States, joined by the UK, France, and Russia, argued to the Court that it should not hear the case because this was a political rather than legal issue. The Court, turning aside these arguments, issued its historic opinion on July 8, 1996. It was an opinion of great significance for humanity, but to date it has been largely ignored by the U.S. and its NATO allies. It has also been largely ignored by the U.S. media.

    The Court began by unanimously finding that international law does not provide specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Court found that international law did not contain “any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.” Three of the 14 judges — Judge Koroma of Sierra Leone, Judge Shahabuddeen of Guyana, and Judge Weeramantry of Sri Lanka — voted against this position, and issued powerful dissenting opinions.

    The Court then went on to state unanimously that any threat or use of nuclear weapons for purposes other than self-defense, in accord with articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter, was prohibited. It followed this statement with the unanimous conclusion that a threat or use of nuclear weapons must also meet the requirements of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

    Earlier in its opinion, the Court had referred to “cardinal principles” of humanitarian law as follows: “The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.” The Court also made clear that if a use would be unlawful, the threat of such use would also be unlawful.

    Based upon its findings with regard to the application of international law to nuclear weapons, the Court reached an unusual two-paragraph conclusion that began, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”

    The Court continued with a second paragraph stating that the current state of international law and the elements of fact at its disposal did not allow the Court to “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.” This indetermination by the Court when “the very survival of a state would be at stake,” must be read in connection with the absolute prohibition of violating international humanitarian law. Thus, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, it would be necessary to avoid injuring a civilian population and causing unnecessary suffering to combatants. This would not be possible by means of using nuclear weapons for retaliation against a civilian population.

    The vote on this two-paragraph conclusion was 7 to 7, with the President of the Court casting the deciding vote, according to the rules of the Court. However, when you analyze who voted against the conclusion you find that the three judges from Western nuclear weapons states were joined by the three judges who found an absolute prohibition on nuclear weapons. The Japanese judge also voted against this conclusion because he opposed the issue coming before the Court. Thus, a better reading of this vote would have ten supporting the conclusion or going further and arguing for an absolute prohibition, and only the judges from the U.S., UK and France opposing it because they found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not be “generally” illegal.

    The Court went on to state unanimously: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” In 1996 and 1997 the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions urging the nuclear weapons states to fulfill this obligation.

    In issuing the Court’s opinion, Judge Bedjaoui, the then president of the Court, referred to nuclear weapons as “the ultimate evil” and declared, “Nuclear weapons can be expected — in the present state of scientific development at least — to cause indiscriminate victims among combatants and non-combatants alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories. The very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on humanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used.”

    Judge Bedjaoui also argued that it would be “quite foolhardy…to set the survival of a State above all other considerations, in particular above the survival of mankind itself.”

    I will conclude with a few observations.

    First, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any conceivable circumstance. Therefore, current U.S. and NATO policies relying upon nuclear weapons are illegal under international law.

    Second, the U.S. has not been fulfilling its obligation under international law to negotiate the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control.

    Third, the likely outcome of this failure of leadership by the U.S. is the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at its year 2000 Review Conference. The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan can be linked to India’s strong opposition to what it has termed “nuclear apartheid,” that is the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by a small group of states that have failed to fulfill their obligations under international law.

    Fourth, the U.S. media has not played a constructive role in analyzing this situation, and reporting on it to the American people.

    Fifth, current U.S. policies make the American people and the U.S. media unwitting accomplices in policies that threaten the mass murder of hundreds of millions of innocent people. If these weapons are used ever again, by accident or design, history — if there is a history — will judge the American people harshly for not demanding the abolition of these weapons when the opportunity to do so presented itself with the end of the Cold War.

    At the outset, I said that the legal case for abolishing nuclear weapons is only one of many that can be made. The legal case is important, but the most important case that can be made is the moral case. To abolish nuclear weapons is to uphold the sanctity of life. I will conclude by quoting Lee Butler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and an eloquent spokesman for abolishing these weapons. General Butler stated: “We cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it. It is time to reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.” This cannot be done without the active participation of the media in analyzing and communicating the case for nuclear weapons abolition to the American people.

  • British Medical Association Calls for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

    On July 8, 1998 in Cardiff the British Medical Association passed a resolution stating:

    “That this meeting considers it a duty to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons which are a worldwide threat to public health

    1) by condemning the development, teting, production, deployment, threat, and use of nuclear weapons;

    2) by requesting that governments refrain from all these activities and work in good faith for their elimination;

    3) by calling for commencement of negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention similar to those for biological and chemical weapons.”

     

  • Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons By Retired Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Armed Forces Personnel

    The following Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons signed by sixty-three Retired Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Armed Forces Personnel is hereby submitted to:

    The Secretary General of the United Nations
    To the Prime Minister of Pakistan
    To the Prime Minister of India
    To the President of the United States of America
    To the President of France
    To the Prime Minister of U.K.
    To the President of China
    To the President of the Russian Federation

    Recent developments in South Asia in the field of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery are a serious threat to the well being of this region. The fact that India and Pakistan have fought wars in the recent past and do not as yet enjoy the best of relations, makes this development all the more ominous. The signatories of this statement are not theoreticians or arm-chair idealists; we have spent many long years in the profession of arms and have served our countries both in peacetime and in war. By virtue of our experience and the positions we have held, we have a fair understanding of the destructive parameters of conventional and nuclear weapons. We are of the considered view that nuclear weapons should be banished from the South Asian region, and indeed from the entire globe. We urge India and Pakistan to take the lead by doing away with nuclear weapons in a manifest and verifiable manner, and to confine nuclear research and development strictly to peaceful and beneficient spheres.

    We are convinced that the best way of resolving disputes is through peaceful means and not through war – least of all by the threat or use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan need to address their real problems of poverty and backwardness, not waste our scarce resources on acquiring means of greater and greater destruction.
    Signed by:
    Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry (Pakistan)
    Admiral L. Ramdas (India) [Ex. Chief of the Indian Navy]
    Lt. Gen Gurbir Mansingh (India)
    Brigadier John Anthony (India)
    Brigadier Madhav Prasad (India)
    Commodore Norman Warner (India)
    Major Vijai Uppal (India)
    Lt Col G.J. Eduljee (India)
    Air Commodore A.K. Banerjee (India)
    Air Commodore A.K. Venkateshwaran (India)
    Commodore K.K. Garg (India)
    Major General M A Mohaiemen (Bangladesh)
    Air Vice Marshal Saeedullah Khan (Pakistan)
    Air Vice Marshal M. Ikramullah (Pakistan)
    Air Vice Marshal M. Y. Khan (Pakistan)
    Air Vice Marshal C. R. Nawaz (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore S. T. E. Piracha (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore Rafi Qadar (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore Ejaz Azam Khan (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore Qamarud Din (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore Habibur Rahman (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore G. Mujtaba Qureshi (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore A. Aziz (Pakistan)
    Air Commodore Wahid A. Butt (Pakistan)
    Wing Commander N. A. Siddiqui (Pakistan)
    Wing Commander M. Yunus (Pakistan)
    Wing Commander Shajar Hussain (Pakistan)
    Flight Lieutenant M. A. Mannan (Pakistan)
    Group Captain N. A. Sheikh (Pakistan)
    Group Captain Amir Shah (Pakistan)
    Group Captain M. Amin (Pakistan)
    Group Captain G. M. Siddiqi (Pakistan)
    Group Captain Khalid Jalil (Pakistan)
    Group Captain Sirajud Din Ahmed (Pakistan)
    Major Saeed A. Malik (Pakistan)
    Dr. Capt. Tariq Rahman (Pakistan)
    Brigadier Rao Abid Hamid (Pakistan)
    Major Ishtiaq Asi (Pakistan)
    Wing Commander Aameen Taqi (Pakistan)
    Brig Izzat M. Shah (Pakistan)
    Sqn Ldr Ihsan Qadir (Pakistan)
    Lt Col Abdur Rehman Lodhi (Pakistan)
    Maj Amjad Iqbal (Pakistan)
    Maj Ishtiaq Asif (Pakistan)
    Lt. Col. Nadeem Rashid Khan (Pakistan)
    Brig Shahid Aziz (Pakistan)
    Brig Bashir Ahmad (Pakistan)
    Capt Omar Asghar Khan (Pakistan)
    Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan (Pakistan) [Ex-C-in-C Pakistan Air Force]
    Lt. Col. Ahsan Zaman (Pakistan)
    Lt. Col. Azhar Irshad (Pakistan)
    Brig Jahangir Malik (Pakistan)
    Lt. Col. S. Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Pakistan)
    Maj.Gen. Syed Mustafa Anwar Husain (Pakistan)
    Brig Humayun Malik (Pakistan)
    Brig A. Wahab (Pakistan)
    Maj. Naim Ahmad (Pakistan)
    Brig SE Jivanandham (Pakistan)
    Brig Luqman Mahmood (Pakistan)
    Lt. Gen Sardar F.S. Lodi (Pakistan)
    Lt. Col. Ernest Shams (Pakistan)
    Lt. Col. Aijazulhaq Effendi (Pakistan)
    Brig Mir Abad Hussain, ex Ambassador (Pakistan)

  • Resolution on Nuclear Testing by India and Pakistan

    The European Parliament,

    -having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing and the work of the Canberra Commission for a nuclear weapon-free world,

    -having regard to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

    -having regard to the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

    -having regard to the statements made by the Council of the European Union, the G7, the UN Security Council and the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

    A. whereas the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have committed themselves to the objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons,

    B. whereas over the past decades the two main nuclear powers have reduced the number of their nuclear warheads and envisage continuing this reduction through a number of bilateral agreements,

    C. whereas these reductions do not, as yet, point to rapid progress towards full elimination of these weapons,

    D. noting with great concern that India carried out five nuclear tests during the period 11-13 May 1998,

    E. noting with great concern that Pakistan then carried out six nuclear tests during the period 28-30 May 1998,

    H. noting that a number of countries, including some EU Member States, the United States and Japan, have decided to impose sanctions on both countries in response to these nuclear tests,

    I. noting that both countries already allocate a disproportionate part of both their GNP and their budget on military spending and on military, nuclear research and development,

    J. whereas the nuclear tests are likely to damage both the Pakistani and Indian economies, in view of their effect on foreign loans and investment, which in turn will affect the already low social condition of the population,

    K. emphasizing that in order to strengthen stability and security in the region and in the world as a whole it is necessary for India and Pakistan on the one hand to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without any modification thereof, and on the other hand to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thus facilitating its entry into force,

    L. noting the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there is an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control,

    1. Condemns the recent nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and then by Pakistan and expresses its deep concern about the danger to peace, security and stability in the region and in the world as a whole provoked by these tests; remains convinced that the NPT and the CTBT are the cornerstones of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential bases for progress towards nuclear disarmament;

    2. Urges the Indian and Pakistani governments to refrain from any further nuclear tests, to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without any modification of this Treaty and to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally;

    3. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani governments to give a commitment immediately not to assemble or deploy nuclear weapons and devices, and to halt the development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

    4. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani Governments to start talks immediately to reduce tension in the region, to establish a framework for reconciliation and cooperation and thus to promote peace, security and stability in South Asia and throughout the continent; calls on the Council and the Member States to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan, where necessary and possible, in this process of reconciliation and cooperation, possibly by (co-)sponsoring a regional conference on security and confidence-building measures;

    5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to prevent the export of equipment, materials and/or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of carrying such weapons;

    6. Calls on Member States which have not yet done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty immediately, in order to facilitate its entry into force as soon as possible;

    7. Calls on the five nuclear weapons states to interpret their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

    8. Asks the Council and the Commission to examine ways and means to promote further progress towards the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on the Council to present a regular progress report to Parliament;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the UN Security Council, the governments of the Member States and the governments and parliaments of India and Pakistan.

  • Nuclear Fears, Nuclear History

    Published in Communalism Combat, Bombay

    Atul Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif have two things in common. Both of them have ordered five nuclear tests, and both of them justified their orders by claiming that their nuclear weapons are defensive. This argument was invented by the Americans to justify their nuclear weapons, after the Soviet Union started to build its own nuclear weapons. It was such a convenient argument that all the nuclear states started to use it once they built nuclear weapons. Now every country with nuclear weapons claims that its weapons are defensive, it is just other countries’ nuclear weapons that are a threat.

    How are nuclear weapons a threat? The first answer given is that an enemy may threaten to use nuclear weapons as way to intimidate or blackmail and so win a war. As the most destructive weapons ever made, nuclear weapons should make states that have them invincible. They should be able to win all their wars. In fact, no one should want to fight such states because they have nuclear weapons.

    The facts of the last fifty years tell another story. Nuclear weapons states have elected to fight wars on many occasions. They have lost many of them. Britain fought and lost at Suez, even though they it had already developed nuclear weapons. The United States suffered significant defeats during the Korean war and the war ended with a stalemate. The French lost Algeria, even though they had their nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons did not help against Vietnam. The most famous examples are of course the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan despite having enormous numbers of nuclear weapons. In all these cases, a non-nuclear state fought and won against a nuclear armed state.

    Another fact from the last fifty years is that having nuclear weapons offers no protection against nuclear threats. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union made nuclear threats numerous times, with the United States making around twenty such threats and the Soviet Union making five or six. Even though both sides had nuclear weapons, this did not change the fact they were threatened by the other side. If a state with nuclear weapons is going to make a threat, it will do so regardless of whether the state being threatened has nuclear weapons of its own.

    The only other use for nuclear weapons that has ever been claimed is that nuclear weapons are supposed to deter attacks by other nuclear weapons and so prevent war between nuclear armed states. This is what is usually meant by nuclear deterrence. The normal example of nuclear deterrence that is used is between the superpowers during the Cold War. The absence of war between them is widely attributed to both sides having nuclear weapons. This cannot however be proven. All that can be said is that the absence of war coincided with both sides having nuclear weapons. It is not logical to deduce that nuclear weapons prevented a war that would otherwise have taken place. The absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union may simply have been due to neither side wanting a war. The experience of total war in World War II was so terrible that this may have been sufficient to prevent a major war. It is worth remembering over 20 million Soviets were killed in that war.

    The history of the Cold War is in fact the history of the elusive search for deterrence. As the years passed and became decades, the amount of destructive power needed to create deterrence kept on increasing. From a few simply atom bombs, it became hundreds of bombs, then thousands and then came the hydrogen bomb, with a destructive power a hundred times greater than an atom bomb. But, even having a few such hydrogen bombs was not enough. McGeorge Bundy, who was an advisor in the White house during both the Cuban Missile Crisis, has argued that deterrence works only if “we assume that each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear weapons [hydrogen bombs] which could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible pre-emptive attack.” It is this kind of nuclear arsenal that is credited by Bundy, and other American supporters of deterrence as being responsible for maintaining the Ñnuclear peaceâ between the United States and Soviet Union. The urge to have weapons that could survive a pre-emptive attack is why both sides developed nuclear submarines and specially hardened silos for missiles. This effort to create deterrence cost the United States at least $4 trillion ($,4000,000,000,000) to develop, produce, deploy, operate, support and control its nuclear forces over the past 50 years.

    The Americans were not alone in thinking that large numbers of hydrogen bombs that could survive a nuclear attack were necessary for deterrence.

    All five of the established nuclear weapons state have tried to achieve this kind of nuclear arsenal. None of them has stopped developing their arsenals once they built simple nuclear weapons. they have not even relied on large numbers of such simple weapons. They have gone on to build weapons tens if not hundreds or thousands of times more destructive. Even the smallest nuclear arsenal, belonging to Britain, has 200 thermonuclear weapons with a collective destructive power two thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

    There are, however, some important dissenting voices who say that deterrence never worked. General George Lee Butler, who until a few years ago actually commanded all of the United States strategic nuclear weapons has said the world survived the Cuban missile crisis no thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God. If General Butler is right, and even the fear created by “very large numbers” of hydrogen bombs was not enough to stop two nuclear states getting ready to go to war then what purpose is served by this fear? What this fear can do is stop peace. Even though the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union gone, the nuclear weapons are still there. The US still has over 10,000 and Russia about as many. The fear now is not the other state, but the others nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons there cannot be real peace.

    History teaches that nuclear fears cannot be calmed with nuclear weapons. The simple truth is that there has never been a weapon that can offer a defense against being afraid. The only defense against fear is courage and courage needs no weapons to make its presence felt.

     

  • G8 Foriegn Ministers Communique on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests

    London

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of eight major industrialised democracies and the Representative of the European Commission, held a special meeting in London on 12 June 1998 to consider the serious global challenge posed by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. Recalling the statement issued by our Heads of State or Government on 15 May, and emphasising the support of all of us for the communiqué issued by the P5 in Geneva on 4 June and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, we condemn the nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 May and 30 May. These tests have affected both countries’ relationships with each of us, worsened rather than improved their security environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable economic development, and run contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

    2. The negative impact of these tests on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be serious and lasting. They will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence. Both countries need to take positive actions directed towards defusing tension in the region and rejoining the international community’s efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Urgent action is needed both to halt an arms race on the Sub-Continent, which would divert resources from urgent economic priorities, and to reduce tension, build confidence and encourage peaceful resolution of the differences between India and Pakistan, so that their peoples may face a better future.

    3. With a view to halting the nuclear and missile arms race on the Sub-Continent, and taking note of the official statements of the Indian and Pakistani Governments that they wish to avoid such an arms race, we consider that India and Pakistan should immediately take the following steps, already endorsed by the United Nations Security Council:

    • stop all further nuclear tests and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force;
    • refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons and from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and enter into firm commitments not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles;
    • refrain from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other states in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement;
    • confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.

    We believe that such actions would be strongly in the interest of both countries.

    4. With a view to reducing tension, building confidence and encouraging peaceful resolution of their differences through dialogue, India and Pakistan should:

    • undertake to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, including infiltrations or hot pursuit, or other provocative acts and statements;
    • discourage terrorist activity and any support for it;
    • implement fully the confidence- and security-building measures they have already agreed and develop further such measures;
    • resume without delay a direct dialogue that addresses the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, through such measures as early resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks, effective use of the hot-line between the two leaders, and realisation of a meeting between Prime Ministers on the occasion of the 10th SAARC Summit scheduled next month;
    • allow and encourage progress towards enhanced Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation, including through a free trade area in South Asia.

    We encourage the development of a regional security dialogue.

    5. We pledge actively to encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems and stand ready to assist India and Pakistan in pursuing any of these positive actions. Such assistance might be provided, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

    6. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan do not change thedefinition of a nuclear weapon state in the NPT, and therefore, notwithstanding those tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to adhere to the NPT as it stands, without any conditions. We shall continue to apply firmly our respective policies to prevent the export of materials, equipment or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

    7. It is our firm view that the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan reinforce the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non- proliferation regime and as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We all, nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, reiterate our determination to fulfil the commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. These commitments were reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and included the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. We note the progress already made in this direction and welcome the firm intention both of the United States and of the Russian Federation to bring START II into force, and to negotiate and conclude a START III agreement at the earliest possible date. We also note contributions made by other nuclear weapon states to the reductions process. We call upon all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rapidly to ensure its entry into force, and welcome the determination of the member governments of the G8 that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. We continue to look for the accession to the NPT of the remaining countries which are not yet parties to it.

    8. We call on all the member states of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the immediate opening of the Cut-Off negotiation at the CD.

    9. Both India and Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building prosperity. However, the recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional instability which will undermine the region’s attractiveness to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospects for economic growth. The diversion of their resources to nuclear and other weapons programmes displaces more productive investment and weakens their ability to pursue sound economic policies. It calls into question the commitment of both governments to poverty reduction and undermines the regional cooperation between SAARC countries on social and economic issues. In line with the approach to development set out in the Naples, Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Communiqués, we call on both governments to reduce expenditure that undermines their objective of promoting sound economic policies that will benefit all members of society, especially the poorest, and to otherwise enhance cooperation in South Asia.

    10. We believe it is important that India and Pakistan are aware of the strength of the international community’s views on their recent tests and on these other subjects. Several among us have, on a unilateral basis, taken specific actions to underscore our strong concerns. All countries should act as they see fit to demonstrate their displeasure and address their concerns to India and Pakistan. We do not wish to punish the peoples of India or Pakistan as a result of actions by their governments, and we will therefore not oppose loans by international financial institutions to the two countries to meet basic human needs. We agree, however, to work for a postponement in consideration of other loans in the World Bank and other international financial institutions to India and Pakistan, and to any other country that will conduct nuclear tests.

    11. We pledge to convey the common views of our Governments on these matters to those of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about early and specific progress in the areas outlined above. We plan to keep developments under review and to continue the process of pursuing the goals on which we are all agreed.

  • NATO Expansion

    To the U.S. Senate

    We believe that NATO expansion is a serious mistake. In this post-Cold War period, we should concentrate on reducing Russia’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, ensuring that her warheads and nuclear materials are secure from diversion, and bringing Russia into the Western family of democratic nations. As you know, Russia has delayed ratification of the START II Treaty because of NATO expansion. Further, the tensions raised by expanding NATO towards Russia’s borders can only make more difficult our critical effort to ensure her stockpile of nuclear warheads do not fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue regimes.

    We lament that, after the expensive and dangerous Cold War, we seem to take rather cavalierly the opportunity at long last to build a friendship with Russia. Surely, moving NATO right up to Poland’s border with the Russian province of Kaliningrad cannot be taken as an act of friendship, however we might dress it up with rhetoric. Admitting the Baltics, who share long borders with Russia, will make matters even worse.

    The Administration has stated repeatedly the first round “will not be the last.” Thus, this first vote is not simply about Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is as much about Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia and the several others whose expectations have been raised. How can we admit some and exclude others without creating instability and tensions? Indeed, how can there be stability if Russia is destabilized by expansion?

    We share the goal of a stable Europe, but suggest that it would be far better to address the needs of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics by opening the markets of Western Europe to them and by pressing our allies to admit them to the European Union, an organization much better suited to nation-building than a military alliance.

    Signed by former Republican Senators

    Jim Abdnor of South Dakota
    Edward Brooke of Massachusetts
    Dick Clark of Iowa
    John Culver of Iowa
    Mark Hatfield of Oregon
    Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire
    Roger W. Jepsen of Iowa
    Mack Mattingly of Georgia.

    Signed by former Democratic Senators

    Thomas Eagleton of Missouri
    Gary Hart of Colorado
    John Melcher of Montana
    George McGovern of South Dakota
    Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin
    Sam Nann of Georgia
    Adlai Stevenson of Illinois
    Harrison Williams of New Jersey.