Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Nuclear Abolition

  • Why Nuclear Deterrence Is A Dangerous Illusion

    In the January-February 1997 issue of the New Zealand International Review, an article by Ron Smith – Director of Defence and Strategic Studies in the Department of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Waikato, New Zealand – argued against the growing tide in favour of the abolition of nuclear weapons. On the following point I have no dispute with him. He wrote:

    “The crucial issue is that of the value of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world. If it still has value, then that value must be measured against what we take to be the value of a nuclear weapons-free world… We cannot discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons without discussing nuclear deterrence.”

    What if nuclear deterrence has no value? I will argue that this is in fact the case; and that the whole doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

    Flying With The Bomb
    I served in the Royal Navy for twenty years from 1962-82. As a Fleet Air Arm Observer (navigator and weapon system operator), I flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike jets from 1968 to 72; and for the next five years in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters equipped with the WE-177 Nuclear Depth Bomb (NDB). As one of four nuclear crews in a Buccaneer squadron, my pilot and I were assigned a target from NATO’s Single Integrated Operational Plan, and were ordered to plan to attack it with a free-fall WE-177 thermo-nuclear bomb.

    Nuclear Versus Conventional Deterrence Between States
    NDBs were withdrawn from the Royal Navy in 1992. By then, new conventional ASW weapons had been developed which were able to neutralise all currently envisaged naval targets. Indeed, as far as the USA is concerned, Ron Smith rightly stated:

    “There is nothing it could do with nuclear weapons that it cannot do with modern conventional weapons.”

    Therefore conventional deterrence – which is credible – is the military answer to his fear that, without nuclear deterrence, “disastrous wars between the major powers are likely to occur again.”

    Modern industrial States, increasingly interdependent on multinational conglomerates, the globalisation of trade and sensitive to public opinion, are increasingly constrained from going to war with each other. But even if this argument is not accepted, there is a fundamental logical objection to relying on nuclear deterrence. Although the risk of conventional deterrence failing is greater, the damage would be confined to the belligerent States – and the environmental damage would usually be reparable. What is at stake from deterrence failing between nuclear weapon States is the devastation and poisoning of not just the belligerent powers, but potentially of all forms of life on the planet. Meanwhile, retention of nuclear arsenals encourages proliferation of the problem, and with it this unacceptable risk.

    Falklands War
    In my last appointment as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, I helped to provide round-the-clock intelligence support to British forces in the Falklands War. I know what a close-run thing that war was. If Argentine aircraft had sunk one of the main troopships before the landing force had got ashore, the British might have had to withdraw. What would Thatcher have done? Polaris had clearly not deterred Galtieri from invading. With victory in his grasp, it is doubtful that he would have believed even Thatcher would have seriously threatened a nuclear strike on Argentina. Yet rumours abounded that a Polaris submarine had been moved south within range of Buenos Aires. If she had so threatened, my assessment was that he would have very publicly called her bluff and relished watching Reagan try to rein her in. And in the last resort, it is likely that the Polaris Commanding Officer would have either refused the order or faked a malfunction, and returned to face the court martial.

    Gulf War
    My scepticism over nuclear deterrence grew when the Berlin Wall came down; but it took the Gulf War to make me break out of my pro-nuclear brainwashing. As the first ex-RN Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them, it was very traumatic.

    In the run-up to the Gulf War, my military intelligence training warned me that the US-led coalition’s blitzkrieg/punitive expedition strategy would give Saddam Hussein the pretext he needed to attack Israel – an undeclared nuclear weapon State. If thereby Israel was drawn into the conflict, this might split the coalition. If not, he still stood to gain widespread Arab support for being the first Arab leader for years to take on the Israelis.

    My greatest fear was that the Iraqi leader would be provoked enough to attack Israel with chemical-headed Scud missiles. Knowing that West German technical support was involved in the warhead design, Israel’s Prime Minister Shamir would come under massive pressure to retaliate with a nuclear strike on Baghdad. Iraq had the best anti-nuclear bunkers Western technology could provide; but even if Saddam did not survive, what would happennext? With Baghdad a radiated ruin, the entire Arab world would erupt in fury against Israel and her friends: there would be terror bombings in every allied capital; Israel’s security would be destroyed forever; and Russia would be sucked in.

    The first Scud attack hit Tel Aviv on the night of *18* January 1991. For the first time, the second most important city of a de-facto nuclear State had been attacked and its capital threatened. Worse, the aggressor did not have nuclear weapons. The rest of the world still waits to learn what Bush had to promise Shamir for not retaliating – fortunately, the warhead was conventional high explosive, and casualties were light. The Israeli people, cowering in gas-masks in their basements, learned that night that their nuclear “deterrent” had failed in its primary purpose. Some 38 more Scud attacks followed.

    Meanwhile, in Britain the IRA just missed wiping out the entire Gulf War Cabinet with a mortar bomb attack from a van in Whitehall. They were not deterred by Polaris – yet a more direct threat to the government could barely be imagined.

    Nuclear Deterrence Won’t Work Against Terrorists
    To my surprise, in 1993 the British Secretary of State for Defence agreed with me. In a keynote speech on 16 November at the Centre for Defence Studies in King’s College, London entitled “UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?”, Malcolm Rifkind almost agonised over the problem:

    “… I have to say that it is difficult to be confident that an intended deterrent would work in the way intended, in the absence of an established deterrent relationship… Would the threat be understood in the deterrent way in which it was intended; and might it have some unpredictable and perhaps counter-productive consequence? Categoric answers to these questions might be hard to come by, and in their absence the utility of the deterrent threat as a basis for policy and action would necessarily be in doubt… it is difficult to see deterrence operating securely against proliferators.”

    By an “established deterrent relationship” presumably he meant the unstable, irrational balance of terror between two trigger-happy, paranoid power blocs – otherwise known as the Cold War. Its inherent instability was evidenced by the inevitable struggle for “escalation dominance”. More than 50,000 nuclear warheads was the ridiculous result; while health, education, and other services that make up civilised society deteriorated on both sides through lack of resources.

    With the break-up of the Soviet Union and an unchecked arms trade, it is only a matter of time before terrorists get a nuclear weapon. They are the most likely “proliferators”, because nuclear blackmail is the ultimate expression of megalomania and terrorism. Yet nuclear deterrence cannot be relied upon against such threats.

    *What If Terrorists Try Nuclear Blackmail?
    The first rule is that on no account should the threat of nuclear annihilation be used to try and oppose them. They will just call your bluff – because targeting them with even a small nuclear weapon would be impossible without incurring unacceptable collateral damage and provoking global outrage. Indeed, they would relish taking as many others with them as they could. So nuclear weapons are worse than useless in such a crisis.

    My advice would be to emulate how the French authorities dealt with a man with explosives wrapped around his chest who hijacked a class of schoolchildren and threatened to blow them up if his demands were not met. They exhausted him by lengthy negotiations while installing surveillance devices to determine his condition and location. At an optimum moment Special Forces moved in and shot him dead with a silenced handgun.

    The most important underlying point to make here is that the surest way to minimise the chances of a nuclear hijack is to stop treating the Bomb as a top asset in the security business and the ultimate political virility symbol.*

    This nightmare will intensify as long as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council insist on the Bomb to “guarantee” their ultimate security – when in fact it does the exact opposite – while trying to deny it to other States. Such a policy of nuclear apartheid is hypocritical and un-sustainable.

    Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Security
    The Falklands and Gulf Wars taught me that competing for unilateral security leads to more insecurity, both for others and ultimately oneself. We need a new understanding of security: one that sees it as a safety net for all, not a “win or lose” military game which leaves the underlying problems which caused the war unresolved, and feeds the arms trade. True security lies in fostering a just, sustainable world order.

    The Bomb directly threatens security – both of those who possess it and those it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is a security problem, not a solution. This is because it provokes the greatest threat: namely, the spread of nuclear weapons to megalomaniac leaders and terrorists – who are least likely to be deterred.

    Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Democracy
    Democracy depends on responsible use of political and military power, with leaders held accountable to the will of the majority of the people. If a democratic nation is forced to use State-sanctioned violence to defend itself, its leaders must stay within recognised moral and legal limits.

    *Morality. The policy of nuclear deterrence inevitably involves an actual intention to use nuclear weapons under certain – admittedly extreme – circumstances. Michael Dummett, Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford took up the argument in a speech on 19 October 1993:

    “We have to ask ourselves, ‘Is it wrong to have an intention to do what is wrong?’ Plainly it is. So, ‘Is it wrong to have a conditional intention to do what would be wrong?’ There is a seductive argument which goes: ‘The point is to prevent the condition from arising in which I am threatening to use nuclear weapons.’ What is wrong about that is not any consequence of forming that intention; it is that you give your will, albeit conditionally, to the act intended. The strategy of deterrence requires a conditional intention to commit a monstrously wicked act: to annihilate entire cities and all the people living in them. It is therefore a strategy which no government should use and no citizen should support.”

    Legality. That is where democracy and Nuremberg come in. On 8 July 1996 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, I was present when the International Court of Justice gave its Advisory Opinion on the following question put to it by the UN General Assembly in December 1994:

    “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance permitted under international law?”

    In the most authoritative declaration of what international law says about the question, the Court highlighted the “unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come.” Thereby, the Court confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons. Indeed, the effects of nuclear weapons are more severe, widespread and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons of which the development, production, stockpiling and use are prohibited by specific convention regardless of size. Also radiation effects are analogous to those of biological weapons, which are also outlawed by specific convention.

    Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court could find no legal circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Also it endorsed the view that threat and use are indivisible. In deciding that it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, the Court left no exception. On the contrary, it challenged the nuclear States that they had not convinced it that limited use of low yield, so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons “would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons.” Furthermore it confirmed that, as part of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg Charter of 8 August 1945 – paradoxically signed two days after the nuclear strike on Hiroshima and the day before the one on Nagasaki – applies to nuclear weapons.

    Though neither directly binding or enforcable, this clearly brings into question the legality of, for example, ballistic missile-firing submarines deployed on patrol. Nuclear deterrence is about threatening the most indiscriminate violence possible, unrestrained by morality or the law. It is therefore a policy of gross irresponsibility, and the antithesis of democratic values.

    Stifling Dissent. Furthermore, democracy within a nuclear weapon State is inevitably eroded by the need for secrecy and tight control of equipment, technology and personnel. When I became a nuclear crew in Buccaneers, I was given a special security clearance before being told never to discuss the nuclear role, even with other aircrew in my squadron, let alone my family. It was considered such an honour – only the four best crews were chosen – that no-one questioned it.

    As Senior Observer of the Sea King ASW helicopter squadron in the carrier HMS EAGLE in 1973-74, I had to train the other Observers how to use a thermo-nuclear depth bomb (NDB). The speed and depth advantage of the latest Soviet nuclear submarines over NATO air-launched ASW torpedoes was such that it had been concluded that only an NDB could be guaranteed to destroy them. Now this was just to protect our carrier, not last- ditch defence of the motherland. Moreover, the Observer would have had to press the button to release it – not the Prime Minister, as they are so fond of claiming. There was a “Low/High Yield” switch: low yield was about 5 kilotons, and high yield over 10 kilotons – Hiroshima was not much more than that. Worse, this would definitely be a suicide mission, because our helicopter was too slow to escape before detonation. For good measure, such an attack would vaporise a huge chunk of ocean, cause heavy radioactive fallout (both from the NDB and the nuclear submarine reactor and any nuclear-tipped torpedoes it carried), and also cause the underwater sonic equivalent of Electro-Magnetic Pulse – quite apart from escalating World War 3 to nuclear holocaust.

    Yet all these concerns were brushed aside when I raised them. I was simply told not to worry, and get on with it. So I did: but I began to realise that nuclear weapons were militarily useless; and that my leaders – both military and political – were placing me in a position where I could fall foul of the Nuremberg Charter. However, the old British military tradition of the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War, as immortalised by Tennyson, was alive and well: “Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die.”

    Nuclear Gunboat Diplomacy? This difficulty has re-emerged recently, with the deployment in Trident of a single, variable lower-yield warhead in some missiles to threaten a “more limited nuclear strike” in order to deliver, in Mr Rifkind’s words, “an unmistakable message of our willingness to defend our vital interests”. He justified this by the need to find an answer to the fact that six 100 kiloton, MIRV’d warheads atop the other missiles are not a credible deterrent threat to “rogue” States threatening British vital interests anywhere in the world.

    These vital interests, spelt out in the 1995 Defence White Paper, include British trade, the sea routes used for it, raw materials from abroad, and overseas investments. This has been accompanied by, for example, the following statement in the December 1996 issue of the Royal United Services Institute Journal by Admiral Sir Peter Abbott KCB, then Commander-in- Chief Fleet:

    “Within the context of a broad security policy, I anticipate that specific military action may be required in the way of dissuasion, retribution or coercion against those nations, regimes or groupings which pose a threat to our vital interests, project a tangible military threat to our homelands, forces overseas or allies, and those who disrupt the international system.

    “Therefore, although part of that framework will include defence in its classic sense of reactive measures consistent with NATO doctrine, it will also have to include more pro-active measures. This will add meaning to new concepts of deterrence, based on dealing with problems as they emerge and whilst the potential adversary is more amenable to persuasion, rather than waiting for them to grow and an adversary to become strong. We will also have to cater for the irrational opponent or those occasions when the threat of nuclear use is not practicable or simply not credible. This can be achieved by dissuasion, which is sustained by a constant demonstration of our military capability and readiness to use it, and retribution which should ensure that if an opponent, whether a pirate or rogue regime, is not dissuaded after warnings, he can expect to suffer considerable, unacceptable, and possibly personal, consequences.

    “This implies the possibility of what I would call pre-emptive deterrence. This is a philosophy which has been fashionable in history at certain times – that of establishing waypoints beyond which a state feels threatened and a potential enemy, rational or not, will be subjected to offensive action at an appropriate level. Given my points about deterrence and economy of effort before, we will wish any action to be at a time and place of our choosing so that we can retain the initiative. This is particularly relevant with regard to emerging technological threats based on WMD, ballistic/cruise missiles and terrorism.. This argues for dealing with the problems at source, before any potential aggressor can concentrate in range and in force.”

    Entente Nucleaire. Such “power projection” thinking reinforces the secretive collaboration between Britain and France, begun in 1992 with the creation of a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine. On 30 October 1995, with the row over French nuclear tests as a backdrop, Chirac and Major announced that the Anglo-French nuclear relationship had reached the point where “we do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the UK could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.” Officials played down reports that joint missile submarine patrols were possible. However, the UK Financial Times reported that “agreement had been reached on a broad definition of sub-strategic deterrence: in other words, the use of a low-yield ‘warning shot’ against an advancing aggressor, along with a threat… of a massive nuclear strike unless the attack halts. This warning shot would apparently be fired as soon as either country’s ‘vital interests’ were threatened.” The implication is that such a threat could be made even against a non-nuclear State, notwithstanding British and French negative security assurances – and the fact that such a threat, let alone use, of nuclear weapons is clearly illegal.

    Undemocratic Decisions. Meanwhile, the history of the British Bomb shows that every major decision was taken without even full Cabinet knowledge, let alone approval. In 1980 I was a fly on the Whitehall wall when Thatcher insisted on having Trident, despite disagreement among the Chiefs of Staff and without consulting the Cabinet. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord at the time, was the first to call it “a cuckoo in the naval nest”. He was supported by Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, then a Captain as Director of Naval Plans. Richard Sharpe, then also a Captain on the Naval Staff and a former nuclear submarine Commanding Officer, later wrote in the 1988-89 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships (the first under his editorship):

    “Because funding for Trident has come mainly from the naval share of the defence budget, it is having an increasingly detrimental effect on the equipment programmes for the rest of the Fleet.”

    Adam Raphael, in an Observer article on 11 July 1993 headlined “Megabuck Trident as much military use as Noah’s Ark”, described it as “Thatcher’s macho mistake”. I understand that the Royal Navy is deeply split over Trident for these reasons. And now it is faced with the likelihood that Trident’s deployment on deterrent patrol contravenes international humanitarian law.*

    Nuclear Weapons Are Self-Deterring
    Fortunately for us all, the one aspect of nuclear deterrence which probably does work is that nuclear weapons are in fact self-deterring. My evidence for this again comes from a British Secretary of State for Defence. In his 16 November 1993 speech, Rifkind said:

    “…there is sometimes speculation that more so-called ‘useable’ nuclear weapons – very low-yield devices which could be used to carry out what are euphemistically called ‘surgical’ strikes – would allow nuclear deterrence to be effective in circumstances where existing weapons would be self-deterring.”

    He went on to warn against reviving a war-fighting role for them, because this would:

    “…be seriously damaging to our approach to maintaining stability in the European context, quite apart from the impact it would have on our efforts to encourage non-proliferation and greater confidence outside Europe. This is not a route that I would wish any nuclear power to go down.”

    Unfortunately, he contradicted his own wise words by supporting the replacement of Polaris by Trident; and more specifically by supervising the introduction, mentioned earlier, of a lower-yield, single warhead in the missile load of the Trident submarine currently on patrol.

    Any sane potential aggressor intent on acquiring nuclear weapons should heed Churchill’s warning after Dresden: “The Allies risk taking over an utterly ruined land” – and that was conventional bomb damage. Even a low-yield “demonstration” strike (rumoured to be in growing favour among US, UK and French planners searching for roles for their nuclear arsenals) would so outrage world opinion that it would be self-defeating.

    For a nuclear State facing defeat by a non-nuclear State, there is evidence that nuclear weapons are again self-deterring. The US in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, preferred withdrawal to the ultimate ignominy of resorting to nuclear revenge.

    For all these reasons, I conclude that nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

    From Nuclear Deterrence To Abolition
    On 4 December 1996 in Washington, General Lee Butler USAF (Ret’d),Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command from 1992- 94, explained to the National Press Club why he, too, had “made the long and arduous journey from staunch advocate of nuclear deterrence to public proponent of nuclear abolition.” He warned: “Options are being lost as urgent questions are unasked, or unanswered; as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War patterns and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward toward a chilling world where the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.”

    As a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, General Butler had joined Field Marshal Lord Carver, Chief of the UK Defence Staff from 1973-76, in stating:

    “The risks of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to deterrence … The end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost.”

    Their first recommended step towards this is for all nuclear forces to be taken off alert. This would “reduce dramatically the chance of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear weapons launch.” Apart from making the world much safer, it would puncture the myths of nuclear deterrence doctrine once and for all.

     

  • India’s Nuclear Testing is a Wake-up Call to the World

    India’s nuclear tests are a wake-up call to the world, and particularly to the nuclear weapons states. The meeting of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Geneva, which concluded on May 8th, attracted near zero press attention and achieved near zero results. It was virtually a non-event. On the other hand, India’s tests three days later immediately got the world’s attention.

    The message of India’s tests is that we can have a world in which many countries have nuclear weapons or a world in which no countries have nuclear weapons, but we will not have a world in which only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Israel retain nuclear weapons in perpetuity. India has long argued that it is unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons option so long as the current nuclear weapons states fail to make a commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a timebound framework. The Indians underlined this position in 1996 when they refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

    Following their recent nuclear tests, however, the Indians have offered to sign the CTBT, but only if the nuclear weapons states agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a timebound framework and cease all subcritical and laboratory nuclear weapons testing. The Indian position is reasonable. They are calling for a world in which no state, including themselves, has nuclear weapons.

    What is not reasonable is the way in which the nuclear weapons states and their allies have treated India’s position as non-negotiable. The nuclear weapons states have consistently failed to this day to show the good faith in seeking nuclear disarmament that they promised in 1968 in Article VI of the NPT.

    Ironically, the only nuclear weapons state to consistently call for nuclear weapons abolition is China, but it, too, has been rebuffed by the other nuclear weapons states. It is ironic because India’s testing was, at least in part, a response to China’s possession and improvement of its nuclear arsenal.

    Despite their promises in 1995 for the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapons states have been largely impeding nuclear disarmament. If they are serious about stopping India, Pakistan and other states from becoming full fledged nuclear powers, they had better reverse their course of action and begin serious and good faith negotiations to rid the world of nuclear arms. This is the only course of action with a chance of success to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

    The knee-jerk reaction of the U.S., Japan and other industrialized states to impose economic sanctions on India will not stop the Indians from developing a nuclear arsenal. It will only result in greater hostility in a world divided not only between rich and poor, but also between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.”

    India’s testing is not only an Indian problem. It is a problem of the international system that leads the country of Gandhi to follow a nuclear weapons path. There is only one way out of the dilemma, and that is a commitment by all nuclear weapons states SQ now including India SQ to the abolition of their nuclear arsenals. According to a 1996 unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice, the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals is the legal obligation of the nuclear weapons states under international law.

    Nuclear weapons abolition is also the solution called for by military and civilian leaders and citizen action groups throughout the world. The Abolition 2000 Statement of over 1000 citizens organizations around the world calls upon the nuclear weapons states to “Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.”

    In crisis there is opportunity. If India’s nuclear tests lead to sufficient pressure on the nuclear weapons states to reverse their course and become serious about ending the nuclear weapons era, we may still be able to enter the 21st century with a treaty in place to accomplish this goal. If the nuclear weapons states hold firm to their present positions, however, India may be only the first of many states to become new members in the nuclear weapons club.

  • United States Policy and Nuclear Abolition

    An address to the Olaf Palme Institute in Stockholm, Sweden

    You are certainly aware that the United States is committed under Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith for nuclear disarmament. You are probably also aware that last year President Clinton approved a policy that nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone of U.S. security for the indefinite future. It is very difficult to reconcile these conflicting positions. Disarm or maintain a massive nuclear war fighting capability? It is impossible to do both. My purpose here is to explain why President Clinton made his decision, what it means to prospects for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and what can be done to promote progress toward a non-nuclear world.

    First, let me tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have been personally involved with these engines of destruction since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42 years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy a European target with a bomb that would have killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe, I was the officer responsible for the security, readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Russia, weapons which could never defend anything – only destroy everything. My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced me that they can never be used for any rational military or political purpose. Their use would only create barbaric, indiscriminate destruction. In the words of the Canberra. Commission, “Nuclear weapons create an intolerable threat to all humanity…”

    Now, to address the reasons for President Clinton’s decision concerning the U.S. nuclear posture. When the nuclear era opened in the U.S. the atom bomb was seen as a source of immense national power and as an essential contribution to efforts to thwart any expansionist efforts by Stalin’s Soviet Union. It was also seen by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force- as the key to service supremacy. The newly autonomous Air Force under General Curtis LeMay saw atomic warfare as its primary raison d’etre and fought fiercely for the dominant role in U.S. atomic plans. The Army and Navy feared that without atomic weapons in their arsenals they would become irrelevant adjuncts to strategic air power.

    This interservice rivalry led to the rapid proliferation of nuclear missions. Without going into needless detail, each service acquired its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for every conceivable military mission: strategic bombardment, tactical warfare, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank rockets and landmines, anti-submarine rockets, torpedoes and depth charges, artillery shells, intermediate range missiles and ultimately intercontinental range land and sea-launched ballistic missiles armed with multiple, thermo-nuclear warheads.

    The Soviet Union, starting more than 4 years behind America, watched this rapid expansion of our war fighting weapons with shock and fear and set out to match every U.S. capability. Despite the obvious fact that the USSR lagged far behind, alarmists in the Pentagon pointed at Soviet efforts as proof of the need for ever more nuclear forces and weapons and the arms race continued unabated for 40 years. During this wasteful dangerous competition the United States built 70,000 nuclear weapons plus air, land and sea-based delivery vehicles at a total cost of $4.000 billion dollars.

    As the Soviets’ arsenal grew, Mutual Assured Destruction became a fact and the two nations finally began tenuous arms control efforts in the 1960’s to restrain their competition. This effort was accelerated in the mid-1980 as a result of world-wide fears of nuclear war when President Reagan spoke of the Soviet

    Union as the “evil empire” and doubled U.S. military spending. Unfortunately, the excesses of the nuclear arms race had created an extremely powerful pro-nuclear weapons establishment in the United States. This alliance of laboratories, weapon builders, aircraft industries and missile producers wielded immense political power in opposition to nuclear disarmament proposals. Abetted by Generals and Admirals in the Pentagon this establishment was able to turn arms control efforts into a talk-test-build process in which talks went slowly and ineffectually while testing and building went on with great dispatch. This same establishment remains extremely powerful today and explains why the United States’ continues to spend more than $28,000 million dollars each year to sustain its nuclear war fighting forces and enhance its weapons despite the formal commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the establishment is the primary reason why in November, 1997, President Clinton decreed in Presidential Decision Directive #60 that nuclear weapons will continue to form the cornerstone of American security indefinitely. This directive also set forth a number of other policies that are directly contrary to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. He reaffirmed America’s right to make first use of nuclear weapons and intentionally left open the option to conduct nuclear retaliation against any nation, which employs chemical or biological agents in attacks against the United States or its allies. He went on to direct the maintenance of the triad of U.S. strategic forces (long range bombers, land-based ICBM’s and submarine-based SLBMs) at a high state of alert which would permit launch-on-warning of any impending nuclear attack on the U.S. This is the dangerous doctrine, which puts thousands of warheads on a hair trigger, thereby creating the risk of starting a nuclear war through misinformation and fear as well as through human error or system malfunction.

    Finally, his directive specifically authorized the continued targeting of numerous sites in Russia and China as well as planning for strikes against so-called rogue states in connection with regional conflicts or crises. In short, U.S. nuclear posture and planning remain essentially unchanged seven years after the end of the Cold War. The numbers of weapons are lower but the power to annihilate remains in place with 7,000 strategic and 5,000 tactical weapons.

    This doctrine would be bad enough alone but it is reinforced by continued efforts to extend and enhance the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. A major element of this process is benignly labeled the Stockpile Stewardship Program costing more than $4, 100 million per year to maintain weapons security as well as test and replace weapon components to insure full wartime readiness of approximately 12,000 strategic and tactical bombs and warheads. In March the U.S. Air Force dropped two B61-11 bombs from a B-2 bomber on a target in Alaska to complete certification of a new design for earth penetrating weapons, clear proof of U.S. intentions to improve its nuclear war fighting capabilities.

    Furthermore, the Los Alamos National Laboratory recently resumed the manufacture of plutonium triggers for thermo-nuclear weapons while the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is preparing a new capability called the National Ignition Facility where conditions within an exploding nuclear device can be simulated Supplemented with continuing sub-critical explosive tests in Nevada and extremely sophisticated computer modeling experiments, this new facility will give the U.S. means not available to other signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to develop and validate new nuclear weapons designs.

    To give even more evidence of the power of the pro-nuclear establishment, the U.S. will decide this year -on how and when to resume the production and stockpiling of tritium, the indispensable fuel for thermo-nuclear explosions. The fact is that the military has enough tritium on hand today for all of its weapons until the year 2006 and enough for 1,000 warheads and bombs at least until the year 2024. To invest thousands of millions of dollars for unneeded tritium is a waste of precious resources undertaken solely to placate and reward the nuclear establishment. It is particularly alarming and discouraging to see the United States investing heavily to perpetuate and increase its nuclear war fighting capabilities when only three years ago it was the dominant force promoting indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To encourage support for extension the U.S. led in the formulation of the important declaration of “Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” More clearly than Article VI of the NPT itself, this statement reaffirmed commitment to: “The determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons…” This renewed and strengthened pledge to reduce nuclear capabilities offered as an inducement for non-nuclear states to agree to extension of the NPT makes the current U.S. nuclear program an affront to all of the signatories. It is not only a direct violation of both the letter and spirit of the NPT; it is a provocation, which jeopardizes the goal of non-proliferation. The clear message is that the foremost nuclear power regards its weapons as key elements of security and military strength, a signal, which can only stimulate other nations to consider the need to create similar capabilities.

    What must those who favor nuclear abolition do to counter this threat to non-proliferation? First, as individuals and as organizations, we must redouble our efforts at home to publicize the dangers created by as many as 35,000 weapons still ready for use in the world. A broadly based global demand by all non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers must live up to the letter and spirit of the NPT extension agreement should precede the first review conference in the year 2000. A call for worldwide public demonstrations on the order and magnitude of those, which supported the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980’s, should be made. The nuclear powers must not be permitted to dictate the results of the review conference in the same manner the United States dominated the 1995 extension conference.

    The message to be stressed is that it is illogical and unrealistic to expect that five nations can legally possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons indefinitely while all other nations are forbidden to create a nuclear capability. Pressure to break-out of the Non Proliferation Treaty is further intensified because one of the nuclear powers is actively developing new, more threatening weapons and pronouncing them essential to its future security.

    A good strategy is to follow the lead of the 62 Generals and Admirals who signed an appeal for nuclear abolition in December of 1996. We stated that we could not foresee the conditions, which would ultimately permit the final elimination of all weapons, but we did recognize many steps, which could be safely begun now to start and accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal.

    As a first step toward nuclear disarmament, all nuclear powers should positively commit themselves to unqualified no-first use guarantees for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Their guarantees should be incorporated in a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the review conference in 2000.

    Concurrently, the process of actual reduction of weapons should begin with the United States and Russia. They should proceed immediately with START III negotiations, particularly since the implementation of START II has been delayed for four years. Even with the delay Russia cannot afford all of the changes required under that Treaty and has suggested willingness to proceed with additional reductions because far deeper reductions by both sides would be less costly.

    At the same time, both nations should agree to take thousands of nuclear warheads off of alert status. This action would reduce the possibility of a nuclear exchange initiated by accident or human error. Once fully de-alerted, warhead removal (de-mating) should commence and the warheads stored remotely from missile sites and submarine bases. Verification measures should include international participation to build confidence between the parties.

    Disassembly of warheads under international supervision should begin in the U.S. and Russia. When a level of 1,000 warheads is reached in each nation, Great Britain, France and China should join the process under a rigorous verification regime. De facto nuclear states, including Israel, should join the process as movement continued toward the complete and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. Finally, an international convention should be adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear explosive devices just as current conventions proscribe chemical and biological weapons. All fissile material should be safely and securely stored under international control.

    Verification of this entire process could best be accomplished by U.N. teams formed and operating in accordance with principles developed by UNSCOM teams operating in Iraq today. This model provides a precedent already accepted by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the nuclear powers.

    None of these progressive steps will happen until the community of nations comes together to make the United States understand that non-proliferation will ultimately fail unless the U.S. abandons its delusion that nuclear superiority provides long term security. Even when the dangers of this delusion are understood, progress toward the complete, final abolition of nuclear weapons will be painfully slow. Nevertheless, the effort must be made to move toward the day that all nations live together in a world without nuclear weapons because it is clear that our children cannot hope to live safely in a world with them.

     

  • Canadian Church Leaders Seek End to Nuclear Weaponry: The Salvation Army War Cry

    On Thursday, February 26, 1998, a representative group of church leaders went before the standing Committee of the House of Commons to talk about the moral urgency of a global drive to abolish nuclear weapons. This is one of the many social justice issues which The Salvation Army in this territory, in partnership with other churches and agencies, is seeking to address and resolve. The following letter addressed to Prime Minister Chretien from church leaders in Canada, was signed by Commissioner Donald V. Kerr, territorial commander.

    Salvationists need to be involved actively where we are, in social services, but also in collaboration with others to seek to advocate action on the many and varied social justice issues which threaten to damage and destroy families, and our world.

    Dear Prime Minister Chretien,
    We write in deep appreciation of your government’s persistent and courageous leadership in the ongoing effort to rid the world of the scourge of anti-personnel landmines, and to challenge you to bring that same visionary dedication to bear on efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

    Our church communities rejoiced with all Canadians, and especially with people in mine-affected countries, in that proud moment in Ottawa last December when Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy signed the land mines treaty on behalf of Canada and when you handed to the UN Secretary-General a copy of the legislation confirming Canada as the first country to ratify the treaty. It was truly a milestone event, showing the world what can be achieved when governments and movements work together, and particularly, when leaders step forward to challenge and encourage others.

    We are grateful for your personal commitment to the effort to ban land mines and for the key role played by Mr. Axworthy and many officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Our gratitude and congratulations to you and your colleagues also extend to the many thousands of Canadians, individuals and organizations, who provided energy and expertise to make this achievement possible.

    Canadian church communities, responding to God’s call to all people to be agents of love and healing in a world that still knows great pain, participated in the movement to ban land mines. As church leaders, we believe that obedience to that same call of God requires us now to raise our voices in urgent appeal to our own communities, to all Canadians, and to you and your government, to bring a new commitment to what we believe to be one of the most profound spiritual challenges of our era — the challenge to rid the world of the plans and the means to nuclear annihilation.

    The willingness, indeed the intent, to launch a nuclear attack in certain circumstances bespeaks spiritual and moral bankruptcy. We believe it to be an extraordinary affront to humanity for nuclear weapon states and their allies, including Canada, to persist in claiming that nuclear weapons are required for their security. Nuclear weapons do not, cannot, deliver security — they deliver only insecurity and peril through their promise to annihilate that which is most precious, life itself and the global ecosystem upon which all life depends. Nuclear weapons have no moral legitimacy, they lack military utility, and, in light of the recent judgement of the World Court, their legality is in serious question. The spiritual, human and ecological holocaust of a nuclear attack can be prevented only by the abolition of nuclear weapons — it is our common duty to pursue that goal as an urgent priority.

    The Canadian churches have long worked for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1982, we leaders wrote to, and met with, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to affirm “nuclear weapons in any form and in any number cannot ultimately be accepted as legitimate components of national armed forces.” In 1988, we sent the same message to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, stating that ” nuclear weapons have no place in national defence policies.”

    Since then we have welcomed the substantial progress that has been made to end the nuclear arms race and reduce the size of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals, But these steps, important as they are, are not nearly enough. The end of the Cold War has created an unprecedented opportunity to start the process toward the final elimination of nuclear weapons and the World Court has confirmed that it is a legal obligation.

    We are therefore especially disturbed by the refusal of nuclear weapons states to even begin negotiations on the abolition of nuclear weapons and to set clear time frames and objectives – and we are profoundly disappointed that Canada has to date chosen to publicly accept that refusal. Indeed, nuclear weapon states continue to take steps to maintain and improve or modernize” their nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future.

    It is our sincere belief that Canada has much to contribute to the effort to make nuclear abolition a reality In this regard, we are heartened by your pledge in Securing Our Future Together (the second “Red Book”) that “a re-elected Liberal government will… work vigorously to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons and antipersonnel mines from the planet.” We are compelled to note, however, that Canada continues to support, and to seek the illusory protection of, nuclear weapons in a number of ways (see the Appendix, pp. 3-4). Canada’s position as an advocate of nuclear disarmament in the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, and other forums is compromised by this fact.

    The time has come for Canada to take a strong, principled stand against the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any state, affirming abolition as the central goal of Canadian nuclear weapons policy and adding Canada’s voice to the call to immediately begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

    In support of this goal, Canada should immediately take the following actions:

    Urge all states to negotiate by the year 2000 an agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework;

    Urge all nuclear weapons states, as interim measures and as a sign of good faith in such negotiations, to take all their nuclear forces off alert status and to commit themselves to no-first-use of nuclear weapons;

    Renounce any role for nuclear weapons in Canadian defence policy, and call on other countries, including Russia and Canada’s NATO allies, to do likewise;

    Review the legality of all of Canada’s nuclear-weapons related activities in the light of the International Court of Justice ruling of July 8, 1996, and move quickly upon the completion of this review to end all activities determined to be of questionable legality; and,

    Embrace publicly the conclusions of the Canberra Commission report of August 14,1996, including in particular its recommendations that the nuclear weapons states “commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement” and that the non-nuclear states support this commitment and join in co-operative international action to implement it.

    As it approaches the dawn of a new Millennium, Canada could offer no finer demonstration of its commitment to being a constructive and healing presence in the international community than to deploy some of its considerable diplomatic skill and political capital to ensure that the world enters the next Millennium with a formal treaty commitment to rid the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons.

    The Canadian churches which we represent are committed to continuing their work toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, in co-operation with other Canadian and international nuclear abolition efforts. In this spirit of co-operation and common cause, we respectfully request the opportunity to meet with you at the earliest possible date to explore ways in which Canadian churches can further support the government in taking bold new steps to make nuclear weapons abolition an urgent priority.

    We look forward to your early response. Please know that you and your colleagues in the Government of Canada are supported by the prayers and good wishes of Canadians.

    His Eminence Metropolitan Archbishop Sotiros, Greek Orthodox Metropolis of Toronto (Canada); Fr. Anthony Nikolie, Polish National Catholic Church of Canada; Mr. M. L. Bailey, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Canada; Jim Moerman, Reformed Church in America; Fr. Marcos Marcos, St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Church; The Very Rev. Bill Phipps, United Church of Canada; Bishop Telmor Sartison, Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada; Archbishop H. Derderian, Primate, Canadian Diocese of the Armenian Orthodox Church; Marvin Frey, Executive Director, Mennonite Central Committee Canada; The Rev. Dr. Kenneth W Bellous, Executive Minister, Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec; Rt. Rev. Dr. Daniel D. Rupwate, General Superintendent, British Methodist Episcopal Church; The Right Rev. Seraphim, Bishop of Ottawa and Canada, Orthodox Church in America; The Most Rev. Michael G. Peers, Primate, The Anglican Church of Canada; The Rev. Messale Engeda, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church; Donald V. Kerr Commissioner, The Salvation Army; John Congram, Moderator, Presbyterian Church in Canada; Bishop Francois Thibodeau, c.j.m., President, The Episcopal Commission on Social Affairs, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops; Gale Wills, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Canada.

    The Salvation Army’s Positional Statement on World Peace (1990)
    The Salvation Army as part of the Universal Christian Church, seeks the establishment of peace as proclaimed by Jesus Christ. The Army recognizes that the world’s problems cannot be solved by force, and that greed and pride, coupled with the widespread desire for domination, poison the souls of men and sow seeds of conflict.

    Since there exists in thermonuclear weapons a destructive power of vast proportions almost too frightful to contemplate, The Salvation Army believes that nuclear disarmament by all nations is a necessary element of world peace. However, a nation has the right to defend itself against the aggression of another nation.

    The Salvation Army continues to be deeply concerned with the investment of huge financial resources to aid the escalating production of terrifying weapons of mass destruction, rather than the diversion of these funds to socioeconomic growth throughout the world. Disarmament, peace and development are inextricably linked.

    The Salvation Army pledges its members to pray and work for peace and to seek to realize the Church’s unique witness to the source of true peace, God himself.

  • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Fails to Ban Nuclear Tests

    President Clinton submitted the long sought Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) to the Senate for ratification, but it falls far short of its description as “comprehensive” and it doesn’t ban nuclear tests. Indeed, in 1997 and 1998, three so-called “sub-critical” nuclear test was conducted 1000 feet below the desert floor at the Nevada Test Site in which 3.3 pounds of deadly plutonium was blown up with chemical explosives without causing a chain reaction, hence “sub-critical”. Three more are scheduled for 1998 with more to come, as part of a thirteen year $60 billion “stockpile stewardship program” which will enable the weaponeers to design new nuclear bombs in computer simulated virtual reality. These computers are not laptops. The program includes the stadium sized $3.4 billion National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, computers as large as houses, and technology for prototyping new weapons and developing virtual manufacturing. The testing of a new post-cold war nuclear weapon, the B61-11 earth penetrating “bunker buster” in Alaska has been revealed, and a replacement for nuclear warheads on Trident submarines is in design, with plans for missile flight tests in 2002 and 2003.

    Clinton’s 1995 announcement supporting CTB negotiations was coupled with a promise to deliver on the stewardship program, ostensibly to secure the “safety and reliability” of the US arsenal. Yet in 1992, Clinton decided not to end a nine month moratorium, declaring that our weapons were safe and reliable and that the costs of resumed testing outweighed the benefits.

    Noted retired weapons designers, Ray Kidder (Livermore) and Richard Garwin (Los Alamos), agree that we can maintain the arsenal’s safety and reliability without the costly stewardship program. Kidder argues that the underground tests will raise international distrust of our good faith intentions to comply with the CTB and both Garwin and Kidder propose that the better option would be to maintain the capability to re-manufacture existing weapons, without the need for new designs which could create the need for ever more tests. Indeed, during the debate on whether to extend the 1992 moratorium, the Congressional Record revealed that since 1950 there were 32 airplane crashes with nuclear bombs aboard, and although two of the crashes resulted in the scattering of plutonium (over Thule Greenland and Palomares Spain), none of the weapons ever exploded! So much for safety. As to reliability, that goes to whether the weapons perform with the strength for which it is designed – a lethal and unnecessary exercise with the end of the cold war. Then why this deal with the labs?

    Clinton promised to provide the Pentagon and the weaponeers the ability to design new nuclear weapons in order to buy their acquiescence for Senate ratification of the CTB. History presents a sad parallel. In 1963, when President Kennedy sought ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Deborah Shapely notes, in Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara, that:

    The foes of the test ban in Congress, who were ready to do battle with Kennedy and expected to gain momentum from military testimony, were disappointed. The chiefs did testify for the treaty, because in the locked room they had demanded an enormous price: more funding for the weapons labs, preparation to test quickly in case the Soviets violated the agreement, and other conditions. The net effect was to strengthen the weapons labs, expand U.S. underground testing, and continue the arms race.

    The irony here is that continued design capacity for a new generation of nuclear weapons, in exchange for Pentagon support for CTB ratification, will undermine its international entry into force. For the CTB to become a binding agreement, the 44 nations with nuclear reactors on their soil must become signatories. (This unusual requirement is an acknowledgment of the bomb-making capacity of nations in possession of commercial reactors.) Countries such as India and Pakistan announced that they will not sign the CTB as long as the US continues its provocative program. Using our advanced technology to design nuclear weapons serves as an invitation to less developed countries to test and develop nuclear arsenals by more antiquated methods.

    India reacting to the July 1997 sub-critical test, stated that its opposition to the CTB as “not genuinely comprehensive” was vindicated as the pact contained “loopholes … exploited by some countries to continue their testing activity, using more sophisticated and advanced techniques”, and is a discriminatory non-proliferation measure that does not contribute to global nuclear disarmament. China also expressed its concern to the US.

    The American public is clearly opposed to such activities. A recent poll by Celinda Lake of Lake Sosin Snell and Associates indicates that 87% of all Americans think we should negotiate a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons just as the world has done for chemical and biological weapons. And 84% said they would feel safer if they knew for sure that all countries, including the US had eliminated their nuclear arsenals.

    Public concern is increasingly echoed by some of our most distinguished scientists and military leaders. The National Academy of Sciences called for much deeper cuts in the arsenal, going down to 1000 bombs and then to a few hundred each for Russia and the US. General Lee Butler, Commander of US Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear forces from 1992 to 1994 , has been joined by a number of other high ranking military leaders in saying that the continued possession of nuclear weapons increases international insecurity because the very existence of nuclear arsenals in some nations provides an incentive to other nations to acquire them. This warning, coupled with overwhelming public concern, should be a signal to the Clinton administration to support a “clean CTB” unencumbered by the baggage of the proposed $60 billion recipe for nuclear proliferation. Economists have calculated in 1995 that a passive curatorship program of the arsenal, while it awaits dismantlement, would cost only $100 million a year. It’s time to end this final chapter of the Cold War. (Copies of the Abolition 2000 public opinion poll on nuclear weapons are available at GRACE, 15 E. 26 St., NY, NY 10010; 212-726-9161 (tel); 212-726-9160 (fax); aslater@igc.apc.org)

  • Question and Answer Session at the National Press Club Newsmakers Luncheon with General Lee Butler

    USAF, (ret.), Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Air Command (1991-92); Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Command (1992-94)

    DOUG HARBRECHT (Moderator. National Press Club president and Washington news editor of Business Week): (Brief audio break) – [Do you think the U.S. should consider using nuclear weapons in] Iraq or in response to any chemical or biological weapon threat?

    GEN. BUTLER: At the risk of reiterating something I just said, I think it’s worth reiterating perhaps in a slightly different context. I had the opportunity to go through this calculus. When I was the director of strategic plans and policy in the 1989 to ’91 time frame, it was my direct responsibility to draw up the strategic objectives of our prospective war in the Persian Gulf, to imagine outcomes and to set war termination objectives.

    At the very heart of that calculus was to imagine the prospect of using nuclear weapons. And I would point out to those of you here who might have read Colin Powell’s memoirs that he goes through this himself in the latter stages of his book, because he was asked to imagine the kinds of targets in the Persian Gulf that might be struck with nuclear weapons. I share his reservations absolutely.

    The first issue, of course, is the one that I posed in my remarks. If we rightfully abhor and condemn the resort to the use of a weapon of mass destruction, how is it we could possibly justify — we, the United States, a democratic society — ourselves steeping to such ends?

    Number two, can you imagine the impact in a part of the world where we worked so assiduously for so many years to build our presence, to build support and credibility, of being the nation that used a nuclear weapon against Arab peoples? Only the second time in history that such a device had been used, and it would be the United States, and it would be in a part of the world where even today those actions raise powerful suspicions.

    Secondly, what would — thirdly, what would have happened to the coalition? How painstakingly we worked to put together a coalition of some 30 nations from very disparate points on the ideological and cultural compass in order to provide the proper underpinnings of the international community for that war. Can you imagine the impact on that coalition if we, the United States, had used a nuclear weapon, even in response to the use of a weapon of mass destruction by the Iraqis? It would have been devastating.

    There’s the question of targets. If you were the target planner for the use of a nuclear weapon in the Persian Gulf, what would be your choice? Surely it would not be the city of Baghdad. Would you hold hundreds of thousands of people accountable for the acts of their leader? Would it be an Iraqi division in the far western reaches of that nation? You might be interested to know the calculation of how many tactical nuclear weapons it requires to bring even one division to its knees when it’s spread over such a vast expanse.

    What would have happened to the fallout from the blast? If you want to do maximum damage, you use a (surface aspirant?). How is it that the fallout patterns would have arrayed themselves beyond the borders of Iraq, perhaps even to the south if the wind had been blowing in that direction?

    The real point of the exercise is that the United States has put itself happily in a position where it has no need to resort to weapons of mass destruction to respond to such provocation. We brought Iraq to its knees conventionally. We could have decimated that country. We could have occupied it as we did Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. We chose not to do that, but it was within our capacity to do so. And if we could do that in 1991, when they had the fourth-strongest army in the world and a significant air force, can you imagine the task today when we’ve reduced all of that by at least two-thirds? It is wrong from every aspect. It is wrong politically. It makes no sense militarily. And morally, in my view, it is indefensible.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, what happens to an officer — (applause). What happens to an officer who breaks, as you have, from the orthodoxy of our military? Is the military changing in this respect?

    GEN. BUTLER: It is, of course, very difficult and probably presumptuous in the extreme to answer on behalf of something called the military. And so I won’t pretend to do that. But I think that I can speak to it from this regard.

    It has been very gratifying over the last two years to receive countless phone calls and letters from colleagues who were on active duty with me, now retired, or who continue to serve, who support the arguments that I have tried to make, who believe, as I do, that it was near-miraculous that we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust, and that our number one foreign policy and national security priority should be the normalization of relations with the former Soviet Union and to walk back from the abyss that we created by the amassing of nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands.

    And, so, no, I would not pretend to speak for the military. And with regard to what happens, it’s also gratifying to have the comfort and to experience the fact that we live in a country where people can express their views freely. And while some, many, might take exception to them, no one in my experience has yet but to do anything but to applaud the fact that we’re trying to bring this issue back to the forefront of policy discourse in this country.

    MR. HARBRECHT: Do you also believe that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary or counterproductive?

    GEN. BUTLER: I don’t know. I don’t know. There are some historical eras into which I can put myself with some comfort; I’ve got the context right. But they’re really only those eras in which I actively participated. I was in uniform as an officer for 33 years. I understand that era very, very well.

    As an itinerant associate professor of political science, formerly with the Air Force Academy, and an historian, particularly a military historian, I have some understanding of the challenges that were faced by political leaders and military forces in early eras.

    It’s very difficult for me yet to recreate in my own mind the intensity of the period in which that decision was made by the president of the United States. And as I said in my speech, my purpose is not to accuse but to assess. It’s to try to understand the lessons that might be drawn from that. It’s to try and understand the consequences of having dropped atomic devices on Japan.

    At the time and today, we still believe that we spared the lives of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million U.S. and allied soldiers. But at the same time, we took the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. And now we have the opportunity, thank God, to step back, to pause and reflect on that in a different political, military and moral climate. And that’s what I’m trying to do. So I can’t make that judgment, but I certainly can try and draw my own observations.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, it’s widely believed that Israel not only possesses nuclear weapons but would use them if its survival depended upon them. Is Israel’s reliance on its nuclear weapons in the dangerous Middle East ill-advised?

    GEN. BUTLER: I think that it is a perfect illustration of the short-sightedness that tends to surround this issue of whether or not nations should acquire nuclear capability. What was it that prompted Iraq to try and acquire weapons of mass destruction, a nuclear weapon arsenal of their own? Could it have in any way been tied to the fact that Israel acquired such capability? And what of Syria or Iran? What of Libya?

    These things have causes and they have effects. They’re related. The circumstances in which nuclear weapons capability is created and sustained aren’t static. As a consequence, in my view, it is dangerous in the extreme that in the cauldron of animosities that we call the Middle East, one nation has armed itself, ostensibly, with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, perhaps numbering in the hundreds, and that that inspires other nations to do so. And, of course, that’s not the only regional conflict where we see this perilous confrontation.

    I will tell you what I do think. I cannot imagine any regional quarrel or conflict that is or will be made easier to resolve by the presence of the further introduction of nuclear weapons.

    MR. HARBRECHT: What can be done to persuade an emerging superpower like China to give up nuclear weapons? Would such a decision have to wait for the emergence of democracy in China?

    GEN. BUTLER: There’s a story, perhaps apocryphal, but it’s been in the literature for many years, as to why it was that the Chinese acquired nuclear weapons capability. The story goes that it was proposed to Mao and he said, “Why should I do this?” And he was told, “Well, other nations have them.” And his answer purportedly was, “Well, I guess we should have some.”

    If you look at the Chinese nuclear arsenal, it is far from modern. Their forces are not on alert. They’re struggling to bring up its safety and surity characteristics. China has avowed time and again that they are a no-first-use nation and that they are strongly on record in favor of nuclear abolition. I don’t know what it would take to persuade China to abandon their nuclear arsenals, but I am comforted by what they say.

    I believe that the keys to creating a climate in which the Chinas of the world — Great Britain, France, the non-declared states — are willing to join in a serious-minded, forthright and concrete series of commitments and steps to move steadfastly toward the abolition of nuclear weapons is for the United States and Russia to take the lead.

    I believe that we are missing priceless opportunities in what is perhaps a perishable window of opportunity to move forward much more swiftly and boldly in getting our forces off alert, bringing tactical nuclear weapons home from Europe, declaring no-first-use policies, and most importantly, reaching out to our friends in Russia and making the decision that it is time to get on with concrete measures for much more severe cuts in nuclear stockpiles than we’ve been willing to acknowledge to date.

    It is, in my view, a sad commentary on the current state of thinking on this issue that we are comfortable with a goal for reductions that would still have 3,500 operational nuclear weapons on alert 10 years from now. It is a dismal commentary on the current state of thinking that we still believe that distant nuclear arsenals that measure in the hundreds is a low number.

    It is time for the United States to act much more boldly and with stronger leadership with respect to getting on with getting the nuclear era to a close.

    MR. HARBRECHT: General, do you ever feel any guilt for having been so integral a part of building the nuclear machine? Shouldn’t you have spoken up earlier?

    GEN. BUTLER: Well, this isn’t about guilt. This is about understanding. This is about reflection. I talked with Bob McNamara about this subject. He took a lot of heat when he published his recent book, “Vietnam.” And Bob may, in fact, be here today. I told him forthrightly that as a veteran of Vietnam, I was anguished by some of what he said. I felt like that perhaps he hadn’t shown enough guilt.

    And he said to me, “Lee, we were who we were and we were where we were.” He said, “I can’t change any of that.” He said, “But what I can do is to try and think through and make public and help others to understand the judgments and the pressures and the outcomes and how I see them now, not in order to assess blame, but in the hope that future generations of policymakers can read those lessons and not make the same mistakes.” That’s all. I’m trying to do here. (Applause.)

  • Countless Voices of Hope

    It is with profound appreciation and gratitude that I return to this city of peace, this sacred city of Hiroshima. This city was made sacred not by the tragedy which befell it, but by the rebirth of hope which emerged from that tragedy. From the ashes of Hiroshima, flowers of hope have blossomed, bringing forth a renewed spirit of possibility, of peace, to a world in which hope has been too often crushed for too many.

    The massive destruction that was visited upon this city on August 6, 1945 gave birth to the Nuclear Age, an age in which our species would move from the too often practiced power of genocide to the potential of omnicide, the destruction of all humanity and perhaps all life. The devastating power of nuclear weapons, as manifested first at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki, has made peace not only desirable but imperative.

    Through the memories of the survivors, the hibakusha, we may learn of the horror they experienced so that we may act to prevent that horror from ever recurring anywhere again. The scenes etched in their memories can pierce us to the marrow of our bones. Sumie Mizukawa, a young girl at the time of the bombing, remembered the sight of a blinded young mother. She wrote:

    Her eyes blinded

    her dead infant in her arms

    with tears streaming

    from those sightless eyes

    that would never see again.

    I saw this in my childhood

    as my mother led me by the hand.

    That image will never leave

    my memories of that dreadful time.

    Kosaku Okabe described a scene of misery with “countless bodies of men, women, and children” floating in the river. “It was then,” he wrote, “that I first began to understand the brutality of war.” He continued, “Burned into my memory is the sight of a young mother, probably in her twenties, a baby on her back and a three- or four-year-old child clasped tightly in her arms. Caught against a girder on a bridge her body bobbed idly in the gentle current.”

    How could these images not be seared into memory? And how vitally important it is that such images be shared with others throughout the world so that this pain will not again be inflicted on young mothers and their children in other cities at other times. As Akihiro Takahashi, a former director of the Hiroshima Peace Culture Center, wrote, “‘Hiroshima’ is not merely a historic fact in the past. It is an alarm bell for the future of humankind.”

    I have had the great privilege of knowing Miyoko Matsubara, who was a twelve year old child when the bomb fell on Hiroshima. Miyoko struggled to learn English so that she could tell the story of what she witnessed and experienced — including her own injury, pain and disfigurement — to young people throughout the world. She was only a child, but she has carried the pain throughout her life. She also carries hope, and her courage gives hope to others.

    Miyoko’s message is the message of Hiroshima: “Never again! We shall not repeat the evil.” This message is a clarion call to sanity. It is a cry to the human species to remember our humanity. If we fail to do so, the consequences will be severe. We run the risk of destroying ourselves and much of life. Our capacity for destruction tests our wisdom. The most important issue of our time, although not widely viewed as such, is that of assuring that the evil is not repeated.

    I would like you to know that the message of your city awakened me. I first visited Hiroshima when I was 21 years old. At the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, I learned of the human cost of nuclear destruction, of the tragedy and suffering caused by that single bomb. The spirit of Hiroshima entered my soul. I had no choice but to find a way to work for peace and an end to the threat of future nuclear holocausts.

    A second experience solidified my commitment to peace. Returning from Japan in 1964, I found that I had been called into the army. Not realizing the full range of my options, I joined a reserve unit rather than serve on active duty. However, four years later this reserve unit was called to active duty, and I received orders to go to Vietnam as an infantry officer. At that time I believed, and continue to believe today, that this was a war both immoral and illegal. I knew that if I went to Vietnam I would be forced to kill and order others to do so. I, therefore, as a conscientious objector, refused the order to go to Vietnam, and ended up fighting the army in federal court.

    It was a great awakening for me to realize that my power as an individual was greater than that of the United States Army. The army had the power to give me an order, but I had the power to say No to their order. I might have gone to jail for doing so, but that was my choice. I had a choice, as we all do, to do what I believed was right. To exercise that choice is tremendously empowering. It is the power of conscience, which is a defining human characteristic, one that separates us from all other forms of life.

    Above all else, I consider myself to be a citizen of Earth. I believe that the bonds of our common humanity uniting us are far stronger than the artificial boundaries that divide us. I am also a citizen of the United States, having been born in Los Angeles three years before the Nuclear Age began. Speaking as a single individual, but I’m sure representing millions of others throughout the world, I deeply regret the crime against humanity that occurred here. As an American, I apologize to you, although I know from Miyoko and other hibakusha that your forgiveness came long ago.

    I apologize because my government has not yet done so. I apologize because my government has not yet heard the message of Hiroshima, nor learned its foremost lesson — “Never again!” I apologize because my government still bases its national security on the threat to use nuclear weapons. I apologize because your pain and your suffering should not be borne by you alone.

    What happened here affects us all. If we can find it in ourselves to share in your tragedy — a tragedy that for most people on Earth today is only of historical memory — we may be capable of sharing in your hope. And, if we can do that, we may be capable of bringing forth a new world in which the ever present threat of nuclear holocaust is ended for all time.

    Just over 40 years ago, Josei Toda, your second president, called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, and called upon the youth of Soka Gakkai to help lead the way. Five months ago I was in Tokyo and Yokohama for the commemoration of that fortieth anniversary. In the short time since that fortieth anniversary, the youth of Soka Gakkai, beginning here in Hiroshima, have gathered over 13 million signatures for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I am in awe of your effort and your accomplishment. I know that President Ikeda is as well. I can only imagine how proud Josei Toda would have been to know of your effort. Your effort inspires and motivates. It is a source of hope.

    In your effort to gather signatures you have become educators and activists. You have brought this critical issue of nuclear weapons abolition to the attention of over 13 million people, and have obtained their affirmation of the need to end this nuclear weapons era which threatens the future of humanity and, indeed, all life.

    The petition on which you gathered signatures was prepared by Abolition 2000, which is a global network of over 1000 citizens organizations in some 75 countries working for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000 draws its strength from the grassroots, from the people. In this respect, it is similar to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. When the landmines campaign succeeded in having a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines signed in Ottawa, Jody Williams, the coordinator of the campaign, said, “Together we are a superpower. It’s a new definition of superpower. It’s not one of us; it’s all of us.” In Abolition 2000, as in the landmines campaign, we are not alone, and together we can become the most powerful grassroots movement in the history of humankind.

    The Abolition 2000 International Petition asks for three actions. First, end the nuclear threat by such reasonable steps as withdrawing all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and committing to unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Second, sign an international treaty — a Nuclear Weapons Convention — by the year 2000, agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a fixed period of time. Third, reallocate resources from military purposes to assuring a sustainable global future.

    Each signature you have gathered represents a voice of hope. Together they represent a chorus of hope that can move the world. We don’t know with certainty what forces you have set in motion by your effort, but we do know that you have touched many lives and that they in turn will touch more lives. If other concerned citizens throughout the world will follow your lead, we can achieve our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

    You have concluded your petition campaign, but please don’t consider your task finished until the last nuclear weapon is removed from the world. This will not happen overnight. It will take sustained effort and commitment. It will require the often under-appreciated virtue of perseverance. All that is truly worth achieving requires perseverance — loving relationships, healthy communities, and a decent world.

    I will take the message of your achievement to the leaders of the United Nations, to the delegates preparing for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to non-governmental organizations working for nuclear weapons abolition throughout the world, and to the leaders of my own country and other nuclear weapons states.

    I urge you to take the message of these 13 million voices to your own government, which has not been true to the people of Japan in its nuclear policies. Your government has not only been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but — by its accumulation of reprocessed plutonium — has become a virtual nuclear weapons power capable of assembling hundreds of nuclear weapons in days or weeks. If we are to have a world free of nuclear weapons, we must convince our respective governments to change their policies. You must help to convince your government and I must help to convince mine that reliance upon nuclear weapons for defense is an act of folly that endangers our future and undermines our decency as well as our security.

    Sometimes we cannot see the full fruits of our efforts during our lifetimes. This has been true of many great peace leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. It is also true of Josei Toda whose vision forms the foundation for your effort. It is true for all of us — if our vision is great enough. I believe, however, that a world free of nuclear weapons can and will be achieved within our lifetimes.

    I urge you to dream of what can be, and to always hold fast to your dreams. I beseech you never to lose the dream of a world free from the threat of nuclear holocaust. I implore you to listen to your conscience, and to act courageously upon it. I encourage you to walk the path of peace, which is also the path of justice. I call upon you to follow President Ikeda’s sage advice, “Continue to advance, step-by-step! Never, ever, give up hope.”

    If we follow our dreams, if we listen to our consciences, if we act courageously, if we walk the path of peace, if we never give up hope, we will rise to our full stature as human beings. We will live lives that are rich and full. We will make a difference and, by our examples, we will influence others to live such lives. I promise you that I will do my utmost to join you in living such a life and will encourage others to join us as well.

    I would like to conclude by sharing with you a poem of hope written by Sadako Kurihara just after the bombing of Hiroshima.

    WE SHALL BRING FORTH NEW LIFE

    It was night in the basement of a broken building.

    Victims of the atomic bombing

    Crowding into the candleless darkness,

    Filling the room to overflowing —

    The smell of fresh blood, the stench of death,

    The stuffiness of human sweat, the writhing moans —

    When, out of the darkness, came a wondrous voice

    “Oh! The baby’s coming!” it said.

    In the basement turned to living hell

    A young woman had gone into labor!

    The others forgot their own pain in their concern;

    What could they do for her, having not even a match

    To bring light to the darkness?

    Then came another voice: “I am a midwife.

    I can help her with the baby.”

    It was a woman who had been moaning in pain only moments before.

    And so a new life was born

    In the darkness of that living hell.

    And so, the midwife died before the dawn,

    Still soaked in the blood of her own wounds.

    We shall give forth new life!

    We shall bring forth new life!

    Even to our death.

    To find such hope in the darkness of that awful night is a triumph of the human spirit. In remembering Hiroshima, let us dedicate ourselves to bringing forth new life. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world in which even the threat of nuclear devastation is not a possibility. Let us dedicate ourselves to bringing forth a new world in which no child ever again must suffer the pain of war or hunger or abandonment. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world in which there is liberty, justice and dignity for all who share this extraordinary planet that gave birth to life. Let us walk the path of peace, and be active participants in the pursuit of peace!

     

  • 20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War

    Ever since the two adversaries in the Cold War, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., realized that their nuclear arsenals were sufficient to do disastrous damage to both countries at short notice, the leaders and military commanders have thought about the possibility of a nuclear war starting without their intention or as a result of a false alarm. Increasingly elaborate accessories have been incorporated in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to minimize the risk of unauthorized or accidenta launch or detonation. A most innovative action was the establishment of the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow in 1963 to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the supreme commanders.

    Despite all precautions, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to an unpredicted sequence of events remained as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. That is the reason I am prepared to spen the rest of my life working for abolition of nuclear weapons.

    One way a war could start is a false alarm via one of the warning systems, followed by an increased level of nuclear forces readiness while the validity of the information was being checked. This action would be detected by the other side, and they would take appropriate action; detection of that response would tend to confirm the original false alarm; and so on to disaster. A similar sequence could result from an accidental nuclear explosion anywhere. The risk of such a sequence developing would be increased if it happened during a period of increased international tension.

    On the American side many “false alarms” and significant accidents have been listed, ranging from trivial to very serious, during the Cold War. Probably many remain unknown to the public and to the research community because of individuals’ desire to avoid blame and maintain the good reputation of their unit or command. No doubt there have been as many mishaps on the Soviet side.

    Working with any new system, false alarms are more likely. The rising moon was misinterpreted as a missile attack during the early days of long-range radar. A fire at a broken gas pipeline was believed to be enemy jamming by laser of a satellite’s infrared sensor when those sensors were first deployed.

    The risks are illustrated by the following selection of mishaps. If the people involved had exercised less caution, or if some unfortunate coincidental event had occurred, escalation to nuclear war can easily be imagined. Details of some of the events differ in different sources: where there have been disagreements, I have chosen to quote those from the carefully researched book “The Limits of Safety” by Scott D. Sagan. Sagan gives references to original sources in all instances.

    1956, November 5: Suez Crisis coincidence
    British and French forces were attacking Egypt at the Suez Canal. The Soviet Government had suggested to U.S. that they combine forces to stop this by a joint military action, and had warned the British and French governments that (non-nuclear) rocket attacks on London and Paris were being considered. That night the U.S. military HQ in Europe received messages that:
    (i) unidentified aircraft were flying over Turkey and the Turkish
    air force was on alert
    (ii) 100 Soviet MIG-15’s were flying over Syria
    (iii) a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria
    (iv) the Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. It is reported that in U.S.A. General Goodpaster himself was concerned that these events might trigger the NATO operations plan for nuclear strikes against U.S.S.R.

    The 4 reports were all shown afterwards to have innocent explanations. They were due, respectively, to:
    (i) a flight of swans
    (ii) a routine air force escort (much smaller than the number reported) for the president of Syria, who was returning from a visit to Moscow
    (iii) the Canberra bomber was forced down by mechanical problems
    (iv) the Russian fleet was engaged in scheduled routine exercises.

    1961, November 24: BMEWS communication failure
    On the night of 24 November, 1961, all communication links went dead between SAC HQ and NORAD, and so cut SAC HQ off from the three Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites (BMEWS) at Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Filingdales (England). For General Power at SAC HQ, there were two possible explanations: either enemy action, or the coincidental failure of all the communication systems which had redundant and ostensibly independent routes including commercial telephone circuits. All SAC bases in U.S.A. were therefore alerted and B-52 nuclear bomber crews started their engines, with instructions not to take off without further orders. Radio communication was established with an orbiting B-52 on airborne alert which was near Thule. It contacted the BMEWS station by radio and could report that no attack had taken place.

    The reason for the “coincidental” failure was that the redundant routes for telephone and telegraph between NORAD and SAC HQ all ran through one relay station in Colorado. At that relay station a motor had overheated and caused interruption of all the lines.

    THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS LASTED FOR THE TWO WEEKS 14-28 OCTOBER 1962. MANY DANGEROUS EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN RELATION TO THE CRISIS, SOME OF THEM BECAUSE OF CHANGES MADE TO ENHANCE MILITARY READINESS. ELEVEN HAVE BEEN SELECTED:

    1962, August 23: B-52 Navigation Error
    SAC Chrome Dome airborne alert route included a leg from the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, SW across the Arctic Ocean to Barter Island, Alaska. On 23 August,1962, a B-52 nuclear-armed bomber crew made a navigational error and flew a course 20 deg. too far north. They approached within 300 miles of Soviet airspace near Wrangel island, where there was believed to be an interceptor base with aircraft having an operational radius of 400 miles.

    Because of the risk of repetition of such an error, in this northern area where other checks on navigation are difficult to obtain, it was decided to fly a less provocative route in future. However, the necessary orders had not been given by the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, so throughout that crisis the same northern route was being flown 24 hours a day.

    August-October 62: U2 flights into Soviet airspace
    U2 high altitude reconnaissance flights from Alaska occasionally strayed unintentionally into Soviet airspace. One such episode occurred in August 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 the U2 pilots were ordered not to fly within 100 miles of the Soviet airspace.

    On the night of 26 October, for a reason irrelevant to the crisis, a U2 pilot was ordered to fly a new route, over the north pole, where positional checks on navigation were by sextant only. That night the aurora prevented good sextant readings and the plane strayed over the Chukotski Peninsula. Soviet MIG interceptors took off with orders to shoot down the U2. The pilot contacted his U.S. command post and was ordered to fly due east towards Alaska. He ran out of fuel while still over Siberia. In response to his S.O.S., U.S. F102-A fighters were launched to escort him on his glide towards Alaska, with orders to prevent the MIG¹s from entering U.S. airspace. The U.S. interceptor aircraft were armed with nuclear missiles. These could have been used by any one of the F102-A pilots at his own discretion.

    1962, October 24: Russian satellite explodes
    On 24 October a Russian satellite entered its parking orbit, and shortly afterwards exploded. Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank observatory wrote in 1968: “the explosion of a Russian spacecraft in orbit during the Cuban Missile Crisis… led the U.S. to believe that the USSR was launching a massive ICBM attack.” The NORAD Command Post logs of the dates in question remain classified, possibly to conceal the reaction to this event. Its occurrence is recorded, and U.S. space tracking stations were informed on 31 October of debris resulting from breakup of “62 BETA IOTA”.

    1962, October 25: Duluth intruder
    At around midnight on 25 October, a guard at Duluth Sector Direction Center saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it, and activated the “sabotage alarm”. This automatically set off sabotage alarms at all bases in the area. At Volk Field, Wisconsin, the alarm was wrongly wired, and the Klaxon sounded which ordered nuclear-armed F-106A interceptors to take off. The pilots knew there would be no practice alert drills while DEFCON 3 was in force, and they believed World War III had started.

    Immediate communication with Duluth showed there was an error. By this time aircraft were starting down the runway. A car raced from the command center and successfully signalled the aircraft to stop.

    The original intruder was a bear.

    1962, October 26: ICBM Test Launch
    At Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, there was a program of routine ICBM test flights. When DEFCON 3 was ordered all the ICBM’s were fitted with nuclear warheads except one Titan missile that was scheduled for a test launch later that week. That one was launched for its test, without further orders from Washington, at 4 a.m. on 26 October.

    It must be assumed that Russian observers were monitoring U.S. missile activities as closely as U.S. observers were monitoring Russian and Cuban activities. They would have known of the general changeover to nuclear warheads, but not that this was only a test launch.

    1962, October 26: Unannounced Titan missile launch
    During the Cuba Crisis, some radar warning stations that were under construction and near completion were brought into full operation as fast as possible. The planned overlap of coverage was thus not always available.

    A normal test launch of a Titan-II ICBM took place in the afternoon of 26 October, from Florida towards the S. Pacific. It caused temporary concern at Moorestown Radar site until its course could be plotted and showed no predicted impact within the United States. It was not until after this event that the potential for a serious false alarm was realized, and orders were given that radar warning sites must be notified in advance of test launches, and the countdown be relayed to them.

    1962, October 26: Malmstrom Air Force Base
    When DEFCON 2 was declared on 24 October, solid-fuel Minuteman-1 missiles at Malmstrom Air Force Base were being prepared for full deployment. The work was accelerated to ready the missiles for operation, without waiting for the normal handover procedures and safety checks. When one silo and the first missile were ready on 26 October no armed guards were available to cover transport from the normal separate storage, so the launch- enabling equipment and codes were all placed in the silo. It was thus physically possible for a single operator to launch a fully armed missile at a SIOP target.

    During the remaining period of the Crisis the several missiles at Malmstrom were repeatedly put on and off alert as errors and defects were found and corrected. Fortunately no combination of errors caused or threatened an unauthorized launch, but in the extreme tension of the period the danger can well be imagined.

    October 1962: NATO Readiness
    It is recorded in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan¹s diary for 22 October that in order to avoid provocation of U.S.S.R., he and the NATO Supreme Commander, General Lauris Norstad, agreed not to put NATO on alert. When the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered DEFCON 3 Norstad was authorized to use his discretion in complying. Norstad therefore did not order a NATO alert. However, several NATO subordinate commanders did order alerts to DEFCON 3 or equivalent levels of readiness at bases in West Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Britain. This seems to have been largely due to the action of General Truman Landon, CINC U.S. Air Forces Europe, who had already started alert procedures on 17 October in anticipation of a serious crisis over Cuba.

    October 1962: British Alerts
    When U.S. SAC went to DEFCON 2, on 24 October, Bomber Command was carrying out an unrelated readiness exercise. On 26 October Air Marshall Cross, C-in-C Bomber Command, decided to prolong the exercise because of the Cuba crisis, and later increased the alert status of British Nuclear forces so that they could launch within 15 minutes.

    It seems likely that Soviet intelligence would perceive these moves as part of a coordinated plan in preparation for immediate war. They could not be expected to know that neither the British Minister of Defence nor Prime Minister Macmillan had authorized them.

    It is disturbing to note how little was learned from these errors in Europe. McGeorge Bundy wrote in Danger and Survival (New York: Random House 1988) “the risk [of nuclear war] was small, given the prudence and unchallenged final control of the two leaders.”

    1962, October 28: Moorestown false alarm
    Just before 9 a.m. on 28 October, the Moorestown, N.J., radar operators informed national command post that a nuclear attack appeared to be under way. A test tape simulating a missile launch from Cuba was being run, and simultaneously a satellite came over the horizon. Operators became confused and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ that impact was expected 18 miles west of Tampa at 9.02 a.m. The whole of NORAD was alerted, but before irrevocable action had been taken it was reported that no detonation had taken place at the predicted time, and Moorestown operators reported the reason for the false alarm.

    During the incident overlapping radars that should have confirmed or disagreed were not in operation. The radar post had not received routine information of satellite passage because the facility carrying out that task had been given other work for the duration of the Crisis.

    1962, October 28: False warning due to satellite sighting
    At 5.26 p.m. on 28 October, the Laredo radar warning site had just become operational. Operators misidentified a satellite in orbit as two possible missiles over Georgia, and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ. NORAD was unable to identify that the warning came from the new station at Laredo and believed it to be from Moorestown, and therefore more reliable. Moorestown failed to intervene and contradict the false warning. By the time C-in-C NORAD had been informed, no impact had been reported and the warning was “given low credence”.

    END OF CUBA CRISIS EVENTS

    1962 November 2: The Penkovsky False Warning
    In the Fall of 1962 Col. Oleg Penkovsky was working in Russia as a double agent for the (U.S.) CIA. He had been given a code by which to warn the CIA if he was convinced that a Soviet attack on the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, one minute apart, and only blow into the receiver. Further information was then to be left at a “dead drop” in Moscow.

    The prearranged code message was received by the CIA on 2 November, 1962.

    It was not known at CIA that Penkovsky had been arrested on 22 October. Penkovsky knew he was going to be executed. It is not known whether he had told KGB the meaning of the code signal or only how it could be given, nor is it known exactly why or with what authorization KGB staff used it. When another CIA agent checked the dead drop he was arrested.

    1965, November: Power failure and faulty bomb alarms
    Special bomb alarms were installed near military facilities and near cities in U.S.A. so that the locations of nuclear bursts would be transmitted before the expected communication failure. The alarm circuits were set up to display a red signal at command posts the instant that the flash of a nuclear detonation reached the sensor and before the blast could put it out of action. Normally the display would show a green signal, and yellow if the sensor was not operating or was out of communication for any other reason.

    During the commercial power failure in NE United States in November 1965, displays from all the bomb alarms for the area should have shown yellow. In fact two of them from different cities showed red because of circuit errors. The effect was consistent with the power failure being due to nuclear weapon explosions, and the Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert. Apparently the military did not.

    1968, January 21: B-52 crash near Thule
    Communication between NORAD HQ and the BMEWS station at Thule had 3
    elements:
    1. Direct radio communication.
    2. A “bomb alarm” as described above.
    3. Radio communication relayed by a B-52 bomber on airborne alert.

    On 21 January, 1968, fire broke out in the B-52 bomber on airborne alert near Thule. The pilot prepared for an emergency landing at the base. However the situation deteriorated rapidly, and the crew had to bale out. There had been no time to communicate with SAC HQ, and the pilotless plane flew over the Thule base before crashing on the ice 7 miles offshore. Its fuel and the high explosive component of its nuclear weapons exploded, but there was no nuclear detonation.

    At that time, the “one point safe” condition of the nuclear weapons could not be guaranteed, and it is believed that a nuclear explosion could have resulted from accidental detonation of the high explosive trigger. Had there been a nuclear detonation even at 7 miles distant, and certainly if much nearer the base, all three communication methods would have given an indication consistent with a successful nuclear attack on both the base and the B-52 bomber. The bomb alarm would have shown red, and the two other communication paths would have gone dead. It would hardly have been anticipated that the combination could have been caused by accident, particularly as the map of the routes for B-52 airborne alert flights approved by the president showed no flight near to Thule. The route had apparently been changed without informing the White House.

    October 73: False alarm during Middle East crisis
    On 24 October, 1973, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire intended to end the Arab-Israeli war was in force, further fighting started between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai desert. U.S. intelligence reports and other sources suggested that U.S.S.R. was planning to intervene to protect the Egyptians. President Nixon was in the throes of the Watergate episode and not available for a conference, so Kissinger and other U.S. officials ordered DEFCON 3. The consequent movements of aircraft and troops were of course observed by Soviet intelligence. The purpose of the alert was not to prepare for war, but to warn U.S.S.R. not to intervene in Sinai. However, if the following accident had not been promptly corrected then the Soviet command might have made a more dangerous interpretation.

    On 25 October, while DEFCON 3 was in force, mechanics were repairing one of the Klaxons at Kinchloe Air Force Base, Michigan, and accidentally activated the whole base alarm system. B-52 crews rushed to their aircraft and started the engines. The duty officer recognized that the alarm was false, and recalled the crews before any took off.

    1979 November 9: Computer Exercise Tape
    At 8.50 a.m. on 9 November, 1979, duty officers at 4 command centres (NORAD HQ, SAC Command Post, the Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center) all saw on their displays a pattern showing a large number of Soviet missiles in a full-scale attack on U.S.A. During the next 6 minutes emergency preparations for retaliation were made. A number of Air Force planes were launched, including the president’s National Emergency Airborne Command Post, though without the president! The president had not been informed, perhaps because he could not be found.

    No attempt was made to use the hot line either to ascertain the Soviet intentions or to tell the Russians the reason for the U.S. actions. This seems to me to have been culpable negligence. The whole purpose of the “Hot Line” was to prevent exactly the type of disaster that was threatening at that moment.

    With commendable speed, NORAD was able to contact PAVE PAWS early warning radar and learn that no missiles had been reported. Also, the sensors on satellites were functioning that day and had detected no missiles. In only 6 minutes the threat assessment conference was terminated.

    The reason for the false alarm was an exercise tape running on the computer system. U.S. Senator Charles Percy happened to be in NORAD HQ at the time and is reported to have said there was absolute panic. A question was asked in Congress. The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation, and an off-site testing facility was constructed so that test tapes did not in future have to be run on a system that could possibly be in military operation.

    June 80: Faulty Computer Chip
    The warning displays at the Command Centers mentioned in the last episode included windows that normally showed

    0000 ICBMs detected 0000 SLBMs detected

    At 2.25 a.m. on 3 June, 1979, these displays started showing various numbers of missiles detected, represented by 2’s in place of one or more 0’s. Preparations for retaliation were instituted, including nuclear bomber crews starting their engines, launch of Pacific Command’s Airborne Command Post, and readying of Minuteman missiles for launch. It was not difficult to assess that this was a false alarm because the patterns of numbers displayed were not rational.

    While the cause of that false alarm was still being investigated 3 days later, the same thing happened and again preparations were made for retaliation.

    The cause was a single faulty chip that was failing in random fashion. The basic design of the system was faulty, allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive display at several command posts.

    This selection represents only a fraction of the false alarms that have been reported on the American side. Many probably remain unreported, or are hidden in records that remain classified. There are likely to have been as many on the Soviet side which are even more difficult to access.

    The extreme boredom and isolation of missile launch crews on duty must contribute to occasional bizarre behaviour. An example is reported by Lloyd J.Dumas in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol.36, #9, p.15 (1980) quoting Air Force Magazine of 17 Nov.71. As a practical joke, a silo crew recorded a launch message and played it when their relief came on duty. The new crew heard with consternation what appeared to be a valid launch message. They would not of course have been able to effect an actual launch under normal conditions, without proper confirmation from outside the silo.

    COMMENT AND NOTE ON PROBABILITY

    The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the occasions listed may have been small, due to planned “failsafe” features in the warning and launch systems, and to responsible action by those in the chain of command when the failsafe features had failed. However, the accumulation of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks adds up to serious danger.

    There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these mishaps but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only 1 in 100, it is a mathematical fact that the chance of surviving all 20 would have been 82%, i.e. about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger at Russian roulette played \ with a 6-shooter. With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger. If the risk in some of the events had been as high as 1 in 10, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have been less than 50:50.

    The following incident is added to illustrate that even now, when the Cold War has been over for 8 years, errors can still cause concern. Some have said this incident brought the world very close to an accidental nuclear war. That is debatable, but there are still 30,000 nuclear weapons deployed, so grave danger would exist if two nuclear weapons states should get into a hostile adversarial status again.

    January 95: Norwegian Meteorological Missile
    On 25 January, 1995, the Russian early warning radars detected an unexpected missile launch near Spitzbergen. The estimated flight time to Moscow was 5 minutes. The Russian President, the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff were informed. The early warning and the control and command systems switched to combat mode. Within 5 minutes, the radars determined that the missile’s impact point would be outside the Russian borders.

    The missile was carrying instruments for scientific measurements. On 16 January Norway had notified 35 countries including Russia that the launch was planned. Information had apparently reached the Russian Defense Ministry, but failed to reach the on-duty personnel of the early warning system.

    Principal Sources

    Sagan, Scott D.: The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
    University Press, 1993).
    Peace Research Reviews, vol.IX, 4, 5 (1984); vol.X, 3,4(1986) (Dundas,
    ON.: Peace Research Institute, Dundas).
    Calder, Nigel: Nuclear Nightmares (London: British Broadcasting
    Corporation, 1979).
    Britten, Stewart: The Invisible Event (London: Menard Press, 1983)

    Acronyms

    BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site
    CIA Central Intelligence Agency
    CINC Commander in Chief
    DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition
    (DEFCON 5 is the peacetime state;
    DEFCON 1 is maximum war readiness)
    HQ Headquarters
    ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (land based)
    KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopaznosti
    (Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence)
    NORAD North American Air Defense Command
    PAVE PAWS Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System
    SAC Strategic Air Command
    SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
    SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

  • Thirteen Million Voices for Abolishing Nuclear Arms

    More than thirteen million Japanese citizens have signed a petition calling for the abolition of the world’s nuclear arsenals in what may be the greatest outpouring of support ever for creating a nuclear weapons free world. The petition is part of a global campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons called Abolition 2000, an international network of over 900 citizen action groups in 74 countries.

    The signatures in Japan were collected in just three months, from November 1997 to January 1998, by members of the Soka Gakkai, a Japanese Buddhist organization long active on disarmament issues. On February 21, 1998, at a ceremony at the Memorial Hall of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the signatures will be presented to David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a leader in the Abolition 2000 campaign. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is the International Contact for the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons.

    “These signatures represent voices of the common people, people in Japan who know the devastation caused by nuclear weapons,” said Krieger. “The people are tired of waiting, they are tired of excuses. The Cold War is long over, and they want an end to the nuclear threat. They understand that the only way to do this is to eliminate nuclear weapons. They are sending a message to the rest of the world, and particularly to the leaders of the nuclear weapons states.”

    According to Krieger, notice of the petition campaign will be provided to the leaders of all nuclear weapons states, and to delegates to the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference which will take place in Geneva from April 27 through May 8, 1998. Krieger also said that plans are being made to pass the 13 million signatures supporting Abolition 2000 to Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to Jayantha Dhanapala, the newly appointed UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament.

    “The nuclear weapons states are currently stalled in efforts to fulfill their promise in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to eliminate their nuclear arsenals,” said Krieger. “We are hopeful that these 13 million plus voices for nuclear weapons abolition will get them moving. There are still some 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and the only number that makes sense for humanity is zero.”

    The Abolition 2000 International Petition calls for ending the nuclear weapons threat, signing an international treaty by the year 2000 to eliminate nuclear weapons within a fixed time period, and reallocating resources from military purposes to meeting human needs and assuring a sustainable future.

    Petition drives are continuing in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, Netherlands, United Kingdom, the United States and other countries. The petition can be signed on the Worldwide Web at www.wagingpeace.org.

  • We Owe an Allegiance to Humanity

    This interview was held with Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate, when he visited Santa Barbara to receive the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 1997 Lifetime Achievement Award for Distinguished Peace Leadership. Professor Rotblat was interviewed on October 29, 1997 by Foundation President David Krieger.

    Krieger: Having worked for more than 50 years for the elimination of nuclear weapons, how would you assess the progress that’s been made toward achieving a nuclear weapons free world?

    Rotblat: I believe that we have made significant progress. Perhaps hopes were a bit too optimistic that, with end of the Cold War, very quickly we could get rid of all nuclear weapons because their purpose, if there was any purpose, certainly ceased to exist. We hoped that particularly the United States would then take drastic steps to get rid of the weapons. Steps have been taken; a certain amount of the dismantlement of weapons has taken place with a number of treaties, stopping testing, etc. But I am disappointed that the progress is not greater, particularly that the nuclear powers still stick to the same way of thinking they did during the Cold War – that nuclear weapons are needed for security. As long as this thinking exists, there is not much hope that there will be an agreement by the nuclear powers to get rid of the weapons. I believe, however, that we’re gradually winning the logical argument against the retention of nuclear weapons. What is needed at the present is a push from the mass media and from mass movements to support the suggestions made in a number of recent studies. I believe that if this is done and specific ideas put forward which could easily be implemented, it will start the process of elimination of nuclear weapons which could be achieved in about two decades.

    Krieger: What do you think is needed to achieve the sort of mass movement for abolition that you are calling for?

    Rotblat: I think two things – a positive and a negative. The negative one is to point out that the problem with nuclear weapons has not been solved – that the progress which started the world toward disarmament has come to a halt. There is now a real danger that the nuclear arms race will start again and more nations will acquire nuclear weapons. People must realize that the nuclear issue must be put on the agenda because of the real threat that we will go back to the dangers that existed during the Cold War. People should be aware there is a danger.

    And then, following out of this, we must put forth specific proposals which will start the whole disarmament process over again. In my opinion, among several proposals like de-alerting of nuclear weapons, separating warheads from the missiles, all of which will make the world safer, we also need something which will enable us to go ahead to the actual elimination of nuclear weapons. One such step is a No First Use Treaty, providing that the nuclear weapons states will agree among themselves that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack and nothing else. Once they’ve agreed to this, if they agree to such a treaty, then I see the way directly open to the final step to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Krieger: What will have to happen for the nuclear weapons states to take such a significant step?

    Rotblat: They will have to be pushed towards it. And I said there are two things. One is to present the logical argument which is really unassailable. There’s no need for nuclear weapons today. It’s been shown that the world can live in better safety without nuclear weapons than with nuclear weapons. So the first thing is to convince the nuclear weapons states from the professional’s point of view, and then they’ll have to feel the pressure from the people because, after all, they are subject to election. They can’t ignore the voice of the people. If we can build up a real mass movement – people demonstrating, writing petitions, writing to member of Parliament, etc. – if we can just build up to a real crescendo, then I think the nuclear weapons states will have to accept it.

    Krieger: What you are calling for is a campaign to educate the people on the one hand and to educate the leaders on the other hand. Is that correct?

    Rotblat: You cannot start a mass movement without telling people what they are trying to achieve. Therefore, when I speak about starting a mass movement, of course, it has to start by educating the people. Give them the facts. They should not just believe they are living in a world where nuclear weapons don’t matter. The truth now is that many people think that the danger is over completely, and this is the reason why the nuclear issue is no longer on the agenda. The first thing is to inform the people that the process is not complete, and in fact it may reverse. Give them facts. Groups like yours, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, have a big task in this mass movement campaign for the abolition of nuclear weapons, part of the Abolition 2000 program.

    Krieger: Do you believe that we will achieve a nuclear weapons free world in a reasonable period of time?

    Rotblat: I don’t know what is reasonable. I would like to see it in my lifetime, at least the beginning. What is important is for the nuclear weapons states to get away from the mode of thinking that nuclear weapons are needed for security. This I believe could be achieved very quickly. It could be done before the end of the century. It could be done next year. I believe that if this were achieved, if leaders really accepted a No First Use Treaty, which would mean a breakthrough in their thinking, from then on it would be largely a technical matter how to ensure that a convention banning nuclear weapons will not be violated. I believe this can be done. The main thing is to start the process. If the process is started, which I hope will happen soon, then it would take another two decades until a nuclear weapons free world is completely achieved.

    Krieger: This way of thinking that you’re talking about, do you believe this is what Einstein meant when he made his famous statement that “the splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking”?

    Rotblat: What he meant was a new way to approach the problem of security – away from national security to global security. This is a new way of thinking. Many people have adopted it, but not yet the decision-makers. We still need a new way of thinking. It is still the most important issue at the present time.

    Krieger: You mentioned Abolition 2000 – the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to be agreed to before the year 2000. Can you share some of your thoughts on this Abolition 2000 campaign?

    Rotblat: It is a much needed mass movement campaign. It will be, I believe, the deciding factor in whether the nuclear decision makers will accept abolition or not. But I feel that we need something more than has been done up to now. Additional aspects need to be added to the present movement, that is, to explain to people that they have to do something about the danger and then point to a number of events and pull out specifically one event that we can get very quickly. In my opinion this would be a No First Use Treaty. I think that with this there is a good chance that we shall be successful.

    Krieger: You’re almost 89 years old and you’ve worked hard over the course of your life to eliminate nuclear weapons and to engender more responsibility by scientists as well as citizens in general. What gives you hope for the future?

    Rotblat: My hope is based on logic. Namely, there is no alternative. If we don’t do this, then we are doomed. The whole existence of humankind is endangered. We are an endangered species now and we have to take steps to prevent the extinguishing of the human species. We owe an allegiance to humanity. Since there is no other way, then we must proceed in this way. Therefore, if we must do it, then there is hope that it will be done.

    Krieger: I know that you have a great concern for young people and for life. If you could give one message to the young people of today, what would it be?

    Rotblat: My message would be: “You have a duty. You enjoy many fine aspects of life, better perhaps than your parents had. We have bequeathed to you many of the things which we ourselves have inherited and have tried to improve on, to ensure that you have a happy life. I think it is your duty to ensure that this goes on to your children and your grandchildren so that human life on this planet will continue to be enriched all the time.”

    Krieger: Thank you.