Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Non-Proliferation

  • The Wrong Deterrence: The Threat of Loose Nukes Is One of Our Own Making

    Nuclear terrorism, thankfully, is still only a specter, not a reality. But the recent wave of bloodshed in Russia underscores the urgency of the need to prevent terrorists capable of indiscriminate slaughter from acquiring nuclear bombs.

    To its credit, the Bush administration has finally launched an ambitious initiative to better secure nuclear and radiological materials, particularly in violence-racked Russia. But unless the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which was introduced in May, becomes part of a far more comprehensive approach to the challenges of nuclear theft and terrorism, it is destined to fall well short of its goal of safeguarding the American people from the threat of nuclear weapons.

    The initiative builds on the bilateral nonproliferation efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a U.S. government-funded, post-Cold War effort that focused on securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The new, expanded cooperative effort seeks to collect weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium that could be used in nuclear bombs from dozens of additional countries, and to lock them down in secure facilities.

    But with U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces still on hair-trigger alert, we need to recognize that present policies for reducing the risk of nuclear strikes against the United States by terrorists or rogue countries are inconsistent and self-defeating. On the one hand, in the name of deterrence, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces both comply with their presidents’ instructions to be constantly prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war with each other at a moment’s notice. On the other hand, in the name of nonproliferation, the United States and Russia cooperate closely in securing Russia’s nuclear weapons against theft.

    By keeping thousands of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch, even under normal peacetime circumstances, the United States projects a powerful deterrent threat at Russia. But at the same time, it causes Russia to retain thousands of weapons in its operational inventory, scattered across that country’s vast territory, and to keep them ready for rapid use in large-scale nuclear war with America. And to maintain the reliability of these far-flung weapons, Russia must constantly transport large numbers back and forth between a remanufacturing facility and the dispersed military bases. This perpetual motion creates a serious vulnerability, because transportation is the Achilles’ heel of nuclear weapons security.

    On any given day, many hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons are moving around the countryside. Nearly 1,000 of them are in some stage of transit or temporary storage awaiting relocation at any time. This constant movement between the far-flung nuclear bases and the remanufacturing facility at Ozersk in the southern Urals stems from the esoteric technical fact that Russian nuclear bombs are highly perishable. In contrast to American bombs, which have a shelf life of more than 30 years, Russian bombs last only eight to 12 years before corrosion and internal decay render them unreliable — prone to fizzling instead of exploding. At that point, they must be shipped back to the factory for remanufacturing. Every year many hundreds of bombs, perhaps as many as a thousand, roll out of Russia’s Mayak factory. The United States turns out fewer than 10 per year. In Russia, the rail and other transportation lines linking the factory to the far-flung nuclear bases across 10 time zones are buzzing with nuclear activity and provide fertile ground for terrorist interception.

    Keeping a small strategic arsenal consolidated at a limited number of locations close to the Mayak factory would be the ideal security environment for preventing Russian nuclear bombs from falling into terrorist hands. But the ongoing nuclear dynamic between the former Cold War foes creates the opposite environment, which undercuts security. Russian nuclear commanders, confronted with U.S. submarines lurking off their coasts with 10-minute missile-flight times to Moscow and thousands of launch-ready U.S. warheads on land- and sea-based missiles aimed at thousands of targets in Russia, are compelled to match the American posture in numbers, alert status and geographic dispersal. U.S. leaders must decide which goal takes precedence: sustaining the Cold War legacy of massive arsenals to deter a massive surprise nuclear attack, or shoring up the security of Russian nuclear weapons to prevent terrorists from grabbing them (or corrupt guards from stealing and selling them).

    And terrorists grabbing such a weapon as it shuttles between deployment fields and factories is not the worst-case scenario stemming from this nuclear gamesmanship. The theft of a nuclear bomb could spell eventual disaster for an American city, but the seizure of a ready-to-fire strategic long-range nuclear missile or group of missiles capable of delivering bombs to targets thousands of miles away could be apocalyptic for entire nations.

    If scores of armed Chechen rebels were able to slip into the heart of Moscow and hold a packed theater hostage for days, as they did in 2002, might it not be possible for terrorists to infiltrate missile fields in rural Russia and seize control of a nuclear-armed mobile rocket roaming the countryside? It’s an open question that warrants candid bilateral discussion of the prospects of terrorists capturing rockets and circumventing the safeguards designed to foil their illicit firing, especially since the 9/11 commission report revealed that al Queda plotters considered this very idea.

    Another specter concerns terrorists “spoofing” radar or satellite sensors or cyber-terrorists hacking into early warning networks. By either firing short-range missiles that fool warning sensors into reporting an attack by longer-range missiles, or feeding false data into warning computer networks, could sophisticated terrorists generate false indications of an enemy attack that results in a mistaken launch of nuclear rockets in “retaliation?” False alarms have been frequent enough on both sides under the best of conditions. False warning poses an acute danger as long as Russian and U.S. nuclear commanders are given, as they still are today, only several pressure-packed minutes to determine whether an enemy attack is underway and to decide whether to retaliate. Russia’s deteriorating early-warning network, coupled with terrorist plotting against it, only heightens the dangers.

    Russia is not the only crucible of risk. The early-warning and control problems plaguing Pakistan, India and other nuclear proliferators are even more acute. As these nations move toward hair-trigger stances for their nuclear missiles, the terrorist threat to them will grow in parallel.

    Even the U.S. nuclear control apparatus is far from fool-proof. For example, a Pentagon investigation of nuclear safeguards conducted several years ago made a startling discovery — terrorist hackers might be able to gain back-door electronic access to the U.S. naval communications network, seize control electronically of radio towers such as the one in Cutler, Maine, and illicitly transmit a launch order to U.S. Trident ballistic missile submarines armed with 200 nuclear warheads apiece. This exposure was deemed so serious that Trident launch crews had to be given new instructions for confirming the validity of any launch order they receive. They would now reject certain types of firing orders that previously would have been carried out immediately.

    Both countries are running terrorist risks of this sort for the sake of an obsolete deterrent strategy. The notion that either the United States or Russia would deliberately attack the other with nuclear weapons is ludicrous, while the danger that terrorists are plotting to get their hands on these arsenals is real. We need to kick our old habits and stand down our hair-trigger forces. Taking U.S. and Russian missiles off of alert would automatically reduce, if not remove, the biggest terrorist threats that stem from keeping thousands of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles fueled, targeted and waiting for a couple of computer signals to fire. They would fly the instant they received these signals, which can be sent with a few keystrokes on a launch console.

    To keep them from flying, we ought to reverse our priorities for nuclear security. The U.S. government should not be spending 25 times more on its deterrent posture than it spends on all of our nonproliferation assistance to Russia and other countries to help them keep their nuclear bombs and materials from falling into terrorist hands. Both the United States and Russia should be spending more on de-alerting, dismantling and securing our arsenals than on prepping them for a large-scale nuclear war with each other.

    The current deterrent practices of the two nuclear superpowers are not only anachronistic, they are thwarting our ability to protect ourselves against the real threats.

    Bruce Blair is president of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information and a former Minuteman launch officer.

    This article first appeared in The Washington Post , September 19, 2004.

  • Senator Feinstein Takes Commendable Stand Against New Nukes

    Concerned citizens from all over the US have been writing their Congressional representatives in opposition to the Bush administration’s plans to research and develop dangerous new nuclear weapons. Elected officials are feeling the heat from their constituents . Some members of Congress are taking commendable stands on this important issue . Sen ator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) in particular has been struggling to eliminate funding for new nuclear weapons. Below is a copy of a letter she is sending constituents in response to their letters.

    If you haven’t already, please take a moment to write to the President and your Members of Congress using the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Action Center.

    —

    Thank you for your letter regarding the development and use of nuclear weapons. I appreciate hearing from you on this important issue. I am deeply concerned by the Bush Administration’s renewed emphasis on the development of so-called “low-yield” nuclear weapons. This policy includes the possible repeal of prohibitions on developing “low-yield” bombs and deep-penetration “bunker-busters.” Even more troubling is the fact that the Administration is contemplating giving nuclear armaments a role in the new doctrine of preemption. I believe that this is taking our Nation in exactly the wrong direction.

    There is no question that a full range of policy options for dealing with new and uncertain threats should be on the table.

    Nevertheless, I am concerned that the development of nuclear weapons by the United States would blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear forces, and in turn, diminish our ability to dissuade other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons.

    Again, thank you for your letter. Please know that I am closely monitoring these developments and will do what I can to limit the development of new nuclear weapons by our country. If you have additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact my Washington, DC office at (202) 224-3841.

    Sincerely yours,

    Dianne Feinstein
    United States Senator

    http://feinstein.senate.gov

    Further information about my position on issues of concern to California and the Nation are available at my website http://feinstein.senate.gov . You can also receive electronic e-mail updates by subscribing to my e-mail list athttp://feinstein.senate.gov/issue.html

  • Toward The 2005 Non-Proliferatioin Treaty Review Conference

    Toward The 2005 Non-Proliferatioin Treaty Review Conference

    The State of the World

    As we move toward the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, the world is experiencing increased extremism and instability. The extremism has manifested in the form of significant attacks by clandestine international terrorist organizations, such as those on 9/11, and acts of retaliation by powerful states that may or may not be directly related to the initial assaults. Neither the terrorists nor the state leaders involved have demonstrated reasonable regard for established rules of international law.

    In the background of this clash between extremist organizations and governments lurks the ever present danger of the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The possibility of course exists that groups like al Qaeda could somehow acquire nuclear weapons from a sympathetic state or from criminal elements. Should such a group attain nuclear weapons it is unlikely they could be deterred from using them, particularly since they have no fixed location that could be threatened with retaliation in accord with the theory of deterrence.

    At the same time, the United States has put in place policies that appear to lower the barriers to the use of nuclear weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review calls for contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven countries, including at least four that are non-nuclear weapons states. It is also declared US policy to use nuclear weapons against chemical or biological weapon stores or in retaliation for the use of these weapons.

    With its doctrine of preventive war, the US administration is undermining the system of international law set in place after the Second World War “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” It has chosen a path of unilateralism and “coalitions of the willing” over multilateral approaches in accord with international law. The US government is further undermining international law by its failure to support many existing treaties and by its active opposition to the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold leaders accountable for the most egregious crimes under international law.

    The Role of the NPT

    The NPT was established primarily to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states other than the first five nuclear weapon states. The treaty was the brainchild of the US, UK and Russia, who believed that the world would be a safer place if they, along with France and China, controlled the world’s store of nuclear weapons. It was largely a self-serving proposition, not one that offered much inducement for other countries to sign off on nuclear weapons. The NPT bargain contained two elements that presumably benefited the countries that agreed to give up their right to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. First, the treaty promised them assistance in developing the “peaceful” uses of nuclear energy, going so far as to describe nuclear power as an “inalienable right.” Second, the treaty had provisions that the nuclear weapons states would engage in “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament and called for a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

    The NPT was put forward in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The non-nuclear weapons states are undoubtedly wondering when the “good faith” negotiations by the nuclear weapons states will begin and why the United States in particular still seems intent on developing new nuclear weapons, such as mini-nukes and “bunker busters.”

    At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the parties to the treaty adopted by consensus a Final Document that contained 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps included the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the preservation and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and called for the nuclear weapons states to take unilateral as well as multilateral steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. It also called for greater transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and for making irreversibility a principle of nuclear weapons reductions. On virtually every one of these commitments, the US, under the Bush administration, has shown bad faith. It is demonstrating that US commitments are not likely to be honored and that the most powerful country in the world finds nuclear weapons useful and is attempting to make them more usable.

    Iraq, Iran and North Korea

    In his 2001 State of the Union Address, President Bush described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an Axis of Evil. In 2002 he began mobilizing US troops in the Middle East and threatening Iraq. In March 2003 he initiated a preventive war against Iraq, which his administration justified on the grounds that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that posed an imminent threat to the US. In the aftermath of the initial combat phase in Iraq, despite extensive searching, no weapons of mass destruction have been located in Iraq.

    Observing the US threats and attacks against Iraq might well have led Iran and North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons programs aimed at deterring US aggression. At this point, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, as is its legal right, and Iran is cooperating with inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

    Six nation talks (US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) have been going on to try to resolve the impasse over North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its declared intention to develop a nuclear arsenal. The CIA estimates that North Korea may currently have one or two nuclear weapons and the materials to make another six or so weapons in the short-term. North Korea is asking for the US to provide it with a non-aggression pact as the price for giving up its nuclear ambitions. It is a small price. The US has vacillated on whether to do this, but recently has indicated its willingness to give informal assurances. It remains unclear whether such assurances will be sufficient to bring North Korea back into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

    Current Problems with the NPT

    In addition to North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty, there are other problems. First, its promotion of nuclear energy and nuclear research create the ever-present possibility of countries using the nuclear materials to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Second, it lacks universality and the countries that have refused to join (India, Pakistan and Israel) have all developed nuclear arsenals and have thus, in a sense, been “rewarded” for not joining. Third, there are many unfulfilled commitments, particularly the nuclear disarmament commitments by the nuclear weapons states, which give the appearance that these countries are just making empty promises that they have no intention of keeping.

    There has been virtually no progress on any of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It is difficult for the non-nuclear weapon states to view this in any way other than as a sign of bad faith on the part of the nuclear weapons states.

    The Role of NGOs

    Given the state of the world and the current problems with the NPT, it seems appropriate for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the disarmament area to question the value of the treaty. What good is a treaty in which the most powerful states do not fulfill their obligations or keep their promises? There is no doubt that the behavior of the nuclear weapon states, and particularly the US, have undermined the value of the NPT and raised serious questions about it in the minds of many observers.

    The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) states have made a diligent effort to get the NPT back on track with their resolutions in the United Nations, but they have been stonewalled by the US and most of its allies. The Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations, has attempted to support and promote the positions of the NAC throughout the world. Through these efforts, they achieved a slight crack in the stone wall when Canada, a NATO member, voted in support of the NAC resolution in the First Committee of the United Nations in November 2003.

    NGOs will likely continue to support and promote the efforts to make the parties to the NPT live up to their obligations, but at the same time are undoubtedly disheartened by the ongoing failure of the nuclear weapon states to meet their obligations or even show minimal good faith. In the years since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 and despite the end of the Cold War, there has been no substantial progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    NGOs must choose the points of greatest importance and leverage, and stress these in their activities.

    First, it is long past time for the nuclear weapon states to provide legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    Second, there should be no regression on the moratorium on nuclear testing.

    Third, there should be far tighter controls of nuclear materials in all states, including the nuclear weapon states.

    In a November 3, 2003 statement to the UN General Assembly, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, called for “limiting the processing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes – as well as the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment – by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to facilities under international control.” In light of the increasing dangers of proliferation, it is amazing that such a proposal was not implemented long ago. It is a minimum acceptable standard for what must take place immediately if proliferation to both other states and terrorists is to be prevented. NGOs should certainly support this proposal.

    NGOs should also press for nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East, Northeast Asia and South Asia. These are dangerous hotspots where the development of nuclear weapons has threatened regional stability and security. To achieve these goals will require concessions by the nuclear weapons states and faster movement toward fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the NPT. A primary activity of NGOs should be to expose the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states and try to develop stronger anti-nuclear sentiments among the populations of these countries and translate such sentiments into political power.

    At the moment there are not many hopeful signs, but one that stands out is 2020 Vision: An Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons by the World Conference of Mayors for Peace. This innovative campaign, spearheaded by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, calls for the 2005 NPT Review Conference to launch “a negotiating process committed to adopting a comprehensive program for progressive and systematic elimination of nuclear weapons by the next NPT Review Conference in 2010,” and then actually eliminating these weapons over the following decade. It is time-bound program that picks up the baton from Abolition 2000.

    I would encourage NGOs to help promote the effort of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace. NGOs must not give up because, in effect, this would be giving up on humanity’s future. That is what is at stake and that is why our work to support the NPT promise of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is so essential.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). This speech was given on November 23, 2003 at the 2nd Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

  • JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation

    Originally Published in Carnegie Analysis

    In honor of the memory of President John F. Kennedy, we present below some of his most important comments on the dangers inherent in the possession of nuclear arms and his proposals for stopping the spread of the the most deadly weapons ever invented.

    “There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is extremely serious. . . I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.” Third Nixon-Kennedy Presidential Debate, October 13, 1960

    “The deadly arms race, and the huge resources it absorbs, have too long overshadowed all else we must do. We must prevent the arms race from spreading to new nations, to new nuclear powers and to the reaches of outer space.” State of the Union Address, January 30, 1961

    “In the thermonuclear age, any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of humanity.” Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961

    “Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

    Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons–ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth–is a source of horror, and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes–for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness–for in a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

    For fifteen years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream–it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race.

    In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan, and a test–a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act.

    Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict and greed– but it would bring a world free from the terrors of mass destruction. It would not usher in the era of the super state–but it would usher in an era in which no state could annihilate or be annihilated by another.

    But to halt the spread of these terrible weapons, to halt the contamination of the air, to halt the spiraling nuclear arms race, we remain ready to seek new avenues of agreement, our new Disarmament Program thus includes the following proposals:

    • First, signing the test-ban treaty by all nations. This can be done now. Test ban negotiations need not and should not await general disarmament.
    • Second, stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and preventing their transfer to any nation now lacking in nuclear weapons.
    • Third, prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not own them.
    • Fourth, keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space.
    • Fifth, gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and converting their materials to peaceful uses; and
    • Finally, halting the unlimited testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and gradually destroying them as well.”
      Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York City, September 25, 1961

    “World order will be secured only when the whole world has laid down these weapons which seem to offer us present security but threaten the future survival of the human race. That armistice day seems very far away. The vast resources on this planet are being devoted more and more to the means of destroying, instead of enriching human life but the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.”State of the Union Address, January 11, 1962

    “Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.” Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962

    “I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

    The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security–it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.” Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963

    “Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

    Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control-a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.

    A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, “the survivors would envy the dead.” For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world’s slide toward final annihilation.

    I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

    If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War.” Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963

  • The Krakow Initiative: Another Blow from Bush

    On May 31, 2003 in the royal castle of Wawel, Krakow, during a state visit to Poland, U.S. President George W. Bush, delivered another forceful blow. This latest onslaught is part of the hegemonic strategy of absolute domination that the Bush administration has assumed in its efforts to consolidate a unipolar vision of the world that the international community rejects with certain timidity but, with a few exceptions, has ended up accepting in real life.

    Significantly, little is known and even less has been commented on in relation to the so-called “Krakow initiative” or, more formally, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in principle aimed at halting the trafficking and increase in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In formalizing his proposal, Bush’s explanation was as follows: “The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation …. When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them.”

    Although he attempted to cloak his words in the rhetoric of legality, the U.S. president promoted and continues to promote a dependent mechanism used by Washington, outside the confines of the United Nations, to control international air space and maritime routes. Initially, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom responded to the call, emphasizing, according to an official statement from the White House released on September 4, 2003, “the need for proactive measures to combat the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

    The goal, to be sure, appears worthy of approval. In practice, however, other nations — Brazil, China, Canada, Russia, South Korea, India, and Pakistan, for the time being, have expressed their concern that the United States seeks to use an instrument of such a scope to strengthen its supremacy in the production of cutting-edge nuclear, ballistic, biological, and chemical technology and to control global transportation routes.

    If the PSI is indeed concretized as conceived by Bush and his strategists, Washington will monopolize espionage, the interception of ships on the high seas and aircraft in international air space, and multilateral control devices, all under the pretext of the simple suspicion that WMD or their components could be in transit.

    The countries that openly oppose the U.S. proposal have pointed to the danger of a quite flexible interpretation of the legal basis for intercepting international transport, as understood by Washington. A first consequence would be the displacement of other producers of weapons and chemical, biological and nuclear products, in favor of the U.S. industrial complex.

    According to the interpretation offered by the Bush administration, almost all cutting-edge technology products can be used in the production of WMD and for the same reason, they can be subject to confiscation by the United States and its allies. This immediately and directly threatens compliance with purchase-sale contracts worldwide and with free international trade, which would become a virtual monopoly of large U.S. corporations and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s European and Asian partners.

    The threat of bioterrorism, for example, which has still not thus far been concretized in specific incidents, has allowed Washington to unilaterally impose much stricter measures of control over foodstuffs and agricultural products exported to the United States and its allied or nearby countries. This, in reality, is an instrument of pressure on exporter countries, which contradicts the norms of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

    In this sense, the law on bioterrorism that is expected to be approved next October is, from the point of view of the Latin American countries, a new and virtually impenetrable barrier to the development of free international trade in agricultural products. This measure, coupled with the U.S. government’s protectionist measures, will sooner than later, cause the collapse of the economies in the region.

    To be sure, no one can have doubts on the importance of strengthening measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in this sense, Bush’s initiative is aimed in the right direction. However, the way in which its functioning has been structured moves away from such real and desirable objectives, to become an element of hegemonic domination.

    The principles that should prevail in the Proliferation Security Initiative should respect international law and the system of norms accepted within the framework of the United Nations. Otherwise, the blow to world legality will be devastating and perhaps definitive.

    *The author is President, Latin American Circle for International Studies (LACIS).

  • Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime

    Each year the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime becomes more uncertain. In the past year alone:

    • North Korea has become the first country ever to withdraw from the treaty.

    • There has been virtually no progress and considerable regression on the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    • The US has reasserted policies of nuclear weapons use that undermine the negative security assurances promised to non-nuclear weapon states parties (NNWS) to the NPT in 1978 and again at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

    • The doctrine of preemption, pursued by the United States and adopted by other states with nuclear weapons, threatens to accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation in the face of the threat of aggressive use of force.

    Bilateral policies of the nuclear weapon states parties (NWS) to the NPT are increasingly integrating those nuclear weapons states outside of the NPT regime: India, Pakistan and Israel’s legitimate nuclear powers, through the elimination of sanctions and technology exchanges.

    The NPT regime obligations are having less and less success in restraining the irresponsible behavior of nations, especially the treaty’s NWS, and the United States in particular. As NWS move further away from their obligations under the treaty, they are simultaneously weakening incentives for non-nuclear weapon state parties to the treaty to remain within the NPT regime. If such regressions continue, they will inevitably lead to an abandonment of disarmament goals and the gradual lack of interest by non-nuclear weapons states parties to remain within the regime’s boundaries. It is time for members of the NPT regime to issue a clear statement outlining how the treaty is being undermined and by whom.

    The NPT 13 Practical Steps Towards Disarmament Ignored

    When the United States ambassador stated at the 2002 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee that Washington no longer supported many of the conclusions from the 2000 NPT Review Conference he was clearly alluding to the 13 Practical Steps to achieve complete disarmament under Article VI of the treaty. In the past year not only has no progress been made in fulfilling these steps but NWS, the United States in particular, have pursued policies that demonstrate significant regression from fulfillment of their Article VI obligations.

    In the past year there have been no further ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by nuclear capable states, including NWS parties to the NPT. There has been no progress in moving towards a fissile material treaty. The principles of irreversibility and verification have been undermined by the United States and Russia in the Moscow Treaty, which lays out reversible offensive reductions without providing for any verification methods. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the START II arms reduction efforts have been entirely abandoned as has progress towards START III. There has been no effort to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and in fact the United States is conducting studies on new nuclear weapon designs. The only area where some progress in meeting the 13 Practical Steps has been made is that some states submitted reports with regard to their Article VI obligations at the 2002 PrepCom, a process that is still being resisted by many NWS, including the United States.

    At the NPT’s inception, disarmament obligations under Article VI played a key role in convincing NNWS that it was in their best interest to sign the treaty, though it restricted their ability to develop nuclear weapons. As these disarmament obligations continue to be ignored by the NWS, they eliminate a significant incentive for NNWS to keep their side of the bargain.

    Negative Security Assurances Undermined

    The US has reiterated its policy to use “overwhelming force” against chemical or biological attacks. This policy was reiterated in the recent US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002, which states, “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including through resort to all of our options to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    Such policies undermine the negative security assurances promised by the United States in 1978 and reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. These assurances are supposed to reassure NNWS that they need not worry about becoming the target of a nuclear weapons attack. Though the United States has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapon attack for some years, the continued emphasis on this first strike policy undermines non-proliferation goals. When the United States, despite its overwhelming conventional military superiority, takes up a policy that requires nuclear weapons to carry out a strike against a potential chemical or biological weapons threat, other states are likely to conclude that nuclear weapons are also necessary for their protection.

    In addition, as the United States continues to fund studies for new tactical weapons designs, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penatrator, it further erodes the confidence building effect of the negative security assurances. These new nuclear weapon designs are not strategic, to be used to deter a nuclear strike upon the United States, but would most likely be used against the chemical or biological facilities or in other tactical battlefield maneuvers in a first strike, most likely against a NNWS. By eroding its own negative security assurances, the United States is diminishing another important incentive for NNWS to remain within the NPT regime.

    Preemption Doctrine Pursued

    The United States government is pursuing a doctrine of preemptive use of force, both in policy and military action, which ultimately threatens to undermine non-proliferation goals. The Bush administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states: “U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used.”

    This US preemption doctrine, which was drafted largely in response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and which was used in justifying the recent invasion of Iraq, is likely to have serious negative effects on the NPT regime.

    First, it is setting a dangerous precedent for other nuclear powers to justify using aggressive preventive force to settle international disputes. Some countries have already begun echoing the new US doctrine as a possible approach to solving long-standing regional conflicts. Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha stated recently, “There were three reasons which drove the Anglo-US forces to attack Iraq possession of weapons of mass destruction, export of terrorism and an absence of democracy all of which exist in Pakistan.” On April 11, 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said he endorsed Sinha’s recent comments that India had “a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United States has in Iraq.” Such a doctrine of preemption pursued by India towards Pakistan is extremely dangerous, particularly given Pakistan’s conventional weakness. In the face of an Indian policy of preemption, Pakistan is likely to approach its own nuclear arsenal with an even higher alert status, bringing these two countries a step closer to intentional or accidental nuclear war, as well as accelerate the regional arms race.

    Second, the US policy of preemption is heightening the level of threat felt by potential nuclear weapons states by adding to the perceived need to possess nuclear weapons in order to ward off an aggressive offensive attack. Instead of warning or discouraging nuclear threshold states such as Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals, the lesson that these countries are most likely to learn from the Iraq example is that they must accelerate their nuclear weapons programs in order avoid to the fate of the Ba’th regime.

    Israel, India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenals Accepted

    In addition to the many regressions from fulfilling obligations under the NPT, NWS policies toward countries with nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT regime are also having a damaging effect on the treaty. Through their evolving bilateral policies, NWS parties to the NPT are increasingly integrating Israel, India and Pakistan into the international community as legitimate nuclear powers outside of the NPT regime, undermining incentives for NNWS to remain within the treaty.

    There has long been a double standard in calling for the adherence to UN resolutions relevant to the elimination of nuclear weapons within the Middle East that puts little pressure on Israel to eliminate its arsenal. While NWS have put increased pressure on countries such as Iraq and Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, Israel has never faced significant consequences for having a nuclear arsenal of some 200 weapons outside of the NPT regime. In fact, by continuing to aid Israel in developing its missile defense technology, the United States is helping Israel create a protective shield from which it may, at some point, be able to launch a nuclear weapon, without perceiving itself to be vulnerable to a reciprocal missile strike. Not only is Israel developing this potentially destabilizing anti-missile technology, but it is also considering selling this technology, if it is given US approval, to India, another nuclear power that is not a member of the NPT regime.

    The United States lifted sanctions against the sale of dual-use technologies to Pakistan in 2001 in order to gain Pakistan’s cooperation in the post-September 11 war on terror. Such sanctions against India, which were partially lifted when India also became part of the US-led “coalition against terrorism” in 2001, were repealed in their entirety in February 2003. The United States Congress is also examining ways to expand the co-operative non-proliferation efforts from states of the former Soviet Union to include countries such as India, aiding them in advancing their nuclear security technology and protocol.

    Reports from a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in December 2002 also indicated that negotiations are moving forward for India to lease at least one Russian-made Akula-11 class nuclear-powered submarine, capable of carrying a payload of nuclear cruise missiles. Though the head of India’s navy, Admiral Madhvendra Singh, refused to confirm or deny assertions concerning the possible lease, if such a lease is undertaken it would significantly alter the balance of nuclear capability between India and Pakistan. Prior to the summit, Russia announced its intention to allow India to become an associated member of the United Nuclear Research Institute, one of the top nuclear research institutes in Russia. India was previously denied access to the facilities of this prestigious institute, where nearly half of all Russian nuclear advances have occurred, because it is not a member of the NPT. But India’s NPT status is a factor that appears to be of decreasing concern to the Russian government when considering weapons, science and technology exchanges.

    The increasing transfer of dual-use and missile defense technology to Israel, Pakistan and India continues despite the fact that these countries are not restrained by the NPT regulations from sharing this technology with NNWS, even in the case of Pakistan, a country that likely aided North Korea in developing its uranium-based nuclear weapons program. Such policies clearly undermine the goals of the NPT, sending NNWS a clear message: remaining outside of the NPT regime has many benefits and few costs.

    A Time To Speak

    The NPT was to be the cornerstone for disarmament, arms control and the peaceful prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, a role that the treaty is clearly failing to fulfill. It is no longer fruitful to wait and hope that the political will appears to make the NPT a workable and effective regime. It is time, instead, to realize how and why the regime is not working and what countries bear responsibility for the treaty’s ineffectiveness. The NNWS members of the NPT should unite in motioning for a type of censure, a statement that clearly lays out the reasons for the NPT’s failures holding specific countries responsible for their part in the regime’s degradation. Such a motion would not pass the NPT PrepCom’s procedure of consensus, but it would send a strong message that the majority of NPT members are not complacent in the face of continuing disregard for treaty obligations by the NWS.

    In particular, the United States’ persistent role in undermining the goals of the NPT should be clearly outlined by the other parties to the treaty. If the United States is not going to take its obligations under the NPT seriously, which it shows no intention of doing in either the near or distant future, and if the United States continues to pursue policies that directly undermine the treaty regime, then this behavior must be recognized and forthrightly condemned by the other members of NPT regime. Such a statement is not likely to be effective in changing US policy it could possibly affect the sentiment of the American public. Given that the NPT regime is hardly benefiting from US symbolic membership, there is little to lose by members of the NPT formally voicing a strong opposition to the United States’ many transgressions.

    As the United States government is becoming more and more frank in its disregard for multilateral diplomatic solutions to security issues, so must the international community be frank in its rejection of the aggressive and dangerous policies of the United States that threaten to draw the world into an unending arms race and a state of perpetual war.
    * David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at dkrieger@napf.org. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age (Middle way Press, 2002) and editor of Hope in a Dark Time, Reflections on Humanity’s Future (Capri Press, 2003).

    Devon Chaffee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at advocacy@napf.org.

  • Preemption Is Not The Model

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is back, in this new century, as the most serious challenge to international peace and security. Current reports cite 10 to 15 countries as either having or seeking to acquire such weapons. Is Iraq unique, or is the war in Iraq the new model for solving nonproliferation concerns? Is there still hope for alternatives less unpredictable in outcome and less costly in terms of human life?

    In the bipolar world of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was used to maintain an uneasy security that covered the superpowers, their allies and their spheres of influence. The end of the Cold War was one huge step forward, but the failure to capitalize on the opportunities it offered — to fill the void with a new, inclusive scheme for international security — may have taken us two steps back. Old ethnic conflicts and cultural disputes that had lain dormant both between and within nations were reawakened. The United Nations system of collective security, paralyzed during the Cold War, has not yet been able to reinvent itself to cope with these changing times and new threats. Longstanding conflicts, such as those in the Middle East and Kashmir and on the Korean Peninsula, have continued to fester with little prospect of settlement. And new conflicts have either been mishandled, as in Rwanda and Burundi, or dealt with outside the United Nations system, as in Kosovo.

    The result is to some extent a standoff: On one side is the sluggishness of the declared nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) in moving forward on their commitments to disarm under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This sluggishness is matched on the other side by the foot-dragging of some nonnuclear-weapons states in enacting legal instruments that would empower the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Between these two groups are several others: states that enjoy the protection of the nuclear “umbrella” of one or more of the nuclear weapon nations; states that remain outside the nonproliferation treaty — i.e., India, Israel and Pakistan; countries within the treaty that nonetheless are suspected of pursuing clandestine nuclear weapons programs; states that pursue the “poor man’s alternative” of chemical or biological weapons; and subnational terrorist groups that, in view of the events of September 2001, would not hesitate to acquire and use such weapons.

    Must we conclude, therefore, that it is futile to try to control weapons of mass destruction through a collective, rule-based system of international security — and that the only available alternative is a preemptive military strike based on a premise that a country may be harboring such weapons? I believe we must reform the former rather than resorting to the latter.

    This requires that the U.N. collective system of security be reinvigorated and modernized to match realities — with, for example, agreed limitations on the use of veto power and readily available U.N. forces that possess the flexibility to respond to a variety of situations. But it also requires that we understand the link between security and the underlying urge to acquire ever more potent weapons arsenals.

    The greatest incentives for acquiring weapons of mass destruction exist in regions of chronic tension and longstanding dispute. It is instructive that many suspected efforts to acquire such weapons are in the Middle East, a hotbed of conflict for more than a half-century. We cannot continue to pretend that old wounds, if left unattended, will heal of themselves. Settlements for these chronic disputes must be pursued in earnest, and weapons proliferation concerns must be treated in parallel, as part of the overall settlements.

    We must resolve to treat not only the symptoms but also the root causes of conflicts — foremost the divide between rich and poor, schisms between cultures and regimes in which human rights are brutally suppressed.

    Finally, no collective system of security is sustainable if it is premised on continuing the asymmetry between the nuclear haves and have-nots. As the Canberra Commission stated a few years ago, “the possession of nuclear weapons by any State is a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them.” The new vision of international security must work toward eliminating this asymmetry by delegitimizing weapons of mass destruction, and it must be inclusive in nature, guaranteeing that every nation that subscribes to the new system will be covered by the security “umbrella.”

    Only by eliminating the motivation to acquire weapons of mass destruction can we hope to significantly improve global security.
    * Mohamed ElBaradei is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  • North Korea Incites More US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    David KriegerOn January 10th, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by stating, “North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. This kind of disrespect for such an agreement cannot go undealt with.” Dick Cheney opined that North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT “could undermine decades of non-proliferation efforts.”

    Yet, those who have read and understand the NPT appreciate that the treaty intertwines the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The one is dependent on the other. Since the US and the other declared nuclear weapons states have failed in their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, they should expect, sooner or later, that one result will be a breakdown of the NPT regime.

    The NPT was created in 1968 by the US, UK and Russia as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and, in return, the nuclear weapons states agreed to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    In the years since 1970 when the treaty entered into force, 187 countries have signed and ratified the treaty. All of these countries are non-nuclear except for the five declared nuclear weapons states (US, UK, France, Russia and China). The only four states that are not parties to the treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba, and Cuba has indicated its intention to join the treaty.

    India, Pakistan and Israel have all developed nuclear arsenals outside the framework of the treaty. India made clear for many years that it was willing to forego its nuclear option if the five declared nuclear weapons states would take seriously their obligations for nuclear disarmament. After years of waiting in vain for the implementation of serious nuclear disarmament efforts by the nuclear weapons states, India went nuclear in 1998 and Pakistan followed suit.

    In 1995 when the NPT was extended indefinitely, the declared nuclear weapons states promised “[t]he determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    In 2000, when the parties to the NPT held their sixth review conference, the nuclear weapons states again promised “[a]n unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament….” In addition to violating this obligation, the US has also withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after promising in 2000 that it would preserve and strengthen this treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability.”

    The US also agreed to apply the “principle of irreversibility” to nuclear disarmament, meaning that deactivated warheads would be destroyed. Instead of following this principle, however, the US pushed the Russians to agree to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that is based upon the opposite principle, that of reversibility. The US announced that at its discretion the strategic nuclear weapons taken off active deployment pursuant to the agreement would be kept in storage for potential future redeployment.

    After the US promised “the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” in 2000, the Bush administration has refused to re-send this treaty to the Senate for ratification (the Senate failed to ratify in 1999). The Bush administration has also sought to reduce the time needed to resume nuclear testing.

    Bush spokesperson Ari Fleischer commented on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “There is a light at the end of the tunnel, and that begins with North Korea’s immediately dismantling its nuclear weapons programs and coming into compliance with its obligations around the world.” The light at the end of the tunnel could also begin with the United States coming into compliance with its obligations around the world, starting with its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

    To defuse the current crisis with North Korea, the US should pursue a policy of engagement. It should accept North Korea’s offer to enter into negotiations for a non-aggression pact. The US should also offer to provide North Korea with additional development assistance to help them in building their economy and eliminating starvation.

    Assurances of peace and non-aggression on the Korean Peninsula would make all of North Korea’s neighbors more comfortable. Such assurances would also be an acceptable trade-off for North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency back into the country to verify the termination and dismantlement of any nuclear weapons program. These assurances would allow North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age.

  • Brussels Against Nukes

    On Thursday, 23 May 2002 three students from the Brussels School of International Relations (BSIS) organized a formal opening of an NGO they founded called Brussels against Nukes (BAN). Jonas Tryggvason chaired the event with addresses from Michelle Myers on the background of NAPF and Erol Hofmans on activism and NGO work. This is a chapter of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), based in California, USA. The chapter will focus on nuclear weapons issues such as non-proliferation and academic research in the field of the politics of nuclear weapons. Local activists and students of BSIS and Brussels Free University (VUB) attended the opening.

    The keynote speaker of the evening was Mr. Meindert Stelling, president of Jurists for Peace and affiliated with the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). He spoke about the illegality of nuclear arms with regard to international humanitarian law.

    The founding of BAN has come at an important time for the local community and the world where the use of nuclear weapons poses a greater threat than ever. BAN is looking to make its mark on the Brussels society by becoming an NGO that will educate and involve the community as well as take a stand on a very important issue, the abolition of nuclear weapons.

    In the courses at BSIS, the students have often discussed and debated the issues surrounding nuclear weapons. BAN and its supporters are convinced that the complete elimination of these weapons of mass destruction is the only way to assure the safety of future generations. This is an enormous task, but the establishment of Brussels Against Nukes is a first step in the right direction.

    Each month BAN will organize one event: in June, the focus will be on the U.S. planned withdrawal from the ABM treaty; in July, the statutes for BAN will be discussed and drafted in a workshop format; in August, BAN members will participate in Hiroshima and Nagasaki remembrances together with other anti-nuclear weapons groups in Brussels; and in September BAN will have its first annual meeting where board members will be elected.

    If you are interested in becoming a member, please email Brussels Against Nukes at BANnukes@hotmail.com and we will send you a membership form. You can also find out more about nuclear issues by visiting the main website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at www.wagingpeace.org.

  • Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty Threatens US and International Security

    The Bush Administration’s announcement on 13 December to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to proceed with plans to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses threatens both US and international security. The announcement that the US will withdraw from the accord negotiated with the former USSR is a signal that the US is willing to act unilaterally and outside the jurisdiction of international law. US withdrawal from the ABM treaty may provoke arms races, including in Outer Space, and undermine international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

    The deployment of ballistic missile defenses is not an effective means to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The deployment of ballistic missile defenses will only produce instability and insecurity in critical regions of the world, including in North East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia.

    Although the proposed US missile defense systems would have been utterly useless in the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Pentagon and other proponents of the systems have continued to call for increased funding for missile defense in the US 2002 fiscal year (FY 2002). The FY 2002 Defense Authorization Bill includes $7 to $8.3 billion for missile defense spending (the President is provided authority to spend $1.3 billion either for missile defense or to combat terrorism, a $3 billion or 57% increase over the authorized FY 2001 budget.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an international non-profit, non-partisan education and advocacy organization, believes that a much better option to increase global cooperation and security is to preserve the ABM Treaty until something more comprehensive can replace it. While the stated purpose of ballistic missile defense systems is to defend against missile attacks, it is unlikely that they could do so effectively.

    Additionally, the inherent link between the deployment of ballistic missile defense and the weaponization of outer space means that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will allow the US to continue conduct tests of space weapons. A far better option for the US would be to take the lead on long-promised negotiations for the abolition of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation urges Congress oppose the President’s announced withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Foundation also urges the US, Russia, China, and other countries to renew and fulfill their commitments to multilateral agreements, in particular all nuclear weapons states should fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    For more information on global initiatives to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles and abolish weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, please visit the website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com.