Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Non-Proliferation

  • For Nuclear Sanity

    This article was first published by the Transnational Institute

    President Barack Obama’s April 5 speech in Prague calling for a world free of the scourge of nuclear weapons is a major foreign and security policy initiative that deserves applause. If he pursues its logic through to the end with the same since rity and passion with which he outlined his commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”, he could be the first United States President to go beyond nuclear arms control and to put nuclear weapons elimination on the global agenda. That would mark a turning point for strategic thinking the world over and open up new avenues through which to seek security.
    This remains a big “if”. Obama has not yet worked out the doctrinal, strategic and practical consequences of his fundamental premise that a secure world without nuclear weapons is both possible and desirable. His speech only outlines some necessary steps but without specifying their sequence or time frame, numbers (of weapons to be de-alerted or destroyed), the roles of different actors, the function of legally binding treaties, and so on.
    But Obama has stated some premises upfront and emphasised their moral-political rationale in a way no major global leader has done in recent years. Thus, he said, “the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War”; these are “the ultimate tools of destruction”, which can erase the world “in a single flash of light”. The global non-proliferation regime is in crisis and “the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up”; soon, “we could reach the point where the centre cannot hold”.
    “We are not destined,” said Obama, “to live in a world where more nations and more people possess [nuclear weapons]. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” Logically, fighting fatalism means putting “an end to Cold War thinking” and reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy”.
    This sets Obama miles apart not just from George W. Bush but also from Bill Clinton. Obama is effectively reversing a long tradition beginning with the Ronald Reagan presidency towards either a hardening of the U.S. nuclear posture, or the development of new weapons such as “Star Wars”-style ballistic missile defence (BMD), itself premised on even more dangerous doctrines than that of nuclear deterrence, which is fatally flawed.
    Thus, the U.S. has failed, even two decades after the Cold War ended, to move beyond relatively paltry reductions in its nuclear arsenal through the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Under Bush, it refused to take 2,200 weapons off “launch on warning” alert. The U.S. military establishment wants to develop a Reliable Replaceable Warhead for existing ones, find new uses (for example, bunker-busting) for old weapon designs, and has yielded to pressures from the nuclear weapons laboratories to modernise and refine existing armaments and do experimental work on fusion weapons at the expensive National Ignition Facility.
    Bush was not only obsessed with perpetuating America’s nuclear superiority. He gave it a particularly deadly edge through BMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, thus exacerbating tensions with Russia and destabilising strategic balances worldwide. Bush also blurred vital distinctions between conventional and nuclear weapons, unsigned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia.
    Bush’s BMD programme will militarise and nuclearise outer space, in which the U.S. seeks “full-spectrum” dominance. His paranoid response to the September 11 attacks resulted in the worst-ever fiasco in the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its important review conference in 2005, liquidating all the significant gains made at the 2000 review.

    Obama promises to change course, radically. He has spoken more boldly and honestly in favour of a nuclear weapons-free world than any other U.S. President in decades. He has gone further than any other in acknowledging that the U.S. bears a “moral responsibility” for nuclear disarmament because it is the only power to have used the horror weapon. This speaks of exemplary moral clarity, as does his statement that the U.S. must take the lead on disarmament. However, that cannot be said about four other propositions in Obama’s speech. First, he betrays an unpardonably naive faith in nuclear deterrence: “Make no mistake. As long as [nuclear] weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.…” He also believes in extended deterrence – deploying nuclear weapons in non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries.
    This column has dissected the fallacy of nuclear deterrence far too often to warrant further comment other than that it is a fallible, fragile and unreliable basis on which to premise security (via a balance of terror). It involves unrealistic assumptions about capabilities and doctrines, symmetrical perceptions by adversaries of “unacceptable damage” means, and the complete absence of miscalculations and accidents – 100 per cent of the time.
    Second, Obama continues to repose faith in BMD – he congratulated the Czech for their “courage” in hosting it – although he qualifies his support by saying BMD must be “cost-effective and proven”. This ignores BMD’s primitive, as-yet-premature status in intercepting missiles, and worse, the danger of escalating military rivalry to uncertain and risky levels where an adversary could feel tempted to neutralise a putative BMD advantage by amassing more missiles or launching wildcat strikes.
    Third, Obama, like Bush and Clinton, makes a specious distinction between responsible/acceptable/good nuclear powers (the Big Five-plus-Israel-plus-India-plus-non-Taliban-Pakistan) and irresponsible/dangerous ones (Iran, North Korea). This permits double standards and detracts from the universal urgency of abolishing all nuclear weapons. Obama’s endorsement of Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative – unilateral interception at sea of suspect nuclear-related materials – follows from this.
    Finally, Obama believes that disarmament may not be achieved in “my lifetime”. Such pessimism is unwarranted. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s thoughtful plan for global nuclear disarmament, presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, set a 15-year timeline for complete nuclear elimination. This is realistic – if the U.S. and the international community musters the will for an early disarmament initiative.
    If Obama effects deep cuts in U.S. nuclear weapons through the promised Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia this year, and launches a drive for banning nuclear testing and ending fissile production worldwide, the momentum can be accelerated, especially if U.S. policy shifts to no-first-use. After all, even the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse – George P. Schulz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn – believe that nuclear weapons abolition can be achieved in the foreseeable future.
    Obama’s speech provides an opportunity to all those who believe in complete nuclear weapons elimination, a cause kept alive by the peace movement, a coalition of states, and several expert commissions. India too professes a commitment to this goal and must seize this opportunity.

    India’s lukewarm response
    Regrettably, Indian policymakers have extended a lukewarm, if not cold, welcome to Obama’s speech. So fearful are they of pressure on India to sign the CTBT that they are clutching at straws. One such is Obama’s statement that “my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT”. This is different from what he wrote in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh before he was sworn in: “I will work with the U.S. Senate to secure ratification of [CTBT] at the earliest practical day, and then launch a major diplomatic initiative to ensure its entry into force.” (The letter was suppressed by South Block.)
    Indian policymakers are also reportedly relieved that Obama has not reiterated his letter’s reference to India’s “real responsibilities – [including] steps to restrain nuclear weapons programmes and pursuing effective disarmament when others do so”. They are also pleased that Obama has appointed Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat Congresswoman, as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security rather than Robert Einhorn, described by India’s nuclear hawks as “an ayatollah of non-proliferation”.
    Such timidity is unbecoming of a nation that claims to be proud of its pro-disarmament record and has pledged to fight for a nuclear weapons-free world. India opposed the CTBT in 1995-96 not for its intrinsic flaws or demerits but because it wanted to test nuclear weapons. Having done so in 1998, India should sign and ratify the treaty. Even Arundhati Ghose, who famously declared that India will not sign it “not now, not ever”, now says that she sees no problem with its signature. This may show a deplorable level of cynicism, but it is nevertheless a ground for correcting course and returning to the disarmament agenda.
    Logically, this includes several steps such as the CTBT, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, regional nuclear risk-reduction and restraint measures (including forswearing missile test-flights and keeping delivery vehicles apart from warheads) and, of course, deep cuts in nuclear weapons by all the nuclear weapons states, beginning with the U.S. and Russia.
    India must boldly seize the initiative by updating the Rajiv Gandhi plan, opposing BMD and proactively arguing for rapid strides towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Here lies the litmus test of India’s commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world and of its creative and principled diplomacy.

    Praful Bidwai is a journalist and author living in India.

  • Inspired by the Hibakusha

    This article was published by the Hiroshima Peace Media Center

    In 1975, I was a 22-year-old high school music teacher in New Zealand. The school syllabus included a Threnody (‘song of lament’) for the Victims of Hiroshima by Penderecki. Until then I had never heard of hibakusha. My life changed forever when I read their stories, and showed photos and their paintings to my young students. The hibakusha inspired me to dedicate my life to help them abolish nuclear weapons.
    At that time there were over 52,000 nuclear weapons. Hundreds more were being tested by the US, UK and France in the Pacific: in Australia, Tahiti, the Marshall Islands and Kiribati. Radioactive fallout from these was even detected in mothers’ milk in New Zealand. Regional protest groups emerged, enraged that the “superpowers” would use our “Ocean of Peace” to test weapons causing severe health and environmental effects, and capable of annihilating most life on the planet. They lobbied their governments and, in 1973, New Zealand, Australia and other Pacific Islands took France to the International Court of Justice (World Court) and effectively forced future tests underground. When US warships, probably carrying nuclear weapons, visited our ports under the Australia New Zealand US (ANZUS) military alliance in 1976, peace groups organised “peace squadrons” of hundreds of small boats to oppose them. Thousands of people demonstrated on the streets throughout the country demanding that New Zealand should become a nuclear free zone.
    Ordinary citizens, including young mothers like myself, were angry that ANZUS membership made us a target for the enemies of the US and her allies, and we did not want nuclear weapons used against others in our defence. We worked hard over the next decade to establish 300 small neighbourhood peace groups throughout the country who educated the public about the dangers of both nuclear weapons and nuclear power. We showed films and exhibitions about hibakusha, and doorknocked nearly every home asking people to display nuclear free stickers on their homes and cars, and in their workplaces.
    By 1984, 66% of municipal councils were nuclear free and the new government pledged to ban visits by nuclear armed and powered vessels. Prime Minister David Lange believed that by rejecting the nuclear umbrella, New Zealand was strengthening its national security. He said: “We were, simply, safer without nuclear weapons in our defence than with them…”
    Although the government came under heavy US, British and Australian pressure, they were bolstered by a massive mobilisation of public support by the peace movement in both New Zealand and the US. The French government’s terrorist bombing of Greenpeace’s anti-nuclear flagship, Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland coincided in 1985 with the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. When the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded in 1986, the combination of these events ensured the passage into law of the Nuclear Free Act. In 1986, retired magistrate Harold Evans, from our local Christchurch peace group, initiated the World Court Project. This grew into a worldwide campaign to persuade the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the Court on the legal status of nuclear weapons. It took nearly a decade to build support and momentum nationally and internationally, helped by the improved political climate after the end of the Cold War.
    In 1994, for the first time the World Court accepted evidence from citizens which included 11,000 signatures from international judges and lawyers; a sample of the 100 million signature Hiroshima and Nagasaki Appeal, and material surveying 50 years of citizens’ opposition to nuclear weapons. In addition, over 700 citizen groups worldwide endorsed the Project. Forty-four states and the World Health Organisation participated in the biggest World Court case ever, with two-thirds arguing for illegality.
    Just before the oral hearings in 1995, the Court accepted 4 million individually signed Declarations of Public Conscience, including over 3 million from Japan. After strong domestic pressure, the Japanese government allowed the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to testify. They confronted the 14 judges with huge photographs depicting the devastation and suffering. Over 50 hibakusha were present to witness this historic legal challenge. A woman from the Marshall Islands powerfully described how many islanders are still dying of cancers and women give birth to deformed babies including some which look like “jellyfish.”
    In July 1996, the Court delivered its historic Advisory Opinion that “a threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The judges also unanimously agreed that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”
    The World Court Opinion helped spark new initiatives to achieve a nuclear weapon free world. As a former member of the World Court Project Steering Committee, I was invited in 1998 to join the Middle Powers Initiative. This campaign by a network of international citizen organisations worked closely with seven countries, including New Zealand, which had played important roles in the World Court Project. Called the New Agenda Coalition, they lobbied effectively within the UN and, at the 2000 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, secured an unequivocal commitment from the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons.
    The Middle Powers Initiative also established the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (coordinated by New Zealander Alyn Ware, another leader of the World Court Project). It now has over 500 members in 70 countries with regular newsletters, and a website translated into 11 languages including Japanese. Recently, politicians from different parties in Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy, Turkey and the UK called for the removal of US nuclear weapons from their soil after a US Air Force investigation concluded that “most sites” used for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe do not meet US Department of Defense minimum security requirements. In June 2008, 110 US tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Britain, which means that there are now no US nuclear weapons there for the first time since 1950.
    Following the presentations by the Mayors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to the World Court in 1995, they were inspired by the 1996 Opinion to renew their call for nuclear abolition and launch an international membership drive for Mayors for Peace. To mark the 10th anniversary of the Court’s Opinion in 2006, Mayors for Peace launched the Good Faith Challenge and the “Cities Are Not Targets” project. Today there are 2,708 member cities in 134 countries. Of these, 89 are capital cities, almost half the world’s capitals, including Moscow, Beijing, London and Paris.
    Other states supportive of the World Court Project, led by Malaysia and Costa Rica, sponsored UN resolutions calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention–an enforceable global treaty to ban nuclear weapons. A consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts drafted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention which was distributed by the UN Secretary-General in 1997 for states to consider. In 2007, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was updated, and translated into Japanese. The proposed treaty, and the more general call for nuclear abolition, have received growing support from across the political spectrum and from a wide array of constituencies including former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, mayors, military leaders, academics, parliamentarians, scientists, governments, Nobel Laureates, NGOs and the general public.
    On United Nations Day last year, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched a five-point plan for nuclear disarmament. He called for the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their obligation under the NPT by pursuing “a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations.”
    With the world’s total of nuclear weapons now half what it was in 1975, and US President Obama himself calling for nuclear abolition, the time is ripe for all states to work together to take weapons off high alert; make immediate and drastic cuts to their nuclear arsenals; cancel missile defence systems; sign and ratify a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and an Outer Space Treaty. There has never been a more hopeful moment for us all to press our leaders to start negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Then the pain and anguish suffered by hibakusha everywhere will not have been in vain, and our dreams and aspirations for a nuclear free world can be realised.

     

    Dr. Kate Dewes coordinates the Disarmament and Security Centre and taught Peace Studies at Canterbury University for 20 years.

  • The Way is Open for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Northern Europe

    This article was originally published on Active Nonviolence

    At the 50th Pugwash Conference in 2000, John Holdren said: “In a rapidly-changing world, which we are certainly living in, the establishment consensus on the necessity of nuclear weapons could crumble quickly.” Today John’s prediction seems to be coming true. There are indeed indications that the establishment is moving towards the point of view that the peace movement has always held: – that nuclear weapons are essentially genocidal, illegal and unworthy of civilization; and that they must be completely abolished as quickly as possible. There is a rapidly-growing global consensus that a nuclear-weapon-free world can and must be achieved in the very near future.

    One of the first indications of the change was the famous Wall Street Journal article by Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn advocating complete abolition of nuclear arms [1]. This was followed quickly by Mikhail Gorbachev’s supporting article, published in the same journal [2], and a statement by distinguished Italian statesmen [3]. Meanwhile, in October 2007, the Hoover Institution had arranged a symposium entitled “Reykjavik Revisited; Steps Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” [4].

    In Britain, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord Hurd and Lord Owen (all former Foreign Secretaries) joined the former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson as authors of an article in The Times advocating complete abolition of nuclear weapons [5]. The UK’s Secretary of State for Defense, Des Brown, speaking at a disarmament conference in Geneva, proposed that the UK “host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010″ to enable the nuclear weapon states to work together on technical issues.

    In February, 2008, the Government of Norway hosted an international conference on “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” [7]. A week later, Norway’s Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere, reported the results of the conference to a disarmament meeting in Geneva [8].

    On July 11, 2008, speaking at a Pugwash Conference in Canada, Norway’s Defence Minister, Anne-Grete Stroem-Erichsen, reiterated her country’s strong support for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons [9].

    Other highly-placed statesmen added their voices to the growing consensus: Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, visited the Peace Museum at Hiroshima, where he made a strong speech advocating nuclear abolition. He later set up an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament co-chaired by Australia and Japan [10].On January 9, 2009, four distinguished German statesmen ( Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher) published an article entitled “Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View” in the International Herald Tribune [11]. Among the immediate steps recommended in the article are the following:

    • “The vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world… must be rekindled.”
    • “Negotiations aimed at drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons must begin…”
    • “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be greatly reinforced.”
    • ” America should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.”
    • “All short-range nuclear weapons must be destroyed.”
    • “The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty must be restored. Outer space may only be used for peaceful purposes.”

    From the standpoint of an NWFZ in Northern Europe, the recommendation that all short-range nuclear weapons be destroyed is particularly interesting. The US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Holland, Belgium and Germany prevent these countries from being (at present) part of a de-facto Northern European NWFZ; but with an Obama Administration in the United States, and with John Holdren advising President Obama, this situation might be quickly altered. Both public opinion and official declarations support the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe [12]. Indeed the only argument for their retention comes from NATO, which stubbornly maintains that although the weapons have no plausible function, they nevertheless serve as a “nuclear glue”, cementing the alliance.

    The strongest argument for the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe is the threatened collapse of the NPT. The 2005 NPT Review Conference was a disaster, and there is a danger that at the 2010 Review Conference, the NPT will collapse entirely because of the discriminatory position of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and their failure to honor their committments under Article VI. NATO’s present nuclear weapon policy also violates the NPT, and correcting this violation would help to save the 2010 Review Conference from failure.

    At present, the air forces of the European countries in which the US nuclear weapons are stationed perform regular training exercises in which they learn how to deliver the weapons. This violates the spirit, and probably also the letter, of Article IV, which prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons from an NWS to a non-NWS. The “nuclear sharing” proponents maintain that such transfers would only happen in an emergency; but there is nothing in the NPT saying that the treaty would not hold under all circumstances. Furthermore, NATO would be improved, rather than damaged, by giving up “nuclear sharing”.

    If President Obama wishes to fulfill his campaign promises [13] – if he wishes to save the NPT – a logical first step would be to remove US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The way would then be open for a nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northern Europe, comprising the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Our final goal is, and must remain, the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. But NWFZs are steps along the road.

    References and links

    [1] George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, page A15 and January 15, 2008, page A15. www.nuclearsecurityproject.org http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html?mod=Commentary-US

    [2] Mikhalil Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat”, The Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2007, page A15. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.htm

    [3] Massimo D’Alema, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi and Francesco Calogero, “For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Corriere Della Sera, July 24, 2008. http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/updates/20.html

    [4] Hoover Institution, “Reykjavik Revisited; Steps Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, October, 2007. http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/online/15766737.html

    [5] Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson, “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb”, The Times, June 30, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece?openComment=true

    [6] Des Brown, Secretary of State for Defense, UK, “Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament”, Geneva Conference on Disarmament, February 5, 2008. http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/people/speeches/sofs/20080205layingthefoundationsformultilateraldisarmament.htm

    [7] Government of Norway, International Conference on “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Oslo, Norway, February 26-27, 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/

    [8] Jonas Gahr Stoere, Foreign Minister, Norway, “Statement at the Conference on Disarmament”, Geneva, March 4, 2008. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/utenriksminister_jonas_gahr_store/taler_artikler/2008/cd_statement.html?id=502420

    [9] Anne-Grete Stroem-Erichsen, Defense Minister, Norway, “Emerging Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament”, Pugwash Conference, Canada, July 11, 2008. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/The-Ministry/defence-minister-anne-grete-strom-erichs/Speeches-and-articles/2008/emerging-opportunities-for-nuclear-disar.html?id=521830

    [10] Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister, Australia, “International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, Media Release, July 9, 2008. http://www.pm.gov.au/media/release/2008/media_release_0352.cfm

    [11] Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View”, International Herald Tribune, January 9, 2009. http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/09/opinion/edschmidt.php

    [12] Hans M. Kristensen and Elliot Negin, “Support Growing for Removal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from Europe”, Common Dreams Newscenter, first posted May 6, 2005. http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0506-09.htm

    [13] David Krieger, “President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Website, 2008. https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/2008/11/05_krieger_obama_elect.php

    John Avery is a leader in the Pugwash movement in Denmark.

  • UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent

    Sir, Recent speeches made by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and the previous Defence Secretary, and the letter from Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson in The Times on June 30, 2008, have placed the issue of a world free of nuclear weapons firmly on the public agenda. But it is difficult to see how the United Kingdom can exert any leadership and influence on this issue if we insist on a costly successor to Trident that would not only preserve our own nuclear-power status well into the second half of this century but might actively encourage others to believe that nuclear weapons were still, somehow, vital to the secure defence of self-respecting nations.

    This is a fallacy which can best be illustrated by analysis of the British so-called independent deterrent. This force cannot be seen as independent of the United States in any meaningful sense. It relies on the United States for the provision and regular servicing of the D5 missiles. While this country has, in theory, freedom of action over giving the order to fire, it is unthinkable that, because of the catastrophic consequences for guilty and innocent alike, these weapons would ever be launched, or seriously threatened, without the backing and support of the United States.

    Should this country ever become subject to some sort of nuclear blackmail — from a terrorist group for example — it must be asked in what way, and against whom, our nuclear weapons could be used, or even threatened, to deter or punish. Nuclear weapons have shown themselves to be completely useless as a deterrent to the threats and scale of violence we currently, or are likely to, face — particularly international terrorism; and the more you analyse them the more unusable they appear.

    The much cited “seat at the top table” no longer has the resonance it once did. Political clout derives much more from economic strength. Even major-player status in the international military scene is more likely to find expression through effective, strategically mobile conventional forces, capable of taking out pinpoint targets, than through the possession of unusable nuclear weapons. Our independent deterrent has become virtually irrelevant except in the context of domestic politics. Rather than perpetuating Trident, the case is much stronger for funding our Armed Forces with what they need to meet the commitments actually laid upon them. In the present economic climate it may well prove impossible to afford both.

    This article was originally published in The Times of London

    The authors are former high-ranking members of the British military.

  • Assessing Nuclear Dangers 63 Years Later

    Sixty-three years ago this month, the United States was the first (and only—so far) nation to use nuclear weapons, detonating two warheads in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Tens of thousands of people were killed instantly. By the end of 1945, more than 200,000 more were dead from radiation-related ailments.

    This somber anniversary provides an opportunity to assess the range of nuclear threats bedeviling international relations and threatening the future. The moment is even more salient given the recent military probe of Georgia into its breakaway province of South Ossetia, the Russian military’s apparent overreaction, and the Bush administration’s subsequent rhetorical bluster threatening to reignite the Cold War, as well as ongoing U.S. attempts to establish antimissile deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, a development provoking concern and defensiveness in Russia.

    There is some good news. In a dramatic display, North Korea destroyed a cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear complex on June 28. Closer to home, the U.S. Congress refused to fund the administration’s demand for a new nuclear weapon system, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which would have upgraded most of the U.S.’s current nuclear warheads. (The existing warheads will remain frighteningly effective for many years, according to a preponderance of scientists and military theorists.)

    Now the bad news. We face a stalled disarmament process, tens of billions of dollars that the U.S. is still pumping into a vast nuclear weapons complex, and the horrifying possibility of nuclear terrorism.

    In 2002, George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart, now former president Vladimir Putin, agreed to sharp reductions in nuclear stockpiles by 2012. (Even under this agreement, however, the “decommissioned” weapons could be easily and quickly re-commissioned.) More than half the allotted time has passed, yet this key post-Cold War priority has faltered.

    Furthermore, the Bush administration has decreased funding directed toward the critically important goal of securing “loose nukes” in Russia to keep them from the hands of terrorists.

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established the framework under which nuclear weapon states, included the U.S., committed to disarm. Nonnuclear signers of the treaty pledged not to develop a nuclear weapons capability in exchange for assistance in acquiring peaceful nuclear technology. The NPT’s delicate balance has now been overturned: Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and India have all built nuclear weapons stockpiles outside the treaty. They have pointed—accurately—to the implicit double standard of the original five nuclear weapons states, “led” by the U.S., which have failed to take any meaningful steps toward their own disarmament.

    At the same time, the U.S. is irresponsibly inconsistent with other countries. The Bush administration has given India a special path to nuclear legitimacy despite its development of nuclear weapons outside of international law. India is close to accepting a deal giving it access to nuclear fuel and technology for power plants, in exchange for opening only part of its nuclear fuel cycle to inspections.

    The U.S. at the same time threatens to attack Iran for thinking nuclear thoughts. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate, in fall 2007, found that Iran ceased pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003, while continuing to attempt mastery over uranium enrichment, maintaining that its current program is for peaceful energy uses, as permitted under the NPT. The Bush administration continues to use an “all options are on the table” threat—code for “nuclear weapons could be used in military strikes”—against Iran, which, all parties agree, has no nuclear weapons. The Bush White House is the first U.S. administration in history to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations, a startling and parlous policy.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that 20-30 countries have the intent or capability to pursue new nuclear weapons programs. And large quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium remain scattered at poorly secured sites throughout the world.

    Despite calls for disarmament from a cadre of converted Cold Warriors, the Department of Energy is asking for an estimated $150 billion to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and a more “responsive” production network. This proposal builds on the Bush administration’s quiet surge in nuclear weapons spending: Adjusting for inflation, U.S. spending on nuclear weapons has increased by more than 13 percent since 2001 and is now one-third more than the Cold War average.

    The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has been measuring the danger posed by nuclear weapons since 1947. In January 2007, it moved the clock from seven minutes to nuclear midnight to five minutes to nuclear midnight, due to “the perils of 27,000 nuclear weapons—2,000 of them ready to launch within minutes.”

    In his campaign stump speech, Illinois Sen. Barack Obama warns that nuclear terrorism is one of the gravest threats facing the United States today, highlighting his work on this overlooked issue. During the election season—and in the first months of a new presidential administration and Congress—citizens have an opportunity to insist that nuclear weapons materials from the Cold War be locked down, that nuclear stockpiles be reduced, and that we turn back the clock with real progress toward nonproliferation.

    Steve Daniels, MD, is the Santa Barbara chair of Physicians for Social Responsibility.
  • A Short Message to the UC Regents: Get Out of the Nuclear Weapons Business

    A Short Message to the UC Regents: Get Out of the Nuclear Weapons Business

    Designing and developing weapons of mass annihilation should not be business as usual, especially for a great university. And yet, for the UC, it is business as usual. Since the beginning of the Nuclear Age, the UC has been in the business of providing management and oversight to the nation’s principal nuclear weapons laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The UC is now in that business with corporate partners such as Bechtel.

    Your involvement with the weapons labs is arguably illegal under international law, is certainly immoral and, from a security perspective, perpetuates US reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines US and global security. It also sends exactly the wrong message to the young people who are educated at the University of California. It suggests to them that it must be acceptable to create weapons capable of destroying civilization when a great university engages in doing so.

    The UC shares in the responsibility for creating all nuclear weapons in the US arsenal. Should these weapons ever be used, by accident or design, the responsibility and accountability for that use will rest not only upon decision makers in the US government, but upon the UC system – including upon those who remained indifferent or apathetic in the face of the UC oversight of the weapons labs.

    Some at the UC refer to its work on nuclear weapons as a “national service.” I would say it is a disservice, both to the nation and to the University.

    The most important thing that can be said about nuclear weapons is that they do not and cannot protect their possessors. By continuing to rely upon these weapons, a prospect furthered by the nuclear weapons laboratories, the US upholds nuclear double standards that encourage nuclear proliferation.

    I suggest to you that a day will come when the UC will deeply regret having sold its good name to provide respectability to the creation and maintenance of nuclear weapons. In the interests of the UC and the country, I would urge you to take the following three actions:

    First, support the Student Department of Energy Lab Oversight Committee, which has already demonstrated serious intent and done important research on the weapons laboratories and how their work negatively impacts national and global security.

    Second, follow the example of the Norwegian government pension fund and divest the UC investment portfolio of corporations involved in creating nuclear weapons and their component parts.

    Third, withdraw from the management and oversight of the weapons labs on the grounds of legality, morality and human security. By doing so, you would be setting an invaluable example for UC students and for institutions of higher education in our country and throughout the world.

    Such acts of conscience by the UC Regents would help spark a national discussion on the need for US leadership for a world free of nuclear weapons.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). On July 17, 2008, members of the public were allotted one minute each to express their views in the public comment portion of the UC Regents’ meeting.
     
  • The Non-Proliferation Treaty Turns Forty

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty Turns Forty

    July 1, 2008 marks the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being opened for signatures. The true purpose of this treaty has always been two-fold: to prevent nuclear proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament; in other words, to create a level playing field in which there are no nuclear weapons. In the preamble to the treaty, the parties declare “their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”

    The treaty recognized five states as nuclear weapons states: the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), United Kingdom, France and China. Three countries never joined the Treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan – and all three have subsequently developed nuclear arsenals. One country, North Korea, withdrew from the treaty and tested a nuclear device in 2006.

    Thus, at the 40-year anniversary, the number of nuclear weapons states in the world has not quite doubled. Actually, four other states became nuclear weapons states during this period, but gave up their nuclear arsenals. South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal and then dismantled it. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union broke apart, but turned them over to Russia for dismantling.

    The greatest failure of the NPT at the 40-year mark is in the area of nuclear disarmament. In 1968, when the NPT was opened for signatures, there were 38,974 nuclear weapons in the world. By 1986, the number of nuclear weapons reached its height at 70,481 nuclear weapons. By the time the NPT turned 25 (from its entry into force in 1970), there were 40,344 nuclear weapons in the world, more than when it was opened for signatures. There remain some 26,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with over 95 percent of these in the arsenals of the US and Russia. Yet, there are some hopeful signs.

    Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has created an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament with the purpose of forging a global consensus on how to reinvigorate the NPT at its 2010 Review Conference. “We cannot simply stand idly by” Rudd said, “and allow another review conference to achieve no progress – or worse, to begin to disintegrate. The treaty is too important. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is too important.”

    In Europe, 69 members of the European Parliament from 19 European Union member states issued a Parliamentary declaration in support of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, a draft treaty for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Angelika Beer, a member of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense, said, “Only a serious commitment to disarmament provides the moral ground for demanding non-proliferation from others.”

    In their endorsement of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, the parliamentarians stated, “We take seriously the universal obligation, affirmed by the International Court of Justice, to achieve nuclear disarmament in good faith in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    It is also hopeful that over 2,300 mayors of cities from throughout the world have recognized the particular danger that nuclear weapons pose to cities. They have joined the Mayors for Peace 2020 Campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

    Despite the United States voting against every one of the 15 nuclear disarmament measures to come before the 2007 United Nations General Assembly, there is hope on this front as well. Both major party candidates for US president have endorsed the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and have indicated that they would take steps to realize this goal. With serious US presidential leadership for achieving the nuclear disarmament obligation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there will hopefully be far more to celebrate on the 50th anniversary of the treaty.

     

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a councilor of the World Future Council (www.worldfuturecouncil.org).
  • Debating Article VI

    Debating Article VI

    Christopher Ford’s article, “Debating Disarmament, Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, November 2007), ends with a disclaimer, “The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the State Department or the U.S. government.” Ford’s views, however, seem extremely closely aligned with those of the State Department, which he joined in 2003 and where he currently serves as the United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation.

    Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” This article is the principal tradeoff in the NPT, in which the non-nuclear weapon states are given the promise that the playing field will be leveled by “negotiations in good faith on…nuclear disarmament.”

    When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in 1996, the judges unanimously concluded, based upon Article VI of the NPT, that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” [Emphasis added.]

    In his article, Ford seeks to substitute his judgment for that of the ICJ, the world’s highest judicial body. He dismisses the view of the Court on the nuclear disarmament obligation as mere dictum, “generally… regarded as having minimal authority or value as precedent.” But, in fact, the Court viewed this portion of its opinion as essential to close the gap in international law that they found in the threat or use of nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”

    Ford uses his impressive rhetorical skills to place emphasis on the word “pursue,” making the claim that “pursuit” of negotiation in good faith is all that is required of a party. He uses the term “pursue” to mean “to seek” or “to chase,” rather than in the sense of “to carry something out” or “to continue with something,” meanings that the ICJ likely had in mind in their reaching their opinion that negotiations must not only be pursued but brought “to a conclusion.”

    It seems unlikely that the non-nuclear weapon states would have been (or now would be) satisfied with Ford’s view of “pursue.” Like the bold lover on the Grecian Urn in Keat’s famous Ode, the non-nuclear weapon states would be denied their reward “[t]hough winning near the goal.” In other words, they could only watch as the nuclear weapons states pursued the goal of negotiations on nuclear disarmament without real hope that the goal would ever be reached.

    Article VI of the NPT makes far more sense when the emphasis is placed on the “good faith” of the parties in pursuing (as in carrying out) negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Ford’s parsing of words literally deprives Article VI of meaning as he seeks to exonerate the US for its failure to act in good faith.

    Ford is predictably also dismissive of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament that were adopted by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. He argues, “Structurally, contextually, and grammatically…the 13 Steps amount to no more than any other political declaration by a convocation of national representatives: their statement of belief, at that time, regarding what would be best.” Since the United States has also been dismissive of the 13 Practical Steps, Ford is certainly in line with US policy on this point.

    The 13 Practical Steps call for, inter alia, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, conclusion of START III, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and “[a]n unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    The United States has, in fact, failed to ratify the CTBT, explicitly not applied the principle of irreversibility in negotiating the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002, failed to negotiate START III with the Russians, withdrawn from the ABM Treaty to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization, and not made the “unequivocal undertaking…to which all states are committed under Article VI.”

    Despite Mr. Ford’s protestations concerning Article VI and his argument that “the United States has made enormous progress” on nuclear disarmament, the facts remain that the US still relies heavily on its nuclear arsenal, is the only country capable of leading the way toward a world free of nuclear weapons, and has not done nearly enough to rid the world nor its own citizens of the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons. The US, for example, has continued to maintain a significant portion of its nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert, has sought to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, has failed to initiate a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, and in 2007 voted against all 15 nuclear disarmament measures that came before the United Nations General Assembly.

    From a practical point of view, this means that other nuclear weapons states will continue to rely upon their nuclear arms for what they believe provides for their security. In fact, as the nuclear weapons states continue to rely upon these weapons, other states will choose to provide such “security” for themselves, and nuclear weapons will proliferate, eventually ending up in the hands of extremist organizations that cannot be deterred from using them against even the most powerful states. In other words, while Mr. Ford’s rationalizations and analysis (“…it would be unfair and inaccurate to extend any special Article VI compliance criticism to the United States”) may provide comforting justifications for some, they in fact contribute to a sense of nuclear complacency that undermines US security and progress on nuclear disarmament.

    It will not be possible to maintain indefinitely the double standards on which the NPT was formulated and which can only be cured by achieving the nuclear disarmament provision in Article VI of the treaty. This will require substantially more effort than pursuing good faith negotiations; it will require actual good faith. US leaders would do well to set aside Mr. Ford’s approach to papering over US failures to act in good faith with a thin veneer of rhetorical justifications and legal advocacy, and get down to the serious business of leading a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons before they eliminate us.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and is a Councilor of the World Future Council.

  • Ten Years After India’s Nuclear Tests: Deeper Into the Morass

    Article originally appeared in The Hindu

    Since Pokharan, we have been witness to an opportunistic shift in the stance of the government, from an outright condemnation of nuclear deterrence to an unabated enthusiasm for the development of a full-fledged arsenal.

    Hand in hand, expenditures on non-nuclear military activities and acquisition of conventional weapons have also increased dramatically…The impact of these expenditures, of course, falls primarily upon the poor and the vulnerable.

    In 1996, the International Court of Justice offered a historic Advisory Opinion where it ruled that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law” and endorsed unanimously a legal obligation on all States “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Earlier, as the case was being considered, India submitted a Memorial where it argued that nuclear deterrence should be considered “abhorrent to human sentiment since it implies that a state, if required to defend its own existence, will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences of its own and adversary’s people”. This description is apt. Though just an unproven assumption, nuclear deterrence relies on the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction aimed at killing large numbers of people in the wishful hope that such annihilation would deter another country from attacking because of fear.

    Some years later, in January 2003, the Indian government issued a nuclear doctrine which explicitly stated that the country is pursuing nuclear deterrence, though this was qualified as a minimal one. But the doctrine also warns that “nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage”. Unacceptable damage, in plain English, means that these nuclear weapons would be dropped on cities, each killing lakhs or millions of innocent people. The few years between the clear and forthright condemnation of deterrence and the enthusiastic invocation of deterrence are among the most important in recent Indian history.

    The biggest event occurred 10 years ago, on May 11, 1998, when three nuclear devices exploded in the Pokharan desert. Two days later, two more explosions were conducted and Prime Minister Vajpayee proudly announced that India was now a nuclear weapon State. Pakistan’s leaders, showing that they too subscribed to the twisted logic that drives the acquisition of nuclear weapons, conducted six explosions of their own on May 28 and 30. With those tests, the half-century-old conflict between India and Pakistan acquired a nuclear edge.
    Nuclear threats

    The edge was to be seen soon. Contrary to the claims of nuclear weapons advocates, who promised peace and a cessation of war, India and Pakistan fought over Kargil bitterly within a year of the tests. Though limited geographically, the war is estimated to have cost about 1,700 Indian lives and nearly 800 Pakistani ones. Indian and Pakistani officials delivered indirect and direct nuclear threats to one another at least 13 times. There are also plausible, though not convincing, reports that the two countries did prepare their nuclear arsenals for potential use.

    Kargil was the first major confrontation between two nuclear powers. Indeed, the war may even be the first caused by nuclear weapons. The late Benazir Bhutto stated that in 1996 Pakistani military officers had presented her with plans for a Kargil style operation, which she vetoed. It would therefore seem that the 1998 tests convinced Pakistan’s political and military leaders that the operation might be feasible with nuclear weapons to restrict any possible Indian riposte.

    The pattern of nuclear intimidation seen in Kargil was to be repeated during the major military crises that followed the militant attack on the Parliament in December 2001. Even Prime Minister Vajpayee warned: “no weapon would be spared in self-defence. Whatever weapon was available, it would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy”. On the other side of the border, former chief of the Pakistan Army, General Mirza Aslam Beg, declared: “We can make a first strike, and a second strike or even a third”.

    Although it did not develop into war, a number of factors make the 2002 crisis more dangerous than the Kargil war. Unlike Kargil, where Pakistan is clearly seen to have lost, especially politically, both sides claim the 2002 crisis as a victory. On the one hand General Musharraf’s promise that he would rein in Pakistan-based militant organisations is seen as proof that India’s “coercive diplomacy” worked. Pakistan’s case is simpler. Despite the huge build-up of forces by India, and much talk of attacking so-called terrorist camps within Pakistan, no military attacks actually occurred. That a massive military confrontation with strong nuclear overtones is seen by both sides as a victory increases the likelihood that similar incidents will occur in the future.

    Nuclear costs

    The obvious lesson of these two military crises, that nuclear weapons cause insecurity, has been ignored by nuclear advocates. Instead, they claimed that just testing nuclear weapons is insufficient for deterrence and called for the kinds of steps that India had earlier criticised nuclear weapons States for taking. Following their advice, India has not only adopted use-doctrines and practices similar to those of nuclear weapon States, but has also embarked on developing the paraphernalia needed for the adoption of these doctrines. These include a triad of delivery vehicles, including aircraft capable of dropping nuclear bombs, missiles launched from land and sea, and a nuclear submarine; training the military to use these; a command and control structure to oversee the deployment and use of nuclear weapons; components of an early warning system and an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system. No one has been keeping count of the crores of rupees being spent in this process. Hand in hand, expenditures on non-nuclear military activities and acquisition of conventional weapons have also increased dramatically. This is in direct contradiction to the erstwhile claims of nuclear advocates that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would reduce expenditure on conventional weapons. The impact of these expenditures, of course, falls primarily upon the poor and the vulnerable.

    A growing arsenal

    One of the adjectives appended to deterrence in India’s nuclear doctrine is minimal. (The other adjective – credible – is superfluous. A deterrent that is not credible cannot deter.) When asked to delineate what constitutes minimal, policy makers resort to obfuscation. Minimal, they claim, is a dynamic concept and one which cannot be specified in advance. Given the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons, it should be obvious that a dozen or so suffice to obliterate several cities and millions of people in Pakistan or China. But going by current public estimates, the fissile material stockpile just from CIRUS and Dhruva, the two reactors reportedly assigned for making plutonium for weapons, should be sufficient for over a hundred nuclear weapons. Perhaps the meaning of minimal is simply that it is not maximal.

    That the future arsenal size sought by policymakers is much larger was made clear during the negotiations and public debates surrounding the nuclear deal that is being negotiated with the United States. As a report from the International Panel of Fissile Materials, which the author is a part of, shows, the number of reactors that the DAE strenuously kept outside of safeguards can produce several dozen nuclear weapons worth of plutonium every year (available at www.fissilematerials.org).

    New attitudes

    During the 1990s, one oft-heard argument from those espousing nuclear weapons was that while these were evil, they were a necessary evil. To the extent that the pressures of this lobby were resisted, India acquired weapons only reluctantly. That was then. What is on display today is unabated enthusiasm for the ongoing development of a full fledged arsenal. And all the attitudes that go with being a State possessing nuclear weapons.

    Such a shift in attitude was on display during the unexpected vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005. While much attention was focused on US pressure, there was something deeper too. In an earlier era, Indian leaders would have denounced the hypocrisy of the United States, with its immense nuclear arsenal, lecturing Iran about its small uranium enrichment plant. Now, one heard many policy-makers talking about why nuclear proliferation was dangerous and Iran should not be allowed to have nuclear technology. Non-proliferation, which used to be seen as immoral, has come to take the place of disarmament, the truly worthwhile goal.

    The opportunistic switch in stance is somewhat akin to what has been called the third class railway compartment syndrome. Those waiting on a crowded platform clamour in the name of justice and fairness to be let into compartment. But once inside, the opportunist shuts the door and keeps the others outside, with force if necessary.

    In July 1946, following the US attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Mahatma Gandhi observed, “the atom bomb has deadened the finest feelings which have sustained mankind for agesŠIt has resulted for the time being in the soul of Japan being destroyed. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see.”

    Unfortunately in our case, the first decade after Pokharan has already started making the impacts quite clear. It is not too late to reverse these.

    M. V. Ramana is Senior Fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, and co-editor of Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream.

  • Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space

    Article originally appeared in the Boston Globe

    As World War I broke out, Henry James identified an inexorable current that had been running below international events, leading to the “monstrous scene” of August “as its grand Niagara.” Below the glassy upriver surface, the swift tide had been driven by habits of mind, arms merchant greed, imperial hubris, and a politics that was wholly inadequate. At the deadly cascade, nations tumbled into the most violent century in history. Writer Jonathan Schell cites the Niagara metaphor to define the still running momentum of war.

    But as James wrote, humans stood on another threshold. Wars had always been fought on land and sea, but then new technologies of flight carried combat into the realm above. Airborne weapons transformed killing. Indeed, air force was the invention that made 20th century warfare catastrophic. In looking back on that development, is it only naïve to ask if governments could have agreed to ban weapons in the air? What if the dropping of bombs from the newfangled aeroplane had been outlawed? The mind reels to think of it.

    A century later, the human race stands at an equivalent threshold, and a version of that exact question is indeed being asked. Can weapons be banned from outer space? Or will the Niagara current of defense contractor greed, imperial hubris, and inadequate politics carry the destructiveness of war into the “fourth battlefield” of the very cosmos? That is the question that has been asked at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for the last six years. But not by Washington. How many Americans know that the nation refusing to discuss a treaty aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space is their own? Indeed, the United States, in various Pentagon documents published during the Bush administration, is explicit in aiming to put weapons in space – lasers, directed energy weapons, kinetic kill vehicles. The US Space Command, in its “Vision for 2020,” plans for “counterspace operations.” The already deployed missile defense system is a first step toward an anti-satellite capability, giving the Pentagon control of the “high frontier.”

    The American Academy of Arts and Sciences recently published “Russian and Chinese Responses to US Military Plans in Space,” a stark look at where the American project is taking the world. The academy was instrumental half a century ago in creating the arms control regime that enabled the Cold War to end nonviolently. Now it warns that “US space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful uses of space.” Russia and China have insisted in Geneva that a treaty banning such weapons is urgently needed. Failing that, neither nation sees a choice but to respond – Russia by extending its aging ballistic missile forces, and China by readying a space weapons program of its own. Last week, for the first time since the Soviet era, missiles were paraded through Red Square. Last year, China fired the warning shot of a first anti-satellite missile test.

    And how is the crucial question of weapons in outer space being considered in America? As the quadrennial political conversation of the presidential primaries was moving into gear last February, the Pentagon announced its intention to send a missile into space to shoot down a “wayward satellite,” supposedly to protect Earth from its unspent fuel. Many observers – certainly including Chinese and Russians – questioned whether this was not, in fact, a step toward anti-satellite weaponry? If Henry James were alive, wouldn’t he have recognized an upshift in the current toward Niagara? Yet neither the presidential candidates, nor the pundits and moderators who yap at them, saw in this event anything to discuss. The missile was fired, the satellite destroyed. No big issue. The world-historic decision about carrying warfare across the last threshold into outer space is being left to defense contractors, military commanders, and their wholly owned subsidiary on Capitol Hill. Not since August 1914 has politics seemed so irrelevant.

    Humans who did not think to ban weapons from the air a century ago know better when it comes to outer space. Yet what are we doing? And if the deadly current is still hidden, what is that low rumble that can be heard, rolling toward us from down the river?

    James Carroll’s column appears regularly in the Boston Globe.