Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: Missile Defense

  • Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability

    In the world of nuclear deterrence theory, beliefs are everything. What the leaders of a country perceive and believe is far more important than the reality. Nuclear deterrence is a seemingly simple proposition: Country A tells country B that if B does X, A will attack it with nuclear weapons. The theory is that country B will be deterred from doing X by fear of nuclear attack by country A. For deterrence to work, the leaders of country B must also believe that country A has nuclear weapons and will use them. Nuclear deterrence theory holds that even if country A might not have nuclear weapons, so long as the leaders of country B believed that it did they would be deterred.

    The theory goes on to hold that country A can generally rely upon nuclear deterrence with any country except one that also has nuclear weapons or one that is protected by another country with nuclear weapons. If country B also has nuclear weapons and the leaders of country A know this, then A, according to theory, will be deterred from a nuclear attack on country B. This situation will result in a standoff. The same is true if country C does not have nuclear weapons, but is under the “umbrella” of country B that does have nuclear weapons. Country A will not retaliate against country C for fear of itself being retaliated against by country B.

    Thus, if country A has nuclear weapons and no other country has nuclear weapons, country A has freedom — within the limits of its moral code, pressures of public opinion, and its willingness to flout international humanitarian law — to threaten or use nuclear weapons without fear of retaliation in kind. For a short time the United States was the only country with nuclear weapons. It used these weapons twice on a nearly defeated enemy. Deterrence played no part. The United States never said to Japan, don’t do this or we will attack you with nuclear weapons. Prior to using the nuclear weapons, these weapons were a closely guarded secret.

    From 1945 to the early 1950s, US strategic thinking saw free-fall nuclear weapons simply extending conventional bombing capabilities. The United States never said that it would attack another country with nuclear weapons if it did X, but this was implied by the recognized existence of US nuclear weapons, the previously demonstrated willingness of the US to use them, and the continued public testing of these weapons by the US in the Pacific.

    The Dangerous Game of Deterrence

    After the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the dangerous game of nuclear deterrence began. Both the US and USSR warned that if attacked by nuclear weapons, they would retaliate in kind massively. They also extended their respective so-called nuclear deterrence “umbrellas” to particular countries within their orbits. As the arsenals of each country grew, they developed policies of Mutual Assured Destruction. Each country had enough weapons to completely destroy the other. Britain and France also developed nuclear arsenals because they did not want to rely upon the US nuclear umbrella, and to try to preserve their status as great powers. They worried that in a crisis the US might not come to their aid if it meant that the US risked annihilation by the USSR for doing so. China also developed a nuclear arsenal because it felt threatened by both the US and USSR. Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa also developed nuclear arsenals, although South Africa eventually dismantled its small nuclear arsenal.

    Nuclear deterrence took different shapes with different countries. The US and USSR relied upon massive retaliation from their large arsenals of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. The UK, France and China maintained smaller deterrent forces of a few hundred nuclear weapons each. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but it is uncertain whether they have yet deployed nuclear weapons. Israel, known to have some 200 nuclear weapons, offers only the ambiguous official statement that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

    One obvious way that nuclear deterrence could fail is if one side could destroy the other side’s nuclear forces in a first strike. To prevent this from happening, nuclear armed states have tried to make their nuclear forces invulnerable to being wiped out by a first strike attack. One way of doing this was to put the weapons underground, in the air and in the oceans. Many of the weapons on land were put in hardened silos, while those in the oceans were put on submarines that were difficult to locate underwater. For decades the strategic bombers of the US and USSR carrying nuclear weapons were kept constantly on alert with many in the air at any given moment.

    Nuclear deterrence became a game of sorts – a dangerous and potentially tragic one and also deeply selfish, irresponsible and lawless, risking all humanity and the planet. Countries had to protect their deterrence forces at all costs and not allow themselves to become vulnerable to a first strike attack on their nuclear forces. In a strange and perverse way, nuclear-armed countries became more committed to protecting their nuclear forces than they were to protecting their citizens. While they hardened their land-based missile silos and placed their submarines in the deep oceans, their citizens remained constantly vulnerable to nuclear attack.

    The game of nuclear deterrence required that no country become so powerful that it might believe that it could get away with a first strike attempt. It was this concern that drove the nuclear arms race between the US and USSR until the USSR was finally worn down by the economic burden of the struggle. It also ensured a high level of hostility between rival nuclear-armed countries, with great danger of misunderstandings – witness, for example, the Cuban missile crisis and many other less well-known scares. Mutual Assured Destruction lacked credibility, requiring the development of policies of “Flexible Response,” which lowered the nuclear threshold, encouraged the belief that nuclear weapons could be used for war-fighting, increased the risk of escalation to all-out nuclear war, and stimulated more arms racing.

    Notice that a first strike doesn’t require that one country actually have the force to overcome its opponent’s nuclear forces. The leaders of the country only have to believe that it can do so. If the leaders of country A believe that country B is planning a first strike attack, country A may decide to initiate a preemptive strike. If the leaders of country A believe that the leaders of country B would not initiate a nuclear attack against them if they did X, then they might well be tempted to do X. They might be mistaken. This led to the “launch-on-warning” hair-trigger alert status between the US and Russia. More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, each country still has some 2,250 strategic warheads ready to be fired on a few moments’ notice. Nuclear deterrence operates with high degrees of uncertainty, and this uncertainty increases, as does the possibility of irrationality, in times of crisis.

    Ballistic Missile Defenses

    President George W. Bush cites as his primary reason for wanting a ballistic missile defense system for the US his lack of faith that nuclear deterrence would work against so-called “rogue” states. Yet, the uncertainty in nuclear deterrence increases when ballistic missile defenses are introduced. If country A believes that it has a perfect defense against country B, then country B may also believe that it has lost its deterrent capability against country A. Ballistic missile defenses, therefore, will probably trigger new arms races. If countries A and B each have 500 nuclear warheads capable of attacking the other, both are likely to believe the other side will be deterred from an attack. If country A attempts to introduce a defensive system with 1,000 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, country B may believe that its nuclear-armed ballistic missile force will be made impotent and decide to increase its arsenal of deliverable warheads from 500 to 2,000 in order to restore its deterrent capability in the face of B’s 1,000 defensive interceptors. Or, country B may decide to attack country A before its defensive force becomes operational.

    If country A plans to introduce a defensive system with only 100 interceptors, country B might believe that its nuclear force could still prevail with 500 deliverable nuclear weapons. But country B must also think that country A’s interceptors would give A an advantage if A decides to launch a first strike attack against B’s nuclear forces. If country A is able to destroy 400 or more of country B’s nuclear weapons, then A would have enough interceptors (if they all worked perfectly) to believe that it could block any retaliatory action by B. Thus, any defensive system introduced by any country would increase instability and uncertainty in the system, making deterrence more precarious. Worse, this introduces a fear that ballistic missile defense has little to do with defense, and far more to do with an offensive “shield” behind which a country could believe that it could coerce the rest of the world with impunity.

    It was concern for the growing instability of nuclear deterrence to the point where it might break down that led the US and USSR to agree in 1972 to place limits on defensive missile forces in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In this treaty each side agreed to limit its defensive forces to no more than two sites of 100 interceptors each. These sites could not provide protection to the entire country. It is this treaty that the United States is now seeking to amend or unilaterally abrogate in order to build a national ballistic missile defense. It claims this defense is needed to protect itself against so-called “rogue” states such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. At present, however, none of these countries is even expected to be able to produce nuclear weapons or a missile delivery system capable of reaching the United States before 2010 at the earliest.

    Russia and China have both expressed strong opposition to the US proceeding with ballistic missile defense plans. Russia wants to maintain the ABM Treaty for the reasons the treaty was initially created, and is aghast at comments from the US such as those of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calling the treaty “ancient history.” Russia is also seeking to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal for economic reasons and its leaders fear the instabilities that a US national ballistic missile defense system would create. Russian leaders have said that such a system that abrogated the ABM Treaty could result in Russia withdrawing from other arms control treaties including the START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    China has a nuclear force a fraction of that of Russia or the US. It has some 400 nuclear weapons, but only some 20 long-range missiles capable of reaching the US. If the US sets up a system of some 100 to 200 interceptors, China would have to assume that its nuclear deterrent capability had been eliminated. Chinese leaders have called for the US not to go ahead with a ballistic missile defense system that would force China to develop a stronger nuclear deterrent force. Were China to do so, this would inevitably provoke India to expand its nuclear capability, which in turn would lead Pakistan to do the same.

    Increasing Instabilities

    At a time when major progress toward nuclear disarmament is possible and even promised by the nuclear weapons states, the US desire to build a ballistic missile defense system to protect it against small nuclear forces is introducing new uncertainties into the structure of global nuclear deterrence and increasing the instability in the system. Nuclear deterrence has never been a stable system. One country’s nuclear strategies have both predictable and unpredictable consequences in other countries.

    Security built upon nuclear arms cannot endure. US nuclear weapons led to the development of the USSR and UK nuclear arsenals. These led to the development of the French and Chinese nuclear forces. The Chinese nuclear forces led to the development of Indian nuclear forces. India’s nuclear forces led to the development of Pakistani nuclear forces. Israel decided to develop nuclear forces to give it a deterrent among hostile Middle East neighbors. No doubt this provoked Saddam Hussein – and gave him the pretext – to develop Iraq’s nuclear capability, and is driving Iran to follow suit.

    Now the US is seeking to introduce national and theater ballistic missile defenses that will provide further impetus to nuclear arms development and proliferation. The world is far more complicated than country A deterring country B by threat of nuclear retaliation. As more countries develop nuclear arsenals, more uncertainties enter the system. As more defenses are set in place, further uncertainties enter the system. While the US seeks to make itself invulnerable against threats that do not yet even exist, it is further destabilizing the existing system of global nuclear deterrence to the point where it could collapse – especially when the President demonstrates his belief that the system can no longer be relied upon.

    The full consequences of US missile defense plans are not predictable. What is predictable is that the introduction of more effective defenses by the US will change the system and put greater stress on the global system of security built upon nuclear deterrence. The system is already showing signs of strain. With new uncertainties will come new temptations for a country to use nuclear forces before they are used against it. Nuclear deterrence is not sustainable in the long run, and we simply don’t know what stresses or combination of perceptions and/or misperceptions might make it fail.

    Nuclear deterrence cannot guarantee security. It undermines it. The only possibility of security from nuclear attack lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons as has already been agreed to in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reiterated in the 2000 Review Conference of that treaty. Ballistic missile defenses, which increase instability, move the world in the wrong direction. For its own security, the US should abandon its plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses that would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and instead provide leadership in immediately negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention leading to the phased and verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons, like the widely-acclaimed enforceable global treaty banning chemical weapons.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The author would like to thank Commander Robert Green for his helpful suggestions on this paper.

  • U.S. Missile Defense Compromises Global Security

    BEIJING- Every state has the right to security and each government has the obligation to protect its nationals. But how to exercise this right and acquire security in its real sense is a question worth serious deliberation.

    As globalization progresses, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent. This is as true in the security area as it is economically.

    Security is mutual and indivisible. No country can exist in isolation, nor can it resolve all the security issues it faces single-handedly. True security is based on global security and on the extensivecooperation of the international community.

    A military edge cannot guarantee security. Unilateralism will only lead to greater insecurity.

    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a complex problem that can be tackled only through global cooperation. Setting up a national missile defense system would not contribute to solving this problem, but only further aggravate it.

    Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has made considerable progress in nonproliferation. It is therefore neither wise nor advisable to build a so-called missile defense system, whose effect is questionable, at the expense of the international arms control and nonproliferation system after so many years’ efforts, including those of the United States.

    Some people describe the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as part of the “Cold War mentality” and hold that it should be discarded. This view is neither fair nor just. Like all the other arms control treaties, the ABM treaty reflects the interdependent relationship among contracting parties in security matters. This relationship did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, but rather is becoming even stronger in the era of globalization. The ABM treaty is effective. It is not outdated.

    Just as the ABM Treaty cannot be viewed in isolation, neither can a U.S. missile defense program. Offense and defense are always indivisible. Enhanced defensive capabilities, to a large degree, mean improved offensive capabilities as well.

    This is particularly true for the United States, the only superpower. The United States possesses the biggest nuclear arsenal and the most sophisticated conventional weapons in the world, and it pursues a deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons. A missile defense will severely impede the nuclear disarmament process and render any U.S. initiative on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons meaningless.

    People cannot but ask what on earth is the real intention behind U.S. insistence on developing a missile defense system in defiance of the international community. Is it really to defend against the missile threat from the few so-called “problem states,” or for greater military advantage over other big countries?

    Recently there has been relaxation of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. All parties should cherish this hard-won state of affairs and create conditions for continued relaxation. Theater missile defense would only add complex and confrontational factors to the detriment of regional stability.

    Some in the United States clamorously advocate incorporating Taiwan into the U.S. theater missile defense system or providing anti-missile weapons or technologies to Taiwan. This is a most dangerous tendency. If the United States chose to do so, it would put Taiwan under the American umbrella of military protection and restore, de facto, the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance. It would surely inflate the arrogance of the forces for Taiwan’s independence, jeopardize stability in the Taiwan Straits, endanger the peaceful reunification of China and lead to serious regression in China-U.S. relations.

    China has no intention of threatening U.S. security, nor does it seek such capabilities. China has always exercised great restraint in the development of nuclear arms. China has always pursued a policy of no first use, and keeps a small but effective nuclear force only for the purpose of containing other countries’ possible nuclear attacks. This policy will remain unchanged.

    China and the United States shoulder common responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. A cooperative and constructive relationship between China and the United States will have a crucial impact on world stability.

    China and the United States have long engaged in fruitful cooperation over nonproliferation. China is ready to continue on this path. But we also look forward to serious and pragmatic dialogue with the Bush administration on missile defense and related issues.

    *Tang Jiaxuan is the Foreign Minister of China. He contributed this comment to the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, Friday, March 30, 2001

  • Preserving the ABM Treaty and Promoting International Security

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    It gives me great pleasure to attend this conference in the beautiful city of Ottawa, to exchange views with our Canadian friends on some important issues related to international security and arms control. To my knowledge, this is one of a series of seminars on National Missile Defense (NMD) Canada has organized in recent months. I hope, and I am convinced, that these open discussions will help deepen people’s understanding on this issue. Now, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my personal observations.

    I. Negative Consequences of NMD for International Peace and Security

    The relentless development of an NMD system by the United States is, undoubtedly, a major event in today’s international politics, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on international security environment. Recently, some key members of the Bush administration have reiterated on different occasions that they will, as promised during the election campaign, intensify this program. This is very disturbing.

    Firstly, the development and deployment of NMD by the United States will jeopardize global strategic balance and stability, and undermine mutual trust and cooperation among major powers. To develop and deploy NMD, the United States has to first overcome a legal “barrier”, namely, the ABM treaty concluded between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in 1972, which explicitly prohibits the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system. For the past decades, this treaty has served as a corner stone of global strategic balance and stability. The compliance of this treaty has been the prerequisite for the strategic nuclear weapons reductions as claimed by the two nuclear superpowers. During the Cold War, it played a pivotal role in preventing the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union from getting out of control. As a matter of fact, in the post-Cold War era today, the treaty still provides a security framework for multilateral nuclear disarmament, and for further bilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia. Though bilateral in nature, the strategic significance of the treaty goes far beyond the scope of the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. It has been universally recognized as playing an indispensable role in maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security. If, however, the treaty is amended, as requested by the U.S., it would certainly lose all its significance, and the global strategic balance and stability would be the victim.

    Over the years, the international situation has undergone drastic changes, but the basic international strategic configuration has remained relatively unchanged in one important aspect, i.e. the strategic balance and mutual deterrence between major powers. This is due, in no small measure, to the existence of the ABM treaty. It must be pointed out that “strategic balance” and “strategic parity” are two different concepts. A strategic balance can exist between a small nuclear-weapon state and a nuclear superpower, so long as the former possesses a second strike capability, that is, the capability to inflict unbearable damage on the latter after sustaining the first nuclear attack. The significance of the ABM treaty lies in the fact that, by prohibiting the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system, it has maintained the strategic balance between the two nuclear superpowers, by extension, has maintained to a lesser degree the strategic balance among all the nuclear-weapon states, including small nuclear powers vis-a-vis the nuclear superpowers. No matter the U.S. like it or not, the fact is that, it is precisely because of this global strategic balance that the major powers have felt compelled to address global and regional security issues through peaceful means and avoid direct confrontation with each other. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the preservation of the global strategic balance is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.S. development and possible deployment of NMD poses a serious challenge to the already fragile global strategic balance. Such a move will disrupt the existing strategic equilibrium among major powers, and jeopardize the security interest of other countries. This will undoubtedly arouse suspicion and mistrust among major powers, hampering their coordination and cooperation in international security affairs.

    Secondly, the U.S. NMD program will severely hinder the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race. The balance of power among major countries, and the global strategic balance based thereon, constitutes the prerequisite for progress in the international arms control and disarmament process. Once this strategic equilibrium is disrupted, the arms control and disarmament process will inevitably become stagnated and even reversed. If the ABM treaty is amended as insisted by the U.S. and the deployment of NMD legitimated, the basis of global strategic stability will be removed. This will bring about fundamental changes to the international security environment. Against this background, who can be sure the existing arms control treaties will continue to be complied with? And who can guarantee that the new arms control negotiations will go smoothly?

    The reductions of their nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia through bilateral agreements and/or unilateral initiatives are welcome and should be encouraged. However, we should also recognize that reduction of surplus nuclear weapons with “overkill” capabilities, is little more than the rationalization of their nuclear force structure, and is a far cry from nuclear disarmament in its real sense. As the only superpower, the U.S. already possesses the strongest military force and most advanced nuclear arsenal, and pursues a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. On top of all this, this country is trying to break the taboo that has been maintained for the last 30 years in the strategic field by building a nationwide missile defense system. In this sense, NMD will become a multiplier of the U.S. strategic offensive force. And the NMD program is in essence an U.S. program of unilateral nuclear expansion, which contains the inherent danger of triggering an arms race at a higher level. In specific terms, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons. It is true that, at current stage, the U.S. enjoys military and technological superiority, and other countries are not in a position to compete with it. From a long-term perspective, however, it will be unrealistic to expect other countries sit on their hands while the U.S. develops NMD. They will certainly take all sorts of counter measures to safeguard their national security.

    Thirdly, the U.S. NMD program will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and efforts. The U.S. claims that its development of missile defense systems is intended to counter the increasing threats posed by missile proliferation. I for one, and I don’t think I am alone here, do not share the U.S. assessment of the missile threats it is faced with. To say the least, the U.S. has over-exaggerated the missile threats from so-called “countries of concern”. Judging from their economic and technological strength, it is difficult to conclude that these countries will be able to develop, much less to deploy, missiles capable of reaching the U.S. territory in the foreseeable future. Even if, a very big “if”, these countries were capable of acquiring such capabilities, they would certainly not lose sight of the massive retaliatory capabilities from the U.S., both nuclear and conventional, not to mention the inevitable strong reactions from the international community. With all this and the fact that chemical and biological weapons have been banned by international treaties, and moreover, the NPT has been extended indefinitely, there is virtually no possibility that these countries may launch a first strikes against the U.S. In addition, the U.S. relations with these countries are not immutable. We all know that, the missile threat that the U.S. was faced with during the Cold War was many times greater than that today. If the U.S. did not find it necessary to amend and scrap the ABM treaty, there is, in my view, certainly less reason to do so today. Even if we conclude there is a danger of missile proliferation, NMD is not a solution to this problem. On the contrary, it can only aggravate it. Now, an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has by and large been established and proven. With regard to the prevention of missile proliferation, MTCR has played a certain role. With MTCR and a series of other initiatives and proposals in this field, one may say that this issue has been half-resolved. If major powers can work together, and in collaboration with the whole international community, the issue of missile proliferation can be resolved, step by step, through political and diplomatic means. The development of NMD is tantamount to “drinking poison to quench thirst”. It cannot solve the problem. Instead, it will undercut the very foundation of the international non-proliferation regime, and even stimulate further proliferation of missile.

    Fourthly, the development and deployment of NMD by the U.S. will increase the weight of the military factor in international relation in detriment to international peace and security. In essence, the international debate on the NMD issue is about what kind of international order should be established, and a choice between unipolar and multipolar world. This is also a debate between two security concepts: seeking one’s own absolute security at the expense of others’ security, or seeking universal security based on international cooperation. In fact, more and more people in the world have come to realize that, the real motive behind the U.S. NMD program is to seek its own absolute military superiority and absolute security. Once NMD is deployed, no matter whether it is really effective or not, it would further strengthen the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism and the tendency to use or threaten to use force. People can imagine, after the deployment of NMD, the U.S. would not sit idly in this impregnable “Fortress America”, enjoying the clear and peaceful sky above. Its omnipresent “national interests” and its zealous “sense of mission”, will drive this NMD-shielded superpower, to embark on a crusade to seek and strike at “countries of concern” all around the world with even higher enthusiasm and adventurism. This will create more instability in the world.

    History has shown that security is both mutual and relative. Real security can only be achieved if a country builds its own security on the basis of common security for all. It is a truly effective way to seek security within a framework of collective security through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality. Any attempt to build its own security to the detriment of the security of others, will only undermine global strategic balance and stability, thus resulting in the loss of sense of security for all. In a world where all countries feel insecure, they would seek every means to protect themselves. As a result, military factor will play a bigger role in international relations, and huge amount of financial resources and materials that would otherwise be devoted to economic development will be diverted to arms buildup. Under such circumstances, how can a country truly enjoy real security? How can the world remain stable? As a matter of fact, today and in the foreseeable future, the U.S. has and will continue to enjoy more security than any other countries.

    II. NMD is not conductive to peace and security in Asia and the Pacific

    Both Canada and China are located in the Pacific region, and thus are naturally more concerned about the security situation in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the situation of the region on the whole has been moving towards relaxation. Most countries in the region take the development of national economy and the improvement of living standard of people as their priority task. To that end, they have made great efforts in building a peaceful and stable regional environment. Thanks to joint efforts of countries concerted, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the “Shanghai Five” and other mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation on regional security are in the steady process of development. They have played an active role in promoting mutual understanding and trust among countries concerned and in safeguarding regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, bilateral exchanges and consultations between countries of the region have also gradually increased. It has become the main trend of the region to strengthen dialogue, promote understanding, build mutual trust, and resolve issues through bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation. In particular, with the relaxation of tension in the Korean Peninsula, the situation in this region is further evolving toward peace.

    At the same time, however, factors detrimental to peace and development in Asia and the Pacific still exist. As an important component of global security structure, security in this region is closely related to the overall international security situation. The implementation of NMD program by the U.S. will not only undermine global strategic balance and stability, but also disrupt efforts for security in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the U.S. also intends to deploy Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in the region. Research and development of TMD per se may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. But, the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of TMD that the U.S. is prepared to deploy in Asia. If this TMD can be used as part of NMD and constitute the front deployment of NMD in the region, then its adverse impact on regional security and stability will be no less than the NMD itself.

    It is obvious that countries in Asia and the Pacific have many common or similar views on the issue of missile defense and have much at stake. It is the aspiration of most countries in the region that global and regional strategic balance and stability should be maintained; that mutual trust and cooperation among major powers will be enhanced; that common security for all countries will be ensured; that individual country should not seek absolute security for itself at the expense of others; that existing arms control achievements will be consolidated and cooperation in this area will be strengthened; that the U.S.-Russia bilateral nuclear disarmament process will not be reversed; that non-proliferation issue will be resolved through political and diplomatic means; and that the tendency towards unilateralism in international relations should be held at bay.

    III. China’s position on Missile Defense

    China needs peace and is eager to see the maintenance of global and regional peace and security. For that reason, China is firmly opposed to the proposed NMD

    What I want to emphasize here is that China does not want to see a confrontation between China and U.S. on the NMD issue nor an arms race between two countries. We oppose the NMD because we hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. This does not in any way imply that we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, China should have the necessary and sufficient means of self-defense, so that we will not be bullied and blackmailed by any other countries again. China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects China’s national security.

    Since the 1960’s, China has been forced to develop its own limited nuclear force due to the repeated nuclear blackmails it has encountered. During the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively threatened for several times to strike China with nuclear weapons. To survive, China had no other choice. Because China developed its own nuclear weapons against such a special historical backdrop, China has never intended to threaten other countries with nuclear weapons. For that reason, on the very first day when China came into possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly declared that under no circumstance would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. As is known to all, though China’s nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, consistently developed good relationship with its neighbors and followed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling its relations with other nations. History has demonstrated that China’s possession of nuclear weapons has not changed its peaceful foreign policy.

    In the past two years, the UN General Assembly has twice adopted the resolution on “Preservation of and Compliance with the ABM Treaty” with an overwhelming majority. This fully demonstrates the international community’s political will against the deployment of NMD and the amendment of the ABM treaty. It is particularly regrettable that, despite the widespread international and domestic opposition, the new U.S. administration would still stick to the NMD program. We sincerely hope that the U.S. government could heed the appeal of the international community, abandon the NMD program, return to the framework of collective security and join the international efforts to maintain the global strategic balance and stability as well as the system of international arms control treaties.

    Thank you.

    *Sha Zukang is Director-General of the Department of Arms Control & Disarmament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

  • Missile Defense and the Maginot Line

    Following World War I, the French decided to build a line of defense that would make them invulnerable to future attack by Germany. They created a 400-mile stretch of defensive installations known as the Maginot Line. It was considered quite high-tech for the time, and the French took great pride in it. When the Germans invaded and quickly defeated France in World War II, they simply went around the Maginot Line. One wonders if there is a lesson here that might apply to the current US plans to develop and deploy a missile defense system to protect against ballistic missiles launched by small hostile nations.

    Imagine this scenario. The United States proceeds with its plans to create a National Missile Defense system. The system employs the latest technology considered capable of shooting and destroying a ballistic missile launched at the United States. The system costs some $100 to $200 billion that might have been used to provide health care and education for America’s youth. Nonetheless, proponents of the system are proud of their accomplishment. They have built a defensive system that will protect the United States against missile attacks by countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq — should these countries ever acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.

    Let’s further imagine that a decade into the future Saddam Hussein succeeds in obtaining a few nuclear warheads and a ballistic missile delivery system capable of reaching the US. The proponents of the National Missile Defense system feel justified in their vision because their system will protect the US from a nuclear-armed missile attack by Saddam Hussein. Now, Hussein may be belligerent, aggressive and hostile to the United States, but he is not suicidal. He decides against attacking an American city by means of a missile attack, which could be traced back to him. Instead he arranges for a nuclear weapon to be smuggled into the US by ship, truck or plane. Of course, only a few trusted accomplices know that it is him who has made these arrangements. In this modern-day Maginot Line-type scenario, a determined enemy would simply go around the defense or, in this case, under it.

    In a different scenario, incoming missiles from a potential enemy might go right through the missile shield. Many experts believe that it will not be difficult to develop offensive measures to overcome the defensive shield. MIT scientists Theodore Postol and George Lewis write: “The Pentagon claims that the warhead and the ineffective large balloon decoy it is testing against are representative of the missile threat from an idealized imagined adversary an adversary presumed to be capable of building intercontinental range ballistic missiles, and nuclear warheads that are sufficiently light and compact to be mounted on such missiles, but at the same time so bungling as to be unable to hide the warhead inside a Mylar balloon decoy released along with empty balloons or to build warhead-shaped cone decoys.” In other words, it is quite possible that after spending upwards of $100 billion to create a missile defense, the shield will prove to be ineffective against an adversary sophisticated enough to develop decoys along with ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads.

    Unfortunately, the fact that the planned National Missile Defense is likely to be wasteful and ineffective is not the worst of it. The truly dangerous aspect of moving forward with deployment of missile defenses is what it will do to our relations with Russia and China. Both countries are strongly opposed to a US defensive shield because of their fear that it will create a US first-strike potential. From the Russian and Chinese point of view, the shield would allow the US to attack them in a surprise first-strike, and then use the shield to destroy any of their remaining missiles that might be launched at the US in response. Their planners, like ours, must think in terms of worst-case scenarios.

    In 1972 the US and the former Soviet Union entered into a treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, prohibiting the development of a national missile defense. Both countries understood that the development of defensive systems would further spur offensive arms races, and that limitations on defense would create the conditions necessary to reduce offensive nuclear arsenals. The ABM Treaty has provided the basis for progress on nuclear disarmament through the START I and II treaties.

    The new US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has been dismissive of the ABM Treaty referring to it as “ancient history,” and publicly suggesting that the treaty is no longer relevant because the Soviet Union no longer exists. At a recent meeting on European security policy in Munich, Rumsfeld, referring to the ABM Treaty, stated: “It was a long time ago that that treaty was fashioned. Technologies were noticeably different. The Soviet Union, our partner in that agreement, doesn’t exist any more.”

    The Russians, however, continue to view this treaty as the foundation of all current and future arms control agreements. The Russian security chief, Sergei Ivanov, responded at the same meeting, “Destruction of the ABM treaty, we are quite confident, will result in the annihilation of the whole structure of strategic stability and create prerequisites for a new arms race including one in space.” Jacques Chirac, the President of France, agrees, having stated that a US missile defense “cannot fail to re-launch an arms race in the world.” This eventuality stands in dramatic contrast to the Russian proposal by President Putin to reduce nuclear arsenals to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons or below in START III negotiations.

    Sha Zukang, the Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, has described the Chinese position on US missile defenses in this way: “To defeat your defenses we’ll have to spend a lot of money, and we don’t want to do this. But otherwise, the United States will feel it can attack anyone at any time, and that isn’t tolerable. We hope [America] will give this up. If not, we’ll be ready.”

    Thus, US plans for missile defenses are a high-stakes game. While they aim at providing security against an improbable future attack by a small nation, they antagonize the other major nuclear powers in the world and are likely to lead to new arms races. While this may be beneficial for weapons producers, it is likely to undermine rather than enhance the security of people everywhere, including Americans.

    The United States agreed with more than 185 other nations at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that it was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” We also agreed, along with the other declared nuclear weapons states to an “unequivocal undertaking” to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. By proceeding with plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system, the US is turning these promises made in the context of preventing nuclear proliferation into empty rhetoric.

    If the US is serious about keeping these promises and achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, it should take the following steps:

    • Reaffirm its commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty;
    • Provide leadership in developing an effective ballistic missile control regime to prevent the spread of this technology;
    • Continue negotiations with states of concern such as North Korea in an effort to find solutions to outstanding problems;
    • Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement;
    • Take steps to diminish the political importance of nuclear weapons such as de-alerting nuclear weapons, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, adopting clear policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons, and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    Security from nuclear threat does not reside in building a Maginot Line in the Sky. Rather, it lies in making the good faith efforts promised long ago to seek the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. There is only one way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again, and that is to abolish them.

    *David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • National Missile Defense: Just Say No!

    Ballistic missile defense sounds on the surface like a good idea. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could just make those nasty nuclear weapons harmless? That is, their nuclear weapons, not ours. We don’t worry much about the threat posed by our own nuclear weapons, but these, of course, are not aimed at us. They are aimed at others or, more accurately, they are presently aimed at the oceans if we are to believe Mr. Clinton. They can, however, be reprogrammed to strike anywhere on only a moment’s notice.

    Our nuclear weapons still pose a security problem to us because relying on nuclear weapons for security means that there will be other countries that will do so as well, and the result will be that we are targeted by their nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense, if we are to believe its proponents, offers a technological solution to this dilemma. It is, however, an unproven and unprovable solution and comes at a high price, both monetarily and in terms of security.

    Ballistic missile defense was pushed by the Reagan administration. In that early incarnation it was derided “Star Wars.” Since then, it has gone through many more incarnations, the latest of which is a land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system that is intended to defend against an attack by relatively small and technologically unsophisticated countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya. None of these countries, however, currently has ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. No matter, we are told by proponents of NMD; it is better to be prepared for any eventuality.

    Despite repeated assurances from our government that an NMD would not be designed to protect the US against a Russian attack, the Russians are not convinced. From their perspective, an NMD would undermine their deterrence capability. Even though the NMD would have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles and the Russians would have more missiles than this aimed at the US, the Russians are concerned on two grounds. First, it would create the possibility that the US could initiate a first-strike nuclear attack against Russia and use the NMD simply to deal with the presumably small remaining number of Russian missiles that survived the attack. This scenario may sound far-fetched to us since we don’t envision ever doing such a thing. The Russians, however, cannot dismiss this scenario since they, like us, base their nuclear strategy on just such worst-case scenarios. The second reason for Russian concern about US deployment of a NMD system is that, although initially the system might have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, more could be added later.

    The Russians have made it clear that if the US goes forward in deploying an NMD system this could spell the end of arms control with the Russians. Implementation of an NMD system would require the US to abrogate or violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was entered into between the US and Russia in 1972. The purpose of the treaty was to prevent a defensive arms race that could lead to a renewed offensive nuclear arms race. The ABM Treaty has been at the heart of arms control efforts between the two countries for most of the past three decades. If the treaty fails due to US plans to deploy NMD, the Russians have said that they will withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), will pull out of the START II agreements, in which the two countries have agreed to lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 3,000 to 3,500, and will refuse to negotiate further nuclear reductions under proposed START III agreements.

    Under proposed START III agreements, the Russians have put forward a proposal for further reducing nuclear arsenals to 1,500 or less on each side. Thus far, the US has responded by saying that it is only willing to go down to 2,500 to 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

    The stakes of NMD deployment in our relationship with Russia are very high. They are no less so in our relations with China. Currently China has some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If the US deploys an NMD with 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, the Chinese have indicated that they will proceed with building and deploying more nuclear-armed missiles capable of overcoming this system and reaching the United States.

    You might ask: why would Russia or China take these steps since it is highly likely that a US NMD system would be ineffective? The answer is that the Russian and Chinese planners must plan for the system to work as the US plans it to work; to do less would be viewed by their security establishments as being irresponsible. Thus, whether or not a US NMD system works, it would be viewed by Russia and China as provocative and would most likely lead to new arms races.

    The arms races would not be limited to the three countries in question. If China increases its strategic nuclear arsenal, India (which views China as a potential threat) would probably follow suit. If India increases its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan would certainly follow suit. There has also been talk of Theater Missile Defense in North Asia, which could have similar effects throughout Asia, and of deploying a Theater Missile Defense in the Middle East, which would underline the nuclear imbalance in the region.

    Will the deployment of an NMD system make the US more secure? It is doubtful. Because of the geopolitical implications described above, it will probably make the US less secure. If this is true, why is there such a strong push within the US government to deploy an NMD system? Why did the Congress vote overwhelmingly to deploy such a system “as soon as technologically feasible”? I think there are two reasons. First, a NMD system plays well in Peoria. It gives the impression of improving security even if it does just the opposite. Second, it provides a welfare program for the military-industrial complex in the aftermath of the Cold War. It provides a way of transferring substantial funding (ranging from $60 to $120 billion or even higher) from the American taxpayer to the defense industry. This is a cynical way for politicians to fulfill their obligations under the Constitution to provide for the common security of the American people.

    But could the system actually work? Anything is possible theoretically, but it is highly unlikely. Up to the present, tests of defensive missiles have failed to consistently and reliably shoot down incoming missiles, even when there is only one missile to destroy and it is known when and from where the missile will be launched. Many experts have argued that it will be far easier for offensive missile attacks to overcome defensive systems by using decoys to trick the defensive missiles.

    Rather than pursuing the delusion of missile defense, US officials would be better off pursuing another course of action. First, they could seek to develop policies that would make friends of potential enemies. There seems to be some progress on this front in relation to US-North Korean relations. Second, and most important, the US should take a leadership role in fulfilling its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal and that all nuclear weapons states are obligated to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects.”

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, promises were made to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses, either nationally or regionally, are at odds with these promises. Also, at this Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states promised an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This is where the US, as the world’s economically and militarily most powerful country, must now provide needed leadership. Plans to deploy a US National Missile Defense will undermine this possibility. The results could be disastrous not only for US security but also for our credibility in the world.

    The articles that follow provide international perspectives on US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. They reinforce each other in the view that this would be a dangerous and foolhardy path for the United States to pursue.

     

  • We Could Learn from the Skeptics

    In a New York Times editorial on December 19, 2000, “Prelude to a Missile Defense,” they rightly point out that “no workable shield now exists” and that the diplomatic and financial costs are too high to begin construction of even a limited system “until the technology is perfected.”

    It is a great leap of faith to believe that this technology will ever be perfected. Experts repeatedly have warned us that even a moderately effective offense that includes decoys will always be able to overcome the type of defensive system we are capable of deploying.

    However, even if we were able to create a foolproof missile defense against Iraq, Iran and North Korea, we would still be at risk from nuclear weapons delivered by terrorist groups or nations by other means than missiles, such as by weapons carried into US harbors on boats. The geo-political damage that deployment of a National Missile Defense would do in our relations with Russia and China would also undermine any advantages such a system might provide.

    The editorial suggests that “Mr. Bush’s new foreign policy team should try to persuade skeptical countries that a limited defensive system can be built without wrecking existing arms control treaties or setting off a destructive new arms race.” To succeed in this persuasion, Mr. Bush’s new team will need either superhuman powers or excessive and dangerous arm twisting skills.

    They would be far wiser to listen carefully to the reasons why many of our closest allies, as well as Russia and China, are skeptical about our missile defense plans. By trying to understand rather than convert the skeptics, the Bush foreign policy team might learn that deploying a costly and unreliable Ballistic Missile Defense would create greater problems than it would solve.

    The new administration might more fruitfully concentrate its efforts on providing leadership in fulfilling the promises made by the nuclear weapons states at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for an “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. Such leadership would be a true gift to humanity. It would also do far more to assure American and global security in the 21st century.

  • National Missile Defense – Why Should We Care?

    To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, the continuing angry debate over the need for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system has polarized public opinion. Pros and cons are put forward in increasingly strident confrontations which lead not to understanding or accommodation but to divisive, emotional rejection of opposing views. What is there about NMD that produces heat – not light – when the issue arises?

    The answer to that question lies in the political schism between the true believers in NMD and those who counsel other measures to reduce nuclear dangers. The believers argue emotionally that American citizens deserve a defense against missile attack and reject out of hand attempts to raise rational objections to NMD. The opponents are denigrated and their patriotism impugned if they dare to question the need for or feasibility of NMD.

    This failure to discuss NMD in civil, factual terms is unfortunate because the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system raises fundamental issues of America’s role in the world. It involves our relationships not only with our adversaries but with our closest allies as well. It is not surprising that Russia and China are loud critics of NMD but Germany, France, Great Britain and other western nations are also questioning the wisdom of proceeding with a program which threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race. It may be possible to shrug off understandable criticism from potential enemies, but we must give thoughtful consideration and great weight to the same criticism from our friends. The need for public debate leading to a constructive decision has never been greater.

    For example, a final decision to deploy NMD must await careful evaluation of four criteria: 1) There must be a real threat; 2) We must have the technological means to address that threat effectively; 3) Our response must be affordable; and 4) NMD deployment must not do unacceptable damage to the stability of current and future international security arrangements. There are serious questions concerning each of these criteria .

    Threat

    As to the threat, it does not now exist. Although some say that North Korea could create a missile capable of reaching the United States by 2005, the consensus is that it will be years later, if ever, that they would have both the missile and a weapon which could be fitted to it. And why would they, or any rogue nation, invest in such a costly, challenging venture when there are far more feasible means of delivering a weapon against us? For example, a crude nuclear device (which could never be fitted to a missile) could easily be welded in the hull of a tramp steamer and sail unchallenged into any U.S. port. Furthermore, any missile fired at America carries a very clear return address, insuring massive U.S. retaliation. The fact is that NMD would be a defense against the least likely means of attack on America while providing no protection whatever against clandestine, less costly, more reliable means of attack.

    Technology

    To date, despite spending more than $60 billion on NMD since 1983, the technological challenges have not been met. Repeated tests have failed far more often than they have succeeded and even the successes have been limited or suspect. The decoy problem has not been solved nor has the required complex of space based sensors, “X” brand radars, interceptors and command and control facilities been designed and built. Many independent scientists have concluded that there will never be any way to test such a system realistically even when it is in place in order to have high confidence that it would work the first time it was needed.

    Cost

    As to cost, the only thing that has been demonstrated is that each estimate is higher than the previous one. As noted, after more than $60 billion have been spent, there is no assurance that another $60 or $120 billion will produce a reliable NMD. Nor is there any confidence that a competent adversary could not develop effective countermeasures to NMD at far less cost than we invest.

    Nuclear Stability

    Finally, the most important criterion remains unresolved; i.e., the need to maintain the current stability of the nuclear balance by protecting present and future arms control arrangements. What good does a defense system do if it weakens nuclear stability which rests on a hard-won arms control structure built over the last 30 years? Repeated U.S. threats to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 ignore the truth that there is a comprehensive arms control structure within which the individual treaties are interdependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement of 1972 (SALT I) was negotiated in tandem with the ABM Treaty as complementary measures, neither one possible without the other. Subsequently the SALT II agreement and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) were erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation. The existence of this stabilizing arms control structure was recognized by other nations (most importantly by China) and thereby inhibited the expansion of other nuclear arsenals as well as contributed to global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. To pull out a keystone of arms control by abrogation of the ABM Treaty now will weaken nuclear stability worldwide, particularly in the sensitive area of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.

    Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly be a bar to progress on future arms control agreements which are essential to achieve genuine reductions in still bloated nuclear arsenals. President Jacques Chirac of France identified this problem when he declared: “Nuclear disarmament will be more difficult when powerful countries are developing new technologies [NMD] to enhance their nuclear capabilities.” The great danger is that other nations, most notably China and Russia, will seek to enhance their own nuclear capabilities in response to the deployment of an American NMD system. In the political effort to justify deployment of defenses against a highly unlikely threat, the United States can undo significant arms control measures and end up facing much greater real nuclear dangers.

    This is why all Americans should care deeply about the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system. By such an action we will signal to the world that we are willing to pursue illusory defenses against non-existent threats even though we subject all nations to continued nuclear competition and increased risks of a future nuclear war.

  • Criticism and Protest Surround Anti-Missile System

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) conducted its first full system test of the national missile defense (NMD) system on 7 July 2000. However, this $100 million failed missile test did not escape criticism and protest.

    More than 120 people gathered at the front gate of the Vandenberg Air Force Base to exercise their first amendment rights on Saturday, 1 July 2000. Organizations that supported the event included: American Friends Service Committee (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Atomic Mirror, California Peace Action, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, Green Party (Santa Barbara/San Luis Obispo), Green Peace, Grey Panthers, Guadalupe Catholic Worker, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Peace & Environmental Council (San Luis Obispo), San Luis Obispo County Environmental Toxic Coalition, and Santa Cruz Center for Non-Violence.

    In the week leading up to the test, activists also held a vigil, coordinated by Greenpeace, at the front gate. Additionally, members of Greenpeace and the Santa Cruz Resource Center for Non-Violence infiltrated the military base and the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace vessel, entered the “hazardous zone” in waters off the California coastline in attempts to stop the missile from being launched. Almost a dozen activists were arrested during the activities.

    Other protests were also held throughout the US and the world to say no to the weaponization of space and a new arms race. Messages of solidarity were sent from Argentina, Australia, Fiji, the UK and many cities in the US, demonstrating broad consensus to halt plans to deploy the controversial anti-missile system.

    Late in the evening on 7 June 2000 PDT, after a two hour delay, a target missile, carrying a warhead and a decoy, was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Approximately twenty minutes after the target missile lifted off, an interceptor missile carrying a model “exoatomospheric kill vehicle,” designed by Raytheon Corporation, was launch from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and was directed toward the target, using data collected from the system’s radars. However, the “hit to kill” weapon fired from Kwajalein Atoll did not separate from the second stage of its liftoff rocket. Of the three tests that have been conducted, two have failed. The Pentagon has scheduled 16 more tests of the system in the next five years.

    The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) claims that the NMD system is needed to protect the US from incoming Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles that would be launched by “states of concern” such as North Korea. The estimated cost to deploy the system by the year 2005 is $60 billion. However, a report released in late June by the Welch Panel, an independent team of scientists, outlined the probability of the systems failure due to time and schedule constraints.

    The deployment of a national missile defense system would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between Russia and the US. The treaty is viewed as the cornerstone of arms control efforts and amendment or abrogation of the treaty will pose serious threats to international relations. After the failed missile test, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that President Vladimir Putin will try to persuade President Clinton to stop deployment of an anti-missile defense system during the G-8 summit, being held in Okinawa, Japan from 21-23 July. President Putin has also offered to reduce Russian and US nuclear arsenals to 1,000 to 1,500 on each side under a new START III agreement.

    On 22 June 2000, China attacked the proposed US national missile defense (NMD) system saying it would turn outer space into a “battlefield” and jeopardize global stability. China has also voiced opposition to amending the ABM Treaty. Both Russia and China have called for negotiations to ban the weaponization of outer space, but the US has refused to engage in any such discussions.

    President Clinton recently made a decision to defer a decision on deployment to the next presidential administration.* Plans for future non-violent demonstrations at Vandenberg Air Force Base and around the world are already being planned to continue voicing grassroots opposition to the deployment of any anti-missile system. The relentless pursuit by the US to deploy a national missile defense system that threatens to initiate a new nuclear arms race must be stopped. Rather than developing new technology that undermines global security, the US should uphold the commitments it has made in international law to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

  • China’s Concern over National Missile Defence

    Understanding Ballistic Missile Defence

    Ballistic missile defence has drawn heated debate in the international community in the recent years. On the one hand, the US has made it a national policy to develop a limited ballistic missile defence program, with a key decision to be made this year regarding whether to deploy the system. On the other hand, the US missile defence build-up has been much criticised by other countries. It is often argued that missile defence would, if unchecked, tilt the balance of power and therefore affect the international political and security order.

    To be honest, there is indeed a genuine concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other types of delivery means. Coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation presents a major challenge to international security and stability. This was manifested during the second Gulf War of 1991, when Scuds fired against Saudi Arabia and Israel took on great psychological importance. Ever since then, more and longer-range missile flight tests, in South Asia and Northeast Asia, have been reported.[1] While the countries concerned may have quite reasonable grounds to acquire missiles for their defensive purposes, such a trend of proliferation does not bode well for global as well as regional stability.

    Ballistic missile proliferation has thus raised concern among states. There have been three kinds of responses. First, denying the intention of those who would seek such delivery vehicles. This would require the creation of a more secure environment in order to reduce the incentive to acquire them. Second, denying the missile-related technology available through transfer, if denial of intention fails to work. Third, establishing a certain level of ballistic missile defence as a protection against incidental and/or unauthorised attack, or a limited intentional attack with ballistic missiles.

    In this context, it is not impossible to understand the need for a limited missile defence, especially for a global power as the United States, which has vast overseas presence and interests, often in turn a reason to invite attack.

    In fact, the US has never given up its attempt to build various missile defence systems. The US set out to build sentinel antiballistic-missile program in 1967 against China’s nascent nuclear deterrent when it first came into being.[2] For the last two decades, the US government has persistently pursued missile defence. The Reagan Administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative, a land- and space-based multi-layer missile defence system which was never successfully developed. The Bush Administration converted the Star War dream into Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The Clinton Administration has decided to continue ballistic missile defence, with components of both National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

    This paper will address China’s position on missile non-proliferation regime, and its concern on National Missile Defence. It is suggested that the US and China should address their respective security concerns and seek a win-win solution in missile non-proliferation and missile defence issues.

    China and Missile Non-proliferation Regime

    Over the last decade, China has been increasingly exposed to a missile-proliferation-prone peripheral environment. Key neighbouring states either have a formidable missile arsenal, a significant missile programme, a fast developing missile capability or an alliance with a nuclear superpower. As such, missile proliferation has clearly affected China’s international environment.

    Therefore, the PRC has taken a series of steps addressing this problem through joining international missile non-proliferation efforts. It has been cautious concerning the transfer of missiles, adopting strict and effective controls over the export of missiles and related technology. Beijing has committed to missile non-proliferation and kept its obligation.[3]

    In February 1992, China committed to observing the then guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[4] With the enhanced dialogue which emerged between China and the US in the missile area, the two countries signed a joint statement in October 1996, reaffirming China’s promise and obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 kilometres with a payload of 500 kilograms.[5]

    Although China has not joined the MTCR’s formulation and revision, it has signalled that it would study the feasibility of joining the regime. This came as a result of the Jiang-Clinton Beijing summit of 1998, reflecting their effort to cultivate a constructive partnership. It is understood that China has conditioned its joining the MTCR on the question of the US arms sales to Taiwan, especially US TMD development and deployment in this part of the world.

    The two countries were engaging on this matter until their talks on non-proliferation, arms control and international security were, unfortunately, suspended in the aftermath of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. Their arms control talk is not resumed till July 2000, following their security consultation in Beijing in February.

    NMD Undermining Russia and China’s Security

    On 17 and 18 March 1999 respectively, the US Senate and House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved National Missile Defence System legislation, stating “That it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defence”.[6] This has evoked tremendous repercussions around the world, drawing negative responses from all other nuclear weapons states and even US allies in NATO.[7]

    According to the NMD plan, the US will deploy 100 interceptors in Alaska in its first configuration. Assuming a 1 in 4 rate of interception, the US could at most hit 25 incoming missiles, a more than sufficient capability to take care of the alleged threat from those “rogue” states’ said to be developing long-range ballistic missiles with which to target America. At later stages, the US would deploy further kinetic kill vehicles in North Dakoda in order to provide nationwide missiles defence.

    The US has stated clearly that China has not figured in its NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the US intentions in terms of NMD development. From China’s perspective, it is untenable that the US would spend 60-100 billion dollars on a system which has only “rogue” states in mind.

    Such capability of intercontinental strike by ballistic missile owned by “rogue” states does not yet exist. Excluding the P5, only Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran are currently believed to have medium-range missiles with ranges above 1,000km. Only four of these states, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran, may also have active programmes to develop intermediate-range missiles with ranges of over 3,000km.[8] It is highly unlikely that any of them will acquire an ICBM capability within a decade or so. The CIA’s classified 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Development recognised that the ICBM threat to the United States from so-called rogue states is unlikely to materialise before 2010, with the possible exception of DPRK.[9]

    Only Russia and China currently have the capability to hit the United States with nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Both the US and Russia have maintained their nuclear arsenals of thousands of deployed nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenals are at basically comparable levels in terms of quality and quantity. It is the ABM Treaty signed in 1972 that has prevented the US and the former Soviet Union from embarking on unlimited strategic arms race.

    The ABM Treaty does allow the US and the former Soviet Union (now Russia as its sole legitimate successor) to deploy limited anti-strategic ballistic missiles capability for the sake of incidental and/or unauthorised launches. It has doubly served strategic stability. First, for limited nuclear attack due to incidental/unauthorised launch, it permits limited capability to intercept. Second, for an all-out nuclear attack and counterattack, it assures the rivals of their mutual destruction. Indeed, the Treaty has helped dissuade the two nuclear weapons superpowers from further escalating their strategic offensive build-up.

    With Russia’s ongoing social and economic disruption, its military capability has been affected significantly. In the context of strategic offence-defence relationship, Russia is being pressed three-fold. First, a significant amount of Russia’s strategic force is ageing and has to be phased out. Therefore, Russia needs deep bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with the US, but it refuses to do this at the expense of revising ABM, permitting the change of balance of power in favour of the US. Second, START II would eliminate Russia’s land-based MIRVs. At a time of the US rhetoric of abrogating ABM anyway, the Russia has to reconsider the necessity to disarm its MIRVed weapons. Third, Russia’s missile defence, permitted under ABM, is eroding as its early warning satellite system can no longer provide full coverage.[10]

    As such the world is experiencing a double danger. Russia cannot properly execute its launch-on-warning of strategic force as it is unable to fully track missile launch and flight. Russia’s refusal to cut its nuclear force, when it has to cut it, also creates difficulty in nuclear disarmament. However, the latter issue is a result of the US missile defence build-up in violation of ABM Treaty.

    Consequently, the US NMD build-up will be harmful to US-Russia relations. It presses Russia to be hesitant in continuing strategic nuclear disarmament, and may force Moscow to strengthen its offensive capability. By revising or even abandoning the ABM Treaty, the US will seek absolute security regardless its negative effect on the security of other countries.

    From China’s perspective, the US national missile defence would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington. Though China has not publicly made its nuclear capability transparent, its CSS-4 ICBM force, capable of reaching the US with a range of 13,000 kilometres, is largely believed by the Western strategic analysts to number around 20.[11]

    China’s concern over the US national missile defence in violation of ABM has been expressed through various channels many times.[12] Primarily China is concerned about two issues. One is that the NMD will destabilise the world order, and harm the international relations. The other is that NMD will undermine China’s strategic deterrence, undermining China’s confidence in its strategic retaliatory capability.

    A limited anti-ballistic missile capability, as allowed by the existing ABM Treaty, would be enough to defend the strategic assets of the US against potential missile threats from outside the P5. Indeed the one-site base of anti-ballistic missile deployment under ABM framework cannot immunise the whole US from being hit. It is exactly this reason that has given Russia (as well as other nuclear weapons states) a confidence that they retain a credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the US. Theoretically, part of the US would thus be exposed to some missile threat from “rogue” states. However, either that threat has been too remote, or the overwhelming strength of the US in both nuclear and conventional weapons will be powerful enough to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities.

    Also the envisaged NMD cannot stop an all-out Russian nuclear attack, considering the thousands of strategic weapons at Russia’s disposal. Therefore, Beijing can only take the view that US NMD has been designed to effectively neutralise China’s strategic deterrence.

    Given the reported level of China’s full-range ICBM force (CSS-4), the NMD plans requiring ABM revision would (if successfully implemented as advertised) compromise China’s strategic capability in two respects. Geographically, it will protect the whole US from being deterred. Numerically, even interceptors deployed on a single site may be enough to knock out all Chinese CSS-4s.[13] Hence China’s national security interest is greatly endangered.

    To hold the US credibly deterred is just to reciprocate, to a much lower extent, what the US has long done against China during the nuclear age. In fact, it was US nuclear threats to PRC on a number of occasions that prompted Beijing to start its nuclear weapons programme.[14]

    Though the US has the most formidable nuclear arsenal and most powerful and sophisticated conventional arsenal, it retains the option of a first-strike with nuclear weapons as its deterrence policy. Now the US would even revise or abolish the ABM which assures nuclear weapons states of their mutual security.

    The PRC has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals and least advanced conventional weaponry among all the nuclear weapons states, but it still adopts a nuclear no-first-use policy, and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear weapons free zones.

    The PRC’s national security thus rests with what ABM provides. The US indeed can develop and deploy anti-strategic weapons capability, as permitted by the ABM, in order to gain certain sense of security against incidental and/or unauthorised attack by nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it ought to take into account the common security of all nuclear weapons states. When the US improves its own security at a time of ballistic missile proliferation, it should mind not to undermine the national security of others. Indeed there is an internationally acceptable limit that the US can pursue, i.e. developing its NMD capability in compliance with the Treaty.

    Addressing China’s Concern

    The US can argue that it is its sovereign rights to develop and deploy NMD beyond ABM Treaty. However, if the US were to go ahead regardless of the other states, it certainly would not create a win-win situation. Indeed, it would be counterproductive in terms of US interests.

    Some in the U.S. have been indifferent of the negative security impact the revision of AMB would bring upon other states. In this theory the US shall at most care to some extent Russia’s concern. As ABM involves the business between US and Russia, there seems no need to address China’s concern.

    The US shall understand the ABM is both a balancer of power between US and Russia, and, more fundamentally, a cornerstone of global security. In the latter context, China’s security is affected by the standing of ABM. The PRC has expressed its interest in multilateralising ABM, in the hope of expanding ABM membership.[15] This reflects Beijing’s interest in maintaining ABM by raising the stake of altering a multilateral treaty. Being a member of the ABM, Beijing would be situated in a better strategic position to enhance world stability.

    There have thus far been two interception tests of NMD systems. The first was carried out on 2 October 1999 and was found to have flaws.[16] The second test on 18 January 2000 was a complete failure due to a “plumbing leak”.[17] The US has self-imposed a deadline for making a decision on NMD deployment in June/July, after one more test. Even though future tests could be more or less “successful”, it would be still quite irresponsible to make a decision to go ahead.[18] It will be in neither America’s ultimate interest, nor the interest of the rest of the world.

    If the US insists on hurting the national interests of Russia and medium nuclear weapons states, it is hard to see how it will be possible to gather international support for non-proliferation initiatives in other fronts. The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FissBan) is an obvious example. Were the US to break the ABM Treaty, medium nuclear weapons states would be unlikely to give up their option of retaining the right to re-open production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, if they feel their deterrence is eroded.

    It should also be pointed out that there are ample means to defeat a missile defence.[19] Various means such as submunitions, high as well as low altitude countermeasures, balloon decoys, chaff and missile fragment decoys can all be considered. MIRVing and ASAT approaches might also be tempting. It goes without saying that if a state is able to independently develop a strategic missile capability, it should also be able to develop a capability to cost-effectively defeat missile defence.[20]

    Some argue that there is a growing threat from China as it is modernising its strategic forces. Looking at the CSS-4 force developed and China’s sea-based deterrence, one can hardly reach this conclusion. A land-based strategic force of about two dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a very small submarine-based missile force, is hardly any match for those of the United States.

    As China intends to adopt a no-first-use strategy, it serves China’s interest to keep a moderate force. However, China has a need to modernise its force as its defensive policy requires to do so, and as all other countries are doing the same. This is especially true at an age of precision-guided weaponry. An ICBM force of some two dozens of missile does not justify the US to revise or abolish ABM Treaty. Quite to the opposite, China’s moderate strategic force and moderate modernisation play a key role in assuring the US adequate security, which serves a stabilising role in terms of China-US relations, and world security.

    In sum, the United States does have legitimate concern over missile proliferation. That concern is shared by Chinese side. Major powers of the world, along with other countries, should work together to address such international problems, and to find solutions which serve both international stability and their respective national interests. Moving along the lines provided for by the ABM Treaty provides such a way forward. On the contrary, going ahead with damaging ABM and other countries’ interests can only be counterproductive.

     

    * Dingli Shen is a professor and Deputy Director of Fudan University’s Centre for American Studies, as well as Deputy Director of University Committee of Research and Development. He co-founded and directs China’s first university-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan. The views presented in this chapter are purely of his own. This piece is adopted and updated from a longer version, “BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY”, Jane’s Special Report, May 2000.

    [1] For instance, India has tested Agni and Prithvi, and Pakistan has tested Ghauri ballistic missiles a number of times in the 1990s. DPRK is alleged to have developed and tested No-dong and Taepo-dong intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Reportedly some other countries are developing their ballistic missile capabilities.
    [2] Edward N. Luttwak, “Clinton’s Missile Defense Goes Way Off Its Strategic Target”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 14, 2000, p.2.
    [3] “China’s National Defence”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, July 1998.
    [4] MTCR was set up in April 1987, and modified in July 1993 to target missiles capable of delivering any type of weapons of mass destruction.
    [5] “Joint United States-People’s Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation”, Washington, D.C., 4 October 1994.
    [6] The House version, sponsored by Curt Weldon (R-PA), was a bill of one-sentence as quoted in the text.
    [7] Joseph Fitchett, “Washington’s Pursuit of Missile Defense Drives Wedge in NATO”, International Harold Tribune, 15 February 2000, p.5.
    [8] “The Missile Threat: An Intelligence Assessment”, Issue Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 10 February 2000.
    [9] Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24.
    [10] David Hoffman, “Russia’s Missile Defense Eroding: Gaps in Early-Warning Satellite Coverage Raise Risk of Launch Error”, Washington Post, 10 February 1999, p.A1.
    [11] CIA put the number as about 20, see Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24, and, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.555; IISS estimated it as 15-20, see The Military Balance 1999-2000 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.186. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimated the number in 1993 as 4, see Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 4: Britain, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Westview Press: Boulder, 1994), p.11.
    [12] For instance, Sha Zhukang, “International Disarmament on A Crossroad”, World Affairs (Beijing), February 2000, p.17; Gao Junmin and Lü Dehong, “A Dangerous Move”, PLA Daily, 24 January 1999, p.4.
    [13] Assuming China has 20 CSS-4s, the 100 interceptors deployed on a single ABM site will be more than enough to hit all of them under a 1 in 4 interception ratio.
    [14] See, Dingli Shen, “The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies”, Princeton University/Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies Report No. 247, February 1990; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Random House: New York, 1988).
    [15] See luncheon speech of Ambassador Shu Zhukang at Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference: Repairing the Regime, 11-12 January 1999, Washington, D.C.
    [16] James Glanz, “Flaws Found In Missile Test That U.S. Saw As A Success”, New York Times, 14 January 2000, p.1.
    [17] Robert Suro, “Missile Defense System Fails Test”, Washington Post, 19 January 2000, p.1; Bradley Graham, “Plumbing Leak Foiled Anti-Missile Test”, Washington Post, 8 February 2000, p.A1.
    [18] However, Richard Garwin has pointed out that “the proposed NMD system would have essentially zero capability against the most likely emerging threat – an ICBM from North Korea”. See, “Effectiveness of Proposed National Missile Defense Against ICBMs from North Korea”, http://www.fas.org/rlg/990317-nmd.htm.
    [19] See description in Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel ed., The Last 15 Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger: Washington, D.C, 1996); Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program), April 2000.
    [20] See cost analysis in Dingli Shen, “Security Issues Between China and the United States”, IFRI Report (Institut Fran¹ais des Relations Internationales, Paris), to be published.

    Paper presented at the International Conference on “Challenges for Science and Engineering in the 21st Century” Stockholm, Sweden, June 14-18, 2000, Session D3

  • Facing Nuclear Dangers and Flinching – Comments on the Final Report of the Tokyo Forum

    The Final Report of the Tokyo Forum is entitled, “Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century.” The Report, however, is not nearly as bold as its title would suggest. A clue as to why this may be so is found in paragraph 12 of the opening section of the Report where it states, “Terrorism using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons has been possible for some time, but serious policymakers have traditionally seen other threats as more pressing.” The members of the Tokyo Forum have aimed their recommendations at influencing such “serious policymakers,” particularly those in the nuclear weapons states. The Final Report ends up being short on vision, and proposes only incremental changes, the kind that might be acceptable to those who have no real desire to change the status quo.

    The Report recognizes, “the fabric of international security is unraveling and nuclear dangers are growing at a disturbing rate.” This is a diagnosis that calls for strong medicine. The Tokyo Forum, however, offers only weak tea and toast, proposals unlikely to offend the “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states. In doing so, the Report falls painfully short of the mark as to what is needed as we approach the beginning of a new century and millennium. Like Nero, the “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states have been fiddling while the nuclear fuse continues to burn.

    When it comes to the issue of nuclear proliferation, the Report finds that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “must be reaffirmed and revitalized.” With breathtaking logic, the Report reaches the conclusion that “The discriminatory basis of the NPT regime need not constitute a moral and practical flaw in the treaty provided that the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states keep their parts of the bargain.” The problem here is that the nuclear weapons states have never kept their part of the bargain, and seem far more intent on maintaining a two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” than in doing so.

    One bright point in the Report is its denunciation of the use of nuclear weapons to deter a chemical, biological or large-scale conventional attack. The Report states, “Until they are abolished, the Tokyo Forum believes that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons.” This is a position with which many so-called “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states apparently do not agree. U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 60, a secret document, is purported to expand the use of nuclear weapons to counter chemical or biological attacks.

    In the end, the Report fails to ask enough of the nuclear weapons states. It calls on the U.S. and Russia “to further extend reductions to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.” This is a step in the right direction, but far from sufficient. The Report asks for a “goal of zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.” Recognizing millennial computer risks, the Report calls for removing nuclear weapons from alert status “for the period of concern.” Good idea, but why not use this as a starting point for keeping all nuclear weapons separated from delivery vehicles to prevent any possibility of accidental launch. Perhaps in the minds of the members of the Tokyo Forum, this would go too far for “serious policymakers.”

    Rather than opposing Ballistic Missile Defenses, which seem to offer only the false promise of security and to have the potential to reignite the development of offensive nuclear capabilities, the Report asks only that “all states contemplating the deployment of advanced missile defences to proceed with caution….”

    The Tokyo Forum offers too little, too late to meet the dangers of our nuclear-armed world. While the Report is not a complete disgrace, it does little if anything to build upon and advance the Report of the Canberra Commission to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons issued three years earlier. I find the Report a serious disappointment when measured against the calls of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a world free of nuclear weapons.

    The people of Japan, even more than the people of most countries of the world, strongly support rapid action to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. The government of Japan, on the other hand, has been content to crawl under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The Tokyo Forum has aligned itself much more closely with the policies of the U.S. and Japanese governments than with the people of Japan, and particularly those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is often what happens when aspiring “serious policymakers” speak to those in power.

    The people of Japan are far ahead of their government and far ahead of the experts in the Tokyo Forum. They should demand a far stronger and more active leadership role for their government in reducing nuclear dangers, beginning with a demand for the de-alerting of all nuclear weapons and the separation of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. This would be a valuable first step on the part of the nuclear weapons states toward fulfilling their obligations in Article VI of the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    The way to proceed is with good faith negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased elimination of nuclear arsenals under strict and effective international control. There is no reason not to commence these negotiations immediately and to conclude them with a treaty by the end of next year. In this way, we could enter the 21st century with an agreed upon plan in place to abolish nuclear arms. The Tokyo Forum was timid about asking for action within a timeframe, but their timidity should not inhibit people everywhere from asking for what is right and in the best interests of humanity, now and in the future.

    * David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and is the editor of Waging Peace Worldwide. He is a member of the international coordinating committee of Abolition 2000 and a member of the executive committee of the Middle Powers Initiative.