Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

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  • A Nuclear Crisis

    This article appeared in the Washington Post, Editorials and Opinions Section.

    Every five years, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) comes up for reassessment by the countries that have signed it. This is the treaty that provides for international restraints (and inspections) on nuclear programs. It covers not only the nuclear nations but 180 other countries as well, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. An end to the NPT could terminate many of these inspections and open a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in states that already present serious terrorist threats to others.

    Now it is time for the 30-year-old NPT to be reviewed (in April, by an international assembly at the United Nations), and, sad to say, the current state of affairs with regard to nuclear proliferation is not good. In fact, I think it can be said that the world is facing a nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has had a good deal to do with creating it.

    At the last reassessment session, in 1995, a large group of non-nuclear nations with the financial resources and technology to develop weapons–including Egypt, Brazil and Argentina–agreed to extend the NPT, but with the proviso that the five nuclear powers take certain specific steps to defuse the nuclear issue: adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996; conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and “determined pursuit” of efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.

    It is almost universally conceded that none of these commitments has been honored. India and Pakistan have used this failure to justify their joining Israel as nations with recognized nuclear capability that are refusing to comply with NPT restraints. And there has been a disturbing pattern of other provocative developments:

    • For the first time I can remember, no series of summit meetings is underway or in preparation to seek further cuts in nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty concluded seven years ago by presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin has not been seriously considered for ratification by the Russian parliament.
    • Instead of moving away from reliance on nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and NATO have sent disturbing signals to other nations by declaring that these weapons are still the cornerstone of Western security policy, and both have re-emphasized that they will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted to this U.S. and NATO policy by rejecting its previous “no first use” commitment; strapped for funds and unable to maintain its conventional forces of submarines, tanks, artillery, and troops, it is now much more likely to rely on its nuclear arsenal.
    • The United States, NATO and others still maintain arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, including up to 200 nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
    • Despite the efforts of Gens. Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner and other military experts, American and Russian nuclear missiles are still maintained in a “hair-trigger alert” status, susceptible to being launched in a spur-of-the-moment crisis or even by accident.
    • After years of intense negotiation, recent rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a serious blow to global nuclear control efforts and to confidence in American leadership.
    • There is a notable lack of enforcement of the excessively weak international agreements against transfer of fissile materials.
    • The prospective adoption by the United States of a limited “Star Wars” missile defense system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which has prevailed since 1972. This could destroy the fabric of existing international agreements among the major powers.
    • There is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the NPT or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt to join the nuclear community.
    • The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has been recently abolished, removing an often weak but at least identifiable entity to explore arms issues.

    I believe that the general public would be extremely concerned if these facts were widely known, but so far such issues have not been on the agenda in presidential debates.

    A number of responsible non-nuclear nations, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have expressed their disillusionment with the lack of progress toward disarmament. The non-proliferation system may not survive unless the major powers give convincing evidence of compliance with previous commitments.

    In April, it is imperative that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be reconfirmed and subsequently honored by leaders who are inspired to act wisely and courageously by an informed public. This treaty has been a key deterrent to the proliferation of weapons, and its unraveling would exert powerful pressures even on peace-loving nations to develop a nuclear capability.

    All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.

    Just as American policy is to blame for many of the problems, so can our influence help resolve the nuclear dilemma that faces the world.

  • Questions to Ask US Political Candidates — Presidential or Congressional — in this Election Year

    Where do you stand on these issues?

    1. Do you favor or oppose reductions in spending for defense?
    2. Do you favor or oppose deployment of a ballistic missile defense for the US?
    3. Do you favor or oppose the sale of military weapons to countries that violate the human rights of their citizens?
    4. Do you favor or oppose US leadership to achieve a treaty for the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons?
    5. Do you favor or oppose US initiation of reciprocal unilateral steps to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal?
    6. Do you favor or oppose giving increased financial support to Russia to help control its nuclear arsenal?
    7. Do you favor or oppose the US signing and ratifying the international treaty to ban landmines?
    8. Do you favor or oppose US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
    9. Do you favor or oppose US participation in an International Criminal Court to hold individuals accountable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity?
    10. Do you favor or oppose full and timely payment of US dues to the United Nations?

  • Open Letter to the Leaders of all Non-Nuclear Weapons States

    Your Excellencies:

    The outcome of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which begins April 24, 2000 at the United Nations in New York, will play a significant role in determining the security of humanity in the 21st century. Your personal commitment to a successful outcome of this Review Conference is essential to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, and thus to humanity’s future.

    The nuclear perils to humanity are not sufficiently widely recognized nor appreciated. In the words of writer Jonathan Schell, we have been given “the gift of time,” but that gift is running out. For this reason vision and bold action are called for.

    General George Lee Butler, a former Commander in Chief of all US strategic nuclear weapons, poses these questions: “By what authority do succeeding generations of leaders in the nuclear weapons states usurp the power to dictate the odds of continued life on our planet? Most urgently, why does such breathtaking audacity persist at the moment when we should stand trembling in the face of our folly and united in our commitment to abolish its most deadly manifestation?”

    It is time to heed the warnings of men like General Butler, who know intimately the risks and consequences of nuclear war. The time is overdue for a New Agenda on nuclear disarmament. What is needed is commitment and leadership on behalf of humanity and all life.

    The heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty agreement is the link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear weapons states agree in the Treaty not to develop nor acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states agreeing to negotiate in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament. The Treaty has become nearly universal and the non-nuclear weapons states, with a few notable exceptions, have adhered to the non-proliferation side of the bargain. The progress on nuclear disarmament, however, has been almost entirely unsatisfactory, leading many observers to conclude that the intention of the nuclear weapons states is to preserve indefinitely a two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.”

    At the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference many countries and non-governmental organizations challenged the nuclear disarmament record of the nuclear weapons states. They argued that to extend the Treaty indefinitely without more specific progress from the nuclear weapons states was equivalent to writing a blank check to states that had failed to keep their promises for 25 years. These countries and NGOs urged instead that the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty be linked to progress on Article VI promises of good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the nuclear weapons states led to the Treaty being extended indefinitely, but only with agreement to a set of non-binding Principles and Objectives that was put forward by the Republic of South Africa.

    These Principles and Objectives provided for:

    — completion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996;

    — early conclusion of negotiations for a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning production of fissile materials; and

    — determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination.

    Progress toward these goals has been unimpressive. A CTBT was adopted in 1996, but has been ratified only by the UK and France among the nuclear weapons states. The US argues that the CTBT necessitates its $4.6 billion per year “Stockpile Stewardship” program, which enables it to design new nuclear weapons and modify existing nuclear weapons in computer-simulated virtual reality tests and “sub-critical” nuclear tests. Despite the existence of this provocative program, ratification of the CTBT by the US Senate was rejected in October 1999. The US and Russia continue to conduct “sub-critical” nuclear weapons tests. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty have yet to begin, and the “determined pursuit” promise has been systematically and progressively ignored by the nuclear weapons states.

    In its 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 60, the US reaffirmed nuclear weapons as the “cornerstone” of its security policy and opened the door to the use of nuclear weapons against a country using chemical or biological weapons. The US, UK and France have also resisted proposals by other NATO members for a review of NATO nuclear policy. Under urgent prodding by Canada and Germany, they did finally agree to a review of nuclear policy, but this will not be completed until December 2000, after the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    The US seems intent on moving ahead with a National Missile Defense plan, even if it means abrogating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which most analysts view as a bedrock treaty for further nuclear arms reductions. The US is also moving ahead with space militarization programs. In the US Space Command’s “Vision for 2020” document, the US proclaims its intention of “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment.”

    Russia has abandoned its policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons in favor of a policy mirroring that of the western nuclear weapons states. The START II agreement is stalled and is still not ratified by the Russian Duma. The date for completion of START II has, in fact, been set back for five years from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2007. Negotiations on START III are stalled.

    China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan, countries that have consistently criticized the discriminatory nature of the NPT, have both overtly tested nuclear weapons and joined the nuclear weapons club. Israel, another country refusing to join the NPT, will not acknowledge that it has developed nuclear weapons and has imprisoned Mordechai Vanunu for more than 13 years for speaking out on Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

    In the face of the intransigence of the nuclear weapons states, the warning bells are sounding louder and louder. These warnings have been put forward by the Canberra Commission, the International Court of Justice, retired generals and admirals, past and present political leaders, the New Agenda Coalition, the Tokyo Forum, and many other distinguished individuals and non-governmental organizations working for peace and disarmament.

    The future of humanity is being held hostage to self-serving policies of the nuclear weapons states. This is an intolerable situation, not only for the myopic vision it represents and the disrespect for the rest of the world that is implicit in these policies, but, more important, for the squandering of the precious opportunity to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat to our common future.

    The more nuclear weapons in the world, the greater the danger to humanity. At present we lack even an effective accounting of the numbers and locations of these weapons and the nuclear materials to construct them. The possibilities of these weapons or the materials to make them falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals or potential new nuclear weapons states has increased since the breakup of the former Soviet Union.

    What is to be done? Will the 2000 NPT Review Conference again be bullied by strong-armed negotiating techniques and false promises of the nuclear weapons states? Or will the non-nuclear weapons states, the vast majority of the world’s nations, unite in common purpose to demand that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their long-standing promises and obligations in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

    Ridding the world of nuclear weapons is the greatest challenge of our time. We ask you to step forward and meet this challenge by demanding in a unified voice that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As we stand on the threshold of a new century and millennium, we ask that you call upon the nuclear weapons states to take the following steps to preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and end the threat that nuclear weapons arsenals pose to all humanity:

    • Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.
    • Publicly acknowledge the weaknesses and fallibilities of deterrence: that deterrence is only a theory and is clearly ineffective against nations whose leaders may be irrational or suicidal; nor can deterrence assure against accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, or terrorists.
    • Publicly acknowledge the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law as stated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, and further acknowledge the obligation under international law for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
    • Publicly acknowledge the immorality of threatening to annihilate millions, even hundreds of millions, of people in the name of national security.
    • De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.
    • Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
    • Establish an international accounting system for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials.
    • Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cease laboratory and subcritical nuclear tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems, cease construction of Megajoule in France and the National Ignition Facility in the US and end research programs that could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons, and close the remaining nuclear test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.
    • Re-affirm the commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and cease efforts to violate that Treaty by the deployment of national or theater missile defenses, and cease the militarization of space.
    • Support existing nuclear weapons free zones, and establish new ones in the Middle East, Central Europe, North Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.
    • Set forth a plan to complete the transition under international control and monitoring to zero nuclear weapons by 2020, with agreed upon levels of nuclear disarmament to be achieved by the NPT Review Conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015.
    • Begin to reallocate the billions of dollars currently being spent annually for maintaining nuclear arsenals ($35 billion in the U.S. alone) to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.
    • You have a unique historical opportunity to unite in serving humanity. We urge you to seize the moment.

    Sincerely,

    David Krieger

    President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

    cc: Leaders of United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel

  • A Twelve Step Program to End Nuclear Weapons Addiction

    The following steps should be taken by the nuclear weapons states to assure a full commitment to ending the nuclear weapons threat that now hangs over the heads of all humanity and clouds our future:

    1. Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

    2. Publicly acknowledge the weaknesses and fallibilities of deterrence: that deterrence is only a theory and is clearly ineffective against nations whose leaders may be irrational or suicidal; nor can deterrence assure against accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, or terrorists.

    3. Publicly acknowledge the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law as stated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, and further acknowledge the obligation under international law for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    4. Publicly acknowledge the immorality of threatening to annihilate millions, even hundreds of millions, of people in the name of national security.

    5. De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    6. Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    7. Establish an international accounting system for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    8. Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cease laboratory and subcritical nuclear tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems, cease construction of Megajoule in France and the National Ignition Facility in the US and end research programs that could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons, and close the remaining nuclear test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.

    9. Re-affirm the commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and cease efforts to violate that Treaty by the deployment of national or theater missile defenses, and cease the militarization of space.

    10. Support existing nuclear weapons free zones, and establish new ones in the Middle East, Central Europe, North Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.

    11.Set forth a plan to complete the transition under international control and monitoring to zero nuclear weapons by 2020, with agreed upon levels of nuclear disarmament to be achieved by the NPT Review Conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015.

    12. Begin to reallocate the billions of dollars currently being spent annually for maintaining nuclear arsenals ($35 billion in the U.S. alone) to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

  • Facing Nuclear Dangers and Flinching – Comments on the Final Report of the Tokyo Forum

    The Final Report of the Tokyo Forum is entitled, “Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century.” The Report, however, is not nearly as bold as its title would suggest. A clue as to why this may be so is found in paragraph 12 of the opening section of the Report where it states, “Terrorism using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons has been possible for some time, but serious policymakers have traditionally seen other threats as more pressing.” The members of the Tokyo Forum have aimed their recommendations at influencing such “serious policymakers,” particularly those in the nuclear weapons states. The Final Report ends up being short on vision, and proposes only incremental changes, the kind that might be acceptable to those who have no real desire to change the status quo.

    The Report recognizes, “the fabric of international security is unraveling and nuclear dangers are growing at a disturbing rate.” This is a diagnosis that calls for strong medicine. The Tokyo Forum, however, offers only weak tea and toast, proposals unlikely to offend the “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states. In doing so, the Report falls painfully short of the mark as to what is needed as we approach the beginning of a new century and millennium. Like Nero, the “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states have been fiddling while the nuclear fuse continues to burn.

    When it comes to the issue of nuclear proliferation, the Report finds that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “must be reaffirmed and revitalized.” With breathtaking logic, the Report reaches the conclusion that “The discriminatory basis of the NPT regime need not constitute a moral and practical flaw in the treaty provided that the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states keep their parts of the bargain.” The problem here is that the nuclear weapons states have never kept their part of the bargain, and seem far more intent on maintaining a two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” than in doing so.

    One bright point in the Report is its denunciation of the use of nuclear weapons to deter a chemical, biological or large-scale conventional attack. The Report states, “Until they are abolished, the Tokyo Forum believes that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons.” This is a position with which many so-called “serious policymakers” in the nuclear weapons states apparently do not agree. U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 60, a secret document, is purported to expand the use of nuclear weapons to counter chemical or biological attacks.

    In the end, the Report fails to ask enough of the nuclear weapons states. It calls on the U.S. and Russia “to further extend reductions to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.” This is a step in the right direction, but far from sufficient. The Report asks for a “goal of zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.” Recognizing millennial computer risks, the Report calls for removing nuclear weapons from alert status “for the period of concern.” Good idea, but why not use this as a starting point for keeping all nuclear weapons separated from delivery vehicles to prevent any possibility of accidental launch. Perhaps in the minds of the members of the Tokyo Forum, this would go too far for “serious policymakers.”

    Rather than opposing Ballistic Missile Defenses, which seem to offer only the false promise of security and to have the potential to reignite the development of offensive nuclear capabilities, the Report asks only that “all states contemplating the deployment of advanced missile defences to proceed with caution….”

    The Tokyo Forum offers too little, too late to meet the dangers of our nuclear-armed world. While the Report is not a complete disgrace, it does little if anything to build upon and advance the Report of the Canberra Commission to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons issued three years earlier. I find the Report a serious disappointment when measured against the calls of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a world free of nuclear weapons.

    The people of Japan, even more than the people of most countries of the world, strongly support rapid action to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. The government of Japan, on the other hand, has been content to crawl under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The Tokyo Forum has aligned itself much more closely with the policies of the U.S. and Japanese governments than with the people of Japan, and particularly those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is often what happens when aspiring “serious policymakers” speak to those in power.

    The people of Japan are far ahead of their government and far ahead of the experts in the Tokyo Forum. They should demand a far stronger and more active leadership role for their government in reducing nuclear dangers, beginning with a demand for the de-alerting of all nuclear weapons and the separation of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. This would be a valuable first step on the part of the nuclear weapons states toward fulfilling their obligations in Article VI of the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    The way to proceed is with good faith negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased elimination of nuclear arsenals under strict and effective international control. There is no reason not to commence these negotiations immediately and to conclude them with a treaty by the end of next year. In this way, we could enter the 21st century with an agreed upon plan in place to abolish nuclear arms. The Tokyo Forum was timid about asking for action within a timeframe, but their timidity should not inhibit people everywhere from asking for what is right and in the best interests of humanity, now and in the future.

    * David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and is the editor of Waging Peace Worldwide. He is a member of the international coordinating committee of Abolition 2000 and a member of the executive committee of the Middle Powers Initiative.

  • Senator Kerrey calls on U.S. to cut Nuclear Weapons Unilaterally

    Writing in the Washington Post on November 17, 1998, Walter Pincus reports that Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb) will call on President Clinton to immediately make unilateral reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and to de-alert many nuclear weapons that remain.

    Kerrey is quoted as stating that the $25 billion spend maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal could be better spend on more important military threats like regional war, ethnic conflict, and international terrorism.

    According to the Washington Post report, Kerrey believes that “our maintenance of a nuclear arsenal larger than we need provokes Russia to maintain one larger than she can control. Keeping nuclear arsenals far in excess of what we need is an accident waiting to happen.”

    The speech follows:

     

    “Toward A New Nuclear Policy: Reducing The Threat To American Lives”
    Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE)
    November 17, 1998

    Prepared Text — Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations

     

    Good afternoon. At the beginning of this talk let me say I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to you today and hope that at the conclusion of my remarks you will feel some gratitude as well. Either for my coming or my departure. It is an honor for me to be introduced by Warren Rudman, with whom I had the great honor of serving. Two other former colleagues, Jim Exon and Sam Nunn, have been instrumental in helping me learn more about, and keeping America safe from, nuclear dangers. They have my thanks as well. Special thanks are also in order for other members of the Council on Foreign Relations, especially my friend Skip Stein, who helped organize this lunch. Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington has been generous with both his time and his creativity on the topic I will address today, as has Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institution and many others.

    The most important business of the Federal government must be to keep the people of the United States of America safe. The President and Congress have the responsibility of assessing the threats to our country and designing an appropriate response to minimize them.

    At the dawn of our Republic the thirty- nine men who drafted our Constitution defined this objective as “providing for the common defense.” They envisioned this purpose as little more than defending our territory against outside invaders. Over time, as our nation has grown, this mission has grown. We have learned from bitter experience that our interests extend beyond our borders. We have learned that diplomacy backed by a credible military force can prevent wars from happening. We have learned that good intelligence can help us build and direct that force so that threats are accurately assessed.

    In these times, devastatingly hovering over mankind are three weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological. They have the dynamics of plunging the world suddenly in an unimaginable war aimed more at civilians than military casualties.

    A commission created by my colleague, Arlen Specter, is engaged in an in-depth study of this threefold threat. It is headed by chairman John Deutch and its report is expected shortly. I hope we have learned the importance and value of a credible military force — but I do not assume it.

    The history of this century should keep us vigilant against the tendency to want to disarm. We disarmed and came home after the Great War, the war to end all wars. We responded to the military actions of Japan and Germany with words which were not enough to prevent 50 million people from dying in the Second World War. Little remembered is this fact: After the second world war we slashed our defense budgets again. We withdrew our forces from Europe and Asia. And though it is an open question as to what might have happened to Eastern Europe had a credible military force faced the Soviet Union or a credible force been close to the Korean peninsula, there can be no doubt it would have had a deterrent impact on the decisions made by Soviet and North Korean leaders. They did not believe we would respond and so they acted.

    Today the United States of America is the most important arbiter of world peace. The measure of our success can be seen around the world. More people are living in free and democratic nations than ever before. The cold war is over. Today, when the word “Russia” is spoken, we think of economic problems and not espionage or proxy wars or nuclear weapons. The global economy — frustrating, confusing and challenging — is making us more interdependent and reducing the ol territorial and military tensions between nation-states. But please observe: It is the threat of conventional force deployment which produced the Dayton Accords and the agreement in Kosovo and, hopefully, Iraq’s compliance with United Nations Resolutions.

    Still, threats remain. Not only do they remain, but the nature of the threat has changed radically from what it was as recently as 10 years ago. Because of that,there is a clear and present need for constant re-examination of policies to ensure we are not using yesterday’s strategy and/or force structure on today’s and tomorrow’s threats. Never before has thinking outside the old box that confined our plans been so important.

    That is my purpose here today: To step outside of the old way of meeting the one threat with the potential of killing every single American: nuclear weapons. I begin by describing that threat. Consider this scenario, which could unfold by sundown today:

    A peaceful scientific rocket is launched off the coast of Norway. To the east, in Russia, radar operators mistake the launch for a nuclear attack by the West. A deadly process — nearly on auto-pilot — is triggered. Within minutes President Yeltsin has been alerted of the attack. For the first time in history, the Russian nuclear briefcase is activated. With thousands of nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert around the world, commanders tell Yeltsin he has just minutes — three minutes, five at most — to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike against American cities. Like a raft on a raging river, Yeltsin is being carried away by events. Literally minutes before a retaliatory strike is ordered, military commanders realize the rocket is peaceful. They had been given advance warning of the scientific launch. They had simply failed to pass it on to the duty officers who evaluate warning indicators.

    In the chaos, though, it is too late: After a breakdown in discipline or communication within Russia’s underpaid and poorly equipped command structure, one SS-25 missile with a 550-kiloton warhead has been launched at Chicago. The missile rockets north over the top of the world, across the arctic pole, and inside an hour detonates over Chicago within — even on a bad day — a few hundred yards of its intended target.

    The surrounding air is instantaneously heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The fireball shoots outward at a rate of a few hundred kilometers per second. A mushroom cloud dozens of miles across and high rips up from the explosion. Everything within miles of the detonation site is vaporized. In the immediate blast zone nearly everyone is killed. The radius of destruction reaches out for miles. Even in the farthest reaches of the blast zone, structures are severely damaged, thousands are dead, half are injured and most survivors have suffered second and third-degree burns.

    If that sounds like a fantasy cooked up in a Hollywood studio, consider this: According to public reports, every event I have just described to you, right up until the actual launch of one missile, occurred on January 25, 1995, with the Soviet Union three years in the grave.

    This scenario will probably not happen, but it most assuredly could. It is at least as plausible as any number of other threats that absorb the attention and rhetoric of our policy makers. And as important as it is to mount a good defense against terrorism, narcotics traffickers, or political instability in the Middle East or Balkans, they are pale worries in comparison to the number of Americans who would die if just one of Russia’s nuclear weapons were to be launched at the United States. Chinese weapons get more attention today, but it is Russia’s, not China’s, that are accurate and capable of being launched across an ocean and hitting a hard target.

    The topic of this speech is reducing nuclear dangers. By the end of it, I intend to leave you with three ideas:

    First, the several thousand nuclear warheads on Russian soil are the gravest, most imminent threat to the security of the United States. Second, our old policies of arms control and deterrence no longer work and may be increasing the danger, both by making nuclear threats worse and by diverting money and resources away from the conventional forces that are the key to our safety in the post-Cold War world. Third, we are confronted by both an urgent danger and an urgent opportunity. The danger is obvious; the opportunity is not. The opportunity is a window of time during which we can significantly reduce the danger nuclear weapons pose to American lives. But this window is closing. We must act now, and we must act boldly.

    I call this nuclear threat to your attention with such an urgent tone because I fear that Americans, amidst our well earned joy in the victory of freedom in the Cold War, have been lulled into a false sense of security about it. What America needs from its leaders today is not a lullaby, but a wake-up call. I am not here to tell you to cast off old suspicions, but to replace them with new ones, suspicions in many ways graver than the old ones and less curable by the incentives for rational behavior on which our strategy of deterrence has historically relied. We need a new nuclear policy to confront new nuclear dangers.

    What are these new nuclear dangers?

    I see four scenarios in which nuclear weapons threaten American lives. First is an authorized launch, which is to say a deliberate attack by Russia on the United States. Even in the unlikely event of a throwback totalitarian regime in Russia, there is little reason to fear such an attack. Second is the acquisition of weapons in the Russian arsenal by rogue groups or individuals, whether they be terrorist states or their clients or simply a disgruntled Russian soldier. Third is an accidental launch, like the one I just described, based on technological error or miscalculation. Fourth is another country acquiring nuclear weapons, either through proliferation or their own nuclear program.

    Today we must deal with nuclear threats differently. The policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, or deterrence, protected us from the old threat — deliberate attack. But it does not protect us from these new ones. In fact, I will argue, it makes them worse.

    The underlying assumption of deterrence is rational behavior on the other side. None of these potential new nuclear powers — whether they be terrorist groups or rogue states or desperate individuals — can be counted on to respond rationally to the threat of retaliation.

    In addition, leaving nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert is a recipe for miscalculation caused by events controlling leaders rather than leaders controlling events. In the case I mentioned to you earlier, President Yeltsin had a matter of minutes to react. The combination of hair-trigger alert, deadly weapons and the potential for human or technological error is a combustible mixture with lethal consequences.

    The threats either of proliferation or the seizure of nuclear materials by criminals inside Russia are real. Russia’s economy is failing, creating an economic incentive to proliferate. The physical and human infrastructure responsible for safeguarding her nuclear arsenal are in dangerous disrepair.

    You do not need the warnings of a senator responsible for oversight of our highly secret intelligence community to know this threat exists. According to the Los Angeles Times, last month a 19-year-old Russian sailor killed eight crewmen on his nuclear submarine near Murmansk, seized control of the sub and held it for 20 hours. Said one former Russian Navy captain: “It is really scary that one day the use of nuclear arms may depend on the sentiments of someone who is feeling blue, who has gotten out of bed on the wrong side and does not feel like living. The probability of this today is higher than ever before.”

    Mutual Assured Destruction is no deterrent to such problems, and the massive, redundant arsenals this policy has produced may be making them worse. Our maintenance of a nuclear arsenal larger than we need provokes Russia to maintain one larger than she can control. In the wake of these kinds of threats, from proliferation to loose weapons, keeping massive nuclear arsenals far in excess of what we need is an accident waiting to happen. Every weapon we maintain that we do not need to defend ourselves provokes the Russians to maintain another to match it. This is a simple mathematical proposition: If what we most fear is a mistake, rather than a deliberate attack, the probability of that threat grows with every weapon in the arsenal of either side. In this environment, every nuclear weapon in those arsenals is like another round loaded into the chamber in what is a literal and deadly game of Russian roulette.

    Nor can the United States ignore the power of our example in influencing others’ behavior. Our heavy reliance on these weapons … despite the vastly diminished threat they were created to deter … has helped make nuclear arms the Rolex wristwatch of international relations: a costly purchase whose real purpose is not the service it provides, but the prestige it confers. It was status, not just security, that the one billion citizens of India sought in electing a government that had made clear its intention to make their nation a nuclear power. It is nationalism, not just national security, that has hogtied START TWO in the Russian Duma.

    And, finally, the passing of Cold War threats has given rise to new ones, ranging from ethnic or regional conflict to international terrorism. The $25 billion we reportedly spend every year to maintain our nuclear arsenal is diverting resources from those real and imminent threats to fight an old one. If America is to be engaged in the world today, it will be with the threat or use of conventional, not nuclear, force. Maintaining massive nuclear forces while trimming the conventional forces that are the real tool of American leadership is an act of retrenchment at a time when the world desperately needs our engagement.

    By alerting you to these dangers, I do not mean to disparage the extraordinary Russian experiment with democracy. Russia’s progress, economic and political, must be measured in decades, not years. The courageous pro democracy leaders there are navigating a complex obstacle course of domestic politics, international diplomacy and, most important, the friction between new ideas and the old.

    Indeed, I underscore our friendship with Russia to suggest that history presents no better time than right now to reduce nuclear danger. But that opportunity comes with this warning: At the dawn of the millennium, history travels in high gear at high speed. The rapid pace of change within Russia and around the world will not shift into neutral while we debate whether to seize this opportunity. I expect our friendship with Russia to endure. I expect their experiment with democracy to succeed. But the road to that destination will take us around a few curves, into a few potholes and over a few speed bumps. We know what our relationship with Russia is like today. We can predict, but cannot know, what it will be in a year, or two, or five, or 10. We do not know whether the circumstances for reducing nuclear dangers will be as favorable then as they are now, and therefore it is incumbent on us to act boldly and to act swiftly. History will judge us harshly if we ignore this opportunity when it is open to us.

    The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, process has taken us in the right direction. It has marked a steady series of steps back from the brink of nuclear conflagration. But even after START ONE is fully implemented and six thousand warheads are left, the walk back to that brink would be a short trip. More important, I fear the pace of change in Russia could overtake us and the opportunity before us could close before the START process has time to run its lengthy course. This process takes so long because its safeguards were erected under a cloud of fear of a first strike by a Cold War enemy. The result is a cumbersome treaty, more than 250 pages long, that makes the journey back from the brink long, laborious and expensive.

    Today our open friendship with Russia and the technology of intelligence allow us to move more swiftly. We need a new nuclear policy that protects us from new nuclear dangers, and we need a new framework for enacting it that moves at the pace of world change and can seize this opportunity before it is gone.

    To that end I am proposing the following:

    First, the President of the United States should work with Congress to remove legislative restraints on reducing deployed strategic U.S. forces below the START ONE level of 6,000 warheads. This deployed arsenal no longer serves our national security interests, and it is provoking Russia to maintain an arsenal that undermines our national security interests.

    Simultaneous with this request, the president should agree with Republican leadership to build a defined, rigorously tested strategic missile defense. He should make clear to Russia’s leaders we would build it for accidental and rouge nation threats.

    The president should couple this request with a request for such funds as necessary to make certain Russia knows that Nunn-Lugar will be fully funded to go to START THREE levels.

    Second, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief and in an act of international leadership, the President should immediately order the reduction of American nuclear forces to no more than the proposed START THREE levels. The two thousand to twenty-five-hundred nuclear warheads that would remain are more than enough — many, many times over — to destroy any nation, any where, any time, that threatens us. And the diversity of our triad — nuclear weapons on air, land and sea — protects us against the risk of a first strike destroying our capacity to retaliate. If we can reduce farther without endangering our security, we should.

    Third, because the complete and verifiable dismantling of those weapons will take time, the President should immediately stand down weapons in excess of START THREE levels from their hair-trigger alert. Warheads should be physically separated from delivery vehicles. Our national security will not be endangered by leaders having two days, rather than two minutes, to make life-and-death decisions about nuclear war. While this proposal would apply only to warheads in excess of START THREE levels, we should seriously explore the possibility of the United States and Russia standing down all forces from hair-trigger alert.

    Fourth, this reciprocal reduction to START THREE levels should be only a way station, not an end point. We should continue to supplement the START process with a series of mutual, transparent and reciprocal steps between the United States and Russia to reduce nuclear arsenals and alert levels. We should be willing to go as low as Russia wants to go, as low as we can verify they are going, and as low as we can go without risking our security either from Russia or other nuclear powers.

    To enable this process of mutual, transparent steps, we should greatly expand funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. We should spend whatever is necessary to help Russia dismantle and secure her nuclear arsenal. Nunn-Lugar is one of the great acts of post-Cold War statesmanship, and it defies understanding that we are engaged in a year-to-year battle to fund it. If we can spend $25 billion a year on a nuclear policy that is making people less safe, surely we can spend a fraction of that on an investment that is making us more safe.

    There is precedent for action like I have described. On September 27, 1991, with the Soviet Union still intact and before the Soviet parliament ratified START ONE, President Bush went on national television to announce he was ordering the elimination of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, deactivating 450 ICBMs, standing down our bomber fleet, and ordering a stop to Pentagon development of a short-range ballistic missile. President Gorbachev reciprocated nine days later. Likewise President Clinton showed courageous leadership by first unilaterally rescinding our nuclear testing, and, second, by providing the leadership that culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations. I will urge the Republican Senate leadership to bring that treaty up for Senate approval as soon as possible.

    Today it is clear Russia not only wants to follow our lead, but must. Russia’s own defense minister recently said, publicly, that Russia is thinking of its long-term nuclear arsenal in terms of hundreds, not thousands. Our action would give Russia the confidence to do what the unbearable cost of maintaining nuclear arsenals already dictates that she must do.

    The approach I have outlined would have the following benefits.

    First, a bold gesture of friendship and leadership that does not threaten our security would give Russia the confidence to significantly reduce her own nuclear arsenal, strengthen the position of our pro-democracy friends there and send a signal to the world that nuclear weapons are a sign of peril, not prestige, in the post-Cold War era.

    Second, by reducing the number of nuclear weapons around the world, we would reduce the new nuclear dangers of accidental launch, proliferation or acquisition by rogue groups or individuals.

    Third, by de-alerting weapons in excess of what we need to defend ourselves — and perhaps the rest of the world’s arsenals — we would reduce the new nuclear danger of total war being dictated by a time-line that prevents rational deliberation.

    Fourth, our reduction of our own stockpile would free money and resources to confront other, newer, threats, from regional war to ethnic conflict to international terrorism. We would, quite simply, be getting more safety for less money. This last point is crucial. The $25 billion a year it is estimated we spend maintaining our nuclear arsenal adds far less value to the safety of Americans today than $25 billion spent on our Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and the intelligence gathering that support these and other pillars of our national security infrastructure.

    No President can take such bold action without domestic support. Our ability to forge a new nuclear policy for the post-Cold War era hinges on our ability to thaw the Cold War between those on opposite sides of the ideological divide in our own country. We must realize that we share a common goal: reducing nuclear dangers. I am eager to build partnerships that seize on that common ground while reducing ideological differences. If, for example, some of my Republican colleagues will support me in seeking steep cuts in nuclear arsenals, I am open to working with them on the deployment of a defined, rigorously tested missile defense. Whether it be through this or other means, those with a common goal — reducing nuclear dangers — must find common ground. If we elevate imagination over ideology, we can do it.

    Imagination seems like a good note on which to end this speech. I opened by telling you we need a new nuclear policy to confront new nuclear dangers. I close by telling you that to do it, we need something that isn’t new at all. The same courage, creativity and leadership that won the Cold War are exactly the ingredients we need to keep our people safe in its aftermath. It is clear to me that our nuclear arsenal and the policies which controlled these weapons of mass destruction helped keep our safety and the world’s peace for 40 years. It is equally clear that we need a new policy — one which will seize an opportunity to make the world safer still. Thank you.

  • Nuclear Weapons and Sustainability

    Nothing threatens sustainability more than nuclear weapons. And yet these weapons are rarely considered in discussions of sustainability, which tend to focus on resources and environmental degradation. The simple fact is that nuclear weapons are capable of destroying not only our most precious global resources and degrading our global environment, but of destroying civilization if not humanity itself. The possession and threat to use nuclear weapons also afflicts the souls and spirits of their possessors.

    Nuclear weapons are a holocaust waiting to occur, but this understanding is obscured by comforting though unprovable theories of deterrence. Decision makers and the public alike confuse deterrence with defense. In fact, deterrence is not defense. Deterrence is only a theory that an attack can be prevented by threatening to retaliate. It is a bad theory because deterrence cannot prevent attacks that occur by accident or miscalculation, nor attacks by terrorists or criminals who have no fixed place to retaliate against.

    National security “experts,” such as Henry Kissinger, who propound theories of deterrence, are the sorcerers of our time. The public is expected to be humble before the apparent wisdom of such self-absorbed theorists. Clearly, there has been a price to pay for accepting their rhetorical invocations in the name of national security. The price is the willingness to place in jeopardy our human future, and our own humanity.

    Nuclear weapons incinerate human beings and other forms of life on a massive scale. This lesson was not lost on the people of Japan, who experienced two attacks with atomic weapons. It was apparently lost, however, on those who used these weapons. The possessors of nuclear weapons, and particularly Americans and Russians, suffer the delusion that they are protected by these weapons.

    Obstacles to the elimination of nuclear weapons include official secrecy concerning nuclear policies, lack of public discourse on these policies, confusion and muddled thinking regarding deterrence by policy elites, and a lack of courage and imagination on the part of political leaders. All of these translate into a lack of political will to radically change nuclear policies and take bold steps toward the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Until the public demands the abolition of nuclear weapons, the world will remain hostage to these instruments of genocide residing in the hands of mere mortals. What will arouse the public from its stupor? This may be the most important question of our time. Moral and legal arguments have not prevailed. Arguments concerning the concentration of power and undermining of democracy have not succeeded. Not even arguments concerning the vulnerability of citizens of nuclear weapons states to others’ nuclear weapons have awakened the power of the people.

    We live at a critical time in human history, in which we share the responsibility to pass the future on intact to the generations to follow. On the shoulders of those of us now living has fallen the responsibility to end the nuclear weapons era, or to face the almost certain spread of nuclear weapons and the likely use again, by accident or design, of these instruments of genocide.

    Sustainability and a future free of nuclear weapons are inseparable. Anyone concerned with a sustainable future should embrace the abolition of nuclear weapons, and become a vocal and active advocate of this cause. Because nuclear weapons abolition affects the future as well as the present, this cause provides an important challenge to the youth of today, who are the inheritors of the future.

  • Statement of His Excellency Archbishop Renato R. Martino Apostolic Nuncio, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations on Landmines

    Before the First Committee of the 53rd Session Of the United Nations
    General Assembly

    General and Complete Disarmament
    New York City

    Mr. Chairman,

    The international community has, in recent times, witnessed some positive-albeit modest-trends in disarmament. An anti-personnel landmines treaty has come into existence and all who worked to make this a reality, deserve congratulations. Unknown numbers of innocent civilians, particularly children, will be spared the cruel maiming and death caused by these evil instruments. The Holy See, which expeditiously ratified the treaty, calls on all nations to do the same.

    The Holy See notes another recent gain in the new momentum given to the small arms issue. Small arms cause the violent death, injury and psychological trauma of hundreds of thousands of people each year. These simple and comparably inexpensive weapons of death find their way into areas of conflict and instability and, shockingly, even into the hands of children, who are locked into a culture of violence. Casualties often occur in the context of religious, ethnic, political and national conflicts. These conflicts are the cause for the existence of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. The weaponization of society fuels cycles of violence, despair and ultimately state collapse. Thus, the establishment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, alongside the work of the Vienna Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, are a positive step forward.

    In the recent meeting, which took place in Oslo, government officials agreed that governments have primary responsibility to reduce the flow and accumulation of small arms. A study of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace noted the anomaly by which certain States have stringent controls on the international transfer of heavy arms, but few if any regarding the sale of small arms and handguns. The supplying of small arms must be regulated at its source, at the same time as efforts are being made to lessen the demand and to choke off access to illicit supplies. In certain areas there is an urgent need to ensure a more effective control of stockpiles. Furthermore, the sale of excess supplies of small arms and light weapons, rendered redundant either through modernization or reduction in the size of military forces, can lead, in a cascading effect, to an ongoing flow of sophisticated arms from developed to developing countries.

    Civil society also has an important role to play, for the human cost of small arms casualties is a societal issue. Reducing arms expenditures and heightened health care costs could enable more resources to be directed to sustainable development programs. The strain on public health care facilities in affected areas would be relieved and the physical and mental health of individuals and families improved. The new efforts to bring together the communities of international arms control and disarmament, humanitarian law, peace and security, public health, gun control, international development and conflict resolution, are hopeful signs of a new global awareness.

    The Holy See appeals, in particular, for increased measures to be taken to effectively identify those individuals and groups who traffic in small arms outside all bounds of legal control, and who, through their activity, unscrupulously contribute to violence and instability. More decisive international police and intelligence cooperation is required. A reliable system of marking small arms would make tracking more effective. All governments must ensure maximum transparency and absolute respect for their own norms and the norms of the international community concerning arms transfers, especially to conflict areas.

    Turning to the nuclear weapons field, the worthy initiative by eight states from different areas of the world which have formed the New Agenda Coalition, is a welcome advance. They have called on the governments of the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement

    In this context, the development of the Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of prominent international nongovernmental organizations, is also welcomed. It aims at encouraging the governments of the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons-capable states to move rapidly to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

    A measure of progress was made this year in the tentative agreement at the Conference on Disarmament to establish committee discussions on a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty. This work would be enhanced by a general recognition that steps toward non-proliferation must go hand-in-hand with steps to disarmament.

    The upgrading of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs signals a higher priority that the UN itself will give to disarmament activities.

    Mr. Chairman, the review of positive developments I have just given should fill us with encouragement for the future. A distinct mark of our time, however, is that the work of disarmament is proceeding slowly. But an offsetting trend of negative developments is slowing us down further. These negative trend lines must be identified in order for us to take action.

    Foremost is the breakdown in the preparatory process for the 2000 Review of the NPT. During two sessions over two years, the NPT Preparatory Committee has struggled to find an acceptable format for deliberations on nuclear disarmament. The debates over terminology, subsidiary bodies and time schedules are but a surrogate for the real debate over a comprehensive program to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    It is not just the NPT that is in trouble. The impasse in the ratification process of both START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bespeak the lingering resistance to disarmament. Further progress is inhibited by the failure to consolidate hard-earned gains.

    The testing of nuclear weapons by States which stand outside the NPT exacerbates the dangers caused by a weak nonproliferation regime. Nuclear testing by any nation is to be deplored. Criticism of those who test, however, does not deal adequately with the central problem. This is the determination of the nuclear weapons states to carry their nuclear weapons into the 21st Century, despite their obligation under the NPT to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

    The continued existence of 30,000 nuclear weapons almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, poses a grave danger to humanity. This is further worsened by the fact that 5,000 of these weapons are on alert status, meaning they are capable of being fired on thirty minutes’ notice. The danger of nuclear catastrophe through accident or terrorism is an unacceptable risk.

    Mr. Chairman, nothing so reveals the negative trend lines in disarmament as the continued insistence that nuclear weapons are essential to national security. The exaggerated claim that nuclear weapons are an aid to peace can only provoke other states to do the same. At this point, I would like to recall the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, that states have an obligation to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

    More over, what is deeply troubling is the prospect of a new nuclear arms race. The modernization programs of those who already have nuclear weapons, combined with the acquiring of nuclear weapons by other states, and research now going on in still others, plunge the world into more danger than existed during the Cold War. The longer this situation continues, the more a growing number of states will falsely claim that nuclear weapons are legitimate.

    The Holy See has stated before and states again: “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition.” (Statement of the Holy See before the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 15 October 1997.)

    My delegation believes that the world must move more and more toward the abolition of nuclear weapons through a universal, non-discriminatory ban with intensive inspection by a universal authority. This process would begin by the nuclear weapons states committing themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations to this end. Practical steps to move this process forward should be taken immediately, such as de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons. A pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons should be made, as an interim step, by every State possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it would be a constructive step to hold an international conference on nuclear disarmament in which both governments and civil society could unite their strengths to develop the political will to take the courageous steps necessary for abolition.

    Mr. Chairman, the great task ahead for the Twenty-first Century is to move the world from a culture of violence and war to a culture of peace. UNESCO has already taken a lead in promoting a culture of peace. This consists in promoting values, attitudes and behaviors reflecting and inspiring social interaction and sharing, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, human rights, tolerance and solidarity. Rather than intervening in violent conflicts after they have erupted and then engaging in post-conflict peace building, it is more human and more efficient to prevent such violence in the first place by addressing its roots.

    Let it not be said that the promotion of a culture of peace, the rooting out of the causes of violence, the abolition of nuclear weapons, are unreachable goals. The world has rid itself of the evils of legalized slavery, legalized colonialism and legalized apartheid. These were eliminated as the result of rising global awareness and political determination. So, also, the growing momentum to delegitimize and eliminate nuclear weapons must now be accompanied by political action by all States. Humanity deserves no less from us.

    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

     

  • World Medical Association Condemns Nuclear Weapons

    The World Medical Association, at its 50th WMA General Assembly, held in Ottawa, Canada, unanimously adopted the following Declaration on Nuclear Weapons:

    Preamble

    In October 1990, the World Medical Association (WMA) adopted a WMA Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons (Document 17.Y) in which it condemned and asked asked all governments to refrain from the development and use of these weapons, and urged national medical associations to join the WMA in actively supporting the Declaration. In adopting the Declaration, the WMA acknowledged the dangers and health hazards of the use of these weapons, including the indiscriminate and long lasting effects on civilian populations and on the environment, and argued that existing health care services, technology and manpower may be helpless to relieve the suffering caused by the weapons.

    The effects of nuclear weapons may be even more catastrophic, more indiscriminate, and longer lasting than chemical and biological weapons. These effects, based on studies of the affected populations and on studies of the consequences of radioactive fallout from nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, have been widely documented over the years.

    At least 40% of the population of Hiroshima and 26% of the population of Nagasaki were killed in the nuclear attacks on these two cities. Modern nuclear weapons are much more destructive and the casualties today would be much higher.

    Apart from the immediately lethal effects of blast, heat and radiation, many of the “survivors” would perish from the latent effects of ionising radiation, (leukaemia, cancer and genetic effects) as well as infectious diseases like cholera, tuberculosis and dysentery, arising from the breakdown in local services.

    Sunlight-absorbing particulate matter, generated by fires following a massive nuclear attack involving many weapons exploding at different sites, would reduce the penetration of sunlight to the earth’s surface and change the physical properties of the earth’s atmosphere, leading to prolonged periods of darkness and devastating effects on agricultural production.

    The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed many health professionals, destroyed all hospitals and infrastructure, such as electricity and water supply, and made it impossible for medical services to function at a time when they were most needed.

    The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its recent advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, has declared that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.

    The ICJ, in view of the current state of international law, however, could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

    The WMA Declarations of Geneva (Document 17.A), of Helsinki (Document 17.C) and of Tokyo (Document 17.F) make clear the duties, responsibilities and sacred mission of the medical profession to preserve and safeguard the health of the patient and to consecrate itself to the service of humanity.

    Recommendations

    The WMA considers that, with its unique position of influence in society, it has a duty to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In accord with this duty, the WMA:

    i) condemns the development, testing, production, deployment, threat and use of nuclear weapons; ii) requests all governments to refrain from the development, testing, production, deployment, threat and use of nuclear weapons, and to work in good faith towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

    iii) requests all national medical associations to join the WMA in supporting this Declaration and to press their respective governments to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

  • An Allegiance to Humanity

    https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/wagingpeaceseries/rotblat.pdf