Category: International Issues

  • The Nuclear History of Micronesia and the Pacific

    “The first shot, Bravo, the largest single nuclear explosion conducted by the United States, with a destructive capability more than one thousand times that of the Hiroshima bomb, was detonated on 1 March 1954. The explosion was so powerful it vaporized several small islands …”

    “…To this day, peoples of Rongelap, Bikini, Enewetak, and many in the Marshall Islands continue to suffer from cancer, miscarriages, and tumors.”

    While it is harrowing that Japanese cities became the ultimate target, Micronesians (Marshallese) and French-Polynesians have never really overcome the disastrous consequences of the nuclear testings that made the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki possible. In French-Occupied Polynesia, 180 tests were conducted for over 30 years beginning with atmospheric testing in the Tuamotos in 1966. Only sometime later did the testings move underground in the atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa; but unlike the Americans, in the case of documentation of test results and effects on environmental and human health, the French have always been and continue to be secretive about their own tests in Polynesia. Tahitians and Marshall Islanders who were exposed, including test site workers, have been dying slow, excruciating deaths. Often they are unable to receive proper medical treatment because French authorities continue to deny officially that the nuclear tests did in fact cause any significant environmental or human damage.

    At the conclusion of World War II after Japan’s defeat, Micronesia was taken by America. In January 1946, the US Naval Military Government selected the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands chain for the first series of nuclear tests–known as Operation Crossroads–which were intended to demonstrate the destructive capacity of the atomic bombs on a fleet of wartime ships (Robie 1989, p.142). In July 1947, the US Government became our “Administering Authority,” with the blessings of the UN. Immediately after the war, eleven territories were under UN supervision. Micronesia became administratively the “Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,” and consisted of the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands (which included the islands of Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truck/Chuuk, Yap, and Belau), and the Marianas Islands (which include Guam, Saipan and Tinian).

    In Belau (Palau), where I come from, we were spared the harrowing experiences of the atomic testings. Kwajalein, Bikini and Enewetak in the Marshall Islands, however, were chosen for a supply base and a smaller command center, respectively, and which were used for the bomb testings. The Marshall Islands suffered the most from these military occupations and tests. Kwajelein also became a vital link in the supply route for American forces during the Korean War as well as a base for missile tests later. On Saipan, the main island of what is now the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Central Intelligence set up a camp which operated a secret training for Chinese nationalist guerillas who were part of an unsuccessful plan to invade the Chinese mainland (Robie p.144).

    Micronesia, therefore, was where the beginnings of important aspects of these US military activities took place. These integral aspects of US military strategy in the western Pacific were the beginnings of a strategic concept at work in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. Ever since, as Joseph Gerson has written, Micronesia has been shaped and influenced by “the goal of maintaining and increasing U.S. power and advantage in the region.” In the Marshall Islands, the US tested a total of 66 atomic and hydrogen bombs between 1946 and 1958. Six islands were vaporised by nuclear weapons and hundreds of people were irradiated. Today, more than 40 years later, many islands are still uninhabited. Many Bikinians and Rongelapese who were downwind of the bomb explosions remain exiled peoples. (Alexander 1994, pp. 28,30).

    In the book, Blood on their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific, David Robie writes,

    …the more than 2000 islands of Micronesia have played a vital role in modern strategic history. Japanese aircraft launched their attack on Peal Harbor from Micronesia, plunging the United States into the Second World War. And it was from Tinian Island in western Micronesia that the Enola Gay took off with its deadly weapons for the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended the war and ushered in the nuclear age. The islands of Micronesia have been used by Washington ever since as pawns to enhance its strategic posture (Robie, ibid, p.142).

    This ‘strategic posture’ was largely the result of a Cold War strategy that relied on massive military might. It emerged as well from a rational calculation of the use of deadly power. Cold War strategy, Alexander observed:

    …required an assessment of both the political and military potential of the atomic weapon in a strategic sense. While the political assessment was made in the context of East-West rivalry, the military assessment required taking note of both the strengths and weaknesses of the new weapon. Two of these weaknesses, the scarcity of bombs and the limited range of the only available delivery vehicle, the B-29 bomber, served to govern US strategy in the first years after World War II, and prompted an all-out effort for research and development, including an ambitious testing program. At the same time, US confidence in its ability to maintain its nuclear lead was bolstered by a new-found strength, the efficacy of which had been demonstrated by the Manhattan Project (Alexander, ibid, p.18).

    A comprehensive program of nuclear research appeared necessary; however, there had been concerns within the US Congress about safety issues. After considerations, the US Atomic Energy Commission told Congress in 1953 that tests should be held overseas until it (can) be established more definitely that continental detonations would not endanger the public health and safety (Weisgall 1980, p. 76). Micronesia, which was captured from the Japanese, seemed, to the AEC, as the most natural place. Bikini was chosen as one of over 20 atolls scattered over close to 400,000 square miles of ocean which make up the Marshall Islands to carry Operation Crossroads, the first series of tests which were conducted near the surface of the atoll, in July 1946. These first tests consisted of two 23 kiloton detonations, one named Able and the other, Baker.

    The explosions gouged out a crater 240 feet deep and 6,000 feet across, melted huge quantities of coral, sucked them up and distributed them far and wide across the Pacific. The island of Rongelap (100 miles away) was buried in powdery particles of radioactive fallout to a depth of one and a half inches, and Utirik (300 miles away) was swathed in radioactive mist. Also in the path of the fallout was a Japanese fishing boat, Lucky Dragon No 5, and all 23 crew rapidly developed radiation sickness. (Alexander 1994, pp.22,23,24). Jonathan Weisgall, in an article titled “Nuclear Nomads of Bikini” noted that according to one report, “Baker alone left 500,000 tons of radioactive mud in the lagoon” (Weisgall, ibid, p.84.).

    But the “US navy [only] sent ships to evacuate the people of Rongelap and Utirik three days after the explosion. These (and other) Pacific people were used as human guinea pigs in an obscene racist experiment – a particularly sharp snapshot of colonialism and the horrors wrought by the arrogant mindset which goes with it,” as a Peace Movement Aotearoa/New Zealand Action Alert put it (Peace Movement Aotearoa, March 1999).

    These two tests were just two of the total 66 nuclear tests that the Department of Defense announced it conducted between 1946 and 1958, 23 of them at Bikini Atoll and 43 at Enewetak, located in the northern Marshall Islands. Operation Sandstone was the name of the series of tests conducted at Enewetak Atoll between April and May 1948. A 49 kiloton blast code-named Yoke, yielded “an explosion which was more than twice the size of any prior atomic bomb detonation.” There was something significant about Operation Sandstone, as Alexander observed. Partly quoting from Harvey Wasserman’s and Norman Solomon’s book, Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation, Alexander wrote,

    Operation Sandstone was significant in that the tests, conducted jointly by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, ‘evidently did result in substantial improvements in the efficiency of use of fissile material,’ and according to Herbert York this ‘success’ ‘boosted morale at Los Alamos and helped garner further support for the laboratory in Washington. As a result, the construction of a new laboratory, located nearby on South Mesa (New Mexico), was authorized as a replacement for the wartime facilities which were still being used.’ This response is an example of the way in which the nuclear industry and nuclear strategists developed their own momentum. Each successful explosion not only helped create the mystique of American nuclear preeminence, but also spoke to the possibility of the development of more and more powerful weapons, resulting in greater insecurity not only for the people involved in the tests, but for the entire world (Alexander, ibid., p. 24).

    Other series of tests, Operation Greenhouse, for example, were conducted at Enewetak in April and May 1951. On November 1, 1952, Mike was exploded on the island of Elugelab. Mike was the name of a cylindrical bomb measuring 22 ft in length and 5-1/2 ft in diameter and weighing 23 tons. Mike’s detonation yielded a force of over 10 megatons, nearly one thousand times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The island of Elugelab completely disappeared.

    The US Government listed the Mike explosion as the first detonation of an experimental thermonuclear device (Wasserman and Solomon, pp. 80-84). A total of six islands would simply vanish as a result of further tests of similar magnitude. The Mike bomb paved the way for the development of future hydrogen bombs. Operation Castle tested these bombs between March and May 1954, using Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The operation included the following detonations: Bravo (15 megaton), Romeo (11 megaton), Union (6.9 megaton), Yankee (13.5 megaton), and Nectar (1.69 megaton).

    Again, according to Alexander:

    The first shot, Bravo, the largest single nuclear explosion conducted by the United States, with a destructive capability more than one thousand times that of the Hiroshima bomb, was detonated on 1 March 1954. The explosion was so powerful it vaporized several small islands and parts of islands in Bikini Atoll and left a hole one-mile deep in diameter in the reef. Years later, some Bikinian leaders would return to Bikini and weep openly at the sight of the sandbars and open water, all that remained of the islands destroyed by the Bravo shot. They would declare that the islands had ‘lost their bones.’

    Bravo coated Rongelap and Utirik Atolls with two inches of radioactive fallout. (Alexander, ibid., 28).

    To this day, peoples of Rongelap, Bikini, Enewetak, and many in the Marshall Islands continue to suffer from cancer, miscarriages, and tumors. Eighty-four percent of those who lived on Rongelap who below 10 years old at the times of the explosions have required surgery for thyroid tumors (Alexander, ibid., p.30).

    Movement for a Nuclear-Free Belau (Palau)

    As someone who is intimately involved in anti-nuclear movements and know of the health consequences of radiation exposure, I grieve today for my Marshallese sisters and brothers. By a kind hand of fate perhaps, my island nation of Belau was spared the harrowing nightmare of nuclear testings. However, we were not spared the full brunt of what is described as nuclear colonialism. By the end of the 1970s, over a decade after the official creation of a larger Micronesian effort to decolonize (Congress of Micronesia), it was clear to us what the monstrous legacy of nuclearism had done just a few thousand miles to the east of us in the Marshall Islands. (Subsequent nuclear catastrophes would contribute to strengthening the anti-nuclear movement). Marshall Islands, the French-Occupied Polynesia, and several places around the world that had been unkindly dealt by nuclearism impressed themselves strongly upon our minds, to say the least.

    In our movement to decolonize, we wrote a Nuclear-Free Constitution in April 1979. Overt and covert American efforts to sidetrack issues and or at the least undermine Belau’s position on anti-nuclearism were unconvincing; via various diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic means, they failed initially to arrest what was quickly becoming a popular movement against what was felt to be outright colonial behavior. The history of the Constitutional Convention that produced the world’s first nuclear-free Constitution offered an explicit rejection of American demands, which were to compel Belau to acquiesce to US military and nuclear requirements. The increasing anti-base movement in the Philippines, where the US maintained its largest foreign military base operation, contributed to the tensions between Belau and America. Belau was always seen as a potential fallback area in the event the Philippine people did successfully evicted the US military. Belau, the Philippines, Guam, Kwajelein and other parts of Micronesia were parts of the network of what was described as a “forward military strategy” which aimed to project US military strength as close as possible to the Asian mainland and throughout the Pacific Ocean. This was part of a grand strategic plan outlined in a US National Security Action Memorandum No. 145 (NSAM-145), signed by John F. Kennedy in April 1962, and designed to formally incorporate all of Micronesia within US’s political and military network in the Pacific.

    NSAM-145 provided the political context in which Kennedy would, over a year later, send a mission to Micronesia to plot the contours of a colonial conspiracy which had been faithfully adhered to by subsequent US administrations. The mission was headed by a Harvard University Business School Professor Anthony M. Solomon. The mission’s report came to bear his name. The Solomon Report, was the blueprint for US neocolonialism in the Pacific [and] provides disturbing reading on American political ambitions (Aldridge and Myers 1990, pp.22, 23). Resisting this grand colonial scheme, we attempted to create a nation-state. The next 15 years proved to be a painful period of radical political and social transformations, as we struggled to preserve our nuclear-free Constitution amidst aggressive US Pentagon attempts to undermine it.

    It is impossible to describe a 15-year movement here in a page or two. I will only refer the reader to the extensive report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Belau in November 1993. The UN mission was sent there to observe the November 9th 1993 plebiscite on the Compact of Free Association, the treaty negotiated by Belau and the US which details the economic and military conditions of a treaty-relationship between the US and Belau (for more details, refer to UN Trusteeship Council Document T/1978, December 1993). This is the treaty that the United States was adamant in compelling Belau to adopt, and which after 15 years and seven attempts to say NO to it, was finally “approved” in 1993. The treaty has essentially laid to rest the nuclear-free provisions of Belau’s Constitution for 50 years; the US, in return, will give Belau some economic assistance only for 15 years.

    The crucial issues to consider here, or in similar nation-building efforts, are those of democratic principles and military imperatives. Between 1983 and 1993, Belau peoples exercised their democratic right to freely express their common wishes in founding a nuclear-free island nation. In all of these democratic exercises, we said No each time. US military imperatives overrode all of those No’s and undermined democratic practice; but this is not something new. Cultures of militarism and nuclearism are, by nature, cultures of secrecy. They erode openness and democracy and make indispensable a culture of death and terror which legitimizes militarism and production and use of weapons of mass destruction. The theory and practice of nuclear deterrence have been extremely hostile to democratic practice. National military strategies have often required the absence of free democratic thought while, on the other hand, a commitment to nuclear disarmament and demilitarization will allow communities to participate more fully in both the political sphere and civil society” in working to ensure a world free of the nuclear dangers that confront us.

    Belau’s first popularly-elected president, Haruo Remeliik, was assassinated, partly as a result of the intricate web of Compact of Free Association politics and internal power struggles shaped by America’s obstinate military policies.

    As a result of the November 1993 plebiscite, the Compact of Free Association was approved and came into force on October 1, 1994, a day hailed as “Independence Day.” A year later, Belau joined the South Pacific Forum, an organization of Pacific Island Governments. In December of 1995, Belau joined the United Nations. As a result, in the South Pacific Forum and within the United Nations, Belau will assume responsibilities for keeping the issue of nuclear disarmament alive.

    One of the stipulations of the Compact of Free Association which made possible its passage in 1993 was that the United States would only seek to exercise its right to militarize (which implies the stationing of nuclear weapons) “during periods of crisis or hostilities.” To be sure, a May 6, 1993 Letter of Assurances from US Secretary of State Warren Christopher failed to explicitly define what such crisis or hostilities would be. In any event, the stipulations expressed in Secretary Christopher’s letter were incorporated within and legislated into binding Belau law. A greater portion of these assurances would rely on the “good faith” of the United States and the Belau Government, in accordance with the provisions of stated military objectives of the Compact treaty (see Republic of Palau Public Law No. 4-9, Sections 5, 6). Regional peace, we must then conclude, will depend to a greater or lesser extent on the responsibilities of these two nations to decrease (or de-escalate) the potential for actual military conflict or violence.

    It is worth noting that for the basic international legal instrument mandating global nuclear disarmament is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT forms the integrated network of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties and other standard-setting arrangements that seek to control/curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear disarmament is premised on the good faith efforts by nuclear weapon states to take unilateral or multilateral initiatives to achieve disarmament. Highlighted in Article Six of the NPT, such a premise has been a controversial issue because of lack of action to pursue good faith initiatives to disarm. That premise of good faith, however, was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996 and remains vital to the trust that must be built within on-going disarmament efforts.

    The nuclear disarmament challenge in Belau would be to compel a good faith compliance to US and Belau laws.For Belau and the United States, respectively, Republic of Palau Public Law No. 4-9 (signed by our president on July 16, 1993), US Public Law 99-658 (approved on November 14, 1986) and US Public Law 101-219 (approved December 12, 1989) are the American legal mandates of the Compact of Free Association. In addition to this July 1993 Belau law which merely restated some interpretations and positions of the Belau Government vis-a-vis the Compact of Free Association as well as subsidiary agreements to it developed in Hawaii and Guam, and authorized what became the final Compact plebiscite, for Belau’s part, we are bound as well by the legal imperatives elaborated in the two US laws referenced above.

    In January 1997, at its regional meeting in Moorea, French-Occupied Polynesia, the Abolition 2000 network passed a resolution denouncing the military/nuclear option of the Belau/US Compact of Free Association, and the undemocratic process within which it was “approved.” More importantly, the Abolition 2000 resolution stated that any attempt to use the option for nuclear purposes would violate the Pacific nuclear-free zone as well as violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would risk adding to the genetic damage already perpetuated on the Pacific peoples.

    Not to be forgotten, there were British Tests in Australia, Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands in the Line Islands. Jacqui Katona (Gundjehmi Aboriginal Organization, Mirrar peoples) from Australia has information on these.

    In French-Occupied Polynesia, the French have conducted a total of 153 nuclear weapons tests, in addition to those conducted in 1995. There is a lack of official information about the tests, so no comparison with how the Americans have done in Micronesia is done. Again, Jacqui Katona may be able to provide information about Moruroa and Fangataufa, and the Te Ao Maohi (French-Polynesians) anti-nuclear movement. And Lysiane Alezard, from Le Mouvement de la Paix in Paris, should also be able to share more information about the French tests.

    The French nuclear test site workers face similar problems that all nuclear test site workers elsewhere face. Amidst the difficulties in Tahiti however, Hiti Tau has worked along with peoples from a university in Belgium to gather personal information and testimonies of previous nuclear test site workers, now published in the book Moruroa and Us: Polynesians’ Experiences during Thirty Years of Nuclear Testing in the French Pacific (See De Vries and Seur 1997). Theirs is a narrative of struggle as well as a triumph of collective grassroots action. It speaks as well to the role of networking within the international anti-nuclear information infrastructure, of which this gathering is part.

    What Can We Conclude From All of This?

    Unfortunate as we Micronesians were for being the unwilling hosts to preparations, testings, and launchings of weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations, over the years within our demilitarization and nuclear-free struggles, we have been constantly reminded of our role within the world-wide struggle for demilitarization and denuclearization. While we grieve for the on-going legacy of human and environmental health resulting from nuclear testings, a greater portion of our nuclear-free Pacific struggles has been inspired by what Betty Burkes described in her talk at an Abolition 2000 conference in Northern California in 1997, that we are constantly making inquiry into the culture of war and violence we inhabit, check out how we participate and are organized to acquiesce in our own exploitation (Burkes 1997). At least we have tried to work along with Japanese, Native peoples, and other victims of the Nuclear Age in forging common struggles of resistance against nuclearization and militarization everywhere.

    We recognize the responsibility for tailoring our struggles in ways that inspire peoples in comparable sites of struggle. As far as we have been able, we have sought to wage our struggles non-violently. Being witnesses to the violence and brutality of nuclearism–and the colonialism which legitimizes nuclear violations of our islands in the first place–Pacific Islanders sensed early on that a struggle for genuine justice had to reject the adoption of violence as a means to end the violence we saw around us. Colonialism provided the ruthless infrastructure from which we yearned to be free from political oppression.

    It was owing partly to the nature of Pacific peoples to reject the principle of violence. Violence killed all in its path, and here we were struggling to survive. Instinctively, decisions were made for a nuclear-free Pacific movement to respond accordingly. A friend in Hawaii, Rolf Nordahl, recently reflecting on this tendency, rejects violence as a means to achieving resolution of the sovereignty movement there and commented to our Allies group, “Violence begets more violence and the resulting desire for revenge leads to twisted thinking such as Milosevic explaining that the reason he can conduct ethnic cleansing is because of what happened 600 years ago.” We need to make the connections between the violence of colonialism and a culture of militarism which allows the militarization/nuclearization of colonial outposts, and funnels resources away from more urgent social needs in Western nations. Moreover, we need to constantly question the many justifications for militarism and its role in economic affairs.

    Writing about the role of weaponry in international trade, John Ralston Saul says in his book Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West that “We are living in the midst of a permanent wartime economy.” He continues, “The most important capital good produced in the West today is weaponry. The most important sector in international trade is not oil or automobiles or airplanes. It is armaments.” Saul does not necessarily add anything new to what we already know about the trade in weapons; but he does reiterate the backwardness or the lack or higher moral values that ought to influence the trading of goods and services. Among many others, Seymour Melman has been writing about these issues for 20 years; his book The Permanent War Economy is recommended reading. John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, Steven Lydenberg, Robert De Grasse, William Hartung, Carol Evans, James Adams, and Martin Navias also have provided compelling analyses of military spendings and economic waste (there is a list of their books in the Works Cited section at the end). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute publishes an annual accounting of arms sales, while The Council of Economic Priorities in New York has addressed the subject in a number of reports which hold to the old liberal approach–that arms are a waste of money and that statistics prove it.

    In the preface to their book Resisting the Serpent: Palau’s Struggle for Self-Determination Bob Aldridge and Ched Myers reflect that “For nowhere else are the concrete mechanisms of the military-industrial-academic complex so sanitized, so overlaid with official mystification. How else could the citizenry of the world’s largest debtor nation continue to accept and subsidize such huge levels of military spending? Militarism, to extend the metaphor, has ‘colonized our minds…But our domestication is most troubling when it deludes us to think that militarism, apart from an overt foreign intervention and short of nuclear war, is at best an economic boom and at worst a victimless crime. The fact is, without a strategic missile ever being launched, militarism is wreaking destruction upon human life and culture. Perhaps North Americans might see this more clearly if we suspend our scenarios of what might happen to our world in the event of all-out war long enough to listen to the voice of those whose worlds have already been ravaged” (Aldridge and Myers 1990, p. xx-xxi)

    Beginnings of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement

    The grassroots Pacific anti-nuclear movement was launched at the first Nuclear-Free Pacific conference at Suva [Fiji] in April 1975, backed by the Against Tests on Moruroa (ATOM) committee which had been formed in 1970. It consisted of people from the Pacific Theological College, the University of the South Pacific and the Fiji YWCA. The committee was merged into the Pacific People’s Action Front in the mid-1970s and then the movement went into decline. It surfaced again as the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG) in 1983. Other Pacific anti-nuclear groups existed already but the Suva conference established a Pacific-wide network. This movement proved to be a major factor in persuading Pacific governments to take a stronger nuclear-free stand and shaping public awareness and opinion throughout the region.

    A draft People’s Charter for a Nuclear-Free Pacific was produced at Suva and influenced the then New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk to call for a nuclear-free zone treaty at the 1975 South Pacific Forum–an ideal that took a decade to be realized. After the draft was reaffirmed at a second conference in Pohnpei [the capital of what is now the Federated States of Micronesia] in 1978, the third meeting two years later at Kailua [O’ahu], Hawaii, expanded the group’s identity as the Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement. Resource centres were set up in Honolulu and Port Vila [Vanuatu].

    The fourth–and biggest–congress was held in Port Vila during 1983 in recognition of the Vanuatu Government’s support of a niuklia fri pasifik, as it is expressed in pidgin (Robie, ibid, p. 146-147). At the opening of this conference in Port Villa, Vanuatu, Deputy Prime Minister Sethy Regenvanu told the delegates that, “We are seeking a Pacific…free of every last remnant of colonialism… [F]reedom and independence will have no meaning if our very existence is threatened by the constant fear of total destruction” (Robie, ibid, p.147).

    In Vanuatu, the People’s Charter for a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific, adopted in Hawaii, was reaffirmed. The Charter’s Preamble declared the following:

    1. We, the people of the Pacific want to make our position clear. The Pacific is home to millions of people with distinct cultures, religions and ways of life, and we refuse to be abused or ignored any longer;

    2. We, the people of the Pacific have been victimised for too long by foreign powers. The Western imperialistic and colonial powers invaded our defenceless region, they took our lands and subjugated our people to their whims. This form of alien colonial political and military domination unfortunately persists as an evil cancer in some of our native territories such as Tahiti-Polynesia, Kanaky, Australia and Aotearoa. Our home continues to be despoiled by foreign powers developing nuclear and other means of destruction, oppression, and exploitation that advance a strategy that has no winners, no liberators and imperils the survival of all human kind;

    3. We, the people of the Pacific will assert ourselves and wrest control over the destiny of our nations and our environment from foreign powers, including Trans-National Corporations;

    4. We note in particular the racist roots of the world’s nuclear powers. We are entitled to and we commit ourselves to the creation of a just and equitable society;

    5. Our environment is further threatened by the continuing deployment of nuclear arsenals in the so-called strategic areas throughout the Pacific. Only one nuclear submarine has to be lost at sea, or one nuclear warhead dumped in our ocean from a stricken bomber, and the threat to the fish and our livelihood is endangered for centuries. The erection of super ports, Nuclear Testing Stations, may bring employment but the price is destruction of our customs, our way of life, the pollution of our crystal clear waters, and brings the ever present threat of disaster by radioactive poisoning into the everyday life of the peoples;

    6. We, the people of the Pacific reaffirm our intention to extract only those elements of Western civilisation that will be a permanent benefit to us. We wish to control our destinies and protect our environment in our own ways. Our usage of our natural resources in the past was more than adequate to ensure the balance between nature and humankind. No form of administration should ever seek to destroy that balance for the sake of a brief commercial gain;

    7. We, the people of the Pacific will strive to be politically, economically, and spiritually self-determining. This includes the right to secede from oppressing nations.

    The Pacific anti-nuclear movement, like the movement of indigenous peoples to assert their rights, was partly a response to the West’s persistent colonial domination in violation of the United Nations Charter’s call for decolonization at that time and the West’s Cold War pretext for use of the Pacific islands for devastating nuclear testing. By that same year, the United Nations Cobo Report [in Geneva] concluded that discrimination against indigenous peoples was due to their lack of self-determination, that imposed assimilation was a form of discrimination, and that the right of indigenous peoples to cultural distinctiveness, political self-determination and secure land resources should be formally declared by the UN (Blaisdell 1998a).

    As a result of previous work then on-going, the UN created, under the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, in order to address, among other things, the continuing abuses of the world’s Indigenous peoples by existing Nation-states. That working group completed, after 12 years of work and intense lobbying in Geneva, the Pacific and around the world, a draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous peoples are still working to get it passed by the United Nations. More significantly, that working group provided an additional forum wherein we attempted to broaden discussions and debate regarding our anti-nuclear struggle, hoping to develop international consensus for final cessation of foreign domination in our homes. We look forward to the future with hope when all the final vestiges of colonialism will have been eradicated.

    Our anti-nuclear movement has been inextricably linked to our struggle to bring about an end to colonialism and neocolonialism. Had Pacific Islanders been able to freely self-determine their political futures–taking serious consideration of informed consent in a climate devoid of fear and economic blackmail–there would absolutely be no doubt we would have rejected hosting the preparations and testing of other foreign countries’ dangerous nuclear bombs in our island homes.

    On July 9, 1999 which was Constitutional Day in my island nation of Belau, we celebrated the full 20 years since we wrote what was once a nuclear-free Constitution! A mere twenty years have taught us much. A grassroots global nuclear abolition movement has been created and continues to grow. Moreover, a campaign to abolish nuclear weapons within the United States has been created and will be formally launched in October 1999.

    The International Court of Justice, the world’s highest court, issued a legal advisory expressing the general illegality of nuclear weapons. For us in Belau, the struggle was long and painful. Assassinations, killings of innocent civilians, and official involvements (of officials in both the Belau and US governments) in the breakdown of law and order, now vindicate the rightness of the nuclear-free idea, once radical and unrealistic but now chic (See Butler, Edwards and Kirby 1988, “Palau: A Challenge to the Rule of Law in Micronesia,” for a description of the systematic breakdown of law engaged in by “top government officials”). Now a broad spectrum of mainstream organizations and individuals are working to create a nuclear-free world, largely because we have now come to understand the depth of the crisis of relying on weapons of mass destruction to ensure “security.”

    For Micronesians generally, it made sense to do the right thing. For Belau peoples particularly, we must have either been ready and willing to pay the price or crazy enough to stand up to the US Pentagon. Whatever the case may have been, twenty years after we wrote that Constitution, on July 9, 1999, the young peoples of Belau–many of them were the children of those who authored the Constitution as well as our nation’s Founding Fathers–hosted a Constitutional Forum wherein the surviving members of the 1979 Constitution Convention spoke about their experiences during the convention. The Forum addressed the challenges now facing the island nation. With all that we have seen take place in the last twenty years, it was encouraging to know that we had been vindicated.

    In July 1978 however, just a year before we authored our own nuclear-free Constitution, the UN General Assembly was scheduled to hold its 10th Special Session between May 23 to July 1, devoted to disarmament. Surprisingly, and by consensus, the General Assembly adopted a Final Document about 20 days ahead of schedule–something unheard of in current multilateral disarmament forums.

    That Final Document declared:

    Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms races, in particular the nuclear arms race, increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and materials resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technical advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of detente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war… (United Nations Office of Public Information 1978, pp.4-5).

    An accompanying program of action identified several key actions and proposals for disarmament work to proceed. I recount that 1978 declaration on disarmament in order to highlight the fact that nation-states cannot be trusted. Twenty years is a bit too long to wait on a sincere promise made to halt development of weapons of mass destruction. Arguably, since 1978, the world has witnessed an increase of nuclear arsenals and the threats now facing humanity have increased as a consequence of the arms race conducted since that time. We now only have approximately 20 weeks before the new millennium comes, making it ever so crucial that we join together as representatives of civil society to develop a more progressive grassroots agenda for a nuclear-free world.

    Envisioning/Ensuring Our Future — Abolition 2000

    This is the legacy of what we in the Pacific have been witnesses to: the violence of colonial aggressions and nuclear colonialism, and the resulting effort to re-think the whole basis of planetary security. Thinking along shared responsibilities of caring for our planet compels us to network far and wide with sympathetic allies who inspire us and help us in a common effort to bring sanity, every precious bit of sanity, to the way we live on this planet. Genuine peace can come when we allow a sense of justice to guide our affairs vis-a-vis one another, and more crucially, in the way we relate with our precious Mother Earth. “We are a culture organized around death, war, profit, and violence,” Betty Burkes proclaimed, “where power is based on the principle of power-over others.” She explains that power over [another] is the power of punishment, weapons, competition, the power of annihilation that supports all the institutions of domination. Nuclear weapons serve the preservation and continuance of that culture.However, to realize a secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations, the stated goal of Abolition 2000 requires that we make some inquiry into the culture of war and violence we inhabit, check[ing] out how we participate and are organized to acquiesce in our own exploitation (Burkes, ibid.).

    Describing what was at stake at a US nuclear disarmament meeting in Chicago last year when the US Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons was being established, Jackie Cabasso, one of Abolition 2000’s founders, wrote in Abolition 2000: Speaking Truth to Power: “We had lots of questions: What exactly does abolition mean. How long would it take?…We recognized that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner, and we spelled out the steps. But we were unyielding in our objective: ‘definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.’ From the basement of the United Nations in New York we faxed out the Abolition 2000 Statement” (Cabasso 1998, pp.2-3). And the rest is history! Abolition 2000 is now a global movement with more than 1,300 organization members around the world.

    Many individuals who were involved in founding the global Abolition 2000 network have created a US campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. Such a short history, less than 5 years–speaks volumes to what a caring and active grassroots movement can do in 5 years what more than 180 Nation-states cannot do in twenty! But this disparity of action–and excessive amount of rhetoric–on the part of nation-states, must also tell us something fundamental: that there may be an unfortunate lack of concern and or sincerity on the part of governments collectively to achieve anything to reduce the increasing dangers humanity faces. It is up to us then, including all concerned peoples and grassroots movements around the world, to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Failing to do so and remaining indifferent to this global effort to rid the world of nuclear arms is to participate in a conspiracy of silence that is ultimately deadly.

    I take this issue very personally, as everything that I and my brothers and sisters in Belau and around the Pacific value politically, culturally, spiritually have been and continue to be challenged in the extreme by the arrogance of power, maintained by the ability to threaten to murder the mass of humanity. Threatening to mass-annihilate peoples in order to defend a certain “way of life” should be crimes against humanity. It is the same logic that inspired colonial excursions across the globe in the past 500 years.

    The excessive amount of financial resources used to sustain nuclear arsenals is a larceny of the mass of peoples who toil daily in America to pay taxes that are then diverted from urgent social needs to maintaining ever-increasing arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. It is a moral bankruptcy that is driving all these policies; the bankruptcy knows no boundaries as we are all deeply impacted in many ways. We have, in essence, all returned to the scene of a crime, and we do so largely to find within ourselves the will to live as human beings.

    * Richard Salvador is currently a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa in Honolulu, where he lives. He is writing a dissertation on the colonial history of Micronesia and Micronesian decolonization movements. He is also gathering research about Belau (Palau), with the goal of writing about Belau’s effort to produce a nuclear-free Constitution; the American Government’s counter-effort to strike down the nuclear-free provisions of that Constitution; and the subsequent effects of the anti-nuclear movement on society and people. Richard is also active in international anti-nuclear work and currently serves on the coordinating committee of Abolition 2000 representing the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs.

    Works Cited

    “Abolition 2000 Resolution Against the Military/Nuclear Option of the Republic of Palau-United States Compact of Free Association,” (Moorea, Te Ao Maohi, January 20-28, 1997). See website of Abolition 2000: A Global Network for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

    http://www.napf.org/abolition2000/index.html

    Adams, James. Engines of War. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990.

    Aldridge, Bob and Ched Myers. Resisting the Serpent: Palau’s Struggle for Self-Determination. Baltimore, Maryland: Fortkamp Publishing Company, 1990.

    Alexander, Ronni. Putting the Earth First: Alternatives to Nuclear Security in Pacific Island States. Honolulu, Hawaii: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1994. (ISBN: 9994371576)

    Bailey, Emily, Richard Guthrie, Daryl Howlett and John Simpson, The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 5th edition. (Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation). Southhampton, UK: The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 1999.

    Blaisdell, Kekuni. “The Indigenous Rights Movement in the Pacific: 1998 Marks the Centennial of the U.S. Colonial Expansion in the Pacific and Caribbean,” published by In Motion Magazine, 1998a. Available on the Internet: http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/pacific.html

    Blaisdell, Kekuni. “Decolonization: Unfinished Business in the Pacific (Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organizations Discussion Paper for the Regional Seminar of the United Nations Decolonization Committee,” Nadi, Fiji, 16-18 June 1998. Published by In Motion Magazine. Available on the Internet: http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/fiji1.html

    Butler, William J. and George C. Edwards and Michael D. Kirby. Palau: A Challenge to the Rule of Law in Micronesia: Report of a Mission on Behalf of The International Commission of Jurists and The American Association for the International Commission of Jurists. New York: The American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, 1988.

    Burkes, Betty, “What can one Abolitionist Movement Learn from Another? Comparing Abolition of Nuclear Weapons with Abolition of Slavery,” Text of speech at a Northern California Abolition 2000 Conference, February 22, 1997.

    Jacqueline Cabasso, “Abolition 2000: Speaking Truth to Power,” Text of speech at US nuclear demilitarization campaign planning meeting, October 9-10, 1998. Chicago.

    Churchill, Ward and Winona LaDuke, “Native North America: The Political Economy of Radioactive Colonialism,” in M. Annette Jaimes (ed), The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance. Boston: South End Press, 1992.

    De Grasse, Robert, Jr., Military Expansion–Economic Decline. New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1983.

    Evans, Caron. “Reappraising Third World Arms Production,” in Survival (March 1986).

    Joseph Gerson, “U.S. Asia-Pacific Hegemony and Possibilities of Popular Solidarity, Fresh Look: Re-examining the role and impact of US bases in Asia-Pacific Seoul, South Korea,” June 26-27, 1999.

    Hartung, William. The Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Freeze. New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1984.

    Lydenberg, Steven. Weapons for the World. New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1977.

    Melman, Seymour. The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1978.

    Moruroa and Us: Polynesians’ Experiences during Thirty Years of Nuclear Testing in the French

    Pacific, published by the Documentation and Research Centre on Peace and Conflict, Lyon, France, 1997.

    Summary: “‘Moruroa and us’ is the final report about the experiences of the Polynesian test-site workers and islanders who lived in the vicinity of Moruroa and Fangataufa. The report is the result of a sociological research conducted by Hiti Tau and the Eglise Evangélique and supported by Pieter de Vries and Han Seur of the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands.

    To see a longer summary of Moruroa and US, please visit: http://www.antenna.nl/ecsiep/resource/moruroa.html

    Navias, Martin. Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World. London: IISS/Brassey’s, 1990.

    Peace Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand), “Action Alert – Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Day,” March 1999.

    Republic of Palau Public Law No. 4-9, Fourth Olbiil Era Kelulau (4th Congress), Third Special Session, May 1993. “An Act to State the interpretations and positions of the Republic of Palau as to the Compact of Free Association between the Republic of Palau and the United States of America…” See especially, Sections 5 and 6.

    Robie, David. Blood on Their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific. Leichhardt, NSW, Australia: Pluto Press, 1989.

    Salvador, Richard N. “Indigenous Peoples Speak Truth to Power: Environmental and Human Health Aspects of the Nuclear Age,” NGO Statement to the Third Preparatory Committee of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2000 Formal Review, May 10-21, 1999. New York.

    Salvador, Richard N. “Nuclear Colonialism and Environmental Racism: An Indigenous Perspective,” unpublished NGO Statement to the Second Preparatory Committee of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2000 Formal Review, 27 April to 8 May 1998. Geneva, Switzerland

    Saul, John Ralston. Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West, Toronto and New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

    Stanley, John and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1972.

    The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], The Arms Trade with the Third World. New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1977.

    Wasserman, Harvey and Norman Solomon, Killing Our Own: The Disaster of America’s Experience with Atomic Radiation, 1945-1982, New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1982.

    Jonathan Weisgall, “The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini,” Foreign Affairs 39, 1980.

    United Nations Office of Public Information, “Final Document of Assembly Session on Disarmament 23 May-1 July 1978,” New York: United Nations Headquarters.

    United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1993.” In Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 1 (T/1978).

  • Arms Trade Code of Conduct

    As of this writing, about 33 wars are raging across the world and 90% of their casualties are civilians. Over 25 million people have been killed in conflicts since the end of World War II. Yet rather than pursuing real disarmament, governments are spending over $2 billion every single day on armies and weapons. And regimes that abuse human rights are eagerly supplied by the world’s arms producers.

    A global Arms Trade Code of Conduct would prohibit the world’s arms producers, virtually all developed countries, from providing military assistance and conventional arms transfers to foreign governments that do not meet certain requirements. These requirements would include democratic governance, respect for human rights, non-involvement in acts of armed aggression, and participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was established on December 1991.

    Conventional arms include more than rifles and submachine guns. Also included are battle tanks, missiles and landmines. The conventional arms category is broad and ambiguous because it groups many types of dangerous weapons together under the category of “conventional” arms! Sensitive military and dual-use technologies are also included, such as telecommunications systems, sensors, lasers and sophisticated satellites that monitor and prevent unforeseen attacks from other countries. Also, military and security training for expertise in the use of such weapons, munitions, sub-components and sensitive technologies are considered conventional arms. All this can be supplied with little restraint to developing countries, some of which disregard democracy and blatantly abuse human rights.

    The United States is the world’s number one arms exporter. As a democratic nation, it has a responsibility to take the lead in curbing the weapons trade. In 1996, thirty three nations including the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (but not China) signed the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies. This agreement was an important step toward the control of the arms trade. The Wassenaar Agreement was set up to contribute to global security and stability by promoting “transparency” of arms exports. The Agreement requires clear and detailed information about arms exports and imports for each country once a year. The problem is that the Wassenaar Arrangement has been signed by only a few nations. The world needs a global Code of Conduct.

    In the United States, the Executive Office approves which countries receive military assistance and arms. Once a year, the President gives Congress a list of countries which will receive arms shipments from U.S. manufacturers. All U.S. arms transfer decisions take into account the multiple U.S. interests involved in each arms transfer. Sales are approved by the Executive Office on a case-by-case basis. All U.S. arms transfer decisions take into account certain criteria including; “Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and recipient security needs”, “Consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives”, and “The human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question” (Criteria for Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports, The White House, Feb. 17, 1995).

    Nevertheless, 85% of U.S. arms transfers during 1990-95 went to the nations that did not meet the proposed Code’s criteria. In fact, they went to the Middle East (Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Israel and Lebanon) and to 43 of the 53 countries in Africa, the continent with the most violent conflicts. In President Clinton’s first term, over two-thirds of all arms Wes agreements with the Third World went to dictatorships which are still violating human rights. In 19917 Clinton approved $83 billion in military assistance to dictatorships, an all-time record even during the Cold War years.

    More than half of U.S. weapons sales are now being financed by taxpayers instead of foreign arms purchasers. During fiscal year 1996, the government spent more than $7.9 billion to help U.S. companies secure just over $12 billion in agreements for new international arms sales. The largest single subsidy program for U.S. weapons exporters is the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Another Pentagon’s subsidy is the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) fund. Furthermore the Pentagon has also been leasing or giving away massive quantities of highly capable U.S. weapons that have been declared “surplus” relative to current needs. In addition to Pentagon programs, other agencies provide subsidies for sales of weapons. After the Pentagon’s FMF program, the second largest subsidy comes from the Economic Support Funds (ESF) program administered by the Agency for International Development. The “Dual Use” Funding of the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) is another source of funding for military exports. In addition the Senate and House Armed Services Committees are working hard to increase the Pentagon spending encouraged by the “Big Three’ weapons contractors — Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.

    Besides the United States, there are other countries that export conventional arms to countries violating human rights. France, for example, sent arms to Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Rwanda. Human Rights Watch and media reports indicate that the French government continued to supply arms to Rwanda for at least two months after international news reports of genocide became public knowledge and after the imposition of an international arms embargo on May 17, 1994. Later, during hearings in March-June 1998, Bernard Debré, who was France’s Minister of Cooperation in 1994, acknowledged that the French government had continued to supply arms to the Rwandan government “ten days after the massacres started,” explaining lamely that this was “because France didn’t immediately realize what was happening.”

    Sales of conventional arms bolster repressive dictatorships at the expense of the poor. In Togo and Rwanda, populations are crying out for schools and doctors, not for guns and military training. In July 1999 more than 100 bodies were found along the coastline of West Africa just after Togo’s June elections, during which opposition party members allegedly were shot and dumped into the sea. Their bodies washed up on the shores of neighboring Benin. They were killed with conventional arms, in this case, rifles or hand guns. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased on the black market for as little as $6.

    Jose Ramos-Horta, a Nobel Peace Laureate form East Timor”, was affected personally by the danger of arms sales. In August 1977 his 21-year old sister, Maria Ortencia, along with at least 20 young children in a remote village in East Timor, were killed by Indonesian Air Force pilots. His sister and these children were only a few of more than 200,000 civilians who were killed in East Timor from December 1975, when Indonesia invaded and illegally annexed the newly independent land, to 1979. Indonesia waged this war — and continues to wage this war — using an arsenal of weapons imported from the United States and Europe.

    Nevertheless, there are still some people who think that an Arms Trade Code of Conduct is not necessary. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN), for example, believes that a Code of Conduct “hamstrings the President of the United States in his conducting of foreign policy.” He argues, “If anybody believes that a country that wants to buy weaponry is going to not buy it simply because they cannot buy them from the United States, they are just barking up the wrong tree.” Congressman Mat Salmon (R-AZ) declared that the Code of Conduct is “not about human rights, and is not about foreign policy. This … is about a philosophical difference that exists within the Congress.” I wonder if Jose Ramos-Horta believes that the Arms Trade Code of Conduct is only a big philosophical pillow-fight in Congress!

    There is a boomerang effect on U.S. interests, Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) explained, citing that the U.S. spends twice as much to fight against countries like Yugoslavia, which was initially armed by U.S. arms exporters. McKinney is the Sponsor of the Code of Conduct bill (HR2269), a bill now pending (Nov 99) in the House International Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. (Contact your legislator)

    There are a growing number of people who agree with the establishment of a global Arms Trade Code of Conduct, people who have a very realistic view of the world. Oscar Arias, former President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner, argues against a “military-dominated mind-set that prevailed throughout the Cold War.” He also states, “It is embarrassing that five permanent members of the UN Security Council are responsible for the largest quantity of arms sales to the developing world. The very countries that should be maintaining world peace and security are the ones most responsible for promoting war and insecurity by producing and selling weapons.”

    I believe that the United States now has an unprecedented opportunity to take the lead in this international effort. In my opinion, if the U.S. leads the way for the establishment of a Code of Conduct, other arms exporters will follow.

    In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to subsidize weapons sales than they paid for elementary and secondary education programs. The original meaning of the word “subsidize” derives from the Latin word subsidium which means to help each other. To spend billions in weapons subsidies and billions more to fight against soldiers armed with these same weapons is simply bad policy. I agree with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who pointed out, “All of us whose nations sell such weapons, or through whose nations the traffic flows, bear some responsibility for turning a blind eye to the destruction they cause. And all of us have it in our power to do something in response.” U.S. foreign policy should mirror this statement and reduce weapons sales in order to establish programs that will benefit not only U.S. citizens but also citizens of the global community.

    * Stefania Capodaglio was the 1999 Ruth Floyd Intern in International Law and Human Rights at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation headquarters in Santa Barbara, California. Presently she is completing a Political Science degree at the Catholic University of Milan, Italy.

  • From Pokharon to Kargil: The Nuclear Danger is No Fantasy

    However one looks at its genesis and its remarkably inept handling by New Delhi, the Kargil crisis highlights, as nothing else, the sub-continent’s strategic volatility and the fragility of the Lahore process. If the Indian army had to wait till May 6 to be informed of the unprecedentedly large-scale intrusion by a shepherd, and then took six days to report this to the defence ministry, and if the ministry two days later still said the infiltrators only occupied “remote and unheld areas”, then there is something deeply wrong with our security decision-making. The sudden switch from smugness and inaction to high-profile air strikes with their high-risk escalation potential testifies to the same flaws. One year after Pokharan-II, these put a huge question-mark over nuclearisation’s claimed gains. The Bomb has comprehensively failed to raise India’s stature, strengthen our claim to a Security Council seat, expand the room for independent policy-making, or enhance our security.

     

    India stands morally and politically diminished: a semi-pariah state to be equated with Pakistan, and periodically reminded of Security Council Resolution 1172. Most Third World countries see India as contradictory: a nation that for 50 years rightly criticised the hypocrisy of the Nuclear Club, only to join it; a country that cannot adequately feed its people, but has hegemonic global ambitions. Our neighbours, crucial to our security, see us as an aggressive, discontented state that violated its own long- standing doctrines without a security rationale.

     

    After prolonged talks with the U.S., in which we put our “non- negotiable” security up for discussion, India remains a minor, bothersome, factor in Washington’s game-plan as a non-nuclear weapons-state. South Asia’s nuclearisation has enabled Washington to grant Pakistan what Islamabad has always craved, and which New Delhi has always denied it, viz parity with India. Today, India and Pakistan act like America’s junior partners. Washington last August drafted both to smash the unity of the Non-Aligned in the Conference on Disarmament on linking FMCT talks with the five NWSs agreeing to discuss nuclear disarmament. If nuclearisation had enhanced our capacity for independent action, we would not have been mealy-mouthed on the U.S. bombing of Sudan and Iraq nor capitulated to unreasonable U.S. demands on patents. Nuclearisation has put India on the defensive in SAARC and ASEAN, in NAM and the World Bank. Damage control remains the main preoccupation of our diplomacy one year after the mythical “explosion of self-esteem”. Worse, nuclearisation has drawn India into dangerous rivalry with Pakistan and China. India has eight times more fissile material than Pakistan. But in nuclear, more isn’t better. The truth is, India has become for the first time vulnerable to nuclear attacks on a dozen cities, which could kill millions, against which we are wholly defenceless.

     

    By embracing the “abhorrent” doctrine of nuclear deterrence, we have committed what we ourselves used to describe as a “crime against humanity” This article of faith assumes that adversaries have symmetrical objectives and perceptions; they can inflict “unacceptable” damage on each other; and will behave rationally, 100 per cent of the time. These assumptions are dangerously wrong. India-Pakistan history is replete with asymmetrical perceptions, strategic miscalculation, and divergent definitions of “unacceptable”. For fanatics, even a few Hiroshimas are not “unacceptable”. Deterrence breaks down for a variety of reasons: misreading of moves, false alerts, panic, and technical failures. The U.S. and USSR spent over $900 billion (or three times our GDP) on sophisticated command and control systems to prevent accidental, unintended or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. But the Cold War witnessed over 10,000 near-misses. Each could have caused devastation. Gen. Lee Butler, who long headed the U.S. Strategic Command, says it was not deterrence, but “God’s grace”, that prevented disaster.

     

    Generally disaster-prone India and Pakistan will have no reliable command and control systems for years. Their deterrence is ramshackle, if not ram-bharose. A nuclear disaster is substantially, qualitatively, more probable in South Asia than it ever was between the Cold War rivals. Kargil starkly highlights this. It would be suicidal for India and Pakistan to deploy nuclear weapons and then “manage” their rivalry. They must never manufacture, induct or deploy these weapons. India must not erase her own memory. For decades, she correctly argued that deterrence is illegal, irrational, strategically unworkable, unstable, and leads to an arms race. The “minimum deterrent” proposition does not weaken this argument’s force. Minimality is variable and subjective, determined not unilaterally, but in relation to adversaries. Embracing deterrence means entering a bottomless pit. That is why the NWSs’ “hard-nosed” realists ended up amassing overkill arsenals–enough to destroy the world 50 times. The danger that India could get drawn into an economically ruinous and strategically disastrous nuclear arms race, especially with China, is very real.

     

    Consider the larger truth. Nuclear weapons do not give security. Because of their awesome power, their use, even threat of use, is determined less by military, than by political, factors. That is why America cannot translate its enormous atomic prowess into real might. Nuclear weapons have never won wars or decisively tilted military balances. Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Falklands, the Balkans, all expose their a-strategic nature. They are not even effective instruments of blackmail. State after state, from tiny Cuba to China, has defied nuclear blackmail attempts. Nuclear weapons are false symbols of prestige. But they are ruinously expensive. To build and maintain a tiny arsenal, about a fifth of China’s, will cost about Rs. 50,000 crores. This will further inflate our bloated military budget. Already, New Delhi spends twice as much on the military as on health, education and social security put together.

     

    With Pokharan-II, and now Kargil, Kashmir stands internationalised. It is widely seen as a potential flashpoint for a nuclear confrontation. Largely symbolic events like Lahore, while welcome, do not alter the causes or conditions of Indo- Pakistan rivalry. The Lahore agreements do not even commit the two to slow down nuclear and missile development, only to inform each other of their tests. Such limited confidence-building can easily collapse, as Kargil vividly demonstrates.

     

    Add to this debit side the enormous social costs of militarism, tub-thumping jingoism and male-supremacist nationalism; of further militarisation of our science; legitimisation of insensate violence; and psychological insecurity among the young. The Pokharan balance-sheet looks a deep, alarming, red. But there is good news too: nuclear weapons aren’t popular. According to recent polls, 73 per cent of Indians oppose making or using them. After November’s “Pokharan-vs-Pyaaz” state elections, politicians know that nukes don’t produce votes. And now, Kargil should induce sobriety. For sanity’s sake, the nuclear genie should be put back into the bottle. What human agency can do, it can also undo.

  • Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals and Law

    This article was an NGO Presentation for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Prepcom of 1999 and The Hague Appeal for Peace addressing nuclear weapons, morals, ethics, spiritual values, the Culture of Peace, and law. Organizations participating in creation of this presentation include NGO Committee on Disarmament, World Conference on Religion and Peace, Temple of Understanding, Pax Christi International, Franciscans International, Interfaith Center of New York, State of the World Forum, and Lawyers Alliance for World Security.

    Ethical and Moral Framework for Addressing the Issue

    In his concurrence with the historic opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued July 8, 1996, addressing the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,1 Judge Ranjeva stated, “On the great issues of mankind the requirements of positive law and of ethics make common cause, and nuclear weapons, because of their destructive effects, are one such issue.”2 Human society has ethical and moral norms based on wisdom, conscience and practicality. Many norms are universal and have withstood the test of human experience over long periods of time. One such principle is that of reciprocity. It is often called the Golden Rule: “Treat others as you wish to be treated.” It is an ethical and moral foundation for all the world’s major religions.3

    Several modern states sincerely believe that this principle can be abrogated and security obtained by the threat of massive destruction. The Canberra Commission highlighted the impracticality of this posture: “Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”

    The solution can be stated simply: “States should treat others as they wish to be treated in return.”4

    It is inconsistent with moral wisdom and practical common sense for a few states to violate this ancient and universally valid principle of reciprocity. Such moral myopia has a corrosive effect on the law which gains its respect largely through moral coherence. Can global security be obtained while rejecting wisdom universally recognized for thousands of years?

    Judge Weeramantry said,”(E)quality of all those who are subject to a legal system is central to its integrity and legitimacy. So it is with the body of principles constituting the corpus of international law. Least of all can there be one law for the powerful and another law for the rest. No domestic system would accept such a principle, nor can any international system which is premised on a concept of equality.”5

    Law and Values

    Law is the articulation of values. Values must be based on moral foundations to have credibility. The recognition of the intrinsic sacredness of life and the duty of states and individuals to protect life is a fundamental characteristic of all human civilized values. Such civilized values are expressed in humanitarian law and custom which has an ancient lineage reaching back thousands of years. “They were worked out in many civilizations — Chinese, Indian, Greek, Roman, Japanese, Islamic, modern European among others.” Humanitarian law ” is an ever continuous development…(and) grows as the sufferings of war keep escalating. With a nuclear weapon, those sufferings reach a limit situation, beyond which all else is academic.”6

    In testimony before the Court, then Foreign Minister of Australia Gareth Evans said, “The fact remains that the existence of nuclear weapons as a class of weapons threatens the whole of civilization. This is not the case with respect to any class or classes of conventional weapons. It cannot be consistent with humanity to permit the existence of a weapon which threatens the very survival of humanity. The threat of global annihilation engendered by the existence of such weapons, and the fear that this has engendered amongst the entire post-war generation, is itself an evil, as much as nuclear war itself. If not always at the forefront of our everyday thinking, the shadow of the mushroom cloud remains on all our minds. It has pervaded our thoughts about the future, about our children, about human nature. And it has pervaded the thoughts of our children themselves, who are deeply anxious about their future in a world where nuclear weapons remain.”7

    We must never forget the awesome destructive power of these devices. “Nuclear weapons have the potential to destroy the entire eco system of the planet. Those already in the world’s arsenals have the potential of destroying life on the planet several times over.”8

    Not only are they destructive in magnitude but in horror as well. 9

    Notwithstanding this knowledge we permit ourselves to continue to live in a “kind of suspended sentence. For half a century now these terrifying weapons of mass destruction have formed part of the human condition. Nuclear weapons have entered into all calculations, all scenarios, all plans. Since Hiroshima, on the morning of 6 August, 1945, fear has gradually become man’s first nature. His life on earth has taken on the aspect of what the Qur’an calls ‘long nocturnal journey’, a nightmare whose end he cannot yet foresee.”10

    Attempting to obtain ultimate security through the ultimate weapon, we have failed for, “the proliferation of nuclear weapons has still not been brought under control, despite the existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Fear and folly may still link hands at any moment to perform a final dance of death. Humanity is all the more vulnerable today for being capable of mass producing nuclear missiles.”11

    As the General Assembly in its “Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe” in 1981 said, “all the horrors of past wars and calamities that have befallen people would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the use of nuclear weapons, capable of destroying civilization on earth.”

    A five megaton weapon represents greater explosive power than all the bombs used in World War II and a twenty megaton bomb more than all the explosives used in all the wars in history. Several states are currently poised ready to deliver weapons that render those used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki small. One megaton bomb represents the explosive force of approximately seventy Hiroshimas while a fifteen megaton bomb a thousand Hiroshimas. Judge Weeramantry emphasized that “the unprecedented magnitude of its destructive power is only one of the unique features of the bomb. It is unique in its uncontainability in both space and time. It is unique as a source of peril to the human future. It is unique as a source of continuing danger to human health, even long after its use. Its infringement of humanitarian law goes beyond its being a weapon of mass destruction, to reasons which penetrate far deeper into the core of humanitarian law.”12

    We are challenged as never before: technology continues to slip away from moral guidance and law chases after common sense.

    International Court of Justice

    When the International Court of Justice addressed the legal status of threat or use of nuclear weapons members of the nuclear club, which has since grown, asserted a principled reliance on nuclear weapons. The Court held that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” and that states are obligated to bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. 13

    Did the Court open the way for permissible uses of a nuclear weapon by saying that is “generally” illegal and that it could not say that there would never be an attack on a country that threatened its very existence to which nuclear weapons would be necessarily an illegal response?

    Did the Court acknowledge that there were conceivably hypothetically legally compliant uses? It quoted the United Kingdom’s statement that “(I)n some cases, such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the high seas or troops in sparsely populated areas it is possible to envision a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few civilian casualties.”14 However, the Court further pointed out that no state demonstrated when even such a limited use would be justifiable or “feasible.”15

    The Court had already ruled unanimously that nuclear weapons must in any and all instances obey humanitarian laws of war. Can our most basic moral judgments founded on “dictates of conscience”, “elementary considerations of humanity” which remain “fundamental” and “intransgressible” be squared with these devices?16 It seems scarcely reasonable with respect to these humanitarian legal requirements that they can.17

    The Court stated unequivocally that the rules of armed conflict, including humanitarian law, prohibits the use of any weapon that is likely to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants;18 that is incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets;19 that violates principles protecting neutral states (such as through fall out or nuclear winter);20 that is not a proportional response to an attack;21 or that does permanent damage to the environment.22

    Under no circumstance may states make civilians the object of attack nor can they use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. Regardless of whether the survival of a state acting in self defense is at stake, these limitations continue to hold.

    For this reason the President Judge stated in forceful terms that the Court’s inability to go beyond its statement “can in no manner be interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to the recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”23 He emphasized his point by stating that nuclear weapons are “the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law which is the law of the lesser evil. Thus the very existence of nuclear weapons is a great challenge to humanitarian law itself.”24

    The Court held that no formal testimony was presented that nuclear weapons can meet the humanitarian law requirements for their use.25

    The President Judge along with several other judges undertook to point out the illogic of the situation: “It would thus be quite foolhardy unhesitatingly to set the survival of a state above all other considerations, in particular above the survival of mankind itself.”26

    The President Judge said, “Atomic warfare and humanitarian law therefore appear to me mutually exclusive: the existence of one automatically implies the non-existence of the other.”27 The Court said, “(M)ethods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons…the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect to such requirements.”28

    Discordance between the incompatibility of these devices with the requirements of humanitarian law, the assertion that there could be possible instances in which their use could be legal and the reliance on the doctrine of deterrence compelled the Court to seek a resolution: “the long promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of achieving that result.”29 The requirements of moral coherence and ethical conduct and the need for “international law, and with it the stability of international order which it is intended to govern,”30 drive the imperative of nuclear disarmament.

    Ongoing Problem

    Legal and moral questions continue to loom before us. We are not faced with nuclear policies founded on a strategy of dropping depth charges in mid-ocean or bombs in the desert. What the world faces is nuclear deterrence with its reliance on the horrific destruction of vast numbers of innocent people, destruction of the environment rendering it hostile to generations yet to be blessed with life.

    Deterrence proponents claim that nuclear weapons are not so much instruments for the waging of war but political instruments “intended to prevent war by depriving it of any possible rationale.”3 The United States has boldly argued that because deterrence is believed to be essential to its international security that the threat or use of nuclear weapons must therefore be legal. The United States representative stated: “If these weapons could not lawfully be used in individual or collective self defense under any circumstances (underlying added), there would be no credible threat of such use in response to aggression and deterrent policies would be futile and meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible to separate the policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of the means of deterrence. Accordingly, any affirmation of a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons would be directly contrary to one of the fundamental premises of the national security policy of each of these many states.”32

    It is clear that deterrence is designed to threaten massive destruction which would most certainly violate numerous principles of humanitarian law. Additionally, it strikes at generations yet unborn.

    Even in the instance of retaliation the moral absurdity challenges us. As Mexico’s Ambassador Sergio Gonzalez Galvez told the Court, “Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass rape acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is retaliatory deterrence—‘You burnt my city, I will burn yours.’ “33

    Professor Eric David, on behalf of the Solomon Islands, stated, “If the dispatch of a nuclear weapon causes a million deaths, retaliation with another nuclear weapon which will also cause a million deaths will perhaps protect the sovereignty of the state suffering the first strike, and will perhaps satisfy the victim’s desire for revenge, but it will not satisfy humanitarian law, which will have been breached not once but twice; and two wrongs do not make a right.”34

    Judge Weeramantry rigorously analyzed deterrence theory:

    1. Intention: “Deterrence needs to carry the conviction to other parties that there is a real intention to use those weapons in the event of an attack by that other party. A game of bluff does not convey that intention, for it is difficult to persuade another of one’s intention unless one really has that intention. Deterrence thus consists in a real intention to use such weapons. If deterrence is to operate, it leaves the world of make believe and enters the field of seriously intended military threats.”35

    2. Deterrence and Mere Possession: “Deterrence is more than the mere accumulation of weapons in a storehouse. It means the possession of weapons in a state of readiness for actual use. This means the linkage of weapons ready for immediate take off, with a command and control system geared for immediate action. It means that weapons are attached to delivery vehicles. It means that personnel are ready night and day to render them operational at a moment’s notice. There is clearly a vast difference between weapons stocked in a warehouse and weapons so ready for immediate action. Mere possession and deterrence are thus concepts which are clearly distinguishable from each other.”36

    For deterrence to work one must have the resolve to cause the resulting damage and devastation.

    Is deterrence limited to depth charges in the ocean or strikes in the desert? Are we willing to permit global security to rely on a bluff? If it is not a lie but a resolve to be willing to destroy all, are we not reducing humanitarian law to being a mere servant of raw power? Is not the very definition of lawlessness when might claims to make right?

    While deterrence continues to place all life on the planet in a precarious position of high risk, one must wonder whether it provides any possible security against accidental or unauthorized launches, computer error, irrational rogue actions, terrorist attack, criminal syndicate utilization of weapons and other irrational and unpredictable, but likely, scenarios.

    Did the Court undermine the continued legitimacy of deterrence? The Court stated clearly that “if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.”37

    The moral position of the nuclear weapons states is essentially that the threat to commit an illegal act—massive destruction of innocent people—is legal because it is so horrible to contemplate that it ensures the peace. Thus the argument is that the threat of committing that which is patently illegal is made legal by its own intrinsic illogic. Does this engender moral coherence in the youth of the world to whom we must argue that violence and the threat of violence in daily life does not bring human fulfillment?

    An unambiguous political commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the elimination of nuclear weapons evidenced by unambiguous immediate pledges never to use them first as well as placing the weapons in a de-alerted posture pending their ultimate elimination will promptly evidence the good faith efforts by the nuclear weapon states to reduce our collective risks. These steps increase our collective security, but are hardly enough to meet the clear decision of the court and the dictates of reason. Only commencement in good faith of multilateral negotiations leading to elimination of these devices will bring law, morals, ethics and reason into coherence. Only then will we be able to tell our children that ultimate violence will not bring ultimate security, a culture of peace based on law, reason and values will.

    Conclusion

    We are heartened by the level of cooperation articulated in the integrated human security agendas that emerged from the world summits of the 1990’s which addressed our common environmental and human security concerns. However, it must be pointed out that to fulfill the commitments made at these summits a new level of cooperation is required. It is appropriate, therefore, that the United Nations has declared the first ten years of the 21st century as dedicated to the creation of a Culture of Peace. That Culture of Peace will require a pattern in which trust, respect and transparency will breed disarmament and reverse the pattern of fear and threat which have continued to justify irrational levels of armaments. According to the Brookings Institute the U.S. alone has spent 5.8 trillion on nuclear arms since 1940.38 General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money on arms alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists and the hopes of its children.”

    The moral experience of shame has been placed in us along with the moral sensibility of revulsion. What right do we have to organize ourselves such that we might give human beings the Sophie’s choice of ending all life on the planet in order to save a human creation, the state. As General Omar Bradley stated, “We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about living.”

    It is time that we took bold moves to change the moral incoherence of the 20th century for it is now time in which statesmen must delve deep into themselves and become men in a state of grace. Let us grasp this moment of hazard and opportunity with our full humanity. Ultimate hazard and horror is our future if we let it slip away; opportunity to lead the world in fulfilling nothing less than an ultimate moral imperative — nuclear disarmament — is ours if we meet the challenge. This is a long journey that must take us from fear and incoherence into reason and moral coherence. Let it truly begin with us today.

    Footnotes

    1 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No. 95 (Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996). Unless otherwise noted, references are to this opinion, which was requested by the General Assembly. The historic importance of this decision cannot be overemphasized for it is the first judicial analysis of the issue by this international tribunal even though the first General Assembly Resolution, unanimously adopted January 24, 1946 at the London session, called for elimination of atomic weapons.

    2 Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, para. 105(2)E1.

    3 Buddhism: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” Udana-Varga, 5:18; Christianity: “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you even so to them.” Matthew 7:12; Confucianism: “Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you.” Analects 15:23; Hinduism: “This is the sum of duty: do not unto others which would cause you pain if done to you.” Mahabharata 5:1517; Islam: “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.” Hadith; Jainism: “In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as we regard our own self.” Lord Mahavir 24th Tirthankara; Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow man. That is the law; all the rest is commentary.” Talmud, Shabbat 31a; Zoroastrianism: “That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatsoever is not good for its own self.” Dadistan-I-Dinik, 94:5.

    4 See, excellent analysis, “Ethics of Abolition” in Douglas Roche’s Unacceptable Risk, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1995, p.90.

    5 Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, V4.

    6 Ibid. I 5.

    7 Gareth Evans of Australia, verbatum record, 30 October, 1995, pp. 44-45, 49.

    8 Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, II 3(a).

    9 Nuclear weapons cause death and destruction; induced cancers, leukemia, keloids and related afflictions; cause gastrointestinal, cardiovascular and related afflictions; continued for decades after their use to induce the health related problems mentioned above; damage the environmental rights of future generations; cause congenital deformities, mental retardation and genetic damage; carry the potential to cause a nuclear winter; contaminate and destroy the food chain; imperil the eco system; produce lethal levels of heat and blast; produce radiation and radioactive fallout; produce a disruptive electromagnetic pulse; produce social disintegration; imperil all civilizations; threaten human survival; wreak cultural devastation; span a time range of thousands of years; threaten all life on the planet; irreversibly damage the rights of future generations; exterminate civilian population; damage neighboring states; produce psychological stress and fear syndromes–as no other weapons do” Opinion of J, Ibid. para. II 4.

    10 Opinion of President Judge Bedjaoui, para. 2.

    11 Ibid. para. 5.

    12 Opinion of Judge Weeramantry II para. 3.

    13 “THE COURT:(1) By thirteen votes to one, Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion; IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;AGAINST: Judge Oda. (2) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly: A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such; IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; AGAINST: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma. C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful; D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons; E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake; IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo; AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins. F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Para.105.

    For full opinion and commentary, See, Ann Fagan Ginger, ed. Nuclear Weapons Are Illegal: The Historic Opinion of the World Court and How It Will Be Enforced, Apex Press, New York, 1998; For analysis with excellent bibliography on the opinion, See, John Burroughs, The (Il)legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, A Guide to the Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice, Munster, London, 1997; For opinion available at cost from UN (document A/51/218, 15 October 1996), UN Publications, 2 UN Plaza, DC2-853, NY, NY 10017, 212-963-8302; Also, available at International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) website http://www.ddh.nl/org/ialana

    14 Para. 91.

    15 Para. 94.

    16 Paras. 78-79.

    17 Para. 95.

    18 Paras. 78, see paras. 92,95.

    19 Paras 78, 95

    20 Para. 78.

    21 Ibid.

    22 Paras. 32, 33, 35.

    23 Opinion of President Judge Bedjaoui, para. 20.

    24 Ibid. 23

    25 Paras.94-95, see para. 91.

    26 Opinion of President Bedjaoui, para. 22.

    27 Ibid. para 20.

    28 Para. 95

    29 Para. 98

    30 Ibid.

    31 Marc Perrinde Brichambaut, France, Verbatim record (trans.) 1 November, 1995, page 33.

    32 Michael Matheson, US, Verbatim record, 15 November, 1995, p. 78.

    33 Verbatim record, 3 November 1995, p. 64.

    34 Verbatim record, (trans.), 14 November, 1995, p. 45.

    35 Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, VII 2(v).

    36 Ibid.

    37 Para. 47.

    38 Washington Post, July 1, 1998.

    * Jonathan Granoff is an attorney and a member of Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Temple of Understanding, and the State of the World Forum.

  • Nuclear Nationalism

    On May 28th last year the government of Pakistan followed that of India and tested nuclear weapons. While everyone else worried about the prospect of nuclear war in South Asia, Eqbal Ahmad, who died recently, predicted that Pakistan’s nuclear tests would have a more profound impact on its domestic politics than on its defence or foreign policies. As on so many other occasions he was proven right. In early May, the government ordered 10 days of national celebrations to mark the first anniversary of Pakistan’s new found “self reliance” and “impregnable defence.” The festivities offer a window into the minds of those heading the newest nuclear weapon state and warn of a dangerous future for the country.

    The numerous events organised and sponsored by the state made it clear that at one level the celebrations were designed to deepen and broaden support across the country for the government and for nuclear weapons. The events announced were to include “a competition of ten best milli [nationalistic] songs, seminars, fairs, festive public gatherings, candle processions, sports competitions, bicycle races, flag hoisting ceremonies, etc.” Thanksgiving prayers and special programmes for children and debates among school children were also arranged. Appropriate programmes were aired on national television and radio networks as well as local radio in the regional languages. To make sure that no missed out on what was being celebrated, cities and towns were decorated with banners and giant posters carrying pictures of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons scientists and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against a backdrop of mushroom clouds. The weapons themselves were not absent. Replicas of Pakistan’s recently tested nuclear missiles and a giant scale model of the nuclear test site at Chaghi in Baluchistan were constructed and put up. Even markets and crossroads were named after nuclear weapons scientists.

    There has probably never been an occasion like this before. It is nothing less than glorying in having acheived the capacity to commit mass murder and, as such, fundamentally immoral. Weapons are tools of violence and fear; and nuclear weapons the ultimate in such tools. All decent people detest them. No one should glory in their existence, never mind their possession.

    There is more here than glory. A state is using all its authority and instutional resources to build pride in having nuclear weapons into the very national identity of a people. Pakistanis are meant to rejoice and delight and think of themselves as citizens of “Nuclear-Pakistan” — a term used by state media. To the extent the state succeeds at its efforts at creating a nuclearised nationalism, Pakistan, henceforth, shall be a country whose identity is based not just like others on a sense of a shared place, or history, language, culture, or even religion. Its identity shall be inextricably linked to a technology of mass destruction. For some this has already happened: as Information Minister Mushahid Hussain proudly puts it: “Chaghi has become a symbol of Pakistan’s identity all over the world.”

    It is worth considering how having imagined itself as a nuclear-nation Pakistan will ever deal with nuclear disarmament. For the nuclear hawks, such as Mushahid Hussain, who have orchestrated the celebrations, that day is never to be allowed to dawn. Whenever the question of disarmament is raised, they will point to the public support for nuclear weapons they have worked so hard to manufacture and say: “How can we? Our people will not permit it. They want nuclear weapons.” With this they are trying to close permanently the door to real peace. Far better in their view an endless nuclear-armed confrontation with India, that in turn gives cause for demands for high military spending and excuses state failure and government excesses in other areas. Revelling in the success of the nuclear tests of 28 May last year was also meant to overcome the growing sense of fundamental political and social crisis. The whole affair certainly had the feel of a circus, albeit a nuclear circus. It offered a national distraction, a brief respite from the grinding daily experience of failure that consumes the time, energy and resources of the people of the country. There is hardly any point in recounting either the specific failures or the crises that have created them. They are all so well known. But it is worth doing as an act of solidarity with Najam Sethi, the editor of The Friday Times, who before he was abducted in the middle of the night by the police and intelligence agencies had written that the country was “in the throes of a severe multi-dimensional crisis. I refer to six major crises which confront Pakistan on the eve of the new millenium: (1) the crisis of identity and ideology; (2) the crisis of law, constitution and political system; (3) the crisis of economy; (4) the crisis of foreign policy; (5) the crisis of civil society; and (6) the crisis of national security.”

    The sense that in the glitter and the noise people were meant to forget that there has been 50 years of abject failure when it comes to the state providing them with social justice or basic needs is sharpened by 28 May being declared to be the most important date since independence. It suggests a search for a new beginning; the rebirth of a nation. This third birth of Pakistan, after 1947 and 1971, is no more auspicious than the first two. Each birth has been violent and produced violence. The first, out of the horrors of Partition, failed to produce a viable constitution and led to military dictatorship and twice to war. The second birth, out of the slaughter in Bangladesh, failed to produce democracy and led to more dictatorship, and the sectarian demons who now haunt the land. The third life, a Pakistan born out of nuclear explosions, carries the threat of terminal violence.

    It is worth delving a little deeper into what the nuclear circus was meant to conceal. It was meant to be an affirmation of strength, pride and ‘virility’ – at least that is what Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar called it. What this tries to conceal, if not erase altogether, is that events after last year’s nuclear tests provided clear evidence of the weakness of this country. The sanctions that were imposed by the international community after the tests were lifted not because the world was awed by Pakistan’s new nuclear might, but because they took a really good look at it and were horrified by its obvious fragility. Sanctions were lifted because otherwise the country would have fallen apart and nobody wanted to see that happen particularly now that nuclear weapons were involved. It was an act aimed to protect Pakistan from itself–or more accurately, to try to protect its people from the criminal stupidity and recklessness of its leaders.

    It is easy to see how having to accept this realisation of weakness would have created a crisis among those who were responsible for taking the decision to test. One the one hand they tested nuclear weapons and thought of themselves as being strong and having broken the “begging bowl”. On the other, the world offered them pity and charity, because otherwise the country would collapse. And thus the nuclear circus as a way of ridding their minds of these fears and memories. The louder and brighter the circus the deeper the anxiety about being weak could be pushed. No wonder then that government press releases insisted the nation was united “to pay tribute to the courage, statesmanship and maturity of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.”

    A bomb, a nation, a leader.

  • No More Kosovos!

    I would like to discuss with you what the Global Action to Prevent War program could have done in helping to prevent the Kosovo crisis, what contribution it still might make to a solution there, and what it could do to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas.

    This is a practical way of reviewing the part of the Global Action to Prevent War program that deals with preventing internal conflict and of eliciting your suggestions to improve the project. And your suggestions are much needed – this is a work in progress and one that is intended to help the practitioner.

    The full text of the Global Action to Prevent War program is on our website (www.globalactionpw.org). The purpose of Global Action where it concerns crises like Kosovo is to enhance the capabilities for conflict prevention of the UN, of regional security organizations, the international judicial system and human rights institutions, as well as of civil society everywhere, and to bring them all more fully into a highly active conflict prevention role.

    To do this, we envision about twenty individual measures, which I would like to describe briefly. (For clarity, I have numbered them in this paper.)

    Please bear in mind that it is unlikely that any of these measures alone could have decisive effect. They have to act together.

    To start with, (1) Global Action foresees a specific treaty commitment to admit official human rights monitors immediately on request to the host country and to facilitate their visits.

    Most countries have already undertaken numerous human rights covenants. There is no point in pressing for additional ones. What is needed is implementation of existing commitments. We know that acute Serb abuse of the Kosovars has been going on for at least ten years since Milosevic revoked the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989. Yugoslavia is a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other human rights covenants. These commitments are being violated by the Serb authorities.

    The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has an agreed but complicated procedure for admitting human rights observers even when the host government is reluctant. It was invoked in Chechnya after much negotiation. What we are proposing here is a worldwide commitment that will make immediate entry of monitors to check compliance with existing human rights commitments a recognized right.

    If human rights monitors had visited Kosovo at the outset of the abuses there and immediately publicized their findings, reporting them to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the international courts, and to the Security Council, and had done this repeatedly, this would have inhibited Milosevic.

    Many NGO’s and diplomatic observers were in Kosovo observing the remarkable development of non-violent self-government there, but their reports did not get action out of Western governments. This is one of the several missed opportunities for preventing Kosovo.

    Remember that the explicit standard for existing human rights covenants, both for the UN and for the OSCE, is that the status of human rights within a given country is not solely a matter of national sovereignty, but a legitimate interest of the international community.

    (2) Another of our measures could have had even more effect — an international treaty on minority rights. This treaty would have promoted Kosovar autonomy and protected that autonomy, once granted, against arbitrary change. And its terms would have given the Kosovars status to complain to the international community and places to lodge these complaints – the UN Human Rights Commission, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and ultimately, the Security Council. After many years of negotiation, in 1992, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on rights of minorities. We want to go a further step to give the declaration binding treaty power.

    (3) We would back this treaty on minority protection by a commitment to teach non-violent conflict prevention and productive intergroup relations in every participating country at every level of education – using the concepts covered in UNESCO’s program for a culture of peace.

    (4) Global Action foresees the establishment of a professional mediator corps at the UN, with counterparts in regional security organizations.

    (5) To feed into these positions and to provide the trained peacekeepers I will mention later, we also propose that, in UN member states, service in mediation, humanitarian aid, and in peacekeeping, be an accepted alternative to military conscription. Where armed forces are professional and there is no conscription, we ask governments to set up a career public service in these fields and to place these practitioners in senior government positions.

    We foresee that a corps of trained mediation professionals at the UN, at the disposal of the Secretary General and Security Council, would collect and analyze information about potential trouble spots and also about proven methods of conflict prevention. They would be sent out individually or in small teams to areas where conflict might develop. Their status would be protected and all UN member states would be committed to receiving them on their territory and facilitating their stay. Small teams could stay on site for months, becoming acquainted with the local population, working with local and foreign NGO’s, trying to bring hostile groups together, proposing solutions, investigating incidents and, if helpful, making their findings publicly known.

    The OSCE already does valuable work of this kind. Our proposal is that the work be intensified and be carried out by trained professionals with a reputation for institutional neutrality. Today, the Secretary General sends out small missions of this kind, but he has neither permanent professional personnel nor adequate funds for this function. A small group of mediation professionals could also be assigned to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague to permit it to undertake a more proactive conflict prevention role.

    These professional mediators in the field could warn UN Headquarters if there is a real possibility of armed violence. (6) They could also alert the Conflict Mediation Panel of the General Assembly that we propose. This open-ended committee of General Assembly members would be a less formal, more flexible conflict prevention group than the Security Council. It would not be subject to the veto and could set its own agenda by majority vote.

    In this case, the General Assembly Conflict Mediation Panel would send a team to Kosovo composed of UN representatives from various countries. It would hold on-site hearings, publicizing them if it seems desirable. In the Panel’s sessions in New York, as many as possible of them public sessions, it would invite Kosovars and Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, and perhaps some officials from Serbia, to tell their side of the story, and to listen to the Panel’s advice on what to do. It would be the obligation of this Panel to give the UN and the world public comprehensive, balanced information on the disputed issue and to propose possible solutions.

    One of the problems of conflicts like that in Rwanda and Kosovo is that, although government officials are often aware of these conflicts at an early stage, they do not publicize their reports. Media coverage in these early stages is often sporadic. As a result, the conflicts often hit an unprepared world opinion only when they are at an advanced state and organized killing has already begun. To give civil society a chance to do its job, it has to be brought in early. The same goes for governments in other areas and for national legislatures that may have to decide on aid, sanctions, or peacekeeping operations.

    In this case, the work of the professional mediators and of the Conflict Mediation Panel would alert the international community, along with NGO’s and publics in major UN member states, to the Kosovo problem. The media would intensify its coverage of Kosovo, and the political opposition in Yugoslavia would have grounds early on to question the actions of their government in Kosovo.

    (7) An important feature of our proposal is a reformed Security Council, expanded in membership and restricted in use of the veto through an informal understanding among the permanent members of the Security Council.

    We suggest that this reformed Security Council should make a deliberate decision to undertake a highly pro-active role in conflict prevention and should make the commitments in professional backup and financing needed to carry out this role.

    In the Kosovo case, backed by information from the Mediation Corps, whose personnel would serve the Council as professional staff for this program, and by information from the General Assembly’s Conflict Mediation Panel, the Security Council would invite the Yugoslav government to appear before it in a series of hearings to explain its policy in Kosovo. The Council would present the reasons for its own concern over the situation. It would give its advice to the Yugoslav government on treatment of the Kosovars and offer its assistance, both in personnel and money, to carry out this advice. In proposing this procedure, we are thinking also of other unresolved internal conflicts like those in Sudan and Sri Lanka. In the case of Kosovo, if the problem continued, the Council would invite the Yugoslav government to appear before it again and would warn it of the probable future consequences of its anti-Kosovar practices. It would point out to the Yugoslav government and the world public that the problem in Kosovo was becoming a threat to international security.

    This activity by the Security Council would prepare the road to further Council action, including the possibility of full negative publicity, the use of emissaries to Yugoslavia’s leaders, carefully selected economic sanctions, of preventive deployment of a peacekeeping force if the Yugoslav government is prepared to agree, or as a last extreme measure, of peace enforcement. The international community would be alerted at each step.

    (8) We believe the Security Council and the main UN member states should move step by step toward an agreed concept for humanitarian intervention based on the idea that governments are entrusted with stewardship of the welfare of their people, especially their human rights, and are accountable for their conduct of this stewardship, and that when this stewardship is misused or abused in an extreme way, the international community should be prepared to intervene in some form.

    The Council would decide in the individual situation whether this is the case and what action should be taken. Actual practice of the Security Council is moving toward this concept. A clear statement of it would have advantages for member state governments and publics.

    We are proposing that civil society be closely linked to this process by (9) formal liaison with the UN Secretariat and the Security Council and regional organizations and with a biennial conference of NGO’s working on all aspects of the conflict reduction field, with participation of the Secretary General and the presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council, to discuss field experience, good and bad methods and improved liaison at all levels.

    If the Security Council is blocked from action by vetoes, then resort should be made to the General Assembly by shifting action to the Conflict Mediation Panel or, in extreme cases, through the Uniting for Peace resolution used in the Korean War and in the big Congo peacekeeping operation of the 1960’s, when the Soviet Union paralyzed the Security Council with vetoes. These proposals for a General Assembly Conflict Mediation Panel, for a proactive role for the Security Council, and for resort to the Uniting for Peace procedure are not “future music.” They could be invoked today.

    (10) This is a logical point to mention that the Global Action project foresees the establishment of universal membership regional security organizations in each major region, each with conflict prevention capability. When intervention is carried out by a regional security organization, the Security Council should give its approval.

    We do not know the long term future of NATO. It may merge with OSCE or both may finally be absorbed into the European Union structure. But, according to our approach, NATO’s membership would have to become universal and NATO would have to recognize the authority of the Security Council.

    (11) We propose in the Global Action program that all newly concluded treaties should provide for referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, giving the court a more active role in conflict prevention. These activities need not be limited to interstate disputes: Under the minority rights treaty we propose, the UN Human Rights Commissioner and the Kosovar community in Yugoslavia would both have status to bring complaints to the Court.

    (12) We also assume effective operation of an International Criminal Court and authority under its procedures for the Kosovars to inform the court’s prosecutor at an early stage that abuses of their human rights are taking place. Effective operation of the Criminal Court will mean that the Court’s existence and practices would have a deterrent effect on actions and practices like those of the Yugoslav government against the Kosovars. We believe other aspects of the Global Action program will also have deterrent effects.

    (13) The Global Action program foresees the existence of full-time UN volunteer peacekeeping forces, a brigade in each major geographic region, with the capacity to call on member states for backup forces. (14) These units would be financed by the proceeds of an international tax, possibly on airline tickets, levied by member state legislatures.

    If the Yugoslav government was prepared to accept the force, the Security Council could propose preventive deployment of this force in Kosovo, stating an emergency was beginning to emerge. If the Yugoslav government refused, the Council could call for further steps, including carefully articulated economic sanctions and the use of military force under Chapter 7.

    In contrast to the present situation, these pre-financed peacekeeping troops would be ready to move on a few hours notice. (15) They would be backed by a standing UN police force composed of volunteer personnel who could also take on the job of maintaining order in Kosovo. There are many occasions, including Kosovo, where inviting in a police force poses much less of a challenge to national sovereignty than an outside peacekeeping force and could therefore be more acceptable to the host country and to the Security Council as well. UN-directed police personnel have been deployed in Haiti and the OSCE has also done so in Bosnia.

    If either of these forces had already been available, they might have provided a vital component for a negotiated solution of the Kosovo problem. In fact, I have been proposing that a United Nations peacekeeping force be substituted for NATO troops as an international peacekeeping force for Kosovo. A proposal to do this could bring about earlier agreement to end the Kosovo crisis than may be achieved otherwise.

    We are talking here of a more powerful Security Council and regional security organizations. To limit the possibility of abuse of power and to enhance accountability of these organizations, we want to (16) institute on a step-by-step basis the practice of judicial review of Security Council decisions by the International Court of Justice.

    What about the opposite problem from that of arbitrary action, the question of political will? Would governments and institutions really act to use this improved international security system?

    We believe so. First, authority in the system we are describing would be widely dispersed. There would be many separate decisionmakers: NGO’s, human rights officials, UN officials and representatives and governments. Above all, the potential victims themselves would have a much louder voice.

    What about timely decisions by regional security institutions or the UN Security Council to send peacekeepers? The issue of political will might become critical at this point.

    (17) As one measure to deal with this issue, Global Action proposes that the president of the General Assembly or his representative should participate in meetings of the Security Council to report on Assembly views and keep the Council engaged — and also accountable.

    As regards the Security Council’s capacity to act in a timely way without veto, we believe that the five permanent members, in their own self-interest of saving the Council from the cold war oblivion it would otherwise suffer and of preserving their own international influence as members of a functioning Council, may ultimately agree informally among themselves to restrict use of the veto. This restriction could be very limited, ad hoc, or general. Resort to the Conflict Mediation Panel of the General Assembly or to the Uniting for Peace procedure are possible alternatives.

    In addition, we are suggesting that (18) the Secretary General of the UN should be given authority by Charter amendment or decision of the Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping military or police force of limited size for conflict prevention only. For the deployment to continue beyond 30 days, it would have to be confirmed by the Security Council.

    Speaking more generally, when we raise the issue of political will, we are talking about education. A large part of what we call political will is learned behavior. (19) The Global Action project foresees an intense education program for political leaders at all levels, government officials, military officers and NGO’s on recognition of the signs of possible conflict and the logic of determined early action to prevent conflict.

    For Kosovo, we know the lesson already: the costs of failure to intervene early in the Kosovo crisis include the costs of the current NATO military campaign, the costs of caring for the refugees, the costs of an international force, the costs of rehabilitating Kosovo, as well as possibly Serbia, a total which will probably exceed $50 billion for all NATO countries for the next two years.

    Governments do not like to take early action. By and large, they believe that most incipient crises will dissipate and that there will be no need to incur the political and economic costs of action to cope with them. That is one lesson they draw from experience. That lesson is wrong in the field of internal conflict. Here, governments have to learn that when certain indicators are present, it is a necessity to pay for the insurance policy of early preventive action. Doing so will save more lives and it will be cheaper to pay these insurance costs than to risk the heavy costs of waiting.

    Using round figures, the maximum cost of applying all the measures proposed by Global Action for Kosovo and described in this paper would perhaps have been $400 or $500 million — excluding the standing peacekeeping brigades, $100 million — as contrasted to the loss of life and uprooting of thousands of lives and costs of at least $50 billion in the belated action now going on.

    This lesson about the need to act early can in fact be learned. A whole generation of Westerners went through World War II and came out with one lesson – the danger of allowing the human and material resources of Europe to fall under hostile hegemony. Without real hesitation, they followed that lesson into the cold war. Debate during the cold war was mainly about the methods.

    To cite another example, in the century between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, the British political class learned the lesson of early warning and early intervention and acted on these lessons scores of times. Sometimes the objective was laudable, sometimes not, but the point is that this kind of alertness can be learned.

    That is the kind of political understanding and political will that must ultimately arise with regard to prevention of conflict. It must be part of the training of every NGO, legislator, diplomat, and soldier on the planet to recognize and react to these symptoms early on. It is a central part of the job of supporters of Global Action to help to carry out this educational task with their political leaders and government officials.

    This description covers only that part of the Global Action program aimed at reducing the outbreak of internal war. Global Action’s program of conflict prevention is backed by a systematic program of transparency on all the components of military power, confidence-building, and conventional disarmament to prevent interstate war and big power war — a necessary complement.

    Let me draw a conclusion from these comments: This list of preventive measures is not and cannot be complete. We need the help of everyone who has ideas on this issue and of the many experienced workers in this field. Please give us your suggestions and help us make the Global Action approach better.

    Our argument is not that any single one of the 18 or 19 measures I have described today would have prevented the Kosovo disaster.

    It is that, working together, these measures, combined with the widespread conviction that armed conflict can in fact be prevented, and combined with insistent pressure from civil society – from all of us — can be a powerful force in drastically reducing the outbreak of armed conflict and in preventing future Kosovos.

    This is the main subject that the United Nations and world civil society should be working on in their preparations for the agenda-setting Millennial forums next year – and this is the subject that we at the Hague Peace Appeal conference should be thinking of today.

    * Jonathan Dean is an adviser on International Security Issues for the Union of Concerned Scientists, Suite 310, 1616 P Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036, 202-332-0900 FAX: 202-332-0905, Global Action to Prevent War.

  • NATO: Abandon First Strike Doctrine, De-Alert Nuclear Weapons

    The world has changed dramatically, even NATO itself has changed, not necessarily for the better, but NATO nuclear policy, based upon nuclear deterrence and a first use option, has not changed.

    For its first 40 years NATO was a defensive alliance. Its purpose was to defend against an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union. NATO relied heavily on the threat to use nuclear weapons to thwart such an attack. Regardless of what one thinks of this policy, it must be recognized that the need for such a strategy has passed.

    The Cold War ended. There is no longer a Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved. No threat against Western Europe currently exists, and the Russians have sought friendly relations with the West.

    How has NATO responded to this situation?

    First, it has expanded. George Kennan, an American elder statesman who crafted the containment policy against the former Soviet Union, has called NATO expansion the single greatest mistake in American foreign policy in the post Cold War era. It is a mistake because it threatens the Russians.

    Second, NATO has changed from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance in disregard of its own Charter.

    NATO, is currently engaged in hostilities that are in clear violation of international law.

    Third, NATO has resisted any change in its nuclear doctrine. It continues to have a nuclear first-strike doctrine, meaning that NATO refuses to declare that it will use nuclear weapons only against attack by nuclear weapons.

    Fourth, NATO continues to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and continues to employ a nuclear sharing policy. U.S. nuclear weapons are located in Germany, UK, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, and Belgium.

    It is important to note that all of this takes place under strong pressure from the United States, and is the result of U.S. leadership of NATO.

    When the new German government came to power and wanted to pursue a No First Use (of nuclear weapons) policy for NATO, the U.S. put strong pressure on them to fall into line. Similar pressure has been applied to Canada and to other NATO governments.

    What is wrong with NATO’s nuclear policy?

    It is terribly dangerous. It could have catastrophic results, by accident or design. It forces the Russians to greater reliance on their nuclear arsenal. It encourages nuclear proliferation. It violates international law, both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Articles VI, and I and II) and the opinion of the International Court of Justice. Most tragically, it undermines the best opportunity we may have to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

    What should NATO do?

    1. Immediately declare a policy of No First Use, and a policy of Non-Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    2. Remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, including withdrawal of Trident submarines from European waters.

    3. Express its support for the World Court decision on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

    4. Make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear arms and take practical steps to accomplish this end, as called for by the New Agenda Coalition.

    5. De-alert its nuclear forces, and begin to separate warheads from delivery vehicles.

    6. Begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, setting forth an agreed upon plan for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons.

    7. Declare an immediate cease fire in the Balkans, and return the issue of peace in the former Yugoslavia to the United Nations Security Council or to the UN General Assembly under Article 20 of the Charter and a “Uniting for Peace” Resolution if the Security Council is deadlocked.

    In concluding, I’d like to share with you a message I received by email from a friend in Russia, Alla Yaroshinskaya, who is an advisor to President Yeltsin:

    “We are very close to theatre of war in Yugoslavia and have information from both sides. And I am very afraid we are on the eve of 3rd world’s war. NATO and USA, bombing Yugoslavia, help very much our crazy communists to take into force sooner than they dreamed about that. And I think that USA has good chance to feel destruction on their own territory if power in such country like Russia with nuclear strategical weapons fall down to the hands of bloody Bolsheviks.”

  • Factsheet on Nuclear Arsenals and Y2K: Potential Y2K Vulnerabilities in Nuclear Operations

    There is a real danger of Y2K errors compromising nuclear safety. However, this danger is not in the weapons themselves. The nuclear missiles and warheads will not spontaneously launch or explode due to Y2K malfunctions. Launch control officers in submarines and ICBM launch control centers must physically turn keys, which are electromechanical in nature rather than digital. Also, for the officers’ actions to be translated into a real launch, a correct “unlock” code must be entered into the warhead and missile systems. The chance that a Y2K error would randomly transmit the correct unlock code to the warhead is infinitesimal.

    The threat of Y2K-induced nuclear war is found in two areas connected to daily nuclear operations: 1) Command and Control (C2) systems, which are primarily telecommunications systems that depend on automated routers and switches; and 2) early warning information systems, which includes not only the satellites and radars for detecting enemy launch but also the thousands of software programs and millions of lines of code for filtering, analyzing, correlating, and fusing the continuous stream of data so that humans can understand it. These “information technology” (IT) systems depend on giant databases that sort and store the incoming information through the use of dates. Also, the software that breaks down and summarizes the data for human consumption executes mathematical operations using date-dependent information. These systems are highly interconnected in a complex network, which could lead to the unpredictable spread of a Y2K error across operations.

    Commanders depend on this early warning information because Russia and the US are still on hair-trigger alert. US analysts at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) have three minutes to study the data and make a judgment on its meaning and validity, after which NORAD, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Nebraska, and top authorities in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon have only 10 minutes to initiate a large teleconference and make a decision on retaliation. These extremely short decision times are due to the policy of “launch on warning,” which demands that Russia and the US “win” a nuclear war. “Winning” means avoiding the preemption of one’s own forces by an enemy surprise attack, while at the same time preempting as many enemy missile sites as possible in an offensive strike. Simply put, ICBMS have a 25-30 flight time between the two countries, and Launch on Warning mandates that US missiles get off the ground before Russian warheads arrive. The same applies to Russian doctrine.

    Without reliable communications during a missile alert, Command and Control (C2) would quickly disintegrate, and the possibility of launch orders being given by mistaken calculations would significantly increase through a combination of human-machine errors. If Y2K were to cause the production of ambiguous data, or incomplete data, or complete blackouts of crucial surveillance sensors (possibly through indirect events such as power outages), the potential exists for escalating actions by lower commanders who may interpret these events as evidence of an ongoing surprise strike by the opponent.

    Even without Y2K, there is a disturbing history of computer-related failures in US-Russian operations. In US operations in 1980, an embedded 64-cent chip with a flawed design, nestled deep in telephone switching hardware at NORAD, suddenly started sending messages to other command posts that a Soviet attack was under way, causing two raised alert levels within a three-day period. Nor was this incident an isolated case. According to nuclear expert Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institution, official correspondence between US commanders in later years refer obliquely to multiple computer-based mishaps, such as false reports from an infrared satellite that “could have resulted in unacceptable posturing of SAC forces.” And in a series of reports on the computer modernization programs at NORAD during the last 18 years, the General Accounting Office has described an operating environment plagued by flawed and lost data, bad screen displays for human operators, and sub-optimal system performance. Similarly, in 1983, Russians had a near-accident when satellite software mistook sun glare off of clouds as 5 US Minuteman III ICBMs streaking towards the Soviet Union. Five minutes into the alert, a lower officer decided to tell upper commanders that the data was false because he had a “gut feeling” that the US would not start a nuclear war in this fashion.

    Because of this history of computer errors, redundancy in sensors and data processing nodes is essential to avoid accidents. Unfortunately, experts do not have high confidence in the ability of Russian radars to back up Russian satellites, and vice-versa. Russia has only 3 operational satellites out of necessary constellation of 7-9 satellites; some of the satellites in orbit have drifted off-station and are useless for early warning purposes. This means that they can spot an American launch of ICBMs within a minute or two after launch (which is good news!), but they cannot spot any Trident submarine launches closer to Russian territory. Only the ground-based radar arrays can spot Trident launches, which gives Russian leaders very little time (possibly as little as 5 minutes) to analyze the data, make a decision, and issue launch orders. To make matters worse, the ground-based radar network for Russia is outdated, and there are two very large gaps in coverage that would allow US Trident submarines to attack with impunity.

    Russia does not have a well-funded and staffed Y2K repair program in place. Russian military officials have found date dependencies and vulnerabilities in early warning and C2 systems, but they have not started the repairs. This leaves little time for testing of Y2K fixes even if systems do get “renovated” before 2000.

    In contrast to Russia, many critical U.S. systems have been “renovated” and the Pentagon is now completing the testing phase of the Y2K remediation process. But a U.S. Air Force official admitted in a Senate hearing recently that these tests included only “the thin line, the minimal number of [computer] systems required to execute the mission.” Commercial providers of telecommunications routers and switches were not incorporated in the test plans. (Even in the event of a nuclear crisis, Strategic Command may need the Baby Bells and other commercial telephone companies!) Nor were private suppliers of electricity included. Also, all of the major communications software and hardware for the US nuclear submarine force are behind schedule. The submarine systems not covered in February tests include onshore antennas, signal processing software, automated message distribution software, and embedded systems for the encryption/decryption of secret messages. This leaves the possibility that when the new millennium arrives, computers left out of the integrated test schedules will “infect” the tested systems or cause other disruptions in normal operations.

    Dedicated testing programs will only reveal the presence of errors, not their complete absence. Moreover, computer failures rarely repeat themselves in exactly the same form, with the result that none of the documented US and Russian near-accidents could have been predicted beforehand by knowledgeable experts. The only guaranteed way to avoid accidental nuclear war is to end Russian and American dependence on the extravagantly complex computer systems that provide early warning information to commanders. And this can only be done by instituting mutually verifiable de-alerting procedures, replacing the current “warfighting” nuclear stance with a doctrine that reflects true post-Cold War international realities.

  • The Bombing of Yugoslavia will Fail to Achieve its Goals

    According to the media, the bombing of Yugoslavia has three goals: 1) to stop the atrocities; 2) to weaken Milosevic and, if possible, to remove him from power, and 3) to prevent a war that could be wider than Kosovo.

    All three goals will fail. The bombing will aggravate the problems it is supposed to solve.

    Goal #1: Stop the atrocities: I know from personal exposure what Milosevic thinks. It is his goal to expel the Albanians from Kosovo, whom he considers unwelcome and often illegal occupants of his Serbian homeland. He could not do it on a wholesale scale until now because world opinion was against it. Now with the war on, he can accomplish his mission without interference. NATO is in the air, while the ethnic cleansing is carried out on the ground. To accelerate the Kosovar exodus he needs to scare the population with atrocities. Thus, the net effect of the bombing is to increase rather than stop the atrocities.

    Goal #2: Weaken Milosevic: Just the opposite is resulting from the bombing. Milosevic uses the war to eliminate any opposition. He now has a legitimate excuse to expel any foreign journalists, which he did promptly. He closed opposition newspapers as soon as the threat of attack was announced. Under the umbrella of war readiness, he broadcasts only material favorable to him. His rule is now absolute and the population, bombarded and brainwashed, naturally supports its leader.

    There is a mistaken belief that the bombing will be so severe that it will bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. They rely on the Bosnian precedent in which the bombing did bring him to sign the peace agreement. They assume he will do the same now. Wrong! People do not understand his motives. Milosevic cares only about one thing: remaining in power. He signed in Dayton, after the bombing, because they were not bombing Serbia. The bombing was hurting Karadjic and that worked in Milosevic’s favor. Karadjic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, threatened him politically by becoming more popular than he was. So Milosevic did not oppose the bombing. He gave up he land without a fight, created thousands of refugees from Bosnia, but succeeded in destroying Karadjic, who is now a sought after war criminal.

    The Kosovo bombing is a totally different matter. This bombing increases his political power. The Serbian people are uniting behind him. Anyone who thinks that President Clinton’s speech to the Serbian nation will make them switch loyalties as the bombs are falling is either naïve or just plain stupid. Milosevic won’t yield. The more the bombing, the stronger he is politically. It is making him a hero in his people’s eyes. Serbian culture values adversity. Serbs create heroes when they are attacked; it invigorates them. They believe that the world wants to eliminate them. First it was the Turks, than the Germans, now the Americans. This bombing confirms their belief structure and strengthens their resolve. They survived the Turks and the Germans. Now it is up to them to prove to themselves that they will survive NATO. They will die and not yield. The’ve done this in the past, and they will do it now. The fiercer the battle, the more popular Milosevic will be. Granted, this can not last forever. Even Hitler eventually experienced an uprising. Howver, for that level of despair to be achieved among the Serbs, it might require the death of many thousands of innocent people.

    Goal # 3: The bombing will contain the war to Kosovo and prevent its spreading. When there is war, there are refugees, and these refugees will seek shelter in a country that has not been yet been involved in the war. This is especially true in the Balkans. The Kosovars will try to move into Macedonia first, where 40% of the population is Albanian, and where they have strong family connections. It will be inhumane to stop them crossing the border because they will be escaping real or anticipated atrocities. Moreover, it will be difficult to stop the movement of population across the border because of the nature of the terrain. I know it from personal experience. I crossed those mountains during the Second World War escaping the holocaust. The Albanians know every nook and cranny on that terrain. They will pass through no matter how many troops are put on the border. The inflow of a million or more Albanians into Macedonia will destabilize that country. It might bring joy to Greece because they would like to see a Slavic Macedonia disappear, but it will not be something about which Bulgaria will be passive. Add to it that Albania itself is a tinder box, with Moslems, Catholics and Greek Orthodox Albanians. An inflow of a million or more Albanian Moslems from Kosovo will threaten this precarious balance. Moreover, the Albanians have strong tribal affiliations, and an inflow from Kosovo will seriously aggravate the situation. One can not help imagine a civil war in Albania. Where will the new refugees go? Traditionally, they have tried to slip across the Adriatic Sea into Italy. One can see that the whole region will be engulfed by a deadly turmoil. This bombing will not contain the war. It will widen it.

    How will NATO exit this war, especially if one assumes that Milosevic will not get down on his knees? How many people will have to die for NATO to realize the futility of this war?

    Should atrocities end? Absolutely! How? Announce the sovereignty of Kosovo. The Kosovars will never be able to live within Yugoslavia. Especially not after this war. Give them arms to fight for themselves. It will become a civil war within Yugoslavia. Civil wars are never popular. That will topple Milosevic. It will be a useless war for Serbia, and they will have to pull out of Kosovo like the Russians pulled out of Afghanistan, or the Israelis will have to pull out of South Lebanon. The Russians did not withdrawn from Afghanistan because of bombing. The Serbs have developed national pride for hundreds of years fighting real and imaginary enemies.

    Stop the bombing now. Spare the loss of more lives — Serbs, Americans, and especially the Kosovars’, whom the war was intended to save.

    *Dr. Adizes is a consultant to corporations and governments and has been a consultant to the Prime Ministers of Macedonia and Greece. In 1991 he was invited by Milosevic in 1991 to consult about the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation. He has published seven books translated into twenty-two languages on conflict resolution and management of change.

  • General Lee Butler Addresses The Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons

    “… nuclear weapons are the enemy of humanity. Indeed, they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.”

     

    “… today we find ourselves in the almost unbelievable circumstance in which United States nuclear weapons policy is still very much that of 1984, as introduced by Ronald Reagan. That our forces with their hair-trigger postures are effectively the same as they have been since the height of the Cold War.”

     

    Full text of speech:

     

    Let me begin by simply expressing my appreciation to those of you in the room who have labored in this vineyard for so many years, most I suspect, simply understanding intuitively what took years for those of us, presumably experts in this business, to appreciate.

     

    And that is, that at the heart of the matter, nuclear weapons are the enemy of humanity. Indeed, they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.

     

    So for those of you in the NGO community, I tell you right at the onset, that I personally take heed and encouragement from what you have done so assiduously all these years. I say in the same breath that for most of my life, certainly my years in uniform, I’d never heard of NGOs, and now I suppose I am one!

     

    I think in that regard that I would begin by recalling a comment from what I understand was a Reform Party member at the hearing yesterday, who observed at the outset of his comments (a bit acerbic I might add, but that’s okay, we tend to be a lightning rod for that kind of view): “Say, weren’t you and McNamara two of those folks who used to advocate all this business, deterrence, etc.?” I think Bob would join me in saying that we’re guilty as charged, if the charge is that we now consider it our responsibility to reflect, free from the emotional cauldron of the Cold War, and with greater access to the principals and the archives of that period. Guilty of the responsibility to reappraise our positions and certainly guilty of a keen sense of obligation to understand and to expound upon the lessons that we draw from that experience.

     

    I recall the words of a wonderful American novelist of the Deep South, Flannery O’Connor, who once put this delicious line in the mouth of one her characters. “You should know the truth and the truth shall make you odd.” And in deference to our interlocutor yesterday, yes it can certainly appear odd. I appreciate that and that is why I am infinitely patient with people who are either surprised, shocked, or in some cases outraged that someone like myself or perhaps like Bob McNamara now express views that in an earlier part of our life we might have seen as antithetical.

     

    But truth, in my own case, took me almost 40 years to grasp. What I now see as the truth of the nuclear era as I understand it in retrospect. It required 30 years simply to reach the point in my career where I had the responsibilities and most importantly, the access to information and the exposure to activities and operations that profoundly deepened my grasp of what this business of nuclear capability is all about.

     

    What I have come to believe is that much of what I took on faith was either wrong, enormously simplistic, extraordinarily fragile, or simply morally intolerable. What I have come to believe is that the amassing of nuclear capability to the level of such grotesque excess as we witnessed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the period of the 50 years of the Cold War, was as much a product of fear, and ignorance and greed, and ego and power, and turf and dollars, as it was about the seemingly elegant theories of deterrence.

     

    Let me just take a moment and give you some sense of what it means to be the Commander of Strategic Nuclear Forces, the land and sea-based missiles and aircraft that would deliver nuclear warheads over great distances. First, I had the responsibility for the day-to-day operation, discipline, training, of tens of thousands of crew members, the systems that they operated and the warheads those systems were designed to deliver. Some ten thousand strategic nuclear warheads. I came to appreciate in a way that I had never thought, even when I commanded individual units like B52 bombers, the enormity of the day-to-day risks that comes from multiple manipulations, maintenance and operational movement of those weapons. I read deeply into the history of the incidents and the accidents of the nuclear age as they had been recorded in the United States. I am only beginning to understand that history in the former Soviet Union, and it is more chilling than anything you can imagine. Much of that is not publicly known, although it is now publicly available.

     

    Missiles that blew up in their silos and ejected their nuclear warheads outside of the confines of the silo. B52 aircraft that collided with tankers and scattered nuclear weapons across the coast and into the offshore seas of Spain. A B52 bomber with nuclear weapons aboard that crashed in North Carolina, and on investigation it was discovered that one of those weapons, 6 of the 7 safety devices that prevent a nuclear explosion had failed as a result of the crash. There are dozens of such incidents. Nuclear missile-laden submarines that experienced catastrophic accidents and now lie at the bottom of the ocean.

     

    I was also a principal nuclear advisor to the President of the United States. What that required of me was to be prepared on a moment’s notice, day or night, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to be within three rings of my telephone and to respond to this question from the President:

     

    “General, the nation is under nuclear attack. I must decide in minutes how to respond. What is your recommendation with regard to the nature of our reply?”

     

    In the 36 months that I was a principal nuclear advisor to the President, I participated every month in an exercise known as a missile threat conference. Virtually without exception, that threat conference began with a scenario which encompassed one, then several, dozens, then hundreds and finally thousands of inbound thermonuclear warheads to the United States. By the time that attack was assessed, characterized and sufficient information available with some certainty in appreciation of the circumstance, at most he had 12 minutes to make that decision. 12 minutes. For a decision, which coupled with that of whatever person half a world away who may have initiated such an attack, held at risk not only the survival of the antagonists, but the fate of mankind in its entirety. The prospect of some 20,000 thermonuclear warheads being exploded within a period of several hours. Sad to say, the poised practitioners of the nuclear art never understood the holistic consequences of such an attack, nor do they today.

     

    I never appreciated that until I came to grips with my third responsibility, which was for the nuclear war plan of the United States.

     

    Even at the late date of January 1991, when the Cold War had already been declared over with the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in Paris in December of 1990, when I went downstairs on my first day in office to meet my war planners in the bowels of my headquarters. I finally for the first time in 30 years was allowed full access to the war plan. Even having some sense of what it encompassed, I was shocked to see that in fact it was defined by 12,500 targets in the former Warsaw Pact to be attacked by some 10,000 nuclear weapons, virtually simultaneously in the worst of circumstances, which is what we always assumed. I made it my business to examine in some detail every single one of those targets. I doubt that that had ever been done by anyone, because the war plan was divided up into sections and each section was the responsibility of some different group of people. My staff was aghast when I told them I intended to look at every single target individually. My rationale was very simple. If there had been only one target, surely I would have to know every conceivable detail about it, why it was selected, what kind of weapon would strike it, what the consequences would be. My point was simply this: Why should I feel in any way less responsible simply because there was a large number of targets. I wanted to look at every one.

     

    At the conclusion of that exercise I finally came to understand the true meaning of MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction. With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan, this was the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life. I was sufficiently outraged that as my examination proceeded, I alerted my superiors in Washington about my concerns, and the shortest version of all of that is, having come to the end of a three decade journey, I came to fully appreciate the truth that now makes me seem so odd. And that is: we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion.

     

    The saving grace was that truly the Cold War was ending at this very moment and therefore I was faced with a decision of great personal consequence. Now having fully to appreciate the magnitude of our nuclear capability and what it implied, when joined in an unholy alliance with its Soviet counterpart, what was I to do? Awaiting in my inbox were $40 billion of new strategic nuclear weapons modernization programs, wanting only my signature. What should be our goals for the next rounds of arms control negotiations? How hard should I fight to maintain the budget of strategic forces, to keep bases open in the face of base closure commissions? And what to do with the nuclear war plan in all of its excess? My conclusion was very simple, that I of all people had the responsibility to be at the forefront of the effort to begin to close the nuclear age. That mankind, having been spared a nuclear holocaust, had now as its principle priority to begin to walk back the nuclear cat, to learn the lessons of the nuclear dimensions of the Cold War, in the interest that others might never go down that path again.

     

    The substance is that I withdrew my support for every single one of those $40 billion of nuclear weapons programs and they were all cancelled. I urged the acceleration of the START I accords and that Minuteman 2 be taken out of the inventory at an accelerated pace. I recommended that for the first time in 30 years bombers be taken off alert. The President approved these recommendations and on the 25th of September 1991, I said in my command center and with my red telephone I gave the orders to my bomber troops to stand down from alert. I put 24 of my 36 bases on the closure list. I cut the number of targets in the nuclear war plan by 75%, and ultimately I recommended the disestablishment of Strategic Air Command, which the President also approved. I took down that flag on the first of June 1992.

     

    As you can imagine, I went into retirement exactly five years ago with a sense of profound relief and gratitude. Relief that the most acute dangers of the Cold War were coming to a close, and gratitude that I had been given the opportunity to play some small role in eliminating those dangers. You can also imagine, then, my growing dismay, alarm and finally horror that in a relatively brief period of time, this extraordinary momentum, this unprecedented opportunity began to slow, that a process I call the creeping re-rationalization of nuclear weapons began, that the bureaucracy began to work its way. The French resumed nuclear testing, the START 2 treaty was paralyzed in the US Senate for three years and now in the Duma for three more. The precious window of opportunity began to close, and now today we find ourselves in the almost unbelievable circumstance in which United States nuclear weapons policy is still very much that of 1984, as introduced by Ronald Reagan. That our forces with their hair-trigger postures are effectively the same as they have been since the height of the Cold War.

     

    Even if the START 2 treaty were ratified, it is virtually irrelevant, its numbers 3000 to 35000 works meaningless. The former Soviet Union, today Russia, a nation in a perilous state, can barely maintain a third of that number on operational ready status, and to do so devotes a precious fraction of shrinking resources. NATO has been expanded up to its former borders, and Moscow has been put on notice that the United States is presumably prepared to abrogate the ABM treaty in the interest of deploying limited national ballistic missile defense.

     

    What a stunning outcome. I would never have imagined this state of affairs five years ago. This is an indictment. The leaders of the nuclear weapons states today risk very much being judged by future historians as having been unworthy of their age, of not having taken advantage of opportunities so perilously won at such great sacrifice and cost of re-igniting nuclear arms races around the world, of condemning mankind to live under a cloud of perpetual anxiety.

     

    This is not a legacy worthy of the human race. This is not the world that I want to bequeath to my children and my grandchildren. It’s simply intolerable. This is above all a moral question and I want to reiterate to you and to those who may be watching these proceedings a quote that I gave yesterday to the joint committees. I took this quote to heart many years ago. It is from one of my heroes, one of my professional heroes – General Omar Bradley, who said on the occasion of his retirement, having been a principal in World War II and having witnessed the aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about living.” We have a priceless opportunity to elevate, to nudge higher, the bar of decent, civilized behavior, to expand the rule of law, and to learn to live on this planet with mutual respect and dignity. This is an opportunity we must not lose. My concern was such that I could not sit in silent acquiescence to the current folly. And so, I have come back into the arena to join my voices with yours, to serve in the company of distinguished colleagues like Bob McNamara and Ambassador Tom Graham who share these concerns and convictions.

     

    Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. Thank you for the work you have done over these many years. It is a privilege to have this opportunity to talk with you.

     

    Thank you.

     

    —speech given by General George Lee Butler in Montreal, March 11, 1999 to the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons