Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Category: International Issues

  • Putting the Chinese Slipper on the Other Foot

    Imagine this: A Chinese airplane is spying on the United States. In a routine flight, it flies just off the coast of Hawaii, using its sophisticated electronic surveillance capabilities to gather intelligence. Since it is a dangerous world, the Chinese want to know what plans our military is making that might affect them. Naturally, our government is somewhat uncomfortable knowing that we are being spied on like this. Why, we wonder, are the Chinese spying on us? What are their intentions?

    US planes regularly intercept Chinese reconnaissance planes, approaching within a safe distance. However, this time, one fighter pilot gets a little overzealous. There is a slight collision. Our plane goes down in the sea. Our pilot is lost at sea. The Chinese plane is damaged and makes an emergency landing on the island of Maui. There are 24 Chinese soldiers aboard the aircraft. They are taken into custody by our military. We also take possession of the Chinese aircraft.

    Our government isn’t too happy about this situation. Opinions are expressed such as: “The Chinese have a lot of audacity coming so close to our territory and spying on us.” Another opinion is: “It’s a damn shame that we lost one of our pilots in an action that never would have happened if the Chinese hadn’t been over here spying on us.” There is a lot of righteous indignation being expressed by top US officials about the Chinese bringing this on themselves by their own arrogance in seeking to spy on us in this manner. Still another opinion expressed is: “They landed on our territory, so we’ll just take our time and examine their plane to see what we can learn about their spying techniques.”

    As soon as the Chinese government learns that its airplane has landed on US territory, the Chinese president sends a message to the US president demanding to see its soldiers and to have its airplane back without any tampering with it. We interpret this as an even greater expression of arrogance on the part of the Chinese, and we respond with silence. In the meantime, we hold the Chinese soldiers in reasonably comfortable detention. We also take advantage of the presence of their aircraft to give it a thorough going over. Since this takes time, we remain silent to the Chinese demands. We decide to just let them cool their heels for awhile. When we do respond to the Chinese, we tell them that we want an apology for their spying on us and for the loss of our fighter pilot.

    The Chinese president, who is relatively new to his job and not too experienced in dealing with people from other countries, responds that he will not apologize. He doesn’t believe that there is anything for which to apologize. He also believes that he will lose face before his people if he does apologize. He thinks an apology will be taken as a sign of weakness. Instead of apologizing, he repeats his demands for the immediate return of the Chinese soldiers and aircraft – and he adds a new demand, that the Americans should stop their spying activities. We can only wonder why the Chinese president refuses to apologize for something that is so clearly poor judgment on the part of the Chinese. His refusal to apologize appears to be additional poor judgment on his part.

    The Chinese president believes he has every right to have his soldiers returned immediately and he takes great offense that the Americans are dragging their feet on returning the aircraft. He dismisses the concerns that we have raised over their spying on us. “Everyone spies,” he thinks. “You spy. We spy. So what is the big deal?” But he also knows deeper down that China bears some responsibility, and that their soldiers and airplane are in US custody. The Chinese president contemplates what threats he can bring to bear on the Americans to get his soldiers and aircraft returned. He is determined to appear strong and not to compromise.

    We Americans, though, are not too worried about any bluster coming from this novice Chinese leader. We know that he does not have a high level of support among the Chinese people. Perhaps showing the Chinese people that he is not as powerful as he might appear to be is not such a bad strategy for us.

    Of course, our position appears sensible. And the Chinese position is arrogant and unapologetic. The next thing we can expect are stronger threats coming from the Chinese leadership, in an effort to assume the moral high ground, even though it was their action that initiated this string of events.

    When our government has discovered everything it wants to know about the Chinese aircraft, we’ll give them back their plane and soldiers. But a reasonable guess is that we will have made an enemy of the Chinese leader.

    It is a dangerous world. Incidents like this can arise without warning at any time. Without restraint on all sides, such incidents can escalate to war. We should never forget that a Chinese leader or any leader armed with nuclear weapons poses a terrible danger not only to us but to the entire world.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Preserving the ABM Treaty and Promoting International Security

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    It gives me great pleasure to attend this conference in the beautiful city of Ottawa, to exchange views with our Canadian friends on some important issues related to international security and arms control. To my knowledge, this is one of a series of seminars on National Missile Defense (NMD) Canada has organized in recent months. I hope, and I am convinced, that these open discussions will help deepen people’s understanding on this issue. Now, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my personal observations.

    I. Negative Consequences of NMD for International Peace and Security

    The relentless development of an NMD system by the United States is, undoubtedly, a major event in today’s international politics, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on international security environment. Recently, some key members of the Bush administration have reiterated on different occasions that they will, as promised during the election campaign, intensify this program. This is very disturbing.

    Firstly, the development and deployment of NMD by the United States will jeopardize global strategic balance and stability, and undermine mutual trust and cooperation among major powers. To develop and deploy NMD, the United States has to first overcome a legal “barrier”, namely, the ABM treaty concluded between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in 1972, which explicitly prohibits the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system. For the past decades, this treaty has served as a corner stone of global strategic balance and stability. The compliance of this treaty has been the prerequisite for the strategic nuclear weapons reductions as claimed by the two nuclear superpowers. During the Cold War, it played a pivotal role in preventing the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union from getting out of control. As a matter of fact, in the post-Cold War era today, the treaty still provides a security framework for multilateral nuclear disarmament, and for further bilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia. Though bilateral in nature, the strategic significance of the treaty goes far beyond the scope of the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. It has been universally recognized as playing an indispensable role in maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security. If, however, the treaty is amended, as requested by the U.S., it would certainly lose all its significance, and the global strategic balance and stability would be the victim.

    Over the years, the international situation has undergone drastic changes, but the basic international strategic configuration has remained relatively unchanged in one important aspect, i.e. the strategic balance and mutual deterrence between major powers. This is due, in no small measure, to the existence of the ABM treaty. It must be pointed out that “strategic balance” and “strategic parity” are two different concepts. A strategic balance can exist between a small nuclear-weapon state and a nuclear superpower, so long as the former possesses a second strike capability, that is, the capability to inflict unbearable damage on the latter after sustaining the first nuclear attack. The significance of the ABM treaty lies in the fact that, by prohibiting the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system, it has maintained the strategic balance between the two nuclear superpowers, by extension, has maintained to a lesser degree the strategic balance among all the nuclear-weapon states, including small nuclear powers vis-a-vis the nuclear superpowers. No matter the U.S. like it or not, the fact is that, it is precisely because of this global strategic balance that the major powers have felt compelled to address global and regional security issues through peaceful means and avoid direct confrontation with each other. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the preservation of the global strategic balance is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.S. development and possible deployment of NMD poses a serious challenge to the already fragile global strategic balance. Such a move will disrupt the existing strategic equilibrium among major powers, and jeopardize the security interest of other countries. This will undoubtedly arouse suspicion and mistrust among major powers, hampering their coordination and cooperation in international security affairs.

    Secondly, the U.S. NMD program will severely hinder the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race. The balance of power among major countries, and the global strategic balance based thereon, constitutes the prerequisite for progress in the international arms control and disarmament process. Once this strategic equilibrium is disrupted, the arms control and disarmament process will inevitably become stagnated and even reversed. If the ABM treaty is amended as insisted by the U.S. and the deployment of NMD legitimated, the basis of global strategic stability will be removed. This will bring about fundamental changes to the international security environment. Against this background, who can be sure the existing arms control treaties will continue to be complied with? And who can guarantee that the new arms control negotiations will go smoothly?

    The reductions of their nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia through bilateral agreements and/or unilateral initiatives are welcome and should be encouraged. However, we should also recognize that reduction of surplus nuclear weapons with “overkill” capabilities, is little more than the rationalization of their nuclear force structure, and is a far cry from nuclear disarmament in its real sense. As the only superpower, the U.S. already possesses the strongest military force and most advanced nuclear arsenal, and pursues a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. On top of all this, this country is trying to break the taboo that has been maintained for the last 30 years in the strategic field by building a nationwide missile defense system. In this sense, NMD will become a multiplier of the U.S. strategic offensive force. And the NMD program is in essence an U.S. program of unilateral nuclear expansion, which contains the inherent danger of triggering an arms race at a higher level. In specific terms, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons. It is true that, at current stage, the U.S. enjoys military and technological superiority, and other countries are not in a position to compete with it. From a long-term perspective, however, it will be unrealistic to expect other countries sit on their hands while the U.S. develops NMD. They will certainly take all sorts of counter measures to safeguard their national security.

    Thirdly, the U.S. NMD program will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and efforts. The U.S. claims that its development of missile defense systems is intended to counter the increasing threats posed by missile proliferation. I for one, and I don’t think I am alone here, do not share the U.S. assessment of the missile threats it is faced with. To say the least, the U.S. has over-exaggerated the missile threats from so-called “countries of concern”. Judging from their economic and technological strength, it is difficult to conclude that these countries will be able to develop, much less to deploy, missiles capable of reaching the U.S. territory in the foreseeable future. Even if, a very big “if”, these countries were capable of acquiring such capabilities, they would certainly not lose sight of the massive retaliatory capabilities from the U.S., both nuclear and conventional, not to mention the inevitable strong reactions from the international community. With all this and the fact that chemical and biological weapons have been banned by international treaties, and moreover, the NPT has been extended indefinitely, there is virtually no possibility that these countries may launch a first strikes against the U.S. In addition, the U.S. relations with these countries are not immutable. We all know that, the missile threat that the U.S. was faced with during the Cold War was many times greater than that today. If the U.S. did not find it necessary to amend and scrap the ABM treaty, there is, in my view, certainly less reason to do so today. Even if we conclude there is a danger of missile proliferation, NMD is not a solution to this problem. On the contrary, it can only aggravate it. Now, an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has by and large been established and proven. With regard to the prevention of missile proliferation, MTCR has played a certain role. With MTCR and a series of other initiatives and proposals in this field, one may say that this issue has been half-resolved. If major powers can work together, and in collaboration with the whole international community, the issue of missile proliferation can be resolved, step by step, through political and diplomatic means. The development of NMD is tantamount to “drinking poison to quench thirst”. It cannot solve the problem. Instead, it will undercut the very foundation of the international non-proliferation regime, and even stimulate further proliferation of missile.

    Fourthly, the development and deployment of NMD by the U.S. will increase the weight of the military factor in international relation in detriment to international peace and security. In essence, the international debate on the NMD issue is about what kind of international order should be established, and a choice between unipolar and multipolar world. This is also a debate between two security concepts: seeking one’s own absolute security at the expense of others’ security, or seeking universal security based on international cooperation. In fact, more and more people in the world have come to realize that, the real motive behind the U.S. NMD program is to seek its own absolute military superiority and absolute security. Once NMD is deployed, no matter whether it is really effective or not, it would further strengthen the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism and the tendency to use or threaten to use force. People can imagine, after the deployment of NMD, the U.S. would not sit idly in this impregnable “Fortress America”, enjoying the clear and peaceful sky above. Its omnipresent “national interests” and its zealous “sense of mission”, will drive this NMD-shielded superpower, to embark on a crusade to seek and strike at “countries of concern” all around the world with even higher enthusiasm and adventurism. This will create more instability in the world.

    History has shown that security is both mutual and relative. Real security can only be achieved if a country builds its own security on the basis of common security for all. It is a truly effective way to seek security within a framework of collective security through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality. Any attempt to build its own security to the detriment of the security of others, will only undermine global strategic balance and stability, thus resulting in the loss of sense of security for all. In a world where all countries feel insecure, they would seek every means to protect themselves. As a result, military factor will play a bigger role in international relations, and huge amount of financial resources and materials that would otherwise be devoted to economic development will be diverted to arms buildup. Under such circumstances, how can a country truly enjoy real security? How can the world remain stable? As a matter of fact, today and in the foreseeable future, the U.S. has and will continue to enjoy more security than any other countries.

    II. NMD is not conductive to peace and security in Asia and the Pacific

    Both Canada and China are located in the Pacific region, and thus are naturally more concerned about the security situation in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the situation of the region on the whole has been moving towards relaxation. Most countries in the region take the development of national economy and the improvement of living standard of people as their priority task. To that end, they have made great efforts in building a peaceful and stable regional environment. Thanks to joint efforts of countries concerted, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the “Shanghai Five” and other mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation on regional security are in the steady process of development. They have played an active role in promoting mutual understanding and trust among countries concerned and in safeguarding regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, bilateral exchanges and consultations between countries of the region have also gradually increased. It has become the main trend of the region to strengthen dialogue, promote understanding, build mutual trust, and resolve issues through bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation. In particular, with the relaxation of tension in the Korean Peninsula, the situation in this region is further evolving toward peace.

    At the same time, however, factors detrimental to peace and development in Asia and the Pacific still exist. As an important component of global security structure, security in this region is closely related to the overall international security situation. The implementation of NMD program by the U.S. will not only undermine global strategic balance and stability, but also disrupt efforts for security in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the U.S. also intends to deploy Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in the region. Research and development of TMD per se may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. But, the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of TMD that the U.S. is prepared to deploy in Asia. If this TMD can be used as part of NMD and constitute the front deployment of NMD in the region, then its adverse impact on regional security and stability will be no less than the NMD itself.

    It is obvious that countries in Asia and the Pacific have many common or similar views on the issue of missile defense and have much at stake. It is the aspiration of most countries in the region that global and regional strategic balance and stability should be maintained; that mutual trust and cooperation among major powers will be enhanced; that common security for all countries will be ensured; that individual country should not seek absolute security for itself at the expense of others; that existing arms control achievements will be consolidated and cooperation in this area will be strengthened; that the U.S.-Russia bilateral nuclear disarmament process will not be reversed; that non-proliferation issue will be resolved through political and diplomatic means; and that the tendency towards unilateralism in international relations should be held at bay.

    III. China’s position on Missile Defense

    China needs peace and is eager to see the maintenance of global and regional peace and security. For that reason, China is firmly opposed to the proposed NMD

    What I want to emphasize here is that China does not want to see a confrontation between China and U.S. on the NMD issue nor an arms race between two countries. We oppose the NMD because we hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. This does not in any way imply that we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, China should have the necessary and sufficient means of self-defense, so that we will not be bullied and blackmailed by any other countries again. China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects China’s national security.

    Since the 1960’s, China has been forced to develop its own limited nuclear force due to the repeated nuclear blackmails it has encountered. During the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively threatened for several times to strike China with nuclear weapons. To survive, China had no other choice. Because China developed its own nuclear weapons against such a special historical backdrop, China has never intended to threaten other countries with nuclear weapons. For that reason, on the very first day when China came into possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly declared that under no circumstance would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. As is known to all, though China’s nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, consistently developed good relationship with its neighbors and followed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling its relations with other nations. History has demonstrated that China’s possession of nuclear weapons has not changed its peaceful foreign policy.

    In the past two years, the UN General Assembly has twice adopted the resolution on “Preservation of and Compliance with the ABM Treaty” with an overwhelming majority. This fully demonstrates the international community’s political will against the deployment of NMD and the amendment of the ABM treaty. It is particularly regrettable that, despite the widespread international and domestic opposition, the new U.S. administration would still stick to the NMD program. We sincerely hope that the U.S. government could heed the appeal of the international community, abandon the NMD program, return to the framework of collective security and join the international efforts to maintain the global strategic balance and stability as well as the system of international arms control treaties.

    Thank you.

    *Sha Zukang is Director-General of the Department of Arms Control & Disarmament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

  • The Case for De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons

    “…the United States should work with other nuclear weapons nations to remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status- another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation- to reduce the risks the of accidental or unauthorized launch.”

    -Republican Platform 2000

    Although the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, estimates of the global nuclear stockpile range from a low of 24,700 to 33,307 suspected nuclear weapons. Nearly five thousand nuclear weapons in the US and Russian arsenals remain on high-alert, ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Although the US and Russia have announced their formal “de-targeting” of one another, the agreement is meaningless as both countries maintain their weapons on “hair-trigger” alert and in “launch-on” warning posture. Also, the US Department of Defense stated in its “Annual Defense Report 2001” that although missiles on “hair-trigger” alert “are not targeted against any specific country,” these missiles “can be assigned targets on short notice.”

    Contrary to conventional thought, keeping nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert does not enforce the security of any nation. In fact, it actually has the adverse effect in that it makes every individual and nation less secure. The Canberra Commission concluded in its 1996 report that taking nuclear weapons off alert is an immediate action and practical step to reduce the risk of nuclear war and enhance the security of all states. The Canberra Commission also recommended de-alerting as a way to develop strategic stability and build trust between the US and Russia. De-alerting was also incorporated into the 1998, 1999 and 2000 text of the New Agenda Resolution passed in the UN General Assembly. In addition it has been the subject of two resolutions passed by the Australian Senate on 12 August and 20 September 1999.

    One of Russia’s greatest fears is the US nuclear submarines which house Trident missiles, capable of reaching Russia’s mainland in 10 minutes. On January 25, 1995 a Russian radar crew spotted a fast-moving object they couldn’t identify above the Barents Sea at Russia’s northern border. Suddenly, the missile separated into several parts, much like a Trident missile would do, and the Russian crew watching the radar immediately signaled the nuclear briefcases carried by then President, Boris Yeltsin and top defense officials.

    Orders were immediately issued to the Russian Strategic Forces to prepare for a missile launch order. For four minutes, Russian commanders stood by, ready to launch at command. Russian policy permits Strategic Forces to launch retaliatory missiles before enemy missiles hit Russian territory. Just eight minutes after the first warning was sent, the mysterious object disappeared into the sea and a retaliatory nuclear strike was averted. Later, Russians learned that the object was a scientific rocket launched from Norway to study the Northern lights. Although the Russian government was notified prior to the launch, no one passed on the information to the radar crew. The possibility of an accidental launch, such as this one, still exists today, even though the Cold War ended more than ten years ago.

    Miscommunication, volatile relations, mistrust, and computer and human errors could easily cause the US and Russia to fire by accident or miscalculation at each other. Of equal concern is the deterioration of the Russian nuclear arsenal. Due to a lack of financial resources, it has become increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain its arsenal. At any given time, only two of Russia’s nuclear submarines are at sea on patrol. Additionally, five of the eight radar stations which formed the Soviet system are outside of Russia.

    The US and Russia have come to the “brink” of launching their nuclear weapons on several occasions because of miscommunication, misunderstanding or poor data. Removing nuclear weapons from high-alert status would eliminate the risk of a global nuclear catastrophe caused by a hasty reaction from any nuclear weapons state.

  • An Alternate Approach to US and Global Security

    Missile Defense Aimed at Potential Threats

    The stated security concerns underlying current US interests in developing and deploying a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system focus on a small number of states with future potential to launch ballistic missile attacks against the US. These states (North Korea, Iran and Iraq) are described by the US as “states of concern” (formerly “rogue states”). The Rumsfeld Commission unanimously concluded in 1998: “Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.”

    The US claims to restrict its targets of missile defense to these states of concern, and has stated that its missile defense efforts are not meant to prevent missile attacks by Russia or China. These assurances have not been convincing to either Russia or China, and both countries have expressed strong concerns about US BMD plans. The US has focused its concerns on relatively weak states that currently present no ballistic missile threat to the US but may in the future. By moving forward with a missile defense system to protect against these states, the US is antagonizing much more powerful potential adversaries. US leaders have even expressed a willingness to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, a treaty widely considered to be a foundation of strategic stability in allowing the possibility of continued major reductions in nuclear armaments.

    Categories of Deterrence

    The US plan to proceed with a BMD system is an admission that deterrence cannot be trusted for security. The US is in effect stating that deterrence is insufficient to assure security – at least against these states of concern. The US is, therefore, creating deterrence categories. One category includes states that the US believes can be deterred by nuclear threat (Russia and China), and one category that the US believes cannot be deterred by such means (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). This categorization of deterrence into those who might or might not be deterred should raise fundamental questions about the value and reliability of all deterrence.

    The US plan to build a BMD system may be viewed as a secondary line of defense. If deterrence fails (but only against a small power), the US would be prepared to shoot down the attacking missiles. This would offer the US the benefit of greater degrees of freedom in its relations with the potentially offending states. If, for example, North Korea had ballistic missiles capable of threatening US territory, troops or allies, the US might be reluctant to initiate an attack against North Korea for fear of retaliation. This threat of retaliation by a smaller power would be nullified, or at least perceived to be nullified, by a BMD system. Thus, the deployment of a BMD system would provide the US with a wider range of options in dealing with a smaller hostile nation armed with a small number of ballistic missiles.

    Problems with BMD Deployment

    There are many problems related to the deployment of a US BMD system. These include:

    • it will be plagued with uncertainties as to its reliability;
    • it will undermine arms control in general and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in particular;
    • it will in all likelihood stimulate new nuclear arms races with Russia and China by undermining their deterrence capabilities;
    • it will not prevent the possibility of hostile countries delivering weapons of mass destruction by means other than ballistic missiles;
    • it will be divisive among US allies;
    • it will be a major diversion of monetary and scientific resources from other security and social priorities; and
    • it will undermine adherence to the promises made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    Alternative Means of Dealing with Security Risks

    Realistic and credible means of dealing with the security risks posed by North Korea, Iran, Iraq and other potentially hostile nations include:

    1. US leadership in developing an effective ballistic missile control regime to prevent the spread of this technology. This would require concessions by the nuclear weapons states to the phased dismantlement of their current arsenals of ballistic missiles.

    2. Cooperative agreements between the US and the states of concern. Negotiations have already had positive results in the relationship between the US and North Korea. Negotiations with the other states of concern can begin by simply opening discussions on problem areas. Mediation by neutral states or by the UN may be needed.

    3. The US and other nuclear weapons states must take steps to diminish the political importance of their nuclear arsenals. Such steps should include de-alerting all nuclear weapons, adopting clear policies of No First Use of these weapons, withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, and the opening of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

    US plans to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense system are rooted in fear. It is worth noting that the US, the most militarily and economically powerful nation on Earth, fears from far smaller nations what it itself threatens to do to others. If the US would make a firm commitment to leadership in a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, it could forego the limited system of ballistic missile defense that it has been pursuing. This course of action would also have risks, but on balance it would be a more meaningful and decent course of action, one that could inspire its own people and people everywhere and one that could free up important resources to build a more solid future for all humanity.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Mr. Bush, The World Doesn’t Want to be American

    MOSCOW -Dear Mr. Bush:

    I am writing to you as a citizen of our planet and someone who beholds the last remaining superpower. Can there be any doubt that the United States plays a major role in guiding our world? Only a fool could disregard that fact. To acknowledge this is a given, even though American spokesmen are perhaps somewhat overly inclined to press the point home to the rest of the world.

    For while America’s role is acknowledged throughout the world, her claim to hegemony, not to say domination, is not similarly recognized. For this reason, I hope, Mr. Bush, as the new American president, that you will give up any illusion that the 21st century can, or even should, be the “American Century.” Globalization is a given – but “American globalization” would be a mistake. In fact, it would be something devoid of meaning and even dangerous.

    I would go even further and say it is time for America’s electorate to be told the blunt truth: that the present situation of the United States, with a part of its population able to enjoy a life of extraordinary comfort and privilege, is not tenable as long as an enormous portion of the world lives in abject poverty, degradation and backwardness.

    For 10 years, U.S. foreign policy has been formulated as if it were the policy of a victor in war, the Cold War. But at the highest reaches of U.S. policy-making no one has grasped the fact that this could not be the basis for formulating post-Cold War policy.

    In fact, there has been no “pacification.” On the contrary, there has been a heightening of inequalities, tension and hostility, with most of the last directed toward the United States.

    Instead of seeing an increase in U.S. security, the end of the Cold War has seen a decline. It is not hard to imagine that, should the United States persist in its policies, the international situation will continue to deteriorate.

    It is also difficult to believe that, under present circumstances, relations between the United States, on the one hand, and China, India and all the rest of the earth that lives in abject poverty, on the other, could develop in a positive direction. Nor is it possible, on the basis of its present posture, for the United States to establish effective, long-term cooperation with its traditional allies, Europe first and foremost.

    Already we see numerous trade disputes, evidence of the conflicting interests separating the United States and the European Union. At the recent conference in The Hague, where the participants were supposed to come up with a common policy on limiting greenhouse effects, U.S. positions were far removed from those of all others. As a result, no decision was taken. This is clearly an example of a failure of “world governance.”

    From the standpoint of the Old World, the post-Cold War period ushered in hopes that now are faded. Over the past decade, the United States has continued to operate along an ideological track identical to the one it followed during the Cold War.

    Need an example? The expansion of NATO eastward, the handling of the Yugoslav crisis, the theory and practice of U.S. rearmament – including the utterly extravagant national missile defense system, which, in turn, is based on the bizarre notion of “rogue states.”

    Isn’t it amazing that disarmament moved further during the last phase of the Cold War than during the period after its end? And isn’t that because U.S. leadership has been unable to adjust to the new European reality? Europe is now a new, independent and powerful player on the world scene. To continue to regard it as a junior partner would be a mistake.

    Europe’s experience must serve as a lesson for future relations, but it can do so only if America and Europe build a genuine, equal partnership.

    Finally, it is hardly a secret that relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated over recent years. Responsibility for this must be shared between Russia and America. The present leadership of Russia appears ready to cooperate with the United States in framing a new agenda for relations. But it is unclear what your orientation will be.

    What we heard during the electoral campaign did not sound encouraging. If we truly want to build a new world order and further European unity, we have to recognize that this will not be possible without an active role for Russia. This recognition is the necessary basis for setting future Russian-American relations on the right path.

    The world is complicated, it contains and expresses a variety of interests and cultures. Sooner or later, international policy, including that of the United States, will have to come to terms with that variety. ‘

    *Mikhail Gorbachev was the last president of the former Soviet Union.

  • Statement by the President on Signing the International Criminal Court Treaty

    The United States is today signing the 1998 Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court.In taking this action, we join more than 130 other countries that have signed by the December 31, 2000 deadline established in the Treaty. We do so to reaffirm our strong support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. We do so as well because we wish to remain engaged in making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come.

    The United States has a long history of commitment to the principle of accountability, from our involvement in the Nuremberg tribunals that brought Nazi war criminals to justice, to our leadership in the effort to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the FormerYugoslavia and Rwanda. Our action today sustains that tradition of moral leadership.

    Under the Rome Treaty, the International Criminal Court (ICC) will come into being with the ratification of 60 governments, and will have jurisdiction over the most heinous abuses that result from international conflict, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Treaty requires that the ICC not supercede or interfere with functioning national judicial systems; that is, the ICC Prosecutor is authorized to take action against a suspect only if the country of nationality is unwilling or unable to investigate allegations of egregious crimes by their national. The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference worked hard to achieve these limitations, which we believe are essential to the international credibility and success of the ICC.

    In signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty. In particular, we are concerned that when the Court comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority over personnel of states that have ratified the Treaty, but also claim jurisdiction over personnel of states that have not. With signature, however, we will be in a position to influence the evolution of the Court. Without signature, we will not.

    Signature will enhance our ability to further protect U.S. officials from unfounded charges and to achieve the human rights and accountability objectives of the ICC. In fact, in negotiations following the Rome Conference, we have worked effectively to develop procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized prosecutions. For example, U.S. civilian and military negotiators helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.

    But more must be done. Court jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come only with U.S. ratification of the Treaty. The United States should have the chance to observe and assess the functioning of the Court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its jurisdiction. Given these concerns, I will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.

    Nonetheless, signature is the right action to take at this point. I believe that a properly constituted and structured International Criminal Court would make a profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide, and that signature increases the chances for productive discussions with other governments to advance these goals in the months and years ahead.

  • National Missile Defense: Just Say No!

    Ballistic missile defense sounds on the surface like a good idea. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if we could just make those nasty nuclear weapons harmless? That is, their nuclear weapons, not ours. We don’t worry much about the threat posed by our own nuclear weapons, but these, of course, are not aimed at us. They are aimed at others or, more accurately, they are presently aimed at the oceans if we are to believe Mr. Clinton. They can, however, be reprogrammed to strike anywhere on only a moment’s notice.

    Our nuclear weapons still pose a security problem to us because relying on nuclear weapons for security means that there will be other countries that will do so as well, and the result will be that we are targeted by their nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense, if we are to believe its proponents, offers a technological solution to this dilemma. It is, however, an unproven and unprovable solution and comes at a high price, both monetarily and in terms of security.

    Ballistic missile defense was pushed by the Reagan administration. In that early incarnation it was derided “Star Wars.” Since then, it has gone through many more incarnations, the latest of which is a land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system that is intended to defend against an attack by relatively small and technologically unsophisticated countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya. None of these countries, however, currently has ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. No matter, we are told by proponents of NMD; it is better to be prepared for any eventuality.

    Despite repeated assurances from our government that an NMD would not be designed to protect the US against a Russian attack, the Russians are not convinced. From their perspective, an NMD would undermine their deterrence capability. Even though the NMD would have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles and the Russians would have more missiles than this aimed at the US, the Russians are concerned on two grounds. First, it would create the possibility that the US could initiate a first-strike nuclear attack against Russia and use the NMD simply to deal with the presumably small remaining number of Russian missiles that survived the attack. This scenario may sound far-fetched to us since we don’t envision ever doing such a thing. The Russians, however, cannot dismiss this scenario since they, like us, base their nuclear strategy on just such worst-case scenarios. The second reason for Russian concern about US deployment of a NMD system is that, although initially the system might have only 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, more could be added later.

    The Russians have made it clear that if the US goes forward in deploying an NMD system this could spell the end of arms control with the Russians. Implementation of an NMD system would require the US to abrogate or violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was entered into between the US and Russia in 1972. The purpose of the treaty was to prevent a defensive arms race that could lead to a renewed offensive nuclear arms race. The ABM Treaty has been at the heart of arms control efforts between the two countries for most of the past three decades. If the treaty fails due to US plans to deploy NMD, the Russians have said that they will withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), will pull out of the START II agreements, in which the two countries have agreed to lower the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads on each side to 3,000 to 3,500, and will refuse to negotiate further nuclear reductions under proposed START III agreements.

    Under proposed START III agreements, the Russians have put forward a proposal for further reducing nuclear arsenals to 1,500 or less on each side. Thus far, the US has responded by saying that it is only willing to go down to 2,500 to 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

    The stakes of NMD deployment in our relationship with Russia are very high. They are no less so in our relations with China. Currently China has some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If the US deploys an NMD with 100 to 200 interceptor missiles, the Chinese have indicated that they will proceed with building and deploying more nuclear-armed missiles capable of overcoming this system and reaching the United States.

    You might ask: why would Russia or China take these steps since it is highly likely that a US NMD system would be ineffective? The answer is that the Russian and Chinese planners must plan for the system to work as the US plans it to work; to do less would be viewed by their security establishments as being irresponsible. Thus, whether or not a US NMD system works, it would be viewed by Russia and China as provocative and would most likely lead to new arms races.

    The arms races would not be limited to the three countries in question. If China increases its strategic nuclear arsenal, India (which views China as a potential threat) would probably follow suit. If India increases its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan would certainly follow suit. There has also been talk of Theater Missile Defense in North Asia, which could have similar effects throughout Asia, and of deploying a Theater Missile Defense in the Middle East, which would underline the nuclear imbalance in the region.

    Will the deployment of an NMD system make the US more secure? It is doubtful. Because of the geopolitical implications described above, it will probably make the US less secure. If this is true, why is there such a strong push within the US government to deploy an NMD system? Why did the Congress vote overwhelmingly to deploy such a system “as soon as technologically feasible”? I think there are two reasons. First, a NMD system plays well in Peoria. It gives the impression of improving security even if it does just the opposite. Second, it provides a welfare program for the military-industrial complex in the aftermath of the Cold War. It provides a way of transferring substantial funding (ranging from $60 to $120 billion or even higher) from the American taxpayer to the defense industry. This is a cynical way for politicians to fulfill their obligations under the Constitution to provide for the common security of the American people.

    But could the system actually work? Anything is possible theoretically, but it is highly unlikely. Up to the present, tests of defensive missiles have failed to consistently and reliably shoot down incoming missiles, even when there is only one missile to destroy and it is known when and from where the missile will be launched. Many experts have argued that it will be far easier for offensive missile attacks to overcome defensive systems by using decoys to trick the defensive missiles.

    Rather than pursuing the delusion of missile defense, US officials would be better off pursuing another course of action. First, they could seek to develop policies that would make friends of potential enemies. There seems to be some progress on this front in relation to US-North Korean relations. Second, and most important, the US should take a leadership role in fulfilling its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal and that all nuclear weapons states are obligated to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects.”

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, promises were made to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses, either nationally or regionally, are at odds with these promises. Also, at this Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states promised an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This is where the US, as the world’s economically and militarily most powerful country, must now provide needed leadership. Plans to deploy a US National Missile Defense will undermine this possibility. The results could be disastrous not only for US security but also for our credibility in the world.

    The articles that follow provide international perspectives on US plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. They reinforce each other in the view that this would be a dangerous and foolhardy path for the United States to pursue.

     

  • We Could Learn from the Skeptics

    In a New York Times editorial on December 19, 2000, “Prelude to a Missile Defense,” they rightly point out that “no workable shield now exists” and that the diplomatic and financial costs are too high to begin construction of even a limited system “until the technology is perfected.”

    It is a great leap of faith to believe that this technology will ever be perfected. Experts repeatedly have warned us that even a moderately effective offense that includes decoys will always be able to overcome the type of defensive system we are capable of deploying.

    However, even if we were able to create a foolproof missile defense against Iraq, Iran and North Korea, we would still be at risk from nuclear weapons delivered by terrorist groups or nations by other means than missiles, such as by weapons carried into US harbors on boats. The geo-political damage that deployment of a National Missile Defense would do in our relations with Russia and China would also undermine any advantages such a system might provide.

    The editorial suggests that “Mr. Bush’s new foreign policy team should try to persuade skeptical countries that a limited defensive system can be built without wrecking existing arms control treaties or setting off a destructive new arms race.” To succeed in this persuasion, Mr. Bush’s new team will need either superhuman powers or excessive and dangerous arm twisting skills.

    They would be far wiser to listen carefully to the reasons why many of our closest allies, as well as Russia and China, are skeptical about our missile defense plans. By trying to understand rather than convert the skeptics, the Bush foreign policy team might learn that deploying a costly and unreliable Ballistic Missile Defense would create greater problems than it would solve.

    The new administration might more fruitfully concentrate its efforts on providing leadership in fulfilling the promises made by the nuclear weapons states at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for an “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. Such leadership would be a true gift to humanity. It would also do far more to assure American and global security in the 21st century.

  • Letter to President Clinton from Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor Ben Ferencz

    President William Jefferson Clinton
    The White House, Pennsylvania Ave.
    Washington D.C. 20500

    December 6, 2000

    Dear Mr. President:

    Over 53 years ago, I was the Chief Prosecutor in a trial brought by the United States in Nuremberg against 22 SS leaders who were convicted of murdering over a million people in cold blood. I fought in every campaign in Europe in World War II and gathered evidence in Nazi death camps. Since then, my life has been dedicated to making this a more humane and peaceful world. On this, “Veteran’s Day” I appeal to you as President and Commander-in-Chief, to exercise your constitutional authority by signing the Rome Treaty for the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC).

    I recall how thousands cheered at the Dodd Center in Connecticut in 1995, when you said: “Nuremberg was a crucial first step… Now it falls to our generation to make good on its promise..we have to do it,… we must do it…We have an obligation to carry forward the lessons of Nuremberg. ” When you addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on Sept.22, 1997, you told the world:…: “before the century ends, we should establish a permanent international court to prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian law.”

    After you sign the treaty, it will be up to your successor to determine whether further measures may be warranted before submission of the treaty to the Senate for its consent before it can be ratified. There will be ample time to debate the details. Your signing now will be an important affirmation that you have not abandoned principles you have so eloquently enunciated. It will help allay fears of small States that feel threatened by misguided Congressional proposals to impose sanctions against any nation that dares to support the ICC. It will uphold the integrity and reputation of our government as a leading champion of the rule of law.

    I am mindful and respectful of objections raised by some members of Congress and the Pentagon. As a 1943 Harvard law graduate and author of countless books and articles on this subject (See my web-site,) it is my considered judgment that such fears are exaggerated and misplaced. The treaty has been found acceptable by many of our staunchest allies. A comprehensive American Academy of Arts and Sciences study, including leading U.S. military and academic experts, concluded that failure to sign now “will miss an opportunity of serious dimensions. And the loss will have an impact on U.S. national interests far beyond the work of prosecuting war crimes.” With every good wish,

    Sincerely,
    Benjamin Ferencz

  • A Proposal for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons

    It is conceded by all hands that we stand at some continuing risk of nuclear war. The risk is possibly not imminent, but it is basically important above all else — for survival. The Defense and Energy Departments together have made promising starts to reduce possession of nuclear weapons, but far more and much faster action is needed.

    Credible report has it that weapons are adrift, potentially available to irresponsible regimes and to terrorists. Independent development by them is not needed to establish threat. The peculiar characteristic of nuclear weaponry is that relative numbers between adversaries mean little. When a target country can be destroyed by a dozen weapons, its own possession of thousands of weapons gains no security. Defense against ballistic missiles is infeasible. What is more, it is irrelevant. Half a dozen non-technical means of delivery are available, in addition to cruise missiles and aircraft.

    The recognized and awful dangers of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological, do not compare to nuclear, despite their vileness. On the tremendous and incredible scale of killing, the others are retail as compared to the nuclear’s wholesale; but there need not be competition since all can be — must be — addressed concurrently.

    Drafting a successor to the nuclear arms treaty is purportedly underway. If START III repeats the mistakes of the past, it may well bog down into haggling over relative numbers. More productive can be a process continuing toward total nuclear disarmament, the only way in which both we and the world may be truly secure from nuclear destruction.

    An irony is that in developing and using nuclear weapons, we, the United States, have done the only thing capable of threatening our own national security. We have comparatively weak and friendly neighbors to the north and south, control of the seas, and a powerful air and combat-tested armed forces. We are proof that this in no way diminishes the need, as the world’s single greatest power, for Army, Navy, Air, and Marines capable not only of our own defense, but of intervention abroad in the interest of peace and human rights. These forces do not come into being overnight, but need to be continually developed and supported. The argument for a nuclear component is no longer valid. The time is now for a concrete proposal that meets the problem. Process, as opposed to negotiating numbers, is the basic principle of the proposal that I suggest. It is nothing less than drastic: the continuing reduction to zero of weapons in the hands of avowed nuclear powers, plus an end to the nuclear ambitions of others.

    The proposal: Let weapons be delivered to a single point, there to be dismantled, the nuclear material returned to the donors for use or disposal, and the weapons destroyed. This process, once underway, will be nearly impossible to stop, since its obvious merits, political and substantive, will compel support. The “single point” may well be a floating platform, at sea, in international waters. A handy platform can be an aircraft carrier that has been removed from “mothballs” and disarmed, yet capable of steaming to the desired location and operating support aircraft and ships to handle heavier loads. Living quarters for personnel, ships company, and disarmament processors, would be integral, as would be major protected spaces.

    The US, of course, is the obvious source of a carrier, but there could be international manning, following the precedent of NATO. This would make the American ship politically palatable to the participants and Russia would be handled sensitively. Obvious and major advantages of security, inspection, availability, timing, and cost would ensue. Those regimes and groups not initially participating can be put under enormous pressure to join. Any remaining recalcitrant can be disarmed militarily, this time with a concert of powers. The need for persuasion and understanding of the participating powers is, of course, fundamental, and probably the most difficult requirement to meet. To meet this need of public understanding and consequent action, domestic and foreign, will require that we dispel some common illusions, such as:

    • Is physical defense against nuclear weapons possible? No. What’s more, it’s irrelevant. A half dozen non-technical means of delivery avail.
    • Can nuclear weapons be used in any sensible manner? No. This includes “tactical.”
    • Does nuclear disarmament imperil our security? No. It enhances it.
    • Is deterrence of nuclear or other attack by threat of retaliation still possible? No. The many potential aggressors are scattered — even location unknown. No targets!

    With these illusions dispelled, it becomes evident that nuclear disarmament works to the advantage of every power. Only in this way can the world be made safe from unprecedented murder and destruction. It remains to take the necessary actions. They are feasible and imperative.
    *Admiral Noel Gayler (US Navy, Ret.) is a four-star admiral and served as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). He was responsible for nuclear attack tactical development and demonstration of nuclear attack tactics to the Chairman and Joint Chiefs.