Category: International Issues

  • Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    United States Draft
    UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
    The Security Council,
    PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,
    PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
    PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
    PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,
    PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,
    PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,
    PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,
    PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,
    PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,
    PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,
    PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,
    PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

    PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
    PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),
    PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,
    PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,
    PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,
    PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,
    PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
    PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,
    PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

    1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;
    2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;
    3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;
    4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;
    5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;
    6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;

    7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

    8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

    9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty;

    10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

    11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;
    12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:
    a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,
    b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,
    c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;
    13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;
    14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;
    15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;
    16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;
    17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;
    18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;
    19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;
    20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;
    21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;
    22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;
    23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;
    24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;
    25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;
    26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

    US President Barack Obama will chair a special meeting of the UN Security Council on September 24 to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

  • Indefensible: David Krieger on the Continuing Threat of Nuclear Weapons

    This article was originally published by The Sun Magazine.

    In 1963 the prospect of war was on many Americans’ minds. The U.S. was increasing its military presence in South Vietnam and had come to the brink of a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union a year earlier, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. David Krieger was fresh out of Occidental College with a degree in psychology. Wanting to experience a foreign culture, he traveled to Japan, where he visited the sites of the World War II atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The experience left an indelible impression on the future nuclear-disarmament activist. “In the U.S. we viewed the bomb as a technological achievement that shortened the war,” he says. “The Japanese, however, viewed the atomic bombings as humanitarian catastrophes. It brought home to me the ways in which our government — perhaps any government — develops a narrative to justify its actions.”

    After he returned to the States in 1964, Krieger was drafted into the army and got permission to join the reserves so that he could attend graduate school at the University of Hawaii. In 1968, having earned his PhD in political science, he was called to active duty, and a year later he was ordered to Vietnam. Convinced that the war was immoral and illegal, he applied for conscientious-objector status. When his application was denied, Krieger sued in federal court and won. It was another turning point for him. He’d learned that one could successfully challenge powerful institutions, even the U.S. government.

    Krieger went on to become a professor and to work for think tanks and international organizations that supported nuclear disarmament. He also earned a law degree from the Santa Barbara College of Law in California and served as a temporary judge for the Santa Barbara County courts. In 1982 he cofounded and became president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), where he has remained for thirty years, working for a world free of nuclear weapons. The organization currently has fifty-six thousand members, and Krieger has appeared on cnn and msnbc and is a frequent contributor to national print media. He is the author or editor of more than twenty books, most recently The Path to Zero: Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, coauthored with Richard Falk.

    Although Krieger has opposed nuclear weapons primarily through educational and advocacy efforts, in February 2012 he was arrested — along with his wife, Carolee, Daniel Ellsberg, Cindy Sheehan, Father Louis Vitale, and ten other activists — for engaging in civil resistance at a test of the Minuteman iii nuclear-missile system at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Asked how he felt after his arrest, Krieger said, “Exhilarated.”

    For this interview Krieger met with me at his office in a converted two-story Victorian house on a tree-shaded street in downtown Santa Barbara. In person he is disarmingly calm, even-tempered, and optimistic. Though he views current U.S. policy as a threat to humanity’s future, he reveals no bitterness, anger, or haste. He is engaged in this struggle for the long haul and believes that most people, once they understand the dangers, will join him.

    Goodman: How many nuclear weapons are there in the world today?

    Krieger: Far too many. Nine countries have a total of almost twenty thousand nuclear weapons. More than 90 percent are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The remaining weapons are divided among the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

    The U.S. has far more nuclear weapons deployed — 1,800 — than there are reasonable targets, especially considering that Russia is more than nominally our friend and China is one of our major trading partners. And we retain thousands more in reserve.

    Goodman: Why so many?

    Krieger: You’d have to ask the U.S. government, which has been reluctant to commit to a nuclear-weapons ban because it has found the arms useful for imposing its will on other nations. We can threaten, “Do as we say, or else.” I see this as an extraordinarily dangerous gambit, however, as we may be challenged to make good on our threat. The potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so horrendous that any risk of their use is too high.

    Goodman: The number of nuclear weapons has fallen from a peak of seventy thousand in 1986. Are the numbers still going down?

    Krieger: Yes, they are still going down. The world has shed fifty thousand nuclear weapons since the 1980s. That’s a terrific accomplishment. But it’s not enough, especially given that the U.S. and its nato allies made no commitment to further nuclear-arsenal reductions when they met in 2012. And nato reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear weapons at its 2012 summit in Chicago.

    The only number that is truly significant is zero, and, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the nuclear-armed countries still have no real plan to get there.

    Gandhi, when asked about the U.S. using nuclear weapons against Japan, said that we could see the effect on the cities that were destroyed, but it was too soon to know what effect the bomb would have on the soul of the nation that used it. In many respects the soul of America has been compromised. We can’t go on developing ever more powerful weapons indefinitely. Those of us born at the onset of the nuclear age are challenged in ways unknown to previous generations, because we grew up in a world in which humans have the capability to destroy everything. If the taboo on nuclear use in warfare, which has existed since 1945, is broken, the consequences could be eight thousand years of civilization coming to an end and a radio­active planet. One nuclear weapon dropped on New York City could be sufficient to destroy the U.S. as a functioning nation. But it’s not too late. We still have the capacity to walk back from the brink.

    Goodman: Why is there not a greater sense of urgency today about the need to reduce nuclear arsenals?

    Krieger: Nuclear weapons have been sold to the public as a necessary protection against nuclear attack. People have bought into the theory of deterrence — the idea that the fear of nuclear retaliation will keep the peace between the nuclear-armed powers. But a terrorist organization could still use a nuclear weapon and leave no way to retaliate because it has no discernible territory. And if just having nuclear weapons actually protects us, then why do we design so-called missile-defense systems to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles? We are planning for nuclear war as if it were winnable, not unthinkable. That is not rational.

    Another reason for the seeming lack of concern is that too many people defer to experts. I think it is important for the public to reclaim the issue, as happened in 1982, when a million people gathered in New York’s Central Park to support a freeze on nuclear buildup.

    Goodman: What is the difference between long-range nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons? Are the two kinds equally important to eliminate?

    Krieger: Long-range weapons are also called “strategic” nuclear weapons and have intercontinental-delivery capabilities. They can be launched from silos, submarines, or aircraft. Tactical nuclear weapons are smaller, with a limited range and generally less explosive power. Strategic weapons can do the most damage, but tactical weapons are more likely to get into the hands of terrorist organizations.

    The U.S. has already eliminated most of its tactical arsenal, but it retains some 180 tactical nuclear weapons in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Russia still has some three to four thousand of them. I believe that strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are equally important to eliminate. My goal is zero nuclear weapons on the planet.

    Goodman: What message does the U.S. send the rest of the world by maintaining such a large arsenal of nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: As long as the U.S. and other powerful nations claim to need nuclear weapons for security, it encourages additional countries to do the same. If the most powerful nation on the planet needs nuclear weapons, why wouldn’t every country need them? The more nuclear weapons there are, the greater the chance that they will end up in the hands of extremist groups or an irrational leader who will one day decide it is in his or her country’s national interest to use them.

    Goodman: Is the U.S. likely to use nuclear weapons again?

    Krieger: I certainly hope not, but so long as the weapons exist in the U.S. arsenal, there remains the possibility that they will be used. Most Americans would probably be surprised to discover that the U.S. has never had a policy of “no first use.” We have given some countries “negative security assurances” — that is, promises that we won’t attack them with nuclear weapons — but we give this only to nations that do not have nuclear weapons and that we believe are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, a treaty that aims, in part, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Countries that possess nuclear weapons or that the U.S. believes are out of compliance do not receive such assurances.

    Goodman: So we say that nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use, but we will not commit to not using them.

    Krieger: Actually, we don’t officially say that nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use. U.S. leaders reserve the right to use them under certain circumstances. If the U.S. were to adopt a no-first-use policy — and then get all the nuclear-armed countries to make the same pledge, with legal consequences for violation — it would be a significant step toward nuclear disarmament. But that doesn’t fit the policy of deterrence.

    General George Lee Butler, who was once in charge of all U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, writes, “Nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence, and fragile human relationships.” This is a denunciation of the very principle by which countries justify their possession of nuclear weapons.

    The policy of mutual assured destruction may have been successful during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but it came close to ruinous failure. The decision makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis have said on many occasions that there was an enormous amount of misinformation and misunderstanding. They were later shocked to discover how much they didn’t know and how fortunate we were to avoid a full-out nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

    Goodman: Still, there has been no use of nuclear weapons for sixty-seven years.

    Krieger: We should not take too much comfort in that, because it’s a relatively short period in human history. That rationalization is analogous to a man who, having jumped from the top of a hundred-story building and fallen sixty-seven stories without a problem, thinks everything is fine.

    Also, you can’t prove that nuclear deterrence is the reason there hasn’t been a war. I could say with just as much certainty that the reason there hasn’t been a nuclear war is because people drink Coca-Cola. Correlation is not causation. We don’t know if both the U.S. and the Soviet Union having nuclear weapons prevented nuclear war. What we do know is that we came close to having a nuclear war on at least one occasion.

    Goodman: But the nuclear era is the longest period of peace between great powers in history.

    Krieger: It has resulted in numerous proxy wars, however. During the Cold War, conflicts were sparked by the power rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, the major nuclear powers’ continued pursuit of hegemony in critical regions of the world has caused much violence. Millions of people, primarily in poorer countries, have been the principal victims. Consider the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, among many others.

    Goodman: What are your biggest fears in regard to nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: I worry that humanity is stumbling toward its own extinction, and that the U.S. is leading the way. Americans don’t want to have to deal with the serious implications of our nuclear policy. We like to stay “above the fray,” which is the position of a pilot who drops the bomb. We want to keep the discussion on a technological or intellectual level and not deal with the terrifying possibility of the extinction of the human species and other complex forms of life on the planet. We don’t want to consider what it means to live in a society that bases its security on threatening to murder hundreds of millions of innocent people.

    Goodman: How many detonations would it take to end all life on the planet?

    Krieger: I don’t think anyone can answer that with certainty, but surely the U.S. and Russia each have enough thermo­nuclear weapons to accomplish it, should either country use them by accident or intention. Scientists have modeled what would happen if there were a relatively “small” nuclear war between India and Pakistan, involving fifty Hiroshima-sized bombs each on the other side’s cities. Those hundred nuclear weapons would, in addition to the destruction of the cities, put enough soot into the upper stratosphere to reduce the sunlight reaching the earth’s surface, decreasing temperatures, shortening growing seasons, causing crop failures, and leading to hundreds of millions of deaths, perhaps a billion, by starvation caused by famine. Using all or most of the deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, perhaps even some smaller number of these weapons, could reduce temperatures to below freezing on most of the agricultural land in the northern hemisphere and result in the extinction of humans and other forms of complex life.

    Goodman: If terrorists were to detonate a single nuclear bomb in a major U.S. population center, how might it affect life in the entire country?

    Krieger: Hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people would die from the blast, more would die from the fires the blast would cause, and still more would die from the radiation poisoning, as happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The detonation of a single nuclear bomb in New York City could be a thousand times worse than the 9/11 tragedy. It’s difficult to imagine the full psychological impact, but people throughout the country would be stunned and frightened about which city might be next. The long-term cleanup and reconstruction would be overwhelming. What would we do in response? Would we pick a country we felt was responsible and destroy one or all of its cities? And we are talking here about only one bomb setting all of this in motion.

    Goodman: How great is the risk of an accidental nuclear war?

    Krieger: It’s above zero, and any number other than zero is too great a risk. I also know that the more countries that develop nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of inadvertent nuclear war. Accidents happen, no matter how careful we are. The Russians thought they had control of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The operators were going through a routine exercise, and before they knew it, they had a meltdown on their hands. The Japanese thought they had control at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant before the tsunami hit. Human fallibility and natural disasters are always with us. A computerized training program could lead to the false belief that we are really under attack, as has happened before. Or a nuclear submarine could lose communication with the command structure or misinterpret a command. In 1995 a U.S.-Norwegian launch of a weather satellite was mistaken by the Russians as a missile attack aimed at Moscow. Boris Yeltsin was awakened in the middle of the night and told Russia was under attack. He had only a few minutes to decide whether or not to launch a “counterattack” against the U.S. Fortunately, Yeltsin took longer than the time allotted to him, and it became apparent that the satellite was not a rocket aimed at Moscow.

    There are many other examples of accidents that could have triggered nuclear detonations but didn’t. There have been midair refueling problems where nuclear weapons have fallen from planes, and planes have crashed with nuclear weapons onboard.

    Goodman: I presume we don’t fly nuclear-armed airplanes over foreign soil.

    Krieger: I believe that is our policy, but such incidents have occurred inadvertently. I can’t say with certainty whether it’s the policy of other nuclear-armed nations.

    Goodman: As a young adult you spent nearly a year in Japan and visited the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How do you respond to the common belief that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 saved lives by ending the war?

    Krieger: It’s interesting that, after the war, the number of lives supposedly saved by the bomb kept going up and up. At first they talked about 250,000. Within a relatively short time it was up to a million: I would say that’s a myth. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, published in 1946, concluded that, even without the atomic bombs, and even without the Soviet Union entering the war in the Pacific, the fighting would have ended in 1945 without an Allied invasion of Japan. Japan had put out feelers to surrender, and the U.S. had broken Japan’s secret codes and knew about its desire to surrender, but we went ahead and bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki anyway. Admiral William D. Leahy, the highest ranking member of the U.S. military at the time, wrote in his memoir that the atomic bomb “was of no material assistance” against Japan, because the Japanese were already defeated. He went on to say that, in being the first to use the bomb, the U.S. “had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

    It’s interesting that, after the war, the number of lives supposedly saved by the bomb kept going up and up. At first they talked about 250,000. Within a relatively short time it was up to a million.

    Goodman: How close is Iran to developing nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: Iran’s nuclear program has been under scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), and there is no evidence at this point that the Iranians have a nuclear-weapons program. They are enriching uranium to 20 percent u-235. You must enrich uranium to higher levels — 80 to 90 percent u-235 — to have the fissile material necessary for constructing nuclear weapons. But they could enrich to that level in the future, so it’s important to keep an eye on the situation. It would be reprehensible, however, to initiate an attack against Iran simply because it could potentially create highly enriched uranium.

    There’s been a subtle shift in the way information about Iran is being conveyed to the American people. The government has gone from talking about the danger of Iran “obtaining” nuclear weapons to talking about the danger of Iran having nuclear-weapons “capability.” Many countries have nuclear-weapons capability without possessing nuclear weapons. Germany and Japan are two. The Scandinavian countries, as well as Brazil and Argentina, probably have the means to make nuclear weapons, but they don’t have them.

    U.S. foreign policy might actually be pushing Iran toward a nuclear-weapons program. Iranians may view threats from the U.S. and Israel as dangerous to their sovereignty and well-being. George W. Bush described an “Axis of Evil” composed of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Iraq gave up its nuclear-weapons program, and the U.S. invaded, overthrew its government, and executed its leader. Meanwhile North Korea developed nuclear weapons, and the U.S. continues to negotiate with its leaders. If you were the leader of Iran and observed what’s gone on with the other two members of the so-called Axis, which path would you take?

    Goodman: Iran is led by a fundamentalist regime that many view as being of dubious sanity. Shouldn’t we worry about their having even nuclear-weapons capability?

    Krieger: They may be of dubious sanity, but that can be said of many regimes. There have been many leaders, in the U.S. and elsewhere, who have acted irrationally at times. If, in fact, Iranian leaders are insane and irresponsible, of course they should not have nuclear weapons. But they also should not have them even if they are perfectly sane. No one should.

    By the way, the Iranian situation points out a problem in the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. A nuclear-power program gives a nation the ability to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons, but Article iv of the Non-Proliferation Treaty refers to nuclear power as an “inalienable right.” Is there really such a “right” to nuclear power? How can we promote nuclear power and nuclear disarmament simultaneously? Personally, I would like to see us rethink the role of nuclear power in the world, because there is such a close connection between the nuclear fuel cycle and the ability to make nuclear weapons.

    Goodman: What should U.S. policy be toward Iran?

    Krieger: First, we should propose that Iran put the enriched uranium created by its nuclear plants under the safeguards of international inspectors. I think Iranians would accept this. Really, any process that creates fissile materials should be put under strict international control. That includes nuclear power in the U.S.

    Second, we should continue to apply sanctions to Iran if it does not allow full inspections of its nuclear fuel cycle.

    Third, U.S. policy needs to be in accord with the promise we made in 1995 to pursue a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and we cannot have that without the participation of Israel. It is almost universally believed that Israel has a relatively large nuclear arsenal, even though it does not admit to it.

    There are successful nuclear-weapons-free zones in a number of regions: Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia. Virtually the entire southern hemisphere is composed of nuclear-weapons-free zones. There have been calls for such a zone in Northeast Asia, to include North and South Korea, Japan, parts of China, and the U.S. fleet in the region. But nuclear weapons are a global problem, and regional solutions will not be sufficient. We need to have a global set of negotiations to achieve a new treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible, and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Goodman: Why do we need a new treaty? What’s wrong with the existing one?

    Krieger: The existing Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for nuclear disarmament, but that goal hasn’t been effectively pursued by its nuclear-armed member states — the U.S., Russia, the UK, France, and China — nor pursued at all by the other four nuclear-armed countries that are not parties to the treaty: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In fact, North Korea withdrew legally from the treaty in its “supreme interests.” We need a treaty that bans the possession of nuclear weapons and provides a road map by which we can move to a world without them.

    A starting point would be a commitment by all nuclear-armed nations to a no-first-use policy. Step two would be major reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia — down to, say, two or three hundred weapons on each side. This is still far too many, but it would bring those nations into rough parity with the other nuclear powers in the world. After that, a new treaty to ban nuclear weapons could be negotiated.

    I hope the leadership to move toward a nuclear-free world will come from the U.S. It appeared there was potential for this when President Obama said in Prague in 2009 that America seeks “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

    But even if we have leaders who are ready to lead on this issue, there will still need to be broad public support. Many Americans remain convinced that nuclear weapons provide security when, in fact, they act as a dangerous provocation and an incentive for proliferation.

    The path to security doesn’t lie in keeping a stash of nuclear weapons for ourselves and preventing other countries from getting any. It’s hypocritical to say that the U.S. should have these weapons and Iran shouldn’t. It also creates resentment and a greater desire to possess them. The path to security can only be through total nuclear disarmament. We cannot indefinitely maintain a world of nuclear haves and have-nots, and we cannot go attacking every country that we think might be on the path to making a bomb.

    Goodman: Do you think the U.S. will go to war with Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: The U.S. isn’t prepared for the consequences of attacking Iran. Iran is much bigger and better organized than Iraq, where our troops fought for nine years. There is no telling how long it would take to subdue Iran or to deal with the consequences throughout the Middle East — and the world.

    If we attacked Iran, it would harden the resolve of its leaders and those of other countries to develop nuclear ar­senals so they wouldn’t be attacked in the future. Remember our bellicose behavior toward Iraq and our conciliatory behavior toward North Korea. And Iran is a proud country; probably nothing would be more effective in uniting Iranians around their current regime than a U.S. or Israeli attack against them.

    An attack would also be viewed as a violation of international law, an act of “aggressive warfare.” In the Nuremberg trials after World War ii, aggressive warfare was one of the three crimes for which the leaders of the Axis powers were tried and convicted. Many were hanged. U.S. leaders committed the same crime in Iraq, and I would say in Afghanistan too.

    Goodman: And in Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen with drone attacks?

    Krieger: If some country sent drones to attack our leaders or citizens, I’m sure we would call that “aggressive warfare.” But when we do it, for the most part it goes unremarked upon in the mainstream media. Few Americans are clamoring for accountability from our leaders.

    Goodman: We have already proven we are not afraid to institute regime change, as we have done in Iraq and as we did in Iran in the 1950s. Is that our intention in Iran today?

    Krieger: That would not be the intention of saner minds. Iran is in the mess it’s in now as a result of our meddling in Iranian affairs sixty years ago by overthrowing its democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. When you overthrow regimes, there are always unintended consequences. Iran and Iraq were frequent rivals and fought a long war in the 1980s. By overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, we shifted the power balance in the Middle East toward Iran. If we overthrow Iran’s regime, there may be something worse in store for us.

    The U.S. should do what it can to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it shouldn’t do it by military means. That would only undermine our own security.

    Goodman: Is total disarmament realistic? Assuming we can’t put an end to war, isn’t it natural for all sides to want the biggest and best weapons?

    Krieger: Not necessarily. Imagine you are one of our early human ancestors, and you have a choice among several sizes of club. You don’t want one that is too thin and will break, but, at the same time, a fallen oak tree will be too big to handle. You want a piece of wood the right size to carry around and use.

    Today the U.S. military needs weapons that can be used efficiently and that don’t destroy indiscriminately. For quite some time there have been laws of warfare against weapons that fail to discriminate between soldiers and civilians. International humanitarian law also forbids weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, such as bullets that expand inside the body and rip out organs, and chemical and biological weapons.

    Goodman: Are there any examples from history of a country voluntarily giving up its military advantage?

    Krieger: It depends what you mean by “military advantage.” The countries that signed the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention saw greater military advantage in all countries giving up the weapons than in retaining the weapons for themselves. Many countries have agreed to a ban on land mines and cluster munitions, although the U.S. has not.

    Goodman: Let’s say we do achieve total nuclear disarmament, but then a rogue nation builds a nuclear weapon. Wouldn’t this destabilize global relations?

    Krieger: No, any treaty that would get us to zero would have safeguards against a country breaking out. To go from twenty thousand to zero nuclear weapons we’ll need a verifiable process based on inspections in all countries. After we finally reached zero, the act of developing a nuclear weapon would be akin to breaking a taboo, and the countries of the world would rise up in protest and retaliation against the treaty breaker. And one nuclear bomb would not be sufficient to defeat a country like the U.S., even if the U.S. had no nuclear weapons, because our conventional forces are so powerful.

    To have an effective disarmament plan, we will also need to institute nonmilitary ways of resolving conflicts so that the elimination of nuclear weapons does not create a world that is safer for conventional warfare. All countries want security, and the strongest guarantee of security is a system in which conflicts are resolved without violence. This is what is set forth in the United Nations Charter. The use of force, except in cases of self-defense or upon authorization of the UN Security Council, is prohibited. Unfortunately the permanent members of the Security Council have not fulfilled their responsibilities to keep the peace. Nor have they fulfilled their responsibilities to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament.

    Goodman: Does the 2010 New START treaty with Russia effectively reduce nuclear stockpiles or is it just a pr tactic?

    Krieger: It’s both. It is not reducing our stockpile much more than the Moscow Treaty did, which George W. Bush signed in 2002. The New START treaty will reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 on each side and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 on each side. But it also allows for modernizing the arsenals. It is a means of managing nuclear arms rather than a commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

    Whether it is going to be an effective stepping stone to further cuts is questionable, particularly because the U.S. has been pursuing the deployment of antiballistic missile defenses up to the Russian border in Eastern Europe, and the Russians are very upset about this.

    Goodman: What are antiballistic missiles?

    Krieger: They are missile defenses that theoretically can take down offensive nuclear missiles in the air before they reach their targets. If only one side has them, that nation could believe it’s able to launch a preemptive first strike and then use its defense missiles to avoid retaliation. It’s really imagining a worst-case scenario, but that’s the way military planners think.

    For thirty years we had an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Russians, signed by Richard Nixon, which limited the number of antiballistic missiles that either side could deploy. That treaty was unilaterally abrogated by George W. Bush in 2002. In 2012 the U.S. made attempts to place missile defenses in Eastern Europe along the Russian border, supposedly to guard against an Iranian attack. It’s as if the Russians put their missile-defense system on the U.S.-Canadian border and said to the U.S., “Don’t worry. It’s aimed at Venezuela.” We would not be reassured.

    Goodman: What is the cost of maintaining our current nuclear arsenal?

    Krieger: Through the middle of the last decade, the U.S. had spent $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The annual figure now is $50 to $60 billion for the U.S. and $100 billion for all nuclear-weapons states. So the world is currently spending about $1 trillion a decade on modernizing and maintaining nuclear arsenals.

    Clearly, with our federal debt crisis and the extent of global poverty, we can’t afford to spend this money. Nuclear weapons are relics of the Cold War. What possible scenario would require us to have a few thousand nuclear weapons ready to be fired at a moment’s notice?

    Goodman: Tell me about your civil resistance in February 2012.

    Krieger: I have worked for peace and nuclear disarmament for most of my adult life, but it was only recently that I joined in civil resistance to a Minuteman iii missile launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base. These unarmed test launches aren’t publicized much, but they occur regularly. I joined others in protesting at Vandenberg because the Minuteman iii missile is a first-strike weapon. The 450 Minuteman iii missiles in the U.S. arsenal are always on high alert, ready to be fired within moments. In a period of extreme tensions between the U.S. and Russia, each side would have an incentive to launch such land-based missiles so that they could not be destroyed in their silos. This is a dangerous and thoughtless carry-over from the Cold War. It was foolish then, and it is even more so now.

    The routine missile test launches from Vandenberg use the Marshall Islands as targets. Imagine if the situation were reversed and the Marshall Islands tested missiles in the ocean off the California coast, putting our marine habitats and cities at risk. The Marshall Islands were our trust territories after World War ii, and we abused that trust by conducting sixty-seven atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests there over a period of twelve years. It was the equivalent of exploding one and a half Hiroshima-sized bombs daily for those twelve years. The Marshallese people still suffer serious health problems from those tests, and they have not been compensated fairly for the wrongs done to them. By contaminating their islands with radiation, we have taken from them not only their health and well-being but their sacred land.

    Goodman: The web address for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is www.wagingpeace.org. What does “waging peace” mean to you?

    Krieger: “Waging peace” means that peace is active, not passive. You can’t sit back and wait for peace to come to you. You must work for it. You must shake off your apathy and demand it. This is not always easy in a culture of war, such as we have in the U.S., but it is necessary.

    It is clear that war makes great demands on its participants. We need to think of peace in the same way. Peace is not the absence of war or the space between wars; it is a goal to be achieved by actively demanding that the world’s governments find nonviolent means of settling disputes.

    Goodman: Hasn’t war been with us since the beginning of humanity?

    Krieger: There is no good anthropological evidence that war existed before the advent of agriculture. At the dawn of human history, it took all the able-bodied adults in a tribe to hunt and gather food. Agriculture enabled specialization, and with specialization came organization and hierarchy and leaders who wanted to increase their territory and wealth through military means. So civilization opened the door for warfare. Military service was encouraged through a system of rewards; soldiers received a portion of the spoils for doing the bidding of the leaders — if they didn’t die in battle. Smart politicians tell soldiers that they are fighting for a noble cause, no matter how ignoble it actually is, and smart military leaders reward their soldiers well to maintain their loyalty and thus increase their own power. Warfare is a socially conceived way of settling disputes, or expanding territory, or gaining riches without working for them.

    Goodman: So you don’t believe human beings are warlike by nature?

    Krieger: I don’t. Humans have a fight-or-flight instinct that resides in the reptilian portion of our brains. When threatened or trapped, we can go berserk. But the vast majority of the time we don’t behave this way. We must be taught to be warlike. It isn’t easy to get humans to kill each other in war. It requires considerable training, the primary goal of which is to get young people to identify with their fellow soldiers. It also takes considerable societal propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. Militarized societies take advantage of the loyalty and trust of recruits and turn them into killers.

    Goodman: You emphasize the need for peace leadership training. Why is it important?

    Krieger: Many Americans are complacent because they feel helpless to bring about change. We need to train and empower people. If someone wants to be a soldier, there are institutions that will train that person for war — the rotc, military academies, the army, navy, and air force — but if you want to work for peace, there are few places to obtain training. We need more institutions to provide opportunities for people to make a career of peace.

    Peace leadership is not based on hierarchy. It must be leadership by example. A peace leader must demonstrate kindness and compassion, resolving conflicts nonviolently. Peace leadership also requires organizing, research, public speaking, working with the media, and expressing oneself with sincerity. The most important trait of a peace leader, though, is a passion for achieving peace, because that passion will be reflected in all that one says and does. It will attract others to the cause. Great peace leaders, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., were also courageous.

    Wars could not exist without the support of the people, particularly the young people who must fight in them. The old antiwar slogan “What if they gave a war and no one came?” reminds us of this. If young people would not participate in wars, there could be none. I don’t think there are contemporary political leaders anywhere who would go out and fight wars themselves. They rely upon the young to do the killing and dying.

    Goodman: Is the nuclear threat a greater threat than climate change?

    Krieger: That’s like asking if you’d rather be executed by a firing squad or an electric chair. Both nuclear war and climate change can destroy human civilization.

    Goodman: You often quote physicist Albert Einstein, who said that human survival in the nuclear age requires us to change our “modes of thinking.” What do you think he meant?

    Krieger: Einstein worried that we would remain stuck in our old warlike modes of thinking, which, in the nuclear age, would lead to “unparalleled catastrophe.” He believed that nuclear weapons made it necessary to abolish warfare altogether and find nonviolent means of resolving our differences. Nations can no longer solve their problems in a warlike manner; they need to use cooperative means.

    Goodman: You have said that investing our defense dollars in foreign aid would make us safer. Can we really buy friends that way?

    Krieger: Calling it “buying friends” sounds patronizing to me. It trivializes the miserable conditions that much of the world lives in — without adequate food, water, shelter, education, and healthcare. You call it “buying friends,” but a better word for it is justice. And, yes, I think it is a far more effective strategy for national security than threatening or killing people in war. Moreover, it is the humane and ethical thing to do. Because we spend hundreds of billions of dollars building up our military, we use force when a conflict comes along, rather than being generous with our resources and trying to help people. Large numbers of humans live in dire poverty while a small percentage live with obscene riches. If we want to prevent war and ensure the survival of the human species, we need to change this.

    We could also prevent war by improving education and reducing poverty in this country. Many young people who join the military do so to get an education or find a better livelihood. If they had more alternatives, fewer of them would turn to the military. Some enlist out of a sense of patriotism, of course, so we also need to teach children that we are members of a single species. We should pledge our allegiance to humanity itself and to our incredible planet. This is the key to creating peace and bringing the nuclear age to an end.

  • Advancing the Disarmament and Non-proliferation Agenda: Seeking Peace in an Over-armed World

    Ban Ki-moon delivered this speech at the Monterey Institute of International Studies on January 18, 2013.

    It is a pleasure to be at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

    I thank President Sunder Ramaswamy for hosting. I also want to recognize Dr. William Potter, Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

    It is not surprising that this Center is located at the Monterey Institute.

    Your graduates are grappling with the many challenges of a world in transition: protecting the environment; promoting sustainable development; strengthening international peace and security.

    Your faculty and students have worked closely with the United Nations.

    The world needs your skills and commitment, especially in advancing disarmament and non-proliferation.

    These are great causes. They are part of the UN’s very identity, helping to define who we are and what we stand for.

    These issues are also part of my own personal and professional DNA.

    In 1992, I served as vice-chair of the South-North Korea Joint Nuclear Control Commission aimed at realizing the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

    I also served in 1999 as Chair of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

    As United Nations Secretary-General, one of my first decisions was to restructure our disarmament office and re-energize its work.

    I also launched a five-point plan on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation early in my tenure.

    Today I would like to review what we have achieved and what challenges remain.

    I will focus on five linked and mutually reinforcing points – accountability; the rule of law; partnerships; the role of the Security Council; and education.

    As I look at the disarmament landscape, my feelings are mixed.

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It has helped curb nuclear proliferation and avoid a world with many dozens of nuclear states as had been feared.

    I also recognize the combined efforts of governments, experts, civil society and international organizations with disarmament and non-proliferation mandates.

    But, as we know, the architecture of non-proliferation is not perfect. There are loopholes and gaps.

    And even more troubling, nuclear disarmament progress is off track.

    Delay comes with a high price tag.

    The longer we procrastinate, the greater the risk that these weapons will be used, will proliferate or be acquired by terrorists.

    But our aim must be more than keeping the deadliest of weapons from “falling into the wrong hands”.

    There are no right hands for wrong weapons.

    This brings me to my first point: accountability.

    Each Member State needs to uphold its commitments.

    My advice, my appeal to all, is this: Be a first mover. Don’t look to others or to your neighbours to start disarmament and arms control measures.

    If you take the lead, others will follow.

    Deferring nuclear disarmament indefinitely pending the satisfaction of an endlessly growing list of preconditions can lead only to a world full of nuclear weapons.

    I want to stress the special responsibility of the nuclear-armed States.

    I also encourage nuclear-weapon-States to come up with a bold set of measures to promote transparency of their nuclear arsenals.

    They can do this next April at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

    Or they can start today by contributing data to the UN’s “Repository of information provided by nuclear-weapon States”, as mandated at the Review Conference in 2010.

    This should commence with in-depth consultations between the States with the largest nuclear arsenals — the Russian Federation and the United States — followed by deep and verified cuts in their arsenals and additional reductions by other States.

    I urge all nuclear-armed States to reconsider their national nuclear posture.

    Nuclear deterrence is not a solution to international peace and stability. It is an obstacle.

    Member States also need to reinvigorate the international disarmament machinery.

    When I spoke to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva I said plainly that the very credibility of the body is at risk.

    The Conference’s record of achievement is overshadowed by inertia that has now lasted for more than a decade. That must change.

    Another year of stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament is simply unacceptable.

    The Conference should start long-overdue negotiations on a fissile material treaty as a priority.

    It should also start deliberations on a nuclear weapons convention, a legal security assurance for non-nuclear weapon States against nuclear threats, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

    Global nuclear disarmament requires global arrangements.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    My second point relates to strengthening the rule of law.

    We must intensify efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

    I urge the remaining eight states whose ratification is essential for the Treaty’s entry into force to do so without further delay.

    In April, I will travel to Washington D.C. with the leadership of the CTBTO to support the Obama Administration’s efforts to get this treaty ratified.

    We also need to achieve universal membership in the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.

    This is not a theoretical issue; there are concerns in the here and now.

    Twice in recent months, I have written to President Assad of Syria to warn against the use of these weapons in the conflict, and I have urged the Syrian government to join the Chemical Weapons Convention without further delay.

    Let there be no doubt: The use of such weapons would be an outrageous crime with dire consequences.

    We also have to further strengthen the capacity of the organizations with key responsibilities for ensuring implementation of treaties and other agreements, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the CTBTO.

    One major rule of law priority this year is to reach agreement on an Arms Trade Treaty.

    There is a great need for responsible standards in the legal trade in conventional weapons, as well as for expanded international cooperation to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

    Every day, we at the United Nations see the human toll of an absence of regulations or lax controls on the arms trade.

    We see it in the suffering of populations caught up in armed conflict or victimized by pervasive crime.

    We see it in the killing and wounding of civilians – including children in schools.

    We see it in the massive displacement of people and through grave violations of international law.

    An agreed set of standards for arms exports along with strong national legislation can help begin to change all of that.

    When concluded, the Arms Trade Treaty will advance global efforts to bring the rule of law to the conventional arms trade.

    This would expand on past successes in conventional arms control, especially the conclusion of Conventions outlawing cluster munitions and landmines.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    My third point today is the importance of advocacy and partnerships.

    Disarmament cannot be considered in isolation from other global challenges.
    The world spends more on the military in one month than it does on development all year.

    And four hours of military spending is equal to the total budgets of all international disarmament and non-proliferation organizations combined.

    The world is over-armed. Peace is under-funded.

    Bloated military budgets promote proliferation, derail arms control, doom disarmament and detract from social and economic development.

    The profits of the arms industry are built on the suffering of ordinary people – in Mali, Syria, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    At the foot of the pyramid lie small arms. At the top are nuclear weapons.

    I will continue to use my moral authority and convening power to advocate for disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security.

    That is why I was the first Secretary-General to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where I met with the survivors — the hibakusha.

    It is why I visited the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan.

    I have also been to Chernobyl and Fukushima, and convened high-level meetings at the United Nations on Nuclear Safety and Security and on Countering Nuclear Terrorism.

    In all I do, I rely on partners to help me spread the word.

    Non-governmental organizations are making significant contributions, such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Global Zero movement and many other groups.

    We are using social media to enrol individuals around the world as messengers for peace, as with the UN’s “WMD-WeMustDisarm!” multimedia campaign in 2009.

    But the responsibility lies ultimately with Member States.

    This brings me to my fourth point — specific regional issues and the role of the Security Council.

    I am deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme.

    I visited Iran last August and emphatically urged the country’s leaders to take concrete steps to reassure the world community about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

    Iran must fully comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.

    And as these issues are being addressed, parallel efforts should be undertaken to advance the broader goal of promoting peace and security in the region.

    In 1995, concerns about other security challenges in the Middle East led the States Parties to the NPT to adopt a resolution calling for the region to be free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

    Last year, we saw the postponement of an important conference to address this issue.

    We have missed a deadline. But we have not lost the opportunity to move this initiative forward.

    This year, the world community must insist on doing exactly that. And I will do all I can to help.

    Turning to the DPRK, the recent launch of a long-range rocket has exacerbated global concern about its pursuit of nuclear weapons, including means of delivery.

    I once again urge the DPRK to fully abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

    Countries in Northeast Asia are in transition, which can offer a new window of opportunity for the DPRK.

    I encourage the new leadership in Pyongyang to build confidence with neighbouring countries and address the concerns of the international community.

    This leads me to another important question: how to respond when Security Council resolutions are violated.

    Unless equipped with robust verification and enforcement measures, the credibility of the Security Council will be called into question.

    I urge the Security Council to take up this matter at a high-level meeting.

    The Council has a critical role to play in advancing disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

    In 2008, I urged the Council to convene a Summit-level meeting on these issues and they did so in 2009. This welcome development should be followed by further meetings and future Summits.

    By considering — and acting – on major existential threats, the Security Council can spur much-needed global debate.

    This brings me to my fifth and final point — the importance of disarmament education.

    A 2002 UN study put it well: the goal must be “To learn how to think rather than what to think.”

    Unfortunately, funding for disarmament education, training and research remains low to non-existent in many States.

    Most damaging of all, the next generation of leaders, legislators and administrators is being encouraged not to think.

    It is easier for students to learn the logic of nuclear deterrence than to learn to discard the myths that keep nuclear weapons in place.

    But education can help to refute the claim that nuclear disarmament is utopian.

    We hear this year after year, especially from critics who seem blind to the social and economic costs of such weapons and the catastrophic human effects of their use.

    Innovative teaching methods are one way forward, and here I credit the approach used at Dr. Potter’s Center, which relies heavily on simulations and role-playing.

    Technology, too, has much to offer. Web-based “massive open online courses” can reach huge audiences worldwide.

    In 2010, the UN launched its “Academic Impact” initiative to deepen its cooperation with the world’s universities.

    I hope we can encourage academia to include disarmament and non-proliferation issues in their curricula and research agendas, as you have done here.

    I am pleased to announce today that the Monterey Institute of International Studies has agreed to join the UN Academic Impact – and I thank you for your leadership and example.

    Disarmament education can also benefit governments through programmes offered at the UN’s regional centres for peace and disarmament in Latin America, Africa and in Asia and the Pacific.

    The UN’s Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament has trained over 800 public officials, mainly from developing countries.

    The UN Institute for Disarmament Research, based in Geneva, continues to perform important work, and I believe it deserves increased financial support.

    And the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the CTBTO have their own excellent training programmes.

    Education can help the world to build a global culture of peace that rejects all weapons of mass destruction as illegitimate and immoral.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Over a half century ago, President John Kennedy stood at the podium in the United Nations General Assembly and warned:

    “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.”

    The world was lucky that the nuclear arms build-up that followed did not result in a global nuclear catastrophe.

    Yet the nuclear sword remains — as does that slender thread.

    But so, too, does that plea for abolition — an appeal rooted in the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and the unrestrained global competition for more, and more potent, weaponry.

    So I will add my own appeal to you today.

    Focus your minds not on clever ways to strengthen the thread. Focus instead on how to remove the sword.

    This is the true challenge for disarmament and non-proliferation.

    Thank you.

    Ban Ki-moon is the United Nations Secretary-General.
  • Should NATO Be Handling World Security?

    This article was originally published by History News Network.


    Lawrence WittnerThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (better known as NATO) is in the news once again thanks to a NATO summit meeting in Chicago over the weekend of May 19-20 and to large public demonstrations in Chicago against this military pact.


    NATO’s website defines the alliance’s mission as “Peace and Security,” and shows two children lying in the grass, accompanied by a bird, a flower and the happy twittering of birds. There is no mention of the fact that NATO is the world’s most powerful military pact, or that NATO nations account for 70 percent of the world’s annual $1.74 trillion in military spending.


    The organizers of the demonstrations, put together by peace and social justice groups, assailed NATO for bogging the world down in endless war and for diverting vast resources to militarism. According to a spokesperson for one of the protest groups, Peace Action: “It’s time to retire NATO and form a new alliance to address unemployment, hunger, and climate change.”


    NATO was launched in April 1949, at a time when Western leaders feared that the Soviet Union, if left unchecked, would invade Western Europe. The U.S. government played a key role in organizing the alliance, which brought in not only West European nations, but the United States and Canada. Dominated by the United States, NATO had a purely defensive mission — to safeguard its members from military attack, presumably by the Soviet Union.


    That attack never occurred, either because it was deterred by NATO’s existence or because the Soviet government had no intention of attacking in the first place. We shall probably never know.


    In any case, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, it seemed that NATO had outlived its usefulness.


    But vast military establishments, like other bureaucracies, rarely just fade away. If the original mission no longer exists, new missions can be found. And so NATO’s military might was subsequently employed to bomb Yugoslavia, to conduct counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan, and to bomb Libya. Meanwhile, NATO expanded its membership and military facilities to East European nations right along Russia’s border, thus creating renewed tension with that major military power and providing it with an incentive to organize a countervailing military pact, perhaps with China.


    None of this seems likely to end soon. In the days preceding the Chicago meeting, NATO’s new, sweeping role was highlighted by Oana Longescu, a NATO spokesperson, who announced that the summit would discuss “the Alliance’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats in the twenty-first century, and take stock of NATO’s mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces.”


    In fairness to NATO planners, it should be noted that, when it comes to global matters, they are operating in a relative vacuum. There are real international security problems, and some entity should certainly be addressing them.


    But is NATO the proper entity? After all, NATO is a military pact, dominated by the United States and composed of a relatively small group of self-selecting European and North American nations. The vast majority of the world’s countries do not belong to NATO and have no influence upon it. Who appointed NATO as the representative of the world’s people? Why should the public in India, in Brazil, in China, in South Africa, in Argentina, or most other nations identify with the decisions of NATO’s military commanders?


    The organization that does represent the nations and people of the world is the United Nations. Designed to save the planet from “the scourge of war,” the United Nations has a Security Council (on which the United States has permanent membership) that is supposed to handle world security issues. Unlike NATO, whose decisions are often controversial and sometimes questionable, the United Nations almost invariably comes forward with decisions that have broad international support and, furthermore, show considerable wisdom and military restraint.


    The problem with UN decisions is not that they are bad ones, but that they are difficult to enforce. And the major reason for the difficulty in enforcement is that the Security Council is hamstrung by a veto that can be exercised by any one nation. Thus, much like the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, which is making the United States less and less governable, the Security Council veto has seriously limited what the world organization is able to do in addressing global security issues.


    Thus, if the leaders of NATO nations were really serious about providing children with a world in which they could play in peace among the birds and flowers, they would work to strengthen the United Nations and stop devoting vast resources to dubious wars.


  • Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea

    This article was originally published by Politico.


    Bennett RambergOnce again North Korea befuddles.


    On the cusp of receiving food aid from the United States as the quid pro quo for opening the Yongbong nuclear complex to international inspectors and a halt in missile testing, Pyongyang wasted little time to turn “progress” into a sink hole.


    The rub: a three-stage North Korean rocket set to launch a small satellite into orbit in the next few days. The concern, the data gleaned from the launch will mature Pyonygang’s ambition to build an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States with a nuclear warhead.


    Maturation has been long in coming. North Korea first replicated the Soviet Scud rockets it acquired from Egypt decades ago, and has slowly developed a healthy inventory of short- and intermediate-range missiles. But the long-range rocket proved to be another matter. Its 2006 and 2009 launch attempts failed.


    In anticipating each, Washington first pouted, but then returned to efforts to coax Pyongyang back to the six-party talks to can fulfill the North’s 2005 nuclear disarmament pledge. For a time, Kim Jong Il did return, but winked — attempting to pocket any benefits he could, while continuing to modernize his secret nuclear enrichment enterprise.


    This has left Washington uncertain, as the new Kim prepares the missile launch. There are no perfect options. But there are at least four imperfect alternatives to deal with the North’s missile and nuclear programs, First, continue the policy of coaxing. Second, attempt further to isolate the regime. Third, use force to halt the most threatening nuclear elements. Or, fourth, accept what cannot be changed and learn to live with a nuclear armed North Korea.


    Coaxing is business as usual. Trying to get Pyongyang to reliably say “uncle” and give up the bomb does not seem to be in the cards. The international community has tried and tried again since South Korea, Russia, China and Japan joined the United States and North Korea in the six-party talks in 2003. The approaching rocket launch, coupled with reports that Pyongyang may yet test another nuclear weapon, suggests that the new Kim intends to continue the path of the old to stay in power.


    The second option might be called the Bolton approach. Former U.N. Amb. John Bolton has written many articles pressing for strict isolation of Pyongyang, to bring down the regime. He advocates detaching Pyongyang from “international financial markets, ramping up efforts to prevent trade in weapons…and pressuring China to adhere to existing UN sanctions resolutions.”


    The major impediment is that Beijing refuses to go along — making the strategy a chimera.


    Force marks a third option. Clinton Defense Secretary William Perry and Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, writing in The Washington Post and Time magazine in 2006, called on the Bush administration to initiate a submarine cruise missile strike to destroy Pyongyang’s long-range rockets on the launch pad. They argued, “the risk of inaction will prove far greater” for the United States — even at the risk of igniting a new Korean war.


    Carter is now deputy secretary of defense. But there is no public talk that his proposal has any traction today in the Obama administration.


    This leaves a fourth option — accepting what we can’t change while attempting to reduce nuclear risks. The stark fact remains that without regime change — which was key in the elimination of other nuclear arsenals, including the former Soviet republics and South Africa — North Korea will remain a nuclear armed state. Washington’s challenge is to assure that Pyongyang never uses the arsenal out of malice or fear.


    North Korea’s use of its arsenal without provocation seems farfetched. More than anything, the leadership seeks to stay in power. It must know that any nuclear launch would result in the regime’s demise in the devastating U.S. and allied response that would be sure to follow.


    Nonetheless, there remains the specter that North Korea could launch due to fear of preemption or as part of an escalating incident. Reducing these risks ought to be the priority.


    This requires better communication between Washington and Pyongyang. At the very least, there should be a negotiated hot-line, replicating the Cold War link between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Better yet, full diplomatic relations could reduce the likelihood of major misunderstanding.


    Neither a hot line nor diplomatic relations should be seen as reward to the North, but rather the realization that a nuclear Pyongyang is likely to be part of the northeast Asian landscape for the foreseeable future.


    Assuming otherwise — without taking the necessary measures to reduce risk — could create is a far greater problem for the United States than either proceeding with the failed policies of the past or the impractical options advanced by some.

  • The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare

    Richard FalkAfter the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the colossal scale of devastation disclosed, there was a momentary embrace of sanity and rationality by world leaders and cultural commentators. There was a realization that living with such weaponry was at best a precarious journey into the future, and far more likely, an appointment with unprecedented human catastrophe if not apocalypse. This dark mood of foreboding did produce some gestures toward nuclear disarmament tabled initially by the U.S. Government, but in a form that reasonably struck others at the time, especially the Soviet Union, as a bad bargain—the U.S. was proposing getting rid of the weapons for the present, but retaining the materials, the technology, and the experience needed to win handily any nuclear rearmament race. In other words, the United States offered the world a Faustian Bargain that rested on bestowing trust upon the dominant geopolitical actor on the global stage, and depended crucially on Soviet willingness to go along on such a basis, an option that never seriously tempted the Stalinist approach to world order.


    It should not seem surprising then or now that given the political consciousness of those running the strongest and richest modern states, that this kind of one-sided deal was not an attractive response to nuclear weaponry. Even the governments most closely allied with the United States in World War II, the United Kingdom and France, were unwilling to forego the status and claimed security benefits of becoming second tier nuclear weapons state. And of course, America’s rivals, first, the Soviet Union and later China, never hesitated to develop their own nuclear weapons capability, interpreting security and global stature through the universal geopolitical optic of countervailing hard power, that is, maximizing military capabilities to defend and attack. Thus disarmament faded into the obscurity of wishful thinking, and in its place a costly and unstable nuclear arms race ensued during the whole of the Cold War, with an array of situations that came close to subjecting humanity to the specter of a nuclear war. That this worst of all nightmares never materialized provides little reassurance about the future, especially if public and elite complacency about the risk of nuclear warfare persists.


    What is less appreciated than this failure to eliminate the weaponry in the immediate aftermath of World War II was the adoption and implementation of a Plan B.  The United States pushed hard for the negotiations that led in 1968 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was successfully marketed to most states in the world. The NPT represented a one-sided bargain in which non-weapons states agreed to give up their weapons option in exchange for two commitments by nuclear weapons states: to share fully the non-military benefits of nuclear technology, especially relating to producing energy that was early on expected to be both clean and cheap; and to undertake in good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament as the earliest possible time, and even to go further, and to work toward the negotiation of general and complete disarmament. This nonproliferation agreement over the years, although a success in Western realist circles, has experienced a number of discrediting setbacks: a few countries with nuclear weapons ambitions stayed outside the treaty and managed to acquire the weaponry without adverse consequences to themselves (India, Pakistan, Israel), while others (Iraq, Iran) have been attacked or threatened because they were suspected of seeking nuclear weapons; there has been a virtual failure of will to seek nuclear disarmament despite a unanimous World Court reaffirmation of the NPT obligations in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons; and there has been a discriminatory pattern of geopolitical management of the NPT, most notably ignoring Israel’s nuclear weapons program while treating Iran’s alleged pursuit of a breakout capability as justifying recourse to war.


    This nonproliferation approach has been accompanying by three massive forms of deception that continues to mislead public opinion and discourage serious debate about the benefits of nuclear disarmament even at this late stage: First, the fallacious implication that the states that do not possess nuclear weapons are currently more dangerous for world peace than the states that possess, develop, and deploy these weapons of mass destruction, and have used them in the past; secondly, that periodic managerial moves among nuclear weapons states, in the name of arms control, are steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament—nothing could be further from the truth as arms control aims to save money and stabilize reliance on nuclear weaponry by way of deterrence, and is generally averse to getting rid of the weaponry; thirdly, the phony claim, endorsed by Barack Obama in his Prague speech of 2009 on the theme, that obtaining a world without nuclear weapons is to be sure an ‘ultimate’ goal to be affirmed, but that it is not a political project that can be achieved in real time by way of a phased and verified nuclear disarmament treaty. In actuality, there is no genuine obstacle to prudently phasing out these weapons over the course of a decade or so. What blocks the elimination of nuclear weapons is only the dysfunctional refusal of the nine nuclear weapons states to give up the weaponry.


    It should be appreciated that this two-tier approach to nuclear weaponry is a departure from the approach taken to other weapons of mass destruction—that is, either prohibiting a weapon altogether or allowing its use in a manner consistent with the principles of customary international law bearing on the conduct of war (proportionality, discrimination, necessity, and humanity). Regimes of unconditional prohibition exist with respect to biological and chemical weapons, and are respected, at least outwardly, by the main global geopolitical actors. Why the difference? The atom bombs dropped on Japan were to a degree, despite the havoc, legitimized because used by the prevailing side in what was claimed to be military necessity and perceived as a just war. The contrast with the prohibition of chemical weapons widely used by the German losing side in World War I illustrates the lawmaking role of geopolitically dominant political actors that impose their will on the evolution of international law, especially in the security domain.


    The U.S. reliance on attack drones to engage in targeted killing, especially in third countries (Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan) has raised controversial international law issues of sovereign rights in interaction with lethal acts of war, especially those far removed from the zone of live combat. The increasing reliance on drones during the Obama presidency has produced unintended deaths, civilians in the vicinity of the target and attacks directed at the wrong personnel, as with the NATO helicopter attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers who had been deployed near the Afghan border on November 25, 2011, provoking a major international incident (although not a drone attack, it was linked by angered Palistani officials to similar mis-targeting by drones). There are also unconfirmed reports of drone follow up raids at sites of targeted killing that seem directed at those who mount rescue operations or arrange funerals for prior victims. As with the Bush torture debate the political leadership in Washington has turned for justifications to government lawyers who have responded by developing drone legal briefs that seem somewhat analogous to the notorious Yoo ‘torture memos.’ There are, however, some differences in the two contexts that work against equating the two controversies about post-9/11 war making.


    For one thing, torture has a long history, having been practiced by governments for centuries, and its relatively recent prohibition is embedded in a clear norm criminalizing torture that is contained in the International Torture Convention of 1984. Torture is also enumerated as one of the Crimes Against Humanity in the statute of the International Criminal Court. Drone technology adapted to serve as a battlefield weapon is, in contrast, of extremely recent origin. Nothing in international law exists that is comparably specific with respect to drone attacks to the legal repudiation of torture. There is some resemblance between efforts by Obama law officials to stretch the conception of self-defense beyond previously understood limits to justify targeted killing and the Bush lawyers who claimed that water boarding was not torture. Expanding the prior understanding of the legal right of self-defense represents a self-serving reinterpretation of this core international legal norm by the U.S. Government. It seems opportunistic and unpersuasive and seems unlikely to be generally accepted as a reframing of the right of self-defense under international law.


    Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do with future implications. Although there are some loopholes involving extraordinary rendition and secret CIA operated overseas black sites, torture has been credibly prohibited by President Obama. Beyond this, the repudiation of torture has been understood in a manner that conforms to the general international consensus rather than the narrowed conception insisted upon by the Bush-era legalists. In contrast, drones seem destined to be central to operational planning for future military undertakings of the United States, with sharply escalating appropriations to support both the purchase of increasing numbers and varieties of drone. The government is  engaging in a major research program designed to make drones available for an expanding range of military missions and to serve as the foundation of a revolutionary transformation of the way America will fight future wars. Some of these revolutionary features are already evident: casualty-free military missions; subversion of territorial sovereignty; absence of transparency and accountability; further weakening of political constraints on recourse to war.


    Future war scenarios involve attacks by drones swarms, interactive squadrons of drones re-targeting while in a combat zone without human participation, and covert attacks using mini-drones. A further serious concern is the almost certain access to drone technology by private sectors actors. These musings are not science fiction, but well financed undertakings at  or beyond the development stage. It is in these settings of fhere, especially, where the analogy to nuclear weapons seems most pertinent, and discouraging. Given the amount invested and the anticipated profitability and utility of drones, it may already be too late to interrupt their development, deployment, and expanding sphere of use. Unlike nuclear weaponry, already some 50 countries reportedly possess drones, mainly adapted to surveillance. As with nuclear weaponry, the United States, and other leading political actors, will not agree to comprehensive prohibitions on the use of drones for lethal purposes.


    If this line of reasoning is generally correct, there are two likely futures for attack drones: an unregulated dispersion of the weaponry to public and private actors with likely strategic roles undermining traditional international law limits on war making and public order; or a new non-proliferation regime for drones that permits all states to possess and use surveillance drones within sovereign space and allows some states to make discretionary use of drones globally and for attack purposes until a set on constraining regulations can be agreed upon by a list of designated states. That is, drone military technology will perpetuate the two-tier concept of world order that has taken shape in relation to nuclear weapons, and reflects the consensus that both nuclear disarmament and unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weaponry are unacceptable. In this regard, a counter-proliferation regime for drones is a lesser evil, but still an evil.


    The technological momentum that has built up in relation to drones is probably too strong to be challenged politically. The military applications are too attractive, the technology is of a cutting edge fantasy quality, the political appeal of war fighting that involves minimum human risk is too great. At the same time, for much of the world this kind of unfolding future delivers a somber message of a terrifying unfolding vulnerability. At present, there seems to be no way to insulate societies from either intrusive and perpetual surveillance or the prospect of targeted killing and devastation conducted from a remote location. It may be contended that such an indictment of drones exaggerates their novelty. Has not the world lived for decades with weapons of mass destruction possessed by a small number of non-accountable governments and deliverable anywhere on the planet in a matter of minutes? This is superficially true, and frightening enough, but the catastrophic quality of nuclear weaponry and its release of atmospheric radioactivity operates as an inhibitor of uncertain reliability, while with drone their comparative inexpensiveness and non-apocalyptic character makes it much easier to drift mindlessly until an unanticipated day of reckoning occurs by which time all possibilities of control will have been long lost.


    As with nuclear weaponry, climate change, and respect for the carrying capacity of the earth, we who are alive at present may be the last who have even the possibility of upholding the life prospects of future generations. It seems late, but still not too late to act responsibly, but we will not be able to make such claims very much longer. Part of the challenge is undoubtedly structural. For most purposes, global governance depends on cooperation among sovereign states, but in matters of war and peace the world order system remains resolutely vertical and under the control of geopolitical actors, perhaps as few as one, who are unwilling to restrict their military activities to the confines of territorial boundaries, but insist on their prerogative to manage coercively the planet as a whole. When it comes to drones the fate of humanity is squeezed between the impotence of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.

  • Libyan Delusions

    Martin HellmanBack in March, as NATO attacks on Libya moved into full swing, I wrote three related blog posts (“Libyan Blowback?”, “More on Libya,” and “Let’s Make a Deal!”) that illuminated the nuclear proliferation aspects of our attacks. But, humanitarian concerns trumped nonproliferation considerations, and we attacked anyway. Or did we fool ourselves? Today’s Wall Street Journal has an article “Revenge Feeds Instability in Libya” on page A7 which suggests that we suffered at least some self-delusion:



    Tawergha, which rebels seized last month, … serves as a cautionary tale of what awaits Libya if the sort of victors’ justice Tawergha has endured for weeks is repeated as rebels move into other pro-Gadhafi cities. It could turn whole tribes and regions into disaffected swaths of society, fueling violence and instability. … rebels have been torching homes in the abandoned city 25 miles to the south. … On the gates of many vandalized homes in the country’s only coastal city dominated by dark-skinned people, light-skinned rebels scrawled the words “slaves” and “negroes.”


    “We are setting it on fire to prevent anyone from living here again,” said one rebel fighter as flames engulfed several loyalist homes. … “The revolution was supposed to give people their rights, not to oppress them,” said Hussein Muftah, a Tawergha elder who fled to Tripoli last month, referring to the Feb. 17 uprising.


    UN Security Resolution 1973, which formed the basis for NATO’s attacks on pro-Gaddafi forces, authorized military action to protect civilians. Where is the public pressure to “do something” now? Or were our earlier actions driven – probably unconsciously – more by hatred of Gaddafi than concern for human suffering?


    We need to probe our motivations more deeply before engaging in seemingly small wars. Otherwise, as my three earlier posts show, we increase the risk of a final, nuclear war.

  • Dysfunctional Disarmament

    Ban Ki-moonAs the United Nations Conference on Disarmament begins a seven-week session in Geneva, its future is on the line. Whereas countries and civil-society initiatives are on the move, the Conference has stagnated. Its credibility – indeed, its very legitimacy – is at risk.


    The “CD,” as it is informally known, has long served as the world’s only multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament. Its many impressive accomplishments include the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Much of this progress was achieved during the Cold War, proving that it is possible to create global legal norms even in times of deep political division.


    Yet today, all is not well at the CD. It operates under a consensus rule, and its member states have different priorities. Some want negotiations on nuclear disarmament; others want to ban the production of fissile material for weapon purposes; and still others insist that such a treaty should also cover existing stocks. Some want a treaty on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states to assure them against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; others want a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space.


    But, instead of compromise and the give-and-take of good-faith discussions, there has been paralysis. There was a brief glimmer of hope in 2009, when the sense of paralysis led the Conference to consensus on a program of work. Unfortunately, that agenda was never implemented. As a result, the CD has failed to make any substantive progress for 15 years. We simply must not let one lost decade turn into a second.


    The CD’s future is in the hands of its member states. But the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda is too important to let the CD lapse into irrelevancy as states consider other negotiating arenas. Last September, I convened a high-level meeting at the UN to consider ways to revitalize the CD’s work and to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations.


    The participants – who included dozens of foreign ministers – were unanimous in stressing that membership of the CD is a privilege. So is the consensus rule. Just one or two countries should not be able to block the organization’s work indefinitely.


    The message was clear: no more business as usual. The CD’s member states must recognize that the Conference’s future is at a critical juncture. Continued stalemate increases the risk that some like-minded countries might take up the matter elsewhere.


    After all, the deadlock has ominous implications for international security; the longer it persists, the graver the nuclear threat – from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons, and from their possible acquisition by terrorists.


    I have urged the CD to adopt an agenda based either on the consensus that was forged in 2009, or on an alternative arrangement. Upon my request, the UN’s entire membership will take up the matter in a first-of-its-kind General Assembly meeting this July. That schedule makes the CD’s current session crucial to its future.


    Reaffirming the CD’s agenda offers the prospect of renewed negotiations on disarmament issues. Prior agreement on the scope or outcome should not be a precondition for talks – or an excuse to avoid them – but rather a subject of the negotiations themselves.


    The current stalemate is all the more troubling in view of recent momentum on other disarmament tracks, including last year’s successful NPT Review Conference and heightened attention to nuclear security. With the world focused so intently on advancing disarmament goals, the CD should seize the moment.


    Shakespeare once wrote that “there is a tide in the affairs of men.” The tide of disarmament is rising, yet the CD is in danger of sinking. And it will sink unless it fulfills its responsibility to act.

  • Radiation, Japan and the Marshall Islands

    This article was originally published by CounterPunch.


    When the dangerous dust and gases settle and we discover just how much radiation escaped the damaged Fukushima reactors and spent fuel rods, we may never know how many people are being exposed to radiation from the burning fuel rods and reactor cores, and how much exposure they will receive over time. Minute and above-background traces of Iodine-131 are already showing up in Tokyo’s water supply – 150 miles southwest of the leaking reactors – and in milk and spinach [with a dash of Cesium-137] from 75 miles away. The Japanese government has recently warned pregnant women and children to avoid drinking Tokyo tap water, and I-131 levels 1,200 times above background levels were recorded in seawater near the reactors.


    Aside from sharing the dubious distinction of both nations having been at the receiving end of America’s nuclear weapons, Japan and the Marshall Islands now share another dubious distinction. The unleashed isotopes of concern from the damaged Japanese reactors – Iodine-131, Cesium-137, Strontium-90 and Plutonium-239 – are well known to the Marshall Islanders living downwind of the testing sites at Bikini and Enewetak atolls in the central Pacific, following sixty-seven A- and H-bombs exploded between 1946-58. In fact, it is precisely these isotopes that continue to haunt the 80,000 Marshallese fifty-three years after the last thermonuclear test in the megaton range shook their pristine coral atolls and contaminated their fragile marine ecosystems.


    In fact, it was the irradiated downwind Marshallese on Rongelap and Utrik in 1954 caught in the Bravo fallout – and I-131 – that taught the world about the thyroid effect from the uptake of radioactive iodine.


    The U.S.’ largest [fusion] hydrogen bomb – Bravo – was 1,000 times the Hiroshima atomic [fission] bomb, and deposited a liberal sprinkling of these and a potent potpourri of 300 other radionuclides over a wide swath of the Central Pacific and the inhabited atolls in the Marshalls archipelago in March 1954 during “Operation Castle.”


    The Rongelap islanders 120 miles downwind from Bikini received 190 rems [1.9 Sv] of whole-body gamma dose before being evacuated. The Utrik people 320 miles downwind received 15 rems [150 mSv] before their evacuation. Many of the on-site nuclear workers at Fukushima have already exceeded the Utrik dose in multiples.


    Also entrapped within the thermonuclear maelstrom from Bravo was the not-so-Lucky Dragon [Fukuryu Maru] Japanese fishing trawler with its crew of twenty-three fishing for tuna near Bikini [see The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon by Ralph Lapp]. As the heavily exposed fishermen’s health quickly deteriorated after Bravo, the radio operator Aikichi Kuboyama died of a liver illness six months after his exposure; his is now a household name in Japan and is associated with the “Bikini bomb.”


    Meanwhile, the Japanese fishing industry was rocked when Geiger counters registered “talking fish” [what the Japanese called the clicking sound of the contaminated fish being monitored] from the 800 pounds of tuna catch of the Lucky Dragon in Yaizu and in local fish markets. Much of the Japanese tuna at the time was caught by a fleet of 1,000 fishing boats operating in the fertile tuna waters near the U.S.’ Pacific Proving Ground in the Marshalls.


    In response to the plight and symbolism of the Lucky Dragon, Japanese women collected 34 million signatures on petitions advocating the immediate abolition of both atomic and hydrogen bombs in 1955. Pugwash, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning anti-nuclear organization was founded in 1955 by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein in response to Bravo. The dangers of radioactive fallout from Bravo inspired Nevil Shute’s classic nuclear dystopia On the Beach, as well as Godzilla.


    To quell the diplomatic furor – whereby the Japanese representative to the U.N. accused the U.S. in March 1954 of “once again using nuclear weapons against the Japanese people” – the U.S. paid two million dollars to the fishing company which owned the Lucky Dragon; each of the 23 fishermen ended up with the princely sum of $5,000 in 1956 and the tuna company kept the rest.


    AEC chair Lewis Strauss (who originally proposed nuclear energy “too cheap to meter” in the post-War Atoms for Peace program) told President Eisenhower’s press secretary James Hagerty in April 1954 that the Lucky Dragon was not a fishing boat at all – it was a “Red spy outfit” snooping on the American nuclear tests.


    The legacy of latent radiogenic diseases from hydrogen bomb testing in the Marshall Islands provides some clues about what ill-health mysteries await the affected Japanese in the decades ahead. Also, the Marshall Islands provide insight about ecosystem contamination of these dangerous radioactive isotopes, and what this means for the affected Japanese.


    Profiles of the four isotopes


    o Iodine-131 [radioactive iodine] has a half life of eight days, and concentrates in the thyroid gland about 5,000 times more efficiently than other parts of the body. Traces of I-131 have been discovered in Tokyo drinking water and in seawater offshore from the reactors. It took nine years for the first thyroid tumor to appear among the exposed Marshallese and hypothyroidism and cancer continued to appear decades later.


    o Cesium-137 has a half life of thirty years and is a chemical analog of potassium; Cs-137 concentrates in muscle and other parts of the body. Rongelap Island has a new layer of topsoil containing potassium to help neutralize the Cs-137 left over from the H-bomb tests, but the Marshallese residents remain unconvinced and suspicious about the habitability of their long abandoned home atoll. Meanwhile, the U.S. is pressuring hard for their repatriation despite the fact that most islands at Rongelap will remain off limits for many decades with strict dietary restrictions of local foods.


    o Strontium-90 has a half life of twenty-eight years, is a chemical analog of calcium and is known as a “bone seeker.” Rongelap and the other downwind atolls have residual Sr-90 in their soils, groundwater and marine ecosystems.


    o Plutonium-239 has a half life of 24,000 years, is considered one of the most toxic substances on Earth, and if absorbed is a potent alpha emitter that can induce cancer. This isotope too is found in the soils and groundwater of the downwind atolls from the Bikini and Enewetak H-bomb tests.


    Lessons from the Marshall Islands


    * It took nine years after exposure to the 1954 Bravo fallout for the first thyroid tumor and hypothyroidism to occur in an exposed Utrik woman from the I-131. Several more tumors [and other radiogenic disorders] among the exposed people appeared the following year and every year thereafter. The latency period for thyroid abnormalities and other radiogenic disorders [see below] endures for several decades.


    * Because a child’s thyroid gland is much smaller than an adult’s thyroid, it receives a higher concentration of I-131 than an adult dose. Also, because a child’s thyroid gland is growing more quickly than an adult’s, it requires and absorbs more iodine [and I-131] than an adult thyroid gland. That is, the thyroid effect is age-related.


    * Radioactive Iodine-129 with a half-life of 15 million years and a well-documented capacity to bioaccumulate in the foodchain, will also remain as a persistent problem for the affected Japanese.


    * The Majuro-based Nuclear Claims Tribunal was established in 1988 to settle all past and future claims against the U.S. for health injury and property loss damages from the nuclear tests. As of 2006, the NCT had paid out $73 million [of the $91 million awarded] for 1,999 Marshallese claimants. There are thirty-six medical conditions that are presumed to be caused by the nuclear tests [http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com]. Eligibility for Marshallese citizens consists of having been in the Marshall Islands during the testing period [1946-58] and having at least one of the presumptive medical disorders.


    * The sociocultural and psychological effects [e.g., PTSD] of the Fukushima nuclear disaster will be long-lasting, given the uncertainty surrounding the contamination of their prefecture and beyond. Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton eloquently detailed this uncertain future and fears about “invisible contamination” concerning the Hiroshima and Nagasaki “hibakusha” [“A-bomb survivors”] in his award-winning 1968 magnum opus Death in Life.


    * Noted radiation experts John Gofman [co-discoverer of U-232 and U-233 and author of Radiation and Human Health], Karl Z. Morgan [a founder of health physics] and Edward Radford [Chair of the National Academy of Sciences’ BEIR III committee and advisor to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal] stated that there is no threshold dose for low level ionizing radiation:


        Any amount of ionizing radiation – which is cumulative – can pose a health threat for certain individuals, and especially those with compromised immune systems.

  • Stoking an Asian Cold War?

    This article was originally published by In Depth News.

    Proxy wars between countries was one of the more tragic features of the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR. Both super-powers fuelled the conflicts supplying military materiel and political support while they piously claimed that nuclear deterrence worked so that they themselves never went to war. The U.S. in particular claimed that the George Kennan doctrine of the “containment” of the USSR worked and ere long the Communist giant imploded obligingly.

    Fast forward two decades, and a declining U.S. super power, trapped in economic woes of its own making, is groping for ways to contain a rising China. Proxy wars are no longer possible especially for a super power mired in the morass of Iraq and Afghanistan and encumbered by the unending and ubiquitous “war against terrorism” fighting an unseen enemy.

    What better then than to outsource the task of the containment of China to ambitious India and reluctant Japan? That, essentially, is the subtext of the unusually lengthy Joint Statement that came out at the conclusion of President Obama’s recent visit to India and the rationale for his Asian tour. Unsurprisingly both Japan and now India are the chosen candidates of the U.S. for permanent member status in the UN Security Council.

    The scenario has been a long time in gestation and operation and spans the presidencies of Bush the Son and of Barak Obama giving it the bipartisan support it needs as national security policy. For India — the world’s most populous democracy unable to match China’s poverty alleviation record and bedevilled by home-grown terrorism — the opportunity to escape the stigma of ostracism following the 1998 nuclear blasts was too good to be true.

    The Nehruvian vision of Non-alignment and moral superiority as the key to Great Power status had failed to unlock the door. Now it was self-built economic muscle (and a clever manipulation of the U.S. political system by the wealthy Indian lobby) and a replay of the old “Yellow Peril” cry replayed as a “string of pearls” theory that secured a place at the high table.

    The sophistication of Indian diplomacy will ensure that the new game will be played with finesse and without any of the crudity of the earlier proxy wars. It will garner huge bilateral trade and technology-transfer benefits for itself while maintaining normal relations with China competing at the same time for economic payoffs and political influence with China in Asia and Africa with U.S. support.

    Japan was settling into a low-key role after brief episode of assertiveness under Koizumi and a succession of bland Prime Ministers with little impact on the international political and economic scene. But China’s ill-conceived saber-rattling over the Diaoyu Tai or Senkaku islands plus Medvedev’s ill-timed visit to the Kuril Islands has made her ready to question China on its intentions in the East and South China Seas, recall its Ambassador from Moscow and play hard ball in the Six Nation Talks over North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme.

    It is a dangerous game to play especially since China is able to revive old animosities against the Japanese with its domestic audience and apply economic pressures as well. For the U.S. the revitalization of its old alliance with Japan on the eastern flank of China was long overdue and the rebuff over Okinawa was a sign that Japan had to fall back in line.

    While the speculation over the shift of the global centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific goes on, the Atlantic powers — the U.S. and NATO militarily and the U.S. and the EU economically — are not ready to abdicate their role in global affairs. The logical — and inexpensive — way to continue to exert influence in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is through allies justifying their selection as a natural alliance among “democracies” with a common allegiance to human rights, anti-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation (giving the Obama slogan of “a nuclear weapon free world” a rest).

    The side benefits are to break Non-aligned and G77 solidarity in the UN and other forums like the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of negotiations and the upcoming Climate Change talks in Cancun isolating China at the same time. Possible irritants in the newly forged U.S.-EU-Japan-India axis will continue to be India’s stance regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, China’s human rights record and Myanmar or Burma’s military junta. The adroit management of this will be a small price to pay rather than giving the Republicans the satisfaction of shredding Obama’s foreign policy as they have done with his domestic policies.