Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Author: Richard Falk

  • The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare

    Richard FalkAfter the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the colossal scale of devastation disclosed, there was a momentary embrace of sanity and rationality by world leaders and cultural commentators. There was a realization that living with such weaponry was at best a precarious journey into the future, and far more likely, an appointment with unprecedented human catastrophe if not apocalypse. This dark mood of foreboding did produce some gestures toward nuclear disarmament tabled initially by the U.S. Government, but in a form that reasonably struck others at the time, especially the Soviet Union, as a bad bargain—the U.S. was proposing getting rid of the weapons for the present, but retaining the materials, the technology, and the experience needed to win handily any nuclear rearmament race. In other words, the United States offered the world a Faustian Bargain that rested on bestowing trust upon the dominant geopolitical actor on the global stage, and depended crucially on Soviet willingness to go along on such a basis, an option that never seriously tempted the Stalinist approach to world order.


    It should not seem surprising then or now that given the political consciousness of those running the strongest and richest modern states, that this kind of one-sided deal was not an attractive response to nuclear weaponry. Even the governments most closely allied with the United States in World War II, the United Kingdom and France, were unwilling to forego the status and claimed security benefits of becoming second tier nuclear weapons state. And of course, America’s rivals, first, the Soviet Union and later China, never hesitated to develop their own nuclear weapons capability, interpreting security and global stature through the universal geopolitical optic of countervailing hard power, that is, maximizing military capabilities to defend and attack. Thus disarmament faded into the obscurity of wishful thinking, and in its place a costly and unstable nuclear arms race ensued during the whole of the Cold War, with an array of situations that came close to subjecting humanity to the specter of a nuclear war. That this worst of all nightmares never materialized provides little reassurance about the future, especially if public and elite complacency about the risk of nuclear warfare persists.


    What is less appreciated than this failure to eliminate the weaponry in the immediate aftermath of World War II was the adoption and implementation of a Plan B.  The United States pushed hard for the negotiations that led in 1968 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was successfully marketed to most states in the world. The NPT represented a one-sided bargain in which non-weapons states agreed to give up their weapons option in exchange for two commitments by nuclear weapons states: to share fully the non-military benefits of nuclear technology, especially relating to producing energy that was early on expected to be both clean and cheap; and to undertake in good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament as the earliest possible time, and even to go further, and to work toward the negotiation of general and complete disarmament. This nonproliferation agreement over the years, although a success in Western realist circles, has experienced a number of discrediting setbacks: a few countries with nuclear weapons ambitions stayed outside the treaty and managed to acquire the weaponry without adverse consequences to themselves (India, Pakistan, Israel), while others (Iraq, Iran) have been attacked or threatened because they were suspected of seeking nuclear weapons; there has been a virtual failure of will to seek nuclear disarmament despite a unanimous World Court reaffirmation of the NPT obligations in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons; and there has been a discriminatory pattern of geopolitical management of the NPT, most notably ignoring Israel’s nuclear weapons program while treating Iran’s alleged pursuit of a breakout capability as justifying recourse to war.


    This nonproliferation approach has been accompanying by three massive forms of deception that continues to mislead public opinion and discourage serious debate about the benefits of nuclear disarmament even at this late stage: First, the fallacious implication that the states that do not possess nuclear weapons are currently more dangerous for world peace than the states that possess, develop, and deploy these weapons of mass destruction, and have used them in the past; secondly, that periodic managerial moves among nuclear weapons states, in the name of arms control, are steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament—nothing could be further from the truth as arms control aims to save money and stabilize reliance on nuclear weaponry by way of deterrence, and is generally averse to getting rid of the weaponry; thirdly, the phony claim, endorsed by Barack Obama in his Prague speech of 2009 on the theme, that obtaining a world without nuclear weapons is to be sure an ‘ultimate’ goal to be affirmed, but that it is not a political project that can be achieved in real time by way of a phased and verified nuclear disarmament treaty. In actuality, there is no genuine obstacle to prudently phasing out these weapons over the course of a decade or so. What blocks the elimination of nuclear weapons is only the dysfunctional refusal of the nine nuclear weapons states to give up the weaponry.


    It should be appreciated that this two-tier approach to nuclear weaponry is a departure from the approach taken to other weapons of mass destruction—that is, either prohibiting a weapon altogether or allowing its use in a manner consistent with the principles of customary international law bearing on the conduct of war (proportionality, discrimination, necessity, and humanity). Regimes of unconditional prohibition exist with respect to biological and chemical weapons, and are respected, at least outwardly, by the main global geopolitical actors. Why the difference? The atom bombs dropped on Japan were to a degree, despite the havoc, legitimized because used by the prevailing side in what was claimed to be military necessity and perceived as a just war. The contrast with the prohibition of chemical weapons widely used by the German losing side in World War I illustrates the lawmaking role of geopolitically dominant political actors that impose their will on the evolution of international law, especially in the security domain.


    The U.S. reliance on attack drones to engage in targeted killing, especially in third countries (Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan) has raised controversial international law issues of sovereign rights in interaction with lethal acts of war, especially those far removed from the zone of live combat. The increasing reliance on drones during the Obama presidency has produced unintended deaths, civilians in the vicinity of the target and attacks directed at the wrong personnel, as with the NATO helicopter attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers who had been deployed near the Afghan border on November 25, 2011, provoking a major international incident (although not a drone attack, it was linked by angered Palistani officials to similar mis-targeting by drones). There are also unconfirmed reports of drone follow up raids at sites of targeted killing that seem directed at those who mount rescue operations or arrange funerals for prior victims. As with the Bush torture debate the political leadership in Washington has turned for justifications to government lawyers who have responded by developing drone legal briefs that seem somewhat analogous to the notorious Yoo ‘torture memos.’ There are, however, some differences in the two contexts that work against equating the two controversies about post-9/11 war making.


    For one thing, torture has a long history, having been practiced by governments for centuries, and its relatively recent prohibition is embedded in a clear norm criminalizing torture that is contained in the International Torture Convention of 1984. Torture is also enumerated as one of the Crimes Against Humanity in the statute of the International Criminal Court. Drone technology adapted to serve as a battlefield weapon is, in contrast, of extremely recent origin. Nothing in international law exists that is comparably specific with respect to drone attacks to the legal repudiation of torture. There is some resemblance between efforts by Obama law officials to stretch the conception of self-defense beyond previously understood limits to justify targeted killing and the Bush lawyers who claimed that water boarding was not torture. Expanding the prior understanding of the legal right of self-defense represents a self-serving reinterpretation of this core international legal norm by the U.S. Government. It seems opportunistic and unpersuasive and seems unlikely to be generally accepted as a reframing of the right of self-defense under international law.


    Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do with future implications. Although there are some loopholes involving extraordinary rendition and secret CIA operated overseas black sites, torture has been credibly prohibited by President Obama. Beyond this, the repudiation of torture has been understood in a manner that conforms to the general international consensus rather than the narrowed conception insisted upon by the Bush-era legalists. In contrast, drones seem destined to be central to operational planning for future military undertakings of the United States, with sharply escalating appropriations to support both the purchase of increasing numbers and varieties of drone. The government is  engaging in a major research program designed to make drones available for an expanding range of military missions and to serve as the foundation of a revolutionary transformation of the way America will fight future wars. Some of these revolutionary features are already evident: casualty-free military missions; subversion of territorial sovereignty; absence of transparency and accountability; further weakening of political constraints on recourse to war.


    Future war scenarios involve attacks by drones swarms, interactive squadrons of drones re-targeting while in a combat zone without human participation, and covert attacks using mini-drones. A further serious concern is the almost certain access to drone technology by private sectors actors. These musings are not science fiction, but well financed undertakings at  or beyond the development stage. It is in these settings of fhere, especially, where the analogy to nuclear weapons seems most pertinent, and discouraging. Given the amount invested and the anticipated profitability and utility of drones, it may already be too late to interrupt their development, deployment, and expanding sphere of use. Unlike nuclear weaponry, already some 50 countries reportedly possess drones, mainly adapted to surveillance. As with nuclear weaponry, the United States, and other leading political actors, will not agree to comprehensive prohibitions on the use of drones for lethal purposes.


    If this line of reasoning is generally correct, there are two likely futures for attack drones: an unregulated dispersion of the weaponry to public and private actors with likely strategic roles undermining traditional international law limits on war making and public order; or a new non-proliferation regime for drones that permits all states to possess and use surveillance drones within sovereign space and allows some states to make discretionary use of drones globally and for attack purposes until a set on constraining regulations can be agreed upon by a list of designated states. That is, drone military technology will perpetuate the two-tier concept of world order that has taken shape in relation to nuclear weapons, and reflects the consensus that both nuclear disarmament and unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weaponry are unacceptable. In this regard, a counter-proliferation regime for drones is a lesser evil, but still an evil.


    The technological momentum that has built up in relation to drones is probably too strong to be challenged politically. The military applications are too attractive, the technology is of a cutting edge fantasy quality, the political appeal of war fighting that involves minimum human risk is too great. At the same time, for much of the world this kind of unfolding future delivers a somber message of a terrifying unfolding vulnerability. At present, there seems to be no way to insulate societies from either intrusive and perpetual surveillance or the prospect of targeted killing and devastation conducted from a remote location. It may be contended that such an indictment of drones exaggerates their novelty. Has not the world lived for decades with weapons of mass destruction possessed by a small number of non-accountable governments and deliverable anywhere on the planet in a matter of minutes? This is superficially true, and frightening enough, but the catastrophic quality of nuclear weaponry and its release of atmospheric radioactivity operates as an inhibitor of uncertain reliability, while with drone their comparative inexpensiveness and non-apocalyptic character makes it much easier to drift mindlessly until an unanticipated day of reckoning occurs by which time all possibilities of control will have been long lost.


    As with nuclear weaponry, climate change, and respect for the carrying capacity of the earth, we who are alive at present may be the last who have even the possibility of upholding the life prospects of future generations. It seems late, but still not too late to act responsibly, but we will not be able to make such claims very much longer. Part of the challenge is undoubtedly structural. For most purposes, global governance depends on cooperation among sovereign states, but in matters of war and peace the world order system remains resolutely vertical and under the control of geopolitical actors, perhaps as few as one, who are unwilling to restrict their military activities to the confines of territorial boundaries, but insist on their prerogative to manage coercively the planet as a whole. When it comes to drones the fate of humanity is squeezed between the impotence of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.

  • A Nuclear-Free Middle East: Necessary, Desirable and Impossible

    This article was originally published by Al Jazeera.


    Richard FalkFinally, there is some discussion in the West that supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone for the Middle East. Such thinking is still treated as politically marginal, and hardly audible above the deafening beat of the war drums. To the extent proposed, it also tends to be defensively and pragmatically phrased to reinforce the prevailing anti-Iran consensus.


    For instance, in a recent New York Times article by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull a full disclosure title gives the plot away: “Preventing a Nuclear Iran”. The authors offer us a prudential argument against attacking Iran to avoid a damaging Iranian retaliation and in view of the inability of an attack to do more than delay Iran’s nuclear programme by a few years. Beyond this, an attack seems likely to create irresistible pressures in Iran to do everything possible to obtain a nuclear option with a renewed sense of urgency, as well as to disrupt Western interests wherever possible.


    This Telhami/Kull position is reinforced by evidence that Israeli society is not as war-prone as claimed, and would be receptive to a more cautious and less belligerent approach. They refer readers to a recent Israeli poll finding that only 43 per cent of Israelis favour a military strike, while 64 per cent support establishing a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the region that included Israel.


    In effect, then, establishing a NFZ that includes Israel would seem politically feasible, although not a course of action that seems within the range of options being considered by the current Israeli political leadership.


    The failure of the United States to raise the possibility of a solution to the conflict other than either an Iranian surrender with respect to its enrichment rights or an impending military attack is also discouraging. The silence of Washington with respect to a peaceful regional solution to the conflict with Iran confirms what is widely believed around the world – that the US Government will not deviate from the official Israeli line on security issues in the Middle East.


    The fact that the Israeli public may be more peace-oriented than its elected leaders seems to make no difference to strategic thinking in the US, and what is more, the realisation that the exercise of the military option would have a likely huge negative impact on national and global interest is also put to one side.


    Prince Turki‘s proposals


    Another variant of NFZ thinking is more oriented to the realities of the Middle East. It has most clearly formulated by the influential Saudi Prince, Turki Al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador to the United States and once the head of his country’s intelligence service. He argues that NFZ is preferable to the military option for many reasons, and he believes, in contrast to President Obama, that it should be removed from the bag of tricks at the disposal of diplomats.


    Prince Turki believes that sanctions have not, and will not alter Iran’s behaviour. His proposal is more elaborate than simply advocating a NFZ. He would be in favour of coercive steps against Iran if there is ever convincing evidence that it actually possesses nuclear weapons, but he also argues for the imposition of sanction on Israel if it fails to disclose openly the full extent of its nuclear weapons arsenal.  


    Prince Turki’s approach has several additional features: extending the scope of the undertaking to all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that is, including biological and chemical weapons; a nuclear security umbrella for the region maintained by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; a resolution of outstanding conflicts in the region in accordance with the Mecca Arab proposals of 2002 that calls for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights occupied in 1967, as well as the political and commercial normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab world.


    Prince Turki warns that if some such arrangement is not soon put in place, and Iran proceeds with its nuclear programme, other countries in the region, including Turkey, will almost certainly be drawn into an expensive and destabilising nuclear arms race.


    In effect, as with Telhami/Kull, Prince Turki’s approach is designed to make sure that worst case scenarios do not happen. It is more contextually framed to encompass several larger challenges in the Middle East, rather than confining its rationale to addressing the Israel/Iran confrontation.  


    The Turki proposals have some problematic aspects, including the idea that governments in the region could be expected to rely on the five permanent members of the Security Council to co-operate effectively if faced with a challenge to the NFZ. From another perspective, the proposal might be questioned as a historically insensitive effort to delegate authority over future security issues in the region to former colonial powers.


    NFZ or WMDFZ without Israel


    There is another perplexing feature of Prince Turki’s vision of a peaceful future for the Middle East. He urges the adoption of such a collective commitment to the elimination of WMD in the region with or without Israeli support at a conference of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled for later this year in Finland, which seems to play into the hands of Western hawks.


    Israel is not even a party to the NPT, has so far not indicated its willingness to attend the conference, and if participating, would likely play an obstructive role. What is the point of a NFZ or WMDFZ without Israel? As long ago as the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the Arab countries put forward a proposal to establish in the Middle East a WMD-free zone, but it has never been subsequently invoked.


    Israel, which is not a member of the NPT, has consistently taken the position over the years that only after peace prevails throughout the region, will it consider lending support to a legal regime, prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons.


    The NFZ or WMDFZ initiatives need to be seen in the setting established by the NPT regime. An initial observation involves Israel’s failure to become a party to the NPT coupled with its covert nuclear programme that resulted in the acquisition of the weaponry more than 20 years ago with the complicity of the West as documented in Seymour Hersh’s 1991 The Samson Option.


    This Israeli pattern of behaviour needs to be contrasted with that of Iran, a party to the NPT that has reported to and accepted, although with some friction in recent years, international inspections on its territory by the Western oriented International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran has consistently denied any ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, but has insisted on its rights under Article IV of the treaty to exercise “… its inalienable right… to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…”


    Iran has been under constant threat of an attack by Israel. It has also been the target for several years of Israel’s extremely dirty low intensity war, as well as being the subject of a US Congressionally funded destabilisation programme of the US that is reinforced by a diplomacy that constantly reaffirms the relevance of a military option, and operates in a political climate that excludes consideration of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.


    What is surprising under these circumstances is that Iran has not freed itself from NPT obligation as it is entitled to do. All parties to the NPT have a treaty right to withdraw set forth in Article X requiring only that a withdrawing state give notice to other treaty parties and provide an explanation of its reasons for withdrawing.


    Geopolitical priorities


    Comparing these Israeli and Iran patterns of behaviour with respect to nuclear weapons, it would seem far more reasonable to conclude that it is Israel, not Iran, that should be subjected to sanctions, and put under pressure to participate in denuclearising negotiations. After all, Israel acquired the weaponry secretly and defiantly, has not been even willing to accept the near universally applicable discipline of the NPT, and has engaged periodically in aggressive wars against its neighbours that have resulted in several long-term occupations.


    It can be argued that Israel was entitled to enhance its security by remaining outside the NPT, and thus is acting within its sovereign rights. This is a coherent legalistic position, but we should also appreciate that the NPT is more a geopolitical than a legal regime, and that Iran, for instance, would be immediately subject to a punitive response if it tried to withdraw from the treaty. In other words, geopolitical priorities override legal rights in the NPT setting.


    The history of the NPT has reflected its geopolitical nature. This is best illustrated by the utter refusal of the nuclear weapons states, above all the US, to fulfill its core obligation under Article VI “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”


    The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons unanimously affirmed in its findings the legal imperative embodied in Article VI: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control.”


    This finding that has been completely ignored by the nuclear weapons states (who had made full use of their diplomatic leverage in a failed effort to convince members of the UN General Assembly not to seek guidance from the ICJ with respect to the legal status of nuclear weapons and the obligations of the NPT). The refusal to uphold these obligations of Article VI would certainly appear to be a material breach of the treaty that under international law authorises any party to regard the treaty as void.


    Again, the international discourse on nuclear weapons is so distorted that it is a rarity to encounter criticism of its discriminatory application, its double standards as between nuclear and non-nuclear states, and its geopolitical style of selective enforcement. In this regard, it should be appreciated that the threat of military attack directed at Iran resembles reliance on the so-called Bush Doctrine of preventive war that had been used to justify aggression against Iraq in 2003, and represents a blatant geopolitical override of international law.


    Need to avoid war


    In summary, it is of utmost importance to avoid a war in the Middle East arising from the unresolved dispute about Iran’s nuclear programme. One way to do this is to seek a NFZ or a WMDFZ for the entire region that must include the participation of Israel. What has given this approach a renewed credibility for the West at this time is that such a measure seems to be the only way to prevent a lose/lose war option from materialising in an atmosphere where mainstream pundits are increasingly predicting an attack on Iran during 2012. 


    A NFZ plan has some prudential appeal to change minds in Tehran and Tel Aviv before it is too late, and could also encourage Washington to take a less destructive and self-destructive course of action. Whether this prudential appeal is sufficiently strong to overcome the iron cage of militarism that constrains policy choices in Israel and the US remains doubtful.


    Thinking outside the militarist box remains a forbidden activity, partly reflecting the domestic lock on the political and moral imagination of these countries by their respective military industrial media think-tank complexes.


    I would conclude this commentary with three pessimistic assessments that casts a dark shadow over the regional future:



    (1) an NFZ or WMDFZ for the Middle East is necessary and desirable, but it almost certainly will not be placed on the political agenda of American-led diplomacy relating to the conflict;


    (2) moves toward nuclear disarmament negotiations that have been legally mandated and would be beneficial for the world, and for the nuclear weapons states and their peoples, will not be made in the current atmosphere that blocks all serious initiatives to abolish nuclear weapons;


    (3) the drift toward a devastating attack on Iran will only be stopped by an urgent mobilisation of anti-war forces in civil society, which seems unlikely given other preoccupations. 


    To overcome such pessimism requires a broader vision of peace and justice that is even broader than the contextual approach taken by Prince Turki. It would centre on demilitarisation of the region through disarmament, as well as a firm regional commitment to avoid entangling alliances with external actors, meaning no military deployments or bases in the region. With drones engaging in lethal missions in the Middle East and an array of American military bases, this seems like a utopian fantasy, and maybe it is.


    But maybe also we have reached a paradoxical stage in the region, and possibly the world, where only the utopian imagination can offer us a realistic vision of a hopeful human future.

  • Learning from History? After Sendai

    Richard FalkAfter atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there was in the West, especially the United States, a short triumphal moment, crediting American science and military prowess with bringing victory over Japan and the avoidance of what was anticipated at the time to be a long and bloody conquest of the Japanese homeland. This official narrative of the devastating attacks on these Japanese cities has been contested by numerous reputable historians who argued that Japan had conveyed its readiness to surrender well before the bombs had been dropped, that the U.S. Government needed to launch the attacks to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that it had this super-weapon at its disposal, and that the attacks would help establish American supremacy in the Pacific without any need to share power with Moscow. But whatever historical interpretation is believed, the horror and indecency of the attacks is beyond controversy.  This use of atomic bombs against defenseless densely populated cities remains the greatest single act of state terror in human history, and had it been committed by the losers in World War II surely the perpetrators would have been held criminally accountable and the weaponry forever prohibited. But history gives the winners in big wars considerable latitude to shape the future according to their own wishes, sometimes for the better, often for the worse.


    Not only were these two cities of little military significance devastated beyond recognition, but additionally, inhabitants in a wide surrounding area were exposed to lethal doses of radioactivity causing for decades death, disease, acute anxiety, and birth defects. Beyond this, it was clear that such a technology would change the face of war and power, and would either be eliminated from the planet or others than the United States would insist on possession of the weaponry, and in fact, the five permanent member of the UN Security Council became the first five states to develop and possess nuclear weapons, and in later years, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed nuclear warheads of their own. As well, the technology was constantly improved at great cost, allowing long-distance delivery of nuclear warheads by guided missiles and payloads hundreds times greater than those primitive bombs used against Japan.


    After Hiroshima and Nagasaki there were widespread expressions of concern about the future issued by political leaders and an array of moral authority figures.  Statesmen in the West talked about the necessity of nuclear disarmament as the only alternative to a future war that would destroy industrial civilization. Scientists and others in society spoke in apocalyptic terms about the future. It was a mood of ‘utopia or else,’ a sense that unless a new form of governance emerged rapidly there would be no way to avoid a catastrophic future for the human species and for the earth itself.


    But what happened? The bellicose realists prevailed, warning of the distrust of ‘the other,’ insisting that it would be ‘better to be dead than red,’ and that, as in the past, only a balance of power could prevent war and catastrophe. The new balance of the nuclear age was called ‘deterrence,’ and it evolved into a dangerous semi-cooperative security posture known as ‘mutual assured destruction,’ or more sanely described by its acronym, MAD.  The main form of learning that took place after the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to normalize the weaponry, banish the memories, and hope for the best. The same realists, perhaps most prominently, John Mearsheimer, even go so far as to celebrate nuclear weaponry as ‘keepers of the peace,’ for them the best explanation for why the Soviet Union-United States rivalry did not result in World War III.  Such nuclear complacency was again in evidence when in the 1990s after the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a refusal to propose at that time the elimination of nuclear weaponry, and there were reliable reports that the U.S. Government actually used its diplomatic leverage to discourage any Russian disarmament initiatives that might expose the embarrassing extent of this post-deterrence, post-Cold War American attachment to nuclearism. This attachment has persisted, is bipartisan in character, is shared with the leadership and citizenry of the other nuclear weapons states to varying degrees, and is joined to an anti-proliferation regime that hypocritically treats most states (Israel was a notable exception) that aspire to have nuclear weapons of their own as criminal outlaws subject to military intervention.


    Here is the lesson that applies to present: the shock of the atomic attacks wears off, is superseded by a restoration of normalcy, which means creating the conditions for repetition at greater magnitudes of death and destruction. Such a pattern is accentuated, as here, if the subject-matter of disaster is clouded by the politics of the day that obscured the gross immorality and criminality of the acts, that ignored the fact that there are governmental forces associated with the military establishment that seek maximal hard power, and that these professional militarists are reinforced by paid cadres of scientists, defense intellectuals, and bureaucrats who build careers around the weaponry, and that this structure is reinforced in various ways by private sector profit-making opportunities. These conditions apply across the board to the business of arms sales.


    And then we must take account of the incredible ‘Faustian Bargain’ sold to the non-nuclear world: give up a nuclear weapons option and in exchange get an unlimited ‘pass’ to the ‘benefits’ of nuclear energy, and besides, the nuclear weapons states, winking to one another when negotiating the notorious Nonproliferation Treaty (1963) promised in good faith to pursue nuclear disarmament, and indeed general and complete disarmament. Of course, the bad half of the bargain has been fulfilled, even in the face of the dire experiences of Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), while the good half of the bargain (getting rid of the weaponry) never gave rise to even halfhearted proposals and negotiations (and instead the world settled irresponsibly for managerial fixes from time to time, known as ‘arms control’ measures that were designed to stabilize the nuclear rivalry of the U.S. and Soviet Union (now Russia). Such a contention is confirmed by the presidential commitment to devote an additional $80 billion for the development of nuclear weapons before the Senate could be persuaded to ratify the New START Treaty in late 2010, the latest arms control ruse that was falsely promoted as a step toward disarmament and denuclearization. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with arms control, it may reduce risks and costs, but it is not disarmament, and should not presented as if it is.


    It is with this background in mind that the unfolding Japanese mega-tragedy must be understood and its effects on future policy discussed in a preliminary manner. This extraordinary disaster originated in a natural event beyond human reckoning and control. An earthquake of unimaginable fury, measuring an unprecedented 9.0 on the Richter Scale, unleashing a deadly tsunami that reached a height of 30 feet, and swept inland in the Sendai area of northern Japan to an incredible distance up to 6 kilometers. It is still too early to count the dead, the injured, the property damage, and the overall human costs, but we know enough by now to realize that the impact is colossal, that this is a terrible happening that will be permanently seared into the collective imagination of humanity, perhaps the more so, because it is the most visually recorded epic occurrence in all of history, with real time video recordings of its catastrophic  ‘moments of truth.’


    But this natural disaster that has been responsible for massive human suffering has been compounded by its nuclear and societal dimensions, the full measure of which remains uncertain at this point, although generating a deepening foreboding that is perhaps magnified by calming reassurances by the corporate managers of nuclear power in Japan  who have past blemishes on their safety record, as well as by political leaders, including the Naoto Kan who understandably wants to avoid causing the Japanese public to shift from its current posture of traumatized witnessing to one of outright panic. There is also a lack of credibility based, especially, on a long record of false reassurances and cover ups by the Japanese nuclear industry, hiding and minimizing the effects of a 2007 earthquake in Japan, and actually lying about the extent of damage to a reactor at that time and on other occasions. What we need to understand is that the vulnerabilities of modern industrial society accentuate vulnerabilities that arise from extreme events in nature, as well as from the determined efforts of industrial lobbyists to cut corners at public expense. There is no doubt that the huge earthquake/tsunami constellation of forces was responsible for great damage and societal distress, but its overall impact has been geometrically increased by this buying into the Faustian Bargain of nuclear energy, whose risks, if objectively assessed, were widely known for many years. These risks were accentuated in this instance by situating this reactor complex in an earthquake zone and near to the ocean, tempting known natural forces to inflict an unmanageable blow to human wellbeing. It is the greedy profit-seekers, who minimize these risks, whether in the Gulf of Mexico or Fukushima or on Wall Street, and then scurry madly even in the midst of disaster to shift responsibilities to the victims that make me tremble as I contemplate the human future. These predatory forces are made more formidable because they have cajoled most politicians into complicity and have many corporatized allies in the media that overwhelm the publics of the world with steady doses of misinformation delivered as if the search for truth was their only motivation.


    The awesome reality of current nuclear dangers in Japan are far stronger than these words of reassurance that claim the risks to health are minimal because the radioactivity are being contained to avoid dangerous levels of contamination. A more trustworthy measure of the perceived rising dangers can be gathered from the continual official expansions of the evacuation zone around the six Fukushima Daiichi reactors from 3 km to 10 km, and more recently to 18 km, coupled with the instructions to everyone caught in the region to stay indoors indefinitely, with windows and doors sealed. We can hope and pray that the four explosions that have so far taken place in the Fukushima Daiichi complex of reactors will not lead to further explosions and a full meltdown in one or more of the reactors. Even without a meltdown the near certain venting of highly toxic radioactive steam to prevent unmanageable pressure from building up due to the boiling water in the reactor cores and spent fuel rods is likely to spread risks and bad effects.  It is a policy dilemma that has assumed the form of a living nightmare: either allow the heat to rise and confront the high probability of reactor meltdowns or vent the steam and subject large numbers of persons in the vicinity and beyond to radioactivity, especially should the wind shift southwards carrying the steam toward Tokyo or westward toward northern Japan or Korea.  In reactors 1, 2, and 3 are at risk of meltdowns, while with the shutdown reactors 4,5, and 6 pose the threat of fire releasing radioactive steam from the spent fuel rods.


    We know that throughout Asia alone some 3,000 new reactors are either being built or have been planned and approved. We know that nuclear power has been touted in the last several years as a major source of energy to deal with future energy requirements, a way of overcoming the challenge of ‘peak oil’ and of combating global warming by some decrease in carbon emissions. We know that the nuclear industry will contend that it knows how to build safe reactors in the future that will withstand even such ‘impossible’ events that have wrought such havoc in the Sendai region of Japan, while at the same time lobbying for insurance schemes to avoid such risks. Some critics of nuclear energy facilities in Japan and elsewhere had warned that these Fukushima reactors sme built more than 40 years ago had become accident-prone and should no longer have been kept operational. And we know that governments will be under great pressure to renew the Faustian Bargain despite what should have been clear from the moment the bombs fell in 1945: This technology is far too unforgiving and lethal to be managed safely over time by human institutions, even if they were operated responsibly, which they are not. It is folly to persist, but it is foolhardy to expect the elites of the world to change course, despite this dramatic delivery of vivid reminders of human fallibility and culpability. We cannot hope to control the savageries of nature, although even these are being intensified by our refusal to take responsible steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but we can, if the will existed, learn to live within prudent limits even if this comes to mean a less materially abundant and an altered life style. The failure to take seriously the precautionary principle as a guide to social planning is a gathering dark cloud menacing all of our futures.


    Let us fervently hope that this Sendai disaster will not take further turns for the worse, but that the warnings already embedded in such happenings, will awaken enough people to the dangers on this path of hyper-modernity so that a politics of limits can arise to challenge the prevailing politics of limitless growth. Such a challenge must include the repudiation of a neoliberal worldview, insisting without compromise on an economics based on needs and people rather than on profit margins and capital efficiency. Advocacy of such a course is admittedly a long shot, but so is the deadly utopian realism of staying on the nuclear course, whether it be with weapons or reactors. This is what Sendai should teach all of us!  But will it?

  • Rebalancing the World

    It may turn out that May 17, 2010 will be remembered as an important milestone on the road to a real new world order.  Remember that the phrase ‘new world order’ came to prominence in 1990 after Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. It was used by George W. H. Bush, the elder of the two Bush presidents, to signify the possibility after the end of the Cold War to find a consensus within the UN Security Council enabling a unified response to aggressive war. The new world order turned out to be a mobilizing idea invoked for a particular situation, and not the beginning of a new framework for collective security. The United States did not want to create expectations that it would always be available to lead a coalition against would be breakers of world peace. The apparent commitment, and even the language, of a ‘new world order’ disappeared altogether from American diplomacy right after the First Gulf War of 1991. What one wonders now is whether the Brazilian/Turkish effort to resolve the Iran nuclear crisis with the West is not more genuinely expressive of a changing global setting, perhaps leading this time to something durable–a ‘real new world order.’

    May 17th was the day that the Brazilian/Turkish initiative bore fruit in Tehran, with Iran agreeing to a ten-point arrangement designed to defuse the mounting confrontation with the United States and Israel with regard to its enrichment facilities. The essence of the deal was that Iran would ship 1200 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey for deposit, and receive in return 120 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% for use in an Iranian  nuclear reactor devoted to medical research. The agreement reaffirmed support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as acknowledged Iran’s right under the treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which meant the entire fuel cycle, including the enrichment phase.

    The bargain negotiated in Tehran closely resembled an arrangement provisionally reached some months earlier at the initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency in which Iran had agreed to turn over a similar amount of low enriched uranium to France and Russia in exchange for their promise of providing fuel rods that could be used in the same medical research reactor. That 2009 deal floundered when Iran raised political objections, and then withdrew. The United States had initially welcomed this earlier arrangement as a desirable confidence-building step toward resolving the underlying conflict with Iran, but it wasted no time repudiating the May 17th agreement, which seemed so similar in its content.

    How should we understand this discrepancy in the American response? It is true that in recent months Iran has increased its LEU production, making 1200 kg of its existing stockpile amount to 50% of its total rather than the 80% that would have been transferred in the earlier arrangement. Also, there were some unspecified features in the May 17th plan, including how the enriched uranium would be provided to Iran, and whether there would be a system of verification as to its use to produce medical isotopes. In this regard, it would have seemed appropriate for Washington, if genuinely troubled by this, for Washington to express its substantive concerns, such as requesting Iran to transfer a larger quantity of LEU and to spell out the details, but this is not what happened.

    Instead of welcoming this notable effort to reduce regional tensions, which it had once encouraged, the Brazilian/Turkish initiative was immediately branded as an amateurish irrelevance by the American Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. She insisted that the concerns about Iranian nuclear enrichment be left exclusively in the hands of the ‘major powers,’ and immediately rallied China and Russia (in addition to France and the United Kingdom) to support a fourth round of punitive sanctions that were to be presented to the UN Security Council in the near future.  It now appears that the five permanent members of the Security Council will support this intensification of sanctions that is expected to call for an arms embargo on heavy weapons, travel restrictions on Iranian officials, a boycott of banks and companies listed as linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and a provocative authority to search ships to and from Iran suspected of carrying prohibited items. Such a resolution if implemented would certainly increase tensions in the Middle East without any discouragement of the Iranian nuclear program.  Indeed a new round of sanctions would almost certainly increase Iran’s incentives to exercise its full rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and complete its development of the complete fuel cycle as has been previously done by several other parties to the treaty, including Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, and ironically, Brazil.

    Given the generally constructive character of the agreement reached in Tehran, the uncompromisingly hostile reaction in Washington can only be understood in one of two ways, neither of which is reassuring. If the U.S. Government, with or without Israeli prodding, had already resolved to impose sanctions, then a tension-reducing development of this sort would weaken the case for this coercive approach and needed to be somehow undermined. All indications point to a conclusion that the United States was determined to go forward with sanctions, and was unpleasantly surprised when it suddenly became clear on May 17th that a credible deal had been negotiated. So long as the Brazil/Turkey initiative was given no chance of success, it was encouraged as a way to reinforcing the impression that Iran was not interested in a diplomatic solution, and the political atmosphere would be supportive of moves to tighten anti-Iranian sanctions. When it turned out that the U.S. had guessed wrong, and that the Brazilian/Turkish diplomacy would reach a positive outcome, the American leadership shifted course, and seemed to blame for Brasilia and Ankara for interfering in a policy domain where thy lacked experience and leverage.  The Brazilians gave the lie to this posturing by Washington when Lula released Obama’s letter of April 20, 2010 in which a green light had been given to the Brazil/Turkey diplomatic effort to find a breakthrough that would reduce tensions and calm the region.

    Perhaps, the more weighty explanation of the hostile response has to do with the changing cast of players in the geopolitical power game. If this reasoning is correct, then the United States angry response was intended to deliver a public reprimand to Brazil and Turkey, warning them to leave questions pertaining to nuclear weapons in the hands of what Hilary Clinton called ‘the major powers.’ In effect, the non-Western world should have no say in shaping global security policy, and any attempt to do so would be rebuffed in the strongest possible terms. Here, too, it was probably felt that this lesson could be indirectly given through the anticipated Iranian rejection of the proposed new arrangement. When this didn’t transpire, then the United States would have had to cede graciously part of the geopolitical stage, or do what it decided to do, and try to slap down the upstart Brazilians and Turks. Perhaps, it might have accepted the outcome had it not meant also giving up its plan to rely on enhanced sanctions.  

    The world of 2010 is very different from what it was in the late 20th century. Globalization, the decline of American power, and the rise of non-Western states have changed the landscape. This process has recently accelerated as a result of the world economic crisis, and the unresolved difficulties in the Euro zone. As the famous Bob Dylan 1960’s song goes, “The times, they are a-changing.” Recall that it was not long ago that the G-8 was scrapped in favor of the more inclusive G-20. Recently, as well, much attention has been given to the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. What seems most at stake in this attempt to supersede and nullify the Iran deal is banishing the Brazilian and Turkish intruders from the geopolitical playing field. For the West to claim that the Security Council remains remotely representative of the arrangement of power in 2010 is ludicrous. The identity of the five permanent members made some sense in 1945 following World War II, but today it is unquestionably anachronistic due to its failure to take any account of the fundamental shifts in world power that have taken place in recent decades. Brazil and Turkey were recently elected to be non-permanent two-year members of the Security Council, and have justified their selection by pursuing active and independent paths to a more secure and peaceful world. The old guard in world politics should have congratulated the Brazilians and Turks for succeeding where they had failed rather than complaining, and should have settled for defusing tensions rather than seeking their intensification, but this is not the world we are living in.

    Further, this is not just a childish ploy by to grab a few headlines and tweak the old guard. The confrontation with Iran is exceedingly dangerous, agitated by Israel’s periodic threats of launching a military attack and reports of pushing hard on the United States behind the scenes to move toward exercising the military option that, in Beltway jargon, has never been taken off the table. This prevailing strategy of tension could easily produce a devastating regional war, disrupting the world economy, and causing widespread human suffering. Both Brazil and Turkey have strong national interests in working for regional peace and security, and one way to do this is to calm the diplomatic waters, especially in relation to Iran’s contested nuclear program. The fact that Iran seems prepared to go ahead with the agreement, at least if the UN refrains from further sanctions, argues for giving the deal a chance to succeed, or at worst, working to make the LEU transfer more reassuring to those countries that suspect Iran of secretly planning to become a nuclear weapons state.

    The concern about Iran seems genuine in many quarters, given the inflammatory language sometimes used by President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and considering the repressive internal practices in Iran. At the same time, even in this regard the United States leadership has rather dirty hands. While insisting that Iran cannot be allowed to do what several other non-nuclear states have already done in conformity with Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States has acknowledged that it has been engaged in a variety of destabilizing military activities under Pentagon auspices within Iranian territory. (For confirmation see Mark Mazzeti, “U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast,” NY Times, May 24, 2010). Also, it is impossible to overlook the dispiriting silence that has long insulated Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal from scrutiny and censure, as well as the closely related refusal of the Western powers to back proposals put forward by Egypt and others for a nuclear free Middle East.

    Back in 2003 Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, made headlines by contrasting ‘Old Europe’ (especially France and Germany) that he denigrated as decadent because it opposed the invasion of Iraq, and ‘New Europe’ that was supposed to be the flourishing wave of the future in Eastern Europe that favored American policy. Now it is Old Europe that is again partnering with the United States, and so restored to the good graces of Washington. In this sense, Brazil and Turkey are being treated as geopolitical trespassers because of their refusal to absent themselves from any further engagement in Middle East diplomacy.

    We seem to be witnessing the passing of an era in world politics, which has yet to be acknowledged. It is two decades since Charles Krauthammer, writing in Foreign Affairs, declared that “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.” The abrupt rejection of the Brazil/Turkey initiative can probably best understood as a nostalgic clinging by Obama’s Washington to the ‘unipolar moment’ long after its reality has passed into history, at lease with respect to nuclear weapons policy, including administering the non-proliferation regime. The U.S. Government has been more flexible in other substantive areas, so far encouraging reliance on the G-20 and treating the BRIC countries as virtual partners in the Copenhagen climate change high-level conference of last December.

    Turkey has already demonstrated the enormous gains for itself and the region arising by the pursuit of an independent and activist foreign policy based on resolving conflicts and reducing tensions to the extent possible, with benefits for itself and its neighbors as measured by peace, stability, and prosperity.  Not all of its initiatives have met with success. It tried to encourage the world to treat Hamas as a political actor after it fairly won elections in Gaza back in January 2006, but was rebuffed by Washington and Tel Aviv. Similarly, it brought to bear its mediating skill in trying to broker a peace deal between Israel and Syria, only to have the process break down after a series of promising negotiating rounds. Maybe also the Brazil/Turkey initiative will be effectively beaten down, but it was still definitely worth trying. For the sake of human security such governments should continue trying to supplant war and militarism with diplomacy and cooperative international relations. Outside of Western diplomatic circles it is already widely appreciated that the May 17th agreement showcases the exciting reality of a new geopolitical landscape in which the countries of the global South are now acting as subjects, being no longer content as mere objects in scenarios devised in the North. In the near future it is likely to be widely appreciated that there does exist a ‘real new world order’! At that time, the May 17th initiative might finally come into its own as the day that the North/South divide disappeared with respect to the shaping of global policy and the quest for the peaceful resolution of war-threatening conflicts.

  • Gaza Aid Convoy Killings: “Those Responsible Must be Held Criminally Accountable”

    GENEVA – The UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Richard Falk, urged Monday the international community to bring to justice those responsible for the killing of some 16 unarmed peace activist, when Israeli armed commandos stormed a convoy of ships carrying aid to Gaza.

    “Israel is guilty of shocking behavior by using deadly weapons against unarmed civilians on ships that were situated in the high seas where freedom of navigation exists, according to the law of the seas,” Mr. Falk said. “It is essential that those Israelis responsible for this lawless and murderous behavior, including political leaders who issued the orders, be held criminally accountable for their wrongful acts.”

    There are confirmed reports of lethal interference by Israeli military units on the high seas with the Freedom Flotilla of six ships carrying some 10,000 tons of medicine, food, and building materials to the civilian population of Gaza. Preliminary reports suggest as many as 16 unarmed activists were killed, and dozens more wounded.

    “This peaceful humanitarian initiative by citizens from 50 countries is an urgent response to the continuation of an unlawful blockade that has been maintained for almost three years causing great physical and mental harm to the whole of the 1.5 million people entrapped within Gaza,” the UN independent expert said. “Such a massive form of collective punishment is a crime against humanity, as well as a gross violation of the prohibition on collective punishment in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”

    “As Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, familiar with the suffering of the people of Gaza, I find this latest instance of Israeli military lawlessness to create a situation of regional and global emergency. Unless prompt and decisive action is taken to challenge the Israeli approach to Gaza all of us will be complicit in criminal policies that are challenging the survival of an entire beleaguered community.”

    Mr. Falk urged the world community “to take urgent action in response to this flagrant flouting of international law. It is time to insist on the end of the blockade of Gaza. The worldwide campaign of boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel is now a moral and political imperative, and needs to be supported and strengthened everywhere.”

    ENDS

    Learn more about the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967:  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/countries/ps/mandate/index.htm.

  • Understanding the Gaza Catastrophe

    For eighteen months the entire 1.5 million people of Gaza experienced a punishing blockade imposed by Israel, and a variety of traumatizing challenges to the normalcy of daily life. A flicker of hope emerged some six months ago when an Egyptian arranged truce produced an effective ceasefire that cut Israeli casualties to zero despite the cross-border periodic firing of homemade rockets that fell harmlessly on nearby Israeli territory, and undoubtedly caused anxiety in the border town of Sderot. During the ceasefire the Hamas leadership in Gaza repeatedly offered to extend the truce, even proposing a ten-year period and claimed a receptivity to a political solution based on acceptance of Israel’s 1967 borders. Israel ignored these diplomatic initiatives, and failed to carry out its side of the ceasefire agreement that involved some easing of the blockade that had been restricting the entry to Gaza of food, medicine, and fuel to a trickle.

    Israel also refused exit permits to students with foreign fellowship awards and to Gazan journalists and respected NGO representatives. At the same time, it made it increasingly difficult for journalists to enter, and I was myself expelled from Israel a couple of weeks ago when I tried to enter to carry out my UN job of monitoring respect for human rights in occupied Palestine, that is, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Gaza. Clearly, prior to the current crisis, Israel used its authority to prevent credible observers from giving accurate and truthful accounts of the dire humanitarian situation that had been already documented as producing severe declines in the physical condition and mental health of the Gazan population, especially noting malnutrition among children and the absence of treatment facilities for those suffering from a variety of diseases. The Israeli attacks were directed against a society already in grave condition after a blockade maintained during the prior 18 months.

    As always in relation to the underlying conflict, some facts bearing on this latest crisis are murky and contested, although the American public in particular gets 99% of its information filtered through an exceedingly pro-Israeli media lens. Hamas is blamed for the breakdown of the truce by its supposed unwillingness to renew it, and by the alleged increased incidence of rocket attacks. But the reality is more clouded. There was no substantial rocket fire from Gaza during the ceasefire until Israel launched an attack last November 4th directed at what it claimed were Palestinian militants in Gaza, killing several Palestinians. It was at this point that rocket fire from Gaza intensified. Also, it was Hamas that on numerous public occasions called for extending the truce, with its calls never acknowledged, much less acted upon, by Israeli officialdom. Beyond this, attributing all the rockets to Hamas is not convincing either. A variety of independent militia groups operate in Gaza, some such as the Fatah-backed al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade are anti-Hamas, and may even be sending rockets to provoke or justify Israeli retaliation. It is well confirmed that when US-supported Fatah controlled Gaza’s governing structure it was unable to stop rocket attacks despite a concerted effort to do so.

    What this background suggests strongly is that Israel launched its devastating attacks, starting on December 27, not simply to stop the rockets or in retaliation, but also for a series of unacknowledged reasons. It was evident for several weeks prior to the Israeli attacks that the Israeli military and political leaders were preparing the public for large-scale military operations against the Hamas. The timing of the attacks seemed prompted by a series of considerations: most of all, the interest of political contenders, the Defense Minister Ehud Barak and the Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, in demonstrating their toughness prior to national elections scheduled for February, but now possibly postponed until military operations cease. Such Israeli shows of force have been a feature of past Israeli election campaigns, and on this occasion especially, the current government was being successfully challenged by Israel’s notoriously militarist politician, Benjamin Netanyahu, for its supposed failures to uphold security. Reinforcing these electoral motivations was the little concealed pressure from the Israeli military commanders to seize the opportunity in Gaza to erase the memories of their failure to destroy Hezbollah in the devastating Lebanon War of 2006 that both tarnished Israel’s reputation as a military power and led to widespread international condemnation of Israel for the heavy bombardment of undefended Lebanese villages, disproportionate force, and extensive use of cluster bombs against heavily populated areas.

    Respected and conservative Israeli commentators go further. For instance, the prominent historian, Benny Morris writing in the New York Times a few days ago, relates the campaign in Gaza to a deeper set of forebodings in Israel that he compares to the dark mood of the public that preceded the 1967 War when Israelis felt deeply threatened by Arab mobilizations on their borders. Morris insists that despite Israeli prosperity of recent years, and relative security, several factors have led Israel to act boldly in Gaza: the perceived continuing refusal of the Arab world to accept the existence of Israel as an established reality; the inflammatory threats voiced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad together with Iran’s supposed push to acquire nuclear weapons, the fading memory of the Holocaust combined with growing sympathy in the West with the Palestinian plight, and the radicalization of political movements on Israel’s borders in the form of Hezbollah and Hamas. In effect, Morris argues that Israel is trying via the crushing of Hamas in Gaza to send a wider message to the region that it will stop at nothing to uphold its claims of sovereignty and security.

    There are two conclusions that emerge: the people of Gaza are being severely victimized for reasons remote from the rockets and border security concerns, but seemingly to improve election prospects of current leaders now facing defeat, and to warn others in the region that Israel will use overwhelming force whenever its interests are at stake.

    That such a human catastrophe can happen with minimal outside interference also shows the weakness of international law and the United Nations, as well as the geopolitical priorities of the important players. The passive support of the United States government for whatever Israel does is again the critical factor, as it was in 2006 when it launched its aggressive war against Lebanon. What is less evident is that the main Arab neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, with their extreme hostility toward Hamas that is viewed as backed by Iran, their main regional rival, were also willing to stand aside while Gaza was being so brutally attacked, with some Arab diplomats even blaming the attacks on Palestinian disunity or on the refusal of Hamas to accept the leadership of Mamoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority.

    The people of Gaza are victims of geopolitics at its inhumane worst: producing what Israel itself calls a ‘total war’ against an essentially defenseless society that lacks any defensive military capability whatsoever and is completely vulnerable to Israeli attacks mounted by F-16 bombers and Apache helicopters. What this also means is that the flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, as set forth in the Geneva Conventions, is quietly set aside while the carnage continues and the bodies pile up. It additionally means that the UN is once more revealed to be impotent when its main members deprive it of the political will to protect a people subject to unlawful uses of force on a large scale. Finally, this means that the public can shriek and march all over the world, but that the killing will go on as if nothing is happening. The picture being painted day by day in Gaza is one that begs for renewed commitment to international law and the authority of the UN Charter, starting here in the United States, especially with a new leadership that promised its citizens change, including a less militarist approach to diplomatic leadership.

     

    Richard Falk is Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is also the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories.

  • Barack Obama’s Historic Victory

    This historic victory by Barack Obama is the first truly global election that has been celebrated by people around the world as if they had been voting participants. The reelection of George W. Bush in 2004 was also a national election with global reverberations, but it only aroused widespread feelings of fear and resentment around the world, and no sense of participation. What we are slowly learning is that the United States is the first global state, and as such, its elections become a global, as well as a national, event. From this perspective it is not surprising that peoples throughout the world follow American presidential campaigns and either cheer or lament their outcome. What may be still unappreciated is that for many societies these American elections seem to generate more interest and enthusiasm than do elections in their own country. Barack Obama’s landslide victory in the United States was without doubt an impressive achievement. It also restored international confidence in the health of the American body politic. It is worth noting that if peoples throughout the world had been enfranchised to vote in the American elections, the outcome would have been far more one-sided in Obama’s favor. Perhaps, someday the realities of political globalization will extend worldwide American voting rights, conferring actual rights as the foundation of an emergent ‘global democracy,’ but such a moment seems far off.

    There are many reasons for most Americans to affirm Obama’s victory. It does represent a remarkable threshold of achievement for African Americans who have long borne the cruel burdens of racism. Beyond this Obama’s signature claim to lead the United States derived initially from his principled opposition to the Iraq War from its onset. His unconditional commitment to end American combat involvement in Iraq was extremely popular with voters, and will be tested in the months ahead as the politics of disengagement and withdrawal unfolds. Obama’s campaign effectively championed the theme of change and hope countering the mood of despair associated with the disillusionment after eight years of George W. Bush’s presidency as recently intensified by the sharp economic downturn. The Obama victory, above all, signaled to the world an American willingness to repudiate Bush militarist and unilateralist approaches to global policy. It also clearly expressed a willingness to address the financial meltdown and its economic fallout with policies helpful to the mass of Americans, and not just to Wall Street. This meant a long overdue reassertion of regulatory authority over markets and banks. There will be broad support among the American people for moving in these reformist directions, but the path will also be blocked at every stage by special interests that benefit from keeping things as they are. The joy of the moment risks becoming the disappointment of the hour as the pain, tensions, and intractability of this economic crisis become clear to the citizenrty. The opportunities for this new president are exciting, and seem attainable given his inspirational qualities of leadership. And yet we must realize that the challenges are daunting, perhaps beyond the capacity of any leader to meet successfully, at least in the short run. Time will tell, but what now prevails is an unprecedented mood of high and happy expectations. This will certainly bring a reformist resolve to Washington, but such a mood is fraught with peril. It can quickly give way to a sense of bitter disappointment, and can even give rise to charges of betrayal.

    The most immediate foreign policy issues concern the war on terror, how to withdraw from Iraq and achieve stability in Afghanistan. Obama will undoubtedly do his best to end the American combat role in Iraq as soon as possible, more or less in accord with his promise of completing the process in 16 months. The success of this effort will depend heavily upon what recently semi-dormant Iraqi insurgent forces do during the initial stages of this withdrawal process, and this is impossible to foresee. Withdrawal is likely to go relatively smoothly if the contending forces in Iraq realize that the alternative to power-sharing accommodations and compromises would be a long and bloody civil war, but such an optimistic outlook may never materialize, and then what. The rapid removal of American troops is quite likely to lead to an immediate escalation of Iraqi violence as anti-government forces are tempted to test the will and capability of the Maliki government in circumstances where it is losing American support. If this latter scenario unfolds, it would exert considerable pressure on Obama to halt further withdrawals, or even reverse course. Under these conditions Obama would likely seek to avoid being charged with responsibility for a costly defeat in Iraq. Republican critics will undoubtedly will allege that such regression in Iraq would have been averted had the Bush/McCain policy of indefinitely prolonging the military engagement continued to guide American policy. As is always the case with foreign intervention in an unresolved struggle for national self-determination, uncertainty pervades any policy choice. Obama’s opposition to the undertaking of the Iraq War has long been vindicated, but whether his advocacy of rapid extrication is feasible under current conditions will remain uncertain during the months ahead. In light of these risks, Obama advisors may be tempted to pursue a more ambiguous policy path in Iraq by appearing to withdraw, but actually redeploying most of the American troops in the region, including the retention of a large military presence in Iraq. If Obama opts for such caution it may temporarily calm some conservative critics in Washington and the media but he will encounter sharp criticism from his legions of young supporters who did so much to elect him. How Obama decides to walk this tightrope between the political mainstream and his grassroots movement will shape the early months of his presidency, especially in foreign affairs.

    Obama is simultaneously being challenged by a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan that includes the revival of the Taliban, a weak central government in Kabul, and the mounting political difficulties of dealing with hostile cross border forces located in Pakistan. During the presidential campaign Obama pursued a centrist line on the war on terror by advocating an enhanced involvement of American military forces in Afghanistan without ever questioning whether this underlying ‘war’ should be ‘undeclared,’ and terrorism treated as elsewhere in the world, as a matter for law enforcement and intelligence operations, and taking full advantage of inter-governmental cooperation. Both Obama and McCain favored augmenting American troops on the ground in Afghanistan by at least 32,000. Obama contended that such a shift could be achieved without further straining the overstretched military by assigning some of the departing American forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. What is at stake here is Obama’s double view of the two wars, that the Iraq War was a wrong turn, whereas the Afghanistan War was a correct response to 9/11 but was not properly carried to completion primarily due to the diversion of attention and resources to Iraq. Obama wants to correct both mistakes of the Bush presidency, but at the same time he appears to subscribe to the major premise that declaring “a war on terror,” at least on al Qaeda, was the right thing to do, and that Afghanistan is a necessary theater of military engagement, including insisting upon and managing Afghan regime change. Obama has also made some threats about carrying out attacks in Pakistan, even without the consent of Islamabad, if reliable intelligence locates Osama Bin Laden or al Qaeda sancturaries.

    What is most troublesome about according renewed attention to Afghanistan is its seemingly uncritical reliance on counterinsurgency doctrine to promote American interests in a distant foreign country. General David Petraeus has reformed counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in intelligent ways that exhibit a more sensitive appreciation of the need of American military forces to win over the population and be respectful toward the indigenous culture and religion, but it is still counterinsurgency. That is, it remains an intervention in internal political life by foreign military forces, which is inevitably an affront to sovereign rights in a post-colonial era of international relations. In practical terms, this means that a substantial portion of the Afghan people will probably view the American undertaking in their country with suspicion and hostility, and are likely to be supportive of resistance efforts. There is no doubt that the former Taliban regime was oppressive, as was Saddam Hussein’s regime, but it still remains highly questionable whether a sustainable politics of emancipation can be achieved by military means, and the effort to do so is at best extremely costly and destructive, and often lands intervening forces in a quagmire. This is the overriding lesson of the American defeat in Vietnam, which has yet to be learned by the foreign policy establishment. What has been attempted over and over again is to tweak counterinsurgency thinking and practice so as to make it succeed. It will be tragic if the Obama presidency traps itself on the counterinsurgency battlefields of Afghanistan. It would be far more understandable to mount a limited challenge to the al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but quite another to undertake the political restructuring of a foreign state. It should be chastening to reflect upon the fact that the British Empire, and even the Soviet state with its common border, failed in their determined attempts to control the political destiny of Afghanistan. It will be so sad if the promise of the Obama presidency is squandered as a result of a misguided and unwise escalation of American ambitions in Afghanistan.

    The other immediate concern for the Obama presidency will be Iran. Obama was much criticized during the presidential campaign for his announced readiness to meet with leaders of hostile states, including Iran, without preconditions. It remains to be seen whether Obama will risk his currently strong international reputation by arranging an early meeting with President Ahmadinejad, especially devoted to ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program does not end up producing nuclear weapons. Such diplomacy would represent a gamble by both parties. If successful, it will demonstrate the wisdom of Obama’s approach, and could be the start of an encouraging regional approach to peace and security in the Middle East, especially if the Iraq withdrawal goes forward successfully, and even more so, if it comes that Iran helps to keep Iraq stable during the removal of American forces. But if such an initiative falters, as seems far more probable, then it will erode Obama’s capacity to bring about an overall change in American foreign policy, and it could even lead to heightened regional tensions, risking a widening of the war zone.

    One golden opportunity for the Obama presidency is to reopen the question of nuclear disarmament. The atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 frightened world leaders about the future and created a momentary resolve to find ways to ensure that these weapons would never be developed further or used again. This resolve was soon dissipated by the Cold War rivalry, which expressed itself in part by a superpower arms race, as well as by the gradual acquisition of nuclear weaponry by additional countries. Not since the end of World War II has there been such a realization as at present that the future of world order is severely threatened by the existence and spread of these ultimate weapons of mass destruction. Favoring nuclear disarmament in the early 21st century is no longer just a peace movement demand that is not taken seriously in governmental circles. Nuclear disarmament has been recently endorsed by several eminent and conservative American political figures: Henry Kissinger, former Republican Secretary of State George Shultz, former Democratic Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former chair of the Senate Armed Forces Committee Sam Nunn. Their reasoning is set forth in two jointly authored articles published in the Wall Street Journal that are premised on realist approach to global security and shaped by a preoccupation with fulfilling American national interests. They argue that the gradual erosion of the Nonproliferation Regime makes the possession and existence of nuclear weapons by the United States far more dangerous than are the risks associated with their elimination by way of negotiated and monitored reductions. Both Obama and McCain expressed general support for a world free from nuclear weapons, but without proposing any specifics. Many observers of the international scene since the Soviet collapse have worried about such weapons falling into the hands of political extremists via the black market or through theft, especially given the ‘loose nukes’ contained in Russia’s poorly guarded arsenal of nuclear weapons. Similar worries have accompanied speculations that the government of nuclear Pakistan might be taken over by political elements with strong links to extremists. There is little doubt that an Obama call for a major conference of nuclear weapons states for the purpose of achieving total nuclear disarmament over a period of one or two decades would generate strong endorsements from most governments and great enthusiasm at the grassroots. Of course, achieving a consensus among the nine nuclear weapons states will not be easy, but the effort to do so if genuinely promoted by the United States, would be worthwhile. It would at the same time help Obama sustain his footing on the moral high ground of world affairs even should the effort become bogged down by disagreements. Putting nuclear disarmament high on the American policy agenda would also provide global civil society with an activist cause with wide transnational appeal.

    There is at present lots of commentary acknowledging the changing geopolitical landscape: the rise of China and India, a resurgent Russia, the collective force of the European Union, and the leftward tilt of Latin America. Clearly the unipolar moment of the 1990s has passed, and it seems likely that the Obama presidency will go out of its way to affirm its recognition of a multipolar world. It will also exhibit a far more active reliance on the mechanisms of international cooperation than has been the case in recent years. The Obama leadership will also hopefully do its best to avoid pressures to revive the Cold War, as were evident in the neoconservative call for the defense of Georgia last August, or in its warning of the start of a new phase of international relations based on great power rivalry. A generally hopeful trend in world affairs, pioneered by Europe, is the rise of regionalism in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, which could produce new forms of cooperation and peacekeeping that might encourage Washington to accept a more modest global presence, which in turn would begin the difficult process of acknowledging that America’s existing overseas commitments had so far outrun its capabilities that it could no longer meet the domestic needs of its own population.

    It is likely that this renewal of multilateralism will express itself in a more constructive approach to the United Nations as well as a determined effort to achieve a shared global strategy on climate change. Here, too, rhetorical promise may not be accompanied by corresponding action. The Obama presidency is likely to give an immediate priority to domestic issues, especially in view of the sharply falling economy that has already caused a credit crisis, housing foreclosures, widespread unemployment, huge fiscal deficits, and a declining national product. As a result, it would be almost currently impossible for any political leader to summon the political will needed to commit sufficient resources to deal effectively longer range global challenges. The overall American situation increasingly requires some serious structural moves, as well as crucial readjustments of policy. At present, there is no indication that either Obama or his advisors are thinking along these lines. There is no way that the United States can live up to the Obama promise, or more modestly, free itself from its current difficulties without at least taking the following fundamental steps: reducing its military expenditures by 50%, which means closing many foreign military bases, reducing drastically its global naval presence, and ending its program of nuclear defense and the militarization of space; it also means going all out for nuclear disarmament and the abandonment of counterinsurgency and preemptive/preventive war doctrines; and it would require an abrupt shift in economic policy from a reliance on capital-oriented neoliberalism to a people-oriented return to Keynesianism. Given the unlikelihood of moving decisively in these directions during this first Obama presidential term, it will be important to lower expectations so as to avoid cynicism and despair. At the same time critical independent voices must continue to call attention to these deeper challenges.

    Richard Falk is Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Assessing the Georgian Crisis

    After delays, the Russian promise to withdraw its military forces from Georgia seems to be taking shape. By the terms of the French-brokered ceasefire Russian troops will remain in South Ossetia, plus occupy a security belt of undisclosed width in South Ossetia. The situation remains fluid and far from resolved. The South Ossetian leadership has indicated its unwillingness to have international monitors on its territory as was agreed in the ceasefire arrangement. There are also new indications of breakaway intentions on the part of Abkhasia, the other ethnic enclave hostile to Georgian claims of sovereignty, including the seizure of the Kodori Ridge, a strategic strip of land by Abkhas soldiers in the Caucasus Ridge. There is no doubt that at this point the territorial unity of the Georgian state has been shattered on a de facto basis as a result of the crisis, and that Russia power will act as a guarantor of South Ossetian and Abkhasian autonomy, which will achieve at minimum de facto independence for these two ethnic enclaves.

    Without qualification the scope and intensity of Russian military moves against Georgia deserve legal, moral, and political condemnation, but at the same time Georgian and United States responsibility for the crisis is significant, and should not be overlooked. Russia violated the core norm of the UN Charter by sending its military forces beyond its borders to attack a small neighbor on August 12, doing heavy damage in the densely inhabited capital city of Tskhinvali by firing a flurry of rockets and missiles, including cluster munitions. There are unconfirmed media reports that as many as 2000 civilians died from the combined Georgian and Russian attacks on South Ossetia, with the bulk of these being caused by Georgia. The violence has also displaced tens of thousands, fleeing both the war zone and fearful of being caught in the ethnic crossfire. It has been established that Russia was especially targeting several villages in the region populated by Georgians, which adds an ethnic cleansing element to the accusations of aggression being made against Russia. These violations of Georgian sovereignty amount clearly to a crime against the peace and the military tactics deployed by Moscow are flagrant violations of the laws of war. Beyond this, if the charges of ethnic cleansing hold up, this would seem to make Russia guilty of crimes against humanity.

    The Georgian government of Mikheil Saakashvili is far from innocent. It did its irresponsible best to provoke the crisis, militarily attacking the Russian peacekeeping presence in the minority republic of South Ossetia five days earlier, and doing serious damage to the resident population, even generating Russian claims of a genocidal Georgian acts and intentions. The apparent objective of this major use of force by Georgia was to disrupt the ceasefire arrangements that had been in place there since 1992, which had allowed a limited number of Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia along with contingents from Georgia and South Ossetia as a tripartite peacekeeping force. Saakashvili made no secret of his goal to drive the Russians out and bringing about a regime change in South Ossetia that would install Georgian leaders compliant with the will of his Tiblisi government in place of the current leader, Eduard Kokoity, who is popular with the local population and enjoys the backing of Russia.

    The South Ossetians had voted overwhelmingly in a 2006 referendum to join their brethren in North Ossetia, which enjoys a high degree of autonomy within the Russian state. The disputed sovereignty of South Ossetia poses a delicate issue of self-determination that was just beneath the surface of the current phase of the struggle before the crisis erupted. It has now been brought to the surface by Russia’s formal diplomatic recognition of the political independence of South Ossetia (and Abkhasia), allegedly in response to the Georgian provocation of August 7th that killed South Ossetian civilians and Russians military personnel present in their peacekeeping roles. By taking this step Russia is further antagonizing the West that has seemed so inept in responding to this challenge directed at its Georgian ally. The actual status of South Ossetia is likely to remain contested for the foreseeable future, with Russia, possibly joined by other states, recognizing the de facto independence of the breakaway enclave, and the West continuing to insist that this political entity remains part of Georgia.

    This claim is not as simple as it might seem for several reasons. First of all, it had been the understanding that claims of self-determination that fragmented the unity of existing states had no validity in international law, but this consensus was set aside without much hesitation by European countries eager to facilitate the breakup of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Secondly, the ugly realities in this small enclave of 70,000 or so raise questions about its legitimacy as a political entity, taking into account its small size and considering the prevalence of gangsterism, ranging from money laundering to human trafficking. At this point there is no comfortable solution for the future of South Ossetia or Abkhasia squeezed in a tight geopolitical vise between Russia and the United States/Georgia, and lacking an acceptable self- governing process of its own.

    Thirdly, the Russian principled claim that Georgia’s abuse of South Ossetians and Abkhasians resulted in the forfeiture of its sovereign rights contradicts Russia’s brutal and bloody suppression of Chechnya’s secessionist movement. At the same time, the NATO approach to Kosovo’s independence claims, in the face of Russian opposition, was no less state-shattering than what Moscow is seeking to achieve in Georgia, and resting on the same combination of forfeiture and consensus arguments, that is, Serbia’s violation of human rights forfeited their sovereign rights and the Kosovar consensus favored political independence. As with Russia, NATO led by the United States, fought a war to ensure that Serbia would be divested of its sovereign rights in Kosovo, initiated without any prior approval by the UN Security Council. Such a precedent played a role in seeming to establish a precedent for the sort of unilateralism exhibited in 2003 when the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq, and made a variety of claims, including liberating the Iraqi people from tyrannical rule.

    Our understanding of this seemingly local struggle cannot get very far without an appreciation of these complex geopolitical forces that are at play. There is to begin with the geopolitics of oil, the strong desire of the West to have pipelines from the Caspian Sea area that pass through a friendly country, and somewhat lessen dependency on Middle Eastern oil. This gives the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline a major strategic importance, as well as directly engaging Turkey’s interest in the conflict. This helps to explain why both Russia and the United States are so interested in controlling the outlook of the Georgian government. Here again Saakashvili, and his backers in Washington that include President Bush, have taken a militaristic approach to security for Georgia that was bound to agitate a leadership in Moscow newly preoccupied with Russian border security and international status. The United States has poured military assistance and training units into Georgia ever since Saakashvili came to power, as well as exerted great pressure a few months ago to gain NATO membership for the country, ignoring warnings from the Russian leadership such a move was unacceptable, and would cause trouble. The major European powers, including France and Germany, were quite sensible in opposing membership in Georgia, being unwilling to accept a future commitment that would include an obligation to defend Georgia in a situation such as now exists. The events of August are quite likely to put NATO membership on hold, perhaps indefinitely, although NATO formally did indicate before the recent crisis that Georgia and Ukraine could become members at some future time. From a Russian perspective recent American moves and rhetoric are bound to be troublesome, especially in the wider context of American plans to deploy an anti-missile interceptor system on Polish soil as well as to locate an elaborate military radar system in the Czech Republic. These recent American moves seem coordinated efforts to threaten Russia with hostile encirclement, although they can be interpreted as gestures of support for the governments along Russia’s borders that are disturbed by this obvious effort by Moscow to reassert its will at the expense of the sovereign rights of its neighbors.

    It is impossible to overlook the timing that set off the destabilizing chain of events. The aggressive Georgian posture toward South Ossetia was struck just as Russia was beginning to flex its post-Soviet muscles having apparently regained its geopolitical confidence and ambition. This probably reflects the effects of its sustained rapid economic growth in recent years that has been given added weight as a result of the rising monetary value of its vast energy reserves. Even if Vladimir Putin were a more moderate leader with a better human rights record, Georgian violent provocations in South Ossetia on August 7th would almost certainly produced some sort of show of Russian force, although the extreme rapidity of such a major and organized Russian response raises suspicions that Moscow was waiting for an opportunity for a show of force to challenge Georgia’s sovereign rights. Of course, Saakashvili’s overt hostility to the Putin/Medvedev government seems in this sense to have played into Russia’s hands, especially given the inability of the United States to back Georgia up with any support more tangible than strong words and humanitarian relief. Taking all these considerations into account makes it tragically clear that South Ossetia, and even Georgia, are hapless pawns in the larger geopolitical chess game that is beginning to assume alarming proportions reminiscent of the worst days of the Cold War era.

    We are also witnessing a collision of two contrasting geopolitical logics the interplay of which pose great dangers for regional and world peace, as well as to the wellbeing of the peoples of the world. Russian behavior seems mainly motivated by a traditional spatially limited effort to establish a friendly and stable security belt in countries near its borders. It is reasserting an historic sphere of influence that has always been at odd with the sovereign rights of its neighbors, sparking their fear and hostility. We can interpret Russia’s behavior in this respect as seeking indirect control over its so-called ‘near abroad’ that was mainly lost after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992. In light of NATO expansion to incorporate the countries of Eastern Europe, the assertion of Russian primacy in relation to its former Soviet republics is a high priority for which Moscow seems willing to pay a considerable price, including a deep chilling of relations with the United States. Russia’s behavior in Georgia undoubtedly is meant to serve as a warning to other governments on its Southern border, especially Ukraine, not to opt for strong ties with Washington. The clash arises with the United States, which especially during the Bush presidency, has stressed its intention to encourage the democratization of the former Soviet republics. Georgia was treated as the shining example of the success of this policy. From Moscow’s viewpoint, what was proclaimed as democratization was surely perceived as Americanization, with only a slightly disguised anti-Russian agenda. In this sense, Saakashvali was the ideal leader as far as Washington was concerned, being so avowedly committed to the United States, even sending 2,000 troops to aid the American effort in Iraq, but the worst possible leader from the Russian viewpoint. He spoke of Russia in derogatory terms, and was eager to do what Russia feared, join in a dynamic process of military encirclement as part of the American global security project that has pushed so hard during the neoconservative presidency of George W. Bush.

    In comparison with Russia, Washington considers that the entire world has become its geopolitical playing field in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, and as an aspect of the global war on terror. The United States follows a global imperial logic rather than Russia’s pursuit of a limited regional sphere of interest logic. Thinking along these lines means that Georgia falls dangerously within both Russia’s sphere of influence and is a battlefield in the American attempt to build an informal global empire that acknowledges no geographic limits. The whole world is Washington’s ‘near abroad.’ This tension if allowed to persist is likely to produce a revival of an arms race reminiscent of the Cold War, and could easily lead to a horrifying renewal of the East-West conflict, even reviving risks of great power warfare fought with nuclear weapons. It is not a happy moment, perhaps the most ominous time from the perspective of world peace since the 9/11 attacks.

    There is also much to worry about of a less grandiose character. Russia now joins the United States as a major power willing to use non-defensive force in world politics without authorization from the United Nations, and hence in violation of international law. It adds its irresponsibility to the recklessness of the United States proceeding in 2003 to invade Iraq despite the refusal of the UN Security Council to support the claim of the Bush presidency that the basis for a defensive ‘preemptive war’ existed due to Iraq’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and Baghdad’s demonstrated willingness to use force aggressively against foreign states. In this respect, the crisis surrounding the events in South Ossetia puts at greater risk the grand design adopted after World War II, never either fulfilled or renounced, resting on governments foregoing the war option as a matter of foreign policy discretion except in situations of self-defense.

    There is much to be learned and much to be feared in relation to these recent events. The Russian resurgence means, above all, that the central rivalry of the last half century again must be treated with utmost seriousness. It can no longer be ignored. Ideally, this should encourage countries threatened by the dangerous geopolitical maelstrom to work toward respect for international law and the authority of the United Nations. If such an effort fails, as it likely will, then it becomes more important than at any time since the breaching of the Berlin Wall that both Moscow and Washington exhibit sensitivity to each other’s fundamental interests as great powers. It will not be possible to avoid encounters arising from this clash between regional and imperial geopolitics, but at least diplomacy can do a far better job of avoiding showdowns than has happened in relation to South Ossetia and Georgia. In the end, prospect for peace and justice in the 21st century depend on respect for sovereign rights, and eventually on the repudiation of geopolitics, but we are not nearly there yet. And these developments suggest that the world may be drifting anew into the most dangerous form of geopolitics, namely, reliance on force to resolve international disputes.

    Richard Falk is Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • President Bush’s Iraq Policy Renewed

    The hope that President Bush might move toward an American withdrawal from Iraq was decisively rejected in his important speech of January 10. This was the first response by the American president to the November electoral mandate that was, above all, an unmistakable rejection of the Iraq policy by the voting public. It was also the first formal response to the report of the high-profile Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State, James Baker, and Democratic Congressional leader, Lee Hamilton, that had recommended a gradual American withdrawal, a robust regional diplomatic strategy designed to encourage help in stabilizing Iraq, and a renewed sense of urgency about seeking a solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict.

    In all respects, rather than heeding these demands of his Iraq critics, or at least meeting them halfway, Bush proposed a set of initiatives that moved precisely in the opposite direction. Instead of withdrawal, Bush decreed a clear escalation of the American combat role, deploying an additional 21,500 American troops to be used in Baghdad and Anbar province, the two areas of most intense resistance to the American occupation of the country. Instead of initiating a regional diplomatic effort that invited the participation of Iran and Syria, the president clearly signaled his intention to confront these countries in a more hostile manner that is almost certain to further heighten regional tensions. This unfortunate prospect was given immediate tangible expression the day after the speech by a provocative American military raid on an Iranian diplomatic mission in the northern city of Arbil, situated in the Kurdish region. And to complete the discouraging picture, not a word was uttered about an increased effort to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine.

    How should we interpret this defiant posture? Already this reaffirmation of the old Iraq policy by Bush has antagonized the Democratic opposition now in control of Congress, and has even disappointed and puzzled most Republicans. This Bush ‘stay the course’ stubbornness almost requires Congress to confront the president on Iraq. If Congress acts it would likely be seen as a challenge to Bush’s authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces under wartime conditions, and could produce a paralyzing constitutional crisis, which might damage the political prospects of the Republican Party for years.

    Part of the explanation of the approach adopted Bush involves a recognition of the extent to which the White House continues to be steered by neoconservative hard liners when it comes to foreign policy. Well ahead of the speech it was widely publicized that these new tactics of escalated deployment in Baghdad had been mainly crafted by Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, a hawkish signatory of the pre-9/11 neoconservative blueprint for American foreign policy published under the auspices of the Project for a New American Century. By relying on Kagan and AEI the Bush presidency reaffirmed its ideological identity, while at the same time repudiating the more pragmatic and realistic option offered by the Baker-Hamilton recommendations. If Bush had gone along with Baker-Hamilton, his leadership would almost certainly have received a dramatic spike of popular support from an American public clamoring for relief from a costly and failing war policy. To have so adjusted would have been applauded throughout the world as a brave effort to acknowledge failure and move in a more hopeful direction. But to do so would have meant renouncing the neoconservative agenda of exporting democracy to the Middle East and of refusing to engage diplomatically with ‘the bad guys’ in control of Iran and Syria. At this point, the Bush presidency remains locked in what increasingly appears to be a death embrace with the neoconservative ideologues. It was they who had advocated regime change in Iraq by military intervention ever since Bush was elected in 2000, if not earlier. It probably should come as no surprise that Bush has so clearly cast his lot with this band of neoconservative extremists, but it is still a disappointment that will make Iraq something worse than the tragedy it has already become.

    Most of Bush’s argument on behalf of the approach he adopted was an elaboration of a single thought: “Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.” To avert failure Bush proposed new tactics involving a dramatic upgrading of the American combat presence in Baghdad, including a new willingness to clear and hold neighborhoods presently controlled by both Sunni and Shi’ia militias, including those of Muqtadar al-Sadr. Bush insisted that the success of such tactics depended on the willingness of the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki to be fully committed to achieving such goals of pacification. Such dependence is almost a guaranty of the failure Bush is preoccupied with avoiding!

    The available evidence clearly establishes that the goal of the Maliki leadership is to consolidate Shi’ia dominance, not to share power with its Sunni adversaries as is implicit in the Bush political strategy. Actually, Maliki had been actively pushing for an adjustment of the American role in Iraq that is diametrically opposed to both the Bush decisions and the Baker-Hamilton recommendations. Maliki was seeking the removal of the American military presence from Baghdad, with its combat mission being redefined as exclusively devoted to engaging and defeating the Sunni elements of the overall insurgency, which would leave the Shi’ia in uncontested control of Iraq. Of course, this makes political sense. Maliki owes his position of leadership to the support of the thirty members of the Iraqi parliament that belong to Muqtador al-Sadr’s political party. For Maliki to act against his own strongest constituency, except verbally to appease the American occupiers, would almost certainly lead to the immediate collapse of his government. In effect, then, Bush’s announced plan of stepped up joint pacification efforts in the Iraqi capital seems doomed before being attempted. More than this, to override Baghdad’s policy on internal security in this way is to make a mockery of the purported transfer of sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government, and to add credibility to the opponents of the Maliki regime who regard it as a puppet government.

    The incoherence of what Bush proposes for a revised Iraq policy is pervasive. On the one side, as mentioned, Bush indicates that failure in Iraq spells disaster for the United States, but arguably in most respects ‘failure’ already exists. On the other side, Bush pins his vain hopes for success on cooperation with the Iraqi government on an approach that contradicts its own power base, and is almost certainly a non-starter. How can a radical Shi’ite leadership suddenly turn around and cooperate in the violent destruction of the most militant Shi’ia political formation with which it has been so closely allied. Think back only a few weeks to the execution of Saddam Hussein, whose hanging was presided over by Shi’ia extremists who were shrieking ‘Muqtador! Muqtador!’ even while the noose was tightened around the deposed dicatator’s neck. This grisley microcosm of the political realities in Iraq should by itself have shown how futile it is to enlist the Maliki government in an effort to crush the Shi’ia militia presence in Baghdad. Maliki is himself a Shi’ia militant, not a captive to forces that he wishes, but is presently unable, to control.

    In the end, what may be most scary, is the double likelihood of continued frustration of the American effort in Iraq combined with growing tensions in the region. In such a setting one cannot ignore the Israeli resolve to confront Iran by military means, possibly on its own, but preferably, more indirectly, by exerting pressure on the United States to do so. There have even been several media reports that Israel has prepared an attack scenario that features the use of bunker buster nuclear bombs against Iranian targets associated with their nuclear program. Such war plans, even if only hypothetical, involve the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki that a government seems to be seriously contemplating the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of its foreign policy. If anything is likely to hasten the collapse of the nonproliferation regime, already tottering, it is such a reckless wielding of nuclear weapons for purposes other than self-defense and deterrence.

    Although American military resources are spread thin, such an expansion of the war zone has some attractive features from the perspective of the neoconservative planners who continue to hold sway in Washington. In one respect, Rumsfeld’s ghost may be a player in this new phase of Middle Eastern diplomacy. The most notorious of the so-called ‘Rumsfeld rules’ fits the present situation—‘if a problem seems insoluble, make it bigger.’ Extending the war zone to Iran and Syria would make the challenge bigger, and divert attention from a deteriorating situation in Iraq. What is more, with Israel strongly behind such an expansion, the Democrats in America might find themselves badly divided and politically confused. And from the perspective of neoconservative priorities, Iraq was always regarded as a prelude to the main goal, which was to achieve regime change in Tehran and Damascus. This kind of objective seems less outlandish as a result of the apocalyptic language used by Mahmoud Ahmedinejad with respect to Israel. As new setbacks in Iraq capture media headlines, the Bush leadership would have to choose between a final admission of humiliating defeat, which it has repeatedly defined as an unacceptable American disaster, or embarking on a regional war, which will end up being a much worse American disaster, but probably not immediately. It may gain the Bush time he desperately needs to end his term in office, and manage to slink back to civilian life on his Crawford ranch before the sky falls.

    We can only hope that prudence intrudes to stop this gathering momentum that is propelling the region toward a calamitous culmination of the neoconservative crusade. It is not a time for American friends in the region and Europe to be silent. It is a great opportunity for Ankara to show that it is an independent actor in the Middle East that has a strategic stake in the conflict, but that also has a constructive view of peace and security for the region.

     

     

    Richard Falk is professor emeritus of international law and practice at Princeton University, and visiting distinguished professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

  • The Middle East and the World Five Years After 9/11

    This is an excellent moment to evaluate what has happened since September 11, 2001. Five years have passed since the dramatic attacks on the highly symbolic American targets, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The US Government has launched wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. A third war, with likely graver consequences, is threatened in the months ahead against Iran. In a speech given in Atlanta, Georgia in early September, President Bush declared that “America is safer” than it was five years ago, “and America is winning the war on terror.” Bush also insisted that this is not only a war against Islamic extremism, but is also “the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century,” a struggle that “threatens all civilized nations.” The American president claimed that “today the civilized world stands together to defend our freedom..to defeat the terrorists” and thereby “secure the peace for generations to come.” A sober appraisal of the facts do not support the American president on any of these contentions.

    Much of the world, including the peoples of the Middle East and countries long allied do not share such a self-congratulatory interpretation of the American role in the post-9/11 world. According to independent polls taken in a variety of countries the Bush approach to world order is not popular elsewhere. When asked if they approved of the American ‘global war on terror,’84% in Egypt, 77% in Turkey, and 74% in Jordan responded ‘No.’ Similar results were found among America’s traditional allies. 76% of those polled in Spain and 57% in France expressed their overall disapproval of the American response to September 11th. A reliable survey of world opinion also found that in recent years that far more people fear the role of the United States in the world than that of al Qaeda.

    What has troubled thoughtful observers more than anything else has been the stubborn American insistence that the only viable response to the 9/11 attacks was to declare ‘war’ on a violent adversary such as al Qaeda, a shadowy transnational network without either a distinct territorial base or allegiance to any specific state. This mistake was further compounded by extending the orbit of the war far beyond al Qaeda to encompass all forms of non-state violence within the operative definition of the ‘terrorist’ threat. Such an extension of the conflict by the US Government encouraged such countries as Israel, Russia, and China to treat self-determination movements within and near their borders as belonging to the war against terror. Both the futility and injustice of treating the Palestinians, the Chechens, and the people of Xingiang as part of the same struggle as that unleashed by the 9/11 attacks was to distort and deflect a more genuine and focused pursuit of security for the United States, as well as give governments around the world an unconditional mandate to engage in uncontrolled violence and oppression against non-state movements seeking human rights and self-determination.

    Additionally, two closely linked counter-terrorist policies were enunciated by President Bush that further escalated and spread the war zone: states that ‘harbored’ terrorists within their borders would be held as responsible as the terrorists, and would be regarded as legitimate targets for attack; and if a state does not join the US in the counter-terrorist war, then it will be viewed as an enemy (“You are either with us or you are with the terrorists). This logic was initially applied, with some plausibility, to justify attacking Afghanistan, and overthrowing its Taliban government. This seemed reasonable to many moderate oberservers at the time, although stretching the limits of international law, because Afghanistan did seem to provide a safe haven for the leadership of al Qaeda, as well as providing the site for extensive terrorist training facilities that led more or less directly to the 9/11 attacks. It did seem necessary at the time to destroy this al Qaeda base of operations to lessen the prospect of future attacks. Waging war against Afghanistan as a whole was always more problematic, especially if considered a precedent for future wars. It is true that the Kabul government had few friends among governments, and the Taliban regime had surely committed some severe Crimes Against Humanity that shocked the world. The American claim that it was rescuing the people of the country from oppression and famine seems much shakier after five years than it did at first. The latest reports indicate the highest ever production rates of narcotic drugs, a revival of the Taliban and armed struggle, and much evidence of corruption and warlordism arising from the American-led occupation. Beyond this, the main rationale for the war was the opportunity to capture the al Qaeda leadership so that it could not plan and carry out further terrorist attacks, a mission pursued so incompetently as to ensure failure. Five years later al Qaeda is still a potent force, although its operational base has mutated in some respects, relying on likeminded extremist groups around the world, and Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri are still at large.

    But worse than Afghanistan, in many respects, was Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was undertaken despite the absence of a connection with the perpetrators of 9/11, a conclusion now even acknowledged by US governmental investigations. The argument that Iraq under Saddam Hussein posed an intolerable threat because of its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction never convinced either the UN Security Council, world public opinion, or most of America’s most trusted allies, and yet the invasion of this country went ahead. The attack on Iraq was widely regarded as illegal, immoral, and imprudent in the extreme. This impression was reinforced by the subsequent failure of the invaders to find any weapons of mass destruction, despite pre-invasions claims of hard evidence that such arsenals existed. Criticism of the Iraq undertaking also mounted as the brutality and incompetence of the occupation became unmistakably clear. Instead of liberation, what ensued under the American-led occupation seemed crudely abusive of the Iraqi people and their culture. Rather than diminish 9/11 kinds of activities, the Iraq experience has significantly strengthened anti-American violent extremism in the region. Three years after the invasion, Iraq remains ravaged and war torn, caught in an escalating spiral of violence that threatens to spill over its borders, dangerously agitating relations throughout the region between Sunnis and Shi’ias. In going forward with its Iraq policy, and refusing to acknowledge the failure of the occupation, the United States has damaged its credibility as a global leader, as well as weakened the authority of the United Nations and of international law generally. The precedent of recourse to war in a situation other than self-defense fundamentally rewrites the Charter restrictions on aggressive war that were such a central aspect of the laudable effort to construct a world order after 1945 that was less prone to war. This resolve to prevent future wars was led by American diplomacy after World War II, which also featured the punishment of surviving German leaders at Nuremberg for their role in planning and waging aggressive war.

    Most regrettable is the missed opportunity to react in a constructive fashion to the 9/11 attacks. Immediately after these attacks there was a world display of solidarity with the United States, including even demonstrations of support in Tehran and the Palestinian Territories. Had the United States taken advantage of this climate of opinion it could have pursued those charged with violent acts, including those of 9/11 by reliance on greatly enhanced law enforcement, sustained by much improved transnational framework of police and paramilitary cooperation. Looking back on the five years, most of the success in weakening al Qaeda, and preventing further terrorist attacks, has resulted from police and intelligence efforts. In contrast, the war paradigm has proved dysfunctional, wasting enormous resources and lives, undermining the legitimacy of the struggle, and inducing many young persons to opt for political extremism.

    The recently concluded Lebanon War gives added weight to this set of conclusions. Israel launched an aggressive war against Lebanon, implicitly relying on the American doctrine that a territorial state will henceforth be held fully responsible and punished for the acts of non-state actors that operate within its borders. The real adversary of Israel was supposedly Hezbollah, which was historically a resistance movement dedicated to the removal of the Israeli presence from Lebanese territory. It should be recalled that Hezbollah was formed in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and its refusal to withdraw from the southern part of the country. As the 2006 war demonstrated anew, military superiority often cannot be translated into political outcomes when the adversary, as was the case with Hezbollah, was a well-entrenched, indigenous political movement, with a strong base of popular support. Israel managed to cause much destruction and suffering, but in the end Hezbollah was not defeated. It emerged stronger, and Israel’s military credibility was weakened. American support for Israel’s war, and its role in neutralizing efforts to obtain an early ceasefire in the UNSC added a vivid new justification to those forces opposing the post-9/11 tactics adopted by the United States, and now imitated by Israel with American backing.

    The tactics relied upon in Lebanon represent more than practical failures. They represent a long step backward with respect to international law and morality. What Israel claimed it was entitled to do was to launch a full-scale war against a relatively defenseless state on the basis of a routine border incident. Because of the difficulty of using war as an instrument against armed resistance forces, the Israel/American policy relies on disproportionate and indiscriminate force to intimidate an adversary, inflicting massive doses of collective punishment on civilian societies. This is essentially a terrorist logic: inflicting so much suffering on the government and people of Lebanon that it will be compelled to decide on the basis of its self-interest that it must surrender to Israeli demands with respect to Hezbollah. But the logic backfired, and the political leverage of Hezbollah within Lebanon is probably greater than it was before the war began.

    My main argument is that war and excessive force have been ineffective in achieving their goals and dangerously destructive of world order. The United States and Israel have persisted with such an approach in the Middle East since 9/11 despite this record of unsuccess. There are three main explanations. The first explanation has to do with the outlook of political leaders. Major states are governed by individuals with a military mentality who are not sensitive to the limits of power when dealing with the sorts of conflicts that exist in the contemporary world. Because of this constricted imagination, the more military efforts prove unable to reach their anticipated goals, the more ardent will be their pursuit. Instead of adjusting to the failure, and switching to more effective political means and police efforts, the tendency as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza is to intensify the military approach, and expand the war zone.

    The second explanation is the unwillingness of the leadership in Washington to address the legitimate grievances that give rise to political extremism. Far more expedient than attacking countries, would be exerting pressure on Israel to reach a fair outcome of the conflict with the Palestinian people. Ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, as agreed unanimously in the Security Council almost forty years ago, would diminish the appeal of extremism in the region, and greatly reduce the resentment of the American role that is so widely felt by the people of the Islamic world.

    The third explanation is the most important, yet difficult to document. The response to 9/11 established a political climate that allowed the neoconservative foreign policy advisors of President Bush to implement their long advocated grand strategy in the Middle East in conjunction with the conduct of the global war on terror. This grand strategy pre-existed 9/11, and focused on the shift from Europe to the Middle East as the main strategic battleground to shape the future of the world. This outlook led to giving the highest foreign policy priority to gaining hegemonic authority in the region to safeguard control over its energy resources, to guide its ideological evolution, and to prevent anti-Western political behavior by its leading governments. Neoconservatives, in collaboration with right-wing Israelis, had believed for many years that their long-term interests in the region could only be protected by achieving ‘regime change’ through military intervention in a series of countries they regarded as problematic including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and most of all, Iran. 9/11 created the political mandate that had been previously lacking. Among the problems with this approach was an over-estimation on the role of military superiority, and the tension between a successful counter-terrorist policy and the grand strategy objective of controlling the region. But despite the setbacks in Iraq and Lebanon, this policy has not been abandoned by the Bush administration, and underlies the intensifying confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program.

    From these perspectives, there never should have been a global war on terror, and there certainly should not have been an American/Israeli partnership to reconfigure by force of arms the internal political governing arrangements in a series of countries perceived as hostile. Unfortunately, the region and the world are more dangerous than five years ago, and future prospects are not encouraging. Whether internal political change in the United States can generate a more constructive approach will determine whether the decline in global security of the past five years can be reversed in the next five.

     

    Richard Falk is the Board Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara.