Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Author: The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

  • 75 U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
    Contact: Dave Robinson
    814-453-4955 Ext. 235

    Erie, PA — Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it’s the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons, say 73 U.S. Catholic bishops in a report issued today by Pax Christi USA, the national Catholic peace and justice organization. The report, “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States,” critiques current U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral statement, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which allowed for the morality of nuclear deterrence on the condition that it only be an interim measure tied to progressive disarmament. Further Catholic Church teaching has since called for a concrete policy of nuclear elimination. “With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we feel our statement is both timely and prophetic,” says Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond, Va. and president of Pax Christi USA. “We hope it will help generate further discussions both within the Catholic community and in the policy-making circles of our government.”

    The report recognizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and offers a warning. “Because of the horrendous results if these weapons were to be used, and what we see as a greater liklihood of their use, we feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence,” the report states. Coming in the wake of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the report calls for the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process that will lead to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons the way that the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have banned those weapons.

    “What the Indian and Pakistani tests make clear is that the discriminatory nature of current nonproliferation efforts will not free the world of the threat posed by these weapons,” says Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Mich., and a leading expert on nuclear deterrence in the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. “The choice today is clear. Either all nations must give up the right to possess these weapons or all nations will claim that right. The events in India and Pakistan must be recognized as a sign of what is inevitable. We must act now to avoid a future where the nuclear threat becomes the currency of international security.”

    Citing the $60 billion Department of Energy program known as Stockpile Stewardship and Management, as well as current administration policies, the bishops conclude that the United States plans to rely on nuclear weapons indefinitely. “Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test, and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States (and the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new design and testing capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with ‘progressive disarmament’ and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely,” state the bishops.

    -30-

    The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
    An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States

    Issued on the 15th Anniversary of Challenge of Peace,
    God’s Promise and Our Response

    June 1998

    Dear Sisters and Brothers,

    We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.

    In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral Letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, grappled with the unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their use would not be morally justified.i We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military objective.

    Deterrence
    Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward progressive disarmament.

    Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It depended on three criteria:

    a) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy only. As we stated then, “We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace;”

    b) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim was only “to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;” and

    c) a reliance on deterrence must be used “not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament.”

    In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, we further specified that “progressive disarmament” must mean a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a concrete policy goal

    A New Moment
    In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were considered two historical forces against each other — capitalism in the West and communism in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each other’s ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no longer exists. The United States is now aiding its democratic successor, the Russian Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications and new missions to fulfill.

    But, with the end of the Cold War came new hope. World opinion has coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of this opinion we note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary, destabilizing and must be outlawed.vi We also note the historic International Court of Justice opinion of July 1996 that, “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The Court went on to say, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, “If biological weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear [weapon]. Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge.

    Unfortunately the monumental political changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely clear to us that the present US policy does not include a decisive commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. “Flexible targeting strategies” are aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons or other threats to US national interests.ix This expanded role of the US nuclear deterrent is unacceptable.

    A New Arms Race
    In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (which will ban full-scale underground nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with “progressive disarmament” and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.

    Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as well as other undefined vital US interests abroad.xii Does not this policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come? The Department of Energy’s own timetable for the Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop, test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983. Rather, it is the manifestation of the very reliance on nuclear nproliferation Treaty.

    In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats: “The United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons.”xv Nuclear deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to these goals.

    Inherent Dangers
    The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included the intention to use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and so-called “rogue nations.” The inherent instability in a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That danger can become manifest if but one so-called “rogue state” calls the deterrent bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of nuclear weapons. This must not be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.

    Moral Conclusions
    Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but rather has become the very “long-term basis for peace” that we rejected in 1983.

    b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of vital national interests abroad.

    c) although the United States and the republics that made up the former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the US intends to retain its nuclear deterrent into the indefinite future.

    Gospel Call of Love
    As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the words of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, “by their cost alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve.”xvi We speak out of love for both victims and the executioners, believing that “the whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5-14).

    It is out of this love that we raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in October 1997:

    “The work that this committee (1st Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention must be increased. Those nuclear weapons states resisting such negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. “This is a moral challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be met by the application of our humanity.”

    We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not. Instead, they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be used by someone.

    Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II’s warning that “violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence.”

    On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.

    May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
    Anthony S. Apuron, OFM, Cap.
    Archbishop of Agana, Guam

    Victor Balke
    Bishop of Crookston, MN

    William D. Borders
    Archbishop of Baltimore, MD (ret.)

    Joseph M. Breitenbeck
    Bishop of Grand Rapids, MI (ret.)

    Charles A. Buswell
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO (ret.)

    Matthew H. Clark
    Bishop of Rochester, NY

    Thomas J. Connolly
    Bishop of Baker, OR

    Patrick R. Cooney
    Bishop of Gaylord, MI

    Thomas V. Daily
    Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    James J. Daly
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY (ret.)

    Nicholas D’Antonio, OFM
    Bishop of New Orleans, LA (ret.)

    Joseph P. Delaney
    Bishop of Fort Worth, TX

    Norbert L. Dorsey, C.P
    Bishop of Orlando, FL

    Joseph A. Ferrario
    Bishop of Honolulu, HI (ret.)

    John J. Fitzpatrick
    Bishop of Brownsville, TX (ret.)

    Patrick F. Flores
    Archbishop of San Antonio, TX

    Joseph A. Fiorenza
    Bishop of Galveston-Houston, TX

    Raphael M. Fliss
    Bishop of Superior, WI

    Marion F. Forst
    Bishop of Dodge City, KS (ret.)

    Benedict C. Franzetta
    Auxiliary Bishop of Youngstown, OH (ret.)

    Raymond E. Goedert
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    John R. Gorman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    F. Joseph Gossman
    Bishop of Raleigh, NC

    Thomas J. Gumbleton
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI

    Richard C. Hanifen
    Bishop of Colorado Springs, CO

    Edward D. Head
    Bishop of Buffalo, NY (ret.)

    Joseph L. Howze
    Bishop of Biloxi, MS

    Howard J. Hubbard
    Bishop of Albany, NY

    William A. Hughes
    Bishop of Covington, KY (ret.)

    Raymond G. Hunthausen
    Archbishop of Seattle, WA (ret.)

    Joseph L. Imesch
    Bishop of Joliet, IL

    Michael J. Kaniecki, S.J.
    Bishop of Fairbanks, AK

    Raymond A. Lucker
    Bishop of New Ulm, MN

    Dominic A. Marconi
    Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NJ

    Joseph F. Maguire
    Bishop of Springfield, MA (ret.)

    Leroy T. Matthiesen
    Bishop of Amarillo, TX (ret.)

    Edward A. McCarthy
    Archbishop of Miami, FL (ret.)

    John E. McCarthy
    Bishop of Austin, TX

    Lawrence J. McNamara
    Bishop of Grand Island, NE

    John J. McRaith
    Bishop of Owensboro, KY

    Dale J. Melczek
    Bishop of Gary, IN

    Donald W. Montrose
    Bishop of Stockton, CA

    Robert M. Moskal
    Bishop of St. Josaphat in Parma, OH

    Michael J. Murphy
    Bishop of Erie, PA (ret.)

    P. Francis Murphy
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    William C. Newman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    James D. Niedergeses
    Bishop of Nashville, TN (ret.)

    Edward. J. O’Donnell
    Bishop of Lafayette, LA

    Albert H. Ottenweller
    Bishop of Steubenville, OH (ret.)

    Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S.
    Bishop of Gallup, NM

    A. Edward Pevec
    Auxiliary Bishop of Cleveland, OH

    Michael D. Pfeifer, O.M.I.
    Bishop of San Angelo, TX

    Kenneth J. Povish
    Bishop of Lansing, MI (ret.)

    Francis A. Quinn
    Bishop of Sacramento, CA (ret.)

    John R. Roach
    Archbishop of St. Paul /Minneapolis, MN (ret.)

    Frank J. Rodimer
    Bishop of Paterson, NJ

    Peter A. Rosazza
    Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford, CT

    Joseph M. Sartoris
    Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, CA

    Walter J. Schoenherr
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI (ret.)

    Roger L. Schwietz, OMI
    Bishop of Duluth, MN

    Daniel E. Sheehan
    Archbishop of Omaha, NE (ret.)

    Richard J. Sklba
    Auxiliary Bishop of Milwaukee, WI

    John J. Snyder
    Bishop of St. Augustine, FL

    George H. Speltz
    Bishop of St. Cloud, MN (ret.)

    Kenneth D. Steiner
    Auxiliary Bishop of Portland, OR

    Joseph M. Sullivan
    Auxiliary Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    Walter F. Sullivan
    Bishop of Richmond, VA

    Arthur N. Tafoya
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO

    Elliot G. Thomas
    Bishop of St. Thomas, VI

    David B. Thompson
    Bishop of Charleston, SC

    Kenneth E. Untener
    Bishop of Saginaw, MI

    Loras J. Watters
    Bishop of Winona, CA (ret.)

    Emil A. Wcela
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY

    __________________________________

    1 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, NCCB, 1983, No. 150. 
    2 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 186 
    3 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 185 & 188 (1) 
    4John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations Special Session On Disarmament, 1982,” #8 
    5 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    6 New York Times, December 6, 1996, Statement on Nuclear Weapons by 61 International Generals and Admirals. 
    7 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the (Il)legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996. 
    8 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    9 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.10 
    10 President William J. Clinton, Letter of Transmittal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate, Sept. 22, 1997. 
    11 Western States Legal Foundation, A Faustian Bargain: Why “Stockpile Stewardship” is Incompatible with the Process of Nuclear Disarmament, March 1998. 
    12 Reported in the Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1. 13 Information shared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Senior NIF Scientist, William J. Hogan with Pax Christi USA Delegation to LLNL, October 7, 1997. 
    14 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.9. 
    15 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    16 Giovanni Cheli, Permanent Representative for the Holy See Observer Mission to the United Nations, United Nations 1st Special Session on Disarmament, 1976. 
    17 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    18 Pope John Paul II, Address to Pax Christi International, May 29, 1995.

  • The Universal Declaration at Fifty: David Krieger interviews with Richard Falk

    DK: As we approach the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights how do you assess the progress in implementing its important standards?

    RF: The formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 50 years ago was an achievement that has produced results far in excess of anything that could reasonably have been anticipated at the time it was adopted. It was originally viewed as an awkward response to vague aspirations and public opinion. There was no real feeling of serious commitment surrounding its adoption. It was a prime example of what is often called “soft law.” It was viewed as something that the governments gave lip service to in this declaratory form that was not even legally obligatory and had no prospect of implementation. Many of the participating countries at the time didn’t practice human rights in their own societies, so there was an element of a hypocrisy built into the endorsement of this declaration from the moment of its inception. One has to ask why did something that started with such low expectations of serious impact on the world turn out to be one of the great normative documents of modern times, perhaps of all times.

    The Declaration has been referred to as the most important formulation of international human rights law ever made. I think one of the things that helps explain this rise to prominence was that the citizens associations concerned with human rights found effective ways to take the Declaration seriously, as well, and to exert effective pressure on many governments to take the Declaration or parts of it seriously. This was a very instructive example of the degree to which what states do with respect to normative issues can be very much influenced by the degree of effective pressure brought to bear by civil society, both within particular countries and transnationally. The role of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and other groups, I think, was instrumental in putting the provisions and the impetus of the Declaration onto the political agenda of the world.

    DK: You feel that the progress that has been made in human rights since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could not have happened without strong pressure from groups in civil society?

    RF: Yes, I’m saying that was an indispensable condition for the partial implementation of the Declaration. There were other factors that I think are also important to identify. One of them was the fact that once human rights emerged with this greater visibility, then governments, particularly in the West, found it a useful way to express their identity, their role in the world. It was useful as a means to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. It was part of the Cold War, a normative dimension that related the conflict to widely shared values. This was the idea that freedom was definitely linked to the promotion of human rights.

    Then came the Helsinki Process in the mid-1970s in which the Soviet bloc was given a kind of stability for the boundaries that emerged in Europe at the end of WWII. In exchange, Moscow accepted a kind of reporting obligation about human rights compliance in their countries at the time. Conservatives in the U.S. criticized the Helsinki Accords harshly because they argued that the agreement was a give-away; they alleged it is legitimizing these improper boundaries and in exchange we get this kind of paper promise that has no meaning at all.

    As events turned out, the Helsinki emphasis on human rights was much more important than the stabilization of boundaries. Reliance on human rights was critical for a process of legitimizing and mobilizing the opposition forces that operated in Eastern Europe, particularly groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity in Poland and even the Moscow Trust group in the Soviet Union. It became clear that, in terms of struggles of resistance within particular societies against oppressive states, international human rights norms provided important political foundations for their commitment and their activity. I think this interplay between human rights norms and procedures at an international level and resistance politics in societies governed in an oppressive manner. was a second important strand.

    The third one that I would mention is the anti-Apartheid campaign, which was based on a worldwide normative consensus that Apartheid represented an unacceptable form of racial persecution that was, in effect, such a systemic violation of human rights that it amounted to a crime against humanity. This was reinforced by grassroots activists in the critical countries of the United Kingdom and the United States that put such pressure on their governments that even Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s U.S. felt obliged to go along with an international sanctioning process that was directed at Apartheid, and probably contributed to the peaceful abandonment by the majority of the white elite of Apartheid. This was something no one could have anticipated a decade before it occurred – people thought either Apartheid was so well established, so much in control of the society, that it was not feasible to challenge it, or that the challenge would come about by a very difficult and bloody civil war. I think that mounting this peaceful challenge was a major triumph in terms of peaceful transformation that was aided by a kind of human rights demand that itself can be traced back to the foundations that one finds in the Universal Declaration.

    DK: Do you feel that the successes that have been achieved up to this point can be built upon, and the Universal Declaration will become an even more significant document and guideline for the 21st century?

    RF: This is a matter of conjecture that is hard to be very clear about at this stage because you find that both possibilities seem susceptible of pretty strong supportive arguments. My sense is that there is a sufficient constituency committed to human rights that will continue to invoke the Universal Declaration and the authority that it provides as a foundation for carrying on campaigns of one sort or another. One of the things that emerged in the 1990s was the degree to which transnational women’s groups and indigenous peoples had organized themselves around a human rights agenda. Their presence was definitely felt in Vienna at the UN Human Rights Conference in 1993, and elsewhere, evidently believing that their own objectives and movements as capable of being articulated by reference to human rights demands and aspirations.

    I think there is a political ground on which post-Cold War world human rights can advance further. There are also the important efforts now, outside the West, expressing different concerns but asking the same question: “What do we want the human rights process to become?” These voices are saying, we didn’t participate in the initial formulations. We think the Declaration and its norms are too individualistic or too permissive in terms of the way it approaches the relationship of the individual to the community. This is a common criticism you find in Islam and Asia. How can the Declaration be extended to represent all the peoples of the world and allow them the sense that it not only substantively is reflective of their values, but also that they’ve had some opportunity to participate in the articulation of the norms. I think it is very important that we recognize the incompleteness of the normative architecture that has flowed from the Declaration, if understood as including the International Covenants that were formulated in 1966, and other more focused treaty instruments.

    There is still very important work to be done on creating a more universally acceptable and accepted framework for the implementation of human rights.

    DK: One of the human rights treaties that has been created in the aftermath of the Universal Declaration is the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It’s nearly universally adhered to. The only two countries that currently have not ratified this important convention are Somalia and the United States. Somalia apparently doesn’t have its government organized well enough to do so, but the United States doesn’t have any excuse. Why is the United States holding out on making this Convention universal, and why is it refusing to give its support to a Convention so broadly adhered to?

    RF: One needs to understand that this pattern of holding out against a nearly universal consensus is not limited to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The United States has been playing this obstructive role in a number of different settings, including the Landmine Treaty and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on the Emission of Greenhouse Gases. I’m not sure about the real objections to the Convention on the Right of the Child. I know the Pentagon has mounted pressure because of the recruiting age of soldiers and the feeling that it would not be cost effective for them to give up the right to recruit young people under the age of 18, which I think is the age in the Convention. The present recruiting age of American soldiers includes people who are 17. It seem like a small difference to justify a holdout on a treaty that enjoys such wide backing.

    Let me take the opportunity to say that the fact that something is put into treaty form or is in the Universal Declaration is no assurance that it’s going to be taken seriously, either by the human rights part of civil society or by governments. One needs to come to the awareness that when we talk about human rights what we really mean is civil and political rights. Social, economic and cultural rights, which are broadly set forth in the Universal Declaration and are the subject of a separate covenant that was signed in 1966, have received very little implementation over the years. The human rights organizations are by and large devoting all their resources to the promotion of selected items of political and civil rights. For much of the world, particularly the non-Western world, economic and social rights are at least as important, if not more important, than civil and political rights. This is one of the reasons that these organizations are viewed with some suspicion, even the Western human rights organizations that tell governments to be less authoritarian or to increase freedom of participation, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression. I had a conversation a couple of years ago with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia, and he was very sensitive to this issue and spoke about it with sincerity and conviction. It’s also, of course, a convenient pretext for not being responsible and accountable in the area of political and civil relations. It is true that for human rights to be broadly accepted as a desirable source of obligation they have to be seriously responsive to the problems of acute poverty and economic and social deprivation as well as to the problems that arise from authoritarian governments and from the absence of democratic practices.

    DK: Do you think that the United States and other Western states are failing in that regard? And, for that matter, also civil society? Have they failed to push for economic and social rights sufficiently?

    RF: Yes, I think there’s no question, especially in the recent period where the Reagan and Thatcher administrations were very clear that they didn’t even regard economic and social rights as a genuine part of human rights. They felt these claims were an importation of a socialist ethos that was inconsistent with the way in which a market-oriented constitutional democracy should operate, and that was basic to the existence of a legitimate form of government. There is that real question. In civil society it’s been partly the feeling that it was much more manageable to conceive of human rights violations as challenges that involved very basic affronts to human dignity that arose out of abuses of governmental power, like the torture of political prisoners or summary executions and disappearances. These abuses captured the political imagination, and they were discreet policies of governments that were in many ways objectionable. Focusing on them seemed to facilitate access to media coverage. It seemed to raise issues that one could get some sort of results in relation to. It didn’t raise the ideological question of whether economic and social rights were somehow an endorsement of a socialist orientation toward policy.

    DK: Of course, preventing torture and disappearances and other abuses of state power is quite important. It’s also a real problem that there is not safety net–that people are continuing to starve to death and to suffer and die from lack of health care and other very basic human rights–the right to be treated with dignity, the most basic right of all. What might we do from this point on to see that those rights are not pushed to the side or neglected entirely?

    RF: There’s no question that by affirming economic and social rights, one doesn’t want to undermine the pressure to prevent the acute violations of civil and political rights. I think there are some new initiatives – there’s a new Center for the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights in New York City, started recently by several Harvard Law School graduates, that is trying to do good work in this area to bring a balance into the human rights picture. It’s not only the sense that one needs to focus on economic and social rights, but also one needs to focus on the structures that generate these violations. There’s a group in Malaysia called JUST, headed by Chandra Muzaffer, that has been very active in trying to show that the global market forces are systematically responsible for the polarization of societies throughout the world, essentially making the rich richer and the poor poorer. The dynamics of globalization contribute to an atmosphere in which even governments feel almost helpless to prevent the impoverishment of a portion of their own societies because of the strength of global capital. It’s important that we understand the thinking that is going on around the world about these issues of economic and social rights.

    DK: How do you feel about the failure of the international community to adequately respond to situations of genocide that have arisen in Bosnia and Rwanda and other places? Hasn’t there been a terrible failure to uphold the right to life for hundreds of thousands, even millions of people?

    RF: Yes, I think it is a revelation of the moral bankruptcy of the organized international community and of a disturbing and recurrent acceptance in this world of sovereign states of the most severe human wrongs being committed as being beyond control or prevention. At the same time, I have some mixed feelings about those who advocate intervention to overcome genocidal behavior without understanding the political and military obstacles that lie on that path. Intervention is a very difficult political process to use effectively as the United States found out in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Cheap, shallow intervention is almost worse than non-intervening. I had many disagreements with friends about the policies that should be pursued with respect to Bosnia during the unfolding of the tragedy there a few years ago. I didn’t see it as beneficial for the United Nations to establish these safe-havens or to make half-hearted gestures because, and I feel in retrospect that this view has been at least vindicated in that setting, that it would create new options for those who were committing the crimes. Unless there was the political will to defend the safe-havens – as the Srebrenica tragedy showed there was not – it would really herd potential victims together in a way that made ethnic cleansing more efficient and more horrible in its execution. One has to be very careful not to embrace a kind of facile interventionism because of our feeling of the utter moral bankruptcy of a world order system that can’t respond to genocide. To jump from inadequacy to futility is to disguise the true nature of the problem and the solution.

    DK: We’ve also experienced a failure of sanctions, which has been particularly evident in relation to the sanctions imposed upon Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. This failure has led to the more vulnerable parts of society suffering as a result of the sanctions. What do you see as the answer to this? Do we need to reform the international system? Do we need to have an international security force? If we have problems making sanctions work and problems with intervention, what do we do when we see the worst abuses of human rights occurring?

    RF: It’s a difficult challenge for which there’s no quick fix, in my view, because it’s not accidental that we don’t have adequate intervention. We don’t have a Peace Force that is disengaged from geopolitics and able to act independently. Sanctions of the sort that were imposed on Iraq have these devastating effects on civilian society. It comes out of a rather profound dominance of international political life by geopolitical considerations. In the case of the Iraqi sanctions, there was a sense of incompleteness in which the war was waged and ended, leaving Saddam Hussein in control after depicting him as such a brutal, dictatorial leader. Sanctions were a cheap way for the victorious coalition to somehow express their continuing opposition without incurring human or financial costs of any significance. The fact that the real victims of this policy were the Iraqi people was not really taken into account. I’ve seen Madeleine Albright and others confronted by this reality and they brush it aside. They just don’t want to confront that reality, and tend to say “Saddam Hussein is building palaces. If he were using his resources for his people….” The whole point of the critique is that this is a leader that is not connected with the well being of his people. If we know what the effect after seven years of these sanctions is and yet insist on continuing them, we become complicit in the waging of indiscriminate warfare against the people of Iraq.

    DK: At this point in time, nearing the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and approaching the new millennium, what advice would you offer to young people with regard to human rights and responsibilities?

    RF: The last fifty years shows how much can be done by activists, young people and others, on behalf of making human rights a serious dimension of political life. I think that what needs to be carried forward is a more comprehensive implementation of the human rights that exist, filling in some gaps on behalf of indigenous peoples and the perspectives of non-western society, extending the serious implementation to matters of economic and social rights. We should push hard for this as something that one takes seriously, also for one’s own society. I think Americans particularly are good at lecturing the rest of the world as to what they should be doing, but are generally rather unwilling to look at themselves critically. We could begin the new millennium particularly with that kind of healthy self-criticism, not a kind of destructive negativism, a healthy self-criticism that would allow us to realize that we too are responsible for adherence to these wider norms of human rights; that we really have to rethink the enthusiasm that so many parts of our country have for capital punishment, for instance, in relation to the worldwide trend toward its abolition. I think we have to ask the question, do we really want to endow our state, or any democratic state, with the legal competence to deprive people of life by deliberate design? If we do endow the state with such power, it seems to me we are endorsing a kind of sovereignty-first outlook that has many other wider implications that are not desirable, and that run counter to deeper tendencies toward the emergence of global village realities.

  • First Annual Sadako Peace Day

    Mayor Harriet Miller declared August 6, 1996 as “The First Annual Sadako Peace Day.” In making this proclamation, she called “for efforts in our community and throughout the world to abolish nuclear weapons and to prevent people everywhere, particularly children, from suffering the horrors of war.”

    Sadako Sasaki was a two-year old girl in Hiroshima, who was exposed to radiation when the atomic bomb was dropped on her city on August 6, 1945. She developed radiation-induced leukemia ten years later. Japanese legend has it that one’s wish will come true if one folds a thousand paper cranes. Sadako began folding paper cranes with the wish to get well and achieve world peace. She wrote a poem, “I will write peace on your wings and you will fly all over the world.” Sadako died with 646 cranes folded, and her classmates finished folding the paper cranes. Sadako’s story has become known to people all over the world, and the folding of paper cranes has become a symbol of world peace.

    To commemorate Sadako Peace Day, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and La Casa de Maria hosted an outdoor ceremony at Sadako Peace Garden at La Casa de Maria. The ceremony, with some 100 people in attendance, included a musical program arranged by Harry Sargous of The Music Academy of the West, and poetry read by several Santa Barbara poets, including Gene Knudsen Hoffman and Sojourner Kincaid-Rolle.

    Foundation president David Krieger summarized the importance of the event and the day: “This day August 6th has many names. For some, looking back in history, it is Hiroshima Day, a time to recall the terrible devastation that took place when a single nuclear weapon was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. For some, looking to the future, it is Abolition Day, a time to rededicate one’s efforts to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world. These are important perspectives. For us here today, the day is also Sadako Peace Day, a commemoration of the loss of an innocent child’s life as a result of the bombing of Hiroshima, and a rededication to preventing other children from being injured and killed as a result of war, any war.”

     

  • Sadako Peace Garden

    The Sadako Peace Garden in Santa Barbara was dedicated on August 6, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy, as a project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, in cooperation with La Casa de Maria. It honors all who work for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Two distinguished Santa Barbara artists, Isabelle Greene and Irma Cavat, gave of their time and skills to create the landscaping and the artistry of this magic location.

    “I ask you to come up and submerge your hands into the water and then bless this space before you leave.”

    -Don George, Director, La Casa de Maria.

    “Hundreds of residents and visitors of Santa Barbara, young and old, have come to the Sadako Peace Garden to reflect and to commit, or recommit themselves to the task of peacemaking.

    The Garden is open to the public. Please feel free to come back at any time, and spread the word among your friends.”

    — Walter Kohn, Co-Chair, Education Committee, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

    Sadako Peace Garden, La Casa de Maria, 800 El Bosque Road, Santa Barbara CA 93108-2794

  • The Magna Carta For The Nuclear Age: A Universal Declaration of Individual Accountability Prepared by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

    Preamble

    Affirming that all people of the World are entitled to life, liberty and other basic human rights;

    Believing that all individuals, states and international organizations share in the responsibility to ensure peace, protect human rights and sustain the common heritage of the planet;

    Acknowledging the significant efforts of the United Nations and other international organizationstoward these ends;

    Committed to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Nuremberg Principles;

    Convinced that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons have no place in a civilized World order;

    Further convinced that survival in the nuclear age requires adherence to principles of justice and the World rule of law;

    Determined to establish a just, peaceful and civilized World order in the twenty-first century,

    We proclaim this Magna Carta for the Nuclear Age.

    Article I

    All individuals, including Heads of State, Ministers of Government, industrial, scientific and military leaders, shall be held personally accountable under international law for planning, preparing, initiating or committing the following acts:

    • Crimes against peace, including waging a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties.
    • War crimes, including deliberate attacks against civilian populations, the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and other grave breaches of humanitarian law.
    • Crimes against humanity, including genocide, torture, and other serious mass violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
    • Crimes against the environment, including intentional spoliation of living habitats.
    • Economic crimes against a people or nation, including slavery in all forms.
    • Terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, hostage taking, and the training, support or sheltering of persons engaged in such crimes.
    • Illicit trafficking in arms or narcotics, and all acts in furtherance of such crimes.
    • Covert acts to overthrow or destabilize a legitimate foreign government, including assassination.
    • Deliberate persecution or denial of civil rights on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.

    Article II

    The World Community shall ensure the further codification of these provisions through the continuing activities of the United Nations and other international organizations, and shall ensure compliance with them by establishing and maintaining the following institutions:

    • An International Commission of Inquiry to engage in fact finding and certification of cases for trial;
    • An International Criminal Court, composed of distinguished jurists, to try cases certified by the International Commission of Inquiry;
    • International Police Forces to enforce the orders of the International Criminal Court;
    • An International Criminal Penitentiary for confinement of convicted offenders; and
    • A Center for the Advancement of International Criminal Law and Justice, independent of governments, to assist in codification of international criminal law and monitoring the implementation of this Charter.
    • An International Commission of Inquiry to engage in fact finding and certification of cases for trial;
    • An International Criminal Court, composed of distinguished jurists, to try cases certified by the International Commission of Inquiry;
    • International Police Forces to enforce the orders of the International Criminal Court;
    • An International Criminal Penitentiary for confinement of convicted offenders; and
    • A Center for the Advancement of International Criminal Law and Justice, independent of governments, to assist in codification of international criminal law and monitoring the implementation of this Charter.

    Article III

    These provisions, upon adoption, may be added to, abridged or altered by the common consent of the World Community of nations and peoples, but without amendment they shall be binding in perpetuity.

  • Peace is More than the Absence of War

    https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/wagingpeaceseries/dalai_lama.pdf

  • The Psychology of Peace

    https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/wagingpeaceseries/walsh.pdf