Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Author: Justine Wang

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security
A Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Panel Discussion
During the 2004 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee at the United Nations, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a panel discussion entitled “Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security,” enabling the opportunity to discuss current proliferation trends and recommendations to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

The panel was moderated by David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and speakers at the event included Canadian Senator and Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, Douglas Roche OC, Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, and Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The resulting discussions were constructive as panelists debated the challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the responsibility to offer alternative visions of security for a more peaceful world.

Senator Roche set the tone by addressing the current state of the world today. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to abide by their promise of good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Without a serious effort by nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament, the NPT will continue to promote double standards that allow some states to continue to expand and improve their nuclear arsenal while denying others of the same rights. In order to meet the challenges of today, the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is in urgent need of reconstruction. In reflecting on the role he played both as a parliamentarian and as a representative of civil society, Senator Roche underlined the importance of the role of civilian grassroots and non-governmental organizations in educating the public and influencing top level policy decisions among different countries.

Kate Hudson spoke on the subject of the “Special Relationship between the US and UK .” Having summarized the background to the relationship based on the UK ‘s historical economic dependence, Hudson spoke of the problems arising from the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) between the two countries. This provides the basis for extensive nuclear collaboration, without which it is unlikely that the UK would be able to sustain its possession of nuclear weapons on Trident submarines. According to Hudson , “It is unlikely that the UK could remain a nuclear weapon states without the support of the US .” The MDA is in line for renewal during 2004, which has a strong bearing on the issue of a possible Trident replacement and the potential development of new nuclear weapons.

Hudson also discussed the UK ‘s strong support for the new framework of the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review. It was noted that many observers feel that political support for US initiatives is part of the “Special Relationship.” The problem in the UK is that the current British government strongly supports the relationship and backs the full range of US policies, including pre-emptive war and nuclear first strike. CND is currently campaigning against the development of new nuclear weapons; for an immediate parliamentary discussion on MDA; for a rejection of pre-emptive war and nuclear first use policies; in opposition to a Trident replacement; for withdrawal of permission for US use of British bases for Missile Defense; and for withdrawal of US weapons from Lakenheath.

Jacqueline Cabasso focused on US nuclear weapons policy and underlined the importance of nuclear disarmament as a core issue on the global peace movement’s agenda. According to Cabasso, while the Bush administration is demanding nuclear disarmament from other nations, it continues to upgrade and expand its nuclear arsenal. Cabasso supports this by referring to several US documents, including:
- The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for:
- The 2002 US National Security Strategy which highlights the administration’s willingness to engage in pre-emptive war, including the possibility of nuclear first strike by “acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
- The US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which reserves to the US the right to respond with overwhelming force – including using nuclear weapons – to the use of weapons of nuclear, chemical or biological against the US or its allies.
According to Cabasso, the legitimization of nuclear weapons by the world’s first nuclear weapons state and super power, the US , poses the gravest threat to international security. The US policy of preventive war and its push to modernize its nuclear arsenal provide arguments for other countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

Cabasso challenged that while the security policy of the Bush administration are more extreme than other administrations, they are really a continuation of them. Cabasso continued by pointing out that even if Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry (D-MA) succeeds in winning the election in November 2004, the global community must not assume that current US nuclear weapons policy will take a dramatic turn for the better. Reading excerpts from An American Security Strategy, released in July 2003 by the National Security Advisory Group to the Democratic Party, Cabasso revealed that Democratic national security policies are not necessarily opposed to current US nuclear weapons policy. The policy paper only demonstrates a marginal change from the current US stance and endorses the current level of spending on US nuclear weapons and other military programs.

Current US nuclear policies have made visible the present and very real dangers of nuclear weapon use. Nuclear weapons threaten everyone’s security and Cabasso concluded for the need to redefine security, “throwing out the outdated model completely to replace it with a human security model” based on food, shelter, clean air and water, jobs, healthcare and education for everyone everywhere, without regard to national borders.

Justine Wang ended the panel discussion by addressing recent calls for countering proliferation and suggesting recommendations for improving the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Wang addressed the recent initiatives proposed by US President George Bush on February 11 2004, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and the recently passed US-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While these proposals are constructive and necessary to the extent that they don’t enshrine double standards, they fall seriously short of being able to meet the current global proliferation challenge.

Wang called for the stemming of nuclear proliferation under a more strict, equitable and effective multilateral framework and shared recommendations of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to improve the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Recommendations include commencing negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, universal application of the NPT to all states under a strict timetable, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , universal and equal application of the Additional Protocol , and the phased elimination of nuclear power.

Wang reiterated that the continuation of the current NPT regime that ignores existing double standards is destined to result in both further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons. Only by embracing significant changes that end existing double standards and elevate nuclear disarmament obligations can the non-proliferation regime succeed.

Krieger concluded the panel discussion and mentioned that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is launching an online campaign entitled “Turn the Tide: Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy” as an example of a grassroots initiative needed to mobilize the public to alert policy makers on the threat of nuclear weapons on the world’s security.

Discussions ended with a question and answer session, where many participants engaged in constructive dialogue on facing the challenge of the increasing threat of nuclear weapons and the future of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.
April 28, 2004
A Symposium on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement

Convened by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Simons Centre
for Peace and Disarmament Studies, December 5-6, 2003

On 5-6 December 2003, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies convened a symposium entitled “Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement,” enabling constructive dialogue among academics and leaders of civil society organizations about the role of the United Nations in enforcing measures to protect civilians from genocide and other gross violations of human rights.

Keynote speaker Lloyd Axworthy, Director and CEO of the Liu Institute for Global Studies at the University of British Columbia and former Foreign Minister of Canada (1995-2000), was joined by Richard Falk, professor Emeritus of International Law and Practice at Princeton University and Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and a range of panelists with varying backgrounds in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. The resulting discussions were constructive and cutting edge as the participants shared their ideas on how to engage the UN in facing the challenges posed by humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect civilians from avoidable catastrophe.

The Politics of Intervention

On 5 December, Richard Falk set the tone with his address entitled: “The Politics of Prevention and Enforcement in a Time of Mega-Terrorism” during the public morning session. Professor Falk spoke of the need to learn from past experiences such as Rwanda, East Timor and Kosovo. He then proceeded to describe the present context of intervention as shaped by the selective response of leading states (primarily the US) to humanitarian crises that reflect their political and strategic interests. In order for the international community to effectively and reliably prevent and protect civilians from genocide and crimes against humanity, Falk identified the need for the UN to detach considerations of humanitarian intervention from geo-politics and state interests.

In highlighting the degree to which state sovereignty can insulate a government from external accountability for human right violations within its national borders, Falk also addressed the need for the UN Security Council to resolve the tension between the protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty.

Falk ended his initial remarks by encouraging the resumption of efforts by the global justice movement during the 1990s prior to 9/11. Under the pretext of the “war against terrorism,” the US has imposed its global security interests on the rest of the world, resulting in unilateral action without the consent of the international community. In order to overcome this, Falk called for the establishment of a “necessary and desirable” long-term vision by the global justice community.

Saul Mendlovitz, co-founder of Global Action to Prevent War, commented on Falk’s remarks by drawing a parallel between the challenges addressed by the symposium and South Africa’s success in abolishing both the apartheid and nuclear weapons, which illustrated the ability of the global social justice movement to influence normative shift in social paradigms. Similarly, the establishment of the Ottawa Landmine Treaty and the International Criminal Court were achieved over time through successful cooperation within the global civil society. Mendlovitz concluded by recognizing the current state of the political climate as timely for mobilizing the global justice movement to develop standing forces to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity.
Options for a Prevention and Enforcement Force

Peter Langille, Senior Research Associate and Human Security Fellow at the Center for Global Studies, University of Victoria, discussed “Options for a United Nations Prevention and Enforcement Force.” Langille provided a historical review of lessons learned from previous attempts and diverse proposals to develop a dedicated UN mechanism for diverse peace operations. He supported the need for the UN to develop a suitable mechanism for securing present and future generations from genocide and crimes against humanity. In the event of a crisis, Langille highlighted the need for the immediate deployment of a UN emergency service. This would serve to prevent further atrocities during the four to six months when the UN encounters difficulties deploying multinational contingents.

Langille shared his thoughts on workable rapid deployment proposals. First, he argued for a multi-dimensional and multi-functional capability, including military, police and civilian services. This sophisticated and comprehensive approach would provide a combination of promising incentives and disincentives to deter violence and promote peace. Langille’s second argument was that any new UN emergency service should not be confined solely to preventing genocide and crimes against humanity, to attract wider support it should also be able to promptly manage diverse assigned tasks in preventing armed conflict, protecting civilians and providing robust peace operations, including those that entail modest enforcement. Third, Langille warned against the failures of overly ambitious proposals in the past, calling instead for a more focused approach.

Langille also discussed the current efforts of the multinational ‘Stand-by’ Readiness Brigade. (SHIRBRIG), and called for the establishment of a “UN Emergency Service,” consisting of independently recruited volunteers comprised of 13,200 individuals, a static headquarters, and two mobile units.

Commenting on Langille’s proposal, Professor Robert Johansen, Senior Fellow and Professor of Political Science at the Kroc Center at Notre Dame University, reminded the audience that positive institutional changes occurred slowly throughout history. He cited the normative shift on racial discrimination and equality, which occurred during the period between the drafting of the charters by the League of Nations after World War I and the UN after World War II. Furthermore, Johansen remarked on the reluctance of many governments to embrace past proposals due to issues related to costs, intervention and control over the UN. In order to overcome this reluctance, Johansen proposed an initial capability with limited intervention powers, a narrow political agenda and uncontroversial laws. Johansen stated that Langille’s proposal was the most sophisticated to date. He left the audience with several questions to ponder: Should the proposal address terrorists? What is the potential for the abuse of power of a UN Force?
The Responsibility to Protect

In his keynote address, Lloyd Axworthy spoke of his involvement in “The Responsibility to Protect: A Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.”
In addressing the challenges of humanitarian intervention, the report wrestled with issues concerning state sovereignty, the duty to protect civilians against human rights violations and the current opposition to providing the UN with the autonomy and resources to act in the interest of preventing genocide and crimes against humanity.

In its recommendations, the report proposed to establish the principle of humanitarian intervention on the basis of international law and to redefine state sovereignty through its right to national security and defense as well as its responsibility to protect its civilians. The failure of any state in fulfilling its obligations to protect its citizens would trigger international action for intervention. The decision to intervene should not rely on decisions from elite states but should instead be based on established procedures that determine whether the violation of human rights would justify intervention. With the primary objective of preventing and stopping genocide and crimes against humanity, humanitarian intervention should, therefore, not necessarily include regime change and/or winning a war.

In recognizing the failure of current efforts in protecting civilian security, Axworthy spoke of the need to reestablish the integrity of the international community and to reform the UN and its decision making procedures in the Security Council. This can be achieved by enabling progressive voices to formulate, disseminate and elaborate an effective prescription to generate global public support, as well as by empowering the younger generation with the ability to bring the issue to the fore of the international arena.
Global or Regional?

Bill Pace, Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement, discussed the “Next Steps in Creating a UN Prevention and Enforcement Force.” Pace identified governments as the weakest link in the responsibility to protect civilians due to their reluctance to respond to circumstances with potential political and strategic risks. At the regional level, however, alliances such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SHIRBRIG have proved their ability to move forward by establishing rapid deployment forces, yet lack the ability to adequately train and equip their troops.

Pace therefore suggested a “three-legged” approach for effective protection action, in which the UN, a regional organization and, more controversially, the US or another leading power are involved in creating a robust force. Furthermore, Pace reiterated the importance of terminology and issue framing in order to minimize opportunities for criticism from opponents of the project. In advocating for the shift of present discussions from “the right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect,” Pace supported the expansion of constituencies of peace organizations to effectively tackle the issue.

Don Kraus, Executive Director of the Campaign for UN Reform, commented on Pace’s discussion on political viability by focusing on the need to counteract US resistance to the proposal. He emphasized the need to replace the idea of preemption with that of prevention and protection. Furthermore, Kraus recommended the empowerment of the UN through increasing its role in post-conflict reconstruction and shifting its current zero financial growth to a policy of sound fiscal management. Kraus agreed with Pace on the necessity to reach out to new constituencies, and identified the need to frame the issue as attractive to the media.
Next Steps

The participants proceeded to discuss ways forward during the working sessions following the symposium. Throughout the afternoon portion of December 5, the participants discussed preferred models for UN prevention and enforcement. Langille’s second presentation elaborated on the current status of the Brahimi report, the expansion of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Standby Arrangements System, the SHIRBRIG and the related, recent efforts to enhance rapid deployment. Kraus spoke about HR1414, the International Rule of Law and Anti-Terrorism Act of 2003. This bill calls on the US to support negotiations on creating a UN Civilian Police Corps. Mendlovitz proposed a UN Constabulary Force as part of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Based on the Rome Statute of the ICC, Mendlovitz envisions a standing force to intervene in the event of genocide or crimes against humanity. James Paul, executive director of the Global Policy Forum, provided his perspective on the role of the Security Council in moving forward.

On December 6, the participants extended their discussion of preferred models for a UN force to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity. The scope and responsibilities of a potential UN force was discussed, and a consensus on a working title, a UN Emergency Peace Service, was reached.

Following this, the working group deliberated on contents for a draft proposal, agreeing to use and adapt material from “The Responsibility to Protect”; “Building the Commitment-Capacity Gap”; as well as the Brahimi Report. A drafting committee was established to prepare a proposal and participants proceeded to consider logistical measures to enable an effective Emergency Service under UN auspices.

The working session ended on a high note, as participants collectively brainstormed ways to promote the Emergency Service, making initial arrangements for future steps to be taken. Proposals included the establishment of an international coalition of civil society organizations, encouraging an annual meeting with DPKO, and approaching sympathetic governments to play an active role.
For further information, contact Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator, at advocacy@napf.org.

January 8, 2004
Congressional Bills Passed Support Bush Agenda For New Nuclear Weapons
November 2003 witnessed the passing of the Defense Authorization Bill (HR1588) and Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (HR 2754) for Fiscal Year 2004. These bills provide authorization and funding for the nuclear weapons activities of both the US Department of Energy and the US Department of Defense.

The 2004 bills include proposals to research a new generation of “usable” nuclear weapons, construct a plutonium pit facility and shorten readiness for nuclear testing, revealing the administration’s intent to rely on its nuclear forces for many decades to come – a stark contrast to US demands that other nations should forgo their nuclear arms.

Defense Authorization Bill
This bill authorizes annual US defense programs, including the nuclear weapons budget which is allocated in the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.

The 2004 Defense Authorization Bill includes provisions that would authorize funding for:
- Research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or nuclear “bunker buster”;
- Research on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes”;
- Design, building and environmental review of a new nuclear bomb plant known as the Modern Pit Facility (MPF);
- Reduction of Enhanced Test Readiness from between 24-36 months to 18 months.
Most significantly, Congress voted to repeal of the Spratt-Furse amendment. Adopted as part of the 1994 Defense Authorization bill, the Spratt-Furse legislation prohibits the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons (five kilotons or less). A final vote took place in November 2003 at the Conference Committee on Defense Authorization, where the Spratt-Furse ban was repealed by a House of Representatives vote of 362-40 and a Senate vote of 95-3. The bill, allocating $401billion, was signed by President Bush on 24 November 2003.

Energy and Water Appropriations Bill
The Energy and Water Appropriations Bill details the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear budget, covering funds for the development and production of US nuclear weapons. In July 2003, the House accepted Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) amendments, which included the following modifications to the administration’s request:
- Cut spending on the RNEP from $15 million to $5 million;
- Eliminate $6 million on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the design of “mini-nukes”;
- Eliminate $25 million allocated for “Enhanced Test Readiness” which proposes to shorten nuclear test readiness from 24-36 to 18 months;
- Cut spending on planning and environmental review for the MPF from $23 million to $11 million.
Most of these proposals, however, were restored in the Senate in September 2003. The bill was reconciled at the House-Senate Conference Committee the following November, where funds totaling $27 billion were approved for water and energy programs. The House voted 387-36 to approve the final version of the bill, and the Senate later approved the bill by a unanimous voice vote. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill was signed by the President on 1 December 2003

What the Bills Approved

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)/ Nuclear “Bunker Busters”
The Bush administration claims that current US nuclear weapons are unsuitable for use against growing numbers of deeply buried bunkers or stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons in enemy states and calls for developing the nuclear “bunker buster.” Designed to withstand high-speed collision with the ground, the “bunker buster” is a nuclear bomb capable of boring through 20-30 feet of rock or concrete before exploding. Research and design activities are currently taking place at Livermore (California) and Los Alamos (New Mexico) nuclear weapons laboratories, both of which are managed by the University of California.

Unlike the “mini-nuke,” the “bunker buster” is a high yield weapon of between 100 to 300 kilotons (the Hiroshima bomb which killed 140,000 people was 15 kilotons). The detonation of such a weapon would create massive collateral damage; the targeting of underground stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons could spread dangerous contaminants and between 10,000-50,000 people would be exposed to a fatal dose radiation within 24 hours if used in urban areas.

The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved the continuation of current research on the nuclear “bunker buster.” Under its guidelines, scientists at nuclear weapons labs are able to draft detailed plans of nuclear “bunker busters,” but must seek approval from Congress prior to the commencement of engineering work on its production – a term often referred to as “bending metal.” The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill approved $7.5 million in funds for the research and development (if further authorized by Congress) of the “bunker buster,” half of the $15 million that the Bush administration had requested.

Low-yield nuclear weapons/“Mini-nukes”
The concept of “mini-nukes” involves the development of small-scale nuclear warheads which are under five kilotons. With an explosive impact that is small and easier to control, the Pentagon argues that such weapons would be more accurate to target, thereby minimizing collateral damage and inducing only small amounts of radioactive fallout. Research of such weapons is also taking place at Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories.

Since the Spratt-Furse amendment in 1994, research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes” has been prohibited. The introduction of “mini-nukes” would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry, increasing the likelihood of their use in conflict.

The passing of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill was significant in revoking the Spratt-Furse amendment, reversing a decade of self-imposed restrictions. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill granted the full $6 million requested by the Bush administration for Advance Concept studies of “mini nukes.” $4 million of this amount will, however, be contingent on the administration’s submittal of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile report to Congress, detailing reductions made to the US nuclear stockpile. As with the ‘bunker busters,” scientists are able to perform research on the development of “mini nukes,” but must receive Congressional approval prior to plans for production.

Modern Pit Facility
A plutonium pit is a steel encased ball that forms the explosive core of nuclear weapons. It serves as a trigger for the fission of atoms within a nuclear warhead, ensuring its explosion upon impact.

The US had observed a 14-year moratorium since the 1989 closure of the Rocky Flats plutonium pit facility in Colorado. However, on 22 April 2003, Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory announced on that it had produced the first (small-scale) US plutonium pit, effectively re-establishing the nation’s capability to manufacture new plutonium cores for nuclear weapons. The DOE estimates that certification of Los Alamos produced pits will be complete by 2007, thus authorizing the laboratories to produce 10 pits annually for testing purposes.

In addition, the DOE has also launched plans to build a Modern Pit Facility (MPF), a new nuclear bomb plant that would boost production in excess of 500 plutonium pits a year. Based on this, each year’s production would equal the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of China’s. The construction of the MPF could produce the next generation of nuclear weapons with the introduction of “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters” and could also facilitate the contingency held open by the Bush administration to bring old nuclear weapons out of storage and back on active duty.

The MPF will cost between $2 to $4 billion to construct, with estimated annual operational costs of $300 million. The facility is due to be constructed by 2020 and an environmental investigation is being prepared to determine how and where the pits should be manufactured. The DOE plans to name a location for the plant by April 2004 and is considering the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina; the Pantex Plant facility in Texas; the Nevada Test Site; and sites at Los Alamos and Carlsbad in New Mexico.

With over 10,000 intact warheads, the US has manufactured enough pits for this stockpile, with another 5,000-12,000 pits in reserve. The renewed production of plutonium pits contravenes US commitments to de-emphasize its reliance on nuclear weapons and adds to speculations regarding Bush’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Plans to launch the MPF and the development of the Los Alamos pit facility coincides with the administration’s plans to increase the US nuclear arsenal and develop a new generation of nuclear weapons.

The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved plans for the MPF while the 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill allocated only $11 million for the project, $12 million short of the $23 billion that the White House had originally requested.

Enhanced Test Readiness
Despite the current 11-year US test moratorium, the Bush administration has called for the recommencement of nuclear testing in order to prevent the “degradation” of the US nuclear arsenal.

The last nuclear explosion at the main US nuclear testing ground, the Nevada Test Site, occurred on 23 September 1992. A US test moratorium was subsequently established in 1994, and between 24-36 months was required to prepare the site for the resumption of full-scale testing. For Fiscal Year 2004, the Bush administration has requested the shortening of this time to 18 months.

While Bush insists that he will not end the moratorium, simultaneous plans for increased funding towards nuclear testing and enhanced readiness of the Nevada Test Site form part of a well-coordinated effort to resume production of nuclear weapons, including new and untested weapons.

The 2004 Defense Authorization bill allocated $34 million in funds to improve the Nevada Test Site. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill approved $25 million in spending toward Enhanced Test Readiness, but restricted the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to improve its current test readiness capability to 24 months rather than the administration’s proposal of 18 months.

Analysis: What do the Bills mean?

In the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that the US nuclear infrastructure had “atrophied,” and emphasized the importance of revitalizing it “to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons and mitigate the risks of technological surprise.” Furthermore, the Pentagon report, “Future Strategic Strike Force” asserts its aims “to transform the nation’s forces to meet the demands placed on them by a changing world order.” The report advocates a new role for nuclear weapons in US strategy, making them “relevant to the threat environment” in the “war on terror.”

The Bush administration’s view is that US must obtain the technology and skills needed to counter threats of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In April 2003, Linton Brooks, administrator at the NNSA and the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security told a Congressional hearing, “We are seeking to free ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring a full range of technical options.”

Despite restrictions of certain funds, the approval of the Defense Authorization and Energy and Water Appropriation bills for 2004 shows strong support for most requests sought by the Bush administration. To critics this indicates moving a step closer to realizing the administration’s aggressive nuclear doctrine. The authorization of the bills further confirms to the world that nuclear weapons constitute a central component of the US defense strategy, prompting other countries to redouble their own efforts to acquire nuclear arms and begin nuclear testing.

The Bush administration’s “vertical proliferation” plans contravene US commitments to de-emphasize reliance on nuclear weapons as well as disregard pledges made under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in taking steps towards disarmament. While the Bush administration demands that North Korea, Iran and other countries renounce their nuclear ambitions and submit to inspections in accordance with the NPT, the US does not engage in a process of transparent and irreversible reduction and elimination of its own arsenal.

As Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, recently stated, “Double standards are being used here. The US government insists that other countries do not possess nuclear weapons.” He adds, “On the other hand they are perfecting their own arsenal. I do not think that corresponds with the treaty they signed.”

By assigning a new, more “usable” role for nuclear weapons, the US is increasing the probability of nuclear weapons use, either by a nation or terrorist group. This would make it more likely, not less, that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be used against the US. Unless effective measures are enforced to curb the current administration, the US will be guilty of leading the world down the slippery slope of an emerging global nuclear arms race.

Opportunities are still available to prevent Bush’s aggressive nuclear plans from materializing. The future deployment of the administration’s new nuclear strategy will depend upon the outcome of the next presidential election, as well as congressional debates over the next few years. These, in turn, will depend upon US and international citizens engaging in a debate on future nuclear policies, and calling on Congress and presidential candidates to take a principled stance against the dangerous Bush nuclear policies.

*Justine Wang is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
December 9, 2003
Results of the UN First Committee Votes on the New Agenda Coalition Resolutions

In an attempt to address the increasing threat of nuclear proliferation, existing nuclear weapons and emerging nuclear doctrines, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) sponsored two resolutions at the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security at the United Nations on 15 October 2003. The New Agenda Coalition member countries are Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand and Egypt.

The first resolution, A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: a New Agenda” is based on the Final Document of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, where all parties to the NPT unanimously agreed to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda by means of 13 practical steps. The resolution expresses “deep concern at the limited progress to date” on implementing the 13 steps and calls for all nations to abstain from actions that could initiate a global arms race.

The resolution raises concerns about the possible effects of development of missile defenses in sparking an arms race around the world and in outer space. It is deeply apprehensive “about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use of, and the possible development of new types of, nuclear weapons.” These comments were made primarily in reference to the US.

Voting took place on 4 November 2003. The resolution received 121 votes in favor, 6 in opposition and 38 abstentions. US, UK and France voted against the resolution. Whilst maintaining their commitment to the NPT, the three Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Permanent Security Council members claimed that the NAC resolution went beyond the agreements of 1995 and 2000 and did not take into account progress made since 2000, including the Moscow Treaty. In the text, the NAC resolution urged the US and Russia to make the Moscow Treaty “a disarmament measure” by making it verifiable and irreversible, and by addressing non-operational warheads.

Pakistan and India also voted against the resolution. They opposed the resolution’s language expressing the “regional tensions and deteriorating security situation” in South Asia and its further calls on India and Pakistan to join the NPT. Pakistan claimed that the resolution did not take into account Pakistan’s “reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons,” which were “for self defense and strategic balance,” whilst India said the resolution was “very prescriptive” and failed to reflect “ground realities.”

Israel was the sixth country to vote against the resolution, Iran voted in favor of it.Germany, Japan and Australia all abstained on the resolution. North Koreaalso abstained from the resolution, stating that it “did not fairly reflect the nuclear issues between DPRK and the US.” The North Korean representative added, “The draft resolution also does not speak a single word about US nuclear threats against DPRK. And instead highlights unilateral and one-sided demand calling for the DPRK to give up its own self-defensive rights, which is subjected to constant nuclear threats from the US.”

China and most members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) voted in favor of the resolution. China, however, expressed that they “are of the view that all Nuclear Weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which is essential to the realization of total nuclear disarmament.” Canada was the only NATO member to vote in favor of the resolution.

Canada requested a vote on preambular paragraph 20 (PP20), which expressed concern that missile defenses “could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space….” The PP20 received 117 votes in favor, 6 in opposition and 39 abstentions. Canadaabstained from the vote, saying that if carried out cooperatively, missile defense “could complement non-proliferation efforts.” The US, UK, Israel and Micronesia voted against the PP20. Japan also voted against the PP20’s statement on missile defense, arguing that the steps needed to be “realistic and practical and take into account different circumstances”. Australia shared the same views.

The full text of the first resolution, “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: a New Agenda” can be found at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/L40rev1.htm

The second resolution, A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, “Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” specifically addresses the issue of tactical (sub-strategic or short range) nuclear weapons. It raises concerns about the threats posed by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) “due to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict.” It also addresses “the risk of proliferation and of early, preemptive, unauthorized or accidental use,” as well as shifting security doctrines and the “possible development of new types of low yield” NSNW. The resolution highlights the need for transparent and verifiable measures to ensure the elimination of NSNW in the context of commitments made in the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

In addition, the resolution warns against Nuclear Weapon States in expanding or developing their NSNW arsenal as well as rationalizing their use. It also calls for the need to further reduce the status of NSNW in order to enhance global security, reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. The resolution also called on the US and Russia to formalize their 1991-92 Presidential Initiatives on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons.

Voting took place on 4 November 2003 and the resolution received 118 votes in favor, 4 in opposition and 41 abstentions.

The US, UK, France and Russia voted against the resolution, while China did not vote at all, claiming that “both the concept and definition of ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons’ as mentioned in the resolution are unclear.” Speaking on behalf of the UK and France, the US said the “three countries could not support the resolution because it fails to take into account efforts already under-way to address the concerns underlying the resolution.” The US said it completed its pledges under the 1991-2 Presidential Initiatives without a formal treaty and that a multilateral approach to the issue would only complicate matters.

Russia said it was compliant with commitments it made in reducing NSNW. It claimed the resolution was insufficiently precise and proposed “new and specific” commitments that went beyond agreements taken in 1991-2 and 2000.

The full text of the second resolution, “Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” can be found athttp://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/L39Rev1.htm

*Justine Wang is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

November 7, 2003