Author: John Burroughs

  • International Law and First Use of Nuclear Weapons

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    John BurroughsInternational law is part of the law of the land in the United States under the Constitution and decisions of the Supreme Court. The Department of Defense acknowledges that military operations must comply with the international law of armed conflict. The question of how international law applies to first use of nuclear weapons is therefore highly pertinent.

    The use of force of any kind is permitted under the United Nations Charter—a treaty to which the United States is a party—in only two circumstances: when directed or authorized by the UN Security Council or in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack. It is worth stressing that Security Council resolutions regarding the North Korean situation contain no hint of an authorization of use of force. On the contrary, they emphasize the primacy of diplomacy backed by sanctions.

    Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has also had a doctrine permitting preemptive attacks in self-defense against serious threats, particularly threats related to weapons of mass destruction. This is essentially a doctrine permitting preventive war, although its proponents tend to avoid that term. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and international law, the extent to which preemptive attacks are permitted is controversial. At the most, globally the majority opinion is that they are legal when in response to the early stages of an armed attack by the enemy. Anything beyond that is in my view an illegal preventive war.

    Is the first use of nuclear weapons legal under international law? I begin my analysis with broad requirements of necessity and proportionality, applying particularly to the initiation of war but also throughout its conduct. Those requirements are inherent in a rational and lawful approach to war, an approach that seeks to avoid conflict and, when it occurs, to limit its extent and to make possible the restoration of peace.

    The requirement of necessity in a sense speaks for itself. Military action must involve the application of the least amount of force required for purposes of self-defense. If a less destructive option is available for responding to an attack, it must be chosen. This has obvious implications for the choice between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.

    Under the requirement of proportionality, the force employed in responding to an attack must not be excessive in relation to the scale of that attack. It must also be rationally related to the purposes of self-defense. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it is especially important that the risk of escalation is part of the proportionality calculus, as the International Court of Justice held in its 1996 Advisory Opinion. The implications are clear for first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed enemy.

    Next, consider legal requirements applicable to particular military operations. A 2013 Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy submitted to Congress by the secretary of defense stated: “The new guidance makes clear that all plans must also be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects. The United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.”

    It is certainly to the good that the United States accepts that under the principle of distinction, civilians and civilian infrastructure may not be attacked. But what is missing is an acceptance of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The essentials of that prohibition are well stated in a 2007 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication: “Attackers are required to only use those means and methods of attack that are discriminate in effect and can be controlled.” (my emphasis).

    The omission of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in the above-cited 2013 guidance probably reflects the fact that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nuclear weapons to be used in a way that is “discriminate in effect” and “controlled.” That consideration played a key role in the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion, which stated that under the fundamental principle of distinction, states must “never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” The Court found that “in view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,” their use “seems scarcely reconcilable with respect” for that requirement.

    In addition to distinction, the 2013 Defense Department guidance also accepts the requirement of proportionality. This should be understood as the requirement of proportionality in attack, as distinguished from the general requirement of proportionality in the exercise of self-defense I discussed earlier. The requirement of proportionality in attack essentially requires that the collateral injury and damage caused by an attack not be disproportionate to the expected military advantage.

    Because it involves a balancing of costs and benefits, the requirement of proportionality in attack as such may not be understood to rule out all possible uses of nuclear weapons. Imagine a situation in which an enemy is believed to be on the verge of launching nuclear forces and it is believed that only a preemptive nuclear attack can prevent or limit such a launch.

    This scenario first of all demonstrates why nuclear-armed states must avoid going to war. From a legal standpoint, it remains the case that even if a proportionality calculus is believed to justify use of nuclear weapons, it is unlawful under the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.

    Let me mention other rules significant in this context. They are included in the preamble to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted at a UN Conference in July 2017. The preamble states that the parties base themselves on “rules of international humanitarian law,” which is at the core of the law of armed conflict. In addition to the ones I have discussed, these include the rules on “precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment.” The preamble also reaffirms that “any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.” Those are factors with legal value in international law. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which is very good at advocacy, has emphasized “principles of humanity” in explaining the prohibition of use.

    The nuclear-weapons-prohibition treaty will enter into legal force when 50 states have ratified it, probably in the next year or two. It will gain increasing authority as a statement of international law binding all states, including nonparties, as its number of parties grows over the years.

    In conclusion, the first use of nuclear weapons is at least generally contrary to international law. I say “at least generally” to acknowledge that skeptics love to trot out marginal scenarios where use arguably could be justified, as against a rogue nuclear-armed submarine. First use is also irrational—regardless of the particularities of a given situation—because it would open the door to further uses in other situations and promote proliferation.

    The rules I have discussed here also apply to second use of nuclear weapons. It is sometimes asserted that second use would be justified under the doctrine of reprisals. But what that doctrine permits is more restrictive than is generally understood.

    The most far-reaching conclusion, which I endorse, is that use of nuclear weapons should never be contemplated in a conflict situation. A more conservative conclusion, in line with existing US doctrine, is that there should be an extremely high threshold for even considering use of nuclear weapons, including with respect to the option of second use. Further, in determining such matters as targets and lethality requirements, minimization of civilian casualties should be an overriding factor, for example by selecting targets in nonurban areas in any second use scenario.

    What are the implications for presidential first use? I support the approach of requiring congressional approval, both for engaging in war generally and for first use of nuclear weapons. I suggest that the requirement of complying with international law be written into the legislation.

    In an ongoing conflict, where there may be pressures for quick decisions, as in a preemption situation, involvement of the entire Congress may be viewed as impractical. So additional approaches should be considered: for example, a body including the president, some officials, and some members of Congress that would make decisions when speed is deemed necessary. Provision should be explicitly made for the involvement of lawyers charged with upholding compliance with international law.

  • Dramatic Hearings at the International Court of Justice

    This article was originally published by Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy.

    ICJ Judges
    ICJ Judges on the opening day of the hearings. Copyright: UN Photo/ICJ-CIJ/Frank van Beek. Courtesy of the ICJ. All rights reserved.

    From March 7 to 16, seven days of dramatic, intensely argued hearings were held in The Hague before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on preliminary issues in the nuclear disarmament cases brought by the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) against India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The Marshall Islands’ legal team, led by former RMI foreign minister Tony deBrum and Amsterdam lawyer and longtime IALANA member Phon van den Biesen, performed brilliantly.

    On the first day of the hearings, Tony deBrum riveted the courtroom with his explanation of why his small Pacific nation chose to resort to the Court. As a nine-year old child out fishing with his grandfather in March 1954, he saw the entire sky turn “blood red” as a result of the 15-megaton Bravo nuclear test explosion 200 miles away. Marshallese suffered dislocation and damage to their health and environment effects as a result of the 67 nuclear tests conducted by the United States from 1946 to 1958. He said: “While these experiences give us a unique perspective that we never requested, they are not the basis of this dispute. But they do explain why a country of our size and limited resources would risk bringing a case such as this regarding an enormous, nuclear-armed State such as India.”

    On March 11, Phon van den Biesen told the Court that in law school he was taught de minimis non curat praetor – a court does not concern itself with trifles. The United Kingdom, he went on, was trying to introduce the opposite concept, de maximus non curat praetor. He commented that “such a concept does not exist and would be entirely incompatible with a world society that is based on the rule of law.” He added that the ICJ is capable of deciding cases that fall in the category maximus, having dealt with issues of genocide, violations of humanitarian law, use of force, and self-determination.

    The Marshall Islands filed applications in the International Court of Justice against the nine nuclear-armed states in April 2014, claiming they are in violation of obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and/or customary international law to pursue in good faith negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The RMI asked the Court to declare that each state is failing to comply with its obligations and to order that it come into compliance within one year.

    The initiative builds upon the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion. Referring to Article VI and to the long history of UN General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, the Court unanimously concluded: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The Marshall Islands contends that this obligation applies universally, binding those few states outside the NPT, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

    Three of the nuclear-armed states, India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ as to disputes involving states, including the Marshall Islands, which have done likewise. Those cases have proceeded. The other six states (China, France, Israel, North Korea, Russia, United States) refused the Marshall Islands’ request, under a normal procedure, that they accept the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter.

    The recent hearings concerned the preliminary objections of India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom to the Court deciding the cases on the merits. Pakistan withdrew from participation in the oral pleadings at the last minute, saying it had nothing to add to its written submission. Accordingly, the only hearing in that case, on March 8, was devoted to RMI’s response to Pakistan’s written arguments.

    The United Kingdom claimed that it has a strong record of support for nuclear disarmament; consequently, it argued, there is no dispute for the Court to adjudicate. The RMI replied that actions speak louder than words, citing the UK’s consistent record of voting against resolutions in the General Assembly calling for commencement of multilateral negotiations on elimination of nuclear arms and its plans to replace its Trident nuclear weapons system.

    India made a similar argument, referring to its decades-long history of calling for nuclear disarmament and its restraint in developing and deploying nuclear weapons. In reply, the RMI pointed to India’s current programs for expansion, improvement and diversification of its nuclear arsenal. In a dramatic moment, on March 14 Phon van den Biesen cited press reports that India had conducted a test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile on the first day of the hearings, and that India is poised to deploy a submarine carrying such missiles.

    The UK and India also each argued that no bilateral dispute existed with the RMI prior to the filing of the cases; that the cases cannot proceed without other states possessing nuclear arms being before the Court; that the relief requested would be ineffective; and that various exceptions to their declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court apply, including India’s exclusion of disputes involving a multilateral treaty, here the NPT.

    The RMI’s lawyers made strong counterarguments, with ample reference to precedent of the Court. They emphasized that India and the UK each can be judged as to its own conduct, regardless of the positions and actions of other nuclear-armed states. With regard to the NPT, on March 14 Professor Christine Chinkin explained that the RMI seeks the application of a customary international law obligation arising out of a dynamic process involving not only NPT Article VI but also developments including General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the Court’s Advisory Opinion itself.

    The Court is expected to issue its rulings on preliminary issues in three to six months. If the Court rules for the Marshall Islands, the cases will proceed to the merits; if the Court rules against the Marshall Islands in any case, that case will be over.

    In addition to Tony deBrum, Phon van den Biesen, and Christine Chinkin, members of the legal team who argued before the Court were Professor Roger Clark, member of the LCNP Consultative Council, LCNP Executive Director John Burroughs, Professor Luigi Condorelli, Professor Paolo Palchetti, Laurie Ashton of Keller Rohrback, and Professor Nicholas Grief.

  • Strange Spectacle: Nuclear Security Summit 2016

    At the invitation of President Obama, on April 1 more than 50 leaders of countries, including all states possessing nuclear arsenals except Russia and North Korea, gathered in Washington for the fourth Nuclear Security Summit. The focus was on securing civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) and similar modest and voluntary steps aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological weapons. HEU intended for use in civilian nuclear reactors is a small fraction of the total amount of weapons-usable HEU and plutonium in the world.

    It was a strange spectacle indeed to have so much political capital invested in limited measures which do not address:

    • the estimated 15,000-plus nuclear weapons in the possession of states which say they are prepared to use them; there are no safe hands, state or non-state, for these horrific devices
    • the large stocks of HEU and plutonium in military programs
    • the large stocks of reactor-grade but weapons-usable plutonium
    • ongoing production of HEU and plutonium and construction of new reprocessing plants to yield plutonium

    The contrast is stark with the global negotiations on prevention of climate change that culminated in the Paris Agreement last December. While that agreement is only a start, at least those negotiations acknowledged the reality of climate change and sought to address the entire threat.

    Also remarkable and deplorable is that the United States and the other nuclear-armed states are boycotting the United Nations Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament. Established by the General Assembly with the support of 138 countries, the Working Group is charged with discussing legal measures and norms needed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

    The United States and five other nuclear-armed states (France, Russia, China, Israel, North Korea) have additionally refused the Marshall Islands’ invitation to appear in the International Court of Justice to defend their compliance with the obligation, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law, to pursue in good faith negotiations on the elimination of nuclear arsenals. Only the nuclear-armed states which have accepted the general jurisdiction of the Court, the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan, are defending their records before the Court in cases brought by the Marshall Islands.

    The world would have been far safer if this had been the fourth Nuclear Abolition Summit. It is past time for the United States, Russia, and other states to embrace and urgently implement a broader agenda to achieve without delay a world free of nuclear weapons.