Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

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  • The Human Right to Peace Declaration

    Lasting peace is a prerequisite for the exercise of all human rights and duties. It is not the peace of silence, of men and women who by choice or constraint remain silent. It is the peace of freedom – and therefore of just laws – of happiness, equality, and solidarity, in which all citizens count, live together and share.

     

    Peace, development and democracy form an interactive triangle. They are mutually reinforcing. Without democracy, there is no sustainable development: disparities become unsustainable and lead to imposition and domination.

     

    In 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations and UNESCO and the United Nations Year for Tolerance, we stressed that it was only through a daily effort to know others better – I am the ‘other’! – and respect them that we would be able to tackle at source the problems of marginalization, indifference, resentment and hatred. This is the only way to break the vicious circle that leads from insults to confrontation and the use of force.

     

    We must identify the roots of global problems and strive, with imagination and determination, to check conflicts in their early stages. Better still prevent them. Prevention is the victory that gives the measure of our distinctively human faculties. We must know in order to foresee. Foresee in order to prevent. We must act in a timely, decisive and courageous manner, knowing that prevention engages the attention only when it fails. Peace, health and normality do not make the news. We shall have to try to give greater prominence to these intangibles, these unheralded triumphs.

     

    A universal renunciation of violence requires the commitment of the whole of society. These are not matters of government but matters of State; not only matters for the authorities, but for society in its entirety (including civilian, military, and religious bodies). The mobilization which is urgently needed to effect the transition within two or three years from a culture of war to a culture of peace demands co-operation from everyone. In order to change, the world needs everyone. A new approach to security is required at world, regional and national levels. The armed forces must be the guarantors of democratic stability and the protection of the citizen, because we cannot move from systems of complete security and no freedom to systems of complete freedom and no security. Ministries of war and defence must gradually be turned into ministries of peace.

     

    Decision-making procedures and measures to deal with emergencies must be specially designed to ensure speed, co-ordination and effectiveness. We are prepared for improbable wars involving the large-scale deployment of inordinately costly equipment, but we are not equipped to detect and mitigate the natural or man-provoked disasters that occur repeatedly. We are vulnerable to the inclemency of the weather, to the vicissitudes of nature. The protection of the citizen must be seen as one of the major tasks of society as a whole if we really wish to consolidate a framework for genuinely democratic living. Investing in emergency help and relief measures and – above all – in prevention and the long term (for example, in continent-wide water distribution and storage networks) is to be prepared for peace, to be prepared to live in peace. Currently, we are prepared for possible war, but find ourselves surprised and defenceless in our daily lives in the face of mishaps of all kinds.

     

    The United Nations system must likewise equip itself with the necessary response capacity to prevent the recurrence of atrocities and instances of genocide such as those which today afflict our collective conscience – Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda…

     

    There is today a general desire for peace, and we must applaud the clear thinking and strength of mind displayed by all the warring parties in the accords that have been reached in El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Guatemala and the Philippines. These agreements fill us with hope but also sadness, when we think of the lives sacrificed on the long road to the cease-fire, and of the open wounds, so difficult to heal. Thus, as we revive the concept of the ‘construction of peace in the minds of men’, we now call on all adversaries who still put their trust in weapons to lay down their arms and seek reconciliation.

     

    Condemnation will not suffice. It is time for action. It is not enough to feel outrage when we learn of the number of children exploited sexually or at work, of refugees or of those suffering from hunger. We must react, each of us to the best of our abilities. It is not just a matter of looking at what the government is doing. We must part with something of ‘our own’. We must give, give of ourselves. We must stop imposing models of development, models for living. The right to peace, to live in peace, implies jettisoning the belief that some are virtuous and correct while others are wrong, and that some are always giving while others are always in need.

     

    It is clear that we cannot simultaneously pay the price of war and the price of peace. Guaranteeing lifelong education for all would enable us to: control population growth, improve the quality of life, increase civic participation, reduce migratory flows, level out differences in income, assert cultural identity and prevent the destruction of the environment through substantial changes in energy use patterns and urban transport; promote endogenous development and the transfer of knowledge; foster the swift and effective operation of justice, with appropriate machinery for international co-operation; provide the United Nations system with appropriate facilities to tackle transnational problems in time. None of this can be achieved in a context of war. What is needed, then, is to reduce the investment in arms and destruction in order to increase investment in the construction of peace.

     

    The distillation of traditions, thoughts, languages, forms of expression, memories, things forgotten, wishes, dreams, experiments, rejections, culture finds its supreme expression in our everyday behaviour. Infinite cultural diversity is our great resource, which is underpinned – this is our strength – by universal cultural values that must be passed on from the cradle to the grave. Family members – especially mothers – teachers, the media, everyone must help to spread the ethical principles, the universal guidelines that are so necessary today for haves and have-nots alike: the latter because they have a right to the basic minimum standards that human dignity demands; the more fortunate because material goods fail to deliver the expected pleasure. Where there is no longing, possession brings no enjoyment. In education, tools are useful. But nothing can replace the friendly words of a teacher, or the caresses and smiles of parents. The only real education is education by example . . . and love.

     

    Learning without frontiers – whether geographical, or frontiers of age or language – can help to change the world, by eliminating or reducing the many barriers that today impede universal access to knowledge and education. Education must help to strengthen, reclaim and develop the culture and identity of peoples.

     

    Globalization carries with it a danger of uniformity and increases the temptation to turn inwards and take refuge in all kinds of convictions – religious, ideological, cultural, or nationalistic. Confronted with this threat, we must ’emphasize the forms of learning and critical thinking that enable individuals to understand changing environments, create new knowledge and shape their own destinies’. Indigenous peoples must be placed on an equal footing with other cultures, participating fully in the drafting and application of laws. Peace means diversity, a blending – of ‘hybrid, wandering cultures’ as Carlos Fuentes put it; it means multi-ethnic and multilingual societies. Peace is not an abstract idea but one rooted firmly in cultural, political, social and economic contexts.

     

    Above all, this profound transformation from oppression and confinement to openness and generosity, this change based on the daily use by all of us of the verb ‘to share – which is the key to a new future – cannot be achieved without our young people, and certainly not behind their backs. We must tell them – they who represent our hope, who are calling for our help and who seek in us and in external authorities the answers to their uncertainties and preoccupations – that it is in themselves that they must discover the answers, that the motivations and glimpses of light that they are seeking can be found within themselves. Although at times it may be difficult, given both their consternation and our own, to present the situation to them in those terms, our position as lifelong teachers and learners obliges us to say to young people, as Cavafy put it in a poem: ‘Ithaca gave you the journey . . . She has nothing left to give you now’. Each according to his own plan. Each according to his own way of thinking. Free from self-serving outside interference, especially when it robs the young of their own ‘core’, the intellect, talent and resourcefulness which are the most precious individual and collective treasure of humankind. Sects and the escape provided by drug addiction are the clearest symptoms of this pathological state of mind that is our great problem today. Indeed, education means activating this immense potential and using it to its fullest so that each may become the master and architect of his or her own destiny. We cannot give to youth what we no longer possess in youthful vitality but instead we can offer what we have learned through experience, the fruit of our failures and successes, of the burdens, joys, pain, and perplexity and the renewed inspiration of each new moment.

     

    Let youth hold high the banner of peace and justice! So convinced am I of the relevance of this goal to the proper fulfilment of our mission that I have proposed to the General Conference that it designate ‘UNESCO and youth’ as a central topic for discussion at its next session. That will be an appropriate moment since the General Conference will be considering for adoption the ‘Declaration on the Safeguarding of Future Generations’.

     

    At all the United Nations conferences, regardless of the subject under consideration (environment, population, social development, human rights and democracy, women, housing), there has been a consensus that education is the key to the urgently needed change in the direction pursued by todays world, which is increasing disparities in the possession of material goods and knowledge, instead of reducing them. To invest in education is not only to respect a fundamental right but also to build peace and progress for the world’s peoples. Education for all, by all, throughout life: this is the great challenge. One which allows of no delay. Each child is the most important heritage to be preserved. UNESCO may at times give the impression that it is only interested in preserving stone monuments or natural landscapes. That is not true. Those efforts are the most visible. And the heritage thus safeguarded the least vulnerable. But we must protect our entire heritage: the spiritual, the intangible, the genetic heritage – and, especially, ethics. These are the basic, universal values that our Constitution sets forth with inspired clarity. If we sincerely believe that each child is our child, then we must radically change the parameters of the ‘globalization’ currently under way. And the human being must become the beneficiary and main actor of all our policies and strategies.

     

    A system collapsed in 1989 because, concentrating on equality, it forgot liberty. The present system focused on liberty, will know the same fate if it forgets equality – and solidarity. The din made as the ‘Iron Curtain’collapsed drowned out the tremor that ran through the foundations of the ‘winning’ side in the Cold War. We must, then, for the sake of both principle and self-interest, redouble in every field the fight against exclusion and marginalization. We must all feel involved. We must all work to ease the great transition from the logic of force to the force of reason; from oppression to dialogue; from isolation to interaction and peaceful coexistence. But first we must live, and give meaning to life. Eliminating violence: that is our resolve. Preventing violence and compulsion by going, as I said before, to the very sources of resentment, extremism, dogmatism and fatalism. Poverty, ignorance, discrimination and exclusion are forms of violence which can cause – although they can never justify – aggression, the use of force and fratricidal conflict.

     

    A peace consciousness – in the interests of living together, of science and its applications – does not appear overnight, nor can it be imposed by decree. First comes disillusionment with materialism and enslavement to the market, and then a return to freedom of thought and action, sincerity, austerity, the indomitable force of the mind, the key to peace and to war, as affirmed by the founders of UNESCO.

     

    Science is always positive, but the same cannot always be said of its applications. Advances in technology and knowledge can be used to enrich or to impoverish the lives of human beings; they can help to develop their identity and enhance their capacities or, on the contrary, they can be used to undermine the personality and coarsen human talent. Only conscience, which is responsibility – and thus ethical and moral – can make good use of the artefacts of reason. Conscience must work in tandem with reason. To the ethics of responsibility we must add an ethics of conviction and will. The former springs from knowledge, and the latter from passion, compassion and wisdom.

     

    We are now approaching the end of a century of amazing scientific and technological progress: we can diagnose and treat many diseases which cause suffering and death; we communicate with extraordinary clarity and speed; we have at our disposal instant, limitless information. However, antibiotics and telecommunications do not compensate for the bloody conflicts which have cut down millions of lives in their prime and inflicted indescribable suffering on so many innocent people. All the obscenities of war, brought home to us nowadays by audio-visual equipment, do not seem able to halt the advance of the huge war machine set up and maintained over many centuries. Present generations have the almost impossible, biblical task of ‘beating their swords into ploughshares’ and making the transition from an instinct for war – developed since time immemorial – to a feeling for peace. To achieve this would be the best and most noble act that the ‘global village’ could accomplish, and the best legacy to our descendants. With what satisfaction and relief should we be able to look into the eyes of our children! It would be also the best way to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1998.

     

    Other ‘rights’ have been added since 1948. These should all be taken into account, and to them should be added the right which underlies them all: the right to peace – the right to live in peace! The right to our own ‘personal sovereignty’, to respect for life and dignity.

     

    Human rights! At the dawn of the new millennium, our ideal must be to put them into practice, to add to them, to live and breathe them, to relive them, to revive them with every new day! No one nation, institution or person should feel entitled to lay sole claim to human rights, still less to determine others’ credentials in this regard. Human rights can neither be owned nor given, but must be won and deserved afresh with every passing day. Nor should they be regarded as an abstraction, but rather as practical guidelines for action which should be part of the lives of all men and women and enshrined in the laws of every country. Let us translate the Declaration into all languages; let it be studied in every classroom and every home, all over the world! Today’s ideal may thus become the happy reality of tomorrow! Learning to know, to do, to be and to live together!

     

    In these first days of the new year – a time for taking stock and making plans – I appeal to all families, educators, religious figures, parliamentarians, politicians, artists, intellectuals, scientists, craftworkers and journalists, to all humanitarian, sporting and cultural organizations and to the media to spread abroad a message of tolerance, non-violence, peace and justice. Our aim must be to foster understanding, generosity and solidarity, so that with our minds more focused on the future than on the past, we may be able to look ahead together and build, however difficult the conditions or inhospitable the setting, a future of peace, which is a fundamental right and prerequisite. Thus, ‘We, the people’ will have fulfilled the promise we made in 1945, our eyes still seared by the most abominable images of the terrible conflict that had just ended – ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, ‘to construct the defences of peace in the minds’ of all the peoples of the Earth.

  • Chaining the Nuclear Beast

    When I became a private citizen and a businessman two and one-half years ago, it was my intention to close the journal of my military career and never to reopen it…. My decision to step back into public life is prompted by an inner voice I cannot still, a concern I cannot quiet. I am compelled by a growing alarm, born of my former responsibilities, and a deepening dismay as a citizen of this planet, with respect to the course of events governing the role of nuclear weapons after the Cold War.

    Over the last 27 years of my military career, I was embroiled in every aspect of American nuclear policy making and force posturing, from the councils of government to military command centers, from cramped bomber cockpits to the suffocating confines of ballistic missile submarines I have certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission and approved thousands of targets for potential nuclear destruction. I have investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a library of books and intelligence reports on the former Soviet Union and what were believed to be its capabilities and intentions…and seen an army of “experts” proved wrong. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing consequences of decisions which would invoke the very survival of our planet.

    Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have been more relieved than was I by the dramatic end to the Cold War. The reshaping of Central Europe, the democratization of Russia, and the rapid acceleration of arms control agreements were miraculous events SQ events that I never imagined would happen in my lifetime. Even more gratifying was the opportunity as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the United States’ military forces, and then as commander of its strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our defense posture, shrinking our arsenals, and scaling back huge impending Cold War driven expenditures. Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.

    Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgment which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

    The concern… which compels me to speak frankly… is that the sense of profound satisfaction with which I departed my military career has been steadily eroded in the ensuing months and years. The astonishing turn of events which brought a wondrous closure to my three and one-half decades of service, and far more importantly to four decades of perilous ideological confrontation, presented historic opportunities to advance the human condition. But now time and human nature are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are marginalized, as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War habits and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward into the dark world we so narrowly escaped without a thermonuclear holocaust.

    What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production?

    I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative, and is in fact growing daily. I see it in the reports issuing from highly respected institutions and authors; I feel it in the convictions of my colleagues on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; it finds eloquent voice in the Nobel prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash; and a strident frustration in the vehement protests against the recent round of nuclear tests conducted by France.

    Notwithstanding the perils of transition in Russia, enmities in the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling chorus of reason and resentment will eventually turn the tide. As the family of mankind develops a capacity for collective outrage, so soon will it find avenues for collective action. The terror-filled anesthesia which numbed rational thought, made nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation for the obscene power of a single nuclear weapon is taking a new hold on our consciousness, as we confront the nightmarish prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.

    Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests?

    First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.

    Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.

    Third, with respect to present and prospective arms control agreements given its crucial leadership role, it is imperative for the United States to undertake now a sweeping review, led by the President, of nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton administration’s 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the decks of some pressing force structure questions, the Review purposefully avoided the large policy issues. However, the Review’s justification for maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a hostile Russia is in my view regrettable from several respects. It sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security relationship with Russia is arguably the United States most important foreign policy concern. It codifies force levels and postures completely out of keeping with the profound transformation we have witnessed in world affairs. And, it perpetuates attitudes which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of strategic arms.

    Finally… I want to record my strong conviction that the risks entailed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave the prospects of their elimination solely within the province of governments. Highly influential opinion leaders like yourselves can make a powerful difference in swelling the tide of global sentiment that the nuclear era must end. I urge you to read the one page statement from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons…. Better still, read the Commission Report in full, reflect on its recommendations, communicate with influential colleagues and with the Canberra Commissioners. Take an active role in debating and supporting the practical steps we set forth in our Report, such as taking nuclear weapons off a hair trigger alert and placing the associated warheads in secure storage.

    These are steps which can be taken now, which will reduce needless risks and terminate Cold War practices which serve only as a chilling reminder of a world in which the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.

    Such a world was and is intolerable. We are not condemned to repeat the lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. The task is daunting but we cannot shrink from it.

    The opportunity may not come again.

  • Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste

    More than a half century after the beginning of the Nuclear Age, there is no satisfactory answer to the serious dilemma of how to dispose of the large quantities of radioactive wastes created by military and civilian uses of nuclear energy. This paper examines technological options for waste disposal, and concludes by favoring Multibarrier Monitored Retrievable Storage (MMRS). The authors point out, however, that this form of storage (it is not really disposal) will require “continuous monitoring… essentially forever.” Thus, the best of the options will require something akin to a “nuclear priesthood” to pass along their skills at monitoring these wastes for thousands of generations – a sobering thought.

    Our century’s indulgence in nuclear technology has created radioactive wastes that are a problem not only in the present but will affect thousands of generations in the future. The problems are so long-term that they are beyond our capacity to plan for adequately. At a minimum, we should cease – with all due speed – to generate more nuclear wastes.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s directors issued a policy statement on nuclear power in May 1996 calling for “a world adequately supplied by renewable, environmentally benign energy sources, and the worldwide elimination of nuclear power.” A copy of the full statement is available from the Foundation.

    – David Krieger

    Introduction

    Disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste is a critical problem for our time and will remain so well into the future. There are two main waste sources: Nuclear power reactors and bomb-related nuclear material from the production facilities and from the decommissioned U.S. and (former) U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons.

    This paper deals with disposal of (a) reactor spent fuel rods and (b) waste sludge from the bomb-grade plutonium separation process. Disposal of bomb-grade plutonium from decommissioned weapons and from existing stockpiles present somewhat different problems which are not treated here.*

    Nuclear waste disposal poses a number of different yet interconnected problems, all of which must eventually be resolved in an integrated fashion: technical, economic, health-related, environmental, political. The present paper addresses primarily technical issues, and does not attempt an analysis of the overall problem.

    Management of radioactive waste is a complex, multifaceted procedure. Spent commercial fuel rods present the most demanding challenge of all waste problems because of the high level of radioactivity. The fuel rods, relatively harmless before entering the reactor, emerge having become dangerously radioactive. They require storage for at least ten years under circulated water in a pool inside the reactor containment structure.

    By statute, the government, through the Department of Energy’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, has promised to provide disposal capacity for the waste generated by the nation’s nuclear power plants. Some of the waste which has accumulated over 45 years of Cold War nuclear bomb production also falls into the high-level category.

    The term “high-level” nuclear waste has had its meaning changed in the U.S. over the years. At the present time the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has defined “high-level” very narrowly as mostly, but not entirely, spent fuel elements and reprocessed military wastes, such as sludges. They further define “spent fuel,” concentrates of strontium-90 and cesium-137, and transuranics as something not necessarily included in their definition of “high-level” waste.

    Because this NRC definition is contrary (if not actually contradictory) to standards of the rest of the world and makes no sense to the authors, “high-level” nuclear waste is defined here as all radioactive waste material coming from nuclear reactor fuel rods whether confined or not:

    a) Spent nuclear fuel rods, clad or declad, from commercial electricity generating reactors; average radioactivity being more than 2.5 million curies per cubic meter.
    b) Semi-liquid sludge from nuclear bomb fabrication waste processing residue – average radioactivity being about 3500 curies per cubic meter.

    All this waste contains five shorter lived and longer lived radionuclides of main concern. The shorter lived are strontium-90 whose half life, t1/2, is 28.5 years, and cesium-137 whose half life, t1/2, is 30 years. See Ref. 1 for the half-life values used in this study. The radioactivity of these shorter lived nuclides is approximately 95% of the total radioactivity of the nuclides of concern. Total hazardous life for these shorter lived nuclides is considered to be between 600 years and 1000 years depending upon one’s point of view.

    The longer lived isotopes are plutonium-239 whose t1/2 is 24,110 years, plutonium-240 whose t1/2 is 6,540 years, and curium-245 whose t1/2 is 8,500 years. Plutonium-238 whose t1/2is 88 years will have essentially disappeared after several thousand years, so in storage terms of the longer lived elements this isotope is not of concern as long as it will have been successfully contained for the next several thousand years. As for the life of these longer lived materials, the NRC considers 10,000 years as the storage time required; however, some people consider a lifetime as long as 100,000 years to 500,000 years as more appropriate.

     Table I
    Radioactivity for 100 Tons of Spent Fuel *
    Curies Remaining
     

     Isotope
    		  

      t1/2 yrs
    		  

      10 yrs
    		  

      500 yrs
    		  

      1000 yrs
    		  

     10,000 yrs
    		  

     100,000 yrs
    		  

     200,000 yrs
     

    Sr-90
    		      28 2,000,000         15    trace  

     –
    		  

      –
    		  

      –
     

    Cs-137
    		      30 3,000,000        40    trace  

     –
    		  

      –
    		  

      –
     

    Pu-239
    		 24,110     22,000   27,000  29,000  56,000    8,000      240
     

    Pu-240
    		   6,540      49,000 175,000 170,000  69,000         7      trace
     

    Cm-245
    		 85,000     56,000   52,000  52,000  25,000        0.5      trace
     * A typical 1000 megawatt reactor contains about 100 tons of enriched uranium, one-third of which is renewed each year.

    Table I (above) extracted from Ref. 2 should be helpful. It must be noted that as some radioactive isotopes disintegrate, they create other radioactive isotopes in the process. Thus Pu-239 and Pu-240 increase at first and do not begin decreasing until many years later.

    Table I illustrates, as does Figure 1 (below), rather spectacularly the fallacy of the NRC rationale for a 10,000 year waste storage lifetime, when the radioactivity for the plutonium isotopes are greater after that long period than at the outset. However, it must be noted that this Pu-239 is relatively confined and in general will not be disturbed, so the basic health hazards from such radioactive materials as radon and radium from uranium ores appear to be far more serious.

    The general nuclear waste disposal approach is that the repositories should not be more dangerous than natural ores of uranium and thorium. In fact, they might be much less hazardous; after all, the natural ores have no barriers such as containers, and radium is leached from many of the ores so that traces get into the food chain. Spent fuel rods have to be stored between 13,000 and 14,000 years before their level of radioactivity decreases to that of natural uranium ore.

    One of the most serious engineering problems is that of allowing for release of the prodigious heat emanating from stored nuclear power waste. Most of the heat comes from the strontium-90 and cesium-137 at the start, but the longer-lived actinides produce more in later years. As noted in Table II (below), the heat liberated by spent nuclear reactor fuel decreases significantly as it ages.

    From a practical engineering standpoint there is little difference between a 500 year lifetime and a 500,000 year lifetime. The 500 years is so long a time that no storage prototype system can ever be tested, thus the basic engineering considerations remain unchanged regardless of the waste lifetime. It is on this fact that any long-term storage conclusions are predicated. As is discussed below, any storage technique that utilizes permanent or nonretrievable ground burial is fundamentally a violation of basic engineering principles. This was pointed out to the nuclear industry over 25 years ago, but their response at that time was that they had “faith” that some satisfactory new technique would be developed, by the government of course and at taxpayers’ expense, before it would be necessary to initiate long-term storage. Obviously, that has not happened and we are now faced with a nuclear waste disposal problem that has no fully satisfactory solution and probably never will have.

    Multibarrier Monitored Retrievable Storage (MMRS)

    This, unfortunately, is the final technique of choice for this particular waste disposal problem. It is unfortunate because there must be a continuous monitoring of the waste essentially forever. There are two fortunate aspects deserving mention: (1) the total volume of the waste involved is small by world standards, i.e., one football field for each type of waste each ten or twelve stories high, and (2) the number of people theoretically required to perform the monitoring task is also quite small, perhaps one hundred people or less worldwide. A ball park estimate of costs in present day dollars indicates that about $100 million is required over a 10,000 year time period for each 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant.

    For the nuclear power plant waste, which consists of spent fuel rods, the most desirable inner barrier is the original cladding used for the nuclear fuel in the basic power plant configuration. This excellent cladding barrier is usually zirconium but sometimes stainless steel is used. The lifetime of this cladding has never been tested, so there is no telling exactly how long it can be depended upon. Safety engineering, however, dictates that because this barrier has already proved to be very reliable, it should be left in place and not removed. Further barriers have to be determined as a result of experimental development based upon both thermal characteristics and mechanical properties. Possibilities include glass, copper, ceramic, additional zirconium, stainless steel, nickel, or titanium. All this is for the power plant spent fuel rods only. Bomb waste having been processed requires another barrier or cladding before application of the “standard” multibarriers.

    Because the bomb waste is initially in a semi-liquid sludge form, it has to be solidified at the outset. The quantities involved are approximately 105 million gallons for the U.S. as of 1994, so the total quantity worldwide would be about 200 million gallons. A ball park estimate of the solidified quantity results in roughly the same volume as the power plant waste with the identical radioactive nuclides. The major difference between this solidified nuclear bomb waste and the spent fuel rods will be that the former will probably be contained in vitrified or glassified cylinders as compared with the latter being in long slender cylindrical fuel rods with metallic cladding. Actually, if we fabricated the bomb waste’s vitrified cylinders in long slender rods the same size as the spent fuel rods, the remainder of the waste disposal process could be identical for both waste components.

    Of special note here is that the final configuration must be a solid container or cask whose outer surface is monitored. Engineering jargon usually refers to this approach as placing the canister in a “bath tub.” Sensitive radioactive sensors in the “bath tub” must monitor this outer container surface continuously in an automated fashion. Such automation must incorporate Built-In-Self-Test, making use of many space exploration techniques.

    While the waste canisters or containers are stored in shallow, underground but easily accessible facilities, all testing and monitoring should be performed by automated equipment. Such techniques preclude human errors caused by boredom, undetected equipment malfunctions, and misinterpretation of displayed information. Human intervention is necessary only for overall supervision and periodic testing of the automated equipment because of multiple error causation possibilities beyond the original design. We have to remember that there is nothing that is 100% safe; nuclear bombs for example only possessed six or seven safety interlocks. Periodically, the nuclear waste monitoring equipment must be replaced and the waste canisters themselves will require retrieval and automatic repackaging every hundred years or more. It is noted that there are essentially two sets of automatic equipment, (1) the canister “bath tub” monitors and (2) the retrieval/repackaging mechanism. The latter might well be simply remote controlled equipment or a combination of semi-automatic components.

    A summary of our viewpoint is that the best disposal method known to date consists of sealing the zirconium or stainless steel-clad spent fuel rods, without reprocessing, in copper or steel canisters and storing these in a geologic but easily accessible repository. This is the once-through fuel cycle. The spent fuel rods should be allowed to stand at least ten years under water so that most of the radioactive materials decay, and the rate of heat generation has fallen by about 86%. The repositories must have multiple barriers. The canisters must be arranged so that sufficient cooling air can circulate around them after disposal. The waste density must not exceed that required for adequate heat flow.

    A major point to be made is that a very responsible and conscientious group of people is required to take care of our long-term nuclear garbage. This group must have substantial credentials for at least several centuries of resource concern and responsible treatment of their environment. Few groups in the world will qualify and it is worth considerable remuneration from the society at large to this select management group to perform the waste monitoring required. The compensation referred to, while quite large for the equipment and personnel involved in terms of the select group, will be minuscule compared with the monetary interest the U.S. presently pays on its debt or the amount societies throughout the world have been willing to spend on weapons of mass destruction.

      Table 2: Thermal Power Per Metric Tonne* of Spent Fuel
     

    Age (years)
    		  

     Rate of Heat Liberated(watts)
    		  

     Percent of Heat from Strontium and Cessium
     

    1
    		  

     12,300
    		  

     67
     

    5
    		  

      2,260
    		  

    69
     

    10
    		  

      1,300
    		  

    72
     

     20
    		  

      950
    		  

     68
     

     50
    		  

      572
    		  

     56
     

    100
    		  

      312
    		  

     31
     

     200
    		  

     183
    		  

     5

     * 2 metric tonne = 1000 kilograms = 1 long ton = 2200 lbs.

    Nonretrievable Geologic Storage

    The major effort toward long-term high-level nuclear waste disposal has been in the area of depositing in the ground all the dangerous material in some sort of containers. This approach seeks to find a permanent disposal technique so the waste can be left for posterity without any possibility of future generations being at risk. While the motivation and results sought after are commendable, the reality of what is being attempted has not really been fully recognized.

    Of prime importance here is the basic engineering principle alluded to above that any truly new system has to be tested for at least one life cycle in order for there to be reasonable confidence that there have been no design or fabrication errors. Given a new disposal system that has a life cycle of at least 300 years, the required engineering prototype test is not possible. After twenty-five years, the faith of responsible nuclear power parties that government would figure out an acceptable solution eventually is as remote a possibility today as it was in the first place. Needless to say, that confidence in a permanent solution has now been thoroughly shaken, as basic engineering considerations dictated at the outset.

    The geologic materials investigated throughout the world have included salt, granite, volcanic tuff, and basalt. Each particular site chosen, after much consideration of geologic and scientific aspects, has proven to have some flaw that makes such contemplated irretrievable burial unacceptable. In some instances fractures in the structure have occurred or been discovered whereby the nuclear waste could eventually get outside the confinement volume. Other problems include the buildup and then outflow of water. Earthquake susceptibility is always of concern and automatically precludes use of some sites.

    In the end it does not look as though we can possibly have sufficient confidence in any one geologic site that would allow permanent disposal. One possibility, of course, is to treat the waste similarly to the way we instituted nuclear power in the first place, i.e., proceed with what seems satisfactory at the time and leave any serious long-term problems to be solved only after they have actually arisen. In other words, there is always the irresponsible option of letting our distant descendants be plagued with our 20th century errors.

    Burying of Casks Inside Underground Bomb Test Cavities

    Given the already contaminated underground cavities made by bomb-testing in Nevada, a logical option would appear to be the use of these voids for permanent waste disposal. An important factor to be considered is the high level of radioactivity already present within those cavities. While leaks into the air occurred in some tests, in most cases all of the radioactivity from the explosions was confined. After all, this was the bomb-testing option of choice to prevent contamination of the atmosphere. A typical test was the Chesire experiment, conducted on February 14, 1976. It was a hydrogen bomb with a yield between 200 and 500 kilotons. It was detonated at a depth of 3830 feet, which was 1760 feet below the water table.

    There is already considerable experience in drilling into bomb cavities. The purpose was to sample the radioactive materials for analysis, in order to estimate the yield and efficiency (which is the percentage of U-235 and/or Pu-239 which underwent fission). If the deeper cavities are chosen (to insure that they are well below the water table), it would be easiest to drill a shaft in the same place as the original one. By now, the fission products which are most dangerous, such as iodine-131, have all decayed. The only gaseous fission product left is krypton-85, with half-life 10.7 years. It is not nearly as dangerous as radon, and in any case only a small amount would diffuse out. Casks of waste would be lowered into the cavity using a cable suspended from a derrick, with the operator inside a shielded housing, if necessary. At the end, the cavity is filled with earth, and the shaft closed.

    Although this burial technique looks promising and derserving of further study, it is by no means clear that this technique for disposing of hazardous waste is satisfactory. It could develop that creating new cavities for the express purpose of using them as repositories could become attractive. In that case, the site would be carefully chosen with the water table in mind, and the cavity blasted very deep. Hydrogen bombs might be best since most of the energy comes from deuterium fusion, thus minimizing the amount of radioactivity created.

    So much for the positive aspects. Negative aspects include the idea that just because deep underground cavities are already contaminated with long lived radioactive nuclides from nuclear bomb explosions, we are not justified increasing the potential future health hazards by orders of magnitude. As with other geologic burials, there are possibilities of earthquakes, ground fractures, and unanticipated failures in the deep drilled shafts that would cause water leakage. However, of all the possible permanent disposal sites, these deep holes of hazardous remnants from past bomb development follies appear to be the most attractive, even though a time period of at least 10,000 years is too long to confidently conclude that there are no significant failure-modes.

    Because permanent geologic disposal in nuclear bomb cavities violates fundamental engineering principles, it can be considered to be irresponsible for present generations to pursue that option. Perhaps considerations of our lack of knowledge today of what the worldwide land usage was many thousands of years ago will provide an understanding of our cautious conclusions here. We simply cannot be reasonably certain how the use of land throughout the world will evolve over the forthcoming thousands of years. Thus conscientious adherence to responsible behavior requires our not utilizing this bomb cavity technique at present. Further study might possibly result in something useful a hundred or more years hence.

    Burial Between Tectonic Plates

    The interior of the Earth contains the elements potassium, uranium, and thorium, all slightly radioactive. This radioactive decay liberates heat, which keeps the Earth’s core hot. The consequence of a hot, liquid core is movement of floating tectonic plates, and formation of mountain ranges and continents. Were this not the case, mountains and all land would erode down, and our planet would be covered with water. Without this radioactivity, we would not exist.

    Geologists discovered many years ago that the continents are in constant motion relative to each other. Far below the ground tectonic plates are sliding very slowly over each other. The continents rest on these plates, so the oceans are changing size and shape while the surface continents are moving relative to one another. At the edge of a plate whose motion is toward the ocean, there will be a subduction layer between that tectonic plate and the one below. Any material between the plates at that point will be pulled in between and remain there for at least several million years.

    Concern over the years has been to consider just how one could perform the placement of high-level nuclear waste into a tectonic plate subduction layer. One major problem is digging down to that depth. But even more stringent than that is the problem of construction of shaft walls that will withstand the weight of all the earth above. The same problem is encountered when constructing a research module to descend to the ocean floor. While the ocean depth is a maximum of about 6 miles, the tectonic plate depth is as much as 50 miles. Finally, there are the construction strength problem differences between an enclosed submerged module in the ocean and the side wall problems in a shaft through which nuclear waste canisters are to be lowered.

    There has not been, nor is there even a contemplated possibility of constructing a shaft that would be strong enough for this nuclear waste disposal option. Thus, another apparently attractive approach seems to be beyond our reach.

    Transmutation

    Soon after commercial generation of electricity via reactors started and their high-level waste began to accumulate, ways to simplify and manage the problem were sought. Among these was reprocessing to separate the waste into several fractions, and then, using neutrons, to transmute via fission the transuranium elements (neptunium, plutonium, americium, etc.) into nuclides which have relatively short half-lives so that they lose their radioactive sting in a repository during an abbreviated storage time. The transuranium elements would require sequestering in a repository for many thousands of years.

    If the nuclear waste is bombarded with neutrons, electrons, or other atomic particles so that it is changed from a long-lived to a short-lived radioactive material, the process has been termed “transmutation.” About thirty years ago, people inquiring about the long-term nuclear waste disposal for commercial reactors were told that the military had the identical problem for its nuclear bomb waste. Because the military waste was already twenty years old, the word to one of the authors was that the military had not only decided that transmutation was the best solution to this problem but had already worked out all pertinent details. Many years and many nuclear reactors later, of course, we found out that the military had not developed any viable transmutation waste disposal system at all.

    In fact, the basic problems with transmutation have been perennial. Each nuance has resulted in the same general result. Any process based on transmutation would require reprocessing to separate the waste into several fractions, and then, using neutrons, to transmute via fission the transuranium elements (neptunium, plutonium, americium, etc.) into nuclides which have relatively short half-lives. Considerable research has been carried out recently on these nuclear incineration techniques. Tests are being conducted at Hanford, Los Alamos, and Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. Success of the proposed procedure depends on reprocessing spent fuel by either the PUREX process or a technique similar to the TRUMP-S process. The actinides would then be reintroduced into the reactor or bombarded with neutrons generated using an accelerator. Thus neutron sources might be either nuclear reactors, perhaps of the breeder type, or linear accelerators to produce high-energy protons, which collide with lead, bismuth, or tungsten targets. This produces abundant neutrons, which must be moderated using heavy water. The neutrons then cause fission of the actinides, and liberation of huge amounts of energy, as in a nuclear reactor.

    Disposal of wastes by transmutation is intimately related to fast breeder reactors. While American reactors of this type were phased out by Congress in 1983, a new type, the Integral Fast Reactor, is now being studied. These breeder reactors use liquid sodium as coolant and have no moderator. They are being promoted as a way to cope with nuclear waste. The problem, of course, is that “we’ve heard that story before.”

    Even though the outlook for nuclear transmutation is most unpromising, a few details are perhaps in order. The accelerator procedure is highly unfavorable from the standpoint of energy consumption. The steel and other parts would be activated by neutrons, and become radioactive. It seems that about as much radioactive waste would be produced as is consumed, as stated above, if not more. Costs would be fantastic. The procedure could not easily be used with fission products. They absorb neutrons poorly; after all, they were in a neutron environment for years, and survived. Only two, iodine-129 and technetium-99, are easily transmuted to nonradioactive nuclides, and these are not particularly important. Technetium-99 (half-life nearly a quarter of a million years) is converted by neutrons into technetium 100 (half-life only 16 seconds) forming ruthenium. If this process is carried out while a stream of ozone is passed through the apparatus, volatile ruthenium tetroxide is constantly removed. Transmutation might be successful in this case, and perhaps that of iodine-129, but in general the technique is not expected to be satisfactory.

    In 1992 a group of nine qualified experts finished an exhaustive assessment of disposing of waste through transmutation via fast breeder reactors, accelerators, and high temperature electrolysis techniques (the Ramspott report, after the first author). These scientists are associated with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, two universities, and a private firm. The study concluded that high-temperature electrolysis procedures for separating actinide metals in reprocessing high-level waste offers no economic incentives or safety advantages. Unfortunately, actinide separation and transmutation cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute for geological disposal.

    Spacecraft Transport to the Sun

    Of all the theoretically possible disposal techniques one can think of, this is one of the most preferable. Materials on the sun are already similar to our waste products, so our depositing high level nuclear materials on the sun would blend right in. Unfortunately, the numbers are such that we cannot do the job, either technologically or economically.

    Given the liquid sludge nuclear bomb waste of about 108 gallons for the U.S. alone, the following ballpark numbers apply:

    ~0.1 = conversion factor for solidification.
    ~0.1 = conversion factor for gallons to cu ft.
    ~100 lbs/cu ft density.
    10,000 lb effective spacecraft waste payload for an Apollo-type vehicle assuming the additional 7000 lb payload will be required for containers and the retro-rockets.
    108 x 0.1 x 0.1 x 100 x 10-4 = 104 spacecraft for only accumulated U.S. military waste.

    Besides the fact that the U.S. does not have the economic resources to fund such a gigantic number of spacecraft, each vehicle would have to have perfect launch systems that would not blow up on the launch pad plus perfect guidance systems that would insure the vehicle not turning around back toward the Earth. Obviously, this is beyond any forseeable capability and must be abandoned as a possible option.

    Conclusions

    A major point emphasized in this study is that it is unethical to force a known potential environmental hazard on future generations when a reasonable alternative exists. This aspect was phrased above in engineering terms, i.e. basic engineering principles; however, it could easily have been phrased in more socially oriented terms. This leads to the only responsible choice being the multibarrier monitored retrievable storage (MMRS) technique which will cost in present dollars between $100 million and $1 billion per 1000 megawatt power plant over a 10,000 to 100,000 year storage period.

    It also needs to be pointed out that there are some important lessons to be learned from Mother Nature:

    1) The natural nuclear reactors at Oklo in Gabon, West Africa, demonstrated that the plutonium and most metallic fission products did not leach out, even over thousands of centuries of leaching. Even the strontium-90 stayed in place until it decayed. The cesium-137 did migrate out, and the iodine fission products evaporated. Despite this favorable result, strictly speaking it applies to the particular geology of that area.

    2) Another natural site teaches us more valuable lessons about the behavior of radioactive materials during long storage. There is a hill called Morro do Ferro in Brazil where there are 30,000 tons of thorium and 100,000 tons of rare earths. Much of the fission products are rare earths. Chemically, thorium resembles plutonium in some ways and the rare earths resemble curium and americium. Again, the evidence is that migration of the most dangerous materials from the surface over eons of weathering has been negligible.

    3) Still another area whose study yields valuable lessons is the Koongarra ore body in Australia. This is a giant deposit of uranium ore in a common type of geological formation through which groundwater has been flowing for millions of years. Movement of uranium and its decay products has been investigated by drilling a series of holes through the ore body and surrounding layers. The results indicate that migration of only a few tens of meters has occurred on the weathered surface, and virtually no movement has taken place underground.

    So with responsible behavior designing and implementing the MMRS long-term nuclear waste system, there is reasonable historical assurance that future disasters will probably be avoided even if some failures should occur in that system.

    References

    1. Edgardo Browne, Richard B. Firestone; and Virginia Shirley, Ed.; Table of Radioactive Isotopes, John Wiley & Sons: New York,1986, Table 1 pp. D-10 to D-26.
    2. Warf, James C., All Things Nuclear, First Edition, Southern California Federation of Scientists, Los Angeles, 1989, p. 85.

     

  • Towards Sustainable Societies

    Sustainability

    Sustainability is a value-based aim and process with environmental, technological, political, social, economic and institutional implications. Sustainability requires that we organise our societies so that they evolve in harmony with nature; dominance over nature is a failed option.

    Sustainability calls for a significant reduction in use of global natural resources and a sharing of these resources between individuals, societies and generations so that a maximum of well-being and dignity is achieved for all. It calls also for the creation of safe and peaceful living conditions and for respect for human, cultural and biological diversity.

    The Current Situation

    While encouraging initiatives and possibilities exist, the overall thrust of our economic systems, social structures and science and technology is working against sustainability; radical changes are required to preserve the options for future generations.

    Human activities are producing unprecedented changes in the biosphere, degrading, for example, soil fertility, ground-water supply and biodiversity. We are overusing natural resources, thus eroding our life-support basis; these resources are being used in an inefficient way, creating too little of value, too few jobs, and too much waste; further, there are growing inequalities, both on a national and on a global level, in the distribution of income, labour and wealth derived from the use of the resources; marginalisation of individuals, societies and even whole regions has become a major threat to sustainability. In most countries, employment has become increasingly precarious and poverty is spreading. All these distortions diminish governability, give rise to insecurity and tensions that often result in excessive reliance on military force, and this reliance in turn exacerbates the problems referred to above.

    A Sustainable Future

    A positive alternative to the current situation is the development of new economic, technological and social structures and implementation of societal values, aiming at sustainable societies. Any process of development seeking sustainability should take the following criteria into account:

    • protecting the integrity of the biosphere:
      • practice sustainable agriculture and forestry;
      • preserve marine resources and biodiversity;
      • establish networks of nature protection;
    • efficient use of resources:
      • social innovation in production and product distribution and use;
      • development of new technologies and designs to increase efficiency;
    • self-reliance: enhancement of endogenous production capacity in the non-industrialised countries using all opportunities available, adding value to the resources and creating jobs in the countries and communities of origin;
    • participatory democracy: creation of structures that ensure access without discrimination of any sort including gender or income level to education, participation in civil and political life, health care, food and other resources, and means of production and labour opportunities; these structures should encourage people to bring their creativity into the political planning and decision process, and thus contribute new ideas and life styles to global sustainability;
    • fair trade: establishment of fair trade patterns and regulatory mechanisms
    • peace and non-violence: creation of a culture of non-violence and establishment and strengthening of structures for peaceful resolution of conflicts; prohibition, elimination and verified safeguards against all weapons of mass destruction; severe restrictions on the development, transfer and use of all weaponry.

    The Role of Science and Engineering

    Science and technology have become instrumental to the present patterns of development, and in many countries have evolved from mere instruments into autonomous driving forces; they are as much a part of the problem as they can be a part of the solution. In some societies there is an impressive capacity for technical innovation; however, it is clearer than ever before that not every innovation can be considered as progress. Natural sciences draw their strength frequently from reductionist analysis, thus inherently favouring specialisation and selective perception of problems. Consequently, the solutions proposed often fall short of an integrated approach.

    A thorough reorientation of science and technology is necessary based on integrated system approaches and the acceptance that science can never claim to fully tackle all aspects of reality.

    Only through innovative reorganisation and public accountability can the scientific and engineering communities meet their obligation to contribute to a sustainable future.

    Appeal

    We, the undersigned engineers and scientists, commit ourselves, as professionals and citizens, to work for a sustainable society, and appeal to other colleagues to join us by undertaking the following actions:

    We appeal to decision makers from the scientific and engineering communities wherever possible to:

    • support and fund the integration of sustainable development in programs and projects
    • emphasise a systematic interdisciplinary approach to the development of alternative technologies and the organisation of their use.

    We appeal to the scientific and engineering communities at large and to their institutions to:

    • be open for new, innovative contributions;
    • foster participation, freedom for and encouragement of innovative thinking and openness for ideas from inside and outside the academic community;
    • support integration of, rather than discrimination against, non-mainstream approaches;
    • investigate and promote all means by which deep inequalities between peoples and between countries can be reduced;
    • apply our insights to our own institutions, buildings, and ways of working.

    We commit ourselves in our professional work to:

    • support the sustainability perspective in the way we develop and conduct projects, to foster systemic integration of different disciplines, schools of thought, and regional perspectives wherever possible;
    • uncover all available information about environmentally, socially or otherwise unsustainable developments.

    For many scientists and engineers there is only limited scope for acting; nonetheless, other options apply:

    • to dedicate some of our time (5 to 10 per cent) to active participation in citizens’ organisations;
    • to support personally, financially and scientifically engineers and scientists who are ill-treated or persecuted for having acted for sustainability in their professional work, or for equity and democracy in their country and in international relations.

    Prof. Dr. Ana-Maria Cetto Mexico, Executive Committee Member of INES
    Dr. David Krieger USA, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
    Gerhard Rohde Switzerland, FIET (International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional & Technical Employees )
    Joachim Spangenberg Germany, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy
    Prof. Dr. Hartwig Spitzer Germany, Chair of the Executive Committee of INES
    Dr. Philip Webber UK, Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility

  • First Annual Sadako Peace Day

    Mayor Harriet Miller declared August 6, 1996 as “The First Annual Sadako Peace Day.” In making this proclamation, she called “for efforts in our community and throughout the world to abolish nuclear weapons and to prevent people everywhere, particularly children, from suffering the horrors of war.”

    Sadako Sasaki was a two-year old girl in Hiroshima, who was exposed to radiation when the atomic bomb was dropped on her city on August 6, 1945. She developed radiation-induced leukemia ten years later. Japanese legend has it that one’s wish will come true if one folds a thousand paper cranes. Sadako began folding paper cranes with the wish to get well and achieve world peace. She wrote a poem, “I will write peace on your wings and you will fly all over the world.” Sadako died with 646 cranes folded, and her classmates finished folding the paper cranes. Sadako’s story has become known to people all over the world, and the folding of paper cranes has become a symbol of world peace.

    To commemorate Sadako Peace Day, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and La Casa de Maria hosted an outdoor ceremony at Sadako Peace Garden at La Casa de Maria. The ceremony, with some 100 people in attendance, included a musical program arranged by Harry Sargous of The Music Academy of the West, and poetry read by several Santa Barbara poets, including Gene Knudsen Hoffman and Sojourner Kincaid-Rolle.

    Foundation president David Krieger summarized the importance of the event and the day: “This day August 6th has many names. For some, looking back in history, it is Hiroshima Day, a time to recall the terrible devastation that took place when a single nuclear weapon was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. For some, looking to the future, it is Abolition Day, a time to rededicate one’s efforts to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world. These are important perspectives. For us here today, the day is also Sadako Peace Day, a commemoration of the loss of an innocent child’s life as a result of the bombing of Hiroshima, and a rededication to preventing other children from being injured and killed as a result of war, any war.”

     

  • First Annual Sadako Peace Day City of Santa Barbara Proclamation

    Whereas, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is dedicated to creating a nuclear weapons free world under international law;

    Whereas, the Sadako Peace Garden, located at La Casa de Maria, was created by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and La Casa de Maria, and was dedicated on August 6, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the first use of an atomic bomb in warfare; and

    Whereas, Sadako Sasaki was two years old when the bombing of Hiroshima occurred, and died ten years after the bombing of Hiroshima from radiation-induced leukemia; and

    Whereas, Japanese legend has it that one’s wish will come true if one folds a thousand paper cranes; Sadako’s wish was to get well and spread the message of peace and she wrote a poem, “I will write peace on your wings and you will fly all over the world”; and

    Whereas, Sadako died with 646 cranes folded, and her classmates finished folding the paper cranes that have since become a symbol of peace throughout the world,

    Now, Therefore, I, Harriet Miller, by virtue of the authority vested in me as Mayor of the City of Santa Barbara do hereby proclaim the day of August 6 1996 as the FIRST ANNUAL SADAKO PEACE DAY and call for efforts in our community and throughout the world to abolish nuclear weapons and to prevent people everywhere, particularly children, from suffering the horrors of war.

    In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Official Seal of the City of Santa Barbara, California, to be affixed this 6th day of August 1996.

    Harriet Miller, Mayor
    Santa Barbara, California

  • Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons

    Introduction

    The two nuclear fission bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki each released nearly 4,000 times as much explosive energy as chemical high explosive bombs of the same weight. Together they killed more than 200,000 people. The energy released by the splitting of the atomic nuclei in the cores of these bombs was more than 10 million times the energy released by rearrangements of the outer electrons of atoms, which are responsible for chemical changes. For an instant after detonation of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, an amount of explosive energy equivalent to a pile of dynamite as big as the White House was contained in a sphere of plutonium no bigger than a baseball.

    This is why, a short time later, Albert Einstein said: “The splitting of the atom has changed everything, save our mode of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Suddenly the destructive capacity accessible to humans went clear off the human scale of things.

    About 10 years later this destructive capacity jumped dramatically again when the United States and the Soviet Union developed hydrogen bombs. By the 1970s, there were five announced members of the nuclear club, and the total number of nuclear warheads in the world had increased to some 60,000.

    Since 1964, when China tested its first nuclear explosive, further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons has been secret or ambiguous or both. India tested a nuclear explosive in 1974, but claimed that is was strictly for peaceful purposes, and has consistently denied that it has any nuclear weapons. Although its government has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that Israel has been accumulating a growing stockpile since the 1960s. South Africa announced that it had made a half-dozen or so nuclear weapons, starting in the 1970s, but that it now has eliminated them. Other countries strongly suspected of having at least one nuclear weapon, and the capacity to make more, include Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq. Commitments have been made by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to turn over to Russia all nuclear weapons on their territories for dismantling. Ukraine completed this transfer on June 1, 1996.

    The immense potential destructive capacity of uranium and plutonium can also be released slowly as energy that can serve the peaceful needs of humans. It took about 10 years after the first nuclear bombs were exploded for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to begin to be practical. Nuclear power has expanded considerably in the last 30 years or so. The two technologies-for destructive uses and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy-are closely connected. I’ll discuss these connections in some detail in this paper.

    Facing the realities of the Nuclear Age as they have become evident these past 50 years has been a difficult and painful process for me, involving many changes of heart in my feelings about nuclear weapons and nuclear power since I first heard of nuclear fission on August 6, 1945. I started with a sense of revulsion towards nuclear weapons and skepticism about nuclear power for nearly five years. Then I worked on and strongly promoted nuclear weapons for some 15 years. In 1966, in the midst of a job in the Pentagon, I did an about-face in my perception of nuclear weaponry, and have pressed for nuclear disarmament ever since. My rejection of nuclear power, because of its connection with nuclear weapons, took longer, and was not complete until about 1980.

    Since that time I have been persistent in calling for the prompt global abolition of all nuclear weapons and the key nuclear materials needed for their production. Since all of the more than 400 nuclear power plants now operating in 32 countries produce large quantities of plutonium that, when chemically separated from spent fuel, can be used to make reliable, efficient nuclear weapons of all types, I have also found it necessary to call for phasing out all nuclear power worldwide. To accomplish this while being responsive to the environmental disruption caused by continued large-scale use of fossil fuels, I also find it necessary to call for intense, global response to opportunities for saving energy and producing what is needed from renewable sources directly or indirectly derived from solar radiation. I shall try in the rest of this paper to explain briefly the convictions that have led me to join others in making these calls with great urgency.

    Latent Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    There are many possible degrees of drift or concerted national actions that are short of the actual possession of nuclear weapons, but that can account for much of what has to be done technically to acquire them. Harold Feiveson has called such activity “latent proliferation” of nuclear weapons.1 A national government that sponsors acquisition of nuclear power plants may have no intention to acquire nuclear weapons; but that government may be replaced by one that does, or may change its collective mind. A country that is actively pursuing nuclear power for peaceful purposes may also secretly develop nuclear explosives to the point where the last stages of assembly and military deployment could be carried out very quickly. The time and resources needed to make the transition from latent to active proliferation can range from very large to very small. Inadequately controlled plutonium or highly enriched uranium, combined with secret design and testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear warheads, can allow a nation or terrorist group to have deliverable nuclear weapons within days, or even hours, after acquiring a few kilograms or more of the key nuclear weapon materials.

    Contrary to widespread belief among nuclear engineers who have never worked on nuclear weapons, plutonium made in nuclear power plant fuel can be used to make all types of nuclear weapons. This “reactor grade” plutonium has relatively high concentrations of the isotope Pu-240, which spontaneously releases many more neutrons than Pu-239, the principal plutonium isotope in “weapon-grade” plutonium. In early nuclear weapons, such as the plutonium bomb tested in New Mexico in 1945, and then used in the bombing of Nagasaki, use of reactor grade plutonium would have tended to cause the chain reaction to start prematurely. This would lower the most likely explosive yield, but not below about 1 kiloton, compared with the 20 kiloton yield from these two bombs. Since that time, however, there have been major developments of nuclear weapons technology that make it possible to design all types of nuclear weapons to use reactor grade plutonium without major degradation of the weapons’ performance and reliability, compared with those that use weapon grade plutonium.2 These techniques have been well understood by nuclear weapon designers in the United States since the early 1950s, and probably also for decades in the other four declared nuclear weapon states.

    Reactor grade plutonium can also be used for making relatively crude nuclear explosives, such as might be made by terrorists. Although the explosive yields of such bombs would tend to be unpredictable, varying from case to case for the same bomb design, their minimum explosive yields could credibly be the equivalent of several hundred tons or more of high explosive.3 Such bombs, transportable by automobile, would certainly qualify as weapons of mass destruction, killing many tens of thousands or more people in some locations.

    All nuclear weapons require plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some use both. The required amounts vary considerably, depending on the desired characteristics and on the technical resources and knowhow available to those who design and build the weapons. Estimates of the maximum total number of U. S. nuclear warheads and of the total amount of plutonium produced for those warheads correspond to an average of about 3 kilograms of plutonium per warhead.4 The minimum amount of plutonium in a nuclear explosive that contains no highly enriched uranium can be significantly smaller than 3 kilograms.

    Nuclear power plants typically produce a net of about 200 kilograms of plutonium per year for each 1,000 megawatts of electric power generating capacity. Some 430 nuclear power plants, with combined electrical generating capacity of nearly 340,000 megawatts, are now operating in 32 countries. The plants account for about 7% of total primary energy consumption worldwide, or about 17% of the world’s electrical energy. Total net annual production of plutonium by these plants is nearly 70,000 kilograms, enough for making more than 10,000 nuclear warheads per year. 5

    So far about four times as much plutonium has been produced in power reactors than has been used for making nuclear weapons-about 1 million kilograms, most of which is in spent nuclear fuel in storage, compared with about 250,000 kilograms for weapons.6

    Nearly 200,000 kilograms of plutonium have been chemically separated from spent power reactor fuel in chemical reprocessing facilities in at least 8 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States).7 This is typically stored as plutonium oxide that can relatively easily be converted to plutonium metal for use in nuclear explosives.

    Research and test reactors can also produce significant amounts of plutonium that, after chemical separation, can be used for making nuclear weapons. This has apparently been the route to nuclear weapons followed by Israel and started by North Korea.

    Although use of highly enriched uranium in nuclear power plants has been sporadic and rare, substantial quantities have been used for R&D purposes-as fuel for research and test reactors, and in connection with development of breeder reactors. Principal suppliers have been and now are the five declared nuclear weapon states. It has been estimated that the world inventory of highly enriched uranium for civil purposes is about 20,000 kilograms.8

    Although this is dramatically smaller than the more than 1 million kilograms of highly enriched uranium associated with nuclear weapons, it may be extremely important to some countries that are secretly developing the technology for making nuclear weapons.

    Facilities for enriching uranium in its concentration of the isotope U-235 to the levels of a few percent needed for light water power reactor fuel can be used for further enrichment to high concentrations used for making nuclear explosives. The technology for doing this is proliferating, both in terms of the numbers of countries that have such facilities, and in the variety of different ways to carry out the enrichment.

    The continuing international spread of knowledge of nuclear technology related to nuclear power development is an important contributor to latent nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the people who have become experts in nuclear technology, whether for military or civil purposes, could be of great help in setting up and carrying out clandestine nuclear weapon design and construction operations that make use of nuclear materials stolen from military supplies or diverted from civil supplies, perhaps having entered a black market.

    An example of highly advanced latent nuclear weapon proliferation is the nuclear weapons development program that started in Sweden in the late 1940s. It remained secret until the mid-1980s, when much detail about the project started becoming publicly available. It included hydronuclear tests of implosion systems containing enough fissile material to go critical but not enough to make a damaging nuclear explosion. The objective of the Swedish nuclear bomb program was to determine, in great detail, what Sweden would need to do if the government ever decided to produce and stockpile nuclear weapons.9 I have no reason to believe that Sweden has ever made that decision. I would not be surprised, however, if many other countries with nuclear reactors or uranium enrichment facilities that could be used to supply needed key nuclear materials have secretly carried out similar programs of lesser or perhaps even greater technical sophistication than Sweden’s.

    Bombardment of Nuclear Facilities

    Another type of latent proliferation that I find especially worrisome is the possible bombardment of nuclear facilities that thereby would be converted, in effect, into nuclear weapons. Military bombardment or sabotage of nuclear facilities, ranging from operating nuclear power plants and their spent fuel storage pools to large accumulations of high level radioactive wastes in temporary or long term storage, could release large quantities of radioactive materials that could seriously endanger huge land areas downwind. Electric power plants and stored petroleum have often been prime targets for tactical and strategic bombing, and sometimes for sabotage. In the case of operating nuclear power plants, core meltdowns and physical rupture of containment structures could be caused by aerial or artillery bombardment, truck bombings, internal sabotage with explosives, or by control manipulations following capture of the facility by terrorists. For orientation to the scale of potential radioactive contamination, consider strontium-90 and cesium-137, two especially troublesome fission products with half-lives of about 30 years. The inventories of these radionuclides in the core of a typical nuclear power plant (1,000 electrical megawatts) are greater than the amounts released by a 20 megaton H-bomb explosion, assuming half the explosion energy is accounted for by fission.

    Inventories of dangerous radioactive materials can be considerably greater in a waste or spent fuel storage facility that has served the needs of many nuclear power plants for many years. In some cases it may not be credible that chemical explosives could release large fractions of such materials and cause them to be airborne long enough to contaminate very large areas. In such situations, however, the explosion of a relatively small nuclear explosive in the midst of the storage area could spread the radioactive materials over huge areas.

    Perhaps the greatest extent of latent proliferation of nuclear weapons is represented by nuclear power fuel cycle facilities that can become enormously destructive nuclear weapons by being bombed by military forces or terrorists.

    Can the Nuclear Power-Nuclear Weapon Connections Be Broken?

    Given the rapidly increasing rate of worldwide latent proliferation of nuclear weapons, what can be done to assure that it does not lead to considerable surges in active proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    Shifts from latent to active nuclear weapon proliferation may be detected or discouraged by application of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear diversion safeguards. IAEA safeguards are applied to parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that are not nuclear weapons states. But the IAEA has authority only to inspect designated (or in some cases suspected) nuclear facilities, not to interfere physically to prevent a government from breaking its agreements under the treaty if it so chooses. Furthermore, a major function of the IAEA is also to provide assistance to countries that wish to develop nuclear power and use it. Thus the IAEA simultaneously plays two possibly conflicting roles-one of encouraging latent proliferation and the other of discouraging active proliferation.

    As we have seen, a nation’s possession of plutonium, whether in spent fuel or chemically separated, or its possession of highly enriched uranium or of facilities capable of producing it, need not depend on a government’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a decision might be made secretly or openly at any time government leaders conclude that threats to their security or ambitions of conquest warrant breaking safeguard agreements; at that point they can quickly extract the key nuclear materials needed for a few or for large numbers of nuclear weapons.

    Various proposals have been made for developing nuclear power in forms that are less prone to diversion of nuclear materials for weapons than present nuclear power systems. None of these proposals avoid the production of substantial quantities of neutrons that could be used for making key nuclear materials for nuclear weapons, however. And none avoid the production of high level radioactive wastes, the permanent disposal of which is still awaiting both technical and political resolution. Furthermore, such concepts, once fully developed, would require decades for substitution for the present types of nuclear power systems.

    Increasing alarm about global climatic instabilities caused by continued release of “greenhouse gases,” particularly carbon dioxide produced by burning fossil fuels, has stimulated many advocates of nuclear energy to propose widescale displacement of fossil fuels by nuclear power. Such proposals would require building thousands of new nuclear power plants to achieve substantial global reduction in combustion of fossil fuels. This would greatly compound the dangers of destructive abuse of nuclear energy.

    In short, the connections between nuclear technology for constructive use and for destructive use are so closely tied together that the benefits of the one are not accessible without greatly increasing the hazards of the other.

    This leaves us with a key question: If nuclear power technology is too dangerous – by being so closely related to nuclear weapon technology – and fossil fuel combustion must be reduced sharply to avoid global climatic instabilities, what can humans do to meet their demands for energy worldwide?

    Efficient Use of Renewable Energy

    The economically attractive opportunities for using energy much more efficiently for all end uses in any of the wide variety of human settings are now so widely set forth that they need no further elaboration here. Although such opportunities generally exist for use of all kinds of energy sources, their detailed nature can depend on the specific type of energy provided for end use.10

    Among the many possibilities for economical renewable energy is hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water, using solar electric cells to provide the needed low voltage, direct current electrical energy. Recent advances in lowering the production costs and increasing the efficiency of photovoltaic cells make it likely that vigorous international pursuit of this option could allow production and distribution of hydrogen for use as a general purpose fuel, at costs competitive with the cost of natural gas.11

    Solar electric cells can also supply local or regional electric power for general use, using generators or fuel cells fueled with stored hydrogen, or pumped hydrolelectic storage, or windpower to meet electrical demands at night, on cloudy days, or in winter. Using such energy storage or windpower makes it possible to provide and use hydrogen to meet all local demands for energy in any climate.

    A common criticism of direct use of solar energy for meeting most human demands for energy results from a belief that the areas required are so large as to be impractical. This criticism is generally not valid. An overall efficiency of 15%, in terms of the chemical energy stored in hydrogen divided by the total solar radiation incident on the ground area used by solar cell arrays, is likely to be routinely achievable with flat, horizontal arrays. At a world annual average insolation rate of 200 watts per square meter, the total area required to meet the entire present world demand for primary energy of all types (equivalent to an annual average of about 10 trillion watts) would be about 0.4 million square kilometers. This is less than 0.4% of the world’s land area-much less than the annual fluctuations in the area devoted to agriculture, and comparable to the area used for roads. Even in Belgium, with perhaps the world’s highest national energy consumption rates per unit land area and lowest solar radiation availability, present demands could be met by solar hydrogen systems covering less than 5% of the country’s land area. Vigorous response to cost-effective opportunities for saving energy could lower considerably the land area requirements for solar energy anywhere.

    A Global Shift From Fossil and Nuclear Fuels to Renewable Energy

    Consider the benefits of a rapid worldwide shift from dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power to vigorous pursuit of opportunities for using energy much more efficiently and providing that energy from renewable sources.

    If nuclear power is phased out completely, it will become possible to outlaw internationally the possession of any key nuclear weapon materials, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium that can sustain a fast neutron chain reaction, along with any facilities that could be used for producing them. This would not require a global ban on basic research in nuclear physics nor the use of selected, internationally controlled accelerators for production of radionuclides for medical and industrial applications.

    A global ban on materials capable of sustaining nuclear explosive chain reactions would make it unnecessary to distinguish between alleged peaceful uses of these materials and uses that could be threatening. It would greatly increase the likelihood that violations of a ban on all nuclear weapons would be detected technically and by people who can report violations of the ban, without having to determine the intended uses of the materials and production facilities.

    A complete phaseout of nuclear power would help focus the world’s attention on safeguarding nuclear materials and safe, permanent disposal of all the nuclear wastes and spent nuclear fuel, separated plutonium, or other stockpiles of nuclear weapon materials that had been produced before nuclear power is completely phased out. All such materials could be internationally secured in a relatively small number of facilities while awaiting ultimate safe disposal. Although the quantities of these materials are already very large, applying the needed safeguards to them would be much easier than in a world in which nuclear power continues to flourish worldwide. The job would be finite, rather than open-ended. The costs of safe, environmentally acceptable, permanent disposal of nuclear weapon materials and nuclear wastes-costs that are now unknown, but are very large-would be bounded.

    Concerns about safety and vulnerability of nuclear power plants and their supporting facilities to military action or acts of terrorism would disappear.

    In anticipation of a phaseout of nuclear power and sharp curtailment of combustion of fossil fuels, research, development, and commercialization of renewable energy sources could be greatly accelerated by a shift of national and international resources toward them and away from dependence on nuclear power and fossil fuel systems that are inherent threats to human security and our global habitat.

    Global Nuclear Abolition

    It troubles me more deeply than I can express that my country continues to be prepared, under certain conditions, to launch nuclear weapons that would kill millions of innocent bystanders. To me, this is preparation for mass murder that cannot be justified under any conditions. It must therefore be considered as human action that is out-and-out evil. The threat of nuclear retaliation also is a completely ineffectual deterrent to nuclear attack by terrorists or leaders of governments that need not identify themselves or that are physically located in the midst of populations that have no part in the initial attack or threat of attack. In short, we humans must find alternatives to retaliation in kind to acts of massive and indiscriminate violence.

    These alternatives must focus on ways to deter use of weapons of mass destruction by determining who is responsible for such attacks or threats of attack, and bringing them to justice.

    One hangup that many people have with global nuclear weapon abolition anytime soon is that nuclear technology is already too widely dispersed to allow accurate and complete technical verification of compliance, using currently available verification methods. Another widespread hangup is that malevolent national leaders might threaten to use secretly withheld or produced nuclear weapons to force intolerable demands on other countries if they did not face certain devastating nuclear retaliation to carrying out such threats.

    I agree that no conceivable global verification system or international security force for identifying and arresting violators of an internationally negotiated and codified legal framework for globally banning nuclear weapons and nuclear power can be guaranteed to deter violation of the the ban. But this is a property of any law governing human beings. The question is not about achieving perfect global security against nuclear violence. The question is: Which would be preferred by most human beings-a world in which possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons is allowed for some but forbidden for others, or one in which they are completely outlawed, with no exceptions?

    I believe the time has come to establish a global popular taboo against nuclear weapons and devices or processes that might be used to make them. The taboo should be directed specifically at any action – by governments, non-government enterprises, or individuals – that is in violation of international laws specifically related to nuclear technology.

    I also propose that as the taboo is formulated and articulated vigorously worldwide, both informal and formal negotiations of an international nuclear abolition treaty start immediately in the relevant United Nations organizations. Why not adopt a formal goal of completing the negotiations and the codification of the associated laws and regulations before the start of the next millennium? I would also join others now pressing for actions that would complete the process of actual global nuclear abolition no later than 2010.

    As is the case for many examples of bringing violators of popularly supported laws to justice, there should be frequent official and popular encouragement, including various kinds of major rewards, of “whistleblowers” who become aware of violations and report them to a well-known international authority. Such whistleblowers should also be well protected against reprisals by the violators, including even authorities of their own country’s government. Such actions may be even more important in filling verification gaps than technical verification procedures implemented by an international authority.

    In conclusion, I now have new and strong feelings of hope about the future of humankind. We are collectively facing new choices. We can continue to apply those cosmic forces -which we discovered how to manipulate 50 years ago-to feed the destructive competitive power struggles among humans. Or we can join together to reject those immensely powerful forces-that are much easier to use to destroy than to build-and reach out together to embrace the energy from our sun, which has for a very long time sustained all life on Earth.

    REFERENCES

    1. Harold A. Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor, “Alternative Strategies for International Control of Nuclear Power,” in Nuclear Proliferation-Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, Ted Greenwood, H. A. Feiveson, and T. B. Taylor, New York: McGraw Hill, 1977, pp. 125-190. 
    2. J. Carson Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, 1993, Volume 4, pp.111-128. 
    3. J. Carson Mark, Theodore B. Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Merriman, and Jacob Wechsler, “By What Means Could Terrorists Go Nuclear?” in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
    Books, 1987, pp. 55-65. 
    4. See, for example, David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 25-35. 
    5. Ibid, pp. 71-83. 
    6. Ibid, pp. 196-209. 
    7. Ibid, p. 90. 
    8. Ibid, p. 148. 
    9. Lars Wallin, chapter in Security With Nuclear Weapons? Regina Cowen Karp, Ed., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, London: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 360-381.
    10. See, for example, Thomas Johansson, Henry Kelly, Amulya K. N. Reddy, and Robert Williams, eds. Renewable Energy, Washington: Island Press, 1993.
    11. See, for example, J. M. Ogden and R. H. Williams, Solar Hydrogen: Moving Beyond Fossil Fuels, Washington: World Resources Institute, 1989.

     

  • Article 26

    In considering the need to reform and strengthen the United Nations to better meet its obligations to provide for international peace and security, special attention should be given to Article 26 of the U.N. Charter. There are probably very few people in the world today familiar with this article. Consequently, the Security Council has been able to ignore one of its most important responsibilities for more than 50 years.

    Article 26 states:

    In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

    The language of Article 26 is simple and straight forward. It is not possible to mistake the intent of its directive. The Security Council is given the responsibility for “formulating…a system for the regulation of armaments.”

    The United Nations Charter was signed 50 years ago. In the intervening period of time, the Security Council has failed to carry out this responsibility to the members of the United Nations and through them to the people of the world. In 50 years the Security Council has done exactly nothing to fulfill its Article 26 obligation.

    Under Article 26, the regulation of armaments is not optional for the Security Council. The Article says unambiguously that the Security Council “shall” formulate such a plan. The members of the Security Council have thus breached a solemn duty to the people of the world. Since the non-permanent members of the Security Council rotate at two year intervals, they cannot be held primarily responsible for failing to meet this obligation. It is the five permanent members of the Council — the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China — that have been in violation of their Article 26 obligation for 50 years.

    The reason that the permanent members of the Security Council have been remiss in fulfilling their obligation under Article 26 is not difficult to identify. After all, these states have been the greatest developers, producers, promoters, and sellers of arms. They have profited enormously by the sale of arms throughout the world, and they continue to do so. To fulfill their Article 26 obligation by formulating plans for the regulation of armaments would disadvantage them economically. Their behavior provides clear evidence that they would prefer to promote rather than regulate armaments.

    The Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 26 is described in Article 47 as being composed of “the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives.” The purpose of the Military Staff Committee is “to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulations of armaments, and possible disarmament.”

    The Military Staff Committee is also in breach of its obligation to “advise and assist” the Security Council in carrying out its Article 26 responsibility for formulating plans for the regulation of armaments. Since the Military Staff Committee is composed of representatives of the military forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council, their breach of duty is a further violation of the duty of the five permanent members.

    The United Nations Charter lists as its first purpose to “maintain international peace and security,” and it gives the primary responsibility for carrying out this purpose to the Security Council. When the Security Council fails in meeting its responsibilities, including its responsibility under Article 26, it is the people of the world who suffer. The Councils failure to formulate plans for the regulation of arms under Article 26 has left the world awash in dangerous arms that take their toll daily against opposing military forces as well as innocent civilians and the environment.

    When a nation signs the United Nations Charter it enters into a solemn treaty obligation. In essence, it makes a contract by which it agrees to be bound. While the five permanent members of the Security Council do have special privileges under the Charter, they do not have the privilege of violating the Charter with impunity. When they ignore the provisions of the Charter, as they have done by failing to meet their obligations under Article 26, they are in violation of international law. In simple terms, they have broken the law. Each day that passes without the formulation of plans by the Security Council for the regulation of armaments is an additional day of illegality for the permanent members.

    For 50 years the permanent members of the Security Council have flaunted their illegality with respect to Article 26. They continue to develop, manufacture, promote, and sell armaments of all levels of sophistication throughout the world. They daily demonstrate by their actions and omissions their lack of respect for the law and for their solemn obligations. Day in and day out they place economic benefit and military power ahead of their legal obligations.

    Article 26 stands in silent testimony to the lawlessness of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Article 26 reminds those of us who know of its existence of the disgraceful behavior of the most powerful nations on Earth in failing to meet their legal obligations under the Charter and, in doing so, setting themselves above the law.

    Under the United States Constitution, treaty law is the law of the land. When the United States government signs and ratifies a treaty, it becomes bound by its provisions, and the obligations become part of the United States law. Thus, in its continuing failure to meet its obligations under Article 26, the United States government is in violation not only of the United Nations Charter but U.S. law as well. The buck stops with the president of the United States and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By their failure to even attempt to formulate a plan with the other members of the Security Council, they demonstrate daily contempt for the law, both international and domestic.

    For those who attack the United Nations for its short-comings, of which there are all too many, Article 26 should be a powerful reminder that the United Nations can succeed only if the nations that are its members live up to their legal duties under the Charter. When nations fail to do so and threaten international peace and security, it is the Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, that is charged with preserving the peace.When the Security Council fails to fulfill its obligation to regulate armaments, it is called upon to remedy the consequences of its inaction.

    When the permanent members of the Security Council fail to meet their obligations to the United Nations, it is the General Assembly that must call them to account. If the General Assembly fails to act, it is the people of the world who must step forward and demand that the permanent members of the Security Council fulfill their obligations. A particular responsibility rests with the people of the nations that have permanent seats on the Security Council to call their governments to account and demand that they fulfill their legal obligations to formulate a system for the regulation of armaments under Article 26.

    Four of the five permanent members of the Security council make claim to being democracies, and in these societies ultimate responsibility for government logically rests with the citizenry. Citizens in these states must be educated about Article 26 and must pressure their governments to act legally and responsibily to develop a plan for the worldwide regulation of armaments as called for in Article 26.

    At the same time, other states must also demand that the Security Council fulfill its obligation under Article 26. The failure to regulate armaments has resultedin the escalation of death and destruction in warfare and made the world far more dangerous and deadly.

    It is past time for the Security Council to act decisively on Article 26.

  • Denuclearization of the Oceans: Linking Our Common Heritage with Our Common Future

    Introduction

    The oceans were nuclearized shortly after the era of nuclear weapons began in 1945. On July 1, 1946, while still negotiating the internationalization of atomic energy at the United Nations, the United States began testing nuclear weapons at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. Nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific continued through January 1996, when French President Jacques Chirac announced an end to French testing in the region.

    In the 1950s, the United States again led the way in nuclearizing the oceans with the launching of a nuclear powered submarine, the Nautilus. The Nautilus and other nuclear submarines could stay submerged for long periods of time without refueling and cruise throughout the world. During the Cold War the U.S., former USSR, UK, France, and China developed nuclear submarine fleets carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Some of these nuclear powered submarines with their multiple-independently-targeted nuclear warheads were and remain capable of single-handedly attacking and destroying more than one hundred major cities. These shadowy creatures of mankind’s darkest inventiveness remain silently on alert in the depths of the world’s oceans, presumably ready and capable, upon command, of destroying the Earth.

    Our oceans are a precious resource to be shared by all humanity and preserved for future generations. It carries the concept of “freedom of the seas” to absurd lengths to allow those nations with the technological capacity to destroy the Earth to use the world’s oceans in so callous a manner.

    Accidents aboard nuclear submarines have caused a number of them to sink with long-term adverse environmental consequences for the oceans. In addition to accidents, many countries have purposefully dumped radioactive wastes in the oceans.

    With regard to proper stewardship of the planet, it is time to raise the issue of denuclearizing the world’s oceans. To fail to raise the issue and to achieve the denuclearization of the oceans is to abdicate our responsibility for the health and well-being of the oceans and the planet.

    Nuclearization of the Oceans

    Nuclearization of the oceans has taken a variety of forms. The primary ones are:

    1. the oceans have served as a medium for hiding nuclear deterrent forces located on submarines;

    2. nuclear reactors have been used to power ships, primarily submarines, some of which have gone down at sea with their nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons aboard;

    3. increasing use is being made of the oceans for the transportation of nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuels;

    4. the oceans have been used as a dumping ground for nuclear wastes;

    5. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, particularly in the Pacific, has been a source of nuclear pollution to the oceans as well as the land; and

    6. underground nuclear weapons testing, such as that conducted by France in the South Pacific, has endangered fragile Pacific atolls and caused actual nuclear contamination to the oceans as well as risking a much greater contamination should the atolls crack due to testing or future geological activity.

    The problems arising from nuclearization of the oceans can be viewed from several perspectives.

    From an environmental perspective, issues arise with regard to nuclear contamination in the oceans working its way up through the food chain. The biological resources of the oceans will eventually affect human populations which are reliant upon these resources.

    The threat of nuclear contamination has diminished with regard to nuclear testing, which has not taken place in the atmosphere since 1980. Moreover, the nuclear weapons states have committed themselves to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which they have promised to conclude by 1996. This treaty, if concluded, will end all underground nuclear testing.

    The dumping of high-level radioactive waste material was curtailed by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, which entered into force in 1975. A later amendment to this Convention prohibited ocean dumping of all radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter. However, exemptions authorized by the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-compliance remain a concern. Problems can be anticipated in the future when radioactive contaminants already dumped in canisters or contained in fuel or weapons aboard sunken submarines breach their containment.

    Increased use of the oceans to transport nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuel (between Japan and France, for example) has substantially increased the risk of contamination. Coastal and island states that are on the route of the transportation of nuclear materials stand high risks of contamination in the event of an accident at sea. International law regarding the transportation of hazardous material must be strengthened and strictly enforced by the international community to prevent catastrophic accidents in the future.

    From a human rights perspective, inhabitants of island states in the Pacific have suffered serious health effects and dislocation as a result of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons testing. In response to assurances by France that their underground testing in the South Pacific is entirely safe, the islanders in Polynesia and throughout the Pacific have retorted: If it is so safe, why isn’t it being done in France itself? The response of the French government has been that French Polynesia is French territory, highlighting the arrogance and abuse that accompanies colonialism.

    Human rights issues also arise with regard to maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that threatens the annihilation of much of humanity. The Human Rights Committee stated in November 1984 in their general comments on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, i.e., the right to life, that “the production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.” The deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines, therefore, arguably constitutes a crime against humanity, and thus a violation of the most fundamental human right, the right to life.

    From a security perspective, the nuclear weapons states argue that having a submarine-based deterrent force assures their security. Thus, to varying degrees, each of the nuclear weapons states maintains strategic submarines capable of causing unthinkable destruction if their missiles were ever launched. (See Appendix.) Viewed from the self-interests of nearly all the world’s population-except the nuclear weapons states whose leaders appear addicted to maintaining their nuclear arsenals -the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, at sea or on land, poses a frightening threat to continued human existence.

    In 1972 the Seabed Agreement prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed, ocean floor, or subsoil thereof. This agreement prohibited what was already deemed unnecessary by the nuclear weapons states; placing nuclear weapons on submarines made them less vulnerable to detection and destruction than placing them on or beneath the seabed or ocean floor. The oceans continue to be used by the nuclear weapons states as an underwater shadow world for their missile carrying submarines.

    The United States alone currently has 16 Trident submarines, each carrying some 100 independently targeted nuclear warheads. Each Trident submarine has a total explosive force greater than all the explosive force used in World War II, including at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Britain, with the help of the United States, is replacing its older class of Polaris SSBNs with a fleet of four Trident submarines. France currently has five strategic missile submarines with four more of a superior class to be commissioned by 2005. Russia has over 35 strategic missile submarines with an estimated capacity of 2,350 nuclear warheads. China has two modern ballistic missile submarines. Its Xia class submarine carries twelve 200 kiloton nuclear warheads.

    The total destructive force that day and night lurks beneath the oceans is a chilling reminder of our technological capacity to destroy ourselves. That this threat was created and is maintained in the name of national security suggests a collective madness that must be opposed and overcome if, for no other reason, we are to fulfill our obligation to posterity to preserve human life.

    An ongoing responsibility resides with the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the obligations set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April and May 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely after extensive lobbying by the nuclear weapons states. At the same time the nuclear weapons states promised to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and to engage in a “determined pursuit” of the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

    Protecting the Common Heritage

    The Law of the Sea Treaty enshrines the concept of the oceans as the common heritage of [hu]mankind. Maintaining the oceans as a common heritage demands that the oceans be protected from contamination by nuclear pollutants; that they not be used in a manner to undermine basic human rights, particularly the rights to life and to a healthy environment; and that the oceans not be allowed to serve as a public preserve for those states that believe their own security interests demand the endangerment of global human survival.

    It is unreasonable to allow our common heritage to be used to threaten our common future. Deterrence is an unproven and unstable concept that is being tested on humanity by a small number of powerful and arrogant states that have turned nuclear technology to its ultimate destructive end. In order to link the common heritage with our common future, the large majority of the world’s nations advocating an end to the threat of nuclear annihilation should seek to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000 that eliminates all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. The prohibition and conversion of strategic ballistic missile submarines must be part of this accord. Perhaps this will be the final step in achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

    Life began in the oceans and eventually migrated to land. We must not allow the oceans to continue to provide a secure hiding place for nuclear forces capable of causing irreparable damage to all life. This is an inescapable responsibility of accepting the proposition that life itself, like the oceans, is a common heritage that must be protected for future generations.

     

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    APPENDIX: NUCLEAR POWER AT SEA*

    A. Nuclear Weapons

    UNITED STATES

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 16 Building: 2

    Trident: 16 + 2

    There are presently 16 Trident submarines in operation, eight at Sub-Base Bangor and eight at Sub-Base Kings Bay. The schedule is to complete one submarine per year for a total of 18 with the final one becoming operational in 1997.

    In September 1994 it was announced in the Pentagon’s “Nuclear Posture Review” that the Trident force would be cut from 18 to 14. The submarines to be retired are still under review but are believed to be the four oldest in the fleet. They will be preserved, however, in mothballs until the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty is fully implemented in 2003.

    These submarines carry 24 missiles each. The submarines are armed with Trident-1 missiles (C-4) and the Trident-2 (D-5). In 1991 all strategic cruise missiles (Tomahawks) were removed from surface ships and submarines.

    The C-4 can carry up to eight 100 kiloton Mark-4/W-76 Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). There are currently 192 Trident-1 missiles deployed in eight Trident submarines based at Bangor, Washington with a total of 1,152 Mk-4 warheads. Four of these submarines are to be deactivated and the remaining four are to be converted to carry Trident-2 missiles. Plans are to then base seven of the 14 submarines on each coast.

    The D-4 can carry up to 12 MIRV with Mark-4/W-76 100-kT warheads, or Mark-5/W-88 300-475-kT warheads each. Under START counting rules, a limit of 8 reentry vehicles (RV) was set, but this may be further reduced to four or five if START II is implemented. About 400 Mk-5/W-88 warheads for the Trident-2 missiles were produced before they were canceled because of production and safety reasons. Two new Trident subs fitted with D-4 missiles will be delivered by 1997.

    Under the START Treaties, warheads that are reduced do not have to be destroyed. According to the Nuclear Posture Review the current plan is to remove three or four warheads per missile from Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to meet the START II ceiling of 1,750 SLBM warheads. Plans are to reduce the C-4 to 1,280 warheads and the D-4 to 400. These warheads will be kept in storage and if it is determined that the SLBMs need to be uploaded, the Pentagon can reuse them.

    RUSSIA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 39 Building: 0

    The Russian navy is divided into four fleets: the Baltic, Northern, Black Sea and the Pacific. In the Northern and the Pacific fleets, the primary issue is of what to do with the estimated 85 retired nuclear submarines. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is believed that over half of their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet has been withdrawn from operational service. These ships are currently moored at various bases with their reactors still on board. The number is growing faster than the money available to remove and store the fuel elements and decontaminate the reactor compartments. Since 1991, there has been a lack of funds to operate the fleet. Consequently, few of the submarines listed as active have actually been at sea.

    In response to President Bush’s September 27, 1991 decision to remove tactical nuclear missiles from ships, President Gorbachev announced that six SSBNs with 92 SLBMs (presumably five Yankee Is and a single Yankee II) were to be removed from operational forces. Russian Fleet Commander Adm. Oleg Yerofeev reports that as of October 20, 1991 all tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the Northern and Pacific fleet ships and submarines.

    The January-February, 1993 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reports that Russia intends to stop building submarines in its Pacific yards within the next two to three years. Russian President Boris Yeltsin made this announcement during a November 1992 visit to South Korea.

    The Russian (CIS) SLBM stockpile is estimated to be at: 224 SS-N-18 Stingray armed with three warheads at 500-kT, 120 SS-N-20 Sturgeon with ten 200-kT warheads, and 112 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles with four 100-kT warheads. Total warheads are believed to be about 2320.

    According to Pentagon officials, Russia has already reduced its patrols to a single ballistic missile submarine. In contrast, the U.S. Navy continues to patrol with a dozen or so submarines at a time.

    NATO names are used in this listing. Russian names are given in parentheses.

    Typhoon (Akula) Class: 6

    The Typhoon carries 20 SS-N-20 Sturgeon missiles, with six to nine MIRV 200-kT nuclear warheads. The Typhoon can hit strategic targets from anywhere in the world. There are plans to modernize the Typhoons to carry an SS-N-20 follow-on missile which would have improved accuracy. All the Typhoons are stationed in the Northern Fleet at Nerpichya. One was damaged by fire during a missile loading accident in 1992, but has since been repaired.

    Delta IV (Delfin) Class: 7

    The Delta IV carries 16 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles, with four to ten MIRV 100-kT nuclear warheads. These ships are based in the Northern Fleet at Olenya.

    Delta III (Kalmar) Class: 14

    The Delta III is armed with 16 SS-N-18 Stingray missiles. There are three possible modifications for the Stingray. (1) three MIRV at 200-kT, (2) a single 450-kT, (3) seven MIRV at 100-kT. Nine ships are in the Northern Fleet and five are in the Pacific Fleet.

    Delta II (Murena-M) Class: 4

    The Delta II has 16 SS-N8 Sawfly missiles with two possible modifications. The first is with a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead, the other is with two MIRV at 800-kT. This class of submarine is no longer in production. All four are stationed in the Northern fleet at Yagelnaya and are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    Delta I (Murena) Class: 8

    The Delta I carries 12 SS-N-8 Sawfly missiles, armed with either a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead or two MIRV 800-kT. Three ships are stationed in the North and the other five are in the Pacific. One of these ships may be converted into a rescue submarine. As with the Delta II’s, all of these ships are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 4 Building: 2

    Vanguard Class: 2 + 2

    The Vanguard-class is modeled on the United States Trident submarine. It carries 16 Trident II (D-5) missiles with up to eight MIRV of 100-120-kT nuclear warheads. The D-5 can carry up to 12 MIRV but under plans announced in November 1993 each submarine will carry a maximum of 96 warheads. The U.K. has stated that it has no plans to refit their Tridents with conventional warheads, insisting on the nuclear deterrent.

    Resolution Class: 2

    The Resolution-class was initially fitted with 16 Polaris A3 missiles with three multiple reentry vehicles of 200-kT each. Beginning in 1982, the warheads were replaced under the “Chevaline Program.” The Chevaline is a similar warhead, but contains a variety of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The two remaining submarines in this class are both scheduled for decommission.

    CHINA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 1 Projected: 1

    Intelligence on Chinese nuclear submarines is extremely limited. Experts disagree on whether there is one or two SSBNs in the Chinese fleet. A new class of SSBN is expected to begin construction in 1996 or 1997.

    Xia Class: 1 or 2

    The Xia carries 12 Julang or “Giant Wave” CSS-N-3 missiles armed with a single 200-300-kT nuclear warhead. Approximately 24 of these missiles have been deployed. An improved version of this missile is currently being developed.

    Golf Class (SSB): 1

    Although the Golf is not nuclear driven, it is armed with ballistic missiles. The submarine is outfitted with two Julang missiles.

    FRANCE

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 5 Building: 3 Projected: 1

    In 1992 France announced that it would cut the number of new Triomphant-class SSBNs under construction from 6 to 4. Robert Norris and William Arkin of the Natural Resource Defense Council estimate that France will produce 288 warheads for the fleet of four submarines, but with only enough missiles and warheads to fully arm three boats. It is estimated that France has 64 SLBMs with 384 warheads.

    Triomphant Class: 0 + 3(1)

    The first submarine of its class, Le Triomphant, recently began conducting trials in the sea and is scheduled to depart on its first patrol in March 1996. The other ships are expected to be operational by 2005. The Triomphant-class is armed with 16 M45 missiles with 6 multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) at 150-kT. There are plans to later refit the submarines with the more powerful M5 with 10-12 MRV around 2010. Testing for these new missiles were recently conducted at the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls.

    L’Inflexible Class: 5

    L’Inflexible is armed with 16 Aerospatiale M4B missiles with six MRV at 150-kT. The French navy has 80 SLBMs deployed on its five submarines. This class of ships is based at Brest and commanded from Houilles. They patrol in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. The minimum number of submarines always at sea has been reduced from three to two.

    B. OTHER NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS

    UNITED STATES

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 86 Building: 4 Projected: 1

    Permit Class: 1
    Benjamin Franklin Class: 2
    Narwhal Class: 1
    Los Angeles Class: 57 + 2
    Sturgeon Class: 25
    Seawolf Class: 0 + 2(1)

    The Seawolf was launched in July 1995, and is scheduled to be commissioned in May 1996.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN )

    Active: 6 Building: 3

    Nimitz Class: 6 + 3

    Guided Missile Cruisers (CGN)

    Active: 5

    Virginia Class: 2
    California Class: 2
    Brainbridge Class: 1

    RUSSIA

    Cruise Missile Submarines (SSGN)

    Active: 19 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    Echo II Class (Type 675M): 3
    Oscar I (Granit) Classes: 2
    Oscar II (Antyey): 10 + 1(1)
    Charlie II (Skat M) Class: 3
    Yankee Sidecar (Andromeda) Class: 1

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 51 Building: 6 Projected: 1

    Severodvinsk Class: 0 + 3(1)
    Sierra II (Baracuda) Class: 2
    Akula I (Bars) Class: 4
    Akula II (Bars) Class: 8 + 3
    Sierra I (Baracuda I) Class: 2
    Alfa (Alpha) Class: 1
    Victor III (Shuka) Class: 26
    Victor II (Kefal II) Class: 3
    Victor I (Kefal I) Class: 2
    Yankee Notch (Grosha) Class: 3

    Battle Cruisers (CGN)
    Active: 4

    Kirov Class: 4

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 12 Projected: 5

    Trafalgar Class: 7 + (5)
    Swiftsure Class: 5

    CHINA

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 5 Building: 1
    Han Class: 5

    Nuclear attack submarines are believed to be a high priority for the Chinese, but due to high internal radiation levels, production has been suspended.

    FRANCE

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 6 Projected: 1

    Rubis Class: 6 + (1)

    The nuclear attack submarine Rubis collided with a tanker on July 17, 1993 and has had to undergo extensive repairs. On March 30, 1994 the Emeraude had a bad steam leak which caused casualties amongst the crew.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN)

    Active: 0 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    The nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was launched in 1994, it is expected to be commissioned in July 1999.

  • Nuremberg and Nuclear Weapons

    The principal message of the Nuremberg trials is that individuals are responsible for what they do, and will be held accountable for committing serious crimes under international law. At Nuremberg, these serious crimes included crimes against peace (that is, planning, preparing for, or participating in acts of aggressive warfare), war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

    One of the great ironies of history or perhaps it is not such a great irony is that the Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was signed on August 8, 1945. That was just three months after the German surrender. More importantly, it was just two days after the first nuclear weapon was used in warfare on the city of Hiroshima, and one day prior to a nuclear weapon being used on the city of Nagasaki. The nuclear weapon used on Hiroshima, with an equivalent force of some 15 kilotons of TNT, killed some 90,000 people immediately and some 140,000 by the end of 1945. The bomb dropped on Nagasaki, with an equivalent force of some 20 kilotons of TNT, killed some 40,000 people immediately and some 70,000 by the end of 1945.

    It has been pointed out that the number of people who died immediately from the use of each of these nuclear weapons was less than the number of people who died in Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945 as a result of U.S. bombing raids. This number is estimated at approximately 100,000. The major difference between the Tokyo bombings and those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that the former took nearly a thousand sorties to accomplish, while the destruction of the latter two cities took only one bomb each.

    I think it is reasonable to speculate that if the Germans had had two or three atomic bombs, as we did at that time, and had used them on European cities prior to being defeated in the Second World War, we would have attempted to hold accountable those who created, authorized, and carried out these bombings. We would likely have considered the use of these weapons on cities by the Nazi leaders as among the most serious of their crimes.

    The irony of history, of course, is that the Germans did not develop nor use atomic weapons, and thus this issue never came before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, or before any other international tribunal. The record of the past 50 years reflects the consequences of this lack of accountability, namely, the nuclear arms race pursued by the United States and the former Soviet Union, which lasted until the end of the Cold War in approximately 1990.

    The question which I want to address is not whether war crimes were committed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Under the rules of international humanitarian law they were, and they were also committed by the bombings of London, Coventry, Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo. The primary targets of all these bombings were civilians, and the indiscriminate killing of civilians has always in modern times been understood to be a clear violation of the laws of war.

    Nuclear Weapons and International Law

    The more relevant question has to do with where we stand today. Not long ago, on July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice in the Hague issued an opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Actually, two questions were placed before the Court for advisory opinions. The first question, posed by the World Health Organization in May 1993, asked: “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law?”

    The second question, put to the Court by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1994, asked: “Is the threat or the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?”

    The International Court of Justice found that the question asked by the World Health Organization, as a legal question, fell outside the scope of activities of the organization, and thus declined to accept jurisdiction. On the question posed by the United Nations General Assembly, however, the Court did find jurisdiction, and issued an advisory opinion.

    In a multi-part answer to the question, the Court found the following: “…that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.

    “However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”

    In reaching this opinion, the Court dramatically reduced the possible circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be threatened or used in conformity with international law. The Court left open only the slim possibility of legality under “an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” Even in this circumstance, the Court did not say that such use would be legal; it said only that it could not determine legality under these conditions. Judge Bedjaoui, the president of the Court, said in his declaration upon releasing the Court’s opinion, “I cannot insist strongly enough on the fact that the inability of the Court to go beyond the statement it made can in no way be interpreted as a partially-opened door through which it recognizes the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”

    Judge Bedjaoui went further to describe nuclear weapons as “blind weapons” that “destabilize, by their very nature, humanitarian law, the law of distinguishing in the use of weapons.” He continued, “Nuclear weapons, absolute evil, destabilize humanitarian law in so far as the law of the lesser evil. Thus, the very existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a great defiance (challenge) to humanitarian law itself…. Nuclear war and humanitarian law seem, consequently, two antithesis which radically exclude each other, the existence of one necessarily supposing the non-existence of the other.”

    Where does this leave us today? Although the opinion of the Court is an advisory opinion, it is the most authoritative statement of international law on this question, and must be taken seriously. Thus far, however, there have been no statements made by any of the declared or undeclared nuclear weapons states indicating that they plan any changes in their nuclear policies as a result of the Court’s opinion.

    Individual Accountability

    We know what the Principles of Nuremberg tell us about individual accountability. The primary principle is that “Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.” The fact that there is no penalty for the act under internal law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law. Nor does the fact that the person acted as a Head of State or as a responsible government official relieve that person of responsibility. Nor does the fact that the person acted pursuant to superior orders, so long as a choice was in fact possible to him, relieve him of responsibility.

    It was the United States, along with the U.K., France, and Russia, that created the Nuremberg Principles after the Second World War by holding Nazi and other Axis leaders accountable for their crimes under international law. I submit that if we want to create a world community that lives under international law in the 21st Century, we must apply the Nuremberg Principles to one and all, equally and without prejudice. That means we must apply these Principles to ourselves as well as to others. If the threat or use of nuclear weapons is, in fact, illegal under international law in virtually every conceivable circumstance, then we must act accordingly and neither use nor threaten the use of these weapons. Instead, we must dismantle our nuclear arsenal subject to agreement with other nuclear weapons states. In the meantime, we must explain to all military personnel with responsibilities for nuclear weapons the criminality under international law attendant to the threat or use of these weapons.

    Military organizations must operate under the law, and that clearly includes the international law of armed conflict. If military organizations do not operate under the law, then are they any better than state-organized thugs? It was for violating the laws of war at My Lai that Lt. Calley was tried and convicted. Lt. Calley’s crimes, terrible though they were, would pale in comparison to the crime of again using nuclear weapons on cities filled with innocent people.

    The International Court of Justice added to their opinion a clarification of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Court unanimously found that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    The Court has clearly indicated that the nuclear weapons states have an obligation to negotiate in good faith not only for nuclear disarmament, but for nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects” and to bring these negotiations to a conclusion. In the aftermath of the Cold War, we have been moving far too slowly to attain this goal. It is a necessary goal so that no other city will ever again have to face the consequences of what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the future of humanity will not be jeopardized.

    The Need for a Permanent International Criminal Court

    Even if the threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful under international law, however, there currently exists no tribunal where persons committing such acts can be brought to account. One of the great shortcomings of the current international institutional structure is the lack of a permanent International Criminal Court. Two Ad Hoc Tribunals have been created by the United Nations Security Council one for the former Yugoslavia and one for Rwanda. The jurisdiction of both of these tribunals, however, is limited by time and space. It is perhaps ironic that while the effects of nuclear weapons are unlimited by either time or space, the jurisdiction of our international criminal tribunals is so limited.

    Were nuclear weapons to be used by accident or design, the consequences would be horrible beyond our deepest fears. Nazis and other war criminals were convicted and punished in part for bringing human beings to the incinerators of the Holocaust. Nuclear weapons may be conceived of as portable incinerators portable crematoria, if you will that bring incinerators to the people. In my view, the silence of the American, Russian, British, French, and Chinese people in the face of these potentially genocidal or omnicidal weapons is as disquieting as the silence of the Germans in the face of Nazi atrocities. Yet none of the people in countries possessing nuclear weapons today are facing the same fearful authoritarian rule that the Nazis imposed upon the Germans during World War II.

    For many, perhaps most, people in nuclear weapons states today, nuclear weapons are not perceived as a critical issue. They are largely ignored. However, if they were to be used again, I think future historians if there were any would be very critical of our lack of commitment to ridding the world of these terrible weapons.

    We have the opportunity, in fact the responsibility under the Nuremberg Principles, to speak out against these genocidal weapons, but for the most part we do not do so. We must break the silence that surrounds our reliance upon these weapons of mass destruction. A hopeful sign recently occurred at the State of the World Forum in San Francisco when General Lee Butler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, broke his personal silence and made a ringing plea to abolish nuclear weapons. “We can do better,” he said, “than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. The task is daunting but we cannot shrink from it. The opportunity may not come again.”

    It is within our grasp to end the nuclear weapons era, and begin the 21st Century with a reaffirmation of the Nuremberg Principles.

    Steps That Need To Be Taken

    1. The following confidence building measures proposed by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons:

    • Taking nuclear forces off alert;
    • Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles;
    • Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
    • Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals; and
    • Agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no-first-use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapons states.

    2. International agreement by the year 2000 on a Nuclear Weapons Convention that, under strict international control, would eliminate all nuclear weapons within a reasonable period of time and prohibit their possession.

    3. The establishment by treaty of a permanent International Criminal Court to hold all individuals, regardless of their rank or nationality, accountable for acts constituting crimes under international law. Considerable progress has been made in preparing such a treaty at the United Nations. It may be hoped that this treaty will be ready to be opened for signatures in 1998, and certainly by 1999 when a third International Peace Conference is convened in the Hague.