Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

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  • Service and Resistance

    In the 16 years the Center for Teaching Peace has worked with schools to begin or expand courses on peace education, one goal has been stressed: ideas first, then action. It isn’t enough to master the theories of nonviolence but do nothing to create the peaceable society. Unbalanced students result. They leave school idea-rich but experience-poor.

    The remedy? Service learning. Much praise is owed teachers who realize that as much can be learned outside the classroom as inside. Such groups as the National Society for Experimental Education are successfully making the case that classroom lectures, discussions and assigned readings should coexist with learning that results from involving students in well-organized community service.

    Often enough, service is the easy part. What’s difficult is making connections. Ladling soup in a homeless shelter is fine but it remains do-gooder slumming unless twinned with learning about governmental policies that allow poverty to persist for the many while wealth increases for the few. Building homes with Habitat for Humanity remains idle charity unless accompanied by knowledge about governmental and corporate deals that keep money flowing to build weapons but not affordable housing.

    Evidence exists that students are twinning public service with private resistance. One example is the Graduation Pledge Alliance by which college seniors about to enter the work world put ideals before dollars by taking a voluntary pledge: “I pledge to explore and take into account the social and environmental consequences of any job I consider and will try to improve those aspects of any organization for which I work.”

    Coordinated by Prof. Neil Wollman of Manchester College, a Church of the Brethren school in Indiana, the pledge was taken by thousands of graduates at more than 100 colleges last spring. It is a natural transition for service-minded students to ask about the ethics of future employers. How are their products or services benefiting society, if at all? What is the employer’s record on such issues as antitrust, race sex and age discrimination, pollution and animal abuse. In the company’s theology of capitalism, is worshipping the dollar-god the sole article of faith, with no heed paid to the victims of structural violence?

    This is genuine resistance. As a result of service, students have thought about the kind of humane world they want to live and work in, and are making the kind of demands to create that world.

  • The Frog’s Malaise: Nuclear Weapons and Human Survival

    If a frog is dropped into a pot of scalding water, it will sense the danger and immediately jump out. However, if a frog is dropped into a pot of tepid water and the water temperature is gradually raised, the frog will succumb rather than trying to escape.

    We humans are like the frog in this story. At the onset of the Nuclear Age we were dropped into a pot of tepid water and here we sit as the temperature of the water rises. ******

    “We cannot bear the thought that human life can disappear from this planet, least of all, by the action of man. And yet the impossible, the unimaginable, has now become possible. The future existence of the human species can no longer be guaranteed. The human species is now an endangered species.” -Sir Joseph Rotblat

    “Nuclear weapons are the enemy of humanity. Indeed, they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.” -General George Lee Butler

    The Rio Conference

    When the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development convened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, nuclear weapons – arguably the most serious threat to the human future – were not on the agenda. It seems surrealistic that the leaders of the world’s nations gathered in Rio de Janeiro could devote nearly two weeks to the subjects of the environment and sustainable development without addressing, or at least acknowledging, the dangers of nuclear weapons.

    The Declaration issued from the Rio Conference contains 27 principles. None of them mention nuclear dangers, although one mentions warfare and one mentions peace. Principle 24 states: “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” Surely if warfare is destructive of the environment, nuclear warfare – if warfare would be an adequate way to conceptualize the extent of the devastation and annihilation caused by the use of nuclear weapons – would immeasurably aggravate the damage.

    Nuclear warfare has the potential to destroy cities, countries, even humanity itself. Given the magnitude of the potential dangers of nuclear weapons, it is surprising that these dangers did not rise to the level of inclusion in the Rio Conference.

    Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration states: “Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.” While true, this principle also does not sound an alarm regarding the magnitude of danger inherent in the nuclear weapons policies of the states that possess these weapons.

    One other principle of the Rio Declaration deserves mention. Principle 1 states: “Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” Surely, this would include freedom from nuclear annihilation. Perhaps a corollary to this principle should be the oft-repeated statement of those who survived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “Nuclear weapons and human beings cannot co-exist.”

    There are many possible explanations for why the Rio Conference did not take up the issue of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the delegates to the Rio Conference in 1992 had their hands full with other problems related to environment and sustainable development, of which there were many. Perhaps dealing with issues of nuclear dangers seemed too confrontational to the nuclear weapons states. Perhaps the organizers of the Rio Conference believed that nuclear weapons issues would be better dealt with in disarmament forums.

    Whatever their reasons for leaving nuclear weapons and their dangers to humanity off the Rio agenda, the Conference failed to deal with what is arguably the most acute present danger to human survival, sustainable development and environmental security. When the Conference was held in 1992 the Nuclear Age, which was initiated by the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in World War II, was 47 years old. The temperature in the pot in which the frog is treading water had grown very warm indeed.

    Nuclear Weapons: Warnings, Promises and Failure to Act

    We are approaching the ten-year anniversary of the Rio Conference, and the water temperature has continued to rise. Not that there have not been warnings. Many of the greatest individuals of the 20th century have spoken out against nuclear weapons. The list is impressive: Albert Camus, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, Jacques Cousteau, Mikhail Gorbachev, the XIVth Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Religious leaders, military leaders and political leaders have spoken out. Nobel Laureates have spoken out, but the frog still treads water as the temperature rises.

    Since the Rio Conference, there have been a number of key events related to the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. At that time, the nuclear weapons states promised the completion of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the early conclusion of negotiations for a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and “determined pursuit…of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    We have learned, however, that the promises of the nuclear weapons states mean very little. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was completed, but has yet to be ratified by some key states, including the United States and China. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty have not yet gotten off the ground. And the “determined pursuit” promise has led only to systematic and progressive efforts to maintain a two-tier structure of nuclear weapon “have” and “have-not” states.

    In 1996, the International Court of Justice considered the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal, but could not decide whether or not it would be illegal if the very survival of a state were at stake. The Court did make clear, however, that there could be no legal threat or use if such use would not discriminate between soldiers and civilians or if such use would cause unnecessary suffering. It is difficult to imagine any possible use of nuclear weapons that would not violate these principles of international humanitarian law.

    The Court was unanimous in concluding: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The nuclear weapons states have largely ignored this strong and clear opinion of the highest court in the world.

    In August 1996, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, composed of a distinguished group of experts from throughout the world convened by the Australian government, issued its report. The Commission stated: “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by decision – defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance they will never be produced again.”

    The Canberra Commission viewed the existing situation of a world divided into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” as discriminatory, unstable and therefore unsustainable. They wrote: “Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”

    The Canberra Commission recommended a series of immediate steps: taking nuclear forces off alert; removal of warheads from delivery vehicles; ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; ending nuclear testing; initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals; and agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    In December 1996, a group of some 60 retired generals and admirals from throughout the world issued a statement in which they said: “We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.” Among other urgently needed steps, the generals and admirals agreed that “long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

    In February 1998, 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past or present presidents and prime ministers, issued a statement calling the threat of nuclear conflict “intolerable,” and invoking a “moral imperative” for the elimination of nuclear weapons. They called, as had the Canberra Commission, for immediate steps to reduce nuclear dangers, including the development of “a plan for eventual implementation, achievement and enforcement of the distant but final goal of elimination.” They also called for consideration of a ban on the production and possession of large, long-range ballistic missiles.

    “The world is not condemned to live forever with threats of nuclear conflict, or the anxious fragile peace imposed by nuclear deterrence,” the civilian leaders stated. “Such threats are intolerable and such a peace unworthy. The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons invokes a moral imperative for their elimination. That is our mandate. Let us begin.”

    In May 1998, India demonstrated the unsustainability of the global nuclear balance by testing nuclear weapons with Pakistan following closely in India’s footsteps. Both countries demonstrated their nuclear capabilities, and held mass public demonstrations lauding the scientists and political leaders who had given them these new powers. South Asia suddenly became a flashpoint of nuclear danger.

    In June 1998, the foreign ministers of eight middle power states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) expressed their concern for the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and called for action by the nuclear weapons states. In a Joint Declaration issued in Dublin on June 9th, the foreign ministers called for a New Agenda to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. They stated: “We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.”

    More recently, at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Review Conference, the parties to the treaty, led by the middle power states calling for a New Agenda, agreed to 13 practical steps to further the goal of nuclear disarmament. Among the new promises made by the nuclear weapons states were “an unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals…” and a promise to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….” The nuclear weapons states have thus far shown no progress on the first promise, and the US is thwarting the second promise by threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy a National Missile Defense system.

    Nuclear Strategy

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the preeminent military and economic power in the world. The United States is the leader of NATO and has the potential to lead the world to achieve the promises of eliminating nuclear weapons. The United States, however, has not demonstrated any inclination to lead in this direction. Through eight years of the Clinton administration, the United States made no further agreements toward achieving nuclear disarmament. In fact, under Clinton’s leadership the United States and Russia postponed the date to achieve the disarmament levels set forth in the START II agreement from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. Russian President Putin offered to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals in a START III agreement from START II levels of 3,500 to 1,500 or lower. Clinton failed to respond. He may be remembered as the President who had the greatest opportunity to end the nuclear weapons threat but lacked the vision and/or courage to do so.

    Whereas Clinton may have lacked vision altogether in the area of nuclear disarmament, George Bush has a confused and dangerous vision. Bush sees the primary nuclear threat to the United States arising from so-called “rogue” nations such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea. He seeks to build a missile shield to protect the United States, its friends, allies and troops from a ballistic missile attack by such smaller hostile states. To do so, he would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the treaty the US promised to preserve and strengthen at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. This has led to expressions of grave concern on the part of Russia, China and a number of US allies. US deployment of a National Missile Defense, as envisaged by Bush, could result in undermining the entire structure of arms control agreements that have been built up over many decades and initiate new arms races.

    While Bush has also made more positive proposals for the unilateral reduction of the size of the US nuclear arsenal to the lowest level consistent with national security and for further de-alerting of the US nuclear arsenal, these proposals would provide a better basis for global stability if they were made in the context of multilateral agreements and were made irreversible. The US has also continued to develop a new nuclear warhead, the B61-11, a warhead claimed to be capable of earth penetration and bunker busting. It has a smaller yield and is presumably a more usable nuclear warhead. The US has also indicated in a 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 60) that it would use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack on the US, its troops or allies.

    The bottom line is that the US and the other nuclear weapons states seem intent upon continuing to rely upon their nuclear weapons for the indefinite future, regardless of their promises made in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the destructive effects on the prospects for global security resulting from their shortsighted policies.

    The frog grows more lethargic as the water temperature rises.

    Sustainability

    Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has led to the comforting illusion that they will never be used again. But as long as these weapons exist in the arsenals of the world’s nuclear weapons states, there remains the possibility that they will be used – by accident or design. So long as these weapons exist, they will also be a spur and incitement to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.

    What is the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used again in warfare? This is perhaps an impossible question to answer, but we know that the answer is not zero. We also know that relations between states can alter rapidly. Further, we know that there have been numerous instances in which states have considered using nuclear weapons or in which they have come close to accidental launches. One such incident occurred in 1995 when the Russians mistook a joint US-Norwegian rocket launch for an attack on their country. President Yeltsin, a man noted for excessive drinking, was awakened in the middle of the night to make the decision on whether or not to launch a retaliatory strike against the US. Yeltsin extended the time allotted to him to make the decision, and disaster was averted when it became clear that the missile was not aimed at Russia.

    Nuclear weapons do not protect any country, and it makes no sense to endanger the security of the world in a futile attempt to provide security to a few countries. Therefore, nuclear weapons must be abolished. This goal is in accord with security interests, international law and the moral foundation of all religions.

    Sustainable development presupposes protecting natural resources and the environment. The mining of uranium, the testing of nuclear weapons, and the ongoing problems of storing nuclear wastes present serious challenges to the environment and human health. The greatest challenge to sustainability, however, comes from the very existence of nuclear weapons, which pose a threat to humanity and all living things that surpasses other dangers. This threat must be addressed, and cannot be swept aside by those who otherwise express concern for the planet’s well being.

    When the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court pointed out: “The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.” In this way nuclear weapons are unique.

    How Did the Frog Get Into the Pot?

    The frog did not just jump into the pot. Someone dropped it in, someone with his own motivations. Likewise, the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to nuclear weapons did not just occur. It was created and maintained by national leaders and others with their own motivations for wanting nuclear weapons and tolerating nuclear dangers.

    The Nuclear Age began with reasonable intentions. Émigré scientists, refugees of Hitler’s policies in Germany, worried about the danger of Hitler developing a nuclear weapon and its implications for the war in Europe. Leo Szilard, a brilliant Hungarian scientist, convinced his friend Albert Einstein to sign a letter to President Roosevelt warning of this danger. The letter encouraged Roosevelt to initiate a project to explore the creation of weapons that would unlock the power of the atom. The project began slowly, but when the United States entered World War II it expanded dramatically. Thousands of scientists and engineers worked on the top-secret Manhattan Project that resulted in the creation of the world’s first atomic weapons.

    Many of the scientists who had worked on creating the atomic bomb, led by Leo Szilard, tried to convince Roosevelt and then Truman that the bomb should not be used against Japan. A petition to President Truman drafted by Szilard and signed by 68 members of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, stated: “The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new weapons of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”

    The petition to President Truman was dated July 17, 1945, less than three weeks before the first atomic weapon was used at Hiroshima. When President Truman heard of the bomb’s “success” at Hiroshima, he said, “This is the greatest thing in history.” Truman believed that it might take the Soviet Union 20 years to develop an atomic bomb. It took them four years. From that point until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world experienced a nuclear arms race that would result in deployment of tens of thousands of ever more powerful nuclear weapons capable of destroying most life on Earth.

    Understanding the Frog’s Malaise

    The first thing that is necessary to understand about our present situation is that there is not just one frog in the pot. We are all in a nuclear cauldron, potentially sharing a common tragic fate. Some have already died – the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the uranium miners, the victims of nuclear experiments, the downwinders of nuclear tests, the soldiers and indigenous peoples deliberately exposed to nuclear tests. There will also be countless future generations that will pay the price — in genetic mutations, deformities, cancers and leukemias — of the radioactive legacy of preparing for nuclear war.

    The second thing necessary to understand is that those who have kept the frog in the pot are able to ignore the dangers to the frog so long as their goals are achieved. Many politicians, military leaders and academics believe that nuclear weapons make them more secure. In many respects, they do not believe that they are in the pot with the rest of us or, if they do, they believe that their personal gain outweighs the risks of disaster. They are true believers and they have constructed deeply held myths, which they have perpetuated to support their recklessness.

    The third thing necessary to understand is that there is no technological fix to the frog’s dilemma. No fancy umbrella over the pot will protect the frog from demise. The nuclear dilemma will not be resolved by a missile shield to protect against so-called “rogue” nations. Not only is it unlikely that a missile shield could ever be effective, but it is a way for certain countries to continue to rely upon nuclear weapons. A US missile shield will also be guaranteed to halt progress on nuclear disarmament with Russia and lead to new nuclear arms races in Asia. It is a costly and dangerous approach, which will decrease rather than increase security from nuclear dangers.

    What Keeps the Frog in the Pot?

    It was more than an oversight that nuclear weapons issues were not on the agenda at the Rio Conference, the world’s most significant conference for environment and sustainable development. Keeping the frog in the pot has been a matter of policy for the nuclear weapons states, and this policy has not been effectively challenged.

    If the frog continues treading water as the temperature rises, it will eventually die. Why does the frog fail to take action to save itself while the water temperature rises? If we can ascribe to the frog some human reasoning skills and other human characteristics, the following may be some of the principal factors that explain its failure to act, and also ours.

    Ignorance. The frog may fail to recognize the dilemma. It may be unable to predict the consequences of being in water in which the temperature is steadily rising.

    Complacency. The frog may feel comfortable in the warming water. It may believe that because nothing bad has happened yet, nothing bad will happen in the future.

    Deference to Authority. The frog may believe that others are in control of the thermostat and that it has no power to change the conditions in which it finds itself.

    Sense of Powerlessness. The frog may fail to realize its own power to affect change, and believe that there is nothing it can do to improve its situation.

    Fear. The frog may have concluded that, although there are dangers in the pot, the dangers outside the pot are even greater. Thus, it fails to take action, even though it could do so.

    Economic Advantage. The frog may believe that there are greater short-term rewards for staying in the pot than jumping out.

    Conformity. The frog may see other frogs treading water in the pot and not want to appear different by sounding an alarm or acting on its own initiative.

    Marginalization. The frog may have witnessed other frogs attempt to raise warnings or jump out, and seen them marginalized and ignored by the other frogs.

    Technological Optimism. The frog may understand that there is a problem that could lead to its demise, but believe that it is not necessary to act because someone will find a technological solution.

    Tyranny of Experts. Even though the frog may believe it is in danger, the experts may provide a comforting assessment that makes the frog doubt its own wisdom.

    Turning Down the Heat

    There are a number of important steps that can be taken to turn down the heat on nuclear dangers. Proposals for moving forward have been set forth in the statement of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in the statements of the generals and admirals and the civilian leaders, and in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament set forth in the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Turning down the heat on nuclear dangers is primarily a question of political will. Without political will progress will continue to be slow to non-existent. With political will to reduce nuclear dangers and achieve a nuclear weapons free world, important steps can be taken that would rapidly improve global security, including the following actions:

    1. De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    2. Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    3. Establish international accounting and control systems for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    4. Reaffirm the commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and cease efforts to violate that Treaty by the deployment of national or theater missile defenses, and cease the militarization of space.

    5. Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cease laboratory and subcritical nuclear tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems, cease construction of Megajoule in France and the National Ignition Facility in the US and end research programs that could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons, and close the remaining nuclear test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.

    6. Support existing nuclear weapons free zones, and establish new ones in the Middle East, Central Europe, North Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.

    7. Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

    8. Publicly acknowledge the weaknesses and fallibilities of deterrence: that deterrence is only a theory and is clearly ineffective against nations whose leaders may be irrational or suicidal; nor can deterrence assure against accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, or terrorists.

    9. Publicly acknowledge the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law as stated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, and further acknowledge the obligation under international law for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    10. Publicly acknowledge the immorality of threatening to annihilate millions, even hundreds of millions, of people in the name of national security.

    11. Set forth a plan to complete the transition under international control and monitoring to zero nuclear weapons by 2020, with agreed upon levels of nuclear disarmament to be achieved by the NPT Review Conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015.

    12. Begin to reallocate the billions of dollars currently being spent annually for maintaining nuclear arsenals ($35 billion in the U.S. alone) to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    Taking the Frog Out of the Pot

    Those who put the frog into the pot are not likely to be the same ones to take the frog out. We need new leadership and, as Einstein warned, a new way of thinking. There is only one way out of the pot, and that is by cooperation on a global scale. Absent such cooperation and the leadership to attain it, further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons by accident or design are inevitable.

    Once the water in the pot has heated up, it is doubtful that the frog can get out of the pot by itself. The frog’s dilemma can only be resolved by getting it out of the pot or turning down the heat. To resolve the nuclear dilemma confronting humanity will require cooperation – cooperation among people, cooperation among countries. Currently the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States, are blocking that cooperation. That is why it is so essential for US citizens to press their government for leadership in achieving agreement for the verified elimination of nuclear weapons in all countries. It is also why the leadership of the middle power countries calling for effective nuclear disarmament is also so important.

    The frog may need help getting out of the pot, but this help is unlikely to be forthcoming unless it asks for help. To end the nuclear threat to humanity requires all of us to raise our voices and demand the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    A Final Word

    Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war. They are devices that kill indiscriminately, and their use cannot be confined to soldiers in combat. Nor is their threat limited in time or place. It affects humanity across the globe and across time. This threat, along with the damage nuclear weapons have already done to the environment, will be our generation’s legacy to the future inhabitants of the planet – if we are able to keep the planet intact.

    Nuclear weapons are the tools of fools and cowards. Those who promote these evil tools should be removed from leadership. They are the ones who have kept the frog in the pot and are manipulating the controls on the heat. They will stay in control until the people of this planet act in concert to change the rules, reach accords for cooperative and sustainable development, and end the nuclear weapons threat to humanity and all life.

    The word croak has two meanings. One is the sound of a frog’s voice. The other is slang for “to die.” By recognizing the frog’s malaise and using our voices, we have the possibility to prevent the widespread death and destruction that will be the predictable result of continuing to base national security on the threat to use nuclear weapons. If we fail to recognize the seriousness of the frog’s malaise and fail to act on our own malaise, the result could be tragedy beyond imagination.

    In 1955 Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein issued a manifesto signed by themselves and some of the greatest scientists of the time. In that manifesto, they stated: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we instead choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings to human beings: remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.” The choice is still before us.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

     

    Appendix A

    Play a Role in Ending the Nuclear Weapons Threat

    If you and others do nothing, humanity will eventually face a nuclear holocaust that in a worst case could end human life on Earth.

    The nuclear weapons threat will not diminish or go away if good people who care about a sustainable human future do nothing. If you would like to play a role in ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity, I encourage you to take these steps.

    1. Educate yourself. A good place to begin is the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s web site: www.wagingpeace.org. At this web site you will find a wealth of information on nuclear dangers as well as ideas for action. At this site you can sign up as a free online participating member of the Foundation and receive the monthly e-newsletter, The Sunflower.

    2. Educate others. Spread the word. Help your family and friends to realize the danger and lack of sustainability of some nations continuing to rely upon nuclear weapons. You can send information to others from the Foundation’s web site.

    3. Take Action. Sign the Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity, and ask others to sign it. You can do this online at the above web site. Encourage political leaders to support the elimination of nuclear weapons and to oppose abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States.

    Appendix B

    Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity

    [This Appeal, initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been signed by some of the world’s great peace leaders, including Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the XIVth Dailai Lama, and Queen Noor of Jordan. The Appeal has been signed by 37 Nobel Laureates, including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates.]

    We cannot hide from the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and all life. These are not ordinary weapons, but instruments of mass annihilation that could destroy civilization and end most life on Earth.

    Nuclear weapons are morally and legally unjustifiable. They destroy indiscriminately – soldiers and civilians; men, women and children; the aged and the newly born; the healthy and the infirm.

    The obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects,” as unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice, is at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    More than ten years have now passed since the end of the Cold War, and yet nuclear weapons continue to cloud humanity’s future. The only way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again is to abolish them.

    We, therefore, call upon the leaders of the nations of the world and, in particular, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states to act now for the benefit of all humanity by taking thefollowing steps:

    De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    Reaffirm commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions foreffective verification and enforcement.

    Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.Reallocate resources from the tens of billions of dollars currently being spent for maintaining nuclear arsenals to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    Appendix C

    13 Practical Steps for Nuclear DisarmamentThe following text is excerpted from the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review ConferenceFinal Document.

    The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systemic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament”:

    1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

    2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

    3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandatecontained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

    4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

    5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

    6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

    7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

    8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way thatpromotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

    – Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

    – Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

    – The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

    – Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

    – A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that theseweapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

    – The engagement as soon as appropriate for all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

    10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material in peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of the military programmes.

    11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

    12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

    13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provideassurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

  • Transcript: President Bush Speech on Missile Defense

    Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you being here.

    I also want to thank Secretary Powell for being here as well.

    My national security advisor, Condi Rice, is here, as well as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers. Appreciate Admiral Clark and General Ryan for being here as well. But most of all, I want to thank you, Admiral Gaffney, and the students for NDU for having me here today.

    For almost 100 years, this campus has served as one of our country’s premier centers for learning and thinking about America’s national security. Some of America’s finest soldiers have studied here: Dwight Eisenhower and Colin Powell. Some of America’s finest statesmen have taught here: George Kennan (ph).

    Today, you’re carrying on this proud tradition forward, continuing to train tomorrow’s generals, admirals and other national security thinkers, and continuing to provide the intellectual capital for our nation’s strategic vision.

    This afternoon, I want us to think back some 30 years to a far different time in a far different world. The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a hostile rivalry. The Soviet Union was our unquestioned enemy, a highly armed threat to freedom and democracy. Far more than that wall in Berlin divided us.

    Our highest ideal was and remains individual liberty. Their’s was the construction of a vast communist empire. Their totalitarian regime held much of Europe captive behind an Iron Curtain. We didn’t trust them, and for good reason. Our deep differences were expressed in a dangerous military confrontation that resulted in thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on hair-trigger alert.

    The security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations.

    We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be ensured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack. The threat was real and vivid. The Strategic Air Command had an airborne command post called the Looking Glass, aloft 24 hours a day, ready in case the president ordered our strategic forces to move toward their targets and release their nuclear ordnance.

    The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops deep in the heart of Europe, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany.

    We used our nuclear weapons, not just to prevent the Soviet Union from using their nuclear weapons, but also to contain their conventional military forces, to prevent them from extending the Iron Curtain into parts of Europe and Asia that were still free.

    In that world, few other nations had nuclear weapons, and most of those who did were responsible allies, such as Britain and France. We worried about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it was mostly a distant threat, not yet a reality.

    Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet Union. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union.

    Its government is no longer communist. Its president is elected. Today’s Russia is not our enemy, but a country in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors.

    The Iron Curtain no longer exists. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are free nations and they are now our allies in NATO, together with a reunited Germany. Yet, this is still a dangerous world; a less certain, a less predictable one.

    More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed a ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds, and a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.

    Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states — states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.

    They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.

    Like Saddam Hussein, some of today’s tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America.

    They hate our friends. They hate our values. They hate democracy and freedom, and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough to maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends.

    We must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to rethink the unthinkable and to find new ways to keep the peace. Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and defenses.

    We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them.

    We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together, we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.

    We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.

    We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past.

    No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.

    This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies.

    We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I’m committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.

    My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.

    Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and our allies. The secretary has explored a number of complementary and innovative approaches.

    The secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere.

    We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase. The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited but effective defenses.

    We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses might take. We will explore all of these options further. We recognize the technological difficulties we face, and we look forward to I’ve made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies, who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

    This treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries.

    That’s why we should work together to replace this treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.

    This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring, rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense.

    It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.

    I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries.

    Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can address today’s threats and pursue today’s opportunities. We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.

    This is a time for vision, a time for a new way of thinking, a time for bold leadership. The Looking Glass no longer stands its 24- hour-a-day vigil. We must all look at the world in a new, realistic way to preserve peace for generations to come.

    God bless. (APPLAUSE)

  • National Missile Defense Jeopardizes Foreign Relations

    Arguably the most important issue regarding US foreign policy is the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system (NMD). There is a general bipartisan agreement to engage a system of some kind, although when and to what extent (meaning size and complexity), are issues of continuing debate.

    Depending on the Bush administration’s decision, the consequences could be dire, ranging from a mere increase in anti-American sentiment to a full-blown arms race like that of the Cold War years. Thus, the most critical factor to be considered is the extent to which this decision will affect US international relations. In particular, the US has come a long way in improving relations with Russia. To upset this progress would jeopardize years of diplomatic efforts. Additionally, China and France have voiced strong opposition to NMD deployment.

    The current administration has proposed a massive NMD with land, sea, and space-based components. The possibility of an internationally accepted US defense system of this type is unfortunately very unlikely. Furthermore, as a world superpower, the United States also has a responsibility to lead by example. But the willingness of the present administration to advocate deployment of a NMD and thereby risk violation of international obligations sends the wrong message to the rest of the world.

    Continued U.S. commitments to arms reduction is of critical importance to maintaining positive international relations. The deployment of a NMD system could significantly affect the status of two of the most important treaties signed by both the United States and Russia ? the USSR at the time the treaties were signed ? in the history of nuclear disarmament: the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The disregard for these treaties is inconsistent with our responsibilities, and will not allow us to legitimately hold other countries to their obligations.

    The sole purpose of the ABM Treaty is to limit missile defense deployment. Some argue that provisions of the 29-year-old document are outdated and, as Henry A. Kissinger claims, do not address the “new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed.” By that same logic, one could dispute the validity of the 225-year-old United States Constitution, a concept unthinkable to those who ironically share Kissinger’s view.

    While the ABM Treaty would be altogether disregarded in the case of a comprehensive missile defense, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be undermined by a failure of the U.S. to consider the potential results of NMD deployment. The focus of this treaty is on the reduction of nuclear weapons, but a large-scale defense system would result in other nuclear powers feeling threatened in their capabilities of deterrence, thus triggering further weapons proliferation.

    Unfortunately, adherence to the commitments outlined in the ABM and NPT treaties is apparently not of utmost concern to US policy makers. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen has gone so far as to suggest complete withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if agreements between the US and Russia on its modification cannot be attained. This kid of attitude is not only reckless, it does not contribute to improving post-Cold War relations with our former adversaries.

    While some Third World countries have access to nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, the threat of attack is not significant enough to risk the deterioration of our relations with the rest of the world. In addition, diplomacy has been shown to have desirable outcomes when applied to arms reduction. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program between the US and Russia has helped Russia disable more than 4,900 nuclear warheads at cost of $3.2 billion to the US from 1992 to 2000.

    Without a doubt, the most serious current threat is that of individual rather than state-sponsored terrorist attacks. No missile defense system of any kind could protect American citizens from terrorists using delivery systems other than ballistic missiles. The recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and closer to home, the World Trade Center bombing are grim reminders of that possibility.

    On the international level, a policy of non-deployment of a NMD could help preserve years of improving relations with Russia achieved since the end of the Cold War. Regression to previous tensions and animosities could create much more of a threat than that which currently exists.

    Russia warned that during the Reagan years it had developed “programs to counteract asymmetrically” US missile defense systems, and should we continue to insist on deployment, Russia could “take them up again.” China has threatened to increase its arsenal at any cost to counter our defenses and urges the US to cease NMD plans. Otherwise, Chinese officials warn, “we’ll be ready.”

    By discontinuing NMD testing and development, we will avoid anti-American sentiment that could potentially spark future conflicts posing a much greater threat to US security than that which is currently perceived.

    As much as we have a responsibility to defend our nation, we also have a responsibility to stand by the promises we made under international treaties. In this age of globalization, we cannot afford the isolationist attitude that would be the result of ignoring international obligations and the concerns of those in the global community.

    In conclusion, the Bush administration should consider the impacts of the proposed National Missile Defense system and question whether it is worth the risk of jeopardizing US foreign relations and possibly the future security of our nation.

    *John Ginder is a senior at UCSB majoring in global studies with an emphasis in socioeconomics and politics. This piece appeared in the Voices section of the Santa Barbara News-Press, Sunday, April 29, 2001.

  • Taking Ourselves Off the Endangered Species List

    Can you imagine a world without human eyes to view its wonder? Nuclear weapons make such a world possible. Our inaction in the face of nuclear dangers may make such a world probable. Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to place human beings on the endangered species list. It is up to us to take ourselves off this list. Before we can do so, however, we must first recognize that we are on it.

    Perhaps this recognition is a motivating factor in US plans to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense system. These plans represent a pursuit of invulnerability to nuclear attack for US citizens. The problem is that there can be no invulnerability for one piece of territory or one country ‘s citizens in the Nuclear Age. There are no perfect defenses and, n the case of nuclear weaponry, even small margins of error can spell disaster.

    The problem is complicated by the fact that if one country proceeds with a defensive system, other countries will feel threatened. The reason for this is that one country ‘s invulnerability or even imagined invulnerability will give it potential offensive advantages over other countries. If, for example, the US has a missile defense system it believes will make it invulnerable to attack, then China will worry about being bullied by the US and further develop its offensive missile capabilities. Thus, improved defensive capabilities can lead to offensive arms races. Such is the contorted logic of security in the Nuclear Age.

    Invulnerability is not an option, but US decision makers are proceeding as though it is. This is a dangerous policy that could rekindle nuclear arms races throughout the world. A far better approach would be to provide leadership toward a nuclear weapons free world. Such an approach would increase global stability and reduce the risks of catastrophe resulting from human fallibility. This approach would be in accord with international law and the precepts of morality basic to all religions. It would also bring nuclear weapons and materials under tighter controls and reduce the risks of the weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or criminals.

    For these reasons, individuals from through- out the world are adding their names and voices to the Foundation ‘s Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. Walter Cronkite, one of the most respected men in America and a signer of the Appeal, wrote: “Facing a holocaust that could take thousands or perhaps billions of lives and render much of the earth uninhabitable, how is it possible for humankind to continue to believe that the way to settle its disputes is by killing each other? Nuclear weapons represent the utmost fantasy in the perpetuation of this savage philosophy.”

    If you ‘d like to add your name to this Appeal, you can sign up online. If you are not already a member of the Foundation, we invite you to join us in waging peace by educating yourself, educating others and taking action. We try to make this easy for you by providing up-to-date information and suggestions for action.

    There is strength in numbers. When people come together for peace they are a powerful force. Like a mighty ocean, people power can overcome even the dangers of the Nuclear Age. We may not be invulnerable, but we are not without the power to shape our future. I invite you to play a greater role in spreading the Foundation ‘s message of peace, and helping us to grow to fulfill our mission of creating a peaceful, nuclear weapons-free future for humanity and all life.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability

    In the world of nuclear deterrence theory, beliefs are everything. What the leaders of a country perceive and believe is far more important than the reality. Nuclear deterrence is a seemingly simple proposition: Country A tells country B that if B does X, A will attack it with nuclear weapons. The theory is that country B will be deterred from doing X by fear of nuclear attack by country A. For deterrence to work, the leaders of country B must also believe that country A has nuclear weapons and will use them. Nuclear deterrence theory holds that even if country A might not have nuclear weapons, so long as the leaders of country B believed that it did they would be deterred.

    The theory goes on to hold that country A can generally rely upon nuclear deterrence with any country except one that also has nuclear weapons or one that is protected by another country with nuclear weapons. If country B also has nuclear weapons and the leaders of country A know this, then A, according to theory, will be deterred from a nuclear attack on country B. This situation will result in a standoff. The same is true if country C does not have nuclear weapons, but is under the “umbrella” of country B that does have nuclear weapons. Country A will not retaliate against country C for fear of itself being retaliated against by country B.

    Thus, if country A has nuclear weapons and no other country has nuclear weapons, country A has freedom — within the limits of its moral code, pressures of public opinion, and its willingness to flout international humanitarian law — to threaten or use nuclear weapons without fear of retaliation in kind. For a short time the United States was the only country with nuclear weapons. It used these weapons twice on a nearly defeated enemy. Deterrence played no part. The United States never said to Japan, don’t do this or we will attack you with nuclear weapons. Prior to using the nuclear weapons, these weapons were a closely guarded secret.

    From 1945 to the early 1950s, US strategic thinking saw free-fall nuclear weapons simply extending conventional bombing capabilities. The United States never said that it would attack another country with nuclear weapons if it did X, but this was implied by the recognized existence of US nuclear weapons, the previously demonstrated willingness of the US to use them, and the continued public testing of these weapons by the US in the Pacific.

    The Dangerous Game of Deterrence

    After the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the dangerous game of nuclear deterrence began. Both the US and USSR warned that if attacked by nuclear weapons, they would retaliate in kind massively. They also extended their respective so-called nuclear deterrence “umbrellas” to particular countries within their orbits. As the arsenals of each country grew, they developed policies of Mutual Assured Destruction. Each country had enough weapons to completely destroy the other. Britain and France also developed nuclear arsenals because they did not want to rely upon the US nuclear umbrella, and to try to preserve their status as great powers. They worried that in a crisis the US might not come to their aid if it meant that the US risked annihilation by the USSR for doing so. China also developed a nuclear arsenal because it felt threatened by both the US and USSR. Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa also developed nuclear arsenals, although South Africa eventually dismantled its small nuclear arsenal.

    Nuclear deterrence took different shapes with different countries. The US and USSR relied upon massive retaliation from their large arsenals of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. The UK, France and China maintained smaller deterrent forces of a few hundred nuclear weapons each. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but it is uncertain whether they have yet deployed nuclear weapons. Israel, known to have some 200 nuclear weapons, offers only the ambiguous official statement that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

    One obvious way that nuclear deterrence could fail is if one side could destroy the other side’s nuclear forces in a first strike. To prevent this from happening, nuclear armed states have tried to make their nuclear forces invulnerable to being wiped out by a first strike attack. One way of doing this was to put the weapons underground, in the air and in the oceans. Many of the weapons on land were put in hardened silos, while those in the oceans were put on submarines that were difficult to locate underwater. For decades the strategic bombers of the US and USSR carrying nuclear weapons were kept constantly on alert with many in the air at any given moment.

    Nuclear deterrence became a game of sorts – a dangerous and potentially tragic one and also deeply selfish, irresponsible and lawless, risking all humanity and the planet. Countries had to protect their deterrence forces at all costs and not allow themselves to become vulnerable to a first strike attack on their nuclear forces. In a strange and perverse way, nuclear-armed countries became more committed to protecting their nuclear forces than they were to protecting their citizens. While they hardened their land-based missile silos and placed their submarines in the deep oceans, their citizens remained constantly vulnerable to nuclear attack.

    The game of nuclear deterrence required that no country become so powerful that it might believe that it could get away with a first strike attempt. It was this concern that drove the nuclear arms race between the US and USSR until the USSR was finally worn down by the economic burden of the struggle. It also ensured a high level of hostility between rival nuclear-armed countries, with great danger of misunderstandings – witness, for example, the Cuban missile crisis and many other less well-known scares. Mutual Assured Destruction lacked credibility, requiring the development of policies of “Flexible Response,” which lowered the nuclear threshold, encouraged the belief that nuclear weapons could be used for war-fighting, increased the risk of escalation to all-out nuclear war, and stimulated more arms racing.

    Notice that a first strike doesn’t require that one country actually have the force to overcome its opponent’s nuclear forces. The leaders of the country only have to believe that it can do so. If the leaders of country A believe that country B is planning a first strike attack, country A may decide to initiate a preemptive strike. If the leaders of country A believe that the leaders of country B would not initiate a nuclear attack against them if they did X, then they might well be tempted to do X. They might be mistaken. This led to the “launch-on-warning” hair-trigger alert status between the US and Russia. More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, each country still has some 2,250 strategic warheads ready to be fired on a few moments’ notice. Nuclear deterrence operates with high degrees of uncertainty, and this uncertainty increases, as does the possibility of irrationality, in times of crisis.

    Ballistic Missile Defenses

    President George W. Bush cites as his primary reason for wanting a ballistic missile defense system for the US his lack of faith that nuclear deterrence would work against so-called “rogue” states. Yet, the uncertainty in nuclear deterrence increases when ballistic missile defenses are introduced. If country A believes that it has a perfect defense against country B, then country B may also believe that it has lost its deterrent capability against country A. Ballistic missile defenses, therefore, will probably trigger new arms races. If countries A and B each have 500 nuclear warheads capable of attacking the other, both are likely to believe the other side will be deterred from an attack. If country A attempts to introduce a defensive system with 1,000 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, country B may believe that its nuclear-armed ballistic missile force will be made impotent and decide to increase its arsenal of deliverable warheads from 500 to 2,000 in order to restore its deterrent capability in the face of B’s 1,000 defensive interceptors. Or, country B may decide to attack country A before its defensive force becomes operational.

    If country A plans to introduce a defensive system with only 100 interceptors, country B might believe that its nuclear force could still prevail with 500 deliverable nuclear weapons. But country B must also think that country A’s interceptors would give A an advantage if A decides to launch a first strike attack against B’s nuclear forces. If country A is able to destroy 400 or more of country B’s nuclear weapons, then A would have enough interceptors (if they all worked perfectly) to believe that it could block any retaliatory action by B. Thus, any defensive system introduced by any country would increase instability and uncertainty in the system, making deterrence more precarious. Worse, this introduces a fear that ballistic missile defense has little to do with defense, and far more to do with an offensive “shield” behind which a country could believe that it could coerce the rest of the world with impunity.

    It was concern for the growing instability of nuclear deterrence to the point where it might break down that led the US and USSR to agree in 1972 to place limits on defensive missile forces in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In this treaty each side agreed to limit its defensive forces to no more than two sites of 100 interceptors each. These sites could not provide protection to the entire country. It is this treaty that the United States is now seeking to amend or unilaterally abrogate in order to build a national ballistic missile defense. It claims this defense is needed to protect itself against so-called “rogue” states such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. At present, however, none of these countries is even expected to be able to produce nuclear weapons or a missile delivery system capable of reaching the United States before 2010 at the earliest.

    Russia and China have both expressed strong opposition to the US proceeding with ballistic missile defense plans. Russia wants to maintain the ABM Treaty for the reasons the treaty was initially created, and is aghast at comments from the US such as those of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calling the treaty “ancient history.” Russia is also seeking to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal for economic reasons and its leaders fear the instabilities that a US national ballistic missile defense system would create. Russian leaders have said that such a system that abrogated the ABM Treaty could result in Russia withdrawing from other arms control treaties including the START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    China has a nuclear force a fraction of that of Russia or the US. It has some 400 nuclear weapons, but only some 20 long-range missiles capable of reaching the US. If the US sets up a system of some 100 to 200 interceptors, China would have to assume that its nuclear deterrent capability had been eliminated. Chinese leaders have called for the US not to go ahead with a ballistic missile defense system that would force China to develop a stronger nuclear deterrent force. Were China to do so, this would inevitably provoke India to expand its nuclear capability, which in turn would lead Pakistan to do the same.

    Increasing Instabilities

    At a time when major progress toward nuclear disarmament is possible and even promised by the nuclear weapons states, the US desire to build a ballistic missile defense system to protect it against small nuclear forces is introducing new uncertainties into the structure of global nuclear deterrence and increasing the instability in the system. Nuclear deterrence has never been a stable system. One country’s nuclear strategies have both predictable and unpredictable consequences in other countries.

    Security built upon nuclear arms cannot endure. US nuclear weapons led to the development of the USSR and UK nuclear arsenals. These led to the development of the French and Chinese nuclear forces. The Chinese nuclear forces led to the development of Indian nuclear forces. India’s nuclear forces led to the development of Pakistani nuclear forces. Israel decided to develop nuclear forces to give it a deterrent among hostile Middle East neighbors. No doubt this provoked Saddam Hussein – and gave him the pretext – to develop Iraq’s nuclear capability, and is driving Iran to follow suit.

    Now the US is seeking to introduce national and theater ballistic missile defenses that will provide further impetus to nuclear arms development and proliferation. The world is far more complicated than country A deterring country B by threat of nuclear retaliation. As more countries develop nuclear arsenals, more uncertainties enter the system. As more defenses are set in place, further uncertainties enter the system. While the US seeks to make itself invulnerable against threats that do not yet even exist, it is further destabilizing the existing system of global nuclear deterrence to the point where it could collapse – especially when the President demonstrates his belief that the system can no longer be relied upon.

    The full consequences of US missile defense plans are not predictable. What is predictable is that the introduction of more effective defenses by the US will change the system and put greater stress on the global system of security built upon nuclear deterrence. The system is already showing signs of strain. With new uncertainties will come new temptations for a country to use nuclear forces before they are used against it. Nuclear deterrence is not sustainable in the long run, and we simply don’t know what stresses or combination of perceptions and/or misperceptions might make it fail.

    Nuclear deterrence cannot guarantee security. It undermines it. The only possibility of security from nuclear attack lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons as has already been agreed to in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reiterated in the 2000 Review Conference of that treaty. Ballistic missile defenses, which increase instability, move the world in the wrong direction. For its own security, the US should abandon its plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses that would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and instead provide leadership in immediately negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention leading to the phased and verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons, like the widely-acclaimed enforceable global treaty banning chemical weapons.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The author would like to thank Commander Robert Green for his helpful suggestions on this paper.

  • Who Will Step Forward

    Who speaks for the innocent victims of the Nuclear Age?

    Who speaks for the uranium miners who suffered and died to bring out the ore?

    Who speaks for the children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

    Who speaks for all radiation victims of all nuclear tests?

    Who speaks for the Pacific Islanders who lost their homes, their health and their lives?

    Who speaks for the unknowing victims of Nazi-like nuclear experiments?

    Who speaks for the soldiers deliberately exposed to nuclear tests?

    Who speaks for the radiation-contaminated earth, air and water?

    Who speaks for the unborn future generations who will suffer from nuclear wastes?

    Who speaks for all humanity that stands at risk of nuclear annihilation?

    Who speaks for ending this peril?

    Who will step forward?

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Earth Day is Every Day

    Earth Day comes only once a year (this year on April 22nd), but protecting our Earth matters everyday. As syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman noted, “In the Earth Day flourish of attention, how did we manage to overlook the greatest environmental danger of all – the mushroom cloud over the green space?”

    Earth is home to all life that we know of in the Universe. Most life on Earth, including the human species, is threatened by nuclear weapons. No country or government has the right to jeopardize the human future and life on our planet for its own shortsighted concept of security through nuclear threat. People need to set their governments right, and demand of their governments an end to this threat.

    If you would like to help make a difference, you can join with others from around the world in signing the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. You can also spread the word by sending this message with a copy of the Appeal to ten friends. Let’s get responsible about saving our planet – it’s the only one we have.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Putting the Chinese Slipper on the Other Foot

    Imagine this: A Chinese airplane is spying on the United States. In a routine flight, it flies just off the coast of Hawaii, using its sophisticated electronic surveillance capabilities to gather intelligence. Since it is a dangerous world, the Chinese want to know what plans our military is making that might affect them. Naturally, our government is somewhat uncomfortable knowing that we are being spied on like this. Why, we wonder, are the Chinese spying on us? What are their intentions?

    US planes regularly intercept Chinese reconnaissance planes, approaching within a safe distance. However, this time, one fighter pilot gets a little overzealous. There is a slight collision. Our plane goes down in the sea. Our pilot is lost at sea. The Chinese plane is damaged and makes an emergency landing on the island of Maui. There are 24 Chinese soldiers aboard the aircraft. They are taken into custody by our military. We also take possession of the Chinese aircraft.

    Our government isn’t too happy about this situation. Opinions are expressed such as: “The Chinese have a lot of audacity coming so close to our territory and spying on us.” Another opinion is: “It’s a damn shame that we lost one of our pilots in an action that never would have happened if the Chinese hadn’t been over here spying on us.” There is a lot of righteous indignation being expressed by top US officials about the Chinese bringing this on themselves by their own arrogance in seeking to spy on us in this manner. Still another opinion expressed is: “They landed on our territory, so we’ll just take our time and examine their plane to see what we can learn about their spying techniques.”

    As soon as the Chinese government learns that its airplane has landed on US territory, the Chinese president sends a message to the US president demanding to see its soldiers and to have its airplane back without any tampering with it. We interpret this as an even greater expression of arrogance on the part of the Chinese, and we respond with silence. In the meantime, we hold the Chinese soldiers in reasonably comfortable detention. We also take advantage of the presence of their aircraft to give it a thorough going over. Since this takes time, we remain silent to the Chinese demands. We decide to just let them cool their heels for awhile. When we do respond to the Chinese, we tell them that we want an apology for their spying on us and for the loss of our fighter pilot.

    The Chinese president, who is relatively new to his job and not too experienced in dealing with people from other countries, responds that he will not apologize. He doesn’t believe that there is anything for which to apologize. He also believes that he will lose face before his people if he does apologize. He thinks an apology will be taken as a sign of weakness. Instead of apologizing, he repeats his demands for the immediate return of the Chinese soldiers and aircraft – and he adds a new demand, that the Americans should stop their spying activities. We can only wonder why the Chinese president refuses to apologize for something that is so clearly poor judgment on the part of the Chinese. His refusal to apologize appears to be additional poor judgment on his part.

    The Chinese president believes he has every right to have his soldiers returned immediately and he takes great offense that the Americans are dragging their feet on returning the aircraft. He dismisses the concerns that we have raised over their spying on us. “Everyone spies,” he thinks. “You spy. We spy. So what is the big deal?” But he also knows deeper down that China bears some responsibility, and that their soldiers and airplane are in US custody. The Chinese president contemplates what threats he can bring to bear on the Americans to get his soldiers and aircraft returned. He is determined to appear strong and not to compromise.

    We Americans, though, are not too worried about any bluster coming from this novice Chinese leader. We know that he does not have a high level of support among the Chinese people. Perhaps showing the Chinese people that he is not as powerful as he might appear to be is not such a bad strategy for us.

    Of course, our position appears sensible. And the Chinese position is arrogant and unapologetic. The next thing we can expect are stronger threats coming from the Chinese leadership, in an effort to assume the moral high ground, even though it was their action that initiated this string of events.

    When our government has discovered everything it wants to know about the Chinese aircraft, we’ll give them back their plane and soldiers. But a reasonable guess is that we will have made an enemy of the Chinese leader.

    It is a dangerous world. Incidents like this can arise without warning at any time. Without restraint on all sides, such incidents can escalate to war. We should never forget that a Chinese leader or any leader armed with nuclear weapons poses a terrible danger not only to us but to the entire world.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • U.S. Missile Defense Compromises Global Security

    BEIJING- Every state has the right to security and each government has the obligation to protect its nationals. But how to exercise this right and acquire security in its real sense is a question worth serious deliberation.

    As globalization progresses, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent. This is as true in the security area as it is economically.

    Security is mutual and indivisible. No country can exist in isolation, nor can it resolve all the security issues it faces single-handedly. True security is based on global security and on the extensivecooperation of the international community.

    A military edge cannot guarantee security. Unilateralism will only lead to greater insecurity.

    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a complex problem that can be tackled only through global cooperation. Setting up a national missile defense system would not contribute to solving this problem, but only further aggravate it.

    Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has made considerable progress in nonproliferation. It is therefore neither wise nor advisable to build a so-called missile defense system, whose effect is questionable, at the expense of the international arms control and nonproliferation system after so many years’ efforts, including those of the United States.

    Some people describe the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as part of the “Cold War mentality” and hold that it should be discarded. This view is neither fair nor just. Like all the other arms control treaties, the ABM treaty reflects the interdependent relationship among contracting parties in security matters. This relationship did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, but rather is becoming even stronger in the era of globalization. The ABM treaty is effective. It is not outdated.

    Just as the ABM Treaty cannot be viewed in isolation, neither can a U.S. missile defense program. Offense and defense are always indivisible. Enhanced defensive capabilities, to a large degree, mean improved offensive capabilities as well.

    This is particularly true for the United States, the only superpower. The United States possesses the biggest nuclear arsenal and the most sophisticated conventional weapons in the world, and it pursues a deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons. A missile defense will severely impede the nuclear disarmament process and render any U.S. initiative on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons meaningless.

    People cannot but ask what on earth is the real intention behind U.S. insistence on developing a missile defense system in defiance of the international community. Is it really to defend against the missile threat from the few so-called “problem states,” or for greater military advantage over other big countries?

    Recently there has been relaxation of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. All parties should cherish this hard-won state of affairs and create conditions for continued relaxation. Theater missile defense would only add complex and confrontational factors to the detriment of regional stability.

    Some in the United States clamorously advocate incorporating Taiwan into the U.S. theater missile defense system or providing anti-missile weapons or technologies to Taiwan. This is a most dangerous tendency. If the United States chose to do so, it would put Taiwan under the American umbrella of military protection and restore, de facto, the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance. It would surely inflate the arrogance of the forces for Taiwan’s independence, jeopardize stability in the Taiwan Straits, endanger the peaceful reunification of China and lead to serious regression in China-U.S. relations.

    China has no intention of threatening U.S. security, nor does it seek such capabilities. China has always exercised great restraint in the development of nuclear arms. China has always pursued a policy of no first use, and keeps a small but effective nuclear force only for the purpose of containing other countries’ possible nuclear attacks. This policy will remain unchanged.

    China and the United States shoulder common responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. A cooperative and constructive relationship between China and the United States will have a crucial impact on world stability.

    China and the United States have long engaged in fruitful cooperation over nonproliferation. China is ready to continue on this path. But we also look forward to serious and pragmatic dialogue with the Bush administration on missile defense and related issues.

    *Tang Jiaxuan is the Foreign Minister of China. He contributed this comment to the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, Friday, March 30, 2001