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  • US Policy and the Quest for Nuclear Disarmament

    US Policy and the Quest for Nuclear Disarmament

    “The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil,
    but because of the people who don’t do anything about it.”

    – Albert Einstein

    Albert Einstein was one of the wisest and most far-seeing men who has walked the Earth. He looked further into the mysteries of the universe than any scientist of his time or any time. Tragically, it was the vision of this humane man that opened the door to atomic weapons. Even more tragically, it was Einstein, concerned about the possibility of a German atomic weapon, who encouraged President Roosevelt to establish the US atomic bomb project, leading to the creation of nuclear weapons and their use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    The Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    From the outset of the Nuclear Age, the United States has been the world’s leading nuclear weapons power, a role it has strived diligently to maintain. The US created the world’s first nuclear weapons during World War II in its top-secret Manhattan Project, ostensibly for the purpose of deterring a German atomic bomb should the Germans have succeeded in developing one. In late 1944, when he understood that the Germans would not succeed in developing an atomic weapon, Joseph Rotblat, a Polish émigré working on the Manhattan Project, resigned out of deep concern for the implications of the project. In 1995, he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his continuing efforts for nuclear disarmament.

    At the time that the atomic bomb was first tested on July 16, 1945 , the war in Europe had already ended with the surrender of Germany in May of that year, so there was no longer a need to deter the Germans. The war in the Pacific continued, however, and the US chose to use its new weapons within a matter of weeks on the Japan ese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . It chose these two cities, which had been largely spared until that point the US carpet bombing of other Japan ese cities, to test the destructive power of first an enriched uranium bomb, Little Boy , and then a plutonium bomb, Fat Man.

    In using nuclear weapons, the US ignored the heroic efforts of Leo Szilard, a Hungarian émigré and atomic scientist who had earlier played a key role in the development of the first atomic weapons. It was Szilard who actually first conceptualized the possibility of a controlled fission reaction that could lead to the creation of a nuclear weapon. In 1939, worried about the possibility of the Germans developing an atomic weapon, Szilard went to Einstein and convinced him to send a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, urging that the US develop a nuclear weapons program to deter a possible German bomb. Szilard then worked in the Manhattan Project with Enrico Fermi on the first experimental test of a controlled fission reaction, proving the bomb was possible.

    When it became clear in spring 1945 that the US would succeed in making an atomic weapon and that the Germans would not, Szilard applied his abundant energy to trying to stop the US from using the bombs on Japan ese cities. Szilard believed that using the bombs on Japan would lead to a nuclear arms race that could result in a terrible destructive force being unleashed on civilization. Through Eleanor Roosevelt he arranged to meet with President Roosevelt, but Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 , just prior to their scheduled meeting. Szilard then sought to arrange a meeting with President Truman, but was sent to see Jimmy Byrnes, a Truman mentor in the Senate who would soon be appointed Secretary of State. Byrnes essentially dismissed Szilard as a foreigner. Finally, Szilard organized a petition among Manhattan Project scientists, urging that the bomb be demonstrated to the Japan ese rather than used on cities. The petition, signed by some 70 scientists, was stalled by General Leslie Groves, the military head of the Manhattan Project, and did not reach Truman before the bomb was used, although it is unlikely that it would have made a difference to Truman had it reached him.

    Byrnes, who accompanied Truman to Potsdam , is believed to have encouraged the use of the bomb for partisan political reasons. He is said to have advised Truman that if Americans discovered how much had been spent on creating the first atomic bombs and was thus diverted from the war effort (approximately $2 billion), they would vote against the Democrats if the bomb were not used as soon as it was ready. Others have argued that the bomb was used on Japan to send a warning to the Soviet Union .

    The official justification for the use of the atomic bombs on Japan was to end the war quickly and save American lives that would otherwise be lost in an invasion of Japan planned for November 1945. Since Japan was already largely defeated and elements of the Japan ese cabinet were seeking favorable terms of surrender, there is now considerable debate among historians about whether the use of the bombs was actually necessary to end the war. The picture is certainly much more complex than the prevalent American mythology, which suggests that the US dropped the bombs and as a result won the war. This mythology paints nuclear weapons as war-winning weapons and therefore useful and positive.

    Perspectives on the Bombings

    It is instructive to look at how the bombing of Hiroshima , the first use of a nuclear weapon on a city, was viewed in its immediate aftermath. Here are the views of four prominent individuals on August 8 and 9, 1945:

    French writer Albert Camus: “Our technical civilization has just reached its greatest level of savagery. We will have to choose, in the more or less near future, between collective suicide and the intelligent use of our scientific conquests. Before the terrifying prospects now available to humanity, we see even more clearly that peace is the only battle worth waging. This is no longer a prayer but a demand to be made by all peoples to their governments — a demand to choose definitively between hell and reason.”

    Former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt: “The only safe counter weapon to this new power is the firm decision of mankind that it shall be used for constructive purposes only. This discovery must spell the end of war. We have been paying an ever-increasing price for indulging ourselves in this uncivilized way of settling our difficulties. We can no longer indulge in the slaughter of our young men. The price will be too high and will be paid not just by young men, but by whole populations. In the past we have given lip service to the desire for peace. Now we must meet the test of really working to achieve something basically new in the world.”

    Former President Herbert Hoover: “The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul.”

    A day later, on August 9 th , President Truman invoked God with regard to the use of the bomb: “We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force – to prevent its misuse, and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind. It is an awful responsibility which has come to us. We thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes.” (Since the two bombs used on Japan ese cities caused the immediate deaths of some 135,000 people by blast, fire and incineration, and the deaths of over 200,000 people by the end of 1945, God must at the very least have been rather surprised by Mr. Truman’s prayer to use nuclear weapons “in His ways for His purposes.”)

    Reflecting a few years later on the use of the atomic weapons by the US , the great Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi said, “What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see. Forces of nature act in a mysterious manner.” Gandhi’s insight is unusually profound. What effect has the bomb had on the soul of America ? Perhaps we are learning about this as we watch the great dream of America becoming increasingly stuck in the tar of militarism and warfare on distant shores.

    US Nuclear Policy

    Following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , the US began an arms race with itself, testing and developing its nuclear arsenal. From 1949, when the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon, until 1990, when the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, the US had a partner in the nuclear arms race and a justification to continue to develop its nuclear arsenal.

    The US has always sought to maintain a devastating nuclear deterrent force, a force that would provide it with political advantage. In order to make its deterrent force credible, the US has sought to demonstrate its willingness to use its nuclear arsenal should it be attacked. Certainly its use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki has contributed to a general belief that the US would not be inhibited by the costs in human lives from a retaliatory nuclear response.

    The US has also been willing to share nuclear technology with its close allies. This applies particularly to the UK, but also to other NATO allies on whose territories the US has maintained nuclear weapons, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and, until recently, Greece. The US has also extended its nuclear “umbrella” to its allies in Europe , Asia and the Pacific.

    With some notable exceptions, such as Israel , the US has always sought to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, but has felt free to engage in vertical proliferation by increasing the size and improving the quality of its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems for the arsenal. In doing so, the US has consistently demonstrated a double standard in asking other countries to abstain from doing what it was not willing to abstain from itself.

    In its policies toward arms control and disarmament, the US has always sought measures that benefited its security, while not reducing US nuclear superiority. In recent years, however, under the Bush administration, the US has shown far less regard than in the past for nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties.

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union partnered on occasion in an attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. This resulted in the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear weapons states (US, UK , USSR , France and China ) and non-nuclear weapons states (all the rest). The non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons states agreed in Article IV of the Treaty to provide technical assistance to the non-nuclear weapons states in the peaceful uses of the atom, going so far as to call the peaceful uses of atomic energy “an inalienable right.” The nuclear weapons states also promised, in Article VI of the Treaty, to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and to hold good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. When the Treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, the nuclear weapons states agreed to “determined pursuit.of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons..” In 1996, the International Court of Justice interpreted Article VI of the NPT to mean: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties to the treaty agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, including an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    The Greatest Danger Confronting Humanity

    Let us fast forward to today. Countering terrorism is high on the agendas of the world’s most industrialized countries, especially the US . But in the eyes of most of the world, the nuclear weapons states are employing the greatest of terrorist threats, which are embedded in the concept of nuclear deterrence. If terrorism is the threat to injure or kill innocent people for political ends, then the reliance on nuclear deterrence is itself a terrorist act.

    I would argue, in the company of Einstein, Rotblat and Szilard, that there is no greater danger confronting humanity than that of nuclear weapons. These weapons place all cities in jeopardy of annihilation. They place civilization in danger of massive destruction. And they place humanity and most of life on the endangered species list. For nearly sixty years humankind has lived with the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and has grown far too comfortable with these instruments of annihilation.

    The US remains the most powerful country in the world, militarily and economically. It is the country that holds the key to nuclear disarmament. Without the active leadership of the US , nuclear disarmament will not be possible, and the world will continue to drift toward the use of these weapons once again. No other country has the capacity to bring the other nuclear weapons states to the table to negotiate the elimination of nuclear arms.

    Nuclear dangers have not disappeared. Should terrorist groups, in the more traditional sense of the term, obtain nuclear weapons, they cannot be effectively deterred from using them. Protecting populations from nuclear attack will require a high level of international cooperation and US leadership. Current US leadership, however, is alienating the international community and its double standards are viewed as nuclear hypocrisy. Without a radical change of course in US nuclear policy, the likelihood of terrorist groups obtaining and using nuclear weapons is an increasingly likely possibility.

    The US Nuclear Posture Review

    Current US nuclear weapons policy is set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), submitted to Congress on December 31, 2001 . This document calls for a “New Triad.” During the Cold War, the US referred to a triad of strategic delivery vehicles for its nuclear forces: inter-continental ballistic missiles; submarine launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. The New Triad is composed of offensive strike systems, nuclear and non-nuclear (including the three delivery systems of the old triad); defenses, active and passive (including missile defense systems); and a revitalized defense infrastructure to meet emerging threats. One interesting aspect of the New Triad is that it will supplement nuclear strike forces with conventional strike forces delivered anywhere in the world in 30 minutes by intercontinental missiles.

    Despite calling for powerful non-nuclear forces to be added to the US arsenal, the Nuclear Posture Review boldly announces, in what may be considered a taunt to the rest of the world in terms of US obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that nuclear weapons provide the US with “credible military options”: “Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and large-scale conventional force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.” In other words, the Nuclear Posture Review informs the world that nuclear weapons are useful to the United States both strategically and politically. Nearly 60 years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and some 15 years after the breakup of the former Soviet Union , the US still finds that nuclear weapons serve strategic and political goals. To further these goals, the US has been developing earth penetrating nuclear weapons (“bunker busters”) and low-yield nuclear weapons (mini-nukes”), one-third the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. While announcing to the world its intent to continue to rely upon its nuclear arsenal, the US has been unabashed in demanding that other countries – including Iraq , Iran , North Korea , Libya and Syria – refrain from following its example.

    The Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the lack of an effective earth penetrating nuclear device as a shortcoming of the current US nuclear arsenal, citing the fact that “more than 70 countries use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes.” The report states, “New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets..” The Bush administration is seeking $28 million in 2005 and $485 million over five years to design this new weapon.

    The Nuclear Posture Review also states, “The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: .be able, if directed, to design, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.” It further states that options exist “that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation’s deterrence posture.” The NPR calls for creating “advanced warhead concepts teams” that “will provide unique opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and engineers.” Overall, the Bush administration is seeking $6.6 billion for nuclear weapons activities in 2005, fifty percent more than the average annual expenditure for these activities during the Cold War.

    Such goals and plans demonstrate little promise of US leadership for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The US cannot have it both ways, depending on nuclear weapons for security and planning to build more, on the one hand; and, on the other, providing leadership to the rest of the world for the elimination of these weapons.

    The overall sense of the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review is that it is a long-term commitment to nuclear weapons at a time when the US is seeking to prevent these weapons from proliferating to other countries and terrorist organizations. Such a double standard cannot hold.

    Presidential Directive 17 and the National Security Strategy of the US

    In September 2002, one year after the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed Presidential Directive 17, a classified document, which states: “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including potentially nuclear weapons-to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    Also in September 2002, the White House issued a document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America .” In a letter accompanying this document, President Bush wrote, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” This is a commitment to preventive war, the kind that the US would subsequently wage, under false pretenses, against Iraq in March 2003. The National Security Strategy document states, “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country..” When combined with Presidential Directive 17, this raises the possibility of preemptive or preventive nuclear war.

    The National Security Strategy document reaffirms “the essential role of American military strength” by calling for building and maintaining “our defenses beyond challenge.” Expressing the understanding that “deterrence can fail,” the document stresses the need for US military dominance: “The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy – whether a state or non-state actor – to impose its will on the United States , or allies, or our friends.” The latter category of US friends has unfortunately become a diminishing species in response to the bellicose words and actions of the Bush administration.

    Finally, the National Security Strategy document supports a special status in the world for American leaders by freeing them from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, a court supported by nearly all US allies. The document states: “We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.” In other words, the US will not allow the same standards of international law to be applied to US leaders as were applied to the defeated Axis powers at Nuremberg and as are accepted by our allies today. 

    Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    In March 2004, the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy issued a joint report, entitled “An Assessment of the Impact of Repeal of the Prohibition on Low Yield Warhead Development on the Ability of the United States to Achieve Its Nonproliferation Objectives.” After reviewing Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the article that calls for nuclear disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race, the report found, “Nothing in the NPT, including Article VI, or any other Treaty, however, prohibits the United States from carrying out nuclear weapons exploratory research or, for that matter, from developing and fielding new or modified nuclear warheads. That said, we should, of course, expect that several countries, in particular, those from the non-aligned movement, perhaps citing inaccurate or misleading press reports, will call attention to certain U.S. nuclear weapons R&D efforts.in questioning the U.S. nuclear policies and will be disappointed that more progress has not been achieved toward nuclear disarmament.”

    The report then continues with a flourish of rhetoric about the US commitment to its Article VI nuclear disarmament commitments, leaving the impression that its “strong record of actions and policies.demonstrate unambiguously U.S. compliance with Article VI..” Unfortunately, most analysts not in the pay of the US government reject this rosy, some would say hypocritical, view of US commitment to its NPT Article VI obligations. They point to the failure of the US to comply with nearly all of the obligations set forth in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The US , for example, has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and has made no provisions for the irreversibility of reductions in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) that it pressed upon Russia .

    When Undersecretary of State for International Security John Bolton spoke to the delegates of the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, he described the “central bargain” of the NPT as the renunciation of nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance in developing civilian nuclear power. He left out of the equation the expectation of the non-nuclear weapons states that the nuclear weapons states would fulfill their Article VI obligations for nuclear disarmament. While pointing a finger at Iran and North Korea , he dismissed the possibility of US Article VI obligations, stating, “We cannot divert attention from the violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist.”

    Positions of Bush and Kerry

    Under the Bush administration, the US has projected its reliance on nuclear weapons far into the future, and there has been virtually no willingness on the part of the US to comply with obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or other major international arms control and disarmament treaties. Would a Kerry presidency be substantially different? In a major policy speech on nuclear terrorism on June1, 2004, Kerry pledged to make the fight against nuclear terrorism his top security priority. While Bush has also taken steps to prevent nuclear proliferation and keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, Kerry distinguished his position from Bush’s by pledging to end the double standard of calling on others not to develop nuclear weapons while the US moves forward with research on new nuclear weapons, such as “bunker busters” and “mini-nukes.” Kerry also pledged to gain control of the nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union at a far more rapid rate than that contemplated by the Bush Administration, and Kerry promised to appoint a Nuclear Terrorism Coordinator to work with him in the White House in overseeing this effort. Finally, Kerry called for taking prompt action on a verifiable ban on the creation of new fissile materials for nuclear weapons, a step long supported by the international community and nearly all US allies, but not acted upon by the US .

    Both Bush and Kerry have called for strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but only in relation to preventing nuclear materials from civilian nuclear reactors from being converted to nuclear weapons. Neither of them has set forth a plan to fulfill US obligations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty. Thus, both of them are prepared to commit to the Treaty to prevent others from obtaining nuclear weapons, but not to fulfilling the long-standing obligations of the US for nuclear disarmament. While Kerry’s positions on nuclear policy issues are certainly preferable to those of Bush, if only for Kerry’s support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of international law in general, they are neither bold nor innovative; they simply are not as damaging as those of the Bush administration.

    We cannot count on US nuclear policies to change significantly on the basis of US political leadership. The only real hope to bring about needed changes in US nuclear policy is by pressure applied by US citizens and foreign governments. I will briefly discuss three efforts to influence US nuclear policy.

    Nuclear Disarmament Campaigns

    Turn the Tide. At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, we are initiating a campaign to chart a new course in US nuclear policy that we call Turn the Tide. It is an Internet-based campaign that seeks to awaken US citizens to the need to change US nuclear policy and spur them to communicate with their Congressional representatives and candidates, as well as the president and presidential candidates, and to cast their ballots based on positions on nuclear disarmament issues. The campaign is based on the following call to action:

    1. Stop all efforts to create dangerous new nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
    2. Maintain the current moratorium on nuclear testing and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    3. Cancel plans to build new nuclear weapons production plants, and close and clean up the toxic contamination at existing plants.
    4. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No Use of nuclear weapons against any nation or group that does not have nuclear weapons.
    5. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nations possessing nuclear weapons.
    6. Cancel funding for and plans to deploy offensive missile “defense” systems which would ignite a dangerous arms race and offer no security against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.
    7. In order to significantly decrease the threat of accidental launch, together with Russia , take nuclear weapons off high-alert status and do away with the strategy of launch-on-warning.
    8. Together with Russia , implement permanent and verifiable dismantlement of nuclear weapons taken off deployed status through the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
    9. Demonstrate to other countries US commitment to reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons by removing all US nuclear weapons from foreign soil.
    10. To prevent future proliferation or theft, create and maintain a global inventory of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials and place these weapons and materials under strict international safeguards.
    11. Initiate international negotiations to fulfill existing treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the phased and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.
    12. Redirect funding from nuclear weapons programs to dismantling nuclear weapons, safeguarding nuclear materials, cleaning up the toxic legacy of the Nuclear Age and meeting more pressing social needs such as education, health care and social services.

    Middle Powers Initiative . The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight international civil society organizations working in the area of nuclear disarmament that supports and encourages middle power governments, such as those middle power states calling for a New Agenda that have worked together in the United Nations for nuclear disarmament (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden). The New Agenda Coalition governments took a leadership role in achieving agreement of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. With support from the Middle Powers Initiative, the New Agenda states have continued to press the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their Article VI obligations.

    Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons . This is an important new initiative that calls for beginning negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2005, completing negotiations by the year 2010, and completing the process of eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2020. Mayors for Peace is a global organization composed of some 600 mayors from cities throughout the world. The organization is led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , who played an active role in the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. They are planning to have more than 100 mayors from around the world at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

    There is much that needs to be done, and many good people are engaged in these efforts. However, still more is needed, and considerably more effort must be put forward by the American people. It is not clear whether this can be achieved. Americans for the most part seem too complacent, too comfortable with the power of their government, and too deferent to their government. They have not acted to curb its abuses, either with respect to nuclear weapons or to illegal wars of aggression such as the Iraq War.

    Silence in the Face of Evil

    Gandhi mused about what would happen to the soul of the destroying power after the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima . His inquiry remains relevant. What has happened to the soul of America , a country that once held such great hope for the world? Its leaders have followed the path of illegal and aggressive warfare, killing far more civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq than died in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . Its young soldiers have become torturers, and their photographs with the prisoners at Abu Ghraib reflect no sense of shame or even self-consciousness about the degradation and torture of the prisoners whom they were to guard and interrogate. And US citizens have been remarkably silent in the face of leaders who have led by fear and instigated aggressive foreign wars.

    The American people have been docile and reticent to react to atrocities committed in their names. Their greatest sin may be silence in the face of the misuse and misdirection of US military might, and this may be a sin that has taken hold of the soul of America .

    The survivors of the atomic bombings are called hibakusha in Japan ese. They were nearly all innocent civilians. Many have lived sad and painful lives following the bombings. Their cry has been “Never again! We will not repeat the evil.” They have summoned the courage to speak out and convey their experiences in the hope that they can prevent future nuclear attacks and future hibakusha . I will conclude with a poem I wrote about hibakusha and silence. It is called Hibakusha Do Not Just Happen.

    Hibakusha Do Not Just Happen

    For every hibakusha
    there is a pilot

    for every hibakusha
    there is a planner

    for every hibakusha
    there is a bombardier

    for every hibakusha
    there is a bomb designer

    for every hibakusha
    there is a missile maker

    for every hibakusha
    there is a missileer

    for every hibakusha
    there is a targeter

    for every hibakusha
    there is a commander

    for every hibakusha
    there is a button pusher

    for every hibakusha
    many must contribute

    for every hibakusha
    many must obey

    for every hibakusha
    many must be silent

    The use of nuclear weapons on civilian populations has been described appropriately by the former president of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui, as “the ultimate evil.” General George Lee Butler, a former commander of the US Strategic Command, described nuclear weapons as “the enemy of humanity.” “Indeed,” he said, “they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.”

    It is silence in the face of evil that allows evil to flourish. I fear this is the case in America today. There is no widespread uprising in the US for nuclear sanity and the elimination of these weapons. As a result, the nuclear threat will likely continue and the result may well be the creation of more hibakusha. This time Americans may learn the deeply painful lesson of being under, rather than above, the bomb. It is my hope that Americans will use both their imaginations and their consciences, and awaken to the serious danger that nuclear weapons pose for all humanity, including themselves, before it is too late, and will lead the world in prevailing in the greatest challenge ever faced by humanity, that of ridding the world of this ultimate evil. It is a far more difficult task than putting a man on the moon, and the first and most important step is breaking the silence that has allowed this evil to go unchallenged. This is surely necessary not only for the future of humanity, but also for the soul of America.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org ). He is the co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World Court and many other studies of peace in the Nuclear Age.

  • US Nuclear Weapons Policy Under the Bush Administration

    Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Policy Studies, UCLA
    Senior Fellow, The Milken Institute and The Gorbachev Foundation of North America
    A Presentation to the GRAD Conference on “Regional Cooperation and Global Security”
    International Business School, Budapest 30 June – 4 July, 2004

    1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

    There have been remarkable recent changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy under the current Bush administration that were announced in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in three official documents but are not widely known or adequately discussed and critiqued. They constitute a new doctrine, the Bush doctrine, ending the security system and policies of the Cold War and thus representing a discontinuous sea change in the international security system that calls for discussion, debate, and analysis, which have not occurred. The bipolar world has been replaced by a unipolar world with the U.S. as the dominant power or sole superpower. Alliance systems that had existed in the earlier epoch have been replaced by unilateral U.S. actions. Arms control has been replaced by unilateral U.S. arms initiatives.

    The purpose of this paper is to present these new concepts related to nuclear weapons doctrine, to evaluate them, and to consider an alternative approach, that of global security. The new concepts as well as alternatives, such as global security, call for a wide-ranging debate both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, this has not happened, possibly due to the concern over the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were, ironically, examples of the new policies put into action. Both the new policies and their underlying goals should be subjects of intense scrutiny.

    2. BACKGROUND TO THE NEW BUSH POLICY

    The background to these new nuclear weapons doctrines include the end of the Cold War in 1989; the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Project for a New American Century established in 1997 “to promote American global leadership” by a group of individuals who eventually took major leadership positions in the Bush Administration in 2001; the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and the declaration by this administration of a “War on Terrorism.

    3. CHANGES IN POLICY ANNOUNCED IN THREE MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENTS

    These changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy were announced in three official documents that were released by the administration in 2002. The first of these documents is the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in January 2002. It is a classified document that is mandated by law and produced periodically, the last one having been that of the Clinton administration in 1994. The latest version was leaked in March 2002 by the Los Angeles Times. According to the NPR, “A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.” It is a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the 21st century. It states that it does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning. Rather, it states that the Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the U.S. and its allies in order to deter such attacks in the first place. It does, however, refer to the “Possible use of nuclear weapons in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the South.” It also refers to the use of nuclear weapons against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, in retaliation for attacks by nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or “in the event of surprising military developments.” It also states that the administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

    Overall, according to the NPR, nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. The NPR states that these “nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important strategic and political objectives.”

    The second of these documents is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) that was issued by the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President in September 2002. It is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. According to the NSS, there are plans to ensure that no nation could rival U.S. military strength. The emphasis is on defeating rogue states and terrorists, noting that deterrence will not work against such enemies. It proclaims the doctrine of U.S. preemption, where it “Cannot let our enemies strike first” and gives arguments for preemption. For example, it notes that, “For Centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” It further states that, “The U.S. has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.” It might be noted, however, that the U.S. did not preempt in most of the recent wars it has fought, including the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, while its attempt at preemption in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was a failure. Far from there being historical precedents, this new policy represents a fundamental shift from a U.S. policy of reaction to one of initiation. It is too early to say that this policy of preemption in the Iraq War was a success. The NSS notes that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary act preemptively.” Such a policy of preemption is, of course, a violation of the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent precisely such preemption, as in Hitler’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China. The UN Charter forbids a member state from taking military action against another member state unless it has itself been attacked or it has the authorization of the Security Council. The U.S. acted preemptively in the Iraq War, which was consistent with the NSS policy, but a violation of the UN Charter. In terms of international law, the U.S. was as much an outlaw in its attack on Iraq as Saddam Hussein was in his attack on Kuwait.

    President Bush’s West Point Commencement Speech of June 2002 articulates many of the points in the NPR and the NSS. In fact, this speech set the stage for the NSS, which quotes at length from it.

    The third of these documents is the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that was issued by the White House in December 2002. As in the case of NSS, WMD is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. It notes that WMD, including nuclear biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of states hostile to the U.S. or terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the U.S. It notes that an effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the U.S. It states that, as in the war on terrorism, the strategy for homeland security, and the new concept of deterrence, the new approach to WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. It notes that the highest priority is accorded to protection of the U.S. and its allies from the threat of WMD. The three pillars it announces are counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. Among the policies it discusses are interdiction of WMD, new methods of deterrence with threats of overwhelming force, and defense and mitigation, including the destruction of an adversary’s WMD before their use, as well as traditional nonproliferation approaches.

    4. TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    According to the NPR the U.S. reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, thereby possibly breaking the taboo against their use that has existed since 1945. They are treated like other weapons with no sharp distinction from non-nuclear weapons. Nuclear targeting discussions have been a part of U.S. military strategy for some time, but the leak of the NPR provides the first time that an official “hit list” of targets for nuclear weapons has come to light.

    The NPR lists seven nations as possible targets for U.S. nuclear weapons. First are the two “old” enemies of Russia and China. Second are the three countries listed as members of the “Axis of Evil” in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech, namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Third are two countries that are listed by the U.S. as terrorist states: Syria and Libya.

    Of these seven nations that could be targets of U.S. nuclear weapons, three are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, namely Iran, Syria, and Libya (Iraq has been invaded and defeated while North Korea has pulled out of the NPT). The U.S. along with other nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT gave so-called “negative assurances” to non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT, stating that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear stages unless they were allied with nuclear powers. Thus, targeting these three with nuclear weapons would be a violation of these U.S. negative assurances that were an inducement for these states to join the NPT and that were reiterated at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

    The NPR also calls for lesser reliance on the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack, with greater reliance on precision-guided weapons to deter attacks. It states that because of improvements in precision-guided weaponry, as demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military can now rely more on powerful, highly accurate conventional bombs and missiles that could provide an inducement to start a war.

    5. A NEW TRIAD

    According to the NPR there is a new triad. The old triad consisted of three different basing modes for nuclear weapons: long-range bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

    By contrast, the NPR refers to a new triad with three component parts of the U.S. strategic system. First are offensive strike weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, including all three components of the old triad. Second are defenses, both active and passive, including the new national missile defense system. Third is a revitalized defense infrastructure that could “design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements and maintain readiness to resume underground testing if required.”

    The Bush administration has recently obtained agreement from Congress to lift its ban on designing new nuclear warheads, and there are plans to develop two new weapons. One is a low-yield weapon that could potentially be used as a weapon in regional conflicts thus possibly changing the role of nuclear weapons from that of deterring war to that of instruments of war. The other is a “bunker buster” that can destroy underground facilities, including missile silos in Russia and elsewhere. The administration has already started to construct a missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the Secretary of Defense has asked his Science Board to look into the possibility that the new system will use nuclear-tipped interceptors. Such interceptors would be much more effective in destroying incoming missiles than the more conventional hit-to-kill interceptors that are being testing now, and they could even neutralize the Russian second-strike deterrent.

    Thus, the NPR is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US nuclear forces in the future. It promotes a nuclear strategy of maximum flexibility as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    6. PREEMPTION AND ITS DANGERS

    The NSS places major emphasis on preemption and calls for preemption rather than deterrence as the fundamental basis of national security. The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars are the initial cases of such preemption, with the U.S. retaining the right to preempt in defending its vital interests.

    Such a policy of preemption requires massive defense spending, and the U.S. now spends about $400 billion annually on defense, more than the rest of the world combined. In addition to its costs, there are significant dangers of preemption. First, it creates antagonism toward toe U.S. and possible terrorist attacks. Second, it sends a message to the rest of the world, that they should not attempt to fight the U.S. with conventional weapons, leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Third, this policy sets a precedent for other nations to also engage in preemption, including China in Taiwan and India in Pakistan. Fourth, there are dangers stemming from U.S. hubris after its quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq, with the next step possibly being an invasion of the other nations on President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” list: Iran and North Korea or possibly others on the NPR nuclear hit list, such as Syria or Libya, or yet others, such as Sudan or Cuba. These nations will see such a possibility as looming and try to protect themselves, possibly by building nuclear weapons, as has already happened in North Korea.

    7. A NEW PROLIFERATION AGENDA

    The new proliferation agenda included “old approaches” such as controls on materials and technology and “new approaches” such as reserving the right to destroy facilities used to make WMD. A precedent for the latter was the Israeli destruction of the Baghdad reactor before it could be used to make nuclear weapons. Many nations criticized Israel for this action that was in violation of international law, including the U.N. Charter, given that the Security Council did not authorize it. Similar criticisms could be directed at the U.S. if it engaged in such acts. Furthermore, if the U.S. claims a right to such acts other nations could also make such a claim, creating very dangerous situations. For example, India might claim the right to destroy Pakistani nuclear facilities using the same logic or China could claim a right to destroy the nuclear infrastructure of Taiwan. Such policies and actions would make the world a much more dangerous place.

    One could also argue that the “old” problem of proliferation was that of nations acquiring nuclear weapons, while the “new” problem is one of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons. More should be done on a cooperative international basis to deny such weapons to terrorist organizations or subnational groups in general. This should be done under the auspices of the U.N. as a truly international cooperative effort. As to the old problem, involving such nations as Iran and North Korea, a case could be made that their acquiring such weapons could be stabilizing rather than destabilizing if the effect is to deter the U.S. from using its nuclear weapons against these nations. The world has noted that the U.S. invaded and occupied two non-nuclear nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, but did not invade North Korea and Iran, possibly since the former already has nuclear weapons while the latter could possibly acquire them in the near future.

    8. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: GLOBAL SECURITY

    There is an alternative to the policies that are enunciated in the NPR and the NSS, namely global security. The concept refers to security for the planet as a whole to replace the concept of national security, which is outmoded. National security, which defined up to certain well-defined borders, makes little sense given the globalization that has occurred. The goal of global security would be that of protecting the planet as a whole from threats to its vital interests. This approach recognizes the value of global cooperation, in particular, the value of cooperative efforts among the current great powers of the U.S., the E.U., Japan, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and others. It recognizes the need to create a new global system comparable to the creation of a new world system after World War II, one that would encompass not only security but also economics, politics, and other issue areas. This new global system would treat problems of security, both military and non-military, through strengthening existing international institutions or creating new global institutions. These new institutions could be built, in part, on the UN system and its components. They would involve supranational decision making and authority, with enforcement capabilities, transparency, and accountability and with global perspectives and responses. Participation in the global decision making process would be through cooperation. There would be a prohibition against preemption by any one nation, no matter how powerful, in favor of collective action. Such a system of global security should be preferred to the current system of the U.S. as a hegemonic global power.

    References

    Gaddis, John Lewis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy 133 (2003): 50-57.
    Gould, Robert M. and Patrice Sutton, “Global Security: Beyond Gated Communities and Bunker Vision,” Social Justice 29.3 (2002): 1.
    Guoliang, Gu, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 135.
    Heisbourg, Francois, “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 75.
    Hoffman, Stanley, “The High and the Mighty: Bush’s National Security Strategy and the New American Hubris,” The American Prospect 13.24 (2003): 28.
    Intriligator, Michael D., “Global Security After the End of the
    Cold War,” Presidential Address, Peace Science Society (International), Conflict Management and Peace Science, 13(2) (1994), 1-11.
    MccGwire, Michael, “Shifting the Paradigm (Western Ideology of the Cold War),” International Affairs 78.1 (2002): 1.
    O’Hanlon, Michael E., “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” Brookings Institution (2002.
    U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, The Pentagon, January, 2002.
    U.S. Office of the National Security Advisor, The National Security Policy of the United States of America, The White House, September, 2002.http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
    U.S. Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, December 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

  • Road Markers

    Road Markers

    We keep passing road markers
    on the long, curved trail of death in Iraq.

    There were one hundred thirty-eight dead American soldiers
    when Bush, impersonating a combat pilot,
    proclaimed, Mission Accomplished.

    Then it was two hundred, then three, four, five hundred.
    Now we have passed the nine hundred marker
    on the bitter trail of death.

    Are we safer? Do they hate us less?
    Perhaps this doesn’t happen until we pass a thousand,
    or perhaps two or three or ten thousand.

    Or perhaps not until as many Americans have died
    as Iraqis we have killed.
    Perhaps they will never hate us less.

    Nor will we ever be safer
    while we are dropping bombs on Iraqis, or Iranians,
    or North Koreans. Anyone.

    What was it we accomplished so early on the trail of death?
    And didn’t Bush look dashing all dressed up for war?

    Baghdad, 21 July 2004 (Associated Press): “A roadside bomb exploded north of Baghdad early Wednesday, killing one U.S. 1st Infantry Division soldier and bringing to 900 the number of U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq since the beginning of military operations in March 2003.”

  • Better Spies Won’t Add Up to Better Foreign Policy

    America’s intelligence system failed to see terrorist threats coming from Al Qaeda that should have been evident before 9/11, and then, after 9/11, saw terrorist threats coming from Iraq that didn’t exist. A system that doesn’t warn of real threats and does warn of unreal ones is a broken system.

    A unanimous and bipartisan report of the commission established by Congress to investigate intelligence mistakes leading up to 9/11 is expected to conclude that when its report is released today. Meanwhile, a unanimous and bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee has discredited the CIA’s prewar assessments that Iraq possessed banned chemical and biological weapons and was seeking nuclear arms. Those assessments “either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence,” according to the committee. The senators blamed “a series of failures” of intelligence, such as taking circumstantial evidence as definitive proof, ignoring contrary information and relying on discredited or dubious sources. The failures occurred because of “shoddy work,” faulty management, outmoded procedures, “groupthink” and a “flawed culture.”

    What to do? The White House, Congress and the Kerry campaign are all sorting through several proposals. One would create a Cabinet-level intelligence “czar” with more control over the nation’s sprawling $40-billion system for collecting and analyzing information about security threats. A second would do just the opposite – remove the CIA director from any control over other intelligence agencies and hence install a better system of checks and balances. A third proposal would fix the length of the director’s term at five to seven years, removing that position from the whim of politics. A fourth, and contrary, proposal would make the director more politically accountable to the president and Congress. Almost all the proposals would beef up American intelligence with more resources.

    Some of these ideas have merit, but they don’t respond to the core lesson we should have learned: When American foreign policy is based primarily on what our spy agencies say, we run huge risks of getting it disastrously wrong.

    The lesson isn’t new. American intelligence failed to foresee the split between China and the Soviet Union in 1960 and 1961 and thereafter never fully comprehended it – right up through Vietnam. Had U.S. policy been based on more direct diplomacy and less on covert operations we might have avoided that shameful and costly war.

    The CIA was also notoriously wrong when it told John F. Kennedy that its plan to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs “could not fail,” and it misread Soviet intentions before the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy managed to avoid a nuclear war only by instigating direct communication with Nikita Khrushchev.

    American intelligence wildly exaggerated Soviet defense capabilities in the 1980s, leading the U.S. to spend billions of dollars for no reason. President Reagan’s military buildup didn’t bring the Soviets to their knees; the Soviet Union collapsed of its own weight.

    By all means, let’s have better intelligence. But let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that better intelligence is a substitute for better policy. This is especially true when the threat comes in the form of terrorism.

    Terrorism is a tactic. It is not itself our enemy. There is no finite number of terrorists in the world. At any given time, their number depends on how many people are driven by anger and hate to join their ranks. Hence, “smoking out,” imprisoning or killing terrorists, based on information supplied by our intelligence agencies, cannot be the prime means of preventing future terrorist attacks against us. It is more important to deal with the anger and hate. This means, among other things, restarting the Middle East peace process rather than, as President Bush has done, run away from it. It requires shoring up the economies of the Middle East, now suffering from dwindling direct investment from abroad because of the violence and uncertainty in the region. And it means strengthening the legitimacy of moderate Muslim leaders, instead of encouraging extremism – as the current administration’s policies have undoubtedly done.

    Equally fatuous is the notion that “preemptive war,” based on what our intelligence agencies say a potential foreign adversary is likely to do to us, will offer us protection. Terrorists aren’t dependent on a few rogue nations. They recruit and train in unstable parts of the world and can move their bases and camps easily, wherever governments are weak.

    The United States cannot control or police the world. Instead, we will have to depend on strong treaties and determined alliances to prevent illegal distribution of thousands of nuclear weapons already in existence in Russia, Pakistan, India and other nuclear powers, and of biological or chemical weapons capable of mass destruction. The administration’s “go-it-alone” diplomacy takes us in precisely the wrong direction. That the United States suffers from a failure of intelligence is indisputable. The calamitous state of our spy agencies is only one part of that failure.

    Robert B. Reich, a professor at Brandeis University , is the author most recently of “Reason” (2004, Alfred A. Knopf). He was secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration. This is adapted from his article in the August issue of the American Prospect, of which he is a cofounder and national editor.

    Originally published in the Los Angeles Times.

  • Support for Wall Mocks International Law

    What is most remarkable about the International Court of Justice decision on Israel’s ”security barrier” in the West Bank is the strength of the consensus behind it. By a vote of 14-1, the 15 distinguished jurists who make up the highest judicial body on the planet found that the barrier is illegal under international law and that Israel must dismantle it, as well as compensate Palestinians for damage to their property resulting from the barrier’s construction.

    The International Court of Justice has very rarely reached this degree of unanimity in big cases. The July 9 decision was even supported by the generally conservative British judge Rosalyn Higgins, whose intellectual force is widely admired in the United States.

    One might expect the government of Ariel Sharon to wave off this notable consensus as an ”immoral and dangerous opinion.” But one might expect the United States — even as it backed its ally Israel — at least to take account of the court’s reasoning in its criticisms. Instead, both the Bush administration and leading Democrats, including Senators John Kerry and Hillary Clinton, mindlessly rejected the decision.

    Even the American justice in The Hague, Thomas Buergenthal, was careful in his lone dissent. He argued that the court did not fully explore Israel’s contention that the wall-and-fence complex is necessary for its security before arriving at its sweeping legal conclusions. But Judge Buergenthal also indicated that Israel was bound to adhere to international humanitarian law, that the Palestinians were entitled to exercise their right of self-determination and, insofar as the wall was built to protect Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, that he had “serious doubt that the wall would. . .satisfy the proportionality requirement to qualify as legitimate self-defense.”

    The nuance in Buergenthal’s narrow dissent contrasts sharply with, for instance, Kerry’s categorical statement that Israel’s barrier “is not a matter for the ICJ.”

    To the contrary, Israel’s construction of the wall in the West Bank has flagrantly violated clear standards in international law. The clarity of the violations accounts for the willingness of the U.N. General Assembly to request an advisory opinion on the wall from the court, a right it has never previously exercised in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The clarity also helps to explain Israel’s refusal to participate in the ICJ proceedings — not even to present its claim that the barrier under construction has already reduced the incidence of suicide bombing by as much as 90 percent.

    Significantly, the court confirms that Israel is entitled to build a wall to defend itself from threats emanating from the Palestinian territories if it builds the barrier on its own territory. The justices based their objection to the wall on its location within occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the consequent suffering visited upon affected Palestinians.

    If Israel had erected the wall on its side of the boundary of Israel prior to the 1967 war, then it would not have encroached on Palestinian legal rights. The court’s logic assumes the unconditional applicability of international humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, to Israel’s administration of the West Bank and Gaza (a principle affirmed by Judge Buergenthal). That body of law obliges Israel to respect the property rights of Palestinians without qualification, and to avoid altering the character of the territory, including by population transfer.

    The decision creates a clear mandate. The ICJ decision, by a vote of 13-2, imposes upon all states an obligation not to recognize ”the illegal situation” created by the construction of the wall. This is supplemented by a 14-1 vote urging the General Assembly and Security Council to “consider what further action is required to bring an end to the illegal situation.”

    Such a plain-spoken ruling from the characteristically cautious International Court of Justice will test the respect accorded international law, including U.S. willingness to support international law despite a ruling against its ally. The invasion of Iraq and the continuing scandals have already tarnished the reputation of the United States as a law-abiding member of the international community. When U.S. officials dismiss the nearly unanimous ICJ decision without even bothering to engage its arguments, America’s reputation suffers further. In fact, elsewhere in the world, U.S. repudiation of this decision can only entrench existing views of America as an international outlaw.

    Richard Falk is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, and is chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • A Cloud over Civilization

    At the end of the second world war, I was the director for overall effects of the United States strategic bombing survey – Usbus, as it was known. I led a large professional economic staff in assessment of the industrial and military effects of the bombing of Germany. The strategic bombing of German industry, transportation and cities, was gravely disappointing. Attacks on factories that made such seemingly crucial components as ball bearings, and even attacks on aircraft plants, were sadly useless. With plant and machinery relocation and more determined management, fighter aircraft production actually increased in early 1944 after major bombing. In the cities, the random cruelty and death inflicted from the sky had no appreciable effect on war production or the war.

    These findings were vigorously resisted by the Allied armed services – especially, needless to say, the air command, even though they were the work of the most capable scholars and were supported by German industry officials and impeccable German statistics, as well as by the director of German arms production, Albert Speer. All our conclusions were cast aside. The air command’s public and academic allies united to arrest my appointment to a Harvard professorship and succeeded in doing so for a year.

    Nor is this all. The greatest military misadventure in American history until Iraq was the war in Vietnam. When I was sent there on a fact-finding mission in the early 60s, I had a full view of the military dominance of foreign policy, a dominance that has now extended to the replacement of the presumed civilian authority. In India, where I was ambassador, in Washington, where I had access to President Kennedy, and in Saigon, I developed a strongly negative view of the conflict. Later, I encouraged the anti-war campaign of Eugene McCarthy in 1968. His candidacy was first announced in our house in Cambridge.

    At this time the military establishment in Washington was in support of the war. Indeed, it was taken for granted that both the armed services and the weapons industries should accept and endorse hostilities – Dwight Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex”.

    In 2003, close to half the total US government discretionary expenditure was used for military purposes. A large part was for weapons procurement or development. Nuclear-powered submarines run to billions of dollars, individual planes to tens of millions each.

    Such expenditure is not the result of detached analysis. From the relevant industrial firms come proposed designs for new weapons, and to them are awarded production and profit. In an impressive flow of influence and command, the weapons industry accords valued employment, management pay and profit in its political constituency, and indirectly it is a treasured source of political funds. The gratitude and the promise of political help go to Washington and to the defence budget. And to foreign policy or, as in Vietnam and Iraq, to war. That the private sector moves to a dominant public-sector role is apparent.

    None will doubt that the modern corporation is a dominant force in the present-day economy. Once in the US there were capitalists. Steel by Carnegie, oil by Rockefeller, tobacco by Duke, railroads variously and often incompetently controlled by the moneyed few. In its market position and political influence, modern corporate management, unlike the capitalist, has public acceptance. A dominant role in the military establishment, in public finance and the environment is assumed. Other public authority is also taken for granted. Adverse social flaws and their effect do, however, require attention.

    One, as just observed, is the way the corporate power has shaped the public purpose to its own needs. It ordains that social success is more automobiles, more television sets, a greater volume of all other consumer goods – and more lethal weaponry. Negative social effects – pollution, destruction of the landscape, the unprotected health of the citizenry, the threat of military action and death – do not count as such.

    The corporate appropriation of public initiative and authority is unpleasantly visible in its effect on the environment, and dangerous as regards military and foreign policy. Wars are a major threat to civilised existence, and a corporate commitment to weapons procurement and use nurtures this threat. It accords legitimacy, and even heroic virtue, to devastation and death.

    Power in the modern great corporation belongs to the management. The board of directors is an amiable entity, meeting with self-approval but fully subordinate to the real power of the managers. The relationship resembles that of an honorary degree recipient to a member of a university faculty.

    The myths of investor authority, the ritual meetings of directors and the annual stockholder meeting persist, but no mentally viable observer of the modern corporation can escape the reality. Corporate power lies with management – a bureaucracy in control of its task and its compensation. Rewards can verge on larceny. On frequent recent occasions, it has been referred to as the corporate scandal.

    As the corporate interest moves to power in what was the public sector, it serves the corporate interest. It is most clearly evident in the largest such movement, that of nominally private firms into the defence establishment. From this comes a primary influence on the military budget, on foreign policy, military commitment and, ultimately, military action. War. Although this is a normal and expected use of money and its power, the full effect is disguised by almost all conventional expression.

    Given its authority in the modern corporation it was natural that management would extend its role to politics and to government. Once there was the public reach of capitalism; now it is that of corporate management. In the US, corporate managers are in close alliance with the president, the vice-president and the secretary of defence. Major corporate figures are also in senior positions elsewhere in the federal government; one came from the bankrupt and thieving Enron to preside over the army.

    Defence and weapons development are motivating forces in foreign policy. For some years, there has also been recognised corporate control of the Treasury. And of environmental policy.

    We cherish the progress in civilisation since biblical times and long before. But there is a needed and, indeed, accepted qualification. The US and Britain are in the bitter aftermath of a war in Iraq. We are accepting programmed death for the young and random slaughter for men and women of all ages. So it was in the first and second world wars, and is still so in Iraq. Civilised life, as it is called, is a great white tower celebrating human achievements, but at the top there is permanently a large black cloud. Human progress dominated by unimaginable cruelty and death.

    Civilisation has made great strides over the centuries in science, healthcare, the arts and most, if not all, economic well-being. But it has also given a privileged position to the development of weapons and the threat and reality of war. Mass slaughter has become the ultimate civilised achievement.

    The facts of war are inescapable – death and random cruelty, suspension of civilised values, a disordered aftermath. Thus the human condition and prospect as now supremely evident. The economic and social problems here described can, with thought and action, be addressed. So they have already been. War remains the decisive human failure.

    Originally published in The Guardian on July 15, 2004

    This is an edited extract from The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, by JK Galbraith, published by Allen Lane. To order a copy for £8 (RRP £10) plus p&p, call the Guardian Book Service on 0870 836 0875

  • US Can Help End Darfur Genocide

    The time is long overdue, but not too late, to stop the active genocide in Sudan. What can we do as Americans?

    The Darfur region of Sudan is in flames. For nearly two years cynical leaders in Khartoum have been seeking to enhance their power by using the country’s armed forces and local militia to suppress the local non-Arab population. They have driven a million and a half people from their homes, holding them in concentration camps and denying them access to adequate food, water, and shelter. More than 30,000 have been killed, and a range of crimes against humanity have been committed, including the mass rape of women and the systematic destruction of villages, livestock, and crops.

    If nothing is done, US officials predict that 350,000 people could be dead of starvation, disease, or murder by the end of this year.

    Does all this sound familiar? Yes – it also happened in Rwanda , Bosnia , and Kosovo. An international convention drafted in 1948 after the Holocaust and ratified by the United States and other countries commits the world “to undertake to prevent” the crime of genocide. Shamefully, in Rwanda that commitment rang hollow in 1994 when 800,000 people were slaughtered in less than three months. In Bosnia and Kosovo the lesson of Rwanda was remembered, although too late for many victims. Intensive diplomatic and military efforts were organized within a UN framework by the United States and other countries in 1995 and 1999. These efforts saved hundreds of thousands of lives and established under international law a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention to stop a genocide in progress.

    What can Americans do to save lives in Sudan?

    First, we must put aside domestic politics. The growing genocide in Darfur is not a partisan issue but one that reaches across a broad range of constituencies, including religious, human rights, humanitarian, medical, and legal communities, among others, all of which are advocating an aggressive international response to the crisis. Many organizations with a conservative bent, particularly within the religious community, have been at the forefront of advocacy for the people of Sudan ; others have been hesitant to link up with them.

    These groups must put aside their differences and join forces to increase pressure to move Sudan to the top of the international agenda. They can do this by stimulating more media coverage, organizing grassroots contacts with members of Congress, seeking support for urgent action from both presidential candidates, and connecting with counterparts in other countries.

    Second, a new push for international action can be mounted on the recent visits to Sudan by Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Powell now “owns” the issue in the Bush administration, and he should be urged to exercise strong leadership on Darfur both in the administration and in the UN Security Council.

    The council must immediately adopt a resolution authorizing much stronger sanctions against the Sudanese leaders if they fail to carry out their commitment to Powell to disarm the militias.

    The resolution should also create the authority for a multinational military force to secure access by the people of Darfur to the humanitarian relief that the government has blocked. Third, the intervention in Darfur should be built on African support, with logistical, financial, and personnel assistance from the United States and European countries. The African Union , a coalition of African countries, recently sent a small group of observers to monitor the tenuous cease-fire in the civil war in southern Sudan . This initial commitment gives the African Union a stake in resolving the crisis and provides legitimacy to an international presence in Sudan . To be effective, however, the intervention will require a large military force to provide security both to the monitors and, more important, to the massive humanitarian relief operation needed to prevent starvation, disease, and ethnic cleansing from claiming hundreds of thousands of lives in the coming months. That force should be assembled from African countries with US and other backing.

    Finally, we should recognize this as an opportunity for the United States to begin to reestablish its role in the world as a defender of human rights. As a result of the disastrous intervention in Iraq , the scandal over prisoner abuses, and unconstrained US unilateralism, American credibility on the world stage has sunk to its lowest point in a generation. In addition, a decade ago we looked the other way and did nothing as genocide swept through Rwanda . Actions, not words, are now needed to restore our human rights credentials. That’s why the United States should act now within an international framework to help rescue the people of Darfur before it’s too late for them, and for us.

    John Shattuck, author of “Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America ‘s Response”, is CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation.

    Originally published in the Boston Globe

  • Doctors and Torture

    There is increasing evidence that U.S. doctors, nurses, and medics have been complicit in torture and other illegal procedures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. Such medical complicity suggests still another disturbing dimension of this broadening scandal.

    We know that medical personnel have failed to report to higher authorities wounds that were clearly caused by torture and that they have neglected to take steps to interrupt this torture. In addition, they have turned over prisoners’ medical records to interrogators who could use them to exploit the prisoners’ weaknesses or vulnerabilities. We have not yet learned the extent of medical involvement in delaying and possibly falsifying the death certificates of prisoners who have been killed by torturers.

    A May 22 article on Abu Ghraib in the New York Times states that “much of the evidence of abuse at the prison came from medical documents” and that records and statements “showed doctors and medics reporting to the area of the prison where the abuse occurred several times to stitch wounds, tend to collapsed prisoners or see patients with bruised or reddened genitals.”1 According to the article, two doctors who gave a painkiller to a prisoner for a dislocated shoulder and sent him to an outside hospital recognized that the injury was caused by his arms being handcuffed and held over his head for “a long period,” but they did not report any suspicions of abuse. A staff sergeant–medic who had seen the prisoner in that position later told investigators that he had instructed a military policeman to free the man but that he did not do so. A nurse, when called to attend to a prisoner who was having a panic attack, saw naked Iraqis in a human pyramid with sandbags over their heads but did not report it until an investigation was held several months later.

    A June 10 article in the Washington Post tells of a long-standing policy at the Guantanamo Bay facility whereby military interrogators were given access to the medical records of individual prisoners.2 The policy was maintained despite complaints by the Red Cross that such records “are being used by interrogators to gain information in developing an interrogation plan.” A civilian psychiatrist who was part of a medical review team was “disturbed” about not having been told about the practice and said that it would give interrogators “tremendous power” over prisoners.

    Other reports, though sketchier, suggest that the death certificates of prisoners who might have been killed by various forms of mistreatment have not only been delayed but may have camouflaged the fatal abuse by attributing deaths to conditions such as cardiovascular disease.3

    Various medical protocols — notably, the World Medical Association Declaration of Tokyo in 1975 — prohibit all three of these forms of medical complicity in torture. Moreover, the Hippocratic Oath declares, “I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing.”

    To be a military physician is to be subject to potential moral conflict between commitment to the healing of individual people, on the one hand, and responsibility to the military hierarchy and the command structure, on the other. I experienced that conflict myself as an Air Force psychiatrist assigned to Japan and Korea some decades ago: I was required to decide whether to send psychologically disturbed men back to the United States, where they could best receive treatment, or to return them to their units, where they could best serve combat needs. There were, of course, other factors, such as a soldier’s pride in not letting his buddies down, but for physicians this basic conflict remained.

    American doctors at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere have undoubtedly been aware of their medical responsibility to document injuries and raise questions about their possible source in abuse. But those doctors and other medical personnel were part of a command structure that permitted, encouraged, and sometimes orchestrated torture to a degree that it became the norm — with which they were expected to comply — in the immediate prison environment.

    The doctors thus brought a medical component to what I call an “atrocity-producing situation” — one so structured, psychologically and militarily, that ordinary people can readily engage in atrocities. Even without directly participating in the abuse, doctors may have become socialized to an environment of torture and by virtue of their medical authority helped sustain it. In studying various forms of medical abuse, I have found that the participation of doctors can confer an aura of legitimacy and can even create an illusion of therapy and healing.

    The Nazis provided the most extreme example of doctors’ becoming socialized to atrocity.4 In addition to cruel medical experiments, many Nazi doctors, as part of military units, were directly involved in killing. To reach that point, they underwent a sequence of socialization: first to the medical profession, always a self-protective guild; then to the military, where they adapted to the requirements of command; and finally to camps such as Auschwitz, where adaptation included assuming leadership roles in the existing death factory. The great majority of these doctors were ordinary people who had killed no one before joining murderous Nazi institutions. They were corruptible and certainly responsible for what they did, but they became murderers mainly in atrocity-producing settings.

    When I presented my work on Nazi doctors to U.S. medical groups, I received many thoughtful responses, including expressions of concern about much less extreme situations in which American doctors might be exposed to institutional pressures to violate their medical conscience. Frequently mentioned examples were prison doctors who administered or guided others in giving lethal injections to carry out the death penalty and military doctors in Vietnam who helped soldiers to become strong enough to resume their assignments in atrocity-producing situations.

    Physicians are no more or less moral than other people. But as heirs to shamans and witch doctors, we may be seen by others — and sometimes by ourselves — as possessing special magic in connection with life and death. Various regimes have sought to harness that magic to their own despotic ends. Physicians have served as actual torturers in Chile and elsewhere; have surgically removed ears as punishment for desertion in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; have incarcerated political dissenters in mental hospitals, notably in the Soviet Union; have, as whites in South Africa, falsified medical reports on blacks who were tortured or killed; and have, as Americans associated with the Central Intelligence Agency, conducted harmful, sometimes fatal, experiments involving drugs and mind control.

    With the possible exception of the altering of death certificates, the recent transgressions of U.S. military doctors have apparently not been of this order. But these examples help us to recognize what doctors are capable of when placed in atrocity-producing situations. A recent statement by the Physicians for Human Rights addresses this vulnerability in declaring that “torture can also compromise the integrity of health professionals.”5

    To understand the full scope of American torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and other prisons, we need to look more closely at the behavior of doctors and other medical personnel, as well as at the pressures created by the war in Iraq that produced this behavior. It is possible that some doctors, nurses, or medics took steps, of which we are not yet aware, to oppose the torture. It is certain that many more did not. But all those involved could nonetheless reveal, in valuable medical detail, much of what actually took place. By speaking out, they would take an important step toward reclaiming their role as healers.

    From the Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Boston.

    References

    1. Zernike K. Only a few spoke up on abuse as many soldiers stayed silent. New York Times. May 22, 2004:A1.
    2. Slevin P, Stephens J. Detainees’ medical files shared: Guantanamo interrogators’ access criticized. Washington Post. June 10, 2004:A1.
    3. Squitieri T, Moniz D. U.S. Army re-examines deaths of Iraqi prisoners. USA Today. June 28, 2004.
    4. Lifton RJ. The Nazi doctors: medical killing and the psychology of genocide. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
    5. Statement of Leonard Rubenstein, executive director, Physicians for Human Rights, June 2, 2004. (Accessed July 9, 2004, athttp://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=13965&c=36.)

  • Holes in America’s Defense

    In the war on terrorism, reliable intelligence is America’s first line of defense.

    The Senate intelligence committee report scheduled to be released today reveals in stark terms that in many key areas, the prewar intelligence regarding Iraq’s threat to the United States was neither reliable nor accurate. And the report tells only half of the story.

    What’s missing is the ways intelligence was used, misused, misinterpreted or ignored by administration policymakers in deciding to go to war and in making the case to the American people that war with Iraq was necessary. The intelligence committee leadership chose to defer these issues to a second report — one that will not be released until after the November elections.

    While failures by the CIA and other intelligence agencies are a significant part of the problem identified in this inquiry, the responsibility — and the blame — for the prewar intelligence debacle is much broader than described in today’s report.

    Senior decision makers throughout the executive branch must bear responsibility as well. They should have been more diligent in challenging the validity of analytical assumptions and the adequacy of intelligence collection and reporting related to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the war. Instead, those analyses that conformed with pro-war views were routinely accepted and reports that did not conform to the pro-war model were largely ignored.

    Beyond Secretary of State Colin Powell’s examination of Iraqi intelligence in preparation for his February 2003 speech to the U.N. Security Council, there is little evidence that administration officials took the time to question any intelligence reports related to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

    CIA Director George Tenet is famously reported to have responded to President Bush’s question on the intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by stating it was “a slam-dunk.” If this conversation did take place, it would have been incumbent upon the president’s senior advisers to demand to see and verify the underlying information that constituted the intelligence community’s “slam-dunk” case. Apparently that did not happen.

    The dissenting views regarding Iraq’s weapons programs in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, and the cautionary notes sounded by intelligence analysts at the Energy and State departments regarding nuclear matters, and the Air Force’s concern regarding Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicle program all fell on willfully deaf ears. In contrast, the CIA’s analysis of terrorism, which found only weak connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, elicited considerable questioning from policymakers. Undoubtedly, this was because the administration’s decision to invade Iraq had already been made.

    Unfortunately, the administration’s conclusions drove the evidence instead of the other way around. The historic House and Senate joint intelligence inquiry into the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks issued a report in December 2002 that recommended intelligence community reform. Within weeks, the Senate intelligence committee should have initiated an in-depth review of the structure and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations. Based on the results of such a review, it should then have initiated appropriate reforms. But more than 18 months later, no movement in that direction has occurred.

    So today we have a report that asks only some of the right questions and, at best, comes to only some of the right conclusions.

    The responsibility for problems related to prewar intelligence regarding Iraq should not be confined to intelligence analysts at the CIA but should extend to policymakers as well — particularly those at the Defense and State departments, the National Security Council, and the White House.

    Nor should the intelligence oversight committees of Congress, which are charged with scrutinizing intelligence analysis as part of their mandate, be excluded from criticism. It should be noted that the inquiry into prewar intelligence related to Iraq was initiated — and its scope expanded — in the face of significant resistance within the committee.

    The intelligence failures noted in today’s report add to the compelling need for Congress to undertake an unbiased and nonpartisan effort to strengthen our first line of defense. Time is not on our side.

    The writer is a Democratic senator from Illinois and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

    Originally published in the Washington Post on July 9, 2004

  • So Much for Democracy: Iraqis Plan For Introduction of Martial Law

    Seventeen months after the Anglo-American invasion in which President George Bush promised to bring democracy to Iraq, the country’s American-approved Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, yesterday introduced legislation allowing the Iraqi authorities to impose martial law, curfews, a ban on demonstrations, the restriction of movement, phone-tapping, the opening of mail and the freezing of bank accounts.

    Military leaders may be appointed to rule parts of Iraq. A temporary reinstatement of Saddam Hussein’s death penalty is also now probable. Already, therefore, Iraq has begun to look just like any other Arab country. But the insurgency, which the laws are supposedly intended to break, exploded in gunfire in the very centre of Baghdad just as the new legislation was announced.

    Incredibly, the fighting broke out in Haifa Street, in one of the busiest streets next to the Tigris river, as gunmen attacked Iraqi police and troops.

    US helicopter gunships at roof-top height could be seen firing rockets at a building in the street which burst into flames. Bullets hissed across the Tigris and at least three soldiers, all believed to be Iraqis, were killed near the river bank.

    The violence in the capital yesterday was impossible to avoid. It began with mortar attacks on the walled-off area where government officials live under American protection, one of the mortars falling close to Mr. Allawi’s home, another exploding beside a medical clinic close to his party headquarters. The explosions echoed over the city.

    A bomb in a van, packed with shrapnel and artillery shells, was defused close to the government headquarters during the morning. Driving out of Baghdad at 11am, I saw another tremendous explosion blasting smoke and debris into the air close to an American convoy. US troops closed all highway bridges in the area in a desperate attempt to protect a long convoy of trucks and supplies moving into the city from the west. Traffic jams trailed for miles across Baghdad in 150F heat.

    Many Iraqis may initially welcome the new laws. Security – or rather the lack of it – has been their greatest fear since the American military allowed thousands of looters to ransack Baghdad after last year’s invasion. They have, anyway, lived under harsh “security” laws for more than two decades under Saddam. But the new legislation may be too late to save Mr. Allawi’s “new” Iraq.

    For large areas of the country – including at least four major cities – are in the hands of insurgents. Hundreds of gunmen are believed to control Samara north of Baghdad; Fallujah and Ramadi – where four more US Marines were killed on Tuesday – are now virtually autonomous republics.

    Bakhityar Amin, Iraq’s new “minister of justice and human rights”, a combination of roles unheard of anywhere else in the world, was chosen to announce the martial-law legislation. “The lives of the Iraqi people are in danger, in danger from evil forces, from gangs and from terrorists,” he said. “We realise this law might restrict some liberties, but there are a number of guarantees. We have tried to guarantee justice and human rights.”

    The legislation was necessary to fight insurgents who were “preventing government employees from attending their jobs, preventing foreign workers from entering the country to help rebuild Iraq and … to derail general elections.”

    Iraq therefore entered into another fatal chapter of its history yesterday, and it didn’t look much like democracy.

    Originally published in the Independent UK on July 8, 2004