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  • 16 Democrats Voice Concern about Draft Nuclear Document

    The Honorable George W. Bush President of the United States

    Dear Mr. President:

    We are writing you to express our strong concern about the draft U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine being prepared by the Pentagon. This draft calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to make pre-emptive strikes, if necessary on adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.

    We recognize that in large part the draft “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” is based on principles contained in the 1995 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. For instance, your 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 17 reportedly states, “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    On the other hand, the language in the draft doctrine removes the ambiguity of the previous doctrine, and now suggests that your administration will use nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear WMD threats and suggests that this use could include pre-emptive nuclear strikes thereby increasing reliance on nuclear weapons.

    On page III-2 of the March 15, 2005 draft, it states that combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons under such conditions as:

    • To counter an adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations;
    • To counter an imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
    • To attack on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons, or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies;
    • To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces;
    • To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.

    We believe this effort to broaden the range of scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be contemplated is unwise and provocative.

    The costs of using a nuclear weapon in the cases contemplated would almost always outweigh the benefits. Many potential targets are near major population centers. Striking a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons cache would require perfect intelligence and is impossible to do without significant collateral damage.

    The draft doctrine says that the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation but notes that no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from using nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In other words, the draft Pentagon doctrine seems to conclude the United States is legally free to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively if it chooses, even against non-nuclear weapon states.

    This drastic shift in U.S. nuclear policy threatens the very foundation of nuclear arms control as shaped by the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which has helped prevent nuclear proliferation for over 35 years. In the context of efforts to strengthen and extend the treaty, the United States issued a negative nuclear security assurance in 1978, reiterated in 1995, that the United States would not use nuclear force against NPT member countries without nuclear weapons unless attacked by a non nuclear-weapon state that is allied with a nuclear-weapon state.

    The draft doctrine contradicts clear statements and assurances of your administration. On February 22, 2002 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated a similar version of the negative nuclear security pledge: “The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear- weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association with a nuclear weapon state.”

    Abandoning this clear negative security assurance under the NPT would further undermine the treaty and our many other efforts to prevent others developing or using nuclear weapons. Partly as a result of U.S. inflexibility on key disarmament issues, your administration has already squandered opportunities to build greater global support for measures to update and strengthen the nonproliferation system.

    In addition, this new doctrine, if approved, could exacerbate the danger of nuclear proliferation by giving states of concern, such as North Korea and Iran, an excuse to maintain their nuclear weapons options and would send a green light to the world’s nuclear states that it is permissible to use these weapons offensively.

    The draft nuclear doctrine also appears to undermine the credibility of other U.S. negative security assurances, such as those contained in the recent six-party statement of principles outlining the terms for the verifiable and complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Mr. President, it is one thing to threaten a devastating response to a biological or chemical weapons attack or the threat of a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack. It is quite another to say explicitly that the United States is prepared to counter non-nuclear weapons threats or attempt to pre-empt a suspected WMD attack by striking with nuclear weapons.

    As former Secretary of State Powell said in response to the possibility that India and Pakistan might use nuclear weapons during their confrontation in the summer of 2002: “Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.”

    We urge you to personally review the draft doctrine and consider its serious negative consequences for U.S. national and international security interests. U.S. nuclear use policy and doctrine should be consistent with your often stated goal of significantly reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons worldwide.

    Thank you for considering our suggestions and we look forward to your reply.

    Sincerely,

    Sens. Dianne Feinstein (CA), Daniel Akaka (HI), Edward Kennedy (MA), Jack Reed (RI), Byron Dorgan (ND), John Kerry (MA), Frank Lautenberg (NJ) and Reps. Ellen Tauscher (CA), Neil Abercrombie (HI), Rob Andrews (NJ), Marty Meehan (MA), Ed Markey (MA), Susan Davis (CA), Loretta Sanchez (CA), Adam Smith (WA), and Mark Udall (CO).

  • What Would J.F.K. Have Done?

    What did we not hear from President Bush when he spoke last week at the United States Naval Academy about his strategy for victory in Iraq?

    We did not hear that the war in Iraq, already one of the costliest wars in American history, is a running sore. We did not hear that it has taken more than 2,000 precious American lives and countless – because we do not count them – Iraqi civilian lives. We did not hear that the struggle has dragged on longer than our involvement in either World War I or the Spanish-American War, or that by next spring it will be even longer than the Korean War.

    And we did not hear how or when the president plans to bring our forces back home – no facts, no numbers on America troop withdrawals, no dates, no reference to our dwindling coalition, no reversal of his disdain for the United Nations, whose help he still expects.

    Neither our military, our economy nor our nation can take that kind of endless and remorseless drain for an only vaguely defined military and political mission. If we leave early, the president said, catastrophe might follow. But what of the catastrophe that we are prolonging and worsening by our continued presence, including our continued, unforgivable mistreatment of detainees?

    Each month that America continues its occupation facilitates Al Qaeda’s recruitment of young Islamic men and women as suicide bombers, the one weapon against which our open society has no sure defense. The president says we should support our troops by staying the course; but who is truly willing to support our troops by bringing them safely home?

    The responsibility for devising an exit plan rests primarily not with the war’s opponents, but with the president who hastily launched a pre-emptive invasion without enough troops to secure Iraq’s borders and arsenals, without enough armor to protect our forces, without enough allied support and without adequate plans for either a secure occupation or a timely exit.

    As we listened to Mr. Bush’s speech, our thoughts raced back four decades to another president, John F. Kennedy. In 1963, the last year of his life, we watched from front-row seats as Kennedy tried to figure out how best to extricate American military advisers and instructors from Vietnam.

    Although neither of us had direct responsibility on Vietnam decision-making, we each saw enough of the president to sense his growing frustration. In typical Kennedy fashion, he would lean back, in his Oval Office rocker, tick off all his options and then critique them:

    Renege on the previous Eisenhower commitment, which Kennedy had initially reinforced, to help the beleaguered government of South Vietnam with American military instructors and advisers?

    No, he knew that the American people would not permit him to do that.

    Americanize the Vietnam civil war, as the military recommended and as his successor Lyndon Johnson sought ultimately to do, by sending in American combat units?

    No, having learned from his experiences with Cuba and elsewhere that conflicts essentially political in nature did not lend themselves to a military solution, Kennedy knew that the United States could not prevail in a struggle against a Vietnamese people determined to oust, at last, all foreign troops from their country.

    Moreover, he knew firsthand from his World War II service in the South Pacific the horrors of war and had declared at American University in June 1963: “This generation of Americans has had enough – more than enough – of war.”

    Declare “victory and get out,” as George Aiken, the Republican senator from Vermont, would famously suggest years later?

    No, in 1963 in Vietnam, despite assurances from field commanders, there was no more semblance of “victory” than there was in 2004 in Iraq when the president gave his “mission accomplished” speech on the deck of an aircraft carrier.

    Explore, as was always his preference, a negotiated solution?

    No, he was unable to identify in the ranks of the disorganized Vietcong a leader capable of negotiating enforceable and mutually agreeable terms of withdrawal.

    Insist that the South Vietnamese government improve its chances of survival by genuinely adopting the array of political, economic, land and administrative reforms necessary to win popular support?

    No, Kennedy increasingly realized that the corrupt family and landlords propping up the dictatorship in South Vietnam would never accept or enforce such reforms.

    Eventually he began to understand that withdrawal was the viable option. From the spring of 1963 on, he began to articulate the elements of a three-part exit strategy, one that his assassination would prevent him from pursuing. The three components of Kennedy’s exit strategy – well-suited for Iraq after the passage of a new constitution and the coming election – can be summarized as follows:

    Make clear that we’re going to get out. At a press conference on Nov. 14, 1963, the president did just that, stating, “That is our object, to bring Americans home.”

    Request an invitation to leave. Arrange for the host government to request the phased withdrawal of all American military personnel – surely not a difficult step in Iraq, especially after the clan statement last month calling for foreign forces to leave. In a May 1963 press conference, Kennedy declared that if the South Vietnamese government suggested it, “we would have some troops on their way home” the next day.

    Bring the troops home gradually. Initiate a phased American withdrawal over an unannounced period, beginning immediately, while intensifying the training of local security personnel, bearing in mind that with our increased troop mobility and airlift capacity, American forces are available without being stationed in hazardous areas. In September 1963, Kennedy said of the South Vietnamese: “In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it.” A month later, he said, “It would be our hope to lessen the number of Americans” in Vietnam by the end of the year.

    President Kennedy had no guarantee that any of these three components would succeed. In the “fog of war,” there are no guarantees; but an exit plan without guarantees is better than none at all.

    If we leave Iraq at its own government’s request, our withdrawal will be neither abandonment nor retreat. Law-abiding Iraqis may face more clan violence, Balkanization and foreign incursions if we leave; but they may face more clan violence, Balkanization and foreign incursions if we stay. The president has said we will not leave Iraq to the terrorists. Let us leave Iraq to the Iraqis, who have survived centuries of civil war, tyranny and attempted foreign domination.

    Once American troops are out of Iraq, people around the world will rejoice that we have recovered our senses. What’s more, the killing of Americans and the global loss of American credibility will diminish. As Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, a Republican and Vietnam veteran, said, “The longer we stay, the more problems we’re going to have.” Defeatist? The real defeatists are those who say we are stuck there for the next decade of death and destruction.

    In a memorandum to President Kennedy, roughly three months after his inauguration, one of us wrote with respect to Vietnam, “There is no clearer example of a country that cannot be saved unless it saves itself.” Today, Iraq is an even clearer example.

    Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. were, respectively, special counsel and special assistant to President John F. Kennedy.

    Originally published by the New York Times.

  • Why Nations Go Nuclear

    Understanding the reasons why a country chooses to go nuclear are complex, variable and speculative, but I would offer as a hypothesis four principal, though often overlapping factors: fear, security, enhancing the country’s bully potential or countering another country’s bully potential, and prestige. North Korea seems to be pioneering a fifth reason: to use the weapons as a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and financial concessions. Each country that chooses to go nuclear will certainly reflect some or all of these reasons in their decision, although they may be in different combinations or proportions for different states. The reasons that the current nuclear weapons states went nuclear provide insights into these dynamics.

    Existing Nuclear Weapons States

    The first country to develop nuclear weapons was the United States, initiating the world’s first nuclear weapons program in anticipation of US involvement in World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt had been warned by Albert Einstein that a possibility existed for the Germans to develop nuclear weapons. Roosevelt and his advisors were motivated by fear that the German scientists would succeed in their quest for nuclear weapons, and that US nuclear weapons would be necessary to assure the security of the United States and the Allied powers by deterring the Germans from using theirs with impunity.

    Germany never succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and was defeated two months prior to the testing of the first US nuclear weapon. The United States quickly found another use for its nuclear arms, using the bombs against two cities in a nearly defeated Japan. Evidence suggests that this militarily questionable act was also intended to keep the Soviets from playing a larger role in the defeat and occupation of Japan and generally to send a warning message to the Soviet Union. Thus, while fear and security may have been the initial impetus for the US developing nuclear weapons, their use was subsequently overtly justified as saving US and Allied lives and bringing the war in the Pacific to a faster conclusion. At the same time, the US was flexing its muscles before the world, and demonstrating the bully potential of these weapons.

    The next country to develop nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union. Although the US and Soviet Union were allies in World War II, there were early signs that this relationship would not hold in the post-WWII period. The US use of nuclear weapons at the end of the war, when combined with the fact that the US kept the project secret from the Soviet Union, must have created the fear for Soviet leadership that the US would use its new weapons to dominate them. While many US political leaders thought that it might take decades for the Soviet Union to go nuclear, it actually took them only four years. Driven by fear of US domination, they sought security in the deterrence potential of the weapons, while at the same time adding to their prestige and bestowing upon themselves the bully potential of the weapons.

    Despite sharing in the Allied victory in World War II, both Britain and France emerged from the war with less power and prestige than they had going into the war. Britain, as a wartime ally of the US, had played a role in the development of the bomb in the US Manhattan Project, and thus its scientists were privy to the secrets of creating nuclear weapons. First Britain and then France went ahead with developing their own nuclear arms. Both countries could have chosen to remain under the US nuclear umbrella, but both chose instead to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Their reasoning was said to be based on the fear that a US leader would not be willing to sacrifice New York in an exchange with the Soviet Union in order to retaliate against a Soviet attack against London or Paris. Thus, both Britain and France, chose to go nuclear out of fear and a lack of trust in placing their security in the hands of the US. At the same time, they bolstered their waning prestige in the world, and increased their bully power against their remaining colonies and other weaker states.

    China, the final permanent member of the UN Security Council, chose also to go nuclear, fearing that without nuclear weapons its security was threatened by both the US and Soviet Union and that it would remain subject to their bully potential. China announced from the onset of its nuclear status that it did not intend to develop more than a minimum deterrent force and that it would not use nuclear weapons first. It sought only a small but sufficient nuclear retaliatory force to prevent the US or Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons against it. Fear and security appeared to be the driving force in China’s decision to go nuclear, although it enhanced its international prestige in the process and also gave itself some increase in bully power on a regional level.

    These five states – the US, Soviet Union (now Russia), UK, France and China – were the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the five states that were named as nuclear weapons states in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While other states joined this treaty as non-nuclear weapons states and agreed not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states promised, among other things, to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice later ruled that these states were obligated by the NPT “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Today the NPT has become nearly universal. Only four states are outside the treaty structure: Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The first three never joined the treaty, and the latter withdrew from the treaty in 2003. Israel’s official position is the ambiguous statement that it will never be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but it is widely understood that Israel possesses some 100 to 200 nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Israel has had a troubled existence and has engaged in many wars with its neighbors, all of which it has won with its high-tech military forces. Israel’s decision to go nuclear may be best understood as a desire to enhance its security by implicitly threatening ultimate recourse against hostile neighboring countries, and by reducing or eliminating the bully power that the US or Russia might seek to use to alter Israeli policies. However, by going nuclear, Israel has raised the fear level of its neighbors and their desire to enhance their security, potentially by going nuclear themselves.

    India held the position for many years that it was willing to remain a non-nuclear weapons state, but not in a world where some states continue to possess and refuse to give up their nuclear arms. Indian leaders have used the term “nuclear apartheid” to describe the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” India is thought to have initially secretly tested a nuclear device in 1974. It openly tested nuclear weapons in 1998. While fear and security may have played some role in India’s decision to go nuclear, particularly vis-à-vis China, there was a sense that India was motivated to a large degree by prestige. The country seemed to go wild with celebration in 1998 when India conducted its open nuclear weapons tests, as though this were validation of its emergence into “great power” status.

    India also had some potential to use its nuclear arms to bully Pakistan in their dispute over Kashmir, but this possibility was erased immediately when Pakistan followed India in publicly testing its own nuclear arms. For Pakistan, reasons for going nuclear certainly included fear of India, the desire to enhance its security, and prestige. The people of Pakistan, like those of India, exploded in celebration upon its successful nuclear weapons tests in 1998. A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s bomb, is a national hero in Pakistan, despite being the mastermind of a major international black market nuclear proliferation scheme.

    The final country that claims to have gone nuclear is North Korea. This country again fits the pattern of developing nuclear weapons out of fear of attack, principally by the US, and thus to enhance its security. In the case of North Korea, there is the added element of creating these weapons as a bargaining chip to gain security assurances from the US and also development aid. The long-standing six-party negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear arms point to North Korea’s desire to trade its nuclear arms capability for nuclear energy plants and US security assurances. Thus, for North Korea, prestige and bully potential seem less significant than security promises and development aid.

    Why Nations Do Not Go Nuclear

    There are currently 191 member states of the United Nations. Of these, only nine have chosen to go nuclear. Thus, the overwhelming majority of states in the international system have chosen not to go nuclear. Why nations go nuclear needs to be weighed against why nations do not go nuclear. Among the reasons why nations choose not to go nuclear are the following:

    1. Technological capability. Many nations, particularly poorer nations, lack the technological capability to develop nuclear arms. While this leaves out many states, there are at least 44 states with nuclear reactors on their territory, suggesting potential technological capability and access to nuclear materials for bomb production.
    2. Security Alliances. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide a nuclear umbrella for member states, and thus act as a disincentive for an alliance member to go nuclear.
    3. Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is the centerpiece of nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. In joining the treaty, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to develop or acquire nuclear arms. There is, however, a reciprocal pledge by the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and the failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill this obligation may be eroding viability of the treaty.
    4. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) Agreements. Such regional agreements now cover the entire southern hemisphere of the planet. Such agreements now exist for Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia.
    5. Perception of Negative Consequences. National leaders may perceive that they would suffer negative consequences by going nuclear, such as a loss of economic support, including development aid, disruption of alliances, and becoming targets of other states’ nuclear arsenals.
    6. National Self-Image. Some states may not have as goals being nuclear weapons states, preferring to provide leadership toward a nuclear weapons-free world.

    Incentives and Disincentives to Going Nuclear

    Among the principal incentives for a state to go nuclear are threats by a current nuclear weapons state or a regional security environment that is uncertain. When the US president named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil,” he provided incentive for them to develop nuclear arms. These incentives were enhanced by the leaked 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review that called for developing contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven states (Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria), five of which were non-nuclear weapons states (although North Korea subsequently chose to go nuclear).

    Four of these states ( Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) are in the Middle East, one of the most dangerous security environments in the world and an area in which one nuclear weapons state currently exists ( Israel). Since the US Nuclear Posture Review came out, Iraq was attacked and invaded by the US and its “Coalition of the Willing,” and Libya has chosen on its own to give up its nuclear weapons program. Iran and Syria, however, are still viewed as possible regional candidates to develop nuclear weapons, as is Egypt. Like India and Pakistan, these states may choose to go nuclear rather than continue to live with the unbalance and uncertainty of implied and overt threats to their security by the US and Israel.

    The greatest disincentives to these states going nuclear would be to establish a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East or, more broadly, a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, combined with credible pledges by the US and other nuclear weapons states to provide security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. It seems clear that so long as Israel remains the sole state in the Middle East with nuclear weapons, there will be strong incentives for other states to seek nuclear weapons as an equalizer, much as the Soviet Union sought to do against the US or Pakistan sought to do against India.

    Several states have come into possession of nuclear weapons and chosen to give them up. South Africa clandestinely developed a small nuclear arsenal when it felt beleaguered due to its policy of Apartheid. When South Africa chose to give up its policy and practice of Apartheid, it also made the decision to give up its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus inherited nuclear weapons upon the break up of the Soviet Union, and all chose to turn these weapons over to Russia for dismantlement. This was accomplished with incentives and security assurances from the US and Russia. Argentina and Brazil were two countries that were moving toward developing nuclear weapons, but were dissuaded from doing so by regional security arrangements and gave up their programs. These examples all show that the development or acquisition of nuclear arsenals can be reversed.

    Unraveling the Nuclear Knot

    What is now needed are disincentives that would unravel the current knot of nuclear weapons states. The greatest disincentive to continue to possess nuclear weapons may be the possibility that other states will also continue to retain their weapons, leading to nuclear weapons or the materials to create them falling into the hands of terrorists. The possibility of a terrorist group in possession of nuclear weapons should give even the most powerful country in the world, the United States, incentive to seek the global elimination of nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and to bring the materials to make such weapons under strict international control.

    Russia has suggested many times that it is prepared to further reduce its nuclear arsenal by agreement with the United States to under 1,500 nuclear weapons. Thus far, the US has not indicated an interest in reducing the number of its deployed strategic weapons to under 1,700 to 2,200 weapons. Further, the US has failed to accept its obligation to move forward on the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Under the Bush administration the leadership for progress in achieving nuclear disarmament has been severely lacking.

    It would seem that only the United States, due to its military and economic power, has the capability and convening power to bring together the nuclear weapons states and lead them in creating a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would set forth obligations for phased nuclear disarmament with adequate provisions for verification and international control. We can only hope that such leadership will be forthcoming before nuclear weapons proliferate to other countries and are again used.

    Although the United States may be needed for the actual implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the world cannot wait for the US to take action on this issue, particularly knowing of the Bush administration’s hostility to fulfilling its obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the steps set forth in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While US initiative remains dormant, other states must fill this void with innovative collective measures to move ahead with a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This idea has been most seriously embraced by civil society groups, such as the Abolition 2000 Global Network and the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons by the year 2020.

    With the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to make any progress and the failure of the 2005 High-Level Summit meeting at the United Nations to reach any agreement on nuclear disarmament issues, both due to US opposition, the world stands at a deadlock on nuclear disarmament issues. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has not addressed nuclear disarmament issues for eight years, also largely due to US opposition.

    There are only two possibilities to change this situation. The first is the awakening of the American people to put pressure on their government to cease being an obstacle to nuclear disarmament efforts and start being a leader in these efforts. The second is for the international community to unite in putting pressure on the US from outside. At this point in time, neither of these possibilities appears promising, and thus we drift toward nuclear the “unparalleled catastrophes” that Einstein warned would occur unless we can change our thinking.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons. This paper was prepared for The Istanbul Workshop on Nuclear Dangers in the Middle East, 17-21 November 2005.

  • A Day Like Any Other Day

    A Day Like Any Other Day

    “It was just a day like any other day.
    The only thing that made it significant
    was that the masses of the people joined in.”
                                                    — Rosa Parks

    By not moving, you began a movement,
    like a cat stretching. Then suddenly alert.

    By remaining seated, you stood for decency,
    though your knees must have trembled.

    By rejecting the law, you accepted a higher law,
    knowing precisely what you were doing.

    By praying silently, you spoke eloquently
    in a language ordinary people could understand.

    By closing your eyes, you opened ours,
    and we could see the path ahead.

    By whispering No, you shouted Yes,
    and we felt your pain.

    By holding your ground, you changed
    our course, and we were never the same.

  • This is Not the Country That I Once Knew

    Former President Jimmy Carter believes that a warring America is abandoning its fundamental values.

    In recent years, I have become increasingly concerned by a host of radical government policies that now threaten many basic principles espoused by all previous administrations, Democratic and Republican.

    These include the rudimentary American commitment to peace, economic and social justice, civil liberties, our environment and human rights.

    Also endangered are our historic commitments to providing citizens with truthful information, treating dissenting voices and beliefs with respect, state and local autonomy and fiscal responsibility.

    At the same time, our political leaders have declared independence from the restraints of international organisations and have disavowed long-standing global agreements, including agreements on nuclear arms, control of biological weapons and the international system of justice.

    Instead of our tradition of espousing peace as a national priority unless our security is directly threatened, we have proclaimed a policy of ‘pre-emptive war’, an unabridged right to attack other nations unilaterally to change an unsavoury regime or for other purposes. When there are serious differences with other nations, we brand them as international pariahs and refuse to permit direct discussions to resolve disputes.

    Regardless of the costs, there are determined efforts by US leaders to exert American imperial dominance throughout the world. These revolutionary policies have been orchestrated by those who believe that our nation’s tremendous power and influence should not be internationally constrained. Even with our troops involved in combat and America facing the threat of additional terrorist attacks, our declaration of ‘you are either with us or against us’ has replaced the forming of alliances based on a clear comprehension of mutual interests, including the threat of terrorism.

    Another disturbing realisation is that, unlike during other times of national crisis, the burden of conflict is now concentrated exclusively on the heroic men and women sent back repeatedly to fight in the quagmire of Iraq. The rest of our nation has not been asked to make any sacrifice, and every effort has been made to conceal or minimise public awareness of casualties.

    Instead of cherishing our role as the great champion of human rights, we now find civil liberties and personal privacy grossly violated under some extreme provisions of the Patriot Act.

    Of even greater concern is that the US has repudiated the Geneva accords and supported the use of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and secretly through proxy regimes elsewhere with the so-called extraordinary rendition programme. It is embarrassing to see the President and Vice President insisting that the CIA should be free to perpetrate ‘cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’ on people in US custody.

    Instead of reducing America’s reliance on nuclear weapons and their further proliferation, we have insisted on our right (and that of others) to retain our arsenals, expand them and, therefore, abrogate or derogate almost all nuclear arms-control agreements negotiated during the last 50 years. We have now become a prime culprit in global nuclear proliferation. America also has abandoned the prohibition of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and is contemplating the previously condemned deployment of weapons in space.

    Protection of the environment has fallen by the wayside because of government subservience to political pressure from the oil industry and other powerful lobbying groups. The last five years have brought continued lowering of pollution standards at home and almost universal condemnation of our nation’s global environmental policies.

    Our government has abandoned fiscal responsibility by unprecedented favours to the rich, while neglecting America’s working families. Members of Congress have increased their own pay by $30,000 per year since freezing the minimum wage at $5.15 per hour (the lowest among industrialised nations).

    I am extremely concerned by a fundamentalist shift in many houses of worship and in government, as church and state have become increasingly intertwined in ways previously thought unimaginable.

    As the world’s only superpower, America should be seen as the unswerving champion of peace, freedom and human rights. Our country should be the focal point around which other nations can gather to combat threats to international security and to enhance the quality of our common environment. We should be in the forefront of providing human assistance to people in need.

    It is time for the deep and disturbing political divisions within our country to be substantially healed, with Americans united in a common commitment to revive and nourish the historic political and moral values that we have promoted during the last 230 years.

    Jimmy Carter was the 39th President of the United States. His latest book, Our Endangered Values: America’s Moral Crisis, is published this month by Simon & Schuster.

    This article first appeared in the Los Angeles Times.

  • The Effects of a 300 kiloton Nuclear Warhead Detonated Above Washington, D.C.

    If you live in a large city in the U.S., Russia, or any other nation possessing nuclear weapons, there is at least one nuclear warhead aimed at you. It patiently waits day and night for a computer to give it your address and send it on a 10 to 30 minute flight to incinerate you and your family. There are many thousands of strategic nuclear warheads kept constantly ready to turn the cities of the world into hurricanes of fire.

    Click here for a larger version Image by Steven Starr and Taylor Starr

    This is a brief description of the effects which a single average sized strategic nuclear weapon would have if detonated above the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (dozens of such weapons are probably targeted upon D.C. by Russia). The warhead has an explosive power of 300 kilotons (kT), equaling 600 million pounds of dynamite and would be detonated at an altitude of 1500 feet above its target.

    A 300 kT warhead would within a millionth of a second release 300 trillion calories of energy primarily in the form of intense light. The surrounding air would be superheated and create a rapidly expanding fireball. Almost all the air within and around the fireball would be compressed into a steeply fronted luminous blast wave of enormous extent and power.

    The fireball would extend more than a mile in diameter and at its center produce temperatures of over 200 million degrees Fahrenheit, about four to five times the temperature found at the center of the sun. This unearthly release of heat and energy would create an environment of unimaginable lethality, igniting extensive fires for many tens of square miles and producing a blast wave which would crush and tear apart any structures in its path. The blast wave would also increase the incidence and rate of fire spread by exposing ignitable surfaces, releasing flammable materials and dispersing burning objects.

    At Pentagon City, a shopping and office complex 0.7 miles from ground zero at the Pentagon, light from the fireball would melt asphalt in the streets, burn paint off walls, and melt metal surfaces within a half second of detonation. The interior of vehicles in line of sight of the fireball would explode into flames.

    About one second later, the blast wave and 750 miles per hour (mph) winds would arrive and toss burning and disintegrating vehicles into the air like leaves in a wind. The blast wave could cave in buildings and would turn windows and furniture into missiles and shrapnel. The interiors of buildings that remained standing would, within minutes, be burning pyres of splintered walls, doors and other combustibles. Seconds after the passage of the blast wave, suction effects created in part by the rising fireball would reverse the winds, drawing them toward the detonation point at perhaps 50 – 70 mph.

    All the areas within 1.3 miles of the Pentagon (almost all of the Arlington National Cemetery, most of the Virginia Highlands and Addison Heights neighborhoods, and parts of Washington D.C. reaching to the Lincoln and Jefferson memorials) would experience more than 15 times the thermal energy found at the edge of the mass fire which destroyed Hiroshima. The fireball here would, for a moment, shine 5,000 times brighter than a desert sun at noon.

    Grass, vegetation, and leaves on tress would explode into flames, and the surface of the ground would explode into superheated dust. Flames and black smoke would spew out from all combustible materials illuminated by the fireball. The marble on the Lincoln and Jefferson memorials would crack, pop, and possibly evaporate. The light would melt the surface of the bronze statue of Jefferson. Birds in flight would drop from the sky in flames. People exposed to the light would be instantly cremated.

    Four seconds later the blast wave would arrive and collapse the Jefferson and Lincoln memorials. This would be followed by winds of 300-400 mph which combining with the blast wave would completely destroy wood-frame and residential brick buildings. Aluminum surfaces on the aircraft at the Reagan National Airport would melt and warp. Interior sections of the aircraft exposed to the fireball would burst into flame. Tires on the aircraft and any nearby vehicles would also catch fire.

    Within 3 miles of ground zero the clothing worn by people in direct line of sight of the fireball would burst into flames or melt, and areas of skin not covered by clothing would be scorched, charring flesh and causing third-degree burns. For many miles in all directions, any creature unfortunate enough to look into the fireball at the time of detonation would either be blinded or suffer permanent retinal damage.

    Only a few mass fires have occurred in human history; those created by British and American conventional incendiary weapons and the U.S. atomic bombs in World War II. The unique features of the mass fire – the simultaneous combustion of many fires over a large area, which causes a great volume of air to heat, rise, and suck in large amounts of fresh air at hurricane speeds from the periphery – fundamentally distinguish it from other fires in history (otherwise know as line fires, which can burn and spread for days, but were not simultaneously set over large areas).

    Fire environments created by mass fires are fundamentally more violent and destructive than fires of smaller scale, and they are far less affected by external weather conditions. Because their dynamics are dominated by the intense hydrodynamic flows generated by the vast releases of energy from combustion in an area of enormous size and the resulting rise of air over the fires zone, these fires are not substantially altered by seasonal and daily weather conditions.

    The 300kT detonation would create a mass fire with a radius of 3.5 miles in all but the most extreme weather conditions. Under a majority of weather conditions, there would be a mass fire ignited to a distance of just over 4.5 miles from the detonation.

    This gigantic fire would quickly increase in intensity and in minutes generate ground winds of hurricane force with average air temperatures well above the boiling point of water (212 degrees F). The fire would then burn everywhere at this intensity for three to six hours, producing a lethal environment over a total area of approximately 40 to 65 square miles – an area about 10 to 15 times larger than that incinerated by the 15 kT atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.

    Even after the fires burned out, street pavement would be so hot that even tracked vehicles could not pass over it for days, and buried and unburned materials from collapsed buildings could burst into flames if exposed to air even weeks after the attack. Those who sought to flee through the streets would be burned alive by hurricane-force winds laden with flames and firebrands. Even those who sought shelter in the deepest subbasements of massive buildings would likely die from heat prostration, suffocation, or lack of water. There would be no escape. The fire would eliminate all life in the fire zone.

    The smoke and mushroom cloud, seething with radioactivity, would rise up to blot out the sun. Deadly fallout would contaminate hundreds of square miles downwind with radioactive poisons from the blast, dooming hundreds of thousands of humans and animals to a painful, vicious death from radiation sickness. Much of the land contaminated by the fallout would remain uninhabitable for years. Scattered deaths and higher mortality rates would continue for centuries from cancer, leukemia, and genetic damage to succeeding generations.

    Imagine this same event happening, in less than an hour, with not one, but with thousands of strategic nuclear weapons detonating in the cities of the U.S., Russia, China, Europe, India, and Pakistan. The details of such a holocaust are already inscribed in the guidance mechanisms of the missiles waiting to deliver the warheads. Now you understand what the global nuclear arsenals, continually kept at launch on warning status, are capable of doing.

    What are you going to do about it?

    Most of the information in this article has been taken, with the permission of the author, from the first chapter of the book by Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire (Cornell University Press, 2004). An adaptation of this first chapter also appeared as “City on Fire,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2004). Anyone interested in learning more about this subject should read these works.

  • It’s Time to Bring the Troops Home

    The war in Iraq is not going as advertised. It is a flawed policy wrapped in illusion. The American public is way ahead of us. The United States and coalition troops have done all they can in Iraq, but it is time for a change in direction. Our military is suffering. The future of our country is at risk. We can not continue on the present course. It is evident that continued military action in Iraq is not in the best interest of the United States of America, the Iraqi people or the Persian Gulf Region.

    General Casey said in a September 2005 Hearing, “the perception of occupation in Iraq is a major driving force behind the insurgency.” General Abizaid said on the same date, “Reducing the size and visibility of the coalition forces in Iraq is a part of our counterinsurgency strategy.”

    For 2 ½ years I have been concerned about the U.S. policy and the plan in Iraq. I have addressed my concerns with the Administration and the Pentagon and have spoken out in public about my concerns. The main reason for going to war has been discredited. A few days before the start of the war I was in Kuwait – the military drew a red line around Baghdad and said when U.S. forces cross that line they will be attacked by the Iraqis with Weapons of Mass Destruction – but the US forces said they were prepared. They had well trained forces with the appropriate protective gear.

    We spend more money on Intelligence than all the countries in the world together, and more on Intelligence than most countries GDP. But the intelligence concerning Iraq was wrong. It is not a world intelligence failure. It is a U.S. intelligence failure and the way that intelligence was misused.

    I have been visiting our wounded troops at Bethesda and Walter Reed hospitals almost every week since the beginning of the War. And what demoralizes them is going to war with not enough troops and equipment to make the transition to peace; the devastation caused by IEDs; being deployed to Iraq when their homes have been ravaged by hurricanes; being on their second or third deployment and leaving their families behind without a network of support.

    The threat posed by terrorism is real, but we have other threats that cannot be ignored. We must be prepared to face all threats. The future of our military is at risk. Our military and their families are stretched thin. Many say that the Army is broken. Some of our troops are on their third deployment. Recruitment is down, even as our military has lowered its standards. Defense budgets are being cut. Personnel costs are skyrocketing, particularly in health care. Choices will have to be made. We can not allow promises we have made to our military families in terms of service benefits, in terms of their health care, to be negotiated away. Procurement programs that ensure our military dominance cannot be negotiated away. We must be prepared. The war in Iraq has caused huge shortfalls at our bases in the U.S.

    Much of our ground equipment is worn out and in need of either serious overhaul or replacement. George Washington said, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.” We must rebuild our Army. Our deficit is growing out of control. The Director of the Congressional Budget Office recently admitted to being “terrified” about the budget deficit in the coming decades. This is the first prolonged war we have fought with three years of tax cuts, without full mobilization of American industry and without a draft. The burden of this war has not been shared equally; the military and their families are shouldering this burden.

    Our military has been fighting a war in Iraq for over two and a half years. Our military has accomplished its mission and done its duty. Our military captured Saddam Hussein, and captured or killed his closest associates. But the war continues to intensify. Deaths and injuries are growing, with over 2,079 confirmed American deaths. Over 15,500 have been seriously injured and it is estimated that over 50,000 will suffer from battle fatigue. There have been reports of at least 30,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.

    I just recently visited Anbar Province Iraq in order to assess the conditions on the ground. Last May 2005, as part of the Emergency Supplemental Spending Bill, the House included the Moran Amendment, which was accepted in Conference, and which required the Secretary of Defense to submit quarterly reports to Congress in order to more accurately measure stability and security in Iraq. We have now received two reports. I am disturbed by the findings in key indicator areas. Oil production and energy production are below pre-war levels. Our reconstruction efforts have been crippled by the security situation. Only $9 billion of the $18 billion appropriated for reconstruction has been spent. Unemployment remains at about 60 percent. Clean water is scarce. Only $500 million of the $2.2 billion appropriated for water projects has been spent. And most importantly, insurgent incidents have increased from about 150 per week to over 700 in the last year. Instead of attacks going down over time and with the addition of more troops, attacks have grown dramatically. Since the revelations at Abu Ghraib, American casualties have doubled. An annual State Department report in 2004 indicated a sharp increase in global terrorism.

    I said over a year ago, and now the military and the Administration agrees, Iraq can not be won “militarily.” I said two years ago, the key to progress in Iraq is to Iraqitize, Internationalize and Energize. I believe the same today. But I have concluded that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is impeding this progress.

    Our troops have become the primary target of the insurgency. They are united against U.S. forces and we have become a catalyst for violence. U.S. troops are the common enemy of the Sunnis, Saddamists and foreign jihadists. I believe with a U.S. troop redeployment, the Iraqi security forces will be incentivized to take control. A poll recently conducted shows that over 80% of Iraqis are strongly opposed to the presence of coalition troops, and about 45% of the Iraqi population believe attacks against American troops are justified. I believe we need to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.

    I believe before the Iraqi elections, scheduled for mid December, the Iraqi people and the emerging government must be put on notice that the United States will immediately redeploy. All of Iraq must know that Iraq is free. Free from United States occupation. I believe this will send a signal to the Sunnis to join the political process for the good of a “free” Iraq.

    My plan calls:

    • To immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.
    • To create a quick reaction force in the region.
    • To create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.
    • To diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq

    This war needs to be personalized. As I said before I have visited with the severely wounded of this war. They are suffering.

    Because we in Congress are charged with sending our sons and daughters into battle, it is our responsibility, our OBLIGATION to speak out for them. That’s why I am speaking out.

    Our military has done everything that has been asked of them, the U.S. can not accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily. IT IS TIME TO BRING THEM HOME.

    MURTHA’S RESOLUTION: H.J.RES.73

    Title: To redeploy U. S. Forces from Iraq Sponsor: Rep Murtha, John P. [PA-12] (introduced 11/17/2005) Cosponsors (13)

    Latest Major Action: 11/17/2005 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

    COSPONSORS (13) [AS OF 11/20/05]

    • Rep Becerra, Xavier [CA-31] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Capuano, Michael E. [MA-8] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Doyle, Michael F. [PA-14] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Holt, Rush D. [NJ-12] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Jackson-Lee, Sheila [TX-18] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Lee, Barbara [CA-9] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Lofgren, Zoe [CA-16] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep McGovern, James P. [MA-3] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep McNulty, Michael R. [NY-21] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Moran, James P. [VA-8] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Solis, Hilda L. [CA-32] – 11/18/2005
    • Rep Weiner, Anthony D. [NY-9] – 11/18/2005

    Whereas Congress and the American People have not been shown clear, measurable progress toward establishment of stable and improving security in Iraq or of a stable and improving economy in Iraq, both of which are essential to “promote the emergence of a democratic government”;

    Whereas additional stabilization in Iraq by U, S. military forces cannot be achieved without the deployment of hundreds of thousands of additional U S. troops, which in turn cannot be achieved without a military draft;

    Whereas more than $277 billion has been appropriated by the United States Congress to prosecute U.S. military action in Iraq and Afghanistan;

    Whereas, as of the drafting of this resolution, 2,079 U.S. troops have been killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom;

    Whereas U.S. forces have become the target of the insurgency,

    Whereas, according to recent polls, over 80% of the Iraqi people want U.S. forces out of Iraq;

    Whereas polls also indicate that 45% of the Iraqi people feel that the attacks on U.S. forces are justified;

    Whereas, due to the foregoing, Congress finds it evident that continuing U.S. military action in Iraq is not in the best interests of the United States of America, the people of Iraq, or the Persian Gulf Region, which were cited in Public Law 107-243 as justification for undertaking such action;

    Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

    Section 1. The deployment of United States forces in Iraq, by direction of Congress, is hereby terminated and the forces involved are to be redeployed at the earliest practicable date.

    Section 2. A quick-reaction U.S. force and an over-the-horizon presence of U.S Marines shall be deployed in the region.

    Section 3 The United States of America shall pursue security and stability in Iraq through diplomacy.

    Representative John Murtha (D-PA) left Washington and Jefferson College in 1952 to join the Marines during the Korean War. There he earned the American Spirit Honor Medal. He rose through the ranks to become a drill instructor at Parris Island and was selected for OfficerCandidateSchool at Quantico, Virginia. He then was assigned to the Second Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In 1959, then Captain Murtha took command of the 34th Special Infantry Company, Marine Corps Reserves, in Johnstown. He remained in the Reserves after his discharge from active duty until he volunteered for service in Vietnam in 1966-67, receiving the Bronze Star with Combat “V”, two Purple Hearts and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. He remained in the Reserves until his retirement as a colonel, receiving the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.

  • Ending the Iraq War

    The American debate on the Iraq War has entered a dramatic new phase. For the first time, a prominent Democrat, Congressman John Murtha, has called for a withdrawal of American forces from the country. Murtha’s words have had a major impact because he was a former supporter of the war, and has had a career distinguished by his consistently pro-military profile. His argument is based on the inability to complete the American military mission in Iraq, making inexcusable the continued killing and loss of life. He also refers to the adverse effects of the unpopular and flawed occupation of Iraq on the wider goals of opposing global terrorism and to the failure of American reconstruction efforts. Murtha’s critique is widely shared by a majority of Americans at this point, and helps explain the declining popularity of the Bush presidency.

    But there is no sign that these developments, even in the face of a rising crescendo of violent incidents and high casualties, will bring a rapid end to the Iraq War. President Bush keeps reiterating his resolve ‘to stay the course,’ to do whatever is necessary to prevail in Iraq. A Republican-controlled Congress, although increasingly restive about the war, is not yet likely to break with the president, and withhold appropriations or mandate an exit strategy that calls for a definite end to the war. Unlike Vietnam, which looks more and more like a precursor to Iraq, the strategic stakes are high. The efforts to pretend that the outcome of Vietnam was strategically important because of ‘falling dominos’ in the region was never convincing, and the only strong argument for American forces remaining was the alleged prospect of a bloodbath in the aftermath of an American departure, a nightmare scenario that never materialized. But in Iraq there are major strategic stakes: oil, non-proliferation, the impact on Turkey and Iran, the containment of radical Islam, anti-terrorism, the security of Israel, regional security politics.

    And so the puzzle posed is how to end the Iraq War without further and too seriously jeopardizing these strategic concerns. The solutions being proposed in the American political mainstream are not convincing: wait until the Iraq military can bring stability to the country, which seems like waiting for Godot; transfer the foreign security role to NATO in the manner of the Kosovo War, which reduces the American role by no more than a tiny percentage; reduce the American presence, but sustain the mission. These supposed solutions are disguised recipes for prolonging the futility of the war, and invitations for terminal disaster. It should be remembered that years after the American leadership realized that the Vietnam War was lost, the dying and killing continued, because the US Government insisted that it could find victory by political maneuver after acknowledging privately its inability to pacify the country by military occupation. As we know, when withdrawal finally came in 1975, it was humiliating, with a total exhibition of defeat, epitomized by helicopters lifting former Vietnamese collaborators with the occupation from the roof of the American Embassy. There is no way to transform the military defeat in the occupation phase of the Iraq War into a political victory. No way, and the sooner the illusion of magic rabbit is recognized for what it is the better the prospects for an effective end to the Iraq War before all room for diplomacy disappears.

    Earlier in Iraq, the US Government had confused military victory with a political victory. Bush’s famous speech on the American aircraft carrier, USS Abraham Lincoln, of May 1, 2003, with the banner behind his podium reading ‘mission accomplished,’ was the extreme version of this miscalculation. Again as the Vietnam experience should have made clear, when confronting a nationalist adversary, battlefield victories are difficult, if not impossible to translate into favorable political outcomes. The bloody occupation of Iraq has confirmed this lesson, dramatizing the limits of military superiority in wars associated with foreign occupation, especially of a country previously colonized.

    Understanding what has failed in the past and is unlikely to succeed in the present, is not enough. Without a positive alternative the blame game leads no where. In my view such an alternative does exist, although it contains big risks and like every proposed line of future policy in Iraq is enmeshed in uncertainty. We cannot know the risks of alternative lines of policy with any precision, but we can do what seems right under the circumstances, and appears to have the best prospect of stopping the bodies from piling up. In a key respect, Rumsfeld was right when a couple of years ago he wrote in an internal Pentagon memo that we lack ‘a metric’ for determining whether we are winning or losing the war against terror inside Iraq or in the world as a whole. Such an acknowledgement should suggest humility on all sides, but especially on those who in the face of such doubts, go on with a war that has had such disastrous human and political results. In law, morality, and politics we should all endorse a strong presumption against war as an instrument of policy.

    I would propose several steps that together constitute a plan, or at least an approach, that moves toward hope for the future; in important respects what I am suggesting reinforces the Murtha resolution that is now before Congress:

    • a clear statement by the US Government that it intends to withdraw completely from Iraq and renounces all plans to build permanent military bases;
    • a timetable for withdrawal of US forces that calls for the complete phasing out of the American (and coalition) presence within one year;
    • a defensive military posture adopted immediately; American forces in Iraq will only attack if attacked from now on;
    • private and public encouragement of Iraqi forces to pursue a diplomacy of compromise and reconciliation as an alternative to prolonged civil war;
    • diversify the effort at economic and social reconstruction to the extent possible, including seeking a new role for the United Nations acting with full independence of the American occupation;
    • encourage regional initiatives that include Turkey, Iran, as well as Arab countries, that explore peacekeeping and political contributions to the post-occupation transition;
    • affirm an American and British commitment to the unity of Iraq;
    • exert greater pressure to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, and move toward a solution of the conflict that recognizes the legal rights of the Palestinian people and the necessity of peace based on equality and mutual respect.

    In the end, this approach has no chance of becoming operative without a major mobilization of anti-war opinion in the United States, reinforced by the expression of similar sentiments throughout the world, and on the part of regional leaders in the Middle East. Without a great heightening of anti-war activism, the war will drag on until a hasty terminal process is adopted in a spirit of desperation. What I am advocating is a comprehensive rethinking of American regional goals and behavior, with a fair chance that the results are likely to be more positive than can be realistically anticipated. My reason for guarded optimism is the sense that when the American protective shield is unmistakenably removed, Kurds and Shi’ia will find themselves under great pressure to reconcile with Sunni elements in Iraq, or face a continuing insurgency, possibly a full-scale civil war, that they would almost certainly lose. On the Sunni side, as well, the incentive of avoiding such prolonged civil strife would create important pressure to reconcile as Sunnis too would be confronted by dissident nationalisms that can no longer be squashed in the post-Saddam era. As long as the US occupation persists, the elements in Iraq that are benefited have no reason to compromise in a manner that is acceptable to the Sunnis. Of course, the ethnic composition of Iraq is more complex than this, and the faultlines of conflict are not only identified by reference to Kurds, Shi’ites, and Sunnis, but these divisions have a definite geographic foundation, and have been deepened by the faulty politics of the American occupation.

    The situation in Iraq has deteriorated to a point that there is no assured exit strategy that is not beset by dangers, but at least these dangers raise hopes that a different path can be taken. By remaining on the Iraq War path, now so suddenly discredited, all we know is that the bodies will keep piling up!

    Richard Falk, chair of the board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, is the author of Religion and Humane Global Governance (Palgrave) and, most recently, The Great Terror War (Olive Branch). He is currently visiting professor of global studies at UC Santa Barbara.

  • How to Achieve Peace in the Middle East

    “A U.S. war against Iraq would open the gates of hell in the Middle East.”

    Amr Moussa

    In November 2005 I traveled to the Middle East in search of answers to questions like is Osama bin Laden still alive, how much time do we have before the next 9/11 attack, and what can be done to prevent it. I learned that Osama bin Laden is indeed alive and the next 9/11 attack continues to be planned (the American Hiroshima plan has evolved to include nuclear facilities outside the United States). In the process of seeking these answers I tested a proposal to prevent the next 9/11 attack and put the United States on the path of peace. I presented specific action steps to citizens from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Qatar, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. My conversations included people I met in the streets as well as senior executives at Al Jazeera and in the energy business. I was also able to obtain the perspective of someone close to Osama bin Laden. The following is the summary of my observations and why we must seize the remaining time that we have to prevent future Hiroshimas.

    To understand the action steps for peace, it is helpful to first consider why global terrorism is currently expanding around the world. Al Qaeda and affiliated movements that are committing acts of violence are labeled “Jihad Fighters” and illustrated in Diagram A. People who are sympathetic and intellectually agree with the jihad fighters are labeled as “Supporters.” The exact size of worldwide jihad fighters and supporters are classified by the U.S. government and not officially published by Al Qaeda or affiliated resistance organizations. On a related note, approximately 90,000 mujahadeen or jihad fighters and 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed in the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war. The population of potential jihad fighters has the potential to be far greater than the hundred thousand plus jihad fighters that fought alongside Osama bin Laden in the Soviet-Afghan war.

    Diagram A

     

    *Prior to 1989 Al Qaeda was not attacking the United States as the CIA was helping recruit jihad fighters in partnership with the intelligence services of Pakistan, Britain, and Saudi Arabia. A 1989 graphic showing the size of jihad fighters would be larger than the period before 9/11/2001 because the intelligences services from these four countries were very successful at recruiting jihad fighters from over 40 countries. When the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended on February 15, 1989, most jihad fighters returned to their home countries and became supporters but did not continue acts of violence in partnership with Al Qaeda.

    The increasing insurgency or “resistance” as labeled by most of the people I spoke with, lends support that the war in Iraq is being lost. Osama bin Laden and his supporters are increasing the number of jihad fighters in Iraq from around the world as well as the number of supporters. Since U.S. foreign policy is currently creating more jihad fighters and supporters, what can be done to reverse the trend? Diagram B projects the current trend in five years as well as presents an alternative five year snapshot.

    Diagram B – The Year 2010

     

    *This remaining force dedicated to violence is reduced in size dramatically. The remaining jihad fighters can be brought to justice by international police and tried in local courts.

    What are people in the Middle East saying about this challenge? Everyone that I spoke with agreed the gates of hell must be closed. This reference to the opening quote in this article is consistently communicated as the most important first step. This means people in the Middle East want the U.S. out of Iraq. Not a reduction in forces staged over several years, but an immediate end of the U.S. presence in Iraq. If the circles in the prior diagrams were balloons, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ongoing occupation is the primary source of new hot air making these circles bigger.

    People in the Middle East will actually laugh at you if you suggest America is liberating the Iraqi people. The standard response is America is liberating Iraq’s oil, not its people. This is a no win situation for the United States. Superficial selling points, like the world is better off without Saddam, don’t go over very well with people who know that the U.S. supported Saddam while he was slaughtering Muslims. People in this part of the world have not forgotten that the U.S. sold weapons to Saddam that enabled him to stay in power and kill his people.

    For people who are 50 years old and younger, they have consistently witnessed how the U.S. suppresses democracy in the Middle East. The 1953 CIA overthrow of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran is far from being forgotten. Whether the country is Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Kuwait or any other Middle East country, the U.S. has consistently suppressed democracy in favor of governments that facilitated access to oil fields. The people I spoke with have no delusions that things have changed and Iraq will become a democracy.

    A simple question can help you appreciate the perspective of people in the Middle East. If the Iraqi government wanted all U.S. forces to leave today or even in a few years, would they? The answer is U.S. forces will remain in Iraq for many years to come and no Iraqi government will stay in power for long if it attempts to kick the U.S. military out of the country. Only the U.S. public is being fooled by associating statements about future troop reductions with ending the presence of all troops. Egyptians know this first hand as Britain made statements and did periodically reduce its forces for decades before finally leaving Egypt.

    The debate on the immediate removal of U.S. forces in Iraq rarely introduces alternatives beyond total chaos or continued occupation. Alternatives that are far less costly and far more likely to work do exist. The problem for the Bush administration is these alternatives require giving up control of Iraq’s oil and water resources. For example, people in the Middle East would welcome a United Nations peacekeeping force that did not include the U.S. or Britain. This is especially true if the U.S. and Britain fund the effort and many of the peacekeepers came from Muslim nations. This one change alone would redefine the debate as one where the liberation is a liberation of people and not oil. This is absolutely achievable and would cost a fraction in dollars and most importantly lives relative to the current occupation. People from the Middle East are confident that removing the existing primarily “Christian Army” factor would help deflate Osama bin Laden’s claims that the invasion of Iraq is really a war on Islam.

    Once my conversations progressed beyond the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq, the next action step was removing all U.S. forces from the Middle East. The U.S. government understood how the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, which during the Gulf War exceeded 500,000 troops, was a leading reason why 15 of the 19 9/11 highjackers were from Saudi Arabia. To correct this problem that was fueling Osama bin Laden’s calls for jihad, in August 2003 the U.S. completed the removal all U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia. This foreign policy change would have removed a major motivator for calls of jihad if the soldiers were not redeployed to other countries.

    No one wants a foreign army in their backyard. Somehow the Bush administration thinks the problem can be sidestepped by hiding the U.S. bases in the desert. The citizens of the Middle East are aware of this strategy to “hide” the U.S. soldiers. The “hide” strategy fails to hide the fact that foreign soldiers are in the country to reinforce governments that suppress democracy. A major factor creating jihad fighters is eliminated when U.S. soldiers leave the Middle East. This is commonsense when you think about how you would feel if a foreign army was stationed in the U.S. to help keep President Bush in power.

    The first two action steps, ending the occupation of Iraq and removing all U.S. military from the Middle East, will stop the growth of anti-U.S. jihad and support. What is needed to reduce and transform anti-U.S. jihad to a barely visible dot and ultimately eliminate jihad support? The answer continues with the U.S. reclaiming its credibility as a nation adhering to international law. Starting a war has resulted in the U.S. being perceived as a nation that does not adhere to international law. The tortures at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have destroyed U.S. credibility as a voice for human rights. The use of white phosphorus (WP) weapons to “shake and bake” communicates that Iraqi citizens are having their skin melted off their bodies instead of being liberated. The Pentagon November 2005 confirmation of WP weapons after countless denials makes people in the Middle East wonder when their fears of depleted uranium weapons will finally be confirmed. Each violation of international law helps to solidify the case that Osama bin Laden is fighting for justice and the U.S. is a force of evil.

    When the U.S. supports the United Nations, endorses the International Criminal Court, and adheres to the Geneva protections without exception, credibility slowly begins to be restored. Policies that are fueling the perception that the U.S. is lawless, must be ended. Programs like extraordinary renditions, where people are kidnapped from around the world and sent to secret prisons, cannot coexist with the perception that the U.S. adheres to international law. People in the Middle East have observed that if the U.S. is bringing democracy that includes programs to torture people, they do not want democracy in Iraq.

    To shrink the global terrorism dot to the point where it would be virtually non-existent, as it is in places like Switzerland, the U.S. will need to renounce its weapons of mass destruction and stop selling weapons to other countries. Current U.S. foreign policies help keep American weapons factories warm, but these policies will come back to haunt everyone. Even if the U.S. took the initial step of stopping the sale of weapons in the Middle East, the global terrorism movement would deteriorate dramatically. Jihad recruiters would face a stiff challenge if the U.S. stopped selling weapons to Israel. Israel, as the only current nuclear weapon nation in the Middle East, hardly needs addition U.S. weapons.

    The combination of no U.S. soldiers anywhere in the Middle East, adherence to international law, and termination of selling weapons will successfully end the anti-U.S. jihad. The Bush administration follows a foreign policy that you have to do some bad things to produce good endings. The action steps needed challenge this point. To achieve peace we must work for justice. U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East has been blind to what Americans value at home and this over time has fueled violent movements. Some say that it is too late, promoting true democracy in the Middle East will bring into power fundamentalists. When is it ever to late to do what is right? The failure to denounce sham democracies like Egypt, are only guaranteed to bring fundamentalist groups like the Egyptian Brotherhood into power.

    In summary, I learned during my visit to the Middle East that a more peaceful world is possible. We know how and only need the courage to implement the initial steps.

    1. End the U.S. occupation of Iraq and support U.N. “liberation” peacekeepers
    2. Remove all U.S. forces from the Middle East
    3. Adhere to international law.
    4. End hypocritical weapons of mass destruction policies and stop selling weapons.

    One final observation that is important to always remember. Muslims in the Middle East are people like you and I. They love their children and want peace. None of the people I spoke with approved of terrorism, especially violence against civilians. This means that unless the United States makes the mistake of making the war on terrorism a war on Islam, the world can be saved from a war that will span the globe and likely last more than 100 years. Unfortunately, starting the war in Iraq, occupying the Middle East with dozens of military bases, torturing Muslims, and supporting governments that suppress democracy are perceived by many as a war on Islam. As members of humanity we must hold our leaders accountable and implement the above four steps for peace.

    David Dionisi is a former US army intelligence officer and business executive. He is the author of American Hiroshima (www.americanhiroshima.info).

  • Burma: The Military Boots Keep Marching in Place

    Aung San Suu Kyi The Burmese military have held power in the country since 1958 and show no signs of yielding it to civilian political leaders. They have prevented discussion of the most burning political issues which have divided Burma since independence: the nationalities question, the insurgencies, the balance of power between central and regional governments, the nature of the state, and the role of democracy. The military, by means of poor policies and incompetent administration took a relatively prosperous country and turned it into a state of economic chaos.

    There was a brief 1960-1962 period when Prime Minister U Nu was restored to power while General Ne Win waited in the wings. Ne Win came to center stage again in 1962 and ruled the country with a small group of fellow officers calling themselves the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). However, unlike the Chinese Communist Party – Ne Win’s inspiration – the BSPP had no local members, no cells, no party structures and no conferences. The BSPP resembled many one-party states of Africa where the single party is only a reminder of an earlier administrative style. Real power is administered through the military hierarchy. Under Ne Win’s direction, Burma closed in on itself. It was not active in the Non-Aligned Movement and was part of no regional grouping. The one civilian Burmese leader of value, U Thant, was pushed outside and became Secretary General of the United Nations.

    The military leadership has been both corrupt and incompetent. They weakened administrative services, schools, health care and the state infrastructure despite a bloated public sector of underpaid and inefficient civil servants. Many educated Burmese left the country for jobs in Britain, Canada and Australia; other Burmese joined the merchant marine in order to be able to feed their families.

    Burmese diplomats at the United Nations made strenuous and finally successful efforts to have Burma designated one of the “least developed countries”. Burma joined ‘the Club’, made up of mostly African states in 1987. However, other than attending a conference every five years, there is little advantage in ‘Club’ membership.

    The military prevented discussion of the most burning political issues which have divided Burma since independence: the nationalities question, the insurgencies, the balance of power between central and regional governments, the nature of the state, and the role of democracy.

    By 1988, economic failure, lack of social services, and an oppressive atmosphere preventing discussion led to student protests. University students have always been the leaders of reform movements in part in memory of the 1936 student strike in Rangoon which was the most visible cry for independence. In March 1988 during “seven days that shook Rangoon”, there was a remarkable series of non-violent protests, led by students, younger Buddhist monks, and young professionals. The demonstrations received a good deal of sympathy from the wider public whose economic conditions were worsening due to ever-rising prices.

    The military hit back with large-scale arrests of students and shootings of demonstrators. Unrest continued and on 8 August there was a general strike and massive street demonstrations in Rangoon. Tens of thousands demanded democracy, human rights, an end to the socialist economic system, and the resignation of the BSPP government. The movement began to spread beyond Rangoon. The army intensified its crackdown, and many student leaders left the country for Thailand or the border areas. The military, however, recognized the seriousness of the crisis. General Ne Win resigned and some of the military in his cabinet were also ‘allowed’ to resign.

    A slightly modified group of military officers retained power but to indicate that a change had taken place they called themselves the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and dropped all mention of the “‘Burmese road to socialism’. They changed the name of the capitol from Rangoon to Yangon and Burma to Myanmar. Since there had been wide international criticism, especially at the UN, of the brutal crackdown upon students, the SLORC decided that there should be elections in order to confirm their legitimacy.

    SLORC had hoped to continue the military’s monopoly of power following the holding of the promised elections, through a classic policy of ‘divide and rule’. The idea was to create a multitude of political parties built around personalities from each section of the country. In all, 93 parties with no previous legal existence were created for the election. The anticipated result would be a divided parliament through which SLORC would continue in power by the building of fragile coalition governments.

    In order to facilitate this plan, the election procedure was weighted against the creation of a mass party. No election meetings of more than five people were allowed. Party publications were limited; no access to radio was given. Leaders of the potentially stronger political parties were put in jail or under house arrest.

    Confounding the military’s plans, one party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) with Aung San Suu Kyi as its secretary general – won 392 of the 485 seats in parliament. A set of ethnic parties, collectively called the Union Nationalities League for Democracy and allied to the NLD won 47 seats, while the political party most allied to the SLORC gained only 10 seats. The SLORC was so out of touch with popular sentiment that they were surprised by the results. Had they had reliable opinion polls on which to base their decisions, chances are they would not have permitted the elections to go ahead at all. Since the elections, for over 16 years the SLORC has had to invent reasons why the Parliament cannot meet.

    As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi has become increasingly the symbol of democracy and of a Parliament unable to come into being. Auug San Suu Kyi represents a new spirit – partly because, unlike many of her contemporaries, she has lived most of her life outside Burma and is, in consequence, not linked to existing political compromises. Her father, Aung San, who died when Aung San Suu Kyi was two years old, was one of the original ‘Thirty Comrades’ – student nationalists, also including Ne Win, who were inspired by Second World War Japanese propaganda which appealed for a common Asian struggle against Western imperialism. Aung San went to Tokyo to assist the Japanese conquest of Burma. By 1944, however, the Thirty had decided that the Japanese were not liberators, that the occupation of Burma was being carried out for Japanese rather than Burmese aims, and that the Japanese might also lose the war. In the last year of the Second World War, the Thirty co-operated with Lord Mountbatten.

    Thus, on 27 January 1947, Clement Attlee and Aung San signed an agreement for full independence of Burma within a year. On 19 July 1947, Aung San was assassinated by a political rival. He became a legend of Burmese independence.

    Aung San Suu Kyi was educated in India (where her mother served as ambassador) and at Oxford University. She married an English academic, Michael Aris, a specialist on Tibet, in 1972 and only returned to Burma in 1988 in order to care for her dying mother. Her dynamism, combined with the legend of her father, led her to being named secretary of the National League for Democracy. She toured the country and was welcomed enthusiastically. She always stressed the importance of non-violence in pressing for democracy against the military.

    The SLORC does not care for symbols it does not control. Since July 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi has been most of the time under house arrest, cut off from most communication, including with her own family. The government refused an entry visa to her husband Michael Aris, who was dying of cancer. He died without being able to see her. It is impossible to know from outside how strong and how structured the democratic forces in Burma remain. Many democratic Burmese have left the country and are often active in pro-democracy activities.

    The major change from the 1962-1988 period is that now Burma is open to the world and the winds of trade. Burma has become a major opium exporting country. Opium is the main export of the country, sent over land through China, Bangladesh, and Northeast India, leaving a trail of ruined lives and conflicts among middlemen along the way. The other major export, largely undocumented, is tropical wood to Thailand. The Thais have limited their forest cutting, having already destroyed much of their forest lands. The Thais buy their wood from the Burmese military – a trade under the control of higher officers on both sides.

    China is the chief beneficiary of the new Burmese openness. The Chinese government sells Burma arms of all sorts but especially cheaply-made land mines which are planted in frontier areas where the ethnic minorities live. Chinese merchants, probably not pushed by the government but following an age-old pattern of Chinese migrating to do business, are taking over the hotels, restaurants and shops of Burma, selling Chinese goods. As hardly anything is made in Burma, it is natural for the Chinese to sell Chinese goods. As a result China is one of the only open defenders of Burma at the UN.

    The military keep marching in place, without vision, without policy, taking what they can while power lasts, but their footprints make ever deeper ruts all the time.

    Rene Wadlow is editor of the online journal of world politics www.transnational-perspectives.org and an NGO representative to the UN, Geneva. Formerly, he was professor and Director of Research of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva. Photo from indymedia.org

    For more resources:

    For a moving account of the 1988 protests and crackdown, including many interviews with participants see: Bertil Lintner Outrange: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy ( London: White Lotus, 1990, 208pp.)

    For an effort to understand why the military continue in power despite economic and administrative incompetence and why so few Burmese democrats criticize the military as such, see the useful analysis by an anthropologist interested in the psychological effects of military rule: Christina Fink. Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule ( London: Zed Books, 2001, 286pp.).