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  • 2008 NAPF Evening for Peace

    2008 NAPF Evening for Peace

    Remarks delivered at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 25th Annual Evening for Peace on November 22, 2008 in Santa Barbara, California.

    Tonight marks a quarter century that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has been holding this annual Evening for Peace. We are gathering at this 25th anniversary event at a time of renewed hope for peace.

    We are honoring two extraordinary individuals – Reverend George Regas and Stanley Sheinbaum – who have together spent over a century, often behind the scenes, working for a more just and peaceful world. This evening we shine a light on their acts of peace and world citizenship, and it is our hope that their lives will inspire all of us, and particularly the young people who are here, to lives of greater compassion, courage and commitment.

    Renewed hope is necessary, but it is not sufficient.

    We still live in a world in which conflicts are too often settled by force rather than law, in which we spend far too much of our precious resources, human and economic, on war and its preparations.

    The world’s nations are spending some $1.3 trillion annually on military preparations and war, with the United States is spending roughly half this amount. Since the beginning of the Nuclear Age, our country has spent some $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. We are still spending some $50 billion annually on nuclear arms.

    We need change in our world and, dare I say, change is coming.

    One thing is absolutely certain: Nuclear weapons do not and cannot protect their possessors. They can be used to commit monstrous acts of mass murder, by a first strike or in retaliation for a preceding attack, but they cannot protect their possessors.

    The only way we can be sure that we are safe from a nuclear attack is by abolishing these weapons.

    This is what President-elect Obama has said: “A world without nuclear weapons is profoundly in America’s interest and the world’s interest. It is our responsibility to make the commitment, and to do the hard work to make this vision a reality.”

    When he says “our responsibility to make the commitment,” I think he means all of us. I think that Barack Obama and America need this commitment from all of us. But it is up to him and to all of us to fulfill this commitment with our actions.

    At the Foundation, we have developed a Nuclear Disarmament Agenda for President Obama during his first 100 days in office. We ask that he take three steps:

    First, make a public commitment for US leadership for a world free of nuclear weapons in a major foreign policy address.

    Second, open bilateral negotiations with Russia on a range of nuclear policy issues. We need Russia as a partner in this journey to sanity.

    Third, initiate global action to convene a meeting of all nine nuclear weapons states to negotiate a new treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

    The proposed agenda has some additional details that can be found in your programs.

    The main point I’d like to leave you with is that a world free of nuclear weapons is not an impossible dream. The genie can be put back in the bottle. The process may begin with a dream, but it continues with a politics of peace and justice. If it also increases our security, as it surely will, we are far the better for it.

    I would ask you to also take three actions:

    First, send the “First Hundred Day Agenda” to President-elect Obama, along with an encouraging note from you about why you want a world with zero nuclear weapons.

    Second, sign the Foundation’s Appeal to the Next President for US Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World and gather another 15 or 50 or 500 signatures and send them to the Foundation by early January.

    Third, watch the Foundation’s DVD, “Nuclear Weapons and the Human Future,” and arrange a showing to a group you organize or that you belong to.

    Let me conclude with some thoughts by General Lee Butler, a former commander in chief of the United States Strategic Command – in charge of all US nuclear weapons. General Butler became an ardent abolitionist after retiring from the military and is one of our past awardees. Referring to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, he said, “We cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it. It is time to reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.”

    I believe that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and each of us have an important role to play in the transformation to a peaceful and nuclear weapons-free world. Your hope, commitment, involvement and support are making and will continue to make all the difference.

    Thank you for being with us; thank you for caring.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor on the World Future Council.

  • Statement of Costa Rican President on Reducing Military Spending

    This speech was delivered to the United Nations Security Council on November 19, 2008

    A curious tale from Scandinavian mythology tells of two kings condemned to fight one another for eternity. If one succeeded in killing the other, the victim would rise again to continue their struggle until the last day of the world. The story has several versions, but, in all of them, the kings and their armies are revived each morning with new weapons, ready to take to the field of battle once more. This fantasy, product of a warrior culture, became a painful premonition of the events that would mark, with blood, the history of the twentieth century: an escalation of weapons, enemies, threats and war that ended the lives of hundreds of millions of people and forced us into the trenches of international insecurity.

    There lies the reason for the creation of this Security Council: in the search for solutions to the endless battle within the human species, fed by the frenzy of the arms race. It is unlikely that any organization has ever been set a more ambitious task than that. And it is unlikely that any organization has faced more difficult choices. Many of those dilemmas remain to be resolved but their answer can be found, without a doubt, in the content of the Charter of the United Nations. In 1945, with the smoke still clearing after the worst war in human memory, the founders of this Organization wrote in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations:

    “In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”

    The wording of that Article is no accident. It makes a statement of which this Council must take note, to the fullest extent of its meaning: spending on arms is a diversion of human and economic resources; that is to say, a use that is not correct. As a minimum, the Charter asks us to accept that excessive military spending exacts an infinite cost in opportunity.

    These are not the delusions of a citizen of the first country in history to abolish its army and declare peace on the world. They are not the dreams of a Nobel Peace laureate. This is the text that holds up this building. It is the text that justifies any action of this Security Council. Article 26 has been, until now, a dead letter in the vast cemetery of intentions for world peace. But in that place there also rests the possibility of reviving that intention; of giving it the meaning intended by those who precede us in this struggle.

    “The least diversion of resources” means, first and foremost, finding alternatives to excessive military spending that do not damage security. One of those alternatives is to strengthen multilateralism. As long as nations do not feel protected by strong regional organizations with real powers to act, they will continue to arm themselves at the expense of their peoples’ development — of the poorest, in particular — and at the expense of international security. The Security Council must support, as a guarantor of collective security, multilateral accords adopted in our various regional organisms. Costa Rica will work along these lines during the coming year as a way to generate an environment that allows for the gradual reduction of military spending.

    Ours is an unarmed nation but it is not a naïve nation. We have not come here to lobby for the abolition of all armies. We have not even come to urge the drastic reduction of world military spending, which has now reached $3.3 billion a day — which is shameful. But a gradual reduction is not only possible, but also imperative, in particular for developing nations.

    I am well aware that neither this Organization nor this Council nor any of its Members can decide how much other countries spend on arms and soldiers. But we can decide how much international aid they receive and on which principles such aid is based. With the money that some developing nations spend on a single combat plane, they could buy 200,000 MIT Media Lab computers for students with limited resources. With the money they spend on a single helicopter, they could pay $100 monthly grants for a whole year to 5,000 students at risk of dropping out of school. The perverse logic that impels a poor nation to spend excessive sums on its armies and not on meeting the needs of its people is exactly the antithesis of human security and is ultimately a serious threat to international security.

    That is why my Government has presented the Costa Rica Consensus, an initiative to create mechanisms to forgive debts and support with international financial resources those developing countries which increase spending on environmental protection, education, healthcare and housing for their people and decrease spending on weapons and soldiers.

    In other words, this initiative seeks to reward developing countries, whether poor or middle-income, that divert increasingly fewer of their economic and human resources to the purchase of arms, just as stipulated in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations. Today, I ask members for their support in making the Consensus of Costa Rica a reality.

    I also ask members for their support for the arms trade treaty that Costa Rica, along with other nations, presented to the United Nations in 2006. This treaty seeks to prohibit the sale of arms to States, groups or individuals, when there is sufficient reason to believe that they will be used to violate human rights or international law. I do not know how much longer we can survive unless we realize that it is just as terrible to kill many people, little by little, every day, as it is to kill many people in a single day. The destructive power of the 640 million small arms and light weapons that exist in the world, 74 per cent of which are in the hands of civilians, has proven to be more lethal than that of nuclear weapons and constitutes one of the principal motors of national and international insecurity.

    Costa Rica knows that the members of this Council include some of the countries that top the list for the sale and purchase of small arms and light weapons in the world. But my country also knows that those nations have recognized terrorism and drug trafficking as serious threats to international security.

    International organized crime depends on arms trafficking, which until now has flowed with terrifying freedom across our borders, with the result that these same powerful nations suffer the consequences. Although the treaty would not eliminate the existence of such criminal groups, it would certainly limit their operations.

    If we do not succeed with these measures, if the Costa Rica Consensus does not win the support of developed nations and if the arms trade treaty sinks in the waters of this organization, our pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals will become nothing more than the impossible dream of a world that, like Sisyphus, labors without rest towards an unattainable goal.

    We are working to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and, yet, armed conflicts constitute the principal cause of hunger in our world. We are working to improve health care, particularly maternal health and the fight against AIDS and malaria. Yet, military spending drains millions of dollars from the health-care budgets of poor countries. The Millennium Development Goals were brave words, but they will never be more than words if we do not regulate arms or devise incentives to reduce global military spending.

    Humanity can break the chain that, until now, has forced us to spend our centuries in an incessant and fratricidal struggle. That was the belief of those who founded this Organization. The enormous mission entrusted to this Council is not a failed expectation, but it is a rocky path. Maintaining peace will never be a simple task, nor will it ever be completed. But, I assure you that strengthening multilateralism, reducing military spending in favor of human development and regulating the international arms trade are steps in the right direction, the same as that marked out 63 years ago by those who, having survived atrocities, were nonetheless able to hope.

    Oscar Arias is a Nobel Peace laureate and President of Costa Rica.

  • Barack Obama’s Historic Victory

    This historic victory by Barack Obama is the first truly global election that has been celebrated by people around the world as if they had been voting participants. The reelection of George W. Bush in 2004 was also a national election with global reverberations, but it only aroused widespread feelings of fear and resentment around the world, and no sense of participation. What we are slowly learning is that the United States is the first global state, and as such, its elections become a global, as well as a national, event. From this perspective it is not surprising that peoples throughout the world follow American presidential campaigns and either cheer or lament their outcome. What may be still unappreciated is that for many societies these American elections seem to generate more interest and enthusiasm than do elections in their own country. Barack Obama’s landslide victory in the United States was without doubt an impressive achievement. It also restored international confidence in the health of the American body politic. It is worth noting that if peoples throughout the world had been enfranchised to vote in the American elections, the outcome would have been far more one-sided in Obama’s favor. Perhaps, someday the realities of political globalization will extend worldwide American voting rights, conferring actual rights as the foundation of an emergent ‘global democracy,’ but such a moment seems far off.

    There are many reasons for most Americans to affirm Obama’s victory. It does represent a remarkable threshold of achievement for African Americans who have long borne the cruel burdens of racism. Beyond this Obama’s signature claim to lead the United States derived initially from his principled opposition to the Iraq War from its onset. His unconditional commitment to end American combat involvement in Iraq was extremely popular with voters, and will be tested in the months ahead as the politics of disengagement and withdrawal unfolds. Obama’s campaign effectively championed the theme of change and hope countering the mood of despair associated with the disillusionment after eight years of George W. Bush’s presidency as recently intensified by the sharp economic downturn. The Obama victory, above all, signaled to the world an American willingness to repudiate Bush militarist and unilateralist approaches to global policy. It also clearly expressed a willingness to address the financial meltdown and its economic fallout with policies helpful to the mass of Americans, and not just to Wall Street. This meant a long overdue reassertion of regulatory authority over markets and banks. There will be broad support among the American people for moving in these reformist directions, but the path will also be blocked at every stage by special interests that benefit from keeping things as they are. The joy of the moment risks becoming the disappointment of the hour as the pain, tensions, and intractability of this economic crisis become clear to the citizenrty. The opportunities for this new president are exciting, and seem attainable given his inspirational qualities of leadership. And yet we must realize that the challenges are daunting, perhaps beyond the capacity of any leader to meet successfully, at least in the short run. Time will tell, but what now prevails is an unprecedented mood of high and happy expectations. This will certainly bring a reformist resolve to Washington, but such a mood is fraught with peril. It can quickly give way to a sense of bitter disappointment, and can even give rise to charges of betrayal.

    The most immediate foreign policy issues concern the war on terror, how to withdraw from Iraq and achieve stability in Afghanistan. Obama will undoubtedly do his best to end the American combat role in Iraq as soon as possible, more or less in accord with his promise of completing the process in 16 months. The success of this effort will depend heavily upon what recently semi-dormant Iraqi insurgent forces do during the initial stages of this withdrawal process, and this is impossible to foresee. Withdrawal is likely to go relatively smoothly if the contending forces in Iraq realize that the alternative to power-sharing accommodations and compromises would be a long and bloody civil war, but such an optimistic outlook may never materialize, and then what. The rapid removal of American troops is quite likely to lead to an immediate escalation of Iraqi violence as anti-government forces are tempted to test the will and capability of the Maliki government in circumstances where it is losing American support. If this latter scenario unfolds, it would exert considerable pressure on Obama to halt further withdrawals, or even reverse course. Under these conditions Obama would likely seek to avoid being charged with responsibility for a costly defeat in Iraq. Republican critics will undoubtedly will allege that such regression in Iraq would have been averted had the Bush/McCain policy of indefinitely prolonging the military engagement continued to guide American policy. As is always the case with foreign intervention in an unresolved struggle for national self-determination, uncertainty pervades any policy choice. Obama’s opposition to the undertaking of the Iraq War has long been vindicated, but whether his advocacy of rapid extrication is feasible under current conditions will remain uncertain during the months ahead. In light of these risks, Obama advisors may be tempted to pursue a more ambiguous policy path in Iraq by appearing to withdraw, but actually redeploying most of the American troops in the region, including the retention of a large military presence in Iraq. If Obama opts for such caution it may temporarily calm some conservative critics in Washington and the media but he will encounter sharp criticism from his legions of young supporters who did so much to elect him. How Obama decides to walk this tightrope between the political mainstream and his grassroots movement will shape the early months of his presidency, especially in foreign affairs.

    Obama is simultaneously being challenged by a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan that includes the revival of the Taliban, a weak central government in Kabul, and the mounting political difficulties of dealing with hostile cross border forces located in Pakistan. During the presidential campaign Obama pursued a centrist line on the war on terror by advocating an enhanced involvement of American military forces in Afghanistan without ever questioning whether this underlying ‘war’ should be ‘undeclared,’ and terrorism treated as elsewhere in the world, as a matter for law enforcement and intelligence operations, and taking full advantage of inter-governmental cooperation. Both Obama and McCain favored augmenting American troops on the ground in Afghanistan by at least 32,000. Obama contended that such a shift could be achieved without further straining the overstretched military by assigning some of the departing American forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. What is at stake here is Obama’s double view of the two wars, that the Iraq War was a wrong turn, whereas the Afghanistan War was a correct response to 9/11 but was not properly carried to completion primarily due to the diversion of attention and resources to Iraq. Obama wants to correct both mistakes of the Bush presidency, but at the same time he appears to subscribe to the major premise that declaring “a war on terror,” at least on al Qaeda, was the right thing to do, and that Afghanistan is a necessary theater of military engagement, including insisting upon and managing Afghan regime change. Obama has also made some threats about carrying out attacks in Pakistan, even without the consent of Islamabad, if reliable intelligence locates Osama Bin Laden or al Qaeda sancturaries.

    What is most troublesome about according renewed attention to Afghanistan is its seemingly uncritical reliance on counterinsurgency doctrine to promote American interests in a distant foreign country. General David Petraeus has reformed counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in intelligent ways that exhibit a more sensitive appreciation of the need of American military forces to win over the population and be respectful toward the indigenous culture and religion, but it is still counterinsurgency. That is, it remains an intervention in internal political life by foreign military forces, which is inevitably an affront to sovereign rights in a post-colonial era of international relations. In practical terms, this means that a substantial portion of the Afghan people will probably view the American undertaking in their country with suspicion and hostility, and are likely to be supportive of resistance efforts. There is no doubt that the former Taliban regime was oppressive, as was Saddam Hussein’s regime, but it still remains highly questionable whether a sustainable politics of emancipation can be achieved by military means, and the effort to do so is at best extremely costly and destructive, and often lands intervening forces in a quagmire. This is the overriding lesson of the American defeat in Vietnam, which has yet to be learned by the foreign policy establishment. What has been attempted over and over again is to tweak counterinsurgency thinking and practice so as to make it succeed. It will be tragic if the Obama presidency traps itself on the counterinsurgency battlefields of Afghanistan. It would be far more understandable to mount a limited challenge to the al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but quite another to undertake the political restructuring of a foreign state. It should be chastening to reflect upon the fact that the British Empire, and even the Soviet state with its common border, failed in their determined attempts to control the political destiny of Afghanistan. It will be so sad if the promise of the Obama presidency is squandered as a result of a misguided and unwise escalation of American ambitions in Afghanistan.

    The other immediate concern for the Obama presidency will be Iran. Obama was much criticized during the presidential campaign for his announced readiness to meet with leaders of hostile states, including Iran, without preconditions. It remains to be seen whether Obama will risk his currently strong international reputation by arranging an early meeting with President Ahmadinejad, especially devoted to ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program does not end up producing nuclear weapons. Such diplomacy would represent a gamble by both parties. If successful, it will demonstrate the wisdom of Obama’s approach, and could be the start of an encouraging regional approach to peace and security in the Middle East, especially if the Iraq withdrawal goes forward successfully, and even more so, if it comes that Iran helps to keep Iraq stable during the removal of American forces. But if such an initiative falters, as seems far more probable, then it will erode Obama’s capacity to bring about an overall change in American foreign policy, and it could even lead to heightened regional tensions, risking a widening of the war zone.

    One golden opportunity for the Obama presidency is to reopen the question of nuclear disarmament. The atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 frightened world leaders about the future and created a momentary resolve to find ways to ensure that these weapons would never be developed further or used again. This resolve was soon dissipated by the Cold War rivalry, which expressed itself in part by a superpower arms race, as well as by the gradual acquisition of nuclear weaponry by additional countries. Not since the end of World War II has there been such a realization as at present that the future of world order is severely threatened by the existence and spread of these ultimate weapons of mass destruction. Favoring nuclear disarmament in the early 21st century is no longer just a peace movement demand that is not taken seriously in governmental circles. Nuclear disarmament has been recently endorsed by several eminent and conservative American political figures: Henry Kissinger, former Republican Secretary of State George Shultz, former Democratic Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former chair of the Senate Armed Forces Committee Sam Nunn. Their reasoning is set forth in two jointly authored articles published in the Wall Street Journal that are premised on realist approach to global security and shaped by a preoccupation with fulfilling American national interests. They argue that the gradual erosion of the Nonproliferation Regime makes the possession and existence of nuclear weapons by the United States far more dangerous than are the risks associated with their elimination by way of negotiated and monitored reductions. Both Obama and McCain expressed general support for a world free from nuclear weapons, but without proposing any specifics. Many observers of the international scene since the Soviet collapse have worried about such weapons falling into the hands of political extremists via the black market or through theft, especially given the ‘loose nukes’ contained in Russia’s poorly guarded arsenal of nuclear weapons. Similar worries have accompanied speculations that the government of nuclear Pakistan might be taken over by political elements with strong links to extremists. There is little doubt that an Obama call for a major conference of nuclear weapons states for the purpose of achieving total nuclear disarmament over a period of one or two decades would generate strong endorsements from most governments and great enthusiasm at the grassroots. Of course, achieving a consensus among the nine nuclear weapons states will not be easy, but the effort to do so if genuinely promoted by the United States, would be worthwhile. It would at the same time help Obama sustain his footing on the moral high ground of world affairs even should the effort become bogged down by disagreements. Putting nuclear disarmament high on the American policy agenda would also provide global civil society with an activist cause with wide transnational appeal.

    There is at present lots of commentary acknowledging the changing geopolitical landscape: the rise of China and India, a resurgent Russia, the collective force of the European Union, and the leftward tilt of Latin America. Clearly the unipolar moment of the 1990s has passed, and it seems likely that the Obama presidency will go out of its way to affirm its recognition of a multipolar world. It will also exhibit a far more active reliance on the mechanisms of international cooperation than has been the case in recent years. The Obama leadership will also hopefully do its best to avoid pressures to revive the Cold War, as were evident in the neoconservative call for the defense of Georgia last August, or in its warning of the start of a new phase of international relations based on great power rivalry. A generally hopeful trend in world affairs, pioneered by Europe, is the rise of regionalism in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, which could produce new forms of cooperation and peacekeeping that might encourage Washington to accept a more modest global presence, which in turn would begin the difficult process of acknowledging that America’s existing overseas commitments had so far outrun its capabilities that it could no longer meet the domestic needs of its own population.

    It is likely that this renewal of multilateralism will express itself in a more constructive approach to the United Nations as well as a determined effort to achieve a shared global strategy on climate change. Here, too, rhetorical promise may not be accompanied by corresponding action. The Obama presidency is likely to give an immediate priority to domestic issues, especially in view of the sharply falling economy that has already caused a credit crisis, housing foreclosures, widespread unemployment, huge fiscal deficits, and a declining national product. As a result, it would be almost currently impossible for any political leader to summon the political will needed to commit sufficient resources to deal effectively longer range global challenges. The overall American situation increasingly requires some serious structural moves, as well as crucial readjustments of policy. At present, there is no indication that either Obama or his advisors are thinking along these lines. There is no way that the United States can live up to the Obama promise, or more modestly, free itself from its current difficulties without at least taking the following fundamental steps: reducing its military expenditures by 50%, which means closing many foreign military bases, reducing drastically its global naval presence, and ending its program of nuclear defense and the militarization of space; it also means going all out for nuclear disarmament and the abandonment of counterinsurgency and preemptive/preventive war doctrines; and it would require an abrupt shift in economic policy from a reliance on capital-oriented neoliberalism to a people-oriented return to Keynesianism. Given the unlikelihood of moving decisively in these directions during this first Obama presidential term, it will be important to lower expectations so as to avoid cynicism and despair. At the same time critical independent voices must continue to call attention to these deeper challenges.

    Richard Falk is Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Our Nuclear Future

    Our Nuclear Future

    Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently delivered a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in which he addressed the future of nuclear weapons. He noted that some past US presidents that he had worked for during the Cold War – Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush – all expressed publicly their desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. But these presidents, he points out, along with other leading policymakers expressing a similar desire, “have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves: to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security – making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”

    This is the succinct argument he offers for maintaining an arsenal of nuclear weapons. It is based on two pillars: deterrence and assurance. I might note that two pillars provide a highly unstable platform. If we are to succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons globally, Gates’ argument needs to be carefully examined. I will begin with the argument he makes for deterrence. There are currently nine countries with nuclear weapons, but Gates refers to only three of these, plus a non-nuclear weapon state, as being candidates for deterrence. These are Russia, China, North Korea and Iran (which has no nuclear weapons).

    North Korea has very few nuclear weapons and thus it would take relatively few nuclear weapons to deter them. More important, North Korea has been willing to negotiate the elimination of its nuclear program in exchange for development assistance and security guarantees. So, in the case of North Korea, it seems reasonable to assume that they could be deterred with a very small arsenal of nuclear weapons, and there is a high probability that with the proper incentives and security guarantees they would eliminate their nuclear arsenal. If one accepts that the theory of deterrence is valid, the deterrent force would not need to exceed 10 nuclear weapons.

    Iran currently has no nuclear weapons. It has the capacity to enrich uranium, which could lead to a program to create nuclear weapons. Since an Iranian nuclear capacity would be destabilizing and dangerous, this potential could also require a small nuclear deterrent force on the order of 10 nuclear weapons. The current situation with Iran’s uranium enrichment program raises the question of double standards. While the US has turned a blind eye to the fissile material programs of, for example, India and Israel, it has sought to shut down Iran’s uranium enrichment. There is a need for applying a universal standard to programs generating weapons usable fissile materials. All such programs in all states are potentially dangerous and require strict and effective international control.

    The other two nuclear weapons states that Gates refers to are Russia and China. He notes that both countries are pursuing “strategic modernization programs,” but neglects to mention that they have been pushed in this direction by US missile defense programs, which both Russia and China view as giving the US a potential first-strike capability against them. From their perspective, they are strengthening their deterrent capacity in response to a US threat. Both Russia and China have been very vocal in expressing their concerns about the US missile defense program, but the US has waved aside their concerns.

    Gates is careful to point out that “we do not consider Russia or China as adversaries.” Given the opportunity this provides, the US should seek agreement with both countries to move the size of all nuclear arsenals to much lower levels and to take other steps that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by accident or design. Russia has in the past expressed a desire to move to lower levels of nuclear weapons than were agreed to in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), but thus far the US has put a floor at 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic weapons with the ability to keep more weapons in reserve. The US should seek immediate negotiations with Russia to move the number far lower, say to 1,000 each (in total) by the end of 2010, and to add verification provisions to the SORT agreement.

    China’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is below 500 at present, and they and India are the only countries to publicly proclaim a No First Use policy, meaning that they will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstance. Further, China does not keep its nuclear arsenal on high alert status, as do the US and Russia. China currently has only about 20 long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to US territory. The US should seek an agreement with Russia and China in which all three states commit to a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia should further agree to remove their nuclear arsenals from high alert status.

    The second pillar of Gates’ argument is assurance to allies and partners that they can feel secure under the US “nuclear umbrella” and do not need to develop their own nuclear arsenals. But if the US led the way in seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons, this would not be an issue. Ronald Reagan argued in relation to the US and Russia, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?” The same, it would seem, would hold true for the world. A world without nuclear weapons would be safer for all countries, including our allies and partners. Many of these allies, including Japan, have been active in building consensus in the United Nations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Secretary Gates goes on in his speech to throw in a few more arguments for maintaining the US nuclear arsenal. “Our nuclear arsenal,” he says, “helps deter enemies from using chemical and biological weapons.” Assuming this is correct and that nuclear weapons could be needed for this purpose, the number of weapons would not exceed the 10 or so needed to deter North Korea or Iran. Gates finds our nuclear arsenal to be “vital” for one further reason: “We simply cannot predict the future.” But this argument cuts both ways. If the US continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal, other countries are likely to pursue nuclear arsenals as well, making it more likely that these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist organizations and creating an even more dangerous future.

    Secretary Gates acknowledges the errors in security that have occurred with the US nuclear arsenal and argues that these problems are being addressed by new strengthened command structures. He leaves to our imaginations, though, what security problems may be going unattended in the nuclear arsenals of other countries. Gates worries about the “credibility” of our nuclear arsenal, based upon the “safety, security and reliability of our weapons.” He makes an interesting but common inversion in placing greater concern on the safety and security of the weapons than that of the people they are intended to protect. In fact, nuclear weapons cannot provide security to their possessors; they can only be used to threaten or massively destroy an opponent. It also seems unlikely that a potential adversary of the US would believe it could attack the US with impunity because it estimated that the US arsenal was something less than 100 percent reliable.

    In the end, Gates believes the US must rely upon a “credible deterrent,” as opposed to providing leadership to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. “To be blunt,” he says, “there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.” He seeks a modernization program that would include the revitalization of the US nuclear weapons infrastructure and the development of a new nuclear warhead, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which the Congress has turned down on several occasions. To follow the Gates plan would be to send a message to the rest of the world that the US, although the world’s most powerful state, finds nuclear weapons useful and will rely upon them for the foreseeable future. Rather than contributing to US security, this is a formula for promoting nuclear proliferation, which in the end will be harmful to US and global security.

    Gates summarizes his position in this way: “Try as we might, and hope as we will, the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact is a genie that cannot be put back in the bottle – at least for a very long time. While we have a long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons once and for all, given the world in which we live, we have to be realistic about that proposition.” It seems clear that Gates’ position is a self-fulfilling prophecy. In our current world, only the US, due to its enormous military might, can provide the necessary leadership to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. If US policymakers believe it cannot be done, that the “genie cannot be put back in the bottle,” it will not happen. On the other hand, if US policymakers adopted a different approach, one in which the US sought to end its reliance on nuclear weapons and pressed the other nuclear states to come along, the prospect of a world with zero nuclear weapons would become realistic.

    This does not mean unilateral US nuclear disarmament. It means a negotiated agreement for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. It would not be easy, but the alternative is to continue with the status quo and drift toward nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear weapons do not and cannot protect their possessors. Retaliation is not protection. All countries, including the US, would be more secure in a world without nuclear weapons. We can move cautiously, but we must move determinedly toward that goal. Only the US can lead the way.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor on the World Future Council.
  • President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States is a great moment for America and the world – a time of celebration and tears. The American people have chosen hope over fear, unity over division. In doing so, we have repudiated policies of violence, lawlessness and closed-door rule. We have restored hope and made possible the restoration of America’s credibility in the world.

    President-elect Obama has already made many statements about US nuclear policy during his long campaign for the presidency. The one I like best is: “A world without nuclear weapons is profoundly in America’s interest and the world’s interest. It is our responsibility to make the commitment, and to do the hard work to make this vision a reality. That’s what I’ve done as a Senator and a candidate, and that’s what I’ll do as President.”

    He has also said, “I will make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a central element of US nuclear policy.” He has also wisely stated that “if we want the world to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia must lead by example.” He has made clear that he does not seek unilateral disarmament, but that America must lead in achieving the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Among the specific steps for US leadership that the newly elected President emphasized in his campaign are the following:

    • lead an international effort to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons around the world;
    • strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
    • lock down the loose nuclear weapons that are out there right now;
    • secure all loose nuclear materials within four years;
    • immediately stand down all nuclear forces to be reduced under the Moscow Treaty and urge Russia to do the same;
    • seek Russia’s agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of the START I [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] before it expires in December 2009;
    • work with Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert;
    • work with other nuclear powers to reduce global nuclear weapons stockpiles dramatically by the end of his presidency;
    • stop the development of new nuclear weapons;
    • seek dramatic reductions in US and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material;
    • set a goal to expand the US-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global;
    • build a bipartisan consensus for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
    • cut investments in unproven missile defense systems; and
    • not weaponize space.

    President-elect Obama has proven himself a man of vision and integrity. For the first time since Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev met at the Reykjavik, Iceland Summit in 1986 and came close to reaching an agreement on abolishing nuclear weapons, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons appears to be within the realm of possibility. This will require presidential leadership, and the President-elect will need support and encouragement from the American people and from people throughout the world.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Joseph Rotblat- The Conscience of this Nuclear Age

    Abstract

    Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat was one of the most distinguished scientists and peace campaigners of the post second world war period. He made significant contributions to nuclear physics and worked on the development of the atomic bomb. He then became one of the world’s leading researchers into the biological effects of radiation. His life from the early 1950s until his death in August 2005 was devoted to the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace. For this he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995. His work in this area ranked with that of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell and this article is an attempt to summarise his life, achievements and outline his views on the moral responsibilities of the scientist. He is a towering intellectual figure and his contributions to mankind should be better known and more widely understood.

    Early life and times in Poland Joseph Rotblat was born to a Jewish family in Warsaw, Poland on November 4 1908 one of seven children (two not surviving child birth). His father, Zygmunt built up and ran a nationwide horse drawn carriage business, owned land and bred horses. His early years were spent in what was a prosperous household but circumstances changed at the outbreak of the First World War. Borders were closed and horses requisitioned leading to the failure of the business and poverty. After the end of the War he worked as a domestic electrician in Warsaw and had a growing ambition to become a physicist. Without formal education he won a place in the physics department of the Free University of Poland gaining an MA in 1932 and Doctor of Physics, University of Warsaw, 1938. He held the position of Research Fellow in the Radiation Laboratory of the Scientific Society of Warsaw and became assistant Director of the Atomic Physics Institute of the Free University of Poland in 1937. During this period he married a literature student, Tola Gryn. Before the outbreak of war, he had conducted experiments which showed that in the fission process neutrons were emitted. In early 1939 he envisaged that a large number of fissions could occur and if this happened within a sufficiently short period of time then

    considerable amounts of energy could be released. He went on to calculate that this process could occur in less than a microsecond and as a consequence would result in an explosion. The idea of an atomic bomb occurred to him in February 1939 (this is discussed in ‘My early years as a physicist in Poland’ reprinted in ‘War and Peace: The life and work of Sir Joseph Rotblat’ p39-55). Also in 1939 he was invited to study in Paris (through Polish connections with Marie Curie) and with James Chadwick at Liverpool University winner of the Nobel Prize for the discovery of the neutron. Chadwick was building a particle accelerator called a ‘cyclotron’ to study fundamental nuclear reactions and as he wanted to build a similar machine in Warsaw he decided to join Chadwick in Liverpool.

    Liverpool University

    Rotblat travelled to England alone in 1939 as he could not afford to support Tola there. At Liverpool University, Chadwick awarded him the Oliver Lodge Fellowship and now, with sufficient funds, returned home in the summer of 1939 with the intention of bringing his wife back to England. He planned to return to England in late August 1939 but Tola fell ill and he returned to Liverpool alone with the expectation that she would follow. However, war broke out as Poland was invaded by Germany on September 1 1939 and Tola was stranded. Rotblat made increasingly desperate attempts to bring her out of Poland through Belgium, Denmark or Italy but these attempts failed as borders closed across Europe. She is believed to have died in the inhumane conditions of the Warsaw Ghetto. This event affected him deeply for the rest of his life.

    Towards the end of 1939 he began experiments in Liverpool that demonstrated that the nuclear bomb was feasible, but it would require a massive technological effort to produce sufficient quantities of the Uranium isotope required to manufacture a bomb.

    Rotblat was wrestling with his conscience during this period and when back in England asked himself the question “What should I do? Should I begin to work or not ?” clearly meaning working on the bomb (see ‘Leaving the Bomb Project’ reprinted in Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace’ p281-288). He considered himself a ‘pure scientist’ and it was not right to work on weapons of mass destruction. However, he was well aware that other scientists need not necessarily share his convictions and in particular German scientists. Put simply, if Hitler had the bomb he would win the war. When Poland was overrun he decided to work on the bomb. His belief was that we needed to work on the bomb in order that it should not be used. In other words, if Hitler can have the bomb, then the only way in which we can prevent him from using it against us would be if we also had it and threatened to retaliate. And this was the argument which he used at the time to enable him, in all conscience, to begin to work. In the beginning of 1944 Rotblat went with the Chadwick group to Los Alamos, New Mexico to work on the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. He was to return to Liverpool in late 1944 and in 1945 to become Director of Research in Nuclear Physics following a series of dramatic and life changing events.

    Manhattan Project

    Rotblat arrived at Los Alamos in March 1944 and soon became ambivalent about his involvement and he made no significant contribution to the development of the bomb and even complained of having nothing to do (this is discussed in the British Library recorded interviews and stated explicitly by Brian Cathcart in his obituary in ‘The Independent’ 2 January 2002). However, this time at Los Alamos was the pivotal intellectual experience of his life while the loss of Tola can be seen as the central emotional experience. He said “I was in Los Alamos for less than a year. Well, I came in the beginning of 1944, and left by the end of 1944. As soon as I came to Los Alamos, I realised that my fear about the Germans making the bomb was ungrounded, because I could see the enormous effort which was required by the American(s), with all their resources practically intact, intact by the war – everything that you wanted was put into the effort. Even so, I could see that it’s still far away, and that by that time the war in Europe was showing that Hitler is going to be defeated, and I could see that probably the bomb won’t be ready; even that Hitler wouldn’t have it in any case. Therefore I could see this from the beginning, that my being there, in the light of the reason why I came to work on it, was not really justified. But nevertheless, I could not be sure that the Germans would not find a shortcut maybe and they could still make the bomb. Therefore I kept on working together with the other people, although I was very unhappy about having to work on it. But as soon as I learned, towards the end of 1944, that the Germans have abandoned the project, in fact a long time before, I decided that my presence there was no longer justified, and I resigned and I went back to England.”(see ‘Leaving the Bomb Project’ reprinted in Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace’ p281-288).

    Chadwick was highly concerned that a Briton was the first to leave the Manhattan Project and the Americans regarded him as a security risk. An incompetent effort was made to ‘fit him up’ as a Russian spy, fearing that he would fly to Russia (he had learned to fly while in America) and divulge the secrets of the bomb. The Americans continued to regard him as a security risk and he was denied an entry visa for many years.

    St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College

    Rotblat was appalled at the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Perhaps as a part of his reaction to the horrors of the atomic bomb he became interested in the medical uses of nuclear radiation. In 1950 he was appointed Professor of Physics to St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College until retirement in1976. During this period he made significant contributions (together with Professor Patricia Lindop) to the understanding of the effects of high energy radiation on mice. He built a 15 MeV electron linear accelerator to enable the study of the biological effects of high energy gamma rays on living organisms. He made significant contributions to the understanding of the effects of radiation on living organisms, especially those of fertility and aging. He also became interested in the effects of radiation from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In particular he researched the hazards associated the bone seeking isotope Strontium 90 with a view to establishing safe levels of exposure. He researched the nature of the fallout from the American nuclear test at Bikini Atoll and made public the type of bomb used (a fission fusion fission device) and the large amounts of radiation released. Rotblat became increasingly more politicised resulting in his growing involvement in the campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons, for which he is best known.

    Pugwash and Nuclear Disarmament

    In 1946, Rotblat took the lead in setting up the British Atomic Scientists Association to stimulate public debate and included many leading scientists. It adopted a non-political agenda and was wound down and ended in 1959, but Rotblat went on to be a founding member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He collaborated with Bertrand Russell and helped launch the “Russell-Einstein Manifesto” in 1955. Russell had written to Einstein saying that “eminent men of science should draw the attention of world leaders to the impending destruction of the human race” (The Russell-Einstein Manifesto reprinted in ‘Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace’ p263-266). The ‘Russell-Einstein Manifesto’ called for a conference of scientists to discuss nuclear disarmament and the abolition of war. This led to the first Pugwash conference in July 1957, funded by a Canadian railway millionaire, Cyrus Eaton, on the condition that it met at Eaton’s home in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. Twenty-one international scientists attended, together with a lawyer, from ten countries, East and West.

    Conferences followed almost once a year with most participants being distinguished scientists from Great Britain, the USA and Soviet Union. The key founding principle was that participants attended as individuals and not representatives of government. Observers, however, from organisations such as the United Nations, UNESCO were welcome. Rotblat was Secretary-General of Pugwash from 1957 to 1993, Chairman of British Pugwash from 1980 to 1988 and President of Pugwash from 1988 to 1997.

    Pugwash has never cultivated extensive publicity but has been highly influential and, for example, was instrumental in achieving agreement on the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Also, Pugwash can be credited with helping to establish links between the US and Vietnam in the late 1960s, the negotiation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Rotblat can claim credit for these landmark achievements.

    Conclusions

    Joseph Rotblat made massively important contributions to science, to combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of peace. Bertrand Russell, in his

    autobiography, summed up his work with these words: “He can have few rivals in the courage and integrity and complete self-abnegation with which he has given up his own career (in which, however, he still remains eminent) to devote himself to combating the nuclear peril as well as other, allied devils”. His achievements were recognised with the award in 1992, with Hans Bethe, of the Einstein Peace Prize. In 1995 he was elected to The Royal Society and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in the same year shared with the Pugwash Conferences. He was appointed KCMG in 1998. However, he could well have been most proud of Mikhail Gorbachev’s statement that Pugwash conferences and papers helped guide foreign policy resulting in the reduction in temperature of the Cold War.

    Joseph Rotblat at 89 said, “We scientists have to realise that what we are doing has an impact not only on the life of every individual, but also on the whole destiny of humankind…all of us who want to preserve the human race owe an allegiance to humanity; and it’s particularly the job of scientists, because most of the dangers to the world result from the work of scientists.” From his Nobel Lecture in Oslo, “the quest for a war free world has a basic purpose, survival. But if in the process, we learn to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than by compulsion, if in the process, we learn to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an excellent incentive to embark on this great task. But above all, remember your humanity (J. Rotblat ‘Remember Your Humanity’ reprinted in ‘Joseph Rotblat: Visionsry for Peace’ p315-322). Joseph Rotblat was a truly great man and the conscience of the Nuclear Age.

    References and sources

    Joseph Rotblat’s papers (some 4 tonnes in weight !) are currently being processed by the University of Bath and the archives will reside in Churchill College, Cambridge. I am told that this process will take about 2 more years to complete.

    I have used 2 sound archive resources:

    British Library Sound Archive (call number F7208). This is an exhaustive, some 20 hours, series of interviews given to Katherine Thompson in his own home between May 1999 and 2002. An invaluable source although full transcripts, to my knowledge, are not available.

    National Security Archive-Cold War Interviews (November 15,1998, Episode 8, SPUTNIK). This is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation of scientists and journalists providing a ‘home’ for former secret U.S. Government information obtained under The Freedom of Information Act. Full transcripts are available on the internet.

    ‘War and Peace: The Life and Work of Sir Joseph Rotblat’ edited by Peter Rowlands and Vincent Attwood. Liverpool University Press 2006.

    ‘Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace’ edited by R. Braun, R. Hinde, D. Krieger, H. Kroto, and S. Milne. Wiley-Vich 2007.

    ‘Joseph Rotblat: Influences, Scientific Achievements and Legacy’, Physics Education, 40, October 2008, in press.

     
    Dr. Martin Underwood is a member of Pugwash UK and was a colleague and friend of Joseph Rotblat.
  • Remembering Joseph Rotblat, Remembering Our Humanity

    Remembering Joseph Rotblat, Remembering Our Humanity

    Joseph Rotblat was one of the great men of our time. As a young physicist from Poland, Rotblat realized that it might be possible to create an atomic weapon and worried that the Germans might succeed in developing such a weapon before the Allied powers. Due to this realization and his belief that the Allied powers needed a deterrent to a possible Nazi bomb, Rotblat agreed to work during World War II on the British bomb project and then on the US Manhattan Project.

    When it became clear to him in late 1944 that the Germans would not succeed in creating an atomic weapon, Rotblat resigned from the Manhattan Project and returned to London. He was the only Allied scientist to resign from the bomb project as a matter of conscience. The following August, he read with shock that the American atomic weapons had been used on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He decided to devote the rest of his life to seeking the abolition of these terrible weapons. He would never again work on a weapon project. Instead, he found work as a nuclear physicist at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital in London.

    Joseph Rotblat was the youngest signer of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955. Most of his colleagues who signed the document were already Nobel laureates, and Bertrand Russell told Rotblat the he was sure that Rotblat would someday receive the prize. Rotblat was a founder and leader of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957 to bring together scientists from East and West. In these conferences, Rotblat carried forward the spirit of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto: “Remember your humanity and forget the rest.”

    Rotblat did indeed receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for his years of dedicated effort in seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. He was 87 years old at the time. He continued to speak out and be a powerful voice for abolishing nuclear weapons until his death in 2005 at the age of 96.

    I had the pleasure to know Joseph Rotblat and work closely with him. He was a man of enormous optimism. He believed in humanity and trusted that we would live up to our potential. He said on many occasions that his short-term goal was to abolish nuclear weapons, and his long-term goal was to abolish war. He believed that a world free of nuclear weapons was both desirable and feasible, and he patiently explained to all who would listen why this was so.

    November 4, 2008 marks the centennial of his birth. It is a good opportunity to pause and remember a man of great compassion and humanity. Above all, Joseph was kind and decent and was unwavering in his commitment to create a better world – a world in which humanity’s future was not threatened by the nuclear weapons that he had helped to create.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a Councilor on the World Future Council (www.worldfuturecouncil.org).

  • The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

    The following is the text of a speech delivered by the Secretary-General to the East-West Institute on October 24, 2008

    Mr. John Edwin Mroz, President and CEO of the East-West Institute,

    Mr. George Russell, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East-West Institute.

    Dr. Kissinger,

    Dr. ElBaradei,

    Mr. Duarte,

    It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to the United Nations. I salute the East-West Institute and its partner non-governmental groups for organizing this event on weapons of mass destruction and disarmament.

    This is one of the gravest challenges facing international peace and security. So I thank the East-West Institute for its timely and important new global initiative to build consensus. Under the leadership of George Russell and Martti Ahtisaari, the East-West Institute is challenging each of us to rethink our international security priorities in order to get things moving again. You know, as we do, that we need specific actions, not just words. As your slogan so aptly puts it, you are a “think and do tank”.

    One of my priorities as Secretary-General is to promote global goods and remedies to challenges that do not respect borders. A world free of nuclear weapons would be a global public good of the highest order, and will be the focus of my remarks today. I will speak mainly about nuclear weapons because of their unique dangers and the lack of any treaty outlawing them. But we must also work for a world free of all weapons of mass destruction.

    Some of my interest in this subject stems from my own personal experience. As I come from [the Republic of Korea, my country has suffered the ravages of conventional war and faced threats from nuclear weapons and other WMD. But of course, such threats are not unique to my country.

    Today, there is support throughout the world for the view that nuclear weapons should never again be used because of their indiscriminate effects, their impact on the environment and their profound implications for regional and global security. Some call this the nuclear “taboo”.

    Yet nuclear disarmament has remained only an aspiration, rather than a reality. This forces us to ask whether a taboo merely on the use of such weapons is sufficient.

    States make the key decisions in this field. But the United Nations has important roles to play. We provide a central forum where states can agree on norms to serve their common interests. We analyze, educate and advocate in the pursuit of agreed goals.

    Moreover, we have pursued general and complete disarmament for so long that it has become part of the Organization’s very identity. Disarmament and the regulation of armaments are found in the Charter. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, in London in 1946, called for eliminating “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. These goals have been supported by every Secretary-General. They have been the subject of hundreds of General Assembly resolutions, and have been endorsed repeatedly by all our Member States.

    And for good reason. Nuclear weapons produce horrific, indiscriminate effects. Even when not used, they pose great risks. Accidents could happen any time. The manufacture of nuclear weapons can harm public health and the environment. And of course, terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear material.

    Most states have chosen to forgo the nuclear option, and have complied with their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet some states view possession of such weapons as a status symbol. And some states view nuclear weapons as offering the ultimate deterrent of nuclear attack, which largely accounts for the estimated 26,000 that still exist.

    Unfortunately, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has proven to be contagious. This has made non-proliferation more difficult, which in turn raises new risks that nuclear weapons will be used.

    The world remains concerned about nuclear activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in Iran. There is widespread support for efforts to address these concerns by peaceful means through dialogue.

    There are also concerns that a “nuclear renaissance” could soon take place, with nuclear energy being seen as a clean, emission-free alternative at a time of intensifying efforts to combat climate change. The main worry is that this will lead to the production and use of more nuclear materials that must be protected against proliferation and terrorist threats.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    The obstacles to disarmament are formidable. But the costs and risks of its alternatives never get the attention they deserve. But consider the tremendous opportunity cost of huge military budgets. Consider the vast resources that are consumed by the endless pursuit of military superiority.

    According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditures last year exceeded $1.3 trillion. Ten years ago, the Brookings Institution published a study that estimated the total costs of nuclear weapons in just one country?the United States?to be over $5.8 trillion, including future cleanup costs. By any definition, this has been a huge investment of financial and technical resources that could have had many other productive uses.

    Concerns over such costs and the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons have led to a global outpouring of ideas to breathe new life into the cause of nuclear disarmament. We have seen the WMD Commission led by Hans Blix, the New Agenda Coalition and Norway’s seven-nation initiative. Australia and Japan have just launched the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Civil society groups and nuclear-weapon states have also made proposals.

    There is also the Hoover plan. I am pleased to note the presence here today of some of that effort’s authors. Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Kampelman: allow me to thank you for your commitment and for the great wisdom you have brought to this effort.

    Such initiatives deserve greater support. As the world faces crises in the economic and environmental arenas, there is growing awareness of the fragility of our planet and the need for global solutions to global challenges. This changing consciousness can also help us revitalize the international disarmament agenda.

    In that spirit, I hereby offer a five-point proposal.

    First, I urge all NPT parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon-states, to fulfil their obligation under the treaty to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

    They could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations. Upon the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia, I have circulated to all UN member states a draft of such a convention, which offers a good point of departure.

    The nuclear powers should actively engage with other states on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The world would also welcome a resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation aimed at deep and verifiable reductions of their respective arsenals.

    Governments should also invest more in verification research and development. The United Kingdom’s proposal to host a conference of nuclear-weapon states on verification is a concrete step in the right direction.

    Second, the Security Council’s permanent members should commence discussions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on nuclear disarmament. Non-NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-weapon capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments.

    My third initiative relates to the “rule of law.” Unilateral moratoria on nuclear tests and the production of fissile materials can go only so far. We need new efforts to bring the CTBT into force, and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately, without preconditions. I support the entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I encourage the nuclear-weapon states to ratify all the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I strongly support efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. And I urge all NPT parties to conclude their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to voluntarily adopt the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol. We should never forget that the nuclear fuel cycle is more than an issue involving energy or non-proliferation; its fate will also shape prospects for disarmament.

    My fourth proposal concerns accountability and transparency. The nuclear-weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing to pursue these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. I invite the nuclear-weapon states to send such material to the UN Secretariat, and to encourage its wider dissemination. The nuclear powers could also expand the amount of information they publish about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements. The lack of an authoritative estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons testifies to the need for greater transparency.

    Fifth and finally, a number of complementary measures are needed. These include the elimination of other types of WMD; new efforts against WMD terrorism; limits on the production and trade in conventional arms; and new weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons. The General Assembly could also take up the recommendation of the Blix Commission for a “World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction”.

    Some doubt that the problem of WMD terrorism can ever be solved. But if there is real, verified progress in disarmament, the ability to eliminate this threat will grow exponentially. It will be much easier to encourage governments to tighten relevant controls if a basic, global taboo exists on the very possession of certain types of weapons. As we progressively eliminate the world’s deadliest weapons and their components, we will make it harder to execute WMD terrorist attacks. And if our efforts also manage to address the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that aggravate terrorist threats, so much the better.

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    At the United Nations in 1961, President Kennedy said, “Let us call a truce to terror?. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.”

    The keys to world peace have been in our collective hands all along. They are found in the UN Charter and in our own endless capacity for political will. The proposals I have offered today seek a fresh start not just on disarmament, but to strengthen our system of international peace and security.

    We must all be grateful for the contributions that many of the participants at this meeting have already made in this great cause. When disarmament advances, the world advances. That is why it has such strong support at the United Nations. And that is why you can count on my full support in the vital work that lies ahead.

    Thank you very much for your support.

    Ban Ki-moon is Secretary-General of the United Nations.

  • The United Nations: Challenges and Leadership

    To dream of vast horizons of the Soul Through dreams made whole, Unfettered, free — help me! Help me make our world anew. – Langston Hughes

    The United Nations remains the only universally representative body the world has to deal with threats to international peace and security. However, the nature of the threats to international security has changed, and the United Nations, just as the national governments which make it up, have difficulty meeting these new challenges. The United Nations was born with the start of the Cold War. In the early months of 1945, it was obvious that Nazi Germany would be defeated and that the Soviet Union would be facing the three Western allies: the USA, the UK and France in that order. The war with Japan, while important militarily, never had the same intellectual impact on the drafters of the UN Charter as had the war on Germany. At the creation of the United Nations, there was a two-pronged view of security. One prong looked to disputes which can lead to aggression and which must be met by cooperative military action through the Security Council. The second prong focused upon the need for social and economic advancement of all peoples. This two-pronged approach arose from an analysis of the events leading to the Second World War: territorial disputes which led to armed aggression and a world-wide economic crisis which led to political dictatorships and nationalistic economic policies which prevented cooperative action . William Rappard, Swiss historian and participant-observer of the League of Nations wrote early in 1946 “The UN was born of and during a great war. The founders of the organization were both the initial, pacific victims of, and the final, complete victors over, the bellicose foes whose wanton aggression had obliged them to fight in self-defense. The consequence of the belligerent origin of the UN is, in my eyes, its hierarchic structure, its authoritarian spirit, and the unpacified and militant character of the most significant provisions of the Charter. In war there is and there can be no equality of nations. The powerful command and the weak obey…that is why the San Francisco Charter, drafted as it was by the belligerent allies before the end of the hostilities, much as it speaks of the sovereign equality of states violates that principle to a degree unknown in all previous annals of international law. It not only distributes influence according to importance as did the Covenant of the League of Nations by recognizing the privileged position of the permanent members of the Council. But, what is much more debatable, the Charter further creates two distinct sets of rights and duties. It, in fact, places the five great powers above the law laid down for the others, a procedure for which there is, to my knowledge, neither precedent in the law of nations, nor analogy in any liberal national constitution. Not only is the international aristocracy of the powerful recognized as such in the Charter and endowed with almost unlimited authority over the underprivileged masses, but its individual members are assured of almost unlimited impunity in case of violation of their pacific covenants. It is therefore not cynicism but only clearsightedness to note that the freedom of the underprivileged members of the UN is conditioned by the disunity of their privileged masters.” The disunity among the privileged masters — the five permanent members of the Security Council — has far exceeded what was predicted in 1946, although some analysts foresaw difficulties from the start. Stefan Possony writing in the Yale Law Journal also in 1946 noted that “While the Charter may offer protection against small dangers, it offers none against the chief danger — war between the big powers. The UN will possibly be able to prevent some wars, especially those which break out without being willed by anybody. That the UN will be able to master the great crises of history and prevent those major wars which are provoked deliberately by powerful nations is doubtful; in fact, it is highly improbable… We have seen that attempts to outlaw war must, in some way or other, be based upon the sanctity of the status quo,, at least as long as there are no effective methods of peaceful change.” Although the Soviet Union was widely considered as a “revolutionary” government, its main aim, as that of the Western states, was to maintain the status quo and the current division of power. The Cold War structured international relations, and although there were dangerous moments and an expensive arms build up, the period 1945 -1990 was one of little change and, with the exception of the 1950-1953 Korean War, few cases of cross-frontier aggression where the Security Council could act. The end of formal colonialism brought a multitude of new states into the UN. There was little change in UN structures. The aim stressed by the states of the Third World of “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” were part of the UN’s goals from the start. While much of the UN system is devoted to helping the developing world, there were few changes in the dominant socio-economic system during the Cold War period. As Gwynne Dyer noted “The United Nations was not founded by popular demand. It was created by governments who were terrified by where the existing system was leading them, and could not afford to ignore the grim realities of the situation by taking refuge in the comforting myths about independence and national security that pass for truth in domestic political discourse. The people who actually have the responsibility for running foreign policy in most countries, and especially in the great powers, know that the present international system is in potentially terminal trouble, and many of them have drawn the necessary conclusion.” It was the break up of the Soviet Union along with the disintegration of Yugoslavia that put an end to Cold War structures and their ideological justifications. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has had difficulty in finding its role in the intra-state conflicts which have followed such as those in former Yugoslavia, Chechenya, and in several African states. The UN’s current difficulties are a reflection of the tests and trials of humanity moving toward a world civilization where the forces of world unity play a more dominant role than the forces of separation and of limited solidarities. Since its establishment, the crucial role of the United Nations has been to lay the foundations of such a world civilization based on world law and justice. Due to the awareness-building efforts of the UN, an ever larger number of people see their lives in a cooperative focus rather than a confrontational one. There are four closely related challenges which must be met by the UN system: The first is the globalization of the world economy. The world economy is becoming more globalized than ever, though its working is hardly understood, and it is without direction or control. Thus, there must be better policy coherence and cooperation between the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, multilateral bodies, and the private sector which is the motor of globalization. The second challenge, closely related to the first, is the need for ecologically-sound development with a particular emphasis on the need to reduce the number of people living in poverty and without access to basic services: shelter, water and food, education, health, and employment. The third challenge is to deal effectively with new forms of violence, in particular intra-state conflict. Such conflicts and the resultant refugee flows are not merely a separation from the old home and community but also from the customary restraints and humane values that hold people together in settled circumstances. The fourth challenge, closely related to the third, is increased respect for the rule of law and human rights. To meet these four challenges, we need leadership. As D. Rudhyar noted “We must summon from within us the courage to meet, with open eyes and minds free of archaic allegiances, the present-day release of unparalleled and utterly transforming potentialities for planet-wide rebirth.” Enlightened leadership with clear vision and with political courage in articulating the way the world has changed and the directional flow of the next cycle is needed. Such leadership within the UN Secretariat, within national governments and within non-governmental organizations will improve the quality of the United Nations so that it will be a transformed instrument for the benefit of all the world’s people.

    René Wadlow is Representative to the UN, Geneva, Association of World Citizens.

  • Inside Hanford: A Trip to America’s Most Toxic Place

    This article was originally published at Counter Punch St. Clair’s book “Born Under a Bad Sky: Notes From the Dark Side of the Earth” can be purchased from www.amazon.com.

    The outback of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in eastern Washington State is called the T-Farm. It’s a rolling expanse of high desert sloping toward the last untamed reaches of the Columbia River. The “T” stands for tanks—huge single-hulled containers buried some fifty feet beneath basalt volcanic rock and sand holding, the lethal detritus of Hanford’s fifty-year run as the nation’s H-bomb factory.

    Those tanks had an expected lifespan of thirty-five years; the radioactive gumbo inside them has a half-life of 250,000 years. Dozens of those tanks have now started to corrode and leak, releasing the most toxic material on earth—plutonium and uranium-contaminated sludge and liquid—on an inexorable path toward the Columbia River, the world’s most productive salmon fishery and the source of irrigation water for the farms and orchards of the Inland Empire, centered on Spokane in eastern Washington.

    Internal documents from the Department of Energy and various private contractors working at Hanford reveal that at least one million gallons of radioactive sludge have already leaked out of at least sixty-seven different tanks. Those tanks and others continue to leak and, according to these sources, the leaks are getting much larger.

    One internal report shows the results from a borehole drilled into the ground between two of Hanford’s largest tanks. Using gamma spectrometry, geologists detected a fifty-fold increase in contamination between 1996 and 2002. The leak from those tanks, and perhaps an underground pipeline, was described as “insignificant” a decade ago. Six years later that radioactive dribble had swelled up into a “continuous plume” of highly radioactive Cesium-137.

    Obviously, there’s been a major radioactive breach from those tanks, but to date the Department of Energy has refused to publicly report the incident. Even though it was reported by their own geologists.

    A few hundred yards away, a tank called TY-102, the third largest tank at Hanford, is also leaking. Radioactive water is draining out of this single-hulled container and a broken subsurface pipe into what geologists call the “vadose zone,” the stratum of subsurface soil just above the water table. In an internal 1998 report, the Grand Junction Office of the DOE detected significant contamination forty-two to fifty-two feet below the surface, and concluded in a memo to Hanford managers that the “high levels of gamma radiation” came from “a subsurface source” of Cesium-137, which likely resulted from leakage from tank TY-102.”

    This alarming report was swiftly buried by Hanford officials. So, too, was the evidence of leakage at tanks TY-103 and TY-106. Instead, the DOE publicly declared that portion of the tank farm to be “controlled, clean and stable.”

    No surprises here. The long-standing strategy of the DOE has been to conceal any evidence of radioactive leaking at Hanford, a policy that was excoriated in a 1980 internal review by the department’s Inspector General, which concluded that “Hanford’s existing waste management policies and practices have themselves sufficed to keep publicity about possible tank leaks to a minimum.”

    Needless to say, the Reagan years didn’t augur a new forthrightness from the people who run Hanford. Seven years and several congressional hearings after the Inspector General’s report was released, bureaucratic cover-up and public denial were still the DOE’s operational reflex to any disturbing data bubbling up out of Hanford’s boreholes. By 1987, Hanford officials had learned an important lesson in the art of concealment: The easiest way to avoid bad press and public hostility is to simply stop monitoring sites that seemed the most likely to produce unpleasant information.

    It is now clear that the tanks began leaking as early as 1956, only a few years after the Atomic Energy Commission began pumping the poisonous sludge into the giant subterranean containers. It is also clear that the federal government covered up evidence of those leaks since the moment it learned of them.

    How many tanks are leaking? How far has the contamination spread? The DOE isn’t talking. It isn’t even looking for answers. But geologists estimated that the faster migrating contaminants, such as uranium, will move from the groundwater beneath Hanford’s central plateau to the Columbia in something like twenty-five years. That means that the first traces of radiated water could have started seeping into the Columbia in 2001.

    This reckless strategy persists. In a document called “Official Characterization Plan of Hanford”—essentially a kind of 3-D map of contamination at the site—the DOE chose not to include Cobalt-60, a highly radioactive material that is present at deep levels across the tank farm. In addition, the Hanford plan fails to mention the fact that its own surveys have shown large amounts of Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60 forming radioactive pools in the geological stratum, called the plio-pleistocene unit, the last barrier between Hanford’s soils and water table.

    If the DOE remains locked onto this course it will never acknowledge or even investigate the potentially lethal flow of radioactivity toward the great river of the West. That’s because the managers of Hanford say they will only research potential leaks if they detect a level of contamination several times higher than that ever recorded at Hanford—a standard clearly designed to shield them from ever having to pursue any subsurface leak investigation or publicly admit the existence of such leaks.

    To help Hanford’s managers avoid ever discovering such embarrassing leaks, the site plan calls for them to drill the penetrometer holes, through which contamination is measured, only to a depth of forty feet—or two feet above the bottom of the tanks, guaranteeing that they will avoid picking up any radioactive traces from the region of the most dangerous contamination.

    There’s a reason the Hanford managers want the public to believe that most of the contamination at the site is limited to the surface terrain. Theoretically, the topsoil can be scooped up and, with large government contracts, transferred to a more secure site or zapped into a glass-like substance through the big vitrification center now under construction. There’s no way to de-contaminate groundwater or the Columbia River. Their only hope for containment is to contain the issue politically by plumbing the leaks from whistleblowers.

    There’s no question that the subsurface leakage is serious, extensive, and dangerous. The internal survey of Hanford by the Grand Junction Office detected high levels of C-137 deeper than 100 feet below the surface—and sixty feet deeper than the current plan calls for probing. That report concluded that both C-137 and CO-60 had “reached groundwater in this area of the tank farm.”

    Consider this. C-137 is a slow traveling contaminant. How far have faster moving radioactive materials, such as uranium, spread? No one knows. No one is even looking.

    The DOE and Hanford’s contractors want to close down the C Quadrant of the tank farm and declare it cleaned up, even though more than 10 percent of the waste at that site remains in tanks with documented leaks. There is mounting evidence that a plume of Tritium-contaminated sludge has recently penetrated the groundwater there as well.

    John Brodeur is one of the nation’s top environmental engineers and a world-class geologist. In 1997, after a whistleblower at Hanford disclosed evidence that the groundwater beneath the central plateau had been contaminated by plumes of radioactivity, Hazel O’Leary commissioned Brodeur to investigate how far the contamination had spread. It proved to be a nearly impossible assignment since the DOE and its contractors had taken extreme measures to conceal the data or avoid collecting it entirely.

    A decade later, Brodeur has once again been asked to assess the situation at one of the most contaminated sites on earth, this time for the environmental group Heart of the Northwest. His conclusions are disturbing.

    “There remains much that we don’t know about the subsurface contamination plumes at Hanford,” says John Brodeur. “The only way to solve this dilemma is to identify what we don’t know up front and get it out on the table for discussion. This is difficult to do in the chilling work environment where bad data are commonplace, lies of omission are standard practice and people lose their jobs because they disagreed with some of the long-held institutional myths at Hanford.”

    This essay is adapted from a chapter in Born Under a Bad Sky: Notes from the Dark Side of the Earth (CounterPunch/AK Press).

    Jeffrey St. Clair is the author of Been Brown So Long It Looked Like Green to Me: the Politics of Nature and Grand Theft Pentagon. His newest books, Born Under a Bad Sky and Red State Rebels: Tales of Grassroots Resistance in the Heartland (co-edited with Joshua Frank) are just out from AK Press. He can be reached at: sitka@comcast.net.