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  • Can President Obama Change Nukes Policy?

    Originally published at truthout.org

    What should the world expect from the new US president on the nuclear front?

    The question may sound distant and largely disconnected from the current context, where the financial crisis looms as his administration’s first priority. No one can be blamed, however, for raising it, as nuclear weapons form one of the main issues on which Barack Obama differentiated himself clearly from his rivals – during the battle for the Democratic nomination as well as the war for the presidency.

    Obama did so dramatically on August 2, 2007, when confronted with a query about use of the ultimate weapon in the war on terror and against proliferation. He declared: “I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance.” He then added: “Involving civilians.”

    Obama then said, “There’s been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That’s not on the table.” That brought reactions bordering on ridicule. “It’s naive to say,” sneered a dismissive John McCain, “that we will never use nuclear weapons.” Hillary Clinton came out with a stronger-than-Republican rebuff: “”Presidents should be very careful at all times in discussing the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. Presidents since the Cold War have used nuclear deterrence to keep the peace. And I don’t believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.”

    “Presidents,” she added for good measure, ” never take the nuclear option off the table.”

    As president now, will Obama keep the terrible option off the table? This and other questions of his nuclear outlook reflect more than ideal curiosity in regions on which the new president’s foreign policy focuses. In South Asia, one of such regions, the questions acquire added urgency.

    Before coming to the region with two nuclear-armed rivals, a little more about what Obama has let the world know so far about his mind on the weapons of mass destruction that provided only an excuse for war to his predecessor.

    In Obama’s inaugural address, the subject figured only in the sentence: “With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet.” He, however, had made clearer promises during the campaign.

    In a speech at DePaul University in Chicago in October 2007, he added his voice to an anti-nuke plan endorsed earlier by a bipartisan group of former government officials from the Cold War era, including Henry Kissinger. The group had wanted the US to start building a global consensus to reverse a reliance on nuclear weapons that had become “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.” Obama set a goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in the world, adding that the US must greatly reduce its stockpile of nuclear arms as well.

    Speaking at Purdue University in Indiana in July 2008, he declared: “It’s time to send a clear message to the world: America seeks a world with no nuclear weapons.” He added: “As long as nuclear weapons exist, we’ll retain a strong deterrent. But we’ll make the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy.”

    The promises compelled attention because of the contrast they presented to what the world had been hearing from the White House. As a summary by the New York-headquartered Natural Resources Defense Council put it years ago: “The Bush administration assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of US military forces at least for the next 50 years. Starting from this premise it is planning an extensive and expensive series of programs to sustain and modernize the existing force and to begin studies for a new ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile) to be operational in 2020, a new SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) and SSBM (surface-to-surface ballistic missile) in 2030, and a new heavy bomber in 2040, as well as new warheads for all of them.”

    Nuclear weapons were to continue to play a “critical role” because they possess “unique properties” that provide “credible military options” for holding at risk “a wide range of target types” important to a potential adversary’s threatened use of “weapons of mass destruction” or “large-scale conventional military force.” The neocon regime wanted a return of the US to nuclear testing, even as Bush promoted the idea of battlefield nukes like bunker-busters.

    Obama has never disowned the general declarations of his intent on nuclear disarmament, but has increasingly been couching it in anti-terrorist terms. A more detailed “foreign policy agenda” delineated on the White House web site cites terrorism as the top-priority target of his administration’s plan of action in this area.

    After recalling Obama’s record as a senator in taking congressional action to counter “the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes,” the agenda states: “Obama and (Vice President Joseph) Biden will secure all loose nuclear materials in the world within four years. While working to secure existing stockpiles of nuclear material, Obama and Biden will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. This will deny terrorists the ability to steal or buy loose nuclear materials.”

    The agenda is silent on US fears of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, but these continue to be voiced. Threats of American efforts to “take out” Pakistan’s nuclear arms have been heard, from time to time, ever since the fall of the military regime of Pervez Musharraf, presumed somehow to have made these weapons pilferage-proof. Apprehensions in that regard have been revived after David Sanger’s article earlier this month, based on his book, “The Worst Pakistan Nightmare for Obama.”

    Pakistan’s army and its civilian government have hastened to assure the US of the safety and security of their nuclear weapons. The Pakistani media have made clear a public resentment, which Islamabad could not officially articulate, over the implications of what are seen as Washington-Pentagon insinuations. Indignant note is made of the fact that, while there is panic over Pakistan’s weapons, India’s nuclear arsenal is not seen as a serious problem at all.

    The second task listed in the agenda – strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – has an India link, too. The agenda, however, takes no note of the blow that, according to the world peace movement, the US-India nuclear deal has dealt the treaty distinguished for its increasing brittleness over the years.

    Instead, the agenda says: “Obama and Biden will crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions.” To many, the formulation would seem to reflect the false priorities that have weakened the “world nuclear order” that the NPT allegedly represents.

    The only way to strengthen the treaty would seem to lie in serious and sincere action by the leading nuclear powers on Article VI of the NPT. The provision, introduced under international pressure, says: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    The agenda, in fairness to its formulators, addresses this issue as well. Talking of the third task of the new administration on the nuclear weapons front, the document says: “Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in US and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the US-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.”

    This, however, is easier said than done. A weighty Bush legacy of nuclear militarism is waiting to be lived down. Officially, the Obama administration is bound to an extent by the interim report of a bipartisan congressional commission, released as recently as last month, which talks about the US teetering “on the brink of losing the capability to maintain its nuclear weapons.”

    The new president cannot listen to this argument and make the nuclear leap he has promised. Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Association offers a strikingly different counsel: “If Obama directs the Pentagon to conduct a congressionally mandated nuclear posture review on the basis of this ‘core deterrence’ mission, then Washington and Moscow could each slash their respective arsenals to 1,000 or fewer total warheads. This would open the way for Obama to fulfill his campaign pledge …”

    Obama faces a challenge to his drive for a change in the US nukes policy not only from the old policies he seeks to discard, but also from personalities whom he prefers to retain in the administration. Reports about a conflict of views on a crucial issue between him and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have not been officially rebutted so far. Gates continues to press for a reliable replacement warhead (RRW) program, while the president’s agenda (quoted above) asserts without ambiguity that the new administration “will stop the development of new nuclear weapons.”

    Obama has shown courage in acting for the closure of the Guantanamo torture chambers, in defiance of powerful defenders of “anti-terrorist” atrocities. Will he move forward towards nuclear disarmament in the face of inevitable opposition from the military-industrial complex?

  • President Obama and the Ballistic Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe

    Overview

    Will nuclear weapons remain a key instrument to reinforce American national security? The dawning of a new American leadership has aroused much curiosity within the international community: how will President Obama respond to the planned American ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe? This analysis seeks to answer the following questions concerning President Obama’s position on the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and prospects on future Russo-American relations:

    • How has the BMD project redefined Russo-American relations?
    • Should this plan go ahead, what implications would it have on the international community?
    • How can President Obama maintain global stability?

    Background

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by Eastern Europe’s hasty departure from Moscow’s periphery. To quickly integrate these former Soviet satellites under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) security umbrella, the Alliance initiated the Partnership-for-Peace program, which served as a stepping stone towards full NATO membership. This was seen as an aggressive encroachment into Russia’s immediate periphery and drastically tipped Eastern Europe’s delicate power balance. With clashing regional security interests and some 3,000 Russian and American nuclear weapons remaining on high (hair-trigger) alert, it has become ever so critical to revisit or replace major nonproliferation accords: the 1972 Antiballistic Treaty (from which President Bush withdrew in 2001), 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (suspended by Russia in 2007), 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (expires in December 2009), and 2002 Treaty of Moscow (scheduled to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles to 1,700 to 2,200 per country by 2012). Still, existing weaknesses of these accords paralyze the international community from eliminating nuclear weapons altogether: reduction cannot be reliably verified and the lack of a requirement to dismantle the weapons allows the U.S. and Russia to simply keep the weapons in storage.

    On the American side, while President Bill Clinton was hesitant about NATO’s eastward expansion, his successor’s defense policies considerably deteriorated Russo-American relations. In particular, President George W. Bush’s strong push of the BMD system in Eastern Europe has rekindled a dangerous Cold War mentality of distrust and rivalry. Despite fervent objections from the Russian side and European public leaders, NATO members meeting at the April 2008 summit reluctantly endorsed Washington’s controversial plan to install the BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

    Even as U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) experts questioned its effectiveness, the Bush administration claimed that the missile shield’s “purely defensive capabilities” would allow the U.S. to respond to any potential attack on its chief ally, Europe, from “dangerous and unpredictable regimes” like Iran. President Bush explained in 2007, “Instead of spending decades trying to develop a perfect shield, we decided to begin deploying missile defense capabilities as soon as the technology was proven ready — and then build on that foundation by adding new capabilities as they matured.”1 Poland plans to host ten interceptor missiles in exchange for significant U.S. military assistance. The Czech Republic plans to host a related tracking radar system designed to identify and shoot down missiles. Tests and developments on the project are already costing $10 billion annually, the Pentagon’s largest procurement program.2

    As the BMD project progresses, Moscow has warned of retaliation. President Dmitrii Medvedev chose to postpone his State of the Union speech until the day after the U.S. presidential election to criticize America’s missile shield plan. In recent months, he has intensified the testing and mass production of advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles specifically designed to penetrate antiballistic shields such as the Bulava and Russian RS-24.3 More relevant is a proposal to install mobile Iskander missiles in Kalingrad, Russia’s southern enclave bordering Poland. Clearly, these weapons will be capable of destroying America’s proposed interceptor missiles in Poland. Furthermore, Medvedev plans to utilize radio equipment to intercept Washington’s planned defense system. Seeking to compromise, the Bush administration offered to allow Russian observers at the planned BMD sites, but President Medvedev swiftly rejected the offer.
    Again disregarding Russia’s opposition to the project, on December 5, 2008, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency tested its “largest, most complex” $120-150 million long-range ballistic missiles from Vandenberg Air Force Base in Southern California. This was the first remote launching of an expansively coordinated experimental project incorporating multiple systems from various branches of the armed forces. While the agency immediately declared success, claiming that “all its components performed as designed,” there were several notable deficiencies associated with the test. This missile test actually failed to “release countermeasures designed to try to confuse the interceptor missile like decoys or chaff to throw off an incoming interceptor.”4 Since these tests began in 2001, many have failed or been scaled back because of technical problems. Adding to these are the unpredictability of missile attacks and unreliability of a missile shield. This leads us to ask: how reliable are the Bush administration and MDA’s “successful” missile tests and are they worth an annual cost of $10 billion?5 Costs of the United States’ missile defense program in the past 25 years have accrued to at least $150 billion.6

    Analysis

    Russia remains committed to a “reactive” foreign policy. With the Kalingrad plan, President Medvedev aims to “neutralize – if necessary – the [American] anti-missile system”. Furthermore, he is confident in Russian technological superiority that would counter any incoming missile attack. He recently asserted that “the Americans will never be able to implement this scenario, because Russian strategic nuclear forces, including the Strategic Missile Forces, will be capable of delivering a strike of retribution under any course of developments.” To take this a step further, President Medvedev announced in early December a comprehensive upgrade of Russia’s missile program. New developments would include the RS-24 missiles specifically designed to counter space-based missile attacks as well as penetrate any missile shield.

    What explains Russia’s intensified reaction? Eastern Europe is strategically positioned at the heart of continental Europe. Washington’s increasingly intimate relations with Poland and the Czech Republic is seen as an intrusion into Russia’s “near-abroad” and traditional sphere of influence. Iran recently announced that it produced and tested missiles capable of hitting southern Europe, but experts remain skeptical as there is not much concrete evidence to support this claim. More notably, the ballistic missile plan explicitly targets space-based military weaponry, and with Russia as the only country with technological capability to develop such advanced weaponry, one could assume that the missile shield targets Russia.

    After European leaders heavily criticized Russia’s proposed missile plan in Kalingrad, both the Russian political and military leadership requested renewed Russo-U.S. relations and invited the new American leadership to engage in deeper dialogue and cooperation on European security. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has expressed renewed hope in cooperating with his new American counterpart, suggesting that new U.S. leadership would unfold a fresh chapter in Russo-American relations, “We very much hope that these changes will be positive. We are now seeing these positive signals.” Obama’s cautious stance on the ballistic missile defense plan has attracted much attention from the Russian leadership; he explains, “If we want the world to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia must lead by example… We cannot and should not accept the threat of accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.”7 While the Russian leadership anxiously awaits concrete actions, Prime Minister Medvedev also states, “If it’s not just words, if they are transformed into practical policy, we will respond accordingly…we will not do anything until America does the first step.”8

    Obama, throughout his presidential campaign, persistently reiterated two primary global concerns: nuclear terrorist attacks and nuclear weapons proliferation by rogue states. He envisioned the U.S. taking up global leadership to denuclearize to allow for “a world in which there are no nuclear weapons” and promised more commitment and funding towards nuclear nonproliferation, which he calls “the most urgent threat to the security of America and the world.” To move toward this nuclear-free world vision, the Obama administration hopes to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty aimed at reducing nuclear weapons and materials by limiting nuclear development, testing, and proliferation. In addition, the Obama administration has outlined plans to cooperate with Russia to remove thousands of nuclear weapons from operational readiness, or hair-trigger alert, to avoid the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch. To allow for an actual chance for a nuclear-free world, the President-elect staunchly believes that Russo-American cooperation is integral to leading a global effort.

    According to Obama, in the immediate future, any American unilateral nuclear disarmament would prove futile and enormously dangerous to American national security. 9 His foreign policy statement says, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, we’ll retain a strong nuclear deterrent.”10 President Obama singles out “dangerous” regimes, notably Iran and Korea, whose nuclear missile developments could lead to a global nuclear catastrophe. Because of this, he acknowledges that a missile defense system would still serve as a vital security shield to strategic America’s European partners. However, the President urges against any “premature” deployment of the missile system but would support the missile plan only after “vigorous testing” has proven the system’s operational effectiveness. In the long run, he warns that such a plan would certainly produce highly undesirable implications on the entire international security regime with the American public bearing enormous financial costs for an experimental project whose capability remains far from able to guarantee Americans and its allies security from missile attacks.

    The claimed “success” of the December 5, 2008, test has produced serious implications for the progression of the BMD plan. Not only has it consolidated public support of the proposed missile shield, but it has already forced the new President into an awkward position and could effectively undermine his commitment to nuclear disarmament. To immediately withdraw the BMD plan, the President-elect would be criticized for appeasing to the Russian demands as well as neglecting to provide sustained support to NATO allies; some fear that such a move would drastically undermine American global leadership. This issue is especially delicate, so the Obama administration will have to develop strategic ways to cooperate with Russia.

    Future Outlook

    Should President Obama move forward with the BMD project:

    • The only real winners are Boeing and other major contractors from the military industrial industry, which are reaping enormous profits at the cost of American taxpayers’ money.
    • The current international structure would become dangerously destabilized. This would antagonize Russia, a crucial participant in global nonproliferation and disarmament, and retard two decades of moderate cooperation on nuclear issues.
    • Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile defense would spur a new Cold War arms race with more sophisticated weaponry with the devastating possibility of a nuclear launch. This would prompt other countries to continue or start their own nuclear programs with nuclear weapons becoming strategic instruments of political leverage in international relations.
    • American unilateral security engagement would undermine European security. Instead of deterring, Washington’s active engagement with Eastern Europe would trigger a new arms race with Russia and others. Continental Europe could become a new target for attack by the United States’ adversaries.

    If President Obama stops the BMD project, the implications are as follows:

    • Much-needed resources could be diverted towards more strategic security measures to safeguard American and global security.
    • Reinforce American leadership and commitment to international security and nonproliferation through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and European Union.
    • President Obama could gain full support from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who has actively pushed for more funding for the State Department to substantially expand its diplomatic corps, cautious NATO expansion and engagement in the former Soviet satellites, and limited reliance on military defense.

    Conclusion When did nuclear deterrence ever deter? Paradoxically, America’s deeply ingrained confidence in nuclear deterrence has only accelerated the arms race. The national missile defense project has consistently exacerbated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and pushed the international community to the brink of a dangerous arms race. The Bush administration’s “new deterrence” policy put at great risk the delicate power balance of the global community.11 The new presidency presents America a unique opportunity to reassess the missile defense plan. Russia’s top political and military leadership, Medvedev, Putin, and General Nikolai Marakov, have already extended their offer of engagement. President Obama has immense power to pursue wise, pragmatic, and strategic global leadership; these are some recommended strategies that he could take:

    1. Initiate regular, high-level dialogue to foster mutual understanding and cooperation with Russia.
    2. Revisit arms control treaties to make necessary changes to address newly emerging dangers of nuclear weaponry. This includes placing a limitation on nuclear stockpiles and the development and production of particularly dangerous weapons of mass destruction. To ensure their effectiveness, the U.S. and Russia would need to engage other nuclear powers, particularly Pakistan, India, and China.
    3. The U.S. could pursue a more multilateral strategy and engage with Moscow through the NATO-Russia Council. This would level the playing field and provide a more transparent forum for the engagement of all 26 members of NATO, in particular Poland and the Czech Republic.
    4. Collaborate with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to develop more strategic, pragmatic, capable, and cost-effective defense strategies which emphasize diplomacy and are detached from the military-industrial complex.

    Endnotes

    1. Bush, George W. (2007, October). Discussion of Global War on Terror. Speech presented at National Defense University, Washington, DC.

    2. Gordon, M. (May 2006). “U.S. Seeks antimissile shield to block Iran.” International Herald Tribune.

    3. Faulconbridge, G. (Dec 2008). “Russia Starts Production of New Ballistic Missiles.” Reuters.

    4. “Pentagon Says It Destroyed Missile In Test of Air Shield” (Dec 2008). Associated Press.

    5. “Obama’s challenge at the Pentagon” (Nov 2008). International Herald Tribune.

    6. “How to Pay for a 21st-century Military” (Dec 2008). New York Times.

    7. “The Candidates and Nuclear Nonproliferation”. Council on Foreign Affairs. <www.cfr.org>.

    8. Isachenkov, V. (Dec 2008). “Russia’s leaders optimistic about ties with US”. Huffington Post.

    9. White House Website <www.whitehouse.gov>.

    10. White House Website. <www.whitehouse.gov>.

    11. Colby, E. (Apr 2008). RAND Corporation. <www.rand.org>.

    Loan C. Pham is a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation intern and is pursuing a Masters degree in Global Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara.
  • Nuclear Weapons After Bush: A Role for the People

    Nuclear Weapons After Bush: A Role for the People

    “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”
    — H.G. Wells

    As with so many other areas of vital importance to the nation and the world, George W. Bush showed no interest in the abolition of nuclear weapons. Instead, he allowed for the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons by the United States, a policy conducive to nuclear war, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Treaties and international law in general were not high on the Bush agenda. The one nuclear disarmament treaty he concluded with the Russians during his tenure, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), has many flaws, most notably a lack of verification provisions. If the terms of the treaty are carried out, however, the result would be that the US and Russia would reduce the number of their deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. Many more nuclear warheads would be held in reserve. On January 1, 2013, the treaty will terminate and both countries will be free to deploy any number of nuclear weapons.

    The prospects for nuclear weapons abolition under Barack Obama are much improved. Obama believes in the importance of international law, and he has spoken often of the need to pursue a course leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. On his White House website, he lists as goals of his administration: securing loose nuclear materials from terrorists, strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and moving toward a nuclear free world. In the latter category, it states, “Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it.”

    The website goes on to say: “Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.”

    Obama is supportive of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, but describes it as a “long road.” He also indicates that he will maintain a “strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.” Thus, he is positive toward abolition, but cautious. To succeed in moving down that road, no matter how long, Obama will need support from the American people. In the past, opinion polls have shown such support to exist, but not to be a high priority for Americans. Obama will need to nurture and encourage such support, which in turn can help him to succeed on the path to abolition.

    I will examine below eight reasons that the public has not been actively engaged in pressing for a world free of nuclear weapons.

    1. Complacency. There has been a widespread belief that the issue is too big and too removed from the day-to-day pressures that we all face. There is a sense of powerlessness on nuclear disarmament issues that gives rise to complacency.
    2. Deference to experts. There has been a strong belief among the American public that nuclear disarmament is an issue requiring political and technical expertise. While some expertise may be required, the general outlines of nuclear disarmament policy do not require such expertise. What is required is a commitment to ending the threat of nuclear devastation to all humanity.
    3. A belief in deterrence. Much of the public has been taught to believe that the threat of nuclear retaliation keeps them safe. In fact, deterrence is only a theory and may not work under real world conditions. It requires rational leaders, and all leaders are not rational at all times. It also requires clear and effective communications, which are not always possible. Most important, deterrence operates at a psychological level. It does not and cannot provide physical protection. A record of non-use of nuclear weapons in the past (since Hiroshima and Nagasaki) is not a guarantee of security from nuclear attack in the future.
    4. Fear of cheating. Many members of the public fear that in a world without nuclear weapons, a cheater will be advantaged. It will require education to assure public understanding that nuclear disarmament will be done in a phased and verifiable manner, and that we will not proceed to zero unilaterally and until we are certain that cheating will not advantage a cheater. By reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons gradually, it will be possible to forge trust and demonstrate the willingness of all parties to submit to effective systems of verification. Such systems would be operational years before the final nuclear weapons are dismantled.
    5. Power and prestige. Members of the public often take pride in nuclear arsenals, believing that they bestow power and prestige. In today’s world, this is unfortunately a valid, albeit dangerous, perspective. It will be necessary to shift thinking on this, which will require leadership. In actuality, nuclear weapons, instruments capable of massive annihilation, can be considered instruments of power and prestige only in cultures that are numb to the potential consequences of such technologies of death or that go beyond such numbness to affirm and glorify the wanton destructiveness these weapons represent.
    6. Conformity. In the past, the public went along with possession of nuclear weapons because they were effectively led to believe these weapons provided security. Consequently, there was no effective challenge to the possession of these weapons.
    7. Denial. Nuclear weapons destroy indiscriminately – men, women and children. They are city-destroying weapons. They are so terrible that it is psychologically more comfortable to deny their threat.
    8. Failure of imagination. Many people are comfortable with nuclear weapons because for most or all of their lives these weapons have been a part of the backdrop of reality in which we live. These people consider such possession as routine and fail to imagine the devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

    All of these reasons that inhibit engagement in seeking nuclear weapons abolition are counterproductive. They will hopefully be impacted by the Obama administration and reversed or, at a minimum, turned in a more positive direction. The Obama administration is about combating complacency with empowerment. Obama himself campaigned on a platform of change, which was broadly supported by the electorate. The administration is already seeking to involve large numbers of individuals in the decisions that affect their lives, and to provide information for informed consent or dissent. After some 60 years of education that has promoted deterrence, people will have to learn the lesson that deterrence is only a theory, one that in fact makes the possessors of nuclear weapons vulnerable to annihilation. To get over the fear of cheating, people will have to trust that the verification procedures are adequate. They will have to adopt the approach of the committed nuclear abolitionist, Ronald Reagan: “trust but verify.”

    The public will need new ways to measure the power and prestige of their country, by indicators such as low infant mortality rates, universal health care for all Americans, increasing use of sustainable energy, and gross national happiness. It will be up to the Obama administration to help people envision new ways of measuring their value. People will have to accept the proposition that conformity is not a virtue, whereas critical thinking enhances both understanding and security. Denial forces us to freeze, to fail to act for our own benefit. Finally, a failure of imagination undermines our capacity to predict the future and prepare for it.

    In addition, there are powerful entrenched forces in the military-industrial-Congressional complex that support continued reliance on nuclear arms and oppose abolition. Leadership by the Obama administration can help to overcome the impediments to change that in the past have hampered progress toward nuclear weapons abolition. In return, a more empowered and awakened citizenry can help press forward an abolition agenda, in their own interests and the interests of all humanity. President Obama appears ready to walk down the path of nuclear weapons abolition, but he cannot stand alone in seeking an end to the nuclear threat to humanity. He will need our voices and our presence in support of new policies aimed at achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

    I will conclude with a quotation from an abolitionist of another time, Frederick Douglass, whose message remains valid in our time as we confront the continuing dangers of nuclear annihilation: “Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are people who want crops without ploughing the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning; they want the ocean without the roar of its many waters. The struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, or it may be both. But it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand; it never has and it never will.”

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a Councilor of the World Future Council.

  • A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: The Wrong and Right Way to Do It

    UPI Outside View, January 24, 2008

     

    Since the beginning of the Atomic Age, policymakers and scholars have attempted to come up with formulas to constrain the nuclear genie. In mid-January, in an effort to move this ambition forward, former senior decision-makers — Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, Defense Secretary William Perry and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Samuel Nunn — released “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” a report published in the Wall Street Journal designed to advance nuclear abolition.

    The timing would seem propitious. In December 2007, in voting down a new nuclear weapon (the reliable replacement warhead), Congress mandated that President Bush and his successor rationalize the U.S. nuclear arsenal by the end of 2009 to justify future appropriations. As a result, a disarmament proposal advanced by such statesmen and endorsed by dozens of prominent experts should be taken seriously. Unfortunately, it cannot.

    At first blush the Shultz et al. proposal appears to be promising for nuclear-arms controllers, who could object to extension of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, deeper nuclear reductions beyond those promoted by the Bush administration or increasing the warning time for the initiation of nuclear use. Likewise the call for cooperative ballistic missile defense, increased security at nuclear materials sites, strengthening non-proliferation verification and implementation of the treaty banning nuclear weapons testing. If constraining nuclear development or use marks the objective, the answer is no one.

    However, if the aim truly is the elimination of nuclear arms — the authors declared an objective to eradicate the “threat to the world” — the proposal falls far short. A review of what could be done versus what the authors say should be done supports this conclusion.

    — Set a timeline for the elimination of nuclear arsenals, not an “agreement to undertake further substantial reductions.” The authors’ call for extension of the monitoring provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty coupled to undefined reductions below the 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads allowed under the 1992 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia may be admirable, but it does not amount a “nuclear-free world.” Absent weapons elimination benchmarks — including disposal of non-deployed warheads — the authors’ plan amounts to maintenance of diminished but still substantial weapons caches.

    — Separate nuclear warheads from delivery systems. To reduce the risk of nuclear war prior to abolition, the authors advocate increased warning and decision time for nuclear initiation. They speak abstractly about mutually agreed upon “physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence” to prevent premature nuclear launch. Only warhead separation from missiles meets the objective. Certainly, if Pakistan can separate its bombs from delivery vehicles to allow time for prudent decisions, so can the United States, Russia and others.

    — Eliminate long-range ballistic missiles except those used for commercial and scientific research. Such an approach nullifies the authors’ promotion of ballistic missile defense. A precedent for negotiated missile elimination includes the 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev Intermediate Force Reduction Treaty. Elimination also finds precedent in the unilateral withdrawal and destruction of obsolete delivery systems from arsenals.

    — Eliminate all high enriched uranium and separated plutonium rather than enhance security at sites holding such material. The authors call for countries to apply the highest standards of security to nuclear materials. But only removal and disposal will prevent access by terrorists or nuclear ambitious nations.

    — Ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. The U.S. Senate failed to do so during the Clinton administration. The authors propose a “process” to get the treaty implemented but fail to call upon the most prominent hold out to adopt the agreement it gave birth to.

    — Go beyond the Additional Protocol to verify that countries are not using civil nuclear programs for military purposes. The protocol allows International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of all suspect nuclear sites. Many countries have yet to adopt it, but the protocol itself is imperfect. Placing all atomic plants under IAEA co-management would do a better job to prevent nuclear breakouts.

    — Provide teeth to deal with nuclear violators. The authors fail to furnish a strategy to combat atomic cheats. Given the gravity of an attempted nuclear breakout, the international community must have “in place” a dedicated military capacity to stop any nuclear fudging.

    Shultz and his colleagues conclude, “Progress (toward a nuclear-free world) must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal.”

    Unfortunately the goal is muddled by the authors’ own formulation. If nuclear disarmament is the objective, we can do far better.

    Bennett Ramberg, Ph.D., J.D., served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the George H.W. Bush administration. The author of three books and editor of three others on international security, he has written for such prestigious journals as Foreign Affairs and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Ramberg’s Op-Eds have appeared in all major newspapers in the United States and many around the world.

  • The Way is Open for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Northern Europe

    This article was originally published on Active Nonviolence

    At the 50th Pugwash Conference in 2000, John Holdren said: “In a rapidly-changing world, which we are certainly living in, the establishment consensus on the necessity of nuclear weapons could crumble quickly.” Today John’s prediction seems to be coming true. There are indeed indications that the establishment is moving towards the point of view that the peace movement has always held: – that nuclear weapons are essentially genocidal, illegal and unworthy of civilization; and that they must be completely abolished as quickly as possible. There is a rapidly-growing global consensus that a nuclear-weapon-free world can and must be achieved in the very near future.

    One of the first indications of the change was the famous Wall Street Journal article by Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn advocating complete abolition of nuclear arms [1]. This was followed quickly by Mikhail Gorbachev’s supporting article, published in the same journal [2], and a statement by distinguished Italian statesmen [3]. Meanwhile, in October 2007, the Hoover Institution had arranged a symposium entitled “Reykjavik Revisited; Steps Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” [4].

    In Britain, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord Hurd and Lord Owen (all former Foreign Secretaries) joined the former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson as authors of an article in The Times advocating complete abolition of nuclear weapons [5]. The UK’s Secretary of State for Defense, Des Brown, speaking at a disarmament conference in Geneva, proposed that the UK “host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010″ to enable the nuclear weapon states to work together on technical issues.

    In February, 2008, the Government of Norway hosted an international conference on “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons” [7]. A week later, Norway’s Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere, reported the results of the conference to a disarmament meeting in Geneva [8].

    On July 11, 2008, speaking at a Pugwash Conference in Canada, Norway’s Defence Minister, Anne-Grete Stroem-Erichsen, reiterated her country’s strong support for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons [9].

    Other highly-placed statesmen added their voices to the growing consensus: Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, visited the Peace Museum at Hiroshima, where he made a strong speech advocating nuclear abolition. He later set up an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament co-chaired by Australia and Japan [10].On January 9, 2009, four distinguished German statesmen ( Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher) published an article entitled “Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View” in the International Herald Tribune [11]. Among the immediate steps recommended in the article are the following:

    • “The vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world… must be rekindled.”
    • “Negotiations aimed at drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons must begin…”
    • “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be greatly reinforced.”
    • ” America should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.”
    • “All short-range nuclear weapons must be destroyed.”
    • “The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty must be restored. Outer space may only be used for peaceful purposes.”

    From the standpoint of an NWFZ in Northern Europe, the recommendation that all short-range nuclear weapons be destroyed is particularly interesting. The US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Holland, Belgium and Germany prevent these countries from being (at present) part of a de-facto Northern European NWFZ; but with an Obama Administration in the United States, and with John Holdren advising President Obama, this situation might be quickly altered. Both public opinion and official declarations support the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe [12]. Indeed the only argument for their retention comes from NATO, which stubbornly maintains that although the weapons have no plausible function, they nevertheless serve as a “nuclear glue”, cementing the alliance.

    The strongest argument for the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe is the threatened collapse of the NPT. The 2005 NPT Review Conference was a disaster, and there is a danger that at the 2010 Review Conference, the NPT will collapse entirely because of the discriminatory position of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and their failure to honor their committments under Article VI. NATO’s present nuclear weapon policy also violates the NPT, and correcting this violation would help to save the 2010 Review Conference from failure.

    At present, the air forces of the European countries in which the US nuclear weapons are stationed perform regular training exercises in which they learn how to deliver the weapons. This violates the spirit, and probably also the letter, of Article IV, which prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons from an NWS to a non-NWS. The “nuclear sharing” proponents maintain that such transfers would only happen in an emergency; but there is nothing in the NPT saying that the treaty would not hold under all circumstances. Furthermore, NATO would be improved, rather than damaged, by giving up “nuclear sharing”.

    If President Obama wishes to fulfill his campaign promises [13] – if he wishes to save the NPT – a logical first step would be to remove US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The way would then be open for a nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northern Europe, comprising the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Our final goal is, and must remain, the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. But NWFZs are steps along the road.

    References and links

    [1] George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, page A15 and January 15, 2008, page A15. www.nuclearsecurityproject.org http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html?mod=Commentary-US

    [2] Mikhalil Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat”, The Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2007, page A15. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.htm

    [3] Massimo D’Alema, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi and Francesco Calogero, “For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Corriere Della Sera, July 24, 2008. http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/updates/20.html

    [4] Hoover Institution, “Reykjavik Revisited; Steps Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, October, 2007. http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/online/15766737.html

    [5] Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson, “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb”, The Times, June 30, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece?openComment=true

    [6] Des Brown, Secretary of State for Defense, UK, “Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament”, Geneva Conference on Disarmament, February 5, 2008. http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/people/speeches/sofs/20080205layingthefoundationsformultilateraldisarmament.htm

    [7] Government of Norway, International Conference on “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Oslo, Norway, February 26-27, 2008. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/

    [8] Jonas Gahr Stoere, Foreign Minister, Norway, “Statement at the Conference on Disarmament”, Geneva, March 4, 2008. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/utenriksminister_jonas_gahr_store/taler_artikler/2008/cd_statement.html?id=502420

    [9] Anne-Grete Stroem-Erichsen, Defense Minister, Norway, “Emerging Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament”, Pugwash Conference, Canada, July 11, 2008. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/The-Ministry/defence-minister-anne-grete-strom-erichs/Speeches-and-articles/2008/emerging-opportunities-for-nuclear-disar.html?id=521830

    [10] Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister, Australia, “International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, Media Release, July 9, 2008. http://www.pm.gov.au/media/release/2008/media_release_0352.cfm

    [11] Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View”, International Herald Tribune, January 9, 2009. http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/09/opinion/edschmidt.php

    [12] Hans M. Kristensen and Elliot Negin, “Support Growing for Removal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from Europe”, Common Dreams Newscenter, first posted May 6, 2005. http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0506-09.htm

    [13] David Krieger, “President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Website, 2008. https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/2008/11/05_krieger_obama_elect.php

    John Avery is a leader in the Pugwash movement in Denmark.

  • The Dawning Age of Nuclear Zero

    This article was originally published on Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

    It is never clear to us why and how certain critical events reach a tipping point — that is how they fundamentally depart from the status quo. In the case of six decades of nuclear armament, that may be particularly true. But an argument can be made that we are at or near such a tipping point, a tipping point away from expanding nuclear arsenals and toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
    Two events in the United States bolster this argument. One was a proposal put forward by four moderate-to-conservative leaders — former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Defense Secretary William Perry — a year ago urging not just a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, but their elimination as a class. This was seen by many at the time, particularly those familiar with the support these figures had given to new strategic weapons systems in the past, as a shift of historic importance.
    More recently, an international organization of public and private figures — once again including a number of Americans and others who had never been identified with disarmament causes in the past — called Global Zero announced its intention to press nuclear-armed nations to reduce, and then eliminate, their arsenals.
    The political landscape clearly is shifting in meaningful ways.
    The reasons for this shift are many and, in the case of particular individuals, probably unknowable. These may include matters of personal legacy, how one’s public career and values are viewed by history. They may include pragmatic considerations, that the longer existing nuclear powers maintain large stockpiles of warheads and delivery systems (missiles), the more likely it will be that less stable or even unstable nations, such as Iran and North Korea, develop their own capabilities. They may include military considerations: only doomsday scenarios include the use of nuclear weapons as a viable option. They may include the new reality of the changing nature of conflict and the transformation of war, that nation-state wars are declining sharply in probability and unconventional conflict involving stateless nations against whom nuclear weapons represent no deterrent are increasing.
    The reasons for the tipping point in opinion may ultimately get down to that most basic of human motives: the desire to leave a safer world for one’s children and future generations now overrides the often casual discussion of the political power once thought to be derived from weapons of ultimate mass destruction.
    Now faced with frightening economic consequences of unregulated market collapse and the prospects of a very long international economic recovery, a new Obama administration in Washington could well be looking at initiatives that bring increased security at little or no cost, or indeed that produce cost savings. Nuclear zero, elimination of nuclear arsenals, must be at the top of this list. It may be argued that the president must fix the economy first before anything else gains attention. This false argument assumes intelligent people can do only one thing, even one complex thing, at a time or that some talented economic people cannot carry out their project while other talented diplomatic people carry out quite another.
    Reasons and motives are incidental to opportunity. And now the opportunity exists, an opportunity not known for more than 60 years, to rid the world of its greatest menace. Eliminating all nuclear weapons will not be easy. It will require skilled and patient multinational diplomacy. It will require breakthroughs in verification. It will require a tolerable sacrifice of national sovereignty. It will most of all require an enormous amount of international purpose and good will. But it can be done. The principal requirement is political will and visionary political leadership. And it must be done. If not now, when?

     

    Gary Hart is a former US Senator from Colorado.
  • Working Tirelessly to Lessen the Nuclear Threat

    Working Tirelessly to Lessen the Nuclear Threat

    I want to thank each of you who supported our idea on Change.org for “US Leadership to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Globally.” Our idea was one of nearly 8,000 ideas submitted to Change.org. With your help, we finished in the top 35 ideas to change America (number 23, I believe). We also had 76 institutional endorsers of our idea from throughout the world, and hundreds of individual comments on the need for abolition. In addition, many tens of thousands of people were alerted to the idea and received some education on the need for action on nuclear disarmament, even if they did not choose to vote.

    My thanks to you is even greater knowing that Change.org did not make it easy to vote. It required a fairly lengthy process by internet standards to get registered at Change.org and cast your vote. So, to those who participated, thank you for sticking with it, and spreading the message to friends, family and colleagues. This is the way that change occurs, often from person to person.

    Just before voting concluded on Change.org, we discovered that the official site of the Obama transition team, Change.gov, was also soliciting ideas for a Citizen’s Briefing Book. We also added our idea of “US Leadership to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Globally” to that site, and we trust that it will be conveyed to President Obama along with the other ideas that were submitted.

    Here is what we said in describing our idea: “It is far too dangerous to keep global nuclear disarmament on the back burner. Nuclear weapons pose the most immediate, overwhelming and devastating threat imaginable to our country and to civilization. The only way to assure that these weapons are never used again is to abolish them forever. Only the United States has the leadership capacity to bring the countries of the world together to achieve this goal. It is time for the US to assert that leadership, and President-elect Obama has shown by his statements that he is prepared to lead on this issue. We call upon him to make a strong public commitment to the abolition of nuclear weapons globally; to initiate bilateral negotiations with the Russians to take nuclear weapons off high alert status and to dramatically and verifiably reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of our two nations; and to convene a meeting of the nuclear weapons states to initiate negotiations on a global treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2020. This would make the United States more secure, restore its credibility throughout the world, and be a gift to all humanity and all future generations.”

    Of course, we understand that the US is not the only country that can lead on this critical issue. But we also believe that without US leadership, the Russians won’t take serious steps, and without the Russians, the UK, France and China will not take the necessary steps, and so on. We are not asking for the US to disarm its nuclear arsenal unilaterally, but to use its status in the world to lead other nations to a common goal, a goal that will benefit all nations and all peoples, now and in the future.

    We are asking for serious and far-reaching change in US nuclear policy, and we are encouraged by President Obama’s own statements on the issue. Most recently, in his Inaugural Address, he stated, “With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet.” This one sentence tells us that President Obama recognizes the seriousness of the nuclear threat, places it on a level with global warming, and understands that it is an issue that will require global cooperation and tireless commitment.

    With so many pressing issues before the new president, it is essential that he be given the support of the American people and people throughout the world in fulfilling his goals. Since he seeks to lessen the nuclear threat, we must give him encouragement and support to achieve this end. Changing the world does not end with a vote on Change.org or an entry in the Citizen’s Briefing Book on Change.gov. It requires persistence, which means a long-term commitment to the goal. At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, we will continue to provide you with information and ideas for action, and we ask you to join us in assuring that these ideas get through to President Obama and his team.

  • UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent

    Sir, Recent speeches made by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and the previous Defence Secretary, and the letter from Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson in The Times on June 30, 2008, have placed the issue of a world free of nuclear weapons firmly on the public agenda. But it is difficult to see how the United Kingdom can exert any leadership and influence on this issue if we insist on a costly successor to Trident that would not only preserve our own nuclear-power status well into the second half of this century but might actively encourage others to believe that nuclear weapons were still, somehow, vital to the secure defence of self-respecting nations.

    This is a fallacy which can best be illustrated by analysis of the British so-called independent deterrent. This force cannot be seen as independent of the United States in any meaningful sense. It relies on the United States for the provision and regular servicing of the D5 missiles. While this country has, in theory, freedom of action over giving the order to fire, it is unthinkable that, because of the catastrophic consequences for guilty and innocent alike, these weapons would ever be launched, or seriously threatened, without the backing and support of the United States.

    Should this country ever become subject to some sort of nuclear blackmail — from a terrorist group for example — it must be asked in what way, and against whom, our nuclear weapons could be used, or even threatened, to deter or punish. Nuclear weapons have shown themselves to be completely useless as a deterrent to the threats and scale of violence we currently, or are likely to, face — particularly international terrorism; and the more you analyse them the more unusable they appear.

    The much cited “seat at the top table” no longer has the resonance it once did. Political clout derives much more from economic strength. Even major-player status in the international military scene is more likely to find expression through effective, strategically mobile conventional forces, capable of taking out pinpoint targets, than through the possession of unusable nuclear weapons. Our independent deterrent has become virtually irrelevant except in the context of domestic politics. Rather than perpetuating Trident, the case is much stronger for funding our Armed Forces with what they need to meet the commitments actually laid upon them. In the present economic climate it may well prove impossible to afford both.

    This article was originally published in The Times of London

    The authors are former high-ranking members of the British military.

  • The Cost of Nuclear Security

    Seven years after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, at a time when government officials and outside experts are expressing growing concern about the prospect of a nuclear 9/11, few members of Congress know how much the United States spends on nuclear security or where the money goes.

    When Secretary of State-designate Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Energy-designate Steven Chu head into their Senate confirmation hearings Tuesday, they’ll face difficult questions about how the U.S. is addressing nuclear dangers. Although most lawmakers would rank nuclear threats at the top of their list of national security concerns, they won’t have sufficient or comprehensive information to work with. But Congress can fix this.

    Our report, the first public examination of open-source data, shows that the U.S. spent at least$52.4 billion on nuclear weapons and programs in fiscal 2008. This budget, which spans many agencies, not just the Defense Department, does not count related costs for air defense, anti-submarine warfare, classified programs or most nuclear weapons-related intelligence programs.

    The 2008 nuclear security budget exceeds all anticipated spending on international diplomacy and foreign assistance ($39.5 billion) and natural resources and the environment ($33 billion). It is nearly double the budget for general science, space and technology ($27.4 billion), and it is almost 14 times what the Energy Department allocated for all energy-related research and development.

    Although the size of the overall budget is troubling, another concern is that we spend so little on initiatives to minimize the risk of nuclear and radiological attacks. More than 17 years after the end of the Cold War, it may come as a surprise to most Americans that the U.S. still spends relatively large annual sums upgrading and maintaining its nuclear arsenal ($29 billion), developing ballistic missile defenses ($9.2 billion) and addressing the deferred environmental and health costs associated with more than 50 years of unconstrained bomb building and testing ($8.3 billion).

    More alarmingly, the government spends relatively little money locking down or eliminating nuclear threats at their source, before they can reach U.S. shores ($5.2 billion), or preparing for the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack on U.S. soil ($700 million).

    As President-elect Barack Obama’s team heads into an enormously difficult budget season, it will need to propose expenditures that match policy goals and economic realities. How, one might ask Chu, can a Department of Energy that devotes 67% of its budget to nuclear weapons-related programs meet Obama’s plan to develop new and cleaner forms of energy?

    Clinton is already on the right track by reportedly seeking to expand the State Department’s role and fighting for a larger budget. State is the frontline agency tackling proliferation concerns with Iran and North Korea, shoring up a rocky relationship with Russia and pursuing cooperation with other states to secure nuclear materials and address the growing threat of nuclear terrorism. Clinton is right to insist that her agency receive more than half a percent ($241.8 million) of the total nuclear security budget.

    As both proliferation dangers and fiscal concerns grow, taxpayers will want to know that their government is getting the best returns on its nuclear security investments. But effective oversight of government nuclear security programs is impossible without complete and reliable scrutiny of their cost and impact, and such an accounting has never been available to decision makers.

    Congress can remedy this by requiring the executive branch to submit, as part of the annual budget request, an unclassified and classified accounting of all nuclear weapons-related spending. A senior White House official, perhaps within the congressionally mandated office to coordinate nuclear proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts, or the National Security Council, should be responsible for overseeing this exercise, in conjunction with key officials of the Office of Management and Budget and senior budget officials of key departments and agencies.

    Working outside of government and using publicly available data, we’ve proved that it is possible to provide a more comprehensive accounting of our nuclear security dollars.

    Implementing these recommendations would increase understanding and accountability, which would in turn lead to greater public support for crucial nuclear security programs and a more effective allocation of public resources. When combined with a new focus on nuclear issues, including the Obama administration’s forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, these efforts would help ensure that political and financial priorities are properly aligned.

    The nuclear threat is changing, and as long as it grows, the United States needs to be prepared to address it — even in a time of austerity. That starts with knowing where the dollars go.

    This article was originally published in the Los Angeles Times

    Stephen I. Schwartz is the editor of the Nonproliferation Review at the Monterey Institute of International Studies; Deepti Choubey is the deputy director of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  • For a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

    In the United States, the call by [Shultz/Perry/Nunn/Kissinger] has been echoed broadly and has received prominent support. There are no known decisions of support by European governments.

    Our response reflects from a German perspective the expectations that are linked with the administration of Barack Obama. This century’s keyword is cooperation.

    We unconditionally support the call of the four eminent U.S. persons for a radical change of direction in nuclear weapons policies, not only in the United States. This relates specifically to the following proposals: The vision of a world without the nuclear threat, as it has been developed by Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, has to be revived. Negotiations have to be started with the goal of drastic cuts in nuclear weapons, first between the United States and Russia, which possess the largest number of nuclear weapons, in order to also attract the other states that possess such weapons. The NPT has to be strengthened decisively. The United States has ratify the CTBT. All short-range nuclear weapons have to be dismantled.

    From a German perspective it has to be added: The agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons will expire this year. From this results the most urgent need of action between Washington and Moscow.

    It will be decisive for the 2010 NPT review conference that the nuclear weapon states finally fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

    The ABM treaty has to be restored. Outer space has to be used only for peaceful purposes.

    [Post Cold War European stability] would for the first time be jeopardized by the American wish to deploy missiles with a matching radar system on extraterritorial bases in Poland and the Czech republic, on NATO’s Eastern border. Such a relapse into the times of confrontation with implications for an arms build-up and tensions can be avoided by an amicable agreement on the topic of missile defense which also reflects the interests of NATO and the EU – and best by restoring the ABM treaty.

    Fundamental efforts by the United States and Russia to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world would facilitate an agreement with all nuclear weapon possessors – regardless whether they are permanent members of the the United Nations Security Council or not – about appropriate behavior. A spirit of cooperation could spread from the Middle East to East Asia.

    Relics from the period of confrontation no longer fit into our new century. Cooperation does not fit well with NATO’s and Russia’s still valid doctrine of nuclear first use, even in response to non-nuclear attacks. A general no-first use treaty among the nuclear armed states would be a highly desirable step.

    Germany, which has renounced nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, has to press for a commitment by the nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. We are also of the view that the remaining U.S. nuclear warheads should be removed from Germany.

    The authors are well-respected German politicians. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Social Democrat); Former President Richard von Weizsaecker (Christian Democrat); Former Federal Minister Egon Bahr (Social Democrat); and former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Liberal).