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  • Learning from World War I

    David KriegerWe are approaching the 100th anniversary of the onset of World War I.  One of the lessons of that horrendous war was that chemical weapons cause inhumane suffering and death and that they are not reliable weapons.  Their effectiveness depends on which way the wind is blowing, a situation subject to change.  After the war, the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare was banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.   More recently, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in 1997, and today 189 countries are parties to this treaty.

    But the deadliness and unreliability of chemical weapons were not the only lessons of World War I.  A far more important lesson is that a war can take on a life of its own.  No one expected that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria Hungary would lead to a world war, but that is the way it worked out.  The assassination set in motion a chain of events leading to all-out war, in which national leaders felt bound to their allies and were unwilling to back down.  It was a war that no one wanted, but one that took four years to halt and resulted in 37 million casualties, including 16 million deaths.

    The Syrian civil war has been going on since spring 2011, but suddenly it has taken on new potential for morphing into a regional or global conflagration.  President Obama said that the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government would be the crossing of a red line.  When leaders of superpower countries say such things, they are to be taken as warnings to less powerful states to behave accordingly or face serious consequences.  Someone in Syria appears to have used chemical weapons, and the US government is expressing certainty that it was the Syrian government.  Thus, for US leaders, the red line has been crossed.

    What does this mean?  It means, if true, that a tacit code of international behavior has been violated.  A weaker state, rather than accepting the warning of the superpower state, committed a prohibited act.  From the perspective of the superpower state, someone must be punished or the superpower’s credibility will be destroyed.  The crossing of red lines must be punished by military means, or so goes the argument of President Obama and his administration.  Are they right?

    There are serious problems with this argument.

    First, it is not confirmed that the offending party that used the chemical weapons was the government of Syria.  The Russian government has suggested that the chemical warfare agents were used by Syrian opposition forces.  President Obama was initially rushing to a US military attack and not taking the necessary time and caution to assure that the offending party was the party it warned.

    Second, if the US were to attack Syria with missiles, as President Obama initially intended to do, it would not be in accord with international law and would thus be illegal.  All countries have a responsibility under the United Nations Charter to act in accord with international law.  The Charter prohibits the use of force, such as missile strikes, except in self-defense against an actual attack, or unless authorized by the UN Security Council.  The proposed US missile attack against the Syrian government fits neither of these criteria.

    Third, it puts the perceived credibility of a superpower leader, no matter how ill-advised, ahead of the importance of maintaining peace or, as the UN Charter states, “ending the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind….”

    Fourth, US missile strikes against Syria are unlikely to improve conditions for the Syrian people and are likely to cause them serious harm.

    Fifth, there are other means of punishing the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons (if this is proven) that do not require the use of military force.  One such means would be organizing an international boycott on the sale or transfer of military equipment to the government of Syria.  Another means would be to refer the evidence on the use of chemical weapons to the International Criminal Court, an institution that can impose criminal liability on national leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

    Once acts of war are commenced, all promises become subject to being broken.  US leaders are promising “no boots on the ground,” but can they keep that promise or will they if things start to go very wrong?  What if a US attack on Syria results in a Syrian attack on US warships or US embassies in the region?  What if it results in a Syrian or Iranian attack on Israel?  What if it brings Russia into the war on the side of Syria, and pits the US and Russia, both nuclear-armed giants, against each other?

    Is it possible that attempting to assure the credibility of President Obama, a Nobel Peace Laureate, through military strikes, could lead to stumbling into a new world war?  No one knows what may happen.  The Middle East is a tinder box.  Throwing a lighted match or a missile strike into that incendiary environment for reasons of credibility is an act of hubris, which could have fiery and tragic consequences that no one wants and none of our experts or political leaders can foresee, just as was the case when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stuck down by assassination in 1914.

    For now, we must consider it most fortunate that Secretary of State Kerry made a seemingly offhand remark to a reporter’s question about what could lead the US to refrain from a military attack.  Kerry responded that a US military attack could be avoided if Syria were to turn over its stocks of chemical weapons for disposal.  Russian leaders quickly pursued this course of action and convinced Syrian President Assad to commit to turning over his chemical weapons stocks.  Thus, diplomacy may have averted the far more dangerous and deadly resort to acts of war by the US and, at the same time, reinforced international law and prevented the possibility of future chemical weapons use by the Syrian government.  Such a path makes the march to an unintended world war far less likely.

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

  • Another War Is Not the Answer

    The actions leading toward US involvement in the civil war in Syria have been moving at a rapid pace. US officials, starting with President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry, have been strong advocates of a limited attack on Syria to punish the Assad regime for an alleged chemical attack on its own citizens. It is unlikely, though, that a limited US military attack on the Syrian regime will result in a positive outcome.  More likely, it will cause additional death and untold sorrow to Syrian civilians, make Syrian President Assad a hero in the region, increase the possibilities of a broader regional war, increase tensions between the US and Russia, further undermine respect for international law, and diminish rather than uphold US credibility in the region and beyond.

    Below is a sketch of the sequence of events leading to where we are now; important choice points for the Congress with implications for the president and the American people; and some conclusions and recommendations.

    Sequence of Events

    1. The president threatens to take military action if Syria uses chemical weapons. This was a deterrent threat — a threat meant to prevent the Syrian government from using chemical weapons.
    2. The deterrent threat apparently fails when chemical weapons are used in the Syrian civil war, although it is not known with certainty what party to the conflict actually used them.
    3. US leaders accuse the Syrian government of being the perpetrator of the chemical attack, which is believed by US leaders to have killed over 1,400 people, including over 400 children.
    4. The president indicates his intention to punish the Syrian government by initiating a missile attack on Syrian government forces. Other administration officials, including the secretary of state, publically support the president.
    5. Some commentators argue that a US attack is necessary to maintain US credibility in the world, despite the fact that in this case it will pit the US against Russia, with each country still maintaining some 1,000 nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert. That is, when the president makes a threat, even an ill-advised and dangerous one, it must be carried out so that US threats will be credible in the future.
    6. Other commentators point out that a US military attack on Syria would be illegal under international law since it is neither a military action made in self-defense nor one authorized by the United Nations Security Council. They also point out that US law requires Congress to authorize such an act of war.
    7. The president responds by ignoring concerns about the planned attack being a breach of international law, but says he will send the matter to Congress for consideration when Congress reconvenes, even though he believes that Congressional approval is not necessary for him to act as commander-in-chief.

    Congressional Choice

    1. Congress will have to make a choice to approve or not approve the president’s plan to initiate a US military attack on Syria.
    2. Even if Congress approves US military action, a likely possibility, a US attack on Syria will not be legal under international law.  Nor will such an attack be moral, in that it would likely kill large numbers of innocent Syrians and bring more suffering to the people of Syria. Nor would such an attack be prudent, with its potential to bog the US down in yet another war in the Middle East, at the expense of the people of Syria and US citizens at home.
    3. If Congress votes against approval of US military action, an unlikely possibility, the president will have to decide whether he bends to the will of Congress and backs down, or initiates the attack on his own authority with the potential to trigger a constitutional crisis in addition to all the other negative consequences of initiating an illegal war.

    Conclusions and Recommendations

    1. The American people should speak out against US military action that could involve the US in yet another war with unknown consequences and of unknown duration.
    2. Congress should say No to authorization of the president’s proposed military action against Syria.
    3. The president should back down on his threat to attack Syria. Following through on every presidential threat with military action is a dangerous game for the US, as well as for the world, particularly on threats that violate and undermine international law.
    4. The US should work with the United Nations, and specifically with Russia, on finding a peaceful settlement of the civil war in Syria and, in general, on resolving the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East that are poisoning the well of international relations.
    5. Those responsible for the chemical attack in Syria should be referred to the International Criminal Court for prosecution under international law. The US should also sign and ratify the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and become a member of the Court.

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

  • Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

    Below is a link to the full text of the working draft of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

    http://fissilematerials.org/library/fmct-ipfm-sep2009.pdf

  • New START Treaty

    Below is a link to the full text of the New START Treaty:

    http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf

  • Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

    Below is the link for the full text of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

    http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

    Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

    Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

    In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

    Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

    Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

    Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

    Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

    Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

    Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

    Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

    Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

    Article II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

    Article III

    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

    2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

    3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

    4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

    Article IV

    1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

    2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

    Article V

    Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

    Article VI

    Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

    Article VII

    Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

    Article VIII

    1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

    Article IX

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

    Article X

    1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

    2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

    Article XI

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

  • Defining Appropriate Action in Syria

    The horrific use of chemical weapons in Syria is a crime against humanity and demands an international response. President Obama states that the United States must take appropriate action vs. doing nothing. This is absolutely true. The problem comes in defining appropriate action. There are at least two options, military vs. non-military, the latter with a host of options.

    Framing that action in military terms guarantees the loss of additional innocent lives. Choosing a military option further fuels the sectarian strife spreading across the Middle East.  This will encourage the growth of anti-American sentiment rife in the region. Our trillion dollar war in Iraq has demonstrated that war is not the answer. Iraq is on the verge of falling into the worst chaos since the beginning of that conflict.

    This crisis does demand action ― non-military action.  Doing nothing is cowardly and not in keeping with the credibility or morals of the United States or any other country that professes to support the rule of international law and morality. This includes Russia, Iran and China.

    An international response is demanded. After 9/11 there was a brief period and opportunity when the world came together with a sentiment that the “whole world was American.” That feeling was quickly lost as the U.S. opted for bombing nation after nation, including a unilateral “pre-emptive” war against Iraq, a nation that had nothing to do with 9/11. We have paid and will pay the price of that war for generations.

    Today, in a similar vein, the entire world identifies with and is sickened and horrified by the images of children and innocent victims of these cowardly gas attacks. But the military intervention being debated is not intended to end the violent conflict that has killed more than 100,000 Syrians. It won’t help the nearly two million Syrian refugees return home or get the more than 6.8 million people in need access to humanitarian aid.

    Our leaders need to show courage against the tide of war. The perpetrators of these crimes must be brought to justice. There is an international arena for these crimes against humanity to be addressed. The International Criminal Court’s mission is to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The International Court of Justice’s mission is to prosecute Nations that have committed crimes against humanity. These are just two methods by which perpetrators of these crimes can be held accountable. The United States has the opportunity to lead the way in empowering and supporting these international institutions in performing the role that they were established to do.

    This will take courage, strength, determination, vision and true international leadership―not bombs. This is the role that the United States can and must pursue if we hope to see an end to sectarian violence in this region and the world over.  We must call upon all nations and our own elected leaders complacent with arming the various sides in these conflicts to endorse and support this international peace keeping effort. This will demonstrate their true commitment to peace, international law and humanity.

    We must follow our moral compass. The United States and other world leaders should intensify their efforts to find a peaceful, political solution to end the bloodshed, not add more violence to a tragic civil war. The president needs to hear from us and be supported for his courage and willingness to pause and hear from the nation as we pursue the best hope for the ordinary men, women, and children of Syria.

    This article was originally published by HuntingtonNews.net.

  • Illegal. Immoral. Dangerous. Why Congress Needs to Say No!

    If I was really optimistic, I’d say that President Obama is hoping that Congress will follow the example of the British parliament – and vote against his proposed military strike on Syria. It would let him off the hook – he could avoid an illegal, dangerous, immoral military assault and say it’s Congress’ fault.

    But unfortunately I don’t think that much optimism is called for. Obama’s speech – not least his dismissal of any time pressure, announcing that his commanders have reassured him that their preparations to fire on command is not time-bound – gives opponents of greater U.S. intervention in Syria a week or more to mobilize, to build opposition in Congress and in the public, and to continue fighting against this new danger. As the President accurately described it, “some things are more important than partisan politics.”  For war opponents in Congress, especially President Obama’s progressive supporters, keeping that in mind is going to be difficult but crucial.

    Obama said he will “seek Congressional authorization” for a military strike on Syria.  He said he believes U.S. policy is “stronger” if the president and Congress are united, but he made clear his belief that he “has the authority to strike without” Congressional support. That’s the bottom line.  The first question shouted by the press as he left the White House Rose Garden was “will you still attack if Congress votes no?”  He didn’t answer.

    There is little question that the Obama administration was blindsided by the British parliament’s vote against the prime minister’s proposal to endorse war. They were prepared to go to war without United Nations authorization, but were counting on the UK as the core partner in a new iteration of a Bush-style “coalition of the willing.” Then NATO made clear it would not participate, and the Arab League refused to endorse a military strike. France may stay in Obama’s corner, but that won’t be enough.

    And Congress was getting restive, with more than 200 members signing one or another letter demanding that the White House consult with them.  Too many pesky journalists were reprinting Obama’s own words from 2007, when then-candidate Obama told the Boston Globe that “the President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”

    All of that led to the drive towards war slowing a bit. But it didn’t stop. And that’s a problem. Because whatever Congress may decide, a U.S. military strike against Syria will still be illegal, immoral and dangerous, even reckless in the region and around the world. Congress needs to say NO.

    ILLEGAL

    However frustrated U.S. presidents may be with the UN Security Council’s occasional refusal to give in to their pressure, the law is clear. The United Nations Charter, the fundamental core of international law, may be vague about a lot of things.  But it is unequivocal about when military force is legal, and when it isn’t. Only two things make an act of war legal: immediate self-defense, which clearly is not the case for the U.S.  The horrific reality of chemical weapons devastated Syrian, not American lives. This is not self-defense. The other is if the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizes the use of force in response to a threat to international peace and security. That’s the authorization President Obama knows he cannot get – certainly Russia and China would veto, but right now a British veto would certainly be a possibility if Cameron wanted to respond to his public. And it’s not at all clear a U.S. resolution to use force would even get the nine necessary votes of the 15 Council members. The U.S. is thoroughly isolated internationally.

    The problem for President Obama is he still is determined to use military force, despite the requirements of international law. He says he doesn’t need that authority – that maybe he’ll use the 1999 Kosovo precedent to “go around” the Security Council. The problem, of course, is that the 1999 U.S.-NATO assault on Serbia and Kosovo was illegal – faced with a sure Russian veto, Bill Clinton simply announced he would not ask for Council permission. Instead, he would get permission from the NATO high command.  But aside from the hammer-and-nail problem (if you’re a hammer, everything looks like a nail; if you’re NATO military leaders looking for re-legitimation, everything looks like it needs a military solution), nothing in international law allows NATO to substitute for the Security Council.  The Charter was specifically designed to make it difficult to get authorization for military force – its whole raison d’etre is to stand against the scourge of war.  So any new decision to go to use military force without Council authority means that use of force is illegal.

    Right now, in Syria, that means that members of Congress have the chance to prevent another illegal U.S. war. If Congress should approve it, likely for political or partisan reasons that have nothing to do with Syria, their vote would mean direct complicity in an illegal and immoral war.

    IMMORAL

    Pentagon officials have confirmed what logic tells us all: every use of military force threatens civilian lives. More than 100,000 Syrians have been killed in this civil war so far, and hundreds more were killed in what appears to be (remember, we still don’t know for sure) a chemical strike last week – U.S. cruise missile strikes won’t bring any of them back, and more important, won’t protect any Syrian civilians from further threat. To the contrary, low-ranking conscript troops and civilians are almost certain to be injured or killed. Reports out of Syria indicate military offices and more being moved into populated areas – that shouldn’t come as a surprise given the nature of the Syrian regime. But the knowledge makes those contemplating military force even more culpable.

    DANGEROUS

    A U.S. military strike on Syria will increase levels of violence and instability inside the country, in the region, and around the world. Inside Syria, aside from immediate casualties and damage to the already shattered country, reports are already coming in (including from al Jazeera, known for its strong support of the Syrian opposition) of thousands of Syrian refugees returning from Lebanon to “stand with their government” when the country is under attack. It could lead to greater support to the brutal regime in Damascus. In Kosovo, more Kosovars were forcibly expelled from their homes by the Serbian regime after the NATO bombing began than had happened before it started; Syrian civilians could face similar retaliation from the government.

    A U.S. strike will do nothing to strengthen the secular armed opposition, still largely based in Turkey and Jordan, let alone the heroic but weakened original non-violent democratic opposition forces who have consistently opposed militarization of their struggle and outside military intervention. Those who gain will be the most extreme Islamist forces within the opposition, particularly those such as the Jubhat al-Nusra which are closest to al Qaeda. They have long seen the U.S. presence in the region as a key recruitment tool and a great local target.

    There is also the danger of escalation between the U.S. and Russia, already at odds in one of the five wars currently underway in Syria. So far that has been limited to a war of words between Washington and Moscow, but with the G-20 meeting scheduled for next week in St Petersburg, President Putin may feel compelled to push back more directly, perhaps with new economic or other measures.

    Crucially, a military strike without United Nations authorization undermines the urgent need for serious, tough diplomacy to end the Syrian war. The U.S. just cancelled a meeting with Russia to talk about negotiations; a couple of months ago, Russia cancelled one. They both must be pushed to meet urgently to arrange and implement an immediate ceasefire and an arms embargo on all sides in Syria.

    And finally, what happens the day after?   If Syria retaliates against a U.S. missile strike – with an attack on a U.S. warship, or a U.S. base in a neighboring country, or on U.S. troops in the region, or against Israel…. do we really think the U.S. will simply stand back and say “no, this was just a one-time surgical strike, we won’t respond”?  What happens when that inevitable response pushes the U.S. closer towards direct full-scale involvement in the Syrian civil war?

    The word to Congress now must be – you got the vote.  That’s important. Because now you can use that vote to say NO to military action.

    SO WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?

    First thing, stop this false dichotomy of it’s either military force or nothing.  The use of chemical weapons is a war crime, it is indeed what Secretary Kerry called a “moral obscenity.”  Whoever used such a weapon should be held accountable. So what do we do about it?

    • First, do no harm.  Don’t kill more people in the name of enforcing an international norm.
    • Recognize that international law requires international enforcement; no one country, not even the most powerful, has the right to act as unilateral cop.  Move to support international jurisdiction and enforcement, including calling for a second UN investigation to follow-up the current weapons inspection team, this one to determine who was responsible for the attack.
    • Recommend that whoever is found responsible be brought to justice in The Hague at the International Criminal Court, understanding that timing of such indictments might require adjustment to take into account ceasefire negotiations in Syria.
    • President Obama can distinguish himself powerfully from his unilateralist predecessor by announcing an immediate campaign not only to get the Senate to ratify the International Criminal Court, but to strengthen the Court and provide it with serious global enforcement capacity.
    • Move urgently towards a ceasefire and arms embargo in Syria. Russia must stop, and must push Iran to stop arming and funding the Syrian regime. The U.S. must stop, and must push Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan and others to stop arming and funding the opposition, including the extremist elements. That won’t be easy – for Washington it may require telling the Saudis and Qataris that if they don’t stop, we will cancel all existing weapons contracts with those countries.  (As my colleague David Wildman has said, why don’t we demand that the Pentagon deal with arms producers the way the Dept of Agriculture deals with farmers – pay them NOT to produce weapons. And then the money can be used to retool their factories to produce solar panels instead of Tomahawk missiles, and the workers stay on the job….)
    • Stand against further escalation of the Syrian civil war by voting NO on any authorization for U.S. military strikes.

    This article was originally published by Mondoweiss.

  • Contra Attack Syria (Excerpt)

    The rationale for an American-led attack on Syria is mostly expressed as follows:

    –America’s credibility is at stake after Obama ‘red line’ was crossed by launching a large-scale lethal chemical weapons attack; doing nothing in response would undermine U.S. global leadership;

    –America’s credibility makes indispensable and irreplaceable contributions to world order, and should not jeopardized by continued passivity in relation to the criminal conduct of the Assad regime; inaction has been tried for the past two years and failed miserably [not clearly tried—Hilary Clinton was avowed early supporter of rebel cause, including arms supplies; recent reports indicate American led ‘special forces operations’ being conducted to bolster anti-Assad struggle];

    –a punitive strike will deter future uses of chemical weapons by Syria and others, teaching Assad and other leaders that serious adverse consequences follow upon a failure to heed warnings posted by an American president in the form of ‘red lines;’

    –even if the attack will not shift the balance in Syria back to the insurgent forces it will restore their political will to persist in the struggle for an eventual political victory over Assad and operate to offset their recently weakened position;

    –it is possible that the attack will unexpectedly enhance prospects for a diplomatic compromise, allowing a reconvening of the U.S.-Russia chaired Geneva diplomatic conference, which is the preferred forum for promoting transition to a post-Assad Syria.

    Why is this rationale insufficient?

    –it does not take account of the fact that a punitive attack of the kind evidently being planned by Washington lacks any foundation in international law as it is neither undertaken in self-defense, nor after authorization by the UN Security Council, nor in a manner that can be justified as humanitarian intervention (in fact, innocent Syrian civilians are almost certain to loom large among the casualties);

    –it presupposes that the U.S. Government rightfully exercises police powers on the global stage, and by unilateral (or ‘coalition of the willing’) decision, can give legitimacy to an other unlawful undertaking; it may be that the United States remains the dominant hard power political actor in the region and world, but its war making since Vietnam is inconsistent with the global public good, causing massive suffering and widespread devastation; international law and the UNSC are preferable sources of global police power than is reliance on the discretion and leadership of the United States at this stage of world history even if this results in occasional paralysis as evidenced by the UN’s failure to produce a consensus on how to end the war in Syria;

    –U.S. foreign policy under President Barack Obama has similarities to that of George W. Bush in relation to international law, despite differences in rhetoric and style: Obama evades the constraints of international law by the practice of ‘reverential interpretations,’ while Bush defied as matter of national self-assertion and the meta-norms of grand strategy; as a result Obama comes off  as a hypocrite while Bush as an outlaw or cowboy; in an ideal form of global law both would be held accountable for their violations of international criminal law;

    –the impacts of a punitive strike could generate harmful results: weakening diplomatic prospects; increasing spillover effects on Lebanon, Turkey, elsewhere; complicating relations with Iran and Russia; producing retaliatory responses that widen the combat zone; causing a worldwide rise in anti-Americanism.

    There is one conceptual issue that deserves further attention. In the aftermath of the Kosovo NATO War of 1999 there was developed by the Independent International Commission the argument that the military attack was ‘illegal but legitimate.’[1] The argument made at the time was that the obstacles to a lawful use of force could not be overcome because the use of force was non-defensive and not authorized by the Security Council. The use of force was evaluated as legitimate because of compelling moral reasons (imminent threat of humanitarian catastrophe; regional European consensus; overwhelming Kosovar political consensus—except small Serbian minority) relating to self-determination; Serb record of criminality in Bosnia and Kosovo) coupled with considerations of political feasibility (NATO capabilities and political will; a clear and attainable objective—withdrawal of Serb administrative and political control—that was achieved). Such claims were also subject to harsh criticism as exhibiting double standards (why not Palestine?) and a display of what Noam Chomsky dubbed as ‘military humanism.’

    None of these Kosovo elements are present in relation to Syria: it is manifestly unlawful and also illegitimate (the attack will harm innocent Syrians without achieving proportionate political ends benefitting their wellbeing; the principal justifications for using force relate to geopolitical concerns such as ‘credibility,’ ‘deterrence,’ and ‘U.S. leadership.’ [For an intelligent counter-argument contending that an attack on Syria at this time would be ‘illegal but legitimate,’ see Ian Hurd, “Bomb Syria, Even if it is Illegal,” NY Times, August 27, 2013; also “Saving Syria, International Law is not the answer,” Aljazeera, August 27, 2013]

    This is an excerpt from a blog by Richard Falk

    Richard Falk is Professor Emeritus at Princeton University and Senior Vice President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Even if Assad Used Chemical Weapons, the West has no Mandate to Act as a Global Policeman

    It is true that the UN security council is not a reliable global policeman. It may be slow to take action, or paralysed because of disagreement between members. But do we want the US or Nato or “alliances of willing states” as global policemen either? Unlike George Bush in 2003, the Obama administration is not trigger-happy and contemptuous of the United Nations and the rules of its charter, which allow the use of armed force only in self-defence or with an authorisation from the security council. Yet Obama, like Bush and Blair, seems ready to ignore the council and order armed strikes on Syria with political support from only the UK, France and some others.

    Such action could not be “in self-defence” or “retaliation”, as the US, the UK and France have not been attacked. To punish the Assad government for using chemical weapons would be the action of self-appointed global policemen – action that, in my view, would be very unwise.

    While much evidence points to the guilt of the Assad regime, would not due process require that judgment and consideration of action take place in the UN security council and await the report of the inspectors that the UN has sent to Syria – at the demand of the UK and many other UN members?

    We may agree with John Kerry, the US secretary of state, that the use of gas is a “moral obscenity”, but would we not feel that “a measured and proportionate punishment”, like striking at some missile sites or helicopter bases, is like telling the regime that “you can go on with your war but do stay away from the chemical weapons”? And what is the moral weight of the condemnation by nuclear weapons states of the use of gas as a serious war crime when they themselves will not accept a norm that would criminalise any first use of their own nuclear weapons?

    It is hard to avoid the impression that the political and military developments now in overdrive stem partly from pressure exerted by the rebel side to trigger an American military intervention – by trying to hold President Obama to an earlier warning to Assad that a use of chemical weapons would alter his calculation. Equally, if not more important, may be a need felt by the Obama administration to avoid criticism for being hesitant and passive – and appearing like a paper tiger to countries such as Iran that have been warned that the US will not allow them to have nuclear weapons.

    In 2003 the US and the UK and an alliance of “friendly states” invaded Iraq without the authorisation of the security council. A strong body of world opinion felt that this constituted a violation and an undermining of the UN charter. A quick punitive action in Syria today without UN authorisation would be another precedent, suggesting that great military powers can intervene militarily when they feel politically impelled to do so. (They did not intervene when Iraq used chemical weapons on a large scale in the war with Iran in the 1980s.)

    So, what should the world reaction be to the use of chemical weapons? Clearly, evidence available – both from UN inspectors and from member states – should be placed before and judged by the security council. Even if the council could only conclude that chemical weapons had been used – and could not agree that the Assad regime alone was responsible – there would be a good chance of unanimous world condemnation. Global indignation about the use of chemical weapons is of value to strengthen the taboo.

    Condemnation is not enough. With 100,000 killed and millions of refugees, the civil war itself is a “moral obscenity”. The council must seek to achieve not just an end to chemical weapons use but an end to all weapons use, by a ceasefire. As was planned not long ago by the US and Russia, the council must seek to bring about a conference at which relevant parties and states can form an interim authority. The alternative is continued civil war in Syria and worsening international relations.

    Is the ending of active hostilities totally unrealistic? Let us be clear that the government in Syria, as well as all rebel groups, depends upon a flow of weapons, munitions and money from the outside. Much is reported to come to the rebels from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey; and much is reported to come to the government from Russia and Iran. The supplier countries have leverage. Agreement should be sought, under the auspices of the security council, that all parties that have given such support demand that their clients accept a ceasefire – or risk losing further support.

    This article was originally published by The Guardian.